TCREUR_Public/110801.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, August 1, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 150



A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Penta Investments Extends Validity of Bid


* CITY OF PLOVDIV: S&P Affirms Rating at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable


ANOVO: In Receivership; Seeks Potential Buyers
CASINO GUICHARD: Fitch Affirms Maturity Swap Securities at 'BB'
PICARD BONDCO: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'B+'
SPCM SA: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable


GELDILUX-TS-2007: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B-'
PFLEIDERER AG: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Ratings at 'C'
PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'


EFG EUROBANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating of Covered Bond Program


MCINERNEY GROUP: Shareholders Vote Against Wind Up; Board Resigns
SUPERQUINN: Directors Withdraw Application for Examinership
TALISMAN 7: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCsf'
XTRA-VISION LTD: Exits Examinership Following Parent's Investment
* IRELAND: NAMA Publishes Receivership List


AVONDALE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Junior Tranche Rating to 'Ba1'
TMD FRICTION: Moody's Upgrades CFR to B2; Outlook Stable


BALLARPUR INT'L: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
CANDIDE FINANCING 2005: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class B2 Notes at 'Bsf'
INVISTA BV: S&P Upgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'


POLKOMTEL SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'


BANCA TRANSILVANIA: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB-'


KOLTSO URALA: S&P Assigns 'B/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
STEEL CAPITAL: Fitch Assigns 'BB-'(exp) Rating on US$500MM Notes


BANCO CAM: Moody's Assigns 'D' Bank Financial Strength Rating
BANCO CAM: Moody's Assigns New Ratings to Covered Bonds
FTA SANTANDER: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating on Series C Notes


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: EIB Won't Allow Antonov to Take Ownership


DTEK HOLDING: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'
INDUSTRIALBANK: Fitch Affirms B- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
* KHARKOV CITY: Fitch Affirms Currency Ratings at 'B'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARTIZAN RETAIL: LaSalle Investment Acquires Firm for GBP4.85MM
BENCHMARK SCAFFOLDING: Placed in Administration Using New Name
CARVILL GROUP: Owes Banks GBP83 Million When it Went Bust
EURODIX: Goes Into Administration, Up to 60 Jobs at Risk
EUROPEAN PROPERTY: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes

GA PINDAR: Administrators Cut 31 Jobs at Preston Operations
J & K CAMPBELL: Creditors Balk at Owner's Voluntary Arrangement
LEEDS UNITED: Owner Should Have Submitted Himself for Inquiry
NEMUS II: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Two Classes of Notes
NORTHERN ROCK: Virgin Money Submits Takeover Bid

PECKHAM AND RYE: Administrators in Talks With Potential Buyers
PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: New Chief Confident Club Can Bounce Back
QUINN GROUP: Administrators Force Quinn Family Out of Firm
ROYAL MAIL: EU Commission Begins Probe Into Overhaul
SVM UK ACTIVE FUND: Shareholders to Vote on Liquidation on Aug. 17

TJ HUGHES: GA Europe Acquires Firms' Debt for Undisclosed Amount
* UK: Bankers Keep "Zombie" Companies Alive, KPMG Survey Shows
* UK: NAMA Controls 847 Properties From Collapsed Developers
* UK: FA Must Get Rid of High Debt Levels or Face Regulation
* UK: Number of British Retailers Into Administration Ups 8% in Q2


* Moody's Says Greek Bond Exchange Has Limited Impact on Insurers
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 25 to July 29, 2011



A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Penta Investments Extends Validity of Bid
Lenka Ponikelska at Bloomberg News reports that Penta Investments
Ltd. said it extended validity of its bid for A-Tec Industries AG
through the end of August.

As reported Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 22, 2011,
Bloomberg News related that A-Tec is still an acquisition target
of Penta Investments even after A-Tec's offices were searched on
July 20 by Viennese authorities.  Penta is standing by its
"serious offer for all the assets of A-Tec" and "has extended the
validity of the offer until the end of July," Bloomberg quoted an
e-mail as saying.  Bloomberg said that executives and creditor
trustees are assessing bids for A-Tec's assets.  The company
became Austria's third-biggest insolvency case since World War II
after it filed for bankruptcy protection in October, Bloomberg

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,


* CITY OF PLOVDIV: S&P Affirms Rating at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its ratings outlook on
the Bulgarian City of Plovdiv to stable from negative. The rating
is affirmed at 'BB+'.

The rating on Bulgaria's second-largest city is constrained by
Plovdiv's limited financial predictability, high infrastructure
needs resulting in consistently weak budgetary performance, and
relatively low economic wealth. Nevertheless, Plovdiv benefits
from a favorable debt profile, still adequate liquidity position,
and low contingent liabilities.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Plovdiv's intention to
maintain a substantial level of capital investment will only lead
to moderate deficits after capital accounts, and gradual debt
accumulation over the coming period. We expect liquidity will
remain stable and adequate. Our base-case scenario also assumes
that the city will increase real estate tax rates from 2012," S&P

"If, in line with our upside scenario, the city's management were
to structurally improve its self-funding capacity -- enabling it
to meet its large investment requirements while consistently
maintaining good liquidity and its reliance on long-term debt --
we could raise the rating in the next 12 months. Improved
visibility around the city's long-term financial policies would
also contribute to a positive rating action," S&P said.

"The rating could be lowered if, in our downside scenario, Plovdiv
accelerates its capital-spending program without improving its
self-funding capacity and/or securing a sufficient stream of
capital transfers. This would lead to a faster consumption of cash
reserves and/or large accumulation of debt beyond our base-case
expectation," S&P related.


ANOVO: In Receivership; Seeks Potential Buyers
SeeNews reports that Anovo was placed on Thursday into
receivership by the commercial court of Beauvais, and on Friday
had blocked payments to creditors.

According to SeeNews, during a monitoring period of six months,
Anovo will seek investors or potential buyers and prepare a
restructuring plan.

SeeNews notes that despite an increase in activity in the past few
months, the company has not been able to improve its financial

In the first half of fiscal 2010/11, ending September, the company
reported a loss of EUR7.8 million (US$11.1 million), SeeNews
relates.  Total debt amounts to EUR58.6 million, SeeNews

The company's shares were suspended from trading on July 19,
SeeNews recounts.

Anovo is a French high-tech product after-sales specialist.  The
company employs 5,400, of whom some 1,200 in France.

CASINO GUICHARD: Fitch Affirms Maturity Swap Securities at 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating
at 'BBB-' and Short-term IDR at 'F3'. Fitch has also affirmed
Casino's EUR600 million perpetual preferred constant maturity swap
securities at 'BB'. The Outlook for the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The affirmation of Casino's ratings reflects Fitch's view that the
company will continue to pursue assets disposals to compensate its
acquisitions in 2011 for a total amount of EUR1.7 billion
including GPA's shares (Brazilian food retailer also named CBD;
rated 'A+(bras)/Stable') and Carrefour's Thailand assets. Fitch
expects Casino's credit metrics to remain steady in 2011 and
improve in 2012. The rating affirmation also assumes that the
Monoprix put option is very unlikely to be exercised by Galeries
Lafayette next year.

"Successful execution of Casino's assets disposal plan in order to
maintain the group's current credit metrics is key to maintain the
investment grade rating and Stable Outlook," says Johnny Da Silva,
a Director in Fitch's European Retail Leisure Consumer Products

Fitch forecasts Casino's lease-adjusted net debt to EBITDAR ratio,
proportionally consolidating GPA, at about 3.7x in FY11, below the
agency's threshold of 4x. In 2011, Fitch notes that Casino's
lease-adjusted net debt ratios will be negatively impacted by 0.1x
due to the new hybrid methodology "Treatment of Hybrids in
Corporate and REIT Credit Analysis" published as of July 11, which
negates any equity credit to any hybrid instruments including a
look-back period reference.

Fitch's credit ratios assumes two scenarios: one with Casino
exercising its right to control GPA in June 2012, in which case
Fitch would proportionally consolidate GPA's performance into
Casino's metrics, and a second in which Casino's participation in
GPA is considered as a financial participation. In the latter
situation, the debt impact on credit ratio would be about 0.3x,
but Fitch notes that Casino would then hold a participation
currently valued at EUR3.3bn therefore enhancing the group's
financial flexibility.

However, Fitch's central scenario is that Casino will exercise its
right to control GPA in June 2012. Fitch also notes Carrefour's
('BBB+'/Negative) statement that conditions are no longer in place
to go ahead with a complex transaction that would aim to merge its
Brazilian activities with those of GPA, a transaction that was
considered hostile by Casino.

Fitch expects Casino's overall trading performance to improve in
2011 driven by good performance in Casino's international
operations and perimeter effects. However, Fitch believes that
Casino's operating performance will remain under pressure in
France, notably at Franprix-Leader Price and in the non-food at
Geant Casino. This is due to weak consumer demand, tough
competition and Fitch's expectation that cost inflation will not
be fully compensated by price increases for the full year. Fitch
also notes that Casino has been able to gain market shares in

There is little rating headroom. Fitch computes and monitors
Casino's all-in leverage ratio encompassing all of Casino's off-
balance sheet obligations (mainly put options). This ratio was at
4.16x as of FY10 and Fitch expects it to reach 4.2x in FY11, which
offers limited headroom at current rating levels.

Casino's liquidity remains adequate, albeit reduced after the
recent acquisitions of GPA shares. Fitch expects Casino to
reinforce its financial flexibility in the coming months. As of
June 2011, Fitch estimates that the group had EUR1.5bn of undrawn
available committed bank lines and about the same amount of debt
repayment that mature by end-2012.

Casino's parent company, Rallye, presently has sufficient
liquidity and a favorable debt maturity profile. The agency does
not expect Rallye to significantly constrain Casino's de-
leveraging financial policy in the near term.

PICARD BONDCO: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'B+'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Picard BondCo S.A.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+' with a Stable Outlook. The agency has
also affirmed Picard Groupe SAS' senior secured bank debt rating
at 'BB' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR2' as well as the company's
senior notes rating at 'B-'/'RR6'.

The affirmation reflects the improvement in FY11 operating
results, which confirms the strength of the company's business
profile, and its ability to generate positive free cash flow
(FCF). Revenues grew above Fitch's expectations, helped by the
economic recovery as well as management's successful marketing
initiatives to increase traffic, reflected in a strong 3.6% like-
for-like growth. It was further supported by store openings, with
limited cannibalization of existing sales. Picard has also been
able to improve its EBITDAR margin by 50bps to 18.7%, mainly
through contract renegotiations with suppliers.

Fitch expects top-line growth to remain above economic growth in
the near term, underpinned by continued network expansion and
further market penetration. However, maintaining operating margins
at the FY11 level could be difficult. Fitch believes that pressure
will come from growing food price inflation, combined with a
continued decrease in basket value, as customers remain selective
in their spending in a still fragile economic environment.

Despite this, the agency continues to forecast Picard will be able
to generate adequate FCF due to natural funding from negative
working capital and relatively low capex requirements, ensuring a
healthy liquidity cushion.

The credit profile remains constrained by the high lease-adjusted
leverage of 5.9x (5.6x on a net debt basis). While this is better
than Fitch's expectations, so far it entirely results from the
EBITDAR improvement.

A downgrade could result from reduced sales growth and significant
EBITDA margin erosion combined with a lease-adjusted leverage
above 6.5x and lease-adjusted net interest cover below 1.5x in the
next three years, indicating limited cash generation capacity.

An upgrade is mainly reliant on sustained deleveraging through
debt repayment to a lease-adjusted gross leverage of about 4.5x,
along with an increase in sales, EBITDA and cash generation.

SPCM SA: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the corporate family rating
(CFR) of SPCM SA to Ba3 from B1. The outlook on the rating is


Moody's decision to upgrade SPCM's CFR and probability of default
rating to Ba3 is driven by the overall improvement in the credit
profile of the group. "In particular, the upgrade reflects the
group's solid performance in 2010 and the first quarter of 2011,
as well as its improved financial flexibility, achieved by its
debt refinancing in 2010", says Gianmarco Migliavacca, a Moody's
Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for SPCM.
Moody's positively notes that, following the refinancing, SPCM has
removed the uncertainty surrounding the funding of its medium-term
growth plans following the extension of its debt maturity profile
to 2015 (for syndicated bank facilities) and to 2017 (for its
EUR190 million bond). Furthermore, the rating action also takes
into account the good progress achieved in several growth
projects, namely the Plaquemine plant in Louisiana (US) nearing
completion, that should offer a broader revenue base to support
SPCM's existing debt.

Moody's positively notes the progress made by SPCM in its Enhanced
Oil Recovery (EOR) division, in terms of financial performance and
expansion of capacity in its North American operations, which are
nearing completion. The EOR division, which has continued to
benefit from high oil prices and the continued expansion of North
American shale gas volumes -- reinforced by technological
improvements such as horizontal drilling and fracturing -- has
increased the number of EOR projects being undertaken by the group
to 119 (2008: 86). Whilst inherently more cyclical than the water
treatment business, Moody's believes the EOR division offers
potential upside over the medium term, based on the positive
outlook in North America. In line with this outlook, Moody's
understands that the majority of the increase in capacity in 2010-
12 will stem from the build-out of the Plaquemine facility in
Louisiana, which is expected to supply the EOR division's
expansion over the next five years. The facility is expected to
commence production in the third quarter of 2011, and will be
capable of producing 130 kilometric-tons (kmt) by the end of 2012
-- with flexibility to rapidly scale-up production to around 300
kmt over the medium term.

In order to continue to substantially increase capacity as
planned, SPCM will need to invest a substantial amount of capital
expenditure (capex) in 2011 and, to a slightly lesser extent, in
the following years. Moody's anticipates that SPCM's free cash
flow (FCF) will remain negative in 2011 and for the first half of
2012, and then begin to gradually improve by the end of 2012 as a
result of the expected benefits from the group's capex plan.
Despite SPCM's high capex having a short-term negative financial
impact, Moody's does not expect a deterioration in the group's
leverage ratios. This expectation reflects the strong momentum in
SPCM's EBITDA, as evidenced by the group's continued strong
operating performance in the first quarter of 2011, as well as
expectations of limited need for additional debt to fund its capex

Moody's considers SPCM's liquidity to be good, with EUR83 million
of cash on the balance sheet as of the first quarter of 2011 and
access to approximately EUR97 million under its revolving credit
facility. Indeed, the group's liquidity is strengthened by the
minimal debt repayments scheduled in 2011 (EUR5 million) and 2012
(EUR13.6 million), as well as the committed revolving credit
facility in place until 2015. Moody's would expect SPCM's working
capital requirements to be comfortably covered by this revolving
credit facility and operating cash flows over the next 12 months.
However, Moody's would also expect SPCM's capex-related outflows
to remain significant, especially in 2011 (capex of EUR148
million) and 2012 (EUR87 million), and as such require the group
to continue to generate substantial operating cash flows in line
with management expectations.

Despite today's rating action, SPCM's rating remains constrained
by the group's relatively low EBITDA margins as well as the
increase in its absolute debt levels. Indeed, Moody's does not
envisage any further upward rating pressure over the near term.
However, longer term, positive rating pressure could arise if SPCM
were able to (i) reduce its (Moody's adjusted) leverage to
sustainably below 3.0x; (ii) sustain a retained cash flow
(RCF)/total debt ratio in the high-teens in percentage terms; and
(iii) generate positive FCF in the mid-teens in percentage terms.

Negative rating pressure could emerge if (i) (Moody's adjusted)
leverage increased above 4.0x; (ii) the group's EBITDA margin
decreased below 10%; (iii) its RCF/total debt ratio slipped to the
low teens in percentage terms; or (iv) its FCF/total debt ratio
remained significantly negative in 2012.


The principal methodology used in rating SPCM SA was the Global
Chemical Industry Methodology published in December 2009.

SPCM SA is the holding for the SNF Group. SNF is one of the
world's leading producers of acrylate-based water-soluble polymers
used in water treatment, as well as in mining, pulp and paper and
enhanced oil recovery. The company is family-owned and was formed
as a result of a buy-out of the flocculants business of WR Grace
in 1978. SNF, headquartered in Saint-Etienne, France, reported
revenues of EUR1.4 billion and EBITDA of EUR180 million for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2010.


GELDILUX-TS-2007: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B-'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Geldilux-TS-2007 S.A.'s notes, due

   -- EUR4,500,000 liquidity notes (ISIN: XS0294511760): affirmed
      at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

   -- EUR2,024,400,000 class A notes (ISIN: XS0294513030):
      affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative;
      Loss Severity (LS) Rating of 'LS-1'

   -- EUR21,000,000 class B notes (ISIN: XS0294513113): affirmed
      at 'BB-sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-5'

   -- EUR21,000,000 class C notes (ISIN: XS0294513204): affirmed
      at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-5'

   -- EUR8,400,000 class D notes (ISIN: XS0294513543): affirmed at
      'B-sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-5'

The affirmation reflects the unchanged pool quality and the short
risk horizon of the assets. The Outlook for all notes has been
revised to Stable from Negative to account for the improved
economic environment in Germany. The liquidity notes have been
affirmed in line with the class A notes, as they can withstand
almost the same level of stress as class A notes.

As the transaction is still replenishing, the credit enhancement
of the notes has not changed since last rating action in January
2010. The portfolio composition remains unchanged, with the top 10
obligors accounting for 5.45% of the pool notional, as opposed to
5.09% at the last review. Loans that are added to the portfolio
during the revolving phase are subject to certain replenishment
criteria in the transaction documents, which implies that the
pool's quality and weighted average life are largely the same as
at the time of last review. Fitch performed an obligor coverage
test that shows how many of the largest obligors' defaults can be
sustained by the current credit enhancement. The results produced
by the test were virtually the same as those obtained at last
rating action.

Since the last rating action, cumulative defaults have increased
to 0.21% of the portfolio notional from almost zero. In Fitch's
view, the overall performance of the transaction is stable.

The current ratings of the notes already incorporate Fitch's view
on the transaction's performance with regards to the refinancing
risk of the underlying borrowers if UniCredit Bank AG were to
default. In this scenario, due to the short weighted average life
of the portfolio -- currently 59 days -- the number of obligors
with refinancing problems would accumulate quickly, in the
agency's view. In Fitch's modelling, an assumption of 10% of
borrowers being unable to secure refinancing within a few months
would lead to an interest shortfall on all classes of notes.
Therefore in September 2009, the agency imposed a rating cap on
all rated classes of notes of Geldilux-TS-2007 S.A. equal to
UniCredit Bank AG's Long-term Issuer Default Rating.

This transaction is a cash securitization of short-term loans
predominantly to German small and medium-sized entities. The loans
are originated and serviced by UniCredit Bank AG (rated
'A+'/Stable/'F1+'/Support Rating '1', formerly Bayerische Hypo-
und Vereinsbank AG) on behalf of the seller, UniCredit Luxembourg
S.A. (formerly HVB Banque Luxembourg S.A.).

Fitch has assigned an Issuer Report Grade (IRG) of three stars
("satisfactory") to the publicly available monthly reports on the
transaction. The reporting is accurate and timely. While it
contains various stratifications, the report does not provide loan
level default and recovery information, thus preventing a higher

PFLEIDERER AG: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Ratings at 'C'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Pfleiderer AG's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'C' and its Short-term IDR at 'C'.
Pfleiderer's subordinated hybrid bond, issued by its subsidiary
Pfleiderer Finance B.V., is also affirmed at 'C' with a Recovery
Rating of 'RR6'.

The affirmation follows the announcement that the company's
shareholders have agreed a capital reduction and subsequent
capital increase of up to EUR100 million. Approval on these issues
is a key part of the financial restructuring plan for the group
presented in May 2011 and previously agreed to by the company's

The financial restructuring plan's implementation is not expected
to be completed until late 2011 or possibly Q112. Should the
restructuring plan be completed as currently planned then a
further downgrade to 'RD' would be the next likely rating action.

Fitch also notes that shareholders have the right to appeal the
vote. However, it is not known if dissenting shareholders (the
vote was carried by 93.3% of participating shareholders), intend
to lodge an appeal.

PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Germany-based pharmaceuticals wholesaler PHOENIX
Pharmahandel GmbH & Co. KG to 'BB-' from 'B+'. The outlook is

"At the same time, we raised the issue rating on PHOENIX's
syndicated loan facilities to 'BB-' from 'B+'. The recovery rating
on these facilities is unchanged at '4', reflecting recovery
prospects in the 30%-50% range. We also raised the issue rating on
the EUR506 million senior unsecured notes, due in 2014, to 'B'
from 'B-'. The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '6'
to reflect negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects," S&P related.

"The rating actions stem from PHOENIX's rapid deleveraging,
particularly over the past nine months, and our belief that
PHOENIX should be able to continue to absorb the negative effects
of health care reforms that are currently underway," said Standard
& Poor's credit analyst Olaf Toelke. "Furthermore, we view the
group's financial policy as supportive to the new ratings."

The company's financial debt totaled EUR2.4 billion (about $3.1
billion) at the end of April 2011, PHOENIX's first quarter of
fiscal year ending Jan. 31, 2012.

"PHOENIX was able to repay considerably more debt in fiscal 2011
than we originally expected. The ratio of pension-and-lease-
adjusted net debt to EBITDA decreased to about 4x at the end of
April 2011 from about 7x at the end of July 2010. This was
achieved with the help of planned financial restructuring of 2010,
including new equity, disposals, and repayment of a loan from an
affiliated company to PHOENIX. In addition, there was a
significantly higher cash release from working capital management
than initially expected," S&P said.

Health care reforms, aimed at reducing health care spending via
mandatory drug price cuts, continue to feature prominently in the
major Western European countries. However, this did not
meaningfully affect PHOENIX's operating margins over the past five
years. "This is, in our view, due to the group's favorable
diversification strategy, both geographically and in terms of
gradually increasing retail exposure. In addition, particularly in
view of recent health care reform in Germany, management has
stated its confidence of being able to balance negative effects on
group margins with sales measures and further expansion in
international markets," S&P related.

"In our view, management's financial policy, which includes
cautious investing and nonpayment of dividends over the next three
years, supports the upgrade because it facilitates further
deleveraging," said Mr. Toelke.

Management's new strategic focus on working capital is another
positive factor that has already contributed to considerable
deleveraging over the past two years. "Although working capital
increased somewhat during the first quarter of fiscal 2012, this
is a normal pattern for PHOENIX's wholesaling business, and
we believe that most of the group's efficiency gains are
sustainable," S&P said.

"The ratings are tempered in our view by the group's currently
aggressive financial risk profile and exposure to highly regulated
health care markets. They continue to be supported by drug demand
that is fuelled by aging populations and life-style-related
factors. The ratings are also supported by PHOENIX's positioning
as the leader in European and German wholesale markets, holding
about 17% and 27% market shares," S&P related.

"The positive outlook reflects our belief that PHOENIX should be
able to reduce leverage further over the next two years, if it
maintains its free cash flow levels and assuming that it can
absorb most of the negative effects on cash flows from health care
reforms," S&P related.

"The rating reflects our view that PHOENIX is likely to maintain a
fully adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 4x. A potential
upgrade would likely be consistent with sustainable debt leverage
of about 3.5x," S&P said.


EFG EUROBANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating of Covered Bond Program
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
ratings of the following covered bonds issued under Greek law,
following Moody's sovereign rating action on Greece (July 25,
downgraded to Ca) and the review of the respective issuer ratings:

- Covered bonds issued by EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (Eurobank
  EFG) under its second covered bond program (EFG CB II): Ba3
  placed on review for downgrade; previously on 12 July 2011, Ba3
  confirmed; and

- Covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG) under
  its Global Covered Bond Programme (NBG CB I): Ba3 placed on
  review for downgrade; previously on 12 July 2011, Ba3 confirmed.

The timely payment indicators (TPIs) are "Improbable" for EFG CB
II and "Very Improbable" for NBG CB I.

The covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank A.E. (Alpha) under its
Direct Issuance Covered Bond Programme (Alpha Direct Issuance CB),
the covered bonds issued by Eurobank EFG under its first covered
bond program (EFG CB I) and the covered bonds issued by NBG under
its Covered Bond Programme II (NBG CB II) are not affected by this
rating action.


The reviews of the above covered bonds were prompted by the review
of the relevant issuer ratings, which in turn followed the
downgrade of Greece to Ca from Caa1 (see press releases: "Moody's
downgrades Greece to Ca from Caa1, developing outlook" and
"Moody's places Greek banks on review for possible downgrade"
dated 25 July 2011). Moody's expects the review of the covered
bonds to continue while the issuers' senior unsecured ratings
remain on review.

Moody's says that the review for downgrade of NBG CB I's covered
bonds reflects the fact that they benefit from a 12-month
extension period only, compared with all other Greek covered bonds
that have a 10-year extension period.

For EFG II's covered bonds, the review reflects the vast majority
of loans in the cover pool that are extended to Greek borrowers
and are Swiss franc-denominated. No other Greek covered bond
program has such a high degree of exposure to foreign-exchange

All other variables being equal, the covered bonds of Alpha Direct
Issuance CB, EFG CB I and NBG CB II are more likely to maintain
their current ratings even after a downgrade of the issuer
ratings, due to extension periods of at least 10 years for
principal repayment and their limited FX exposure.

Generally, a downgrade of the issuer ratings negatively affects
the covered bonds through their impact on both the expected loss
method and the timely payment indicator (TPI) framework. In
addition, the rating of a sovereign has an impact on the maximum
rating covered bonds can achieve. A weaker sovereign rating is
likely to lead to deterioration of the future asset performance
and increases the likelihood of a transaction experiencing event


As the issuer's credit strength is incorporated into Moody's
expected loss assessment, any downgrade of the issuer's rating
will increase the expected loss on the covered bonds. The current
minimum over-collateralization levels for the programs are (i)
42.0% for EFG CB II and (ii) 31.0% for NBG CB I. Moody's views
these over-collateralization levels as "committed".


Given the sovereign rating of Ca, Moody's does not currently
assign ratings higher than Ba3 to covered bonds issued by Greek
banks, which represents the lowest point in the TPI table.
Currently, the TPI of "Very Improbable" assigned to NBG CB I
restricts the rating of these covered bonds to Baa3. The TPI of
"Improbable" assigned to EFG CB II would cap the covered bond
ratings at a higher level than they are currently rated. The
ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed to
investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to

The rating assigned to the existing covered bonds is expected to
be assigned to all subsequent covered bonds issued by the issuers
under these programs and any future rating actions are expected to
affect all such covered bonds. If there are any exceptions to
this, Moody's will, in each case, publish details in a separate
press release.


Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: expected loss analysis and TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL) which determines expected loss as a function of the
issuer's probability of default, measured by the issuer's rating,
and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator" (TPI)
which indicates the likelihood that timely payment will be made to
covered bondholders following issuer default. The effect of the

framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain number
of notches above the issuer's rating.


The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI Leeway. The ratings of all Greek
covered bonds have been lowered to Ba3, which represents the
lowest point in the TPI table. Covered bonds of issuers rated
below B3 are not subject to restriction due to the TPI.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances. Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple-notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction of the value of the
cover pool.


The principal methodology used in rating the issuer's covered
bonds is Moody's Approach to Rating Covered Bonds published in
March 2010.


MCINERNEY GROUP: Shareholders Vote Against Wind Up; Board Resigns
Caroline Madden at The Irish Times reports that the board of
McInerney Holdings plc resigned on Friday after a proposal to put
the troubled house-builder into liquidation was rejected by

Rebel shareholder David Nabarro, who owns 21.45% of the group, was
co-opted on to McInerney's board after an extraordinary general
meeting in Dublin city centre on Friday, The Irish Times says.

According to The Irish Times, Mr. Nabarro succeeded in rallying
enough support among shareholders to defeat the board's motion to
wind down the company through a voluntary liquidation.

Of the 50% of shareholders who voted, some 73% rejected the
motion, The Irish Times discloses.

Addressing the egm, The Irish Times relates, chairman Ned Sullivan
said the plc "has run out of cash, has no assets of worth and no
bank facilities."  Its main Irish businesses were in receivership,
the British businesses had been sold as had its Club business in
Spain.  Its remaining Spanish businesses had been placed into
insolvency procedures, Mr. Sullivan said.

Mr. Sullivan, as cited by The Irish Times, said the directors had
exhausted "all possible efforts and options" to rescue the group.

"In this situation, it is not realistic to consider that there is
any equity value for the shareholders," the report quotes
Mr. Sullivan as saying.

On the website, Mr. Nabarro and two associates,
John Garratt and Kevin Lynch, pledged to do their best to bring
about an "equitable resolution of all stakeholders' interests"
upon assuming control of the board. The group also pledged to
examine all actions taken by the board and senior management over
the last five year and to investigate the "ruinous" borrowing
relationship between McInerney and Anglo Irish Bank, The Irish
Times notes.

                          About McInerney

McInerney Holdings plc -- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.

SUPERQUINN: Directors Withdraw Application for Examinership
Sarah Stack, Fiachra O'Cionnaith and Juno McEnroe at Irish
Examiner reports that Superquinn's Directors -- Kieran Ryan, David
Courtney, Terry Sweeney, Bernard Doyle and Jerry O'Reilly --
confirmed that they are withdrawing their application to place the
business into examinership securing 2,800 jobs in the process.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 27,
2011, said Superquinn directors went to court looking
to begin the process of examinership seeking an injunction against
the appointment of receiver to the business.  A separate TCREUR
report on July 20, 2011, citing Reuters, related that Superquinn
was put into receivership by a syndicate of banks, including
Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, and National Irish Bank after
building up debts of more than EUR400 million (US$561 million).
Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson, representatives of
professional services firm KPMG, have been appointed as receivers
to the firm.

Irish Time relates that the withdrawal was a result of Musgrave,
which intends to acquire the chain, announcing a EUR10 million
fund is to be established to reimburse certain creditors of the

In a statement obtained by Irish Times, Superquinn said it
challenged the receivership decision to secure a better outcome
for suppliers.  "With the support fund in place, we now believe
that the receivership process is in the best interests of our
suppliers, colleagues and the many other partners of Superquinn
and are happy to support the process," Superquinn added.

The syndicate of banks also welcomed the decision, according to
Irish Times.  "The decision will protect the Superquinn brand, its
2,800 staff and will ensure that the business can continue trading
as normal in all Superquinn outlets," the syndicate banks said in
a statement, Irish Times relates.

Irish Examiner notes that Gerry Light, of the Mandate trade union,
said the move was in the best interests of the business and all
the stakeholders, particularly its members.

Irish Examiner relates that Agriculture Minister Simon Coveney
said that the multi-million euro fund is a "significant
development" for suppliers.   However, not every small business
connected to Superquinn will be covered and that the dispute
surrounding the supermarket chain had damaged the Irish food
business, he added.

"The fund isn't going to cover all debts, all money owed, but it
is going to cover the majority of money owed through the process.
Hopefully that situation can be improved even further," Irish
Examiner quoted Mr. Coveney as saying.

Superquinn is one of Ireland's largest domestic retailers.  It
employs around 2,800 people in 23 stores around the country.
Superquinn is owned by Select Retail Holdings, which bought the
retailer for EUR350 million in 2005.

TALISMAN 7: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Talisman 7 plc's notes:

   -- EUR579m class A: downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook

   -- EUR87.3m class B: downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook

   -- EUR84.2m class C: downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook

   -- EUR66.5m class D: downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook

   -- EUR47.1m class E: downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; 'RR4'

   -- EUR68.9m class F: downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; 'RR6'

The downgrades are principally driven by the deterioration in the
underlying performance of the Mozart and Wagner loans, which
account for 64.4% of the current loan balance.

The EUR888.3 million Mozart whole-loan was transferred to special
servicing on April 14, 2010 and has subsequently been restructured
to remove the threat of borrower insolvency. This was caused by
the sponsor's guaranteed interest covenant rolling-off in January
2010 which combined with a fall in underlying performance, has
resulted in a loan event of default as the coverage ratio dropped
below 1.0x.

The restructuring has seen the transfer of EUR197 million debt
from the Propco to a new Luxemburg entity -- Sanchez Sarl (in
effect a new borrower), in order to de-lever the Propco. The
Propco will then owe a contingent consideration to Sanchez Sarl
which will be borne from any future Propco profits after payments
to the remaining whole loan.

Fitch regards the restructuring, which has also seen the loan
extended by over three years until April 2015, as neutral, but
views the change of asset manager with enhanced incentive fees as
mildly positive. Fitch remains skeptical about the practicalities
of a new business plan which envisions all properties being sold
in 2014 before loan maturity.

The EUR70.6 million Wagner loan has experienced a fall in value
from EUR104.5 million to EUR53.8 million, and ICR fall to 0.91x.
This was principally due to the expiry of a rental guarantee which
was to cover an initial vacancy rate of 24% by ERV. Fitch believes
the Wagner loan will incur heavy losses if an asset sale is
completed at loan maturity in January 2012.

Eight of the nine loans have Fitch LTVs of over 100%, whilst Fitch
regards the Haydn LTV as 90.6%. As such, the agency does not
believe that any of the loans will be refinanced at their
respective loan maturity dates, five of which fall either on or
before January 2012. This would require the servicer, Hatfield
Phillips (rated 'CPS2'/'CSS3+'), to devise viable de-levering
strategies combining the capture of excess rental income, sponsor
equity injections and scheduled amortization. The credit events,
including loan event of defaults, have led to the principal
waterfall switching to fully sequential, which benefits the
position of senior noteholders.

XTRA-VISION LTD: Exits Examinership Following Parent's Investment
Silicon Republic reports that Xtra-vision Limited emerged from
examinership on Friday after parent company Birchhall Investments
committed to invest EUR8 million in the business.  Birchall
Investments bought the chain from US firm Blockbuster in 2009.

The company's emergence also came after Mr. Justice Brian McGovern
of the High Court approved a survival scheme for the Xtra-vision
chain of stores, The Irish Times reports.

The Irish Time says the High Court deemed the survival scheme,
proposed by the company's examiner, David Hughes, as in the best
interests of creditors, employees and all concerned with the
company.  The news agency adds that the court gave its approval
after being told the scheme had secured approval of most classes
of creditors, including the Revenue Commissioners.

The company has also entered into agreements on leases with
landlords, which will reduce overheads, The Irish Times adds.
Various classes of the company's creditors will receive between
8%t and 90% of what they are owed, the report discloses.

According to Silicon Republic, the company's plans to invest capex
in an online digital content delivery system are at an advanced

Approval of the Scheme of Arrangement on Friday allowed Xtra-
vision to end its period of examinership which it entered on
April 29, 2011.  Mr. McGovern's order takes effect on August 4,
2011, Silicon Republic notes.  The Irish Times notes that the
company will continue to trade as a going concern after its exit.

Xtra-vision now operates 163 stores throughout Ireland and employs
1,200 staff, Silicon Republic discloses.  In the course of the
examinership, the company closed non-trading and loss making
stores, Silicon Republic recounts.

Xtra-vision was granted court protection from creditors last April
after it said it was insolvent and unable to pay its debts as they
fell due, The Irish Times recounts.  David Hughes, of accountancy
firm Ernst and Young, was appointed examiner of Xtra-vision,
The Irish Times disclosed.

The Irish Times says the court was previously told Xtra-vision's
difficulties were caused by factors including falling revenues,
the withdrawal of coverage by two providers of trade credit
insurance to Xtra-vision's suppliers and poor trading figures
caused by the bad weather over Christmas and the new year.  High
rents were also cited as problematic.

Incorporated in 1980, Xtra-vision Ltd operates a chain of video
rental stores.  The company has 180 stores across Ireland
employing 1,300 people.

* IRELAND: NAMA Publishes Receivership List
The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) has published a full
list of properties placed in receivership across Northern Ireland,
the Republic, England, Scotland and Wales.  A full text copy of
NAMA's report is available free at:


AVONDALE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Junior Tranche Rating to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term rating of
the EUR20 million Class A-2 Emergence Offset Notes (junior
tranche), the life insurance-linked notes issued by Avondale
Securities SA, a special purpose Luxembourg societe anonyme
sponsored by Bank of Ireland, to Ba1(sf) from Baa3(sf), and has
assigned a negative outlook to this rating. At the same time,
Moody's affirmed the Baa2(sf) long-term rating of the EUR380
million Class A-1 Notes (senior tranche) with a negative outlook.


The rating action follows Moody's downgrade of the Irish
government bond rating to Ba1 from Baa3. The downgrade of the
junior tranche reflects the linkage between the factors that drive
the sovereign credit profile -- economic strength, institutional
strength, government financial strength and susceptibility to
event risk -- and the notes' credit profile. In particular,
deteriorating government financial metrics could lead to more
volatile financial markets, slower economic growth, and a possible
reduction in persistency, which would be credit negative for the
notes. More specifically, declining financial markets and an
increase in surrender rates would have a negative impact on the
Value-in-Force (VIF) of the securitized book and therefore a
negative impact on the expected loss posed to the noteholders,
especially for the most junior tranche, bearing in mind its
relative small size (EUR20 million), and consequently the junior
tranche was downgraded to Ba1(sf). Moody's affirmation of the
Baa2(sf) rating of the senior tranche reflects however the
relative stability of this larger tranche to these risks.

Moody's rating of the notes continues to reflect a) the role that
Bank of Ireland, as owner of Bank of Ireland Life (originator of
the securitized book of business) and provider of various support
mechanisms and covenants to the transaction, plays within the
issuance, b) the underlying expected loss on the notes, resulting
from the assessment of the expected emergence of the cashflows
from the reference book of policies under a variety of
deterministic stress scenarios, as well as using a Moody's-derived
stochastic model to simulate a wider range of possible outcomes,
c) the transaction's legal structure and d) the financial strength
of the various parties to the transaction, including Bank of
Ireland Life, originator of the securitized book of business.

The negative outlook on both tranches reflect the continuous high
level of uncertainty on the long-term level of lapse rates and
volatility in capital markets. The negative outlook also reflects
the negative outlook on the Irish government bond ratings and on
Bank of Ireland's debt and deposit ratings, the exposure of Bank
of Ireland Life to Irish government bonds and Irish bank deposits,
and the direct and indirect linkages of the notes ratings to the
financial strength of Bank of Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life as
well as to the economic environment prevailing in Ireland.

Commenting on what could change the rating of the Emergence Offset
Notes down, Moody's mentioned either a deterioration of the
financial strength of Bank of Ireland Life, or revised long-term
assumptions (eg higher level of lapses or reduced level of
investment returns) driven by the new economic environment
prevailing in Ireland which would negatively affect the expected
loss of the Notes.

These rating has been affirmed with a negative outlook:

- EUR380,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Emergence Offset Notes
  due 2032 -- long-term secured rating at Baa2(sf).

This rating has been downgraded and assigned a negative outlook:

- EUR20,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Emergence Offset Notes due
  2032 -- long-term secured rating to Ba1(sf) from Baa3(sf).

The last rating action on the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Emergence
Offset Notes was on May 10, 2011, when Moody's confirmed the
ratings of both tranches and assigned a negative outlook to these

The Emergence Offset Notes' ratings were assigned by evaluating
factors believed to be relevant to the credit profile of the Notes
such as (i) the financial strength of Bank of Ireland Life, (ii)
historical performance of the securitized book of business, (iii)
review of independent actuarial report, including assumptions
underlying projected cash flows, (iv) expected loss and
probability of default estimated via stochastic and deterministic
modeling of the cashflows, focusing principally on equity risk,
persistency risk and mortality risk, and (v) other factors
believed to be applicable to the assessment of the
creditworthiness of the transaction, such as a review of the
structural, legal, and regulatory risks.

TMD FRICTION: Moody's Upgrades CFR to B2; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded TMD Friction Group S.A.'s
corporate family rating (CFR) by one notch to B2 from B3. At the
same time, Moody's has upgraded the rating of the company's EUR160
million senior secured notes by one notch to B2 from B3. The
rating outlook is stable.


"Today's upgrade reflects TMD Friction's continued progress in
improving its credit metrics in 2010, as evidenced by strengthened
leverage ratios, such as a debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.3x on a Moody's-
adjusted basis," says Rainer Neidnig, a Moody's Vice President and
lead analyst for TMD Friction. "In addition, we expect TMD
Friction to be able to maintain EBIT margins of close to 5% going
forward, reflecting the company's successful restructuring
measures undertaken in recent years," adds Mr. Neidnig.

TMD Friction recorded a 20% rise in revenues in 2010 supported by
a more favorable automotive industry environment, following the
recent economic crisis. Therefore, the company achieved an EBITDA
of EUR64.9 million compared to EUR3.4 million in 2009, on a
Moody's-adjusted basis. However, free cash flow was negative in
2010 as the increased business activity required higher investment
in net working capital. Moreover, higher capital expenditures to
support growth programs as well as a higher interest cost related
to the 2010 notes issue burdened cash flow generation. As of March
2011, Moody's-adjusted EBITDA on a last-twelve-months (LTM) basis
amounted to EUR63.1 million, which supports Moody's expectations
that TMD Friction will be able to achieve similar earnings levels
in the future, backed up by ongoing healthy market conditions.

TMD Friction's ratings are based on: (i) the group's strong
position in the original equipment market and the aftermarket for
automotive brake pads and linings; (ii) a large share of its
revenues being generated in the usually more resilient
aftermarket; (iii) the company's advanced technologies, which
allow it to supply original equipment manufacturing (OEM)
customers worldwide despite region-specific product requirements;
(iv) the company's established and solid relationships with
automobile manufacturers and auto equipment suppliers; and (v) the
company's enhanced operating performance, which is the result of a
reduced cost base on the back of successful rationalization and
cost cutting initiatives in recent years.

However, the ratings remain constrained by the company's limited
diversification in terms of geography and product scope. In
addition, there is strong competition among suppliers in the
automotive OEM market, which is in turn highly exposed to
fluctuations in the overall economic environment. Moreover,
Moody's expects that TMD Friction's high interest costs combined
with further investments in growth opportunities will pose a
significant challenge to material positive free cash flow
generation. Lastly, the company is also exposed to raw material
price fluctuations (e.g., steel, copper and chemicals) and may be
challenged to recover increasing input costs from customers in a
timely fashion.

The stable outlook is based on Moody's expectation that TMD
Friction can broadly sustain the performance it showed in 2010 and
first quarter 2011. While current leverage ratios would position
the rating in an even higher rating category, Moody's regards the
company's weak track record prior to 2010, as well as the further
potential for M&A activity, as limiting today's upgrade to one
notch. In addition, Moody's still views TMD Friction's financial
flexibility as rather limited and expects that positive free cash
flow generation will remain challenging.

Moody's would consider an additional upgrade for TMD Friction if
the group was able to: (i) persistently generate EBIT-margins
above 6%; (ii) further reduce leverage close to 3x Debt/EBITDA;
and (iii) return to a positive free cash flow on a sustainable
basis. A further upgrade would also require a stronger short term
liquidity situation.

Downward pressure on TMD Friction's ratings would arise should the
company fail to: (i) maintain EBIT-margins of at least 4%; (ii)
return to free cash flow above breakeven; and (iii) maintain
leverage levels at below 4x debt/EBITDA.


   Issuer: TMD Friction Finance S.A.

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to LGD3,
      48% from LGD3, 47%


   Issuer: TMD Friction Finance S.A.

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2 from

   Issuer: TMD Friction Group S.A.

   --  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B2 from B3

   --  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B2 from B3


The principal methodology used in rating TMD Friction Group S.A.
was the Global Automotive Supplier Industry Methodology published
in January 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S.,
Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

TMD Friction is a manufacturer of brake pads and linings based in
Luxembourg. The company generated EUR637 million of revenues in
2010. Thereof 41% were generated by the IAM segment, 28% by OES
and 31% by OEM. While expanding abroad TMD Friction is strongly
reliant on the European home market which accounted for 85% of
2010 revenues. However, given the number of cars produced in
Europe that are exported, management estimates the group's revenue
exposure to Europe to be closer to 76%. TMD Friction was bought by
Pamplona Capital Management out of an administration process in
April 2009. TMD Friction's management also holds an equity
interest in the company.


BALLARPUR INT'L: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating to Ballarpur International Graphic Paper
Holdings B.V. (BIGPH). The outlook is stable.

"The rating on BIGPH reflects the company's sizable capital
expenditure (capex) and negative free operating cash flow, its
exposure to volatility in pulp and paper prices, and intense
competition in the domestic paper market," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Suzanne Smith. "BIGPH's dominant domestic market
position and healthy growth prospects temper these weaknesses."

"We assess BIGPH as a core subsidiary of Ballarpur Industries Ltd.
(BILT; BB-/Stable/--). BIGPH accounts for more than 70% of BILT's
consolidated revenues, assets, and EBITDA. We anticipate that BILT
will retain majority ownership of and management control over
BIGPH. We have therefore equalized the rating on BIGPH with that
on BILT," S&P related.

"BIGPH's financial risk profile is aggressive, in our view. We
estimate the company's ratio of debt to total capital at about 50%
and its ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA at about 4x for the
fiscal year ending June 2012," S&P said.

"We estimate its capex to be more than US$700 million over the
next three to four years. We believe that the company will fund
its capex in fiscal 2012 via a proposed perpetual capital issue
and internal accruals. In later years, the company is likely to
fund capex with a mix of internal accruals, a possible equity
issuance, and debt," S&P related.

"We consider BIGPH's proposed hybrid issue to have intermediate
equity content," said Ms. Smith. "This means we would treat 50% of
the principal amount of the issue as equity and the rest as debt
while calculating the company's financial ratios."

"We assume the issue won't exceed 15% of total capitalization.
Standard & Poor's does not rate the proposed issue. Nevertheless,
according to our criteria on hybrid securities, 'intermediate'
equity instruments that are subordinated to senior obligations and
include some form of payment deferral clause are typically rated
up to three notches below our issuer rating," S&P said.

"We expect BIGPH's revenues to grow modestly over two to three
years, its EBITDA margins are likely to be stable at about 20%. We
believe the company's limited pricing flexibility due to intense
competition will offset the benefits of backward integration due
to increased pulp capacity," S&P related.

BIGPH's sizable paper production base, recognized brand name, and
strong distribution network support its favorable market position
in India. The company is also a dominant manufacturer of writing
and printing paper in Malaysia based on volumes.

"We believe BIGPH and BILT have adequate liquidity. The company
intends to spend more on capex in fiscal 2013-2014, but this is
discretionary and would require funding sources that the company
has not yet identified," S&P stated.

CANDIDE FINANCING 2005: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all notes in Candide Financing 2005 B.V., Candide Financing 2006
B.V., Candide Financing 2008 B.V., and Candide Financing 2008-2

"We have reviewed the transactions in light of amended
documentation that reflects our 2010 counterparty criteria
('Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6, 2010). The documents are in
line with our 2010 counterparty criteria, and hence the
ratings are not adversely affected," S&P related.

"Additionally, we have reviewed the performance of the
transactions, which we believe has been stable over the past few
quarters. Delinquencies are stable with only a slight upward
trend, however severe delinquencies (defined in this transaction
as 180+ days in arrears) are at low levels. Credit enhancement has
increased further through amortization since our last review, and
in our view is sufficient to maintain the current ratings on the
notes. As such, we have affirmed our ratings on all notes in these
four transactions," S&P said.

Candide Financing 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2008-2 securitize mortgage
loans originated in The Netherlands by Bank of Scotland (Amsterdam

Ratings List

Class       Rating

Candide Financing 2005 B.V.
EUR1.505 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A          AAA (sf)
B          AA+ (sf)
C          AA (sf)
D          BBB+ (sf)
E          BB+ (sf)

Candide Financing 2006 B.V.
EUR2.016 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A2         AAA (sf)
A3         AAA (sf)
B          AA+ (sf)
C          A+ (sf)
D          BBB (sf)

Candide Financing 2008 B.V.
EUR1.444 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes and
Subordinated Notes

Rating Affirmed

A          AAA (sf)

Candide Financing 2008-2 B.V.
EUR1.279 Billion Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes, Mezzanine
Class B
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Subordinated Class C Notes

Rating Affirmed

A          AAA (sf)

HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class B2 Notes at 'Bsf'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V. and
Harbourmaster CLO 8 B.V.'s notes and removed the ratings from
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Fitch placed the ratings on RWN in September 2009 due to
uncertainty about the treatment of defaulted assets for the
purpose of the overcollateralization (OC) tests and interest
coverage (IC) tests. This was clarified in May 2011, when
amendments to both Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V. and Harbourmaster CLO
8 B.V.'s transaction documents were executed after noteholders of
each class of notes in both transactions passed extraordinary
resolutions approving the amendments.

The amendments mean that defaulted assets would be marked at the
lower of their market value and rating agencies recovery estimates
for the purpose of calculating OC ratios, instead of being marked
at par. This is in line with the agency's original assumptions
when analyzing the transactions, leading to the removal of the

The affirmations reflect the transactions' performance, which is
in line with the agency's expectations since the last review in
April 2011. The agency has assigned Stable Outlooks to the senior
notes rated 'AAsf' and above, reflecting the stabilization of the
underlying assets' performance over the past year. However, Fitch
has assigned Negative Outlooks to the mezzanine and junior notes
because the CLO portfolios remain exposed to further negative
rating migration and defaults, where a key risk for the underlying
leveraged borrowers is refinancing risk, as the amount of debt to
be refinanced increases from 2013 onwards.

The ratings actions are:

Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V.

   -- Class A2 (XS0273887363): affirmed at 'AAsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Stable, 'LS3'

   -- Class A3 (XS0273889229): affirmed at 'Asf', off RWN, Outlook
      Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class A4 (XS0273890664): affirmed at 'BBBsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class B1 (XS0273891639): affirmed at 'BBsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class B2 (XS0273893502): affirmed at 'Bsf', off RWN, Outlook
      Negative, 'LS5'

   -- Class S2 Combo (XS0273896273): affirmed at 'Asf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative

   -- Class S4 Combo (XS0273897917): affirmed at 'BBsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative

   -- Class S5 Combo (XS0273900992): affirmed at 'BB+sf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative

Harbourmaster CLO 8 B.V.

   -- Class A2 (XS0277549969): affirmed at 'AAsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Stable, 'LS3'

   -- Class B (XS0277554886): affirmed at 'Asf', off RWN, Outlook
      Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class C (XS0277555933): affirmed at 'BBBsf', off RWN,
      Outlook Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class D (XS0277559174): affirmed at 'BBsf', off RWN, Outlook
      Negative, 'LS4'

   -- Class E (XS0277559844): affirmed at 'Bsf', off RWN, Outlook
      Negative, 'LS5'

INVISTA BV: S&P Upgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on INVISTA B.V. to 'BB+' from 'BB-'. At the same time,
Standard & Poor's removed the rating from CreditWatch where it was
placed with positive implications on Feb. 14, 2011.

The upgrade follows several quarters of improving operating
results and significant debt reduction. The rating reflects
Standard & Poor's assessment of INVISTA's stand-alone business
risk profile as weak and its financial risk profile as
intermediate as well as slight uplift for perceived support from
its parent. INVISTA is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
privately held, unrated Koch Industries Inc.

The rating outlook is positive. "We will continue to evaluate
INVISTA's strategic ties to its parent Koch," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Cynthia Werneth. "If we come to regard them
as stronger than we currently do, or if operating results exceed
expectations and cause us to revise our business risk assessment
to fair, we could raise INVISTA's ratings further."

INVISTA is a leading global producer of nylon, spandex, and
polyester fibers and the chemical intermediates that INVISTA and
others use to make them. The company also produces intermediates
used in the manufacture of polyurethane, coatings, solvents, and
rigid foam, as well as nylon engineering polymers for automotive,
electrical, consumer electronics, and sporting goods applications.
INVISTA also holds large positions in downstream applications,
such as fibers used in nylon carpeting and airbags, and benefits
from brands including STAINMASTER(R) carpet fiber and LYCRA(R)
fiber. Nevertheless, most of its products are commodities.

Financial performance has strengthened steadily and significantly
since early 2009. Sales and earnings deteriorated sharply during
the 2008-2009 recession as a result of demand downturn in the
housing, auto, retail clothing, and industrial markets. Annual
EBITDA turned negative in 2008 and 2009 before recovering
strongly. Improvement stems from stronger demand, steps INVISTA
took to substantially reduce capacity across most of its
businesses, and the benefits of more than $2.6 billion that its
owners invested between the third quarter of 2008 and the first
quarter of 2011.

In addition to cyclicality, the business risk assessment reflects
INVISTA's participation in competitive markets such as spandex
that are currently experiencing soft pricing because of supply
additions. Moreover, the company faces erosion in brand premiums
for nylon and carpet fibers, raw material and energy cost
volatility, and periodic raw material shortages. In particular,
the cost of butadiene, a key raw material, is currently high as a
result of refineries cracking lighter feedstocks, which Standard &
Poor's expects to continue. Also, the majority of the company's
intermediates capacity is located along the U.S. Gulf Coast, and
some facilities have sustained hurricane damage in recent years.
The financial risk assessment balances INVISTA's conservative
financial policies, moderate leverage, and strong liquidity
against relatively weak cash flow metrics.


POLKOMTEL SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate
credit rating on Polish wireless telecommunications operator
Polkomtel S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB+', and kept it on CreditWatch,
where it was placed with negative implications on July 6, 2011.

"At the same time, we lowered the short-term corporate credit
rating on Polkomtel to 'B' from 'A-2' and removed it from
CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative implications on
July 6, 2011," S&P stated.

In addition, the 'BBB+' issue rating on the Euro Medium Term Note
(EMTN) program recently established by Polkomtel's finance
subsidiary Polkomtel Finance AB (publ) was kept on CreditWatch,
where it was placed with negative implications on July 6, 2011.

"The rating actions reflect our understanding that Polkomtel is in
the process of raising a meaningful amount of debt to fund its
acquisition by Mr. Solorz-Zak. We understand that the debt
financing -- part of which the banks have already underwritten --
will amount to about Polish zloty (PLN) 13 billion to PLN14
billion in total, including subordinated funds. As a result, we
view Polkomtel's financial policy as no longer adequate for an
investment-grade rating," S&P related.

"On March 31, 2011, Polkomtel reported gross consolidated debt to
financial institutions of about PLN1.1 billion. We understand that
the acquisition of Polkomtel is subject, among other things, to
approval from Poland's Office of Competition and Consumer
Protection," S&P said.

"We also understand that Mr. Solorz-Zak intends to repay
Polkomtel's outstanding notes under the EMTN program in full in
conjunction with the acquisition," S&P said.

"We aim to review the CreditWatch placement within the next three
months, once we have more details on Polkomtel's new capital
structure. We plan to focus our review, in particular, on the
company's post-sale leverage and its prospects for deleveraging
with discretionary cash flow over the medium term. We will also
review the interest on the different debt layers and potential
limitations on shareholder remuneration. We will also consider any
possible business or financial effects of Polkomtel's potential
ownership by Mr. Solorz Zak, who controls large media assets in
Poland," S&P related.

"We could lower the long-term corporate credit rating further,
potentially into the 'B' category, if we were to assess
Polkomtel's financial risk profile as highly leveraged after the
sale," S&P stated.

"We could also lower the issue ratings on the EMTNs to speculative
grade if we were to perceive an increasing risk that the
outstanding notes would not be fully repaid at least at par prior
to the completion of the sale. We could lower the issue rating on
the EMTNs to one or two notches below the corporate credit rating
if we were to assess weaker recovery prospects for noteholders
as a result of the new funding structure," S&P added.


BANCA TRANSILVANIA: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB-'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three Romanian banks' ratings: Banca
Transilvania S.A. (BT; Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
affirmed at 'BB-'), UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A. (UCTB; Long-term
IDR affirmed at 'BBB+') and ProCredit Bank Romania (PCBR; Long-
term IDR affirmed at 'BB+').

The affirmation of BT's ratings reflects its good franchise, well-
diversified and stable funding structure, no reliance on short-
term wholesale funding and comfortable liquidity. It also reflects
the deterioration in its asset quality, average profitability and
improving, albeit still high cost base. BT's IDRs are driven by
its standalone strength and also underpinned by the potential
support from the sovereign, if needed, as reflected by the Support
Floor of 'BB-'. Given BT's nationwide presence and its market
share in Romania, Fitch believes there is a moderate likelihood
that the Romanian authorities would provide support if necessary.
Although BT's asset quality has deteriorated, its non-performing
loan (NPL) ratio (7.8% at end-Q111) was better than the sector
average of 12.7%. BT has a fairly well-diversified loan portfolio
and a relatively low share of foreign-currency loans compared with
the Romanian banking sector.

The affirmation of UCTB's IDR and Support Rating reflect Fitch's
maintained view that the support it can expect to receive from its
ultimate parent Unicredit S.p.A. ('A'/Stable), through its fully
owned subsidiary UniCredit Bank Austria AG ('A'/Stable) remains
high, should it be needed. Its Long-term IDR is constrained by
Romania's Country Ceiling of 'BBB+'. The Viability Rating reflects
rising loan impairment charges, concentrated lending in the
construction and real estate sectors, which exposes the bank to
sector volatility and its reliance on its parent for funding. It
also takes into account its good core profitability, sustained
efficiency and comfortable liquidity. Fitch considers that
achieving good asset quality is UCTB's main challenge. Its NPL
ratio was 11.5% at end-Q111, slightly lower than the sector

The affirmation of PCBR's IDRs and Support Rating reflects Fitch's
opinion that ProCredit Holding AG (PCH, 'BBB-'/Stable), the bank's
main shareholder, remains committed to PCBR and there is a
moderate probability of support forthcoming from PCH given its
financial strength. The affirmation of the Viability Rating
acknowledges the bank's efforts in managing credit risks and
limiting the asset quality deterioration, still adequate
capitalization and good liquidity that to some extent compensate
for low core profitability resulting from structural cost
inefficiency and small franchise.

PCBR's better-than-market asset quality is due to the bank's focus
on financing production rather than consumption, lending more in
local currency relative to the sector, having close contact with
customers and diversified lending. At end-Q111, loans in arrears
of more than 90 days totalled 2.79% of gross loans, still
comfortably covered by reserves (146%). A recent cash capital
injection resulted in regulatory total capital ratio of 14.7% at
end-June 2011, which in Fitch's opinion is adequate taking into
account the provisioning level.

The rating actions are:

Banca Transilvania S.A.:

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB-'

UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A.:

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

ProCredit Bank (Romania):

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook

   -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'


KOLTSO URALA: S&P Assigns 'B/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term and
'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings to Russia-based
regional bank LLC CB Koltso Urala. The outlook is negative.

"At the same time, we assigned a 'ruBBB-' Russia national scale
rating to Koltso Urala," S&P said.

The ratings reflect Koltso Urala's untested business model and
aggressive growth targets, high credit risks in the loan
portfolio, a significant maturity mismatch of assets and
liabilities, and barely moderate capitalization. These weaknesses
are partly offset by the overall improvements in the operating
environment in Russia, benefits for the bank arising from its
connections to the Ural Mining and Metallurgical Co. (UGMK) group,
and Koltso Urala's niche position in the Ural region.

Koltso Urala reported total assets of Russian ruble (RUB) 18
billion (about US$591 million) as of Dec. 31, 2010, based on
International Financial Reporting Standards. It is a small
regional bank that ranks among the five largest banks in
Sverdlovsk Oblast (BB/Positive/--), its home market. However
Koltso Urala is only No. 142 among Russian banks in terms of
assets and its overall market share in a very concentrated Russian
banking sector is less than 1%.

The bank's majority shareholder, with a 61.256% stake, is the
Russian metallurgical company Megnogorsk Copper Sulphate Plant
(MMSK), whose assets totalled RUB3 billion at year-end 2010. One
of the largest metallurgical companies in Russia -- UGMK, which
had RUB208.7 billion in assets as of Dec. 31, 2010 -- owns 15.59%
of Koltso Urala, and the remaining 23.154% is in the hands of
minority shareholders, including the bank's top management.

Although a separate legal entity, MMSK is operationally very close
to UGMK.

"We understand that the bank benefits from the connection with the
UGMK group. Consequently, we include the benefits received from
UGMK and its affiliates and from MMSK in our assessment of Koltso
Urala's stand-alone credit profile. Nevertheless, the ratings do
not include any notches of uplift for extraordinary external
support, either from the shareholders or from the government," S&P

Koltso Urala's asset quality is better than peers'. Its
nonperforming loans (overdue by more than 90 days) represented
1.9% of the loan book as of year-end 2010 and restructured loans
another 2.1%. "However, we believe that recent double-digit growth
and Koltso Urala's unseasoned loan portfolio distort the reported
figures. Koltso Urala's strategy implies continued, aggressive
asset growth that could increase the loan portfolio by at least
50% by the end of 2011. We also expect to see significant
geographic expansion, primarily in the Ural and Siberia regions
and in Murmansk Oblast," S&P related.

"In our view, the bank is exposed to significant credit risk
through uncollateralized corporate loans, which comprised 37% of
total corporate loans as of year-end 2010. The portfolio is very
concentrated, with the top 20 borrowers making up as much as 46.6%
of the loan book and 3x the bank's adjusted total equity as of
Dec. 31, 2010. This is a very high level of concentration, even
compared with similarly rated peers," S&P said.

Koltso Urala's funding profile is dominated by customer deposits,
which account for 92% of total liabilities. "We see a significant
asset and liability mismatch because contractual maturities of
assets are considerably longer than those of liabilities. This
makes the bank vulnerable to adverse changes in system-wide
liquidity," S&P related.

"In view of the bank's aggressive growth targets, we believe its
capitalization is currently barely moderate. The risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio -- as of Dec. 31, 2010 -- was 4.9% before
adjustments for concentration and diversification and 3.9% after
these adjustments (see 'Bank Capital Methodology And Assumptions,'
published Dec. 6, 2010, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit
Portal). The bank's policy of retaining earnings provides it
with some flexibility. However, internal capital generation is
insufficient to support planned asset growth. An expected capital
injection of RUB1 billion in 2011 will only support the growth for
2011, and capitalization will be under pressure from 2012," S&P

"The negative outlook reflects our view of Koltso Urala's
aggressive growth strategy, which makes the bank vulnerable to a
tightening of banking sector liquidity and could put pressure on
its already barely moderate capitalization," S&P related.

"We could consider lowering the ratings, if capitalization fell,
reflected in a RAC ratio of less than 3%, if asset quality
deteriorated and significantly depressed profitability and
capitalization, or if the currently adequate liquidity cushion
reduced significantly," S&P stated.

"We could consider revising the outlook to stable if the bank
improved its market position, while keeping the quality of its
loan portfolio at least in line with the market average. An
outlook revision is unlikely, however, unless the bank reaches at
least moderate capitalization (a RAC ratio exceeding 5%), which we
believe will not be possible without external capital support,"
S&P stated.

STEEL CAPITAL: Fitch Assigns 'BB-'(exp) Rating on US$500MM Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Steel Capital S.A.'s prospective
US$500 million loan participation notes due in 2016 an expected
senior unsecured rating of 'BB-'(exp). The final rating is
contingent upon the receipt of final documents conforming to
information already received.

The sole purpose of issuing the notes is to finance a loan to OAO
Severstal (Severstal, 'BB-'/Stable) as a borrower. Noteholders are
deemed to have accepted and agreed that they are relying solely on
Severstal's credit standing in respect of the payment obligations
of Steel Capital S.A. under the notes.

Severstal is one of the largest Russian integrated steel
producers. The upgrade of its ratings in May 2011 was mainly based
on Fitch's more positive view of the fundamentals of the Russian
steel market and the improvement of Severstal's financial profile,
connected with selling its underperforming North American
facilities at Warren, Wheeling and Sparrows Point in March 2011.

Severstal's core business -- Russian Steel -- benefits from high
self sufficiency in iron ore and coking coal, which allows low-
cost upstream operations. According to Fitch's estimates, the cash
cost of slab production at the Cherepovets steel mill is
comparable with other integrated steel producers and is 40% lower
than the global average.

Gold production contributes to Severstal's higher profitability.
Gold provided 14.5% of Severstal's total Q111 EBITDA, with a 6.5%
share of sales according to company reports.

Fitch views Severstal's liquidity position as acceptable. Negative
free cash flow of US$700 million during 2011-2012 is expected
because of higher capex. This will limit the company's capability
for de-leveraging. The agency estimates net leverage (net
debt/EBITDAR) at 1.0x-1.2x during 2011-2012 compared with 1.28x at

Uncertainty about the company's majority-shareholder strategy for
Lucchini SpA and exposure of Severstal to the weak Russian
business environment with the associated higher-than average
political, business and regulatory risks are constraints on its


BANCO CAM: Moody's Assigns 'D' Bank Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned long and short term debt
and deposit ratings of Ba1/Not Prime and a standalone Bank
Financial Strength of D (mapping to Ba2 on the long-term scale) to
the new entity Banco CAM. This follows the transfer (effective as
of 22 July 2011) of the financial business of the savings bank,
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM) to this new entity. Moody's
rates Banco CAM's dated subordinated debt Ba2 and the government-
guaranteed debt at Aa2. The outlook on all the ratings is

At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn the following ratings of
CAM: (i) the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of D
(which mapped to Ba2 on the long-term scale); (ii) the long and
short term deposit ratings of Ba1/Not Prime; and (iii) the long-
term issuer rating of Ba1.

Banco CAM, a wholly owned subsidiary of CAM, has been created as
part of the savings bank's recapitalization plan, which followed
the failure to create a "cold merger" (SIP) of CAM, Cajastur (Baa2
on review for downgrade, D+/Baa3 negative), Caja Cantabria (Baa2
on review for possible downgrade, D-/Ba3 negative) and Caja
Extremadura (unrated) into Banco Base (for further reference see
Moody's press release on CAM dated 19 April 2011). This
recapitalization plan involves the transfer of CAM's financial
business to a commercial bank, a precondition imposed by the
recent Royal Decree 2/2011 for savings banks if they are to
receive public funds in the form of capital as these institutions
do not have share capital. CAM's role will be to manage the social
welfare projects financed through dividends paid by Banco CAM upon
completion of the transfer; it also acts as the holding company of
Banco CAM. As a result of the completion of the transfer of CAM's
assets and liabilities, the debt obligations of the savings bank
have been assumed by the new entity, Banco CAM. All of CAM's other
ratings have subsequently been withdrawn.

On July 22, 2011 and following the transfer of the financial
business of CAM to Banco CAM, Bank of Spain initiated the
announced restructuring process of the entity (for further details
please see "Moody's downgrades Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo to
Ba1" published on 19 April 2011). At the same time, the state-
owned fund ("FROB", Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the
Banking System) made a EUR2.8 billion capital injection into Banco
CAM and granted a EUR3 billion credit facility to ensure the
liquidity position of the entity. Banco CAM is now governed and
owned by the FROB, which has also taken control of the entity's
board to ensure the accomplishment of the restructuring plan.


Following the transfer of the financial business, the ratings
assigned to Banco CAM are at the same level as those formerly
assigned to CAM. Upon completion of the transfer, Banco CAM is
liable for the deposits and debt obligations of CAM.

The D standalone BFSR -- which maps to a Ba2 on the long-term
rating scale -- incorporates the recent recapitalization, but also
reflects Banco CAM's continuing weak risk-absorption capacity.
Moody's believes that even with the EUR2.8 billion capital
injection made by the FROB, the bank's capital base remains
vulnerable to further expected losses under Moody's scenario
analysis, especially given Spain's uncertain economic outlook and
the uncertainties within the real-estate sector to which Banco CAM
retains a significant exposure. Furthermore, Moody's expects that
this very challenging domestic operating environment is likely to
subdue growth and exert downward margin pressures arising from the
high level of non-earning assets, increased funding costs and
ongoing provision requirements. This is likely to limit internal
capital generation from recurring sources.

Moody's assigned a negative outlook on Banco CAM's standalone BFSR
which reflects the negative pressures stemming from the very weak
operating environment in Spain and the bank's particular exposure
to these pressures. This continues to expose Banco CAM's ratings
to downward pressure stemming from further deterioration in asset
quality, funding metrics and/or profitability.

Following the capital injection by the government, Banco CAM's
senior debt and deposit ratings of Ba1 continue to incorporate
Moody's consideration of a moderate probability of systemic
support for the bank that results in a one-notch uplift from its
standalone credit strength. The outlook on the senior debt and
deposit ratings is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on
the Kingdom of Spain's Aa2 bond rating and the negative outlook on
Banco CAM's standalone credit profile.


Downward pressure would be exerted on Banco CAM's standalone
credit strength because of (i) greater-than-expected deterioration
in its risk-absorption capacity and further depletion of its
recently increased capital levels; and/or (ii) deterioration of
Banco CAM's current liquidity position, especially if it should
face any restrictions accessing central bank liquidity or any
signs of a change in deposit flows.

Banco CAM's senior debt and deposit ratings benefit from systemic
support. These ratings are therefore (i) linked to the
creditworthiness of the Spanish government; and (ii) exposed to
any further reduction of Moody's current systemic support
assumption. A downgrade of the Spanish government could also exert
downward pressure on Banco CAM's debt and deposit ratings. The
bank's debt and deposit ratings are also linked to the standalone
BFSR, and any change to the BFSR would likely also impact these

An improvement in Banco CAM's standalone BFSR could exert upward
rating pressure on its debt and deposit ratings. This could be
driven by the longer-term benefits of the restructuring that
should lead to (i) stronger corporate governance; (ii) greater
efficiency of cost structures; (iii) an in-depth revision of risk
management practices; (iv) reduction of its exposure to real-
estate and related assets; and (v) better access to capital. An
improvement in the economic and overall operating environment
could also positively affect Banco CAM's BFSR and its senior debt
and deposit ratings.


The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Alicante, Spain, CAM had total assets (unaudited)
of EUR72.5 billion as of end-March 2011.

BANCO CAM: Moody's Assigns New Ratings to Covered Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on the
mortgage covered bonds (Cedulas Hipotecarias or CHs) and public-
sector covered bonds (Cedulas Territoriales or CTs) transferred to
Banco CAM (rated Ba1/NP/D, negative outlook) from Caja de Ahorros
del Mediterraneo (CAM):

- Mortgage covered bonds assumed by new Banco CAM: Baa1, new

- Mortgage covered bonds issued by CAM: Baa1, withdrawn for
  reorganisation; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on review
  for downgrade on 19 April 2011

- Public-sector covered bonds assumed by new Banco CAM: A3, new

- Public-sector covered bonds issued by CAM: A3, withdrawn for
  reorganisation; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on review
  for downgrade on 19 April 2011


The rating actions were prompted by the effective transfer on 22
July 2011 of the financial business of CAM to Banco CAM.

Banco CAM, a wholly owned subsidiary of CAM, has been created as
part of CAM's recapitalization plan, which followed the failure to
create a "cold merger" of four savings banks into Banco Base (for
further information see Moody's press release on CAM dated 19
April 2011).

The recapitalization plan -- involving the transfer of CAM's
financial business to a commercial bank -- is a precondition
imposed by the recent Royal Decree 2/2011 for savings banks, if
they are to receive public funds in the form of capital, as these
institutions do not have share capital.

On July 22, 2011 and following the transfer of the financial
business of CAM to Banco CAM, Bank of Spain initiated the
announced restructuring process of CAM (for further details see
"Moody's downgrades Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo to Ba1"
published on 19 April 2011). At the same time, the state-owned
fund ("FROB", Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking
System) made a EUR2.8 billion capital injection into Banco CAM and
granted a EUR3 billion credit facility to ensure the liquidity
position of the entity.

Banco CAM is now governed and owned by the FROB, which has also
taken control of the entity's board to ensure that the
restructuring plan is implemented.

CAM's role will be to manage the social welfare projects financed
through dividends paid by Banco CAM, following the completion of
the transfer; it also acts as the holding company of Banco CAM. As
a result of the completion of the transfer of CAM's assets and
liabilities, Banco CAM has assumed CAM's debt obligations,
including the existing CHs and CTs.

Moody's understands that the new cover pool backing Banco CAM's
CHs is CAM's former total mortgage pool and has therefore taken a
view on CAM's former pool. Moody's has sufficient information on
this pool to assess its credit quality.

Likewise, Moody's understands that the new cover pool backing
Banco CAM's CTs is CAM's former total public-sector pool.
Therefore, Moody's has taken a view on CAM's former pool. Moody's
has sufficient information on this pool to assess its credit

The mortgage covered bonds constitute direct, unconditional and
senior obligations of Banco CAM and are secured by the issuer's
entire mortgage loan pool (excluding securitized loans).

The public-sector covered bonds also constitute direct,
unconditional and senior obligations of Banco CAM and are secured
by the issuer's entire domestic and EEA public-sector loan pool.

The new ratings take into account these factors:

(1) The credit strength of Banco CAM (Ba1/NP/D).

(2) The structure created by the transaction documents in
    combination with the legal framework for Spanish mortgage and
    public-sector covered bonds.

(3) The credit quality of the assets securing the payment
    obligations of the issuer under the covered bonds. All the
    cover assets covering the CHs are residential or commercial
    mortgages originated in Spain. Most of the assets covering the
    CTs are loans to Spanish regional and local governments, or
    companies owned by such entities.

(4) Sizeable amounts of over-collateralization. For mortgage
    covered bonds: on a statutory level this is 25% based on the
    eligible cover pool, and total over-collateralization as of
    end-March 2011 was 214.9%. The over-collateralization level
    needed to maintain the current rating is 16.5%. For public-
    sector covered bonds: on a statutory level this is 42.9%, and
    the over-collateralization as of end-March 2011 was 177.9%.
    The over-collateralization level needed to maintain the
    current rating is 6.5%.

Moody's has assigned a TPI of "Probable" to the CHs and "Probable-
High" to the CTs.

The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed to
investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to

The ratings assigned to the existing CHs and CTs is expected to be
assigned to all subsequent covered bonds issued by Banco CAM under
these programs and any future rating actions are expected to
affect all such covered bonds. If there are any exceptions to
this, Moody's will in each case publish details in a separate
press release.


Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: expected loss analysis and TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL) which determines expected loss as a function of the
issuer's probability of default, measured by its rating of Ba1,
and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer

Mortgage covered bonds:

The estimated Cover Pool Losses for this program are 41.6%. This
is an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models in the event
of issuer default. Cover Pool Losses can be split between Market
Risk of 19% and Collateral Risk of 22.6%. Market Risk measures
losses as a result of refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral Risk measures losses
resulting directly from the credit quality of the assets in the
cover pool. Collateral Risk is derived from the Collateral Score
which for this program is currently 33.8%.

Public-sector covered bonds:

The estimated Cover Pool Losses for this program are 27.5%. This
is an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models in the event
of issuer default. Cover Pool Losses can be split between Market
Risk of 19.9% and Collateral Risk of 7.6%. Market Risk measures
losses as a result of refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral Risk measures losses
resulting directly from the credit quality of the assets in the
cover pool. Collateral Risk is derived from the Collateral Score
which for this program is currently 15.2%.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a TPI which indicates the
likelihood that timely payment will be made to covered bondholders
following issuer default. The effect of the TPI framework is to
limit the covered bond rating to a certain number of notches above
the issuer's rating.


The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI Leeway. Based on the current TPI
of "Probable" and "Probable-high" for the mortgage covered bonds
and public-sector covered bonds, respectively, the TPI Leeway for
both programs is two notches, meaning the issuer rating would need
to be downgraded to B1 before the covered bonds are downgraded,
all other things being equal.

A multiple notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances. Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction of the value of the
cover pool.

For further details on Cover Pool Losses, Collateral Risk, Market
Risk, Collateral Score and TPI Leeway across all covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's EMEA Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. These figures are
based on the most recent reporting by the issuer and are subject
to change over time.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco CAM was "Rating
Approach to Covered Bonds Rating Methodology", published in March
2010. Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

FTA SANTANDER: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating on Series C Notes
DBRS Inc., (DBRS) has assigned the following ratings to notes

-- EUR1,440 million Series A rated AAA (sf)
-- EUR360 million Series B rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- EUR359.7 million Series C rated C (sf)

The receivables securitized in the transaction consist of
obligations arising under mortgage loans to individuals secured by
residential properties.  The loans in the portfolio have a loan to
value greater than 80%. The mortgages were originated by Banco
Santander SA.

The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

    * The transaction's capital structure and the form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

    * Relevant credit enhancement in the form of subordination, a
reserve fund and excess spread.  Credit enhancement levels are
sufficient to support DBRS projected expected cumulative net loss
(CNL) assumption under various stress scenarios for each Series of

    * Santander's capabilities with respect to originations,
underwriting, servicing, and financial strength.

    * The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
Servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral.

    * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of the
transaction documents.

    * The legal structure and presence of legal opinions
addressing the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the
consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: EIB Won't Allow Antonov to Take Ownership
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that the European
Investment Bank said it will bar Russian banker Vladimir Antonov
from investing in Saab Automobile as long as the struggling
Swedish carmaker owes the bank money.

"The EIB confirms that the loan to Saab was made available under
the condition that Vladimir Antonov not get the opportunity to
take ownership in Saab," Bloomberg quotes Par Isaksson, a
spokesman for the European Union's lending arm, as saying on
Thursday.  "This decision stands."

Mr. Isaksson, as cited by Bloomberg, said the EIB decided to
prevent Mr. Antonov and informed the Swedish government of that
decision in 2009 when the carmaker first applied for the loan,
declining to give a reason for the rejection.  Saab owes EUR217
million (US$310 million) to the EIB, Bloomberg discloses.

Saab was forced to halt production in April amid a cash shortage,
Bloomberg recounts.  The company on July 21 said it is negotiating
payment and delivery terms with suppliers and aims to restart
manufacturing in the week of Aug. 29, Bloomberg relates.  It is
also trying to raise more cash, including from Mr. Antonov who
aims to invest EUR100 million in Saab, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Lars Carlstrom, a spokesman for
Mr. Antonov, said the banker may report the EIB decision to the
European Commission and will "weigh opportunities for legal
action" against the bank and the Swedish government.

"The EIB and the government have pretended for months to consider
our application to let Antonov in.  This charade has probably cost
Saab a billion kronor," Mr. Carlstrom, as cited by Bloomberg,

Johanna Martin, spokeswoman for Swedish Industry Minister Maud
Olofsson, said the government is not making a decision on
Mr. Antonov until it hears from the EIB and Saab's former owner
General Motors Co., Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg notes that Mr. Carlstrom said Mr. Antonov's investment
in Saab would be in the form of working capital, letter of credit
and shares.  According to Bloomberg, he said Mr. Antonov would cap
his stake in Swedish Automobile at below 30%.

With an annual production of up to 126,000 cars, Saab's current
models include the 9-3 (available as a convertible or sport
sedan), the luxury 9-5 sedan (also available in a sport wagon),
and the seven-passenger 9-7X SUV.  As it prepared to separate from
General Motors, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection in February
2009.  A year later, in February 2010, GM sold Saab to Dutch
sports car maker Spyker Cars for about US$400 million in cash and


DTEK HOLDING: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'
Fitch Ratings has revised five Ukrainian companies' Outlooks to
Positive from Stable, following the agency's rating action on
Ukraine's sovereign ratings. Ukraine's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) were affirmed at 'B' and
Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'. Ukraine's Country Ceiling
was affirmed at 'B'.

The rating actions are:

DTEK Holding Limited

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable. The rating remains
      constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'.

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable

   -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';
      Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

   -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook

   -- National senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'

Metinvest B.V.

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable. The rating remains
      constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable

   -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';

   -- Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

   -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)' ; Outlook

   -- National Short-term rating: affirmed at 'F1+(ukr)'.


   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable. This rating remains
      constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook

   -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';

   -- Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. Outstanding bonds are jointly
      guaranteed on a senior basis by several group subsidiaries,
      including OJSC Myronivsky Hliboproduct, the group's
      intermediate holding company. Guarantors collectively
      represent in excess of 90% of MHP's consolidated revenues
      and total assets.

OJSC Myronivsky Hliboproduct (MHP S.A.'s 99.9% owned subsidiary)

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable. This rating remains
      constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook

Kernel Holding SA

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable. This rating remains
      constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'.

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook

INDUSTRIALBANK: Fitch Affirms B- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has revised Ukraine-based Industrialbank's (INB)
rating Outlook to Negative from Stable and affirmed its Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'. At the same time, the agency
has affirmed Bank Khreschatyk's (Khreschatyk) and Pivdennyi Bank's
(PB) Long-term IDRs at 'B-'with Stable Outlooks.

The revision of the Outlook on INB's foreign-currency IDR reflects
Fitch's concerns about sustainability of the bank's business model
following the changes in the shareholding structure of its related
party, Zaporizhstal (ZS, a large domestic steel producer). In July
2011, Metinvest agreed to purchase a 25% stake in ZS from INB's
shareholders, with an option to acquire the remaining 25% within a
year. This change in shareholding is particularly important for
INB in light of the bank's significant focus on servicing of ZS
and its counterparties, which comprised at least half of INB's
credit exposure and corporate customer accounts. Fitch believes
that the expected disposal of stakes in ZS held by INB's
shareholders will likely result in an eventual withdrawal of ZS-
related business from the bank. This will lead to compression of
INB's already relatively small balance sheet and narrow franchise,
and will force the bank to re-examine its business model.
INB's non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased somewhat in absolute
terms by end-Q111 (compared with end-H110), although they remained
a still considerable 12.4% of the portfolio. In addition, a
substantial 48% of loans were restructured/rolled-over and only
about a third of this amount was connected with routine
prolongations to ZS's suppliers and customers. INB's liquidity is
currently adequate and the bank had solid capital adequacy (27.5%
under local requirements). That said, the quality of capital is
compromised by high volume of related-party and relationship-based
lending and largely dependent on due recoverability of these

Khreschatyk's ratings continue to reflect its poor profitability,
high borrower concentrations, asset quality concerns associated
with a high share of renegotiated/rolled over loans, and low loss
absorption capacity afforded by its capital position. However, the
ratings also reflect Khreschatyk's limited exposure to foreign
currency and retail lending, its participation in lower-risk
municipal programs, stable client funding and comfortable
liquidity. NPLs and restructured loans accounted for 9.2% and 49%
of gross loans, respectively, at end-Q111. However, Fitch notes
that nearly a third of restructured loans related to state-owned
and municipal organizations, where adequate recoveries could be
expected, in Fitch's view. NPL coverage by loan-impairment
reserves was adequate, at 95% at end-Q111 to local GAAP, but weak
of 15% for NPLs plus rolled-over/restructured loans. Fitch
estimates that Khreschatyk could have increased its loan loss
reserves to the maximum of about 15% of loans without breaching
the local regulatory capital adequacy limit of 10%. A planned
equity injection of UAH200 million in H211 would boost regulatory
capital by 27%. However, further capital increases may be required
should the performance of restructured loans be worse than
management's current expectations. The liquidity position remains
comfortable, underpinned by the deposit growth, with highly liquid
assets (cash and equivalents, repoable securities, net inter-bank
funds up to 30 days) covering 20% of customer deposits at end-
Q111.  PB's ratings reflect significant risk concentrations in its
loan portfolio, a large proportion of foreign currency lending
(47% of loans), limited loss absorption capacity and the still-
challenging operating environment. The ratings also consider PB's
stable niche franchise in its home region and comfortable
liquidity. PB reported NPLs at 5.8% of the total loan book at end-
Q111, significantly below the sector average. However, this share
is diluted by a high 35% share of restructured/rolled-over loans.
Impairment reserves accounted for a modest 7.8% of loans at end-
Q111 (local GAAP). Fitch estimates that PB would be able to
reserve up to a further 8% of the portfolio before its capital
adequacy ratio breached regulatory limits. In view of the
magnitude of rolled-over/restructured exposures and high risk
concentrations, this should be viewed as limited loss-absorption
capacity. PB's liquidity cushion remained adequate at end-4M11,
covering the deposit base by 26%, and the bank had no borrowings
from wholesale debt markets at end-H111, implying zero refinancing

The rating actions are:


   -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable

   -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Bank Khreschatyk:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-';
      Outlook Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB-(ukr)'; Outlook

Pivdennyi Bank:

   -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

   -- Support rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

* KHARKOV CITY: Fitch Affirms Currency Ratings at 'B'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine's City of Kharkov's Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings at 'B', Short term foreign
currency rating at 'B' and National Long-term rating at 'AA-
(ukr)'. The Outlooks on the city's Long-term ratings are Stable.
The city's ratings factor in the improved macroeconomic
conditions, reduction of political risks, sufficient liquidity,
and an adequate budgetary performance in 2010 that is expected to
improve in 2011. The ratings also consider the city's rigid
operating expenditure and proposed increase in direct debt.

Fitch notes that positive rating action is subject to an upgrade
of the sovereign's ratings, followed by the city's ability to
record operating margin at about 10% and containment of direct
debt below 20% of current revenue. Conversely, an operating margin
below 5%, coupled with significant deterioration of debt and debt
coverage ratios, would put negative pressure on the ratings.

Fitch expects the city's economy to benefit from continued growth
of national GDP in 2011, which is projected to expand by 4.5% yoy.
Kharkov's economy is diversified across manufacturing and
services, and supported by a large number of companies. The city
was positively affected by the rebound of the national economy --
Ukrainian GDP increased by 4.2% yoy in 2010. The positive
macroeconomic environment was beneficial for the city's tax base
expansion, and consequently boosted its operating revenue by 15.6%
in 2010. National and local elections pressured operating
expenditure, which increased by 17% yoy in 2010.

Fitch expects a moderate improvement in the city's operating
performance in 2011, driven by continued growth of the tax
revenue, with full-year operating balance of about 9%-10% of
operating revenue. Kharkov's operating margin hovered at 5%-6% in
2009-2010, as it was negatively affected by the financial crisis.
The city's operating expenditure remains rigid as inflexible
current transfers and personnel salaries amounted to 77.1% of opex
in 2010.

Direct debt of the city moderately increased in 2010 from a debt-
free position, as the city contracted bank loans of UAH103m for
public transportation improvement. Fitch expects a further
increase in the city's direct debt in 2011 up to UAH300m when
major infrastructure projects for the EURO 2012 championship will
commence. The agency notes that the city's direct debt after the
proposed increase of the debt stock will remain manageable at less
than 10% of current revenue.

Kharkov is located in north-east Ukraine and is the country's
second-largest city. With 1.447 million people, it accounts 3.2%
of the national population. The city accounted for estimated 3.4%
of national GDP in 2009.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARTIZAN RETAIL: LaSalle Investment Acquires Firm for GBP4.85MM
Rachel Loxton at EveningTimes reports that the Artizan retail
centre in Dumbarton, a troubled shopping centre, has been bought
for GBP13million less than the former owners paid for it.

The Artizan retail centre in Dumbarton -- home to shops including
New Look, Peacocks, Wilkie and Rider -- has been taken over by
London-based LaSalle Investment Management for GBP4.85 million,
EveningTimes notes.

The town centre facility was put on sale last October for just a
third of the GBP17.8 million prices paid in 2006 by former owner
Jermon, the report notes.

BENCHMARK SCAFFOLDING: Placed in Administration Using New Name
UK Construction News reports that Benchmark Scaffolding Ltd was
placed in administration using a new name, BSL Realisations 2011
Ltd.  Benchmark was swiftly back in business, the report says.

Insolvency specialists from Smith & Williamson and lawyers from
Lawrence Graham worked together to save the company from its
financial difficulties, with a funding injection from turnaround
investor RCapital, according to UK Construction News.

UK Construction News notes that the restructuring has helped save
more than 350 jobs and ensured the continuation of building works
at the Olympic site in Stratford.

Benchmark Scaffolding is one of the largest scaffolding companies
in the southeast.  It has a management team of around 30 and
approximately 350 scaffolders.  The company was established in
1995 by managing director Rob West.

CARVILL GROUP: Owes Banks GBP83 Million When it Went Bust
BBC News reports that an administrator report revealed that
Carvill Group owed banks around GBP83 million when it was placed
into administration in May.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 23,
2011, BBC News reports that Carvill Group is to go into
administration and that Carvill Group Limited, Carvill (Scotland)
Limited and Carvill (Newcastle) Limited would all be affected.
BBC News related that the group blamed the "adverse economic
climate" for the move.

BBC News notes that the administrator report said the Ulster Bank
and Northern Bank can expect "a significant shortfall" because of
the fall in the value of the firm's assets.  BBC News relates that
smaller unsecured creditors are unlikely to get any of what they
are owed, which is estimated at GBP2.3 million.

The creditors included:

  -- a County Antrim plastering firm owed GBP80,000,
  -- a Belfast architect who is owed GBP94,000, and
  -- transport company Translink is owed GBP118,000.

BBC News notes that the administrator said Carvill had seen
"unprecedented" growth between 1995 and 2007, but that the
business came under increasing pressure from 2007 when the
property price bubble burst.  The report relates that the collapse
in house sales reduced Carvill's income while interest payments on
the firm's loans continued to mount.

Carvill Group is a construction firm.  It has been involved in
projects in Germany, as well as Northern Ireland, England and

EURODIX: Goes Into Administration, Up to 60 Jobs at Risk
The Evening Telegraph reports that Eurodix has gone into
administration putting up to 60 jobs at risk.  The report relates
that the company has appointed administrators Pitman Cohen
Recoveries to find a buyer for the business.

An unnamed spokesman said that between 40 and 60 staff will lose
their jobs at the site in Morley Way unless a buyer can be found
by August 5, according to The Evening Telegraph.

The Evening Telegraph notes that the decline of the firm has been
blamed on the rising price of fruit from international suppliers
coupled with the constant driving-down of prices by supermarkets,
Eurodix's main customers.

A spokesman said: "We are just in a very difficult trading
environment.  We are fruit importers serving the supermarket
sector at a time when there are increased pressures on the supply
and pressure from the supermarkets on pricing.  We have been
squeezed out of the industry after decades of trading.  It's very
much a global supply business now, which is different from how it
was five to ten years ago as there are a lot more emerging
markets.  It means the fruit producers are taking the better
option for them, in other words the best prices get the product.
[Thus,] we're paying more for the product but at the same the
supermarkets want to pay less during the current financial

Peterborough-based Eurodix is a fruit importing firm.

EUROPEAN PROPERTY: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
European Property Capital 4 PLC's class A, X, B, C, and D notes
following their full repayment.

The sole remaining loan securitized in this transaction repaid in
full at its maturity date on July 15, 2011. The cash manager
applied the repayment proceeds on the subsequent note interest
payment date to fully redeem the notes on July 20, 2011.

These were the last outstanding notes in this transaction, after
the class E notes prepaid last year.

At closing in October 2006, European Property Capital 4 acquired
two senior loans secured on 19 properties in the U.K. Both these
loans and all of the notes that they secure have now repaid in
full. The notes' legal final maturity date was scheduled for July

Ratings List

European Property Capital 4 PLC
GBP481.885 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class               Ratings
            To                   From

Ratings Withdrawn

A           NR                   AA+ (sf)
X           NR                   AA+ (sf)
B           NR                   A+ (sf)
C           NR                   BBB+ (sf)
D           NR                   BB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.

GA PINDAR: Administrators Cut 31 Jobs at Preston Operations
Scarborough Evening News reports that administrators have made 31
jobs redundant at the GA Pindar & Son's Preston operation.

GA Pindar went into administration on July 26, almost three weeks
after the company was put up for sale as a result of reporting
losses of GBP1.4 million, according to Scarborough Evening News.
The report relates that the administrators also sold GA Pindar's
web offset and bindery division to York Mailing, based in
Elvington, which secured the future of GA Pindar's largest
operation, and saw all 255 staff transferred as part of the deal.

However, the report notes, GA Pindar was still left with another
177 employees working in smaller divisions of the company,
including the Preston site, and a further 47 Scarborough staff
working for a confidential printing operation.

Scarborough Evening News discloses that an unnamed spokesperson
for administrator KPMG said they were continuing to trade the
Preston site, while they seek a buyer.

KPMG also confirmed that GA Pindar owed trade creditors in excess
of GBP6 million, and that it is too soon to say whether there
would be a return to unsecured creditors.

The GA Pindar pension scheme, which had a deficit of GBP19.5
million according to recent statements, is also an unsecured
creditor, the report relays.  The Pension Protection Fund has been
notified of the company's administration.

Worries also arose surrounding the future of 40 workers on
temporary contracts, who were transferred to York Mailing as part
of the takeover, Scarborough Evening News says.  The report
relates that following the takeover York Mailing stated printing
will continue in Scarborough at the Pindar site and under the
Pindar name.

The U.S. operations continue to trade as normal and are not
affected by the administration.

Meanwhile, Yorkshire relates that 16 jobs have been saved Printers
Halstan Holdings, based in Buckinghamshire, have bought GA Pindar
& Son's Aylesbury cartography business and all its employees will
transfer as part of the deal.

GA Pindar Preston runs a sheet-fed printing facility and employs
72 people in total.  The firm produces a variety of work including
magazine and catalogue covers.  The Pindar Group also owns the
worldwide print shop franchise Alphagraphics Inc, headquartered in
Salt Lake City, Utah in the US, and Pindar North America, the
multi-channel software provider.

J & K CAMPBELL: Creditors Balk at Owner's Voluntary Arrangement
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that J & K Campbell
owner Ken Campbell was confronted by angry creditors as he tried
to persuade them to accept a deal paying a percentage of his

Belfast Telegraph relates that the meeting at Belfast's Wellington
Park Hotel went on for nearly three hours as around 30 creditors
questioned Mr. Campbell and insolvency practitioner Walter Lismore
-- the nominee for the proposed voluntary arrangement -- over the
proposal.  According to Belfast Telegraph, creditors voted against
it, resulting in the meeting being adjourned.  A meeting will be
held this week when another vote will be taken, Belfast Telegraph

Eight creditors have already started legal action over debts
ranging from GBP5,000 owed to Balloo Hire Centres to GBP61,000
owed to PACC Engineering, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

The document containing the proposed arrangement, which has been
seen by the Belfast Telegraph, reveals that Ulster Bank is owed
GBP2.1 million by his business J & K Campbell, while 200 unsecured
creditors are owed GBP1.69 million.

Provisionally, the agreement could see them getting back 37% of
what they are owed, Belfast Telegraph says.  According to Belfast
Telegraph, a spokesman for insolvency practitioners Lismore Group
said: "The eventual outcome for creditors will depend on the
amounts realized from the assets and the liabilities admitted by
the supervisor after he completes his investigations."

A summary of accounts in the document shows net profit at J & K
Campbell fell from GBP587,557 in 2008 to GBP77,725 last year,
while 35 employees at the business are already on notice of losing
their jobs, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

According to Belfast Telegraph, giving his proposal in the
document, Mr. Campbell stated: "Trading conditions have recently
become increasingly difficult and profit margins have been
steadily decreasing.  Creditors have been reducing credit terms
available to the business and this has impacted on the business
cashflow.  A number of creditors have recently issued statutory
demands against me which I am not in a position to discharge."

If creditors do accept the proposal this week, the business will
be wound down gradually, Belfast Telegraph notes.  The alternative
is for Mr. Campbell to be adjudicated bankrupt, in which case
trading would cease right away and creditors are unlikely to get
paid at all, Belfast Telegraph says.

Belfast Telegraph notes that a report by Mr. Lismore attached to
the document said the arrangement will see a dividend being paid
to the creditors which would not be available if Mr. Campbell is
made bankrupt.

J & K Campbell does building work for clients including Henderson
Group, Herbel Properties and South Eastern Health & Social Care

LEEDS UNITED: Owner Should Have Submitted Himself for Inquiry
Yorkshire Post reports that Leeds United Association Football Club
Ltd. owner Ken Bates should have submitted himself willing to a
Parliamentary inquiry when a Commons committee investigated
football's governance and, specifically, outstanding questions
about Leeds United's ownership.

Mr. Bates' refusal is one reason why Member of Parliament (MP)s
have suggested a wider inquiry into the finances of Leeds United
since the club went into administration four years ago, according
to Yorkshire Post.

Yorkshire Post notes that while issues of ownership and such like
only pre-occupy fans when their team performs poorly on the pitch,
this latest report is a poor indictment on the state of football's
finances and the way in which the sport is run at the highest
level.  It should be acted upon, the report says.

To their credit, MPs have made a number of recommendations that
will help football regain some of its lost prestige, Yorkshire
Post says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Europe in 2007, Richard
Fleming, Mark Firmin and Howard Smith, of KPMG Restructuring, were
appointed May 4, 2007, administrators of Leeds United at the
request of the Club's directors.  Shortly after their appointment,
the joint administrators agreed to sell the business and its
assets to a newly formed company called Leeds United Football Club
Limited, the directors of which are Ken Bates, Shaun Harvey and
Mark Taylor.

Headquartered in Leeds, England, Leeds United Association
Football Club Ltd.  -- is an
English professional football club.

NEMUS II: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Two Classes of Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
NEMUS II (Arden) PLC's class A and B notes. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class C, D, E, and F notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions result from our review of the five remaining
underlying loans. Although the property cash flows for these loans
has been relatively stable since issuance, we believe that loan
recoveries may be put under further pressure if the continued
refinancing difficulties in the current market persist," S&P

"We assumed in our analysis that the servicer -- CB Richard Ellis
Loan Servicing (CBRELS) -- and the B-lenders, when relevant, would
take advantage of the tail period that ends in February 2020, if
necessary, to work out loans in default in order to maximize
recoveries. We also assumed that in a work-out scenario, CBRELS
would divert any amounts due to the B-lenders if the borrowers did
not repay their loans at maturity to eventually reduce the
issuer's exposure to principal losses," S&P said.

              Kirkglade Loan (52% of the Pool)

Secured against an office property in Victoria, London, the
Kirkglade Ltd. loan is the largest loan in the pool, accounting
for 52% of the pool. Nine tenants occupy the property but the John
Lewis Partnership has let most of the spaces until 2031 (break
option date). CBRELS placed the loan on its watchlist following a
breach of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (80.2%) covenant after
the property was revalued in December 2008. Although the
property's value has increased by 16% following its further
revaluation in June 2010, the LTV ratio breach is still
continuing. Consequently, the servicer is holding surplus
rental income in an escrow account. The reported securitized-loan
LTV ratio currently stands at 77.0% and the whole-loan has a final
maturity date of November 2016.

    Fern Trustee 1 and Fern Trustee 2 Loan (17% of the Pool)

Secured against a refurbished office property located in Glasgow,
Scotland, the Fern Trustee 1 Ltd. and Fern Trustee 2 Ltd. loan is
the second-largest loan in the pool, accounting for 17% of the
pool. Three tenants occupy the property, of which Network Rail
Infrastructure and Transport Scotland generate about 94% of the
rental income under leases that expire in 2024 and 2021.

CBRELS placed the loan on its watchlist following a breach of the
LTV ratio covenant (85.5%) after the property was revalued in
April 2009. Although the property's value has increased by 20%
following its further revaluation in June 2010, the LTV ratio
breach is still continuing. Consequently, the servicer is holding
surplus rental income in an escrow account. The reported
securitized-loan LTV ratio currently stands at 86.8% and the
whole-loan has a final maturity date of October 2013.

        Chainmill Properties Loan (16% of the Pool)

Secured against an office property located in London's West End,
the Chainmill Properties Ltd. loan is the third-largest loan in
the pool, accounting for 16% of the pool. Six tenants fully let
the property. Most of the spaces are let by McKinsey and Company
Inc. U.K. until March 2018. "We understand that McKinsey and
Company Inc. U.K. is not in occupation and that it sub-lets its
spaces. The reported securitized-loan LTV ratio currently stands
at 74.1% and the whole-loan has a final maturity date of May
2013," S&P related.

               Oriel Property Loan (9% of the Pool)

Secured against 11 U.K. Somerfield supermarkets, the Oriel
Property Ltd. loan is the second-smallest loan in the pool,
accounting for 9% of the pool. The Somerfield leases are in effect
until September 2036 and benefit from an annual 2.25% fixed rental
uplift. The loan defaulted in January 2009 following the
borrower's failure to discharge additional amortization payments
agreed following an initial LTV ratio breach, which occurred in
June 2008. The LTV ratio breach is continuing. The reported
securitized-loan LTV ratio currently stands at 75.7% and the
whole-loan has a final maturity date of October 2011.

     Carlton House Investments Loan (5% of the Pool)

Secured against three mixed-use commercial properties in Sutton
Coldfield, Birmingham, the Carlton House Investments Ltd. loan is
the smallest loan in the pool, accounting for 5% of the pool.
CBRELS transferred the loan into special servicing in December
2008. At that time, Woolworths -- one of the tenants -- became
insolvent, meaning that there were insufficient funds to make
amortization payments. Since then, the borrower has re-let most of
the vacated spaces.

As of the most recent valuation in April 2009, the reported
securitized-loan LTV ratio is 96.2%, which is in breach of the LTV
ratio covenant of 85.0%. "We understand that CBRELS has negotiated
an amendment to the loan whereby scheduled amortization is being
deferred until 2012 and where the servicer would hold all excess
cash in an escrow account. The loan remains current under the
renegotiated terms and has a final maturity date of October 2014,"
S&P said.

"Taking into account the above analysis of each underlying loan's
refinance and recovery risks, we have lowered our ratings on the
class A and B notes," S&P said.

"We are of the opinion that the relatively high gearing of each
loan may limit the lender's options if the difficult market
conditions persist. However, the presence of junior debt -- in the
form of B-notes -- mitigates the possibility of principal losses
occurring at the issuer level. We therefore believe that the
risk of losses is not imminent for the junior classes of notes and
have subsequently affirmed our ratings on the class C, D, E, and F
notes," S&P related.

At closing in December 2006, NEMUS II (Arden) acquired six loans
secured by 22 properties in the U.K. Since closing, one loan has
repaid in full. Five loans remain outstanding and the current note
balance is GBP245.2 million (from GBP260.9 million at closing).
The final maturity date of the notes is in February 2020.

Ratings List

Class                Rating
              To               From

GBP260.87 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A             AA- (sf)         AA (sf)
B             BBB+ (sf)        A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C             BBB (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)
E             BB- (sf)
F             BB- (sf)

NORTHERN ROCK: Virgin Money Submits Takeover Bid
Harry Wilson at The Telegraph reports that Virgin Money has
emerged among the bidders for Northern Rock as the deadline
elapsed to make a bid for the nationalized lender.

Several bidders are understood to have submitted formal
indications of interest in Northern Rock on Friday ahead of the
deadline, The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, among the other bidders said to have
made a bid are the Coventry Building Society, financial services
acquisition vehicle Resolution, and mortgage lender the Paragon
Group of Companies.

Advisors to Northern Rock are aiming to identify a buyer for the
business before the end of the year, The Telegraph says.

Northern Rock was fully nationalized in early 2008 after the then
Labour Government was unable to find a private buyer willing to
take on the collapsed lender, The Telegraph recounts.  The state's
interest in the company is currently controlled by UK Financial
Investments, which also manages the taxpayer's holdings in Lloyds
Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland, The Telegraph discloses.

Northern Rock is also likely to attract interest from private
equity bidders and US buyout firm JC Flowers is also expected to
have made a formal indication of interest in the business, The
Telegraph notes.

Operating some 70 branches across the UK, Northern Rock offers
residential mortgages and savings accounts, including variable
cash and fixed-rate Individual Savings Accounts (or ISAs, which
are tax-exempt savings accounts offered in the UK), as well as
bonds and traditional savings accounts.  The bank also offers
financial planning and mortgage-related insurance and life
assurance products through third-party providers.  Northern Rock
was formed in early 2010 after being spun off from its troubled
predecessor of the same name.  The remaining company was
restructured and renamed Northern Rock (Asset Management) plc.

PECKHAM AND RYE: Administrators in Talks With Potential Buyers
BBC News reports that administrators are in talks with potential
buyers of Peckham and Rye.

The firm's 11 stores were put up for sale earlier this month after
the company went into administration, BBC News relates.

"We can confirm that discussions are ongoing with potential
purchasers," BBC News quoted Administrators Zolfo Cooper, as

BBC News notes that the administrators said only the Peckham
group's stores were affected and that it's other businesses, such
as a cookery school in Edinburgh, continued to trade as normal.

Zolfo Cooper was appointed on July 14 after Peckham and Rye
experienced "a number of financial setbacks".

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 18,
2011, Evening Times reports said part of Peckham's has gone under
with the closure of three stores.  Peckham and Rye, the oldest
part of the upmarket family-owned business, has gone into
administration, according to Evening Times.  The report related
that shops at Lenzie, Newton Mearns and Raeburn Place, Edinburgh
have been closed with only the Raeburn Place and Newton Mearns
stores sold.

Glasgow-based Peckham and Rye is one of Scotland's biggest
specialty delicatessen chains.

PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: New Chief Confident Club Can Bounce Back
Plymouth Herald reports that Plymouth Argyle's new Chief
Executive-in-waiting David Jones has revealed he is confident the
hard-up League Two club will make it back to the Championship.

The plan is for Mr. Jones, formerly finance director at
Southampton, to be confirmed in his post when the club exits
administration and splits into two companies -- one to run the
football team and the other to own the stadium and to develop
property assets, according to Plymouth Herald.

Plymouth Herald recalls that Mr. Jones has been working at Home
Park since December, when he was appointed as a financial
consultant to Argyle on an initial short-term basis.  The report
relates that Mr. Jones remained at Home Park after the club
entered administration at the start of March, working alongside
acting chairman Peter Ridsdale.

Mr. Jones will be responsible for the financial side of the
football club, a role which includes ticket sales and commercial
matters, Plymouth Herald discloses.

"I'm really quite excited about it.  I have been in football for
13 years with Southampton, where I was finance director. . .When I
came here in December, it felt like a club in administration.  But
I think there's massive potential here and I can't see why Argyle
should not have a go at getting back into the Championship,"
Plymouth Herald quoted Mr. Jones as saying.

The report notes Mr. Jones, however, conceded it had been
difficult to get the financially-ailing club to the point where
they could attract new shirt sponsors.  The report notes that the
club obtained a deal with WH Bond and Sons and is for an initial
12 months with an option to extend.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 8,
2011, the High Court has placed Plymouth Argyle Football Club has
been placed into administration.  Brendan Guilfoyle, Christopher
White and John Russell of The P&A Partnership have been appointed
as administrators.  The TCR-Europe, citing The Guardian, reported
on March 3, 2011, that Plymouth Argyle directors have been warned
that the club needs an injection of around GBP3 million if it is
not to be placed into administration.  Peter Ridsdale, who is
acting as an independent adviser to Argyle's board, has told the
directors that the club does not have the money to meet its
liabilities and that they are "in denial" about the seriousness of
its problems, The Guardian related.  The joint administrators said
have received a number of offers to acquire the club and are now
pursuing a funding facility linked with an exclusivity agreement,
the TCR-Europe reported on March 16, citing SkySports.

                     About Plymouth Argyle

Plymouth Argyle Football Club, commonly known as Argyle, or by
their nickname, The Pilgrims, is an English professional football
club based in Central Park, Plymouth.  It plays in Football League
One, the third division of the English football league system.

QUINN GROUP: Administrators Force Quinn Family Out of Firm
Clare Weir at Belfast Telegraph reports that startling allegations
about the "de-Quinning" of the Fermanagh insurance and building
empire have been made by tycoon Sean Quinn's family.

A statement claimed that, in recent weeks, four members of the
family have been either sacked, made redundant or constructively
dismissed, according to Belfast Telegraph.  The report relates
that the statement from the Quinns said that the family is
"extremely concerned" that they are being targeted "in a most
unjust and discriminatory manner" by court-appointed
administrators Grant Thornton and the nationalized Anglo Irish

The e-mail alleged that Ciara Quinn was sacked while on maternity
leave, and then subjected to two "wholly inappropriate" emails
from the administrators, Belfast Telegraph notes.  The report says
that sources close to the Quinn family say that Ms. Quinn, who had
been pursuing a return to work, is instead preparing to sue both
the insurance arm of the company and one of its administrators.

Belfast Telegraph notes that the statement also claims that Sean
Quinn Jr. is the only person to be made "compulsorily redundant"
from an initial workforce of 2,600 and is initiating High Court
proceedings.  The report discloses that Brenda Quinn has already
commenced proceedings against Quinn Insurance, claiming
"victimization in the workplace".

Meanwhile, Belfast Telegraph notes that it is alleged that Colette
Quinn was asked to resign last week from various positions within
the Quinn Group, while on maternity leave.

Belfast Telegraph recalls that Sean Quinn's troubles began in 2008
when he was fined EUR3.4 million (GBP3 million) by Ireland's
financial regulator for using an inter-company loan to fund a 15%
stake in Anglo Irish Bank.  That gamble lost him nearly EUR1
billion.  Last year the Republic's Financial Regulator put the
Quinn Insurance arm into administration because its liabilities
outweighed its assets, Belfast Telegraph relates.

Anglo Irish took control of the rest of the businesses in the
Quinn Group earlier this year, including cement and glass-making,
Belfast Telegraph adds.

Quinn Group ROI Ltd. controls its cement, building materials,
glass and other manufacturing businesses in Ireland and Britain
through its ownership of Quinn Group, an operating entity
registered in Northern Ireland.

ROYAL MAIL: EU Commission Begins Probe Into Overhaul
BBC News reports that the European Commission has begun an
investigation into whether the UK government's plan to overhaul
the Royal Mail contravenes EU rules on state aid.

According to BBC, the government plans to take on Royal Mail's
GBP8 billion pension deficit and restructure its GBP1.7 billion

BBC relates that the European Commission said it doubted that the
plan did enough to deal with how much it would distort

The UK government said that its plan was in line with EU
guidelines for rescuing firms in difficulty, BBC notes.  It wants
to privatize some or all of the Royal Mail, but needs to sort out
its finances first if a buyer is to be found, BBC states.

Postal Affairs Minister Edward Davey said the investigation had
been expected and was the next step in the government's attempts
to reform the Royal Mail, BBC discloses.

"It is only right that the Commission has opened the State Aid
process to properly investigate the case," BBC quotes Mr. Davey as

"However, we are keen to resolve the case as soon as possible, and
are seeking a resolution by March 2012."

Royal Mail delivers 62 million items to almost 29 million UK
addresses every working day.  The company collects mail from
115,271 post boxes -- often more than once a day -- as well as
from approximately 11,800 Post Offices and more than 80,000

SVM UK ACTIVE FUND: Shareholders to Vote on Liquidation on Aug. 17
The Board of SVM UK Active Fund PLC disclosed proposals to
liquidate the Company and the cancellation of the Listing of SVU
shares of 25p each and their trading on the London Stock
Exchange's main market. A circular is to be posted to SVU
Shareholders today containing the notice of a general meeting.

1. Background

Cyrun Finance Limited ("Cyrun") has acquired approximately 93% of
the issued share capital of the Company.  It was Cyrun's stated
intention that the Company should continue to operate as an
investment trust following its offer, not to wind it up.  However,
as a result of the high level of acceptances that Cyrun received
under its Offer, it is not possible for the Company to continue to
operate as an investment trust.  Cyrun has therefore considered
the liquidation of the Company and requested the board to convene
a general meeting at which a resolution to liquidate the Company
will be proposed.

The Board has therefore convened a general meeting, notice of
which is set out at the end of this document to consider a
resolution to liquidate the Company, to appoint the Liquidators
and to authorize the Liquidators to exercise certain powers in
accordance with the Insolvency Act 1986.

Cyrun served notice under section 979 of the Companies Act 2006 on
June 30, 2011 to acquire compulsorily all Shares which it does not
already own, as a result of which all Shareholders (other than
Cyrun and its nominee) will be entitled to receive 191.2 pence per
Share in cash and will not be exposed to any risk or rewards
arising from variations in the amount of the liquidation

The effect of the Compulsory Acquisition Procedures is that Cyrun
and its nominees will be the sole Shareholders at the time of the
meeting. Cyrun has stated its intention to vote in favour of the
Resolution, the effect of which is that the Resolution will be

2. Cancellation of Listing and trading

The Offer document published by Cyrun containing its Offer for all
the Shares which it did not already owned contained a statement
that a notice period of not less than 20 days would be given of
the cancellation of listing following Cyrun obtaining over 75% of
the Shares in issue or issuing compulsory acquisition notices.

Notice is hereby given of the cancellation of the Listing of
Shares on the Official List and trading in Shares on the London
Stock Exchange's main market, which is expected to take effect on
August 17, 2011 being the date of the General Meeting.  The ISIN
of the Shares is GB0009115444.

3. Net Asset Value and liquidation proceeds

The Company's investment portfolio has been sold in anticipation
of the proposed liquidation.  The Company has settled
substantially all its liabilities, and its net asset value
therefore amounts to GBP59.6 million held in cash or near cash,
being approximately 187.6 pence per Share.

No dividends will be paid prior to the general meeting.

The liquidation proceeds will comprise the cash, less costs of the
liquidation and may be distributed to Shareholders (being Cyrun
and its nominee following the Compulsory Acquisition Procedures)
in one or more installments. .

4. Compulsory acquisition of Shares

Where a bidder acquires over 90% of the shares to which an offer
relates, it has the power under the Companies Act 2006 to acquire
the remaining shares compulsorily at the offer price.

On June 30 2011 Cyrun exercised its right under the Companies Act
to buy the Shares which it did not already own for 191.2p per
Share in cash.  Cyrun will transfer the cash consideration to the
Company''s registrar, Computershare Investor Services PLC on 11
August 2011.

Computershare Investor Services will act as agent for the Company
maintaining a register and holding cash for dissenting
shareholders, if any, and (subject to the action being taken by
Shareholders as set out in the following paragraph) will send
cheques to the relevant Shareholders by first class post, at the
risk of the Shareholders concerned, within 14 days of 11 August
2011 or within 14 working days of the later receipt of
certificates or CREST details.

5. Action to be taken to receive 191.2p per Share

Holders of Shares in certificated form (ie not held electronically
in CREST), should send their certificate(s) with a signed letter
quoting the number of Shares to be acquired (or a Form of
Acceptance) to Computershare, Corporate Actions Projects, Bristol
BS99 6AH, United Kingdom or by hand (during normal business hours)
to Computershare The Pavilions, Bridgwater Road, Bristol BS13 8AE
so as to be received by close of business on August 11, 2011.

If any certificates are not received before August 11, 2011, the
cash consideration due will be held on trust for the relevant
shareholder pending the subsequent receipt of the certificates,
following receipt of which a cheque will be issued within 14
business days.

Holders of Shares in uncertificated form (i.e. in CREST) should
send a letter signed by all authorized signatories to the above
address, quoting the number of shares to be acquired and also the
shareholder's CREST Participant ID and Member Account.  If the
required authorization is not received before August 11, 2011, the
cash consideration due will be held on trust for the relevant
shareholder pending the subsequent receipt of the required signed
letter, following receipt of which a cheque will be issued within
14 business days.

Holders of Shares who did not accept the Offer and have not
applied to the court in respect of all their holding of Shares
before August 11, 2011, or if such application to court is made
and is then dismissed, Cyrun will be entitled and bound to acquire
compulsorily their Shares for 191.2p each.

The cash consideration payable to shareholders will be held for
them on trust, in accordance with section 981(9) of the UK
Companies Act.  Thereafter, it will be transferred to the relevant
shareholders upon their application to Computershare Investor
Services PLC, provided that such application contains details of
the Shares held by them and is accompanied by the relevant share
certificate(s) and/or other document(s) of title.

6. General Meeting

The liquidation of the Company will be considered and voted on as
a special resolution at the General Meeting, which has been
convened for 4:00 p.m. on August 17, 2011.  The notice convening
the General Meeting is set out at the end of this document.  The
General Meeting will be held at the offices of Fairfax I.S. PLC at
46 Berkeley Square, London W1J 5AT.

All Shareholders on the register at close of business on
August 15, 2011 are entitled to attend and vote at the General
Meeting.  In accordance with the Articles, all Shareholders
present in person or by proxy shall upon a show of hands have one
vote and upon a poll shall have one vote in respect of every Share

As Cyrun and its nominees will be the only Shareholders entitled
to attend and vote at the General Meeting (as a result of the
Compulsory Acquisition Procedures), no forms of proxy are being
distributed to other Shareholders.

7. Recommendation

The Board considers that the Liquidation is in the best interests
of Shareholders as a whole and recommends Shareholders who are
eligible to vote to do so in favor of the resolution to liquidate
the Company.

None of the directors holds any Shares, accordingly they will not
vote on the resolution.  However Cyrun (of which I am chairman)
intends to vote in favor of the resolution in respect of its
entire shareholding, which is expected to comprise 100% of the
Company's issued share capital by the date of the General Meeting
as a result of the compulsory acquisition process becoming
effective on 11 August 2011.

8. Circular

A copy of the Circular will shortly be submitted to the National
Storage Mechanism and will shortly be available for inspection at

All enquiries

Carolina Viola
Company Secretary
Tel: (0131) 226 6699

TJ HUGHES: GA Europe Acquires Firms' Debt for Undisclosed Amount
Warrington Guardian reports that liquidation specialists GA Europe
have acquired the debt of department store chain TJ Hughes Ltd for
an undisclosed sum.

TJ Hughes entered into administration on June 30, 2011.  Tom Jack
and Simon Allport from Ernst & Young were appointed as joint

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 6,
2011, Birmingham Mail said that more than 400 West Midland workers
are facing a race against time to save their jobs after 100-year
old department store TJ Hughes collapsed into administration.

Warrington Guardian says the company, which has a shop on Sankey
Street, is currently holding a closing down sale.  The report
notes that GA Europe will work with administrators by trading the
stores to look at the options available.

Ernst and Young had previously hoped that a buyer or buyers could
be found for at least a part of the ailing business, Warrington
Guardian relates.

"Those efforts are continuing but, in view of the trading history,
it is probable that a significant number of the stores will
close," Warrington Guardian quotes a TJ Hughes spokesman as

TJ Hughes was the subject of a management buy-out in 2003 but has
struggled for some time against a difficult market background,
Warrington Guardian recalls.

The business was sold in March this year to turnaround specialists
Endless, Warrington Guardian notes.

Warrington Guardian quotes a GA Europe spokesman as saying that,
"Despite the injection by Endless of significant additional funds
for working capital, TJ Hughes has continued to suffer and its
financial difficulties reached a point where it could no longer
continue to trade solvently."

                       About T J Hughes

Based in Liverpool, United Kingdom, T J Hughes operates discount
department stores, specializing in home and fashion, garden
furniture, fragrance, cosmetics, menswear, womens-wear, toys, and
electrical items.  TJ Hughes operates 57 department stores
throughout the United Kingdom.

* UK: Bankers Keep "Zombie" Companies Alive, KPMG Survey Shows
Norma Cohen at The Financial Times reports that so-called zombie
companies, which can afford to pay their interest bills but not
pay down the debts themselves, are being kept alive on bankers'
books much longer than they normally would.

According to the FT, KPMG, in a survey of 400 "workout" bankers,
found that the average time that it takes to resolve the affairs
of a zombie company has risen to 12-18 months from six to 12
months just two years ago.

Richard Fleming, head of restructuring at KPMG, described these
companies as "stuck in a kind of purgatory" and said that
interviews with bankers show that many lenders are "hoping for a
miracle cure" that will resolve a company's cash flow woes, the FT

"Companies generating marginal profits or losses, together with an
inability to generate sufficient cash to pay down borrowings, are
treading water in terms of meeting their debt obligations," the FT
quotes Mr. Fleming as saying.  "These companies are not
technically bust, but in another interest rate environment they
would be."

The survey offers one clue as to why the nation's insolvency rate
appears to be so much lower in the 2008-09 recession than in that
in the early 1990s despite the fact that the most recent drop in
output is so much deeper, the FT states.  According to the FT,
bankers are apparently willing to allow companies to avoid
insolvency so long as they can cover the interest payments on
their loans.

The survey found that the factors that ultimately trigger a formal
insolvency are a breakdown in the relationship between a company's
managers and its lenders, and a perception of lenders that the
existing management is weak, the FT notes.

The most frequent events that trigger an insolvency or a
restructuring of debt through a pre-pack arrangement are a rise in
interest rates and an increase in the company's working capital
requirements, the FT says.

Mr. Fleming, as cited by the FT, said lenders often pull the plug
when it becomes obvious that the company needs another capital

Zombie companies are most likely to be small- to medium-sized
enterprises, the FT notes.  Nearly half of zombie companies have
annual turn-over between GBP3 million (US$4.9 million) and GBP20
million, according to the FT.  That is the group of companies who
have complained the most about access to bank finance and for
which the costs of borrowing are highest, the FT says.

* UK: NAMA Controls 847 Properties From Collapsed Developers
Jim Fitzpatrick at BBC News reports that The Irish government
agency created to manage the toxic property loans of its banks has
revealed details of the billions of pounds of property it controls
in the UK.

According to BBC, the National Asset Management Agency (Nama)
listed 847 properties in the UK and Irish Republic linked to
developers it has forced out of business.

BBC relates that the agency said there would be no fire sale of
cheap properties.

The list includes only those developments that have gone into
receivership, BBC discloses.  Many other developers have signed
agreements with Nama and are continuing to trade under its
supervision, BBC notes.

The agency took control of the bad property debt from Irish banks
during the height of the financial crisis and it is tasked with
maximizing the return to the Irish taxpayer over the long term,
BBC recounts.

The agency has said that it wants to dispose of EUR5 billion of UK
loans in 2011, BBC discloses.  Its annual report listed total UK
assets of about GBP8.5 billion, BBC states.

* UK: FA Must Get Rid of High Debt Levels or Face Regulation
Ed Hammond at The Financial Times reports that Football's
governing body has been told to overhaul the way the game is run
in the England or face the possibility of legislation.

The FT relates that in a report published on Friday, the culture,
media and sport select committee said the Football Association
must rid the sport of its high debt levels and tackle the issue of
financial instability among clubs.

The committee, headed by John Whittingdale, MP for Maldon, made
the key recommendation of introducing a rigorous and consistent
licensing model which would be imposed throughout the country's
professional football clubs, the FT discloses.  According to the
FT, the license would promote "sustainable forward-looking
business plans and underpin self-regulation measures".

"No one doubts the success of the Premier League in revitalizing
English Football.  But it has been accompanied by serious
financial problems throughout the football league pyramid.
Significant changes need to be made to the way the game is run to
secure the future of England's unique football heritage, and the
economic and community benefits it provides," the FT quotes
Mr. Whttingdale as saying.

He added that the FA was the right organization to carry out the
overhaul, but warned that is had some way to go "getting its own
house in order" before it could tackle the problems in the sport,
the FT notes.

The government insists it wants football to run itself and that
legislation is a last resort, the FT states.  But it is concerned
by a number of problems bedevilling the game, including the amount
of debt carried by football clubs, the lack of financial
transparency and the difficulty of establishing the ownership of
some clubs, according to the FT.

* UK: Number of British Retailers Into Administration Ups 8% in Q2
Mark Potter at Reuters reports that consultants Deloitte said the
number of British retailers falling into administration rose 8% in
the second quarter on a year ago and will continue climbing as
consumers are squeezed by rising prices and government cut backs.

Deloitte said that some 43 retailers, including wine chain
Oddbins, home improvements group Focus DIY and fashion chain Jane
Norman, entered administration -- a form of protection from
creditors -- in the March-June quarter, according to Reuters.  "It
is likely that consumer spending will continue to decline this
year, as concerns continue to grow around high inflation,
unemployment and reduced disposable income," Reuters quoted Lee
Manning, restructuring partner at Deloitte, as saying.  "It is
difficult to see where the positive growth will come from in the
next few months.  Inflation has hit retailers hard in the second
quarter and unfortunately we are likely to see retail
administrations increase as the year goes on," he added.

Analysts expect the next pinch point for retail failures to be at
the end of September, when fourth-quarter rents become due. At
that point, many retailers have their worst cash position of the
year, having committed to stock for Christmas, Reuters relays.


* Moody's Says Greek Bond Exchange Has Limited Impact on Insurers
The capitalization of European insurers will be affected to a
limited degree only by the voluntary financing offer that was
extended to the government of Greece (rated Ca, developing
outlook), says Moody's Investors Service in a new report published
on July 27.  The offer by the Institute of International Finance
(IIF) represents the private sector contribution to a new IMF/EU
program for Greece, and is supported by around 30 financial
institutions, including some of the largest European insurance

Although the IIF financing offer will crystallize losses in the
income statements of some insurers, Moody's believes that it will
have a limited impact on the overall capitalization of the
European insurance sector because (i) the sector has limited
exposure to Greek sovereign debt, and (ii) the value of government
bonds for most of the sector is already marked to market.

Moody's estimates that Moody's-rated insurers currently hold a
relatively small portion of Greek government debt, at around EUR10
billion. The holdings are mainly concentrated in continental
European insurers, representing only on average 0.5% of insurers'
investments and around 3% of their shareholders' equity at year-
end 2010 before considering policyholder participation.

The IIF states that institutions participating in the offer should
expect a 21% net present value loss relative to par, based on a 9%
discount rate. However, as most European insurers already mark to
market their Greek government bond exposure, participating in the
offer is unlikely to lead to any additional reduction in
shareholders' equity. In addition, according to most local
regulatory treatments, unrealized losses are already included in
the calculation of solvency capital. Moody's consequently expects
a limited impact from impairments on the sector's available
solvency capital under Solvency I.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 25 to July 29, 2011

Issuer                 Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                 ------    --------  --------     -----

IMMOFINANZ               4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       3.86
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.900   8/18/2025      EUR      65.75
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.160   5/20/2025      EUR      74.79
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.750   4/30/2021      EUR      73.12
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.810   7/29/2025      EUR      60.63
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          4.500   9/28/2035      EUR      75.43

CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600  10/23/2018      EUR      58.23
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   10/9/2016      EUR      67.96
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600   2/26/2019      EUR      57.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.625    2/3/2020      EUR      64.45
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.100   4/20/2020      EUR      59.18
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.350    6/9/2020      EUR      55.62
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.000    6/9/2021      EUR      70.69
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   9/28/2017      EUR      62.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.100   1/29/2018      EUR      63.73
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600   4/23/2018      EUR      60.43
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   2/15/2017      EUR      66.15
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    4/2/2017      EUR      65.45
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    1/4/2017      EUR      66.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         3.750   11/1/2015      EUR      71.05
REP OF CYPRUS            4.750   2/25/2016      EUR      72.54

SAZKA                    9.000   7/12/2021      EUR      60.01

KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR      45.75
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500    2/3/2016      TRY      70.72
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR      62.90
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   3/17/2025      CAD      56.03
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR      68.83
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR      69.81
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.250   6/28/2040      CAD      24.04
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR      45.39
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   9/24/2020      CAD      71.97
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR      55.95
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000   2/27/2018      AUD      74.27

AIR FRANCE-KLM           4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.72
ALCATEL-LUCENT           5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       3.68
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG         6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       6.28
ASSYSTEM                 4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      21.55
ATOS ORIGIN SA           2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      52.75
CALYON                   6.000   6/18/2047      EUR      21.20
CAP GEMINI SOGET         3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      41.42
CAP GEMINI SOGET         1.000    1/1/2012      EUR      42.30
CGG VERITAS              1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      29.92
CLUB MEDITERRANE         6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      20.54
CLUB MEDITERRANE         5.000    6/8/2012      EUR      16.41
CMA CGM                  8.500   4/15/2017      USD      75.40
CMA CGM                  8.875   4/15/2019      EUR      74.00
CMA CGM                  8.500   4/15/2017      USD      80.35
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.910   11/3/2030      USD      74.86
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.850   9/17/2030      USD      73.26
CREDIT AGRICOLE          3.537   1/15/2016      EUR     100.73
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY         1.000  12/23/2024      EUR      63.34
EURAZEO                  6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      57.96
FAURECIA                 4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      29.38
INGENICO                 2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      41.89
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      19.33
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      20.03
NEXANS SA                4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      66.91
NOVASEP HLDG             9.625  12/15/2016      EUR      57.03
ORPEA                    3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.02
PEUGEOT SA               4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      31.76
PUBLICIS GROUPE          1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      48.30
PUBLICIS GROUPE          3.125   7/30/2014      EUR      37.64
RHODIA SA                0.500    1/1/2014      EUR      51.82
SOC AIR FRANCE           2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      20.38
SOITEC                   6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       9.33
TEM                      4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      56.14
THEOLIA                  2.700    1/1/2041      EUR      10.89

EUROHYPO AG              5.560   8/18/2023      EUR      71.25
EUROHYPO AG              6.490   7/17/2017      EUR       5.88
EUROHYPO AG              3.830   9/21/2020      EUR      65.88
HSH NORDBANK AG          4.375   2/14/2017      EUR      69.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR         6.500   3/31/2012      EUR      20.77
L-BANK FOERDERBK         0.500   5/10/2027      CAD      51.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.800   2/23/2037      JPY      70.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.500   1/30/2034      EUR      69.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT          5.250  10/20/2015      EUR      28.61
Q-CELLS                  6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       2.17
QIMONDA FINANCE          6.750   3/22/2013      USD       2.38
TAG IMMO AG              6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       7.96
TUI AG                   5.500  11/17/2014      EUR      74.60
TUI AG                   2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      49.94

ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.057   3/26/2013      EUR      67.74
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.851   9/19/2016      EUR      55.49
ATHENS URBAN TRN         5.008   7/18/2017      EUR      55.59
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.301   8/12/2014      EUR      59.43
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.300   7/25/2030      EUR      39.47
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.900   7/25/2025      EUR      42.19
HELLENIC REPUB           5.000   3/11/2019      EUR      54.50
HELLENIC REPUB           2.125    7/5/2013      CHF      73.00
HELLENIC REPUB           5.200   7/17/2034      EUR      49.50
HELLENIC REPUB           6.140   4/14/2028      EUR      53.25
HELLENIC REPUB           4.590    4/8/2016      EUR      55.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.250   5/18/2012      EUR      75.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.100   8/20/2012      EUR      72.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.506   3/31/2013      EUR      71.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI         7.500   5/20/2013      EUR      69.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.900    7/3/2013      EUR      68.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.427   7/31/2013      EUR      66.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.000   8/20/2013      EUR      62.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.520   9/30/2013      EUR      63.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500   1/11/2014      EUR      62.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500   5/20/2014      EUR      58.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500    7/1/2014      EUR      60.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.985   7/25/2014      EUR      56.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.500   8/20/2014      EUR      57.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.113   9/30/2014      EUR      56.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700   7/20/2015      EUR      57.11
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.100   8/20/2015      EUR      59.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.702   9/30/2015      EUR      54.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700  11/10/2015      EUR      52.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.600   7/20/2016      EUR      57.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.020   9/13/2016      EUR      55.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.225    3/1/2017      EUR      56.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900   4/20/2017      EUR      57.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300   7/20/2017      EUR      56.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.675   10/9/2017      EUR      56.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   7/20/2018      EUR      55.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.000   7/19/2019      EUR      55.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.161   9/17/2019      EUR      54.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500  10/22/2019      EUR      57.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.250   6/19/2020      EUR      59.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900  10/22/2022      EUR      52.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   5/20/2013      EUR      65.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.300   3/20/2026      EUR      49.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500   9/20/2037      EUR      45.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   9/20/2040      EUR      45.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.700   3/20/2024      EUR      48.84
NATL BK GREECE           3.875   10/7/2016      EUR      63.61

AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000    3/1/2030      EUR      44.05
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         4.875   6/29/2017      EUR      71.83
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.580   4/28/2028      EUR      49.55
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000   2/12/2030      EUR      44.08
ALLIED IRISH BKS        12.500   6/25/2035      GBP      24.38
ALLIED IRISH BKS         4.000   3/19/2015      EUR      70.74
ANGLO IRISH BANK         4.000   4/15/2015      EUR      70.37
BANK OF IRELAND          5.600   9/18/2023      EUR      34.63
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000   2/12/2020      GBP      35.67
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000   2/12/2020      EUR      35.25
BANK OF IRELAND          4.473  11/30/2016      EUR      51.63
BANK OF IRELAND          3.585   4/21/2015      EUR      62.63
BANK OF IRELAND          3.780    4/1/2015      EUR      71.90
BANK OF IRELAND          4.000   1/28/2015      EUR      72.04
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.400   11/6/2029      EUR      46.57
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.450    3/1/2030      EUR      46.67
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.360  10/12/2029      EUR      46.36
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.760    9/7/2029      EUR      49.21
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125   3/16/2037      USD      72.46
DEPFA ACS BANK           0.500    3/3/2025      CAD      38.18
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125   3/16/2037      USD      72.45
DEPFA ACS BANK           4.900   8/24/2035      CAD      65.19
EBS BLDG SOCIETY         4.000   2/25/2015      EUR      70.17
IRISH GOVT               4.500  10/18/2018      EUR      69.30
IRISH GOVT               4.400   6/18/2019      EUR      67.31
IRISH GOVT               5.900  10/18/2019      EUR      71.90
IRISH GOVT               5.000  10/18/2020      EUR      67.04
IRISH GOVT               4.500   4/18/2020      EUR      66.10
IRISH GOVT               5.400   3/13/2025      EUR      66.48
IRISH LIFE PERM          4.000   3/10/2015      EUR      68.44
IRISH NATIONWIDE         6.250   6/26/2012      GBP      75.50

BTPS                     4.000    2/1/2037      EUR      72.66
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.500    3/5/2016      EUR      74.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.400   9/17/2017      EUR      70.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000   11/2/2016      EUR      74.00
CITY OF TURIN            5.270   6/26/2038      EUR      72.06
CO BRAONE                4.567   6/30/2037      EUR      74.72
COMUNE CASTELNOV         4.047  12/31/2030      EUR      67.39
COMUNE DI MILANO         4.019   6/29/2035      EUR      67.50
INTESA SANPAOLO          1.750   1/19/2026      EUR       3.06
REP OF ITALY             2.200   9/15/2058      EUR      61.70
REP OF ITALY             2.000   9/15/2062      EUR      55.85
REP OF ITALY             4.850   6/11/2060      EUR      73.68
REP OF ITALY             1.850   9/15/2057      EUR      55.09
REP OF ITALY             2.870   5/19/2036      JPY      66.33
SARDINIA REGION          4.022  11/28/2035      EUR      73.09
TELECOM ITALIA           5.250   3/17/2055      EUR      73.98

ARCELORMITTAL            7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      27.73
ESPIRITO SANTO F         6.875  10/21/2019      EUR      58.15
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000   4/30/2014      EUR      27.19
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000   4/30/2014      EUR      27.33
UMICORE FINANCE          4.875   2/18/2012      EUR     100.74

ABN AMRO BANK NV         4.500  10/20/2020      NOK     103.09
ABN AMRO BANK NV         5.400   2/18/2026      NOK     114.18
APP INTL FINANCE        11.750   10/1/2005      USD       0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   6/22/2021      ZAR      44.52
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   2/24/2025      CAD      57.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/17/2016      TRY      69.63
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   4/27/2016      TRY      69.04
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   5/25/2016      TRY      68.65
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   6/22/2016      TRY      68.10
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500    3/3/2021      NZD      62.47
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/29/2021      USD      72.48
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/29/2021      NZD      62.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   5/12/2021      ZAR      43.85
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500   5/15/2014      USD      70.50
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500   5/15/2014      USD      79.95
BRIT INSURANCE           6.625   12/9/2030      GBP      64.32
DGS INTL FIN BV         10.000    6/1/2007      USD       0.01
EDP FINANCE BV           4.125   6/29/2020      EUR      73.34
ELEC DE CAR FIN          8.500   4/10/2018      USD      60.24
FRIESLAND BANK           4.210  12/29/2025      EUR      73.42
INDAH KIAT INTL         12.500   6/15/2006      USD       0.01
ING BANK NV              4.715   11/2/2020      NOK     104.74
ING BANK NV              5.115    2/1/2021      NOK     107.97
NATL INVESTER BK        25.983    5/7/2029      EUR      19.22
NED WATERSCHAPBK         0.500   3/11/2025      CAD      56.85
NIB CAPITAL BANK         4.510  12/16/2035      EUR      65.57
PORTUGAL TEL FIN         4.500   6/16/2025      EUR      72.28
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      49.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         1.375   2/28/2012      EUR      74.83
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         2.910   6/21/2036      JPY      72.56
SIDETUR FINANCE         10.000   4/20/2016      USD      69.25
TJIWI KIMIA FIN         13.250    8/1/2001      USD       0.01

EKSPORTFINANS            0.500    5/9/2030      CAD      43.98
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR      71.55
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   5/25/2018      ZAR      58.46
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/29/2016      ZAR      68.61
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/26/2016      ZAR      72.60
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR      71.14
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   5/25/2016      ZAR      70.13
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   1/27/2016      ZAR      72.12
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500  12/18/2015      ZAR      72.79
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/29/2016      TRY      71.66
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125  10/15/2033      USD      65.75
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.000   6/26/2017      EUR      72.16
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125  10/15/2033      USD      65.75

BANCO BPI                1.000   4/10/2014      EUR      73.73
BANCO COM PORTUG         5.625   4/23/2014      EUR      73.18
BANCO COM PORTUG         4.750   6/22/2017      EUR      68.82
BANCO COM PORTUG         3.750   10/8/2016      EUR      67.42
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.160   7/23/2015      EUR      74.75
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.875   7/15/2016      EUR      70.63
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600   1/26/2017      EUR      69.86
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600   9/15/2016      EUR      71.66
BANCO ESPIRITO           3.875   1/21/2015      EUR      73.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.250   1/27/2020      EUR      67.53
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         3.511   10/7/2014      EUR      74.26
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.500   1/19/2016      EUR      68.94
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.750   2/14/2016      EUR      60.89
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.050   4/26/2016      EUR      69.41
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         3.875   12/6/2016      EUR      70.27
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.455   8/20/2017      EUR      73.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.400   10/8/2019      EUR      51.10
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.980    3/3/2028      EUR      68.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.380   10/1/2038      EUR      51.91
COMBOIOS DE PORT         4.170  10/16/2019      EUR      53.98
COMBOIOS DE PORT         5.700    2/5/2030      EUR      60.88
METRO DE LISBOA          4.061   12/4/2026      EUR      48.43
METRO DE LISBOA          7.300  12/23/2025      EUR      58.42
METRO DE LISBOA          5.750    2/4/2019      EUR      60.62
METRO DE LISBOA          4.799   12/7/2027      EUR      46.55
MONTEPIO GERAL           5.000    2/8/2017      EUR      59.50
PARPUBLICA               4.200  11/16/2026      EUR      42.75
PARPUBLICA               4.191  10/15/2014      EUR      71.63
PARPUBLICA               3.567   9/22/2020      EUR      45.63
PARPUBLICA               3.500    7/8/2013      EUR      75.38
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500   3/25/2015      USD      74.12
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500   3/25/2015      USD      74.12
PORTUGUESE OT'S          6.400   2/15/2016      EUR      72.59
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.600  10/15/2014      EUR      72.71
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.350  10/15/2015      EUR      67.08
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.200  10/15/2016      EUR      64.26
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.350  10/16/2017      EUR      61.16
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.450   6/15/2018      EUR      60.93
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.750   6/14/2019      EUR      59.90
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.800   6/15/2020      EUR      59.83
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.850   4/15/2021      EUR      59.19
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.950  10/25/2023      EUR      57.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.100   4/15/2037      EUR      52.30
REFER                    5.875   2/18/2019      EUR      57.00
REFER                    4.000   3/16/2015      EUR      57.38
REFER                    4.675  10/16/2024      EUR      47.38
REFER                    4.047  11/16/2026      EUR      48.87
REFER                    4.250  12/13/2021      EUR      50.63

APK ARKADA              17.500   5/23/2012      RUB       0.38
ARIZK                    3.000  12/20/2030      RUB      53.09
DVTG-FINANS              7.750   7/18/2013      RUB      20.29
DVTG-FINANS             17.000   8/29/2013      RUB      55.55
ENERGOMASH-FINAN        13.000  11/22/2011      RUB      90.00
M-INDUSTRIYA            12.250   8/16/2011      RUB      17.00
MIG-FINANS               0.100    9/6/2011      RUB       1.00
MIRAX                   17.000   9/17/2012      RUB      23.02
MOSMART FINANS           0.010   4/12/2012      RUB       1.81
NOK                     10.000   9/22/2011      RUB      49.90
NOK                     12.500   8/26/2014      RUB       5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA         1.000  12/17/2012      RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE           9.000   6/12/2012      RUB      65.00
RBC OJSC                 3.270   4/19/2018      RUB      45.54
RBC OJSC                 7.000   4/23/2015      RUB      72.50
RBC OJSC                 7.000   4/23/2015      RUB      70.00
RMK PARK PLAZA           5.000    1/8/2013      RUB      70.00
SAHO                    10.000   5/21/2012      RUB       1.10
SATURN                   8.500    6/6/2014      RUB       1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS         10.500   3/27/2012      RUB       3.40
TERNA-FINANS             1.000   11/4/2011      RUB       0.01

AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750   6/30/2025      EUR      63.15
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750  12/14/2022      EUR      68.91
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.750   5/25/2027      EUR      70.14
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.250  10/25/2023      EUR      70.83
AYUNTAM DE MADRD         4.550   6/16/2036      EUR      74.15
BANCAJA                  1.500   5/22/2018      EUR      66.23
BANCO PASTOR             4.550   7/31/2020      EUR      73.47
CAJA CASTIL-MAN          1.500   6/23/2021      EUR      62.85
CAJA MADRID              5.755   2/26/2028      EUR      43.00
CAJA MADRID              4.125   3/24/2036      EUR      63.76
CAJA MADRID              5.020   2/26/2038      EUR      72.75
CAJA MADRID              4.000    2/3/2025      EUR      71.29
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         3.875   5/23/2025      EUR      63.97
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         4.250   4/10/2031      EUR      60.15
CEDULAS TDA A-5          4.250   3/28/2027      EUR      64.25
COMUN AUTO CANAR         3.900  11/30/2035      EUR      58.98
COMUN AUTO CANAR         4.200  10/25/2036      EUR      62.01
COMUNIDAD ARAGON         4.646   7/11/2036      EUR      72.67
COMUNIDAD BALEAR         4.063  11/23/2035      EUR      59.38
COMUNIDAD MADRID         4.300   9/15/2026      EUR      71.50
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.690  10/28/2034      EUR      65.62
GEN DE CATALUNYA         5.219   9/10/2029      EUR      75.26
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.220   4/26/2035      EUR      60.40
IM CEDULAS 5             3.500   6/15/2020      EUR      72.84
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         2.570  10/22/2021      CHF      74.51
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         3.250   6/28/2024      CHF      76.30
INSTITUT CATALA          4.250   6/15/2024      EUR      71.36
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          4.250  10/31/2036      EUR      65.52
JUNTA LA MANCHA          3.875   1/31/2036      EUR      49.54
JUNTA LA MANCHA          5.950    9/9/2030      EUR      74.64
JUNTA LA MANCHA          4.625  11/30/2022      EUR      74.78
SPANISH GOV'T            4.200   1/31/2037      EUR      73.43
XUNTA DE GALICIA         4.025  11/28/2035      EUR      68.08

SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.130   1/10/2012      USD      10.22
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.000   12/7/2011      USD      10.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500   2/28/2012      USD       8.77
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.000   7/28/2011      USD      10.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000   11/4/2011      USD       7.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  12/17/2027      USD      52.14
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500    3/5/2018      AUD      72.29
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   8/25/2016      ZAR      72.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   6/29/2016      TRY      65.34
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   6/14/2016      ZAR      68.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   1/25/2028      USD      51.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500    3/3/2016      ZAR      70.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  12/21/2015      ZAR      71.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000  10/21/2011      USD       9.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500   6/12/2012      USD       9.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.250   4/27/2012      USD       8.51
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.750   3/23/2012      USD       8.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000    3/9/2012      USD       9.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000    3/9/2012      USD      10.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000   1/27/2012      USD       8.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED         6.500   1/27/2012      USD       9.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.000   8/12/2011      USD      10.40

CRED SUIS NY             8.000    8/3/2012      USD      56.60
CYTOS BIOTECH            2.875   2/20/2012      CHF      68.64
UBS AG                  14.000   5/23/2012      USD       8.03
UBS AG                  13.300   5/23/2012      USD       4.00
UBS AG                  10.530   1/23/2012      USD      40.38
UBS AG                   9.250   3/20/2012      USD      13.83
UBS AG                  10.070   3/23/2012      USD      35.34
UBS AG JERSEY            9.450   9/21/2011      USD      49.91
UBS AG JERSEY           11.150   8/31/2011      USD      38.35
UBS AG JERSEY            3.220   7/31/2012      EUR      45.21
UBS AG JERSEY           10.140  12/30/2011      USD      15.04
UBS AG JERSEY           10.360   8/19/2011      USD      51.48

LVIV CITY                9.950  12/19/2012      UAH      95.42

ABBEY NATL TREAS         5.000   8/26/2030      USD      70.18
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         6.000   6/20/2014      EUR      74.75
BANK OF SCOTLAND         5.772    2/7/2035      EUR      71.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC          7.500   9/22/2011      USD      17.12
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.000    6/3/2041      USD      72.77
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.500   8/31/2012      USD      29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.800   7/31/2012      USD      27.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.400   7/31/2012      USD      11.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC         11.000   7/27/2012      USD      10.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC          7.000   7/27/2012      USD       9.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.000   7/20/2012      USD      10.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000   6/29/2012      USD      10.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         12.950   4/20/2012      USD      23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.950   4/20/2012      USD      16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.650   1/31/2012      USD      42.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.250   1/31/2012      USD       9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.350   1/23/2012      USD      26.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.550   1/23/2012      USD      11.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.750   9/22/2011      USD      71.74
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.875   3/28/2033      GBP      70.65
EFG HELLAS PLC           5.400   11/2/2047      EUR      22.25
EFG HELLAS PLC           4.375   2/11/2013      EUR      71.47
EFG HELLAS PLC           6.010    1/9/2036      EUR      32.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.000   2/28/2013      EUR      69.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.000   2/28/2013      EUR      69.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.350   7/22/2014      EUR      56.25
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.375   9/26/2031      GBP      74.97
ESPRIT TELECOM          10.875   6/15/2008      USD       0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT          6.750  12/20/2026      GBP      73.61
HBOS PLC                 6.000   11/1/2033      USD      73.03
HBOS PLC                 6.000   11/1/2033      USD      73.03
HBOS PLC                 4.500   3/18/2030      EUR      72.32
HEALTHCARE SUPP          2.067   2/19/2043      GBP      73.20
NEW HOSPITALS ST         1.777   2/26/2047      GBP      59.40
NOMURA BANK INTL         0.800  12/21/2020      EUR      66.18
NORTHERN ROCK            4.574   1/13/2015      GBP      78.30
NORTHERN ROCK            5.750   2/28/2017      GBP      70.83
PIRAEUS GRP FIN          4.000   9/17/2012      EUR      71.66
PUNCH TAVERNS            8.374   7/15/2029      GBP      64.02
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.692    6/9/2025      EUR      71.25
SKIPTON BUILDING         5.625   1/18/2018      GBP      72.75
UNIQUE PUB FIN           5.659   6/30/2027      GBP      75.65
UNIQUE PUB FIN           6.464   3/30/2032      GBP      63.64
WESSEX WATER FIN         1.369   7/31/2057      GBP      31.65


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *