TCREUR_Public/110808.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, August 8, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 155



DEXIA SA: Posts EUR4-Bil. Net Loss in Second Quarter 2011


* CITY OF STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB'


* DENMARK: Healthy Lenders to Suffer Liquidity Squeeze Fallout


* CITY OF ATHENS: Moody's Downgrades Issuer Rating to 'Caa3'


* ICELAND: Failed Banks May Drop Settlement Efforts After Ruling


ALLIED IRISH: Sells Jersey Unit to Capita Group for GBP12.5-Mil.
ANTHRACITE EURO: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Three Note Classes
EIRCOM GROUP: Mum on Reports of Likely Examinership
EIRCOM GROUP: Restructuring Plan to Hit Subordinated Debt Holders
JUST MOBILE: Opts for Liquidation After Funding Efforts Fail

PALMER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on $2.012-Bil. Notes to 'CC(sf)'
PARTHOLON CDO: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B1'
QUINN INSURANCE: Premiums Down 44% Since Administration
SUPERQUINN: Suppliers to Get Paid From Credit Insurance Policies


THINK3 INC: Italian Trustee Seeks to Take Over in Chapter 15
THINK3 INC: Chapter 15 Case Summary


INDIGOLD CARBON: Moody's Corrects 'Ba3' Rating to Ba3 From WR


BANCO ITAU: Moody's Withdraws 'D+' BSFR & (P)Ba1 Jr. Debt Rating


CEZ VANZARE: On Verge of Liquidation


IM PASTOR 3: Moody's Cuts Rating EUR10MM D Certificate to 'Ca'


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Nears Long-Term Funding Deal with U.S. Investor

* TURKEY: Moody's Says Post-Election Policies to Affect Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HOOKWAYS LIMITED: Faces liquidation Amid High Fuel Cost
NATIONWIDE CHRISTIAN: Enters Insolvency Proceedings
PRIMROSE ASSOCIATES: London Police Drops Probe Into Owner
ROYAL BANK: Posts GBP1.4-Bil. Net Loss in First Half 2011
STERLING HELICOPTERS: Applies for Liquidation

* UK: One in Three law Centers Set to Shut Down


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 80 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 1 to August 5, 2011



DEXIA SA: Posts EUR4-Bil. Net Loss in Second Quarter 2011
Jennifer Thompson at The Financial Times reports that a hit to its
Greek bondholdings and an accelerated program of asset sales
weighed on Dexia SA, the Franco-Belgian bank, which posted a
EUR4 billion net loss for the second quarter of the year.

According to the FT, the Franco-Belgian bank took a EUR377 million
pre-tax impairment on its Greek sovereign debt due to mature
before the end of 2020 as part of its involvement in a bail-out
package agreed by eurozone leaders last month.

Dexia held EUR1.8 billion of Greek government bonds due to mature
by 2020 at the end of June, and added that its participation in
the rescue plan will take the form of a bond exchange resulting in
an estimated 21% loss, the FT discloses.

Dexia, which was rescued by an international government bail-out
three years ago, also took a EUR3.67 billion exceptional hit in
the second quarter, following a decision announced in May to
accelerate the sale of assets such as US mortgage-backed
securities and long-term bonds that helped to bring the bank to
its knees in 2008, the FT notes.

                          About Dexia SA

Dexia SA -- is a Belgian bank specialized
in retail banking and local public finance.  The Bank offers a
range of banking services for individual customers, small and
medium-sized enterprises and institutional clients.  It has four
divisions: Asset Management, Personal Financial Services, Treasury
and Financial Markets, and Investor Services.  The Asset
Management division offers products ranging from traditional and
alternative funds to socially responsible investments.  The
Personal Financial Services segment focuses on banking and
insurance products, including both life and non-life insurance
products.  Through its Treasury and Financial Markets division,
Dexia is present in the capital markets and provides support to
the entire Group.  The Investor Services segment offers various
services to shareholders, such as fund and pension administration.
Through its subsidiaries, Dexia SA is active in over 30 countries,
including Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Turkey, France, Australia
and Japan.


* CITY OF STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services had revised its outlook on the
Bulgarian City of Stara Zagora to stable from negative and
affirmed the long-term issuer credit rating at 'BB'.

"We revised the outlook to stable from negative because we expect
that Stara Zagora will profit from higher revenue flexibility,
which we forecast will lead to an improvement of own budget
revenues and a higher self-financing capacity of investments.
Moreover, our base case does not foresee a further decline of
Stara Zagora's still weak liquidity levels," S&P said.

The rating on Stara Zagora, located in the Republic of Bulgaria
(BBB/Stable/A-3), is constrained by its still weak liquidity
levels; the limited predictability and volatility of the city's
budgetary performance; underdeveloped financial management in some
areas; very low expenditure flexibility; and low economic income
levels and a declining population trend in an international
context. Stara Zagora's relatively low debt burden and the
trend toward fiscal decentralization that grants municipalities
more tax-setting leeway are ratings supports.

The rating is constrained by the limited predictability of Stara
Zagora's capital expenditures and its future budgetary
performance. Two-thirds of own operating revenues stem from
revenue items where the tax base is directly or indirectly linked
to real estate prices. "The high volatility of real estate prices
hampers revenue-side predictability for 2012-2014, which we see as
a weakness in the city's credit profile," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that, due to economic
recovery in Bulgaria and widening revenue-raising capacity, the
city will be able to achieve consistent operating surpluses and
modest deficits after capital accounts in 2011-2014, as well as
addressing large infrastructure needs with only a gradual debt
accumulation and without further deterioration of the liquidity
position," S&P related.

"We could raise the rating if the city's currently still weak
liquidity levels improve. Continuing economic recovery in Bulgaria
and an improving real estate market would likely result in
stronger budgetary performance, slower debt accumulation, and
limited debt service levels, which could also trigger an upgrade.
Under our upside scenario, we expect the city's own liquidity
levels to improve by year-end 2011 to above-100% coverage of next-
12-months' debt service," S&P said.

"We will assess the fiscal, liquidity, and debt policies of the
city's new management team after local elections in October 2011.
Our upside scenario sees tax-supported debt increasing to 26% of
own operating revenues by 2014 from 21% in 2010. An increase of
the property taxes or fees and charges after the municipal
elections leading to a structural improvement of the city's
revenues side and liquidity levels could also result in an
upgrade," S&P related.

"We might lower the rating if the Bulgarian economy's growth
prospects significantly weakened, contrary to our base-case
expectation. We might lower the rating within the next year if the
city's management fails to strengthen its financial policy in line
with our base case, which would likely result in large deficits
and borrowings, in turn leading to a weaker liquidity position,"
S&P said.

A downgrade could also result from the city's following an
aggressive debt-financed capital-expenditure policy that increased
short-term debt.

"Under our downside scenario, we would lower the rating if debt
service coverage by free cash and liquid assets fell below 100%.
Our downside scenario also assumes an increasing trend of tax-
supported debt to above 60% of own operating revenues by 2014,"
S&P added.


* DENMARK: Healthy Lenders to Suffer Liquidity Squeeze Fallout
Christian Wienberg at Bloomberg News reports that Bent Naur, the
head of the Local Bankers Association, said the Danish state's
refusal to extend guarantees on bank debt beyond 2013 means even
healthy lenders will suffer the fallout of a liquidity squeeze
that could be avoided.

"There's nothing wrong with helping banks out with their
liquidity, it won't cost the taxpayer," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Naur,
the chairman of the Copenhagen-based group, as saying on Wednesday
in a phone interview.  "The state should prolong the guarantee,
not for troubled banks, but for those that meet solvency
requirements.  That will avoid a liquidity squeeze when everybody
needs to refinance at the same time."

Banks in Denmark, home to the European Union's toughest resolution
laws, need to refinance about US$35 billion in state-guaranteed
debt in the next two years, Bloomberg discloses.  The government
has rejected calls to extend its backing, arguing the industry
should instead consolidate, Bloomberg notes.  Lenders already face
higher funding costs as two regional bank failures since February
triggered senior creditor losses, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, Central bank Governor Nils Bernstein and
Financial Supervisory Authority Director General Ulrik Noedgaard
have both said lenders shouldn't expect rescue programs to be

Debate on the need for additional bank support measures has flared
in Denmark following the Feb. 6 failure of Amagerbanken A/S and
the subsequent collapse in June of Fjordbank Mors A/S, Bloomberg


* CITY OF ATHENS: Moody's Downgrades Issuer Rating to 'Caa3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the City of Athens'
issuer rating to Caa3 from Caa1 and changed the outlook to
developing from negative.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on Athens follows (i) Moody's decision to
downgrade Greece's sovereign rating to Ca, with a developing
outlook; and (ii) recognizes the City's strong financial and
operational linkages with its sovereign.

The sovereign rating action reflects the combination of the
announced EU support program and debt-exchange proposals from
major financial institutions, which implies that private creditors
will incur substantial economic losses on their Greek government-
debt holdings.

The rating of the City has been set one notch above that of the
sovereign, reflecting (i) the City is not in default; (ii) there
are no indications suggesting that the sovereign plans to force a
default by its lower-tier governments, including the City of
Athens; and (iii) the City remains fully committed to servicing
its debt obligations on a timely basis.

Moody's recognizes Athens' reliance on central government
transfers in order to fund its operations and capital investments,
and the high level of integration of its local economic base with
that of the national economy. The strong operational and financial
linkages between the city and the sovereign imply significant
limitations for the City's administration to act independently
from the sovereign and outside of the scope of broader government
reforms. These linkages are illustrated in the recent
deterioration in the City's financial performance, which has
mirrored the overall deterioration of the sovereign's fiscal

Figures for 2010 reveal Athens' difficulty in adjusting
expenditure levels to match lower revenue, resulting in a widening
cash-financing deficit. Moody's believes that anticipated cuts in
central government transfers and the impact of lower revenues from
a weakening economy will be difficult to absorb within the City's
budget. In particular, measures to reduce personnel costs --
dictated under government reforms -- and to streamline public
services remain uncertain and may take time to generate structural
savings. In the near term, this will exert greater liquidity
pressure on Athens' finances and will require tight cash flow
management to avoid future defaults in a time of increased funding
uncertainty and a weaker economy.

The developing outlook on the City matches the sovereign rating
outlook and reflects (i) the strong linkages referred to above;
and (ii) the current uncertainty surrounding the sovereign debt
exchanges. Following the sovereign debt restructuring, Moody's
will re-assess the credit risk profile of the Greek government, as
well as that of the City of Athens.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Given the strong linkages between the sovereign and the City of
Athens, any future rating change for the City's rating will be
strongly influenced by the outcome of the sovereign debt
restructuring. Furthermore, deteriorating cash flow entailing an
almost certain likelihood of default by the City to its debt
holders may weaken the rating further.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Regional and
Local Governments Outside the US published in May 2008, and The
Application of Joint Default Analysis to Regional and Local
Governments published in December 2008. Please see the Credit
Policy page on for a copy of these methodologies.

As the capital city of Greece, Athens plays a key role as the
financial, economic and political hub of the country. It accounts
for almost 50% of national GDP and has a total population of


* ICELAND: Failed Banks May Drop Settlement Efforts After Ruling
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Glitnir Bank
hf said Iceland's failed banks may drop efforts to reach an
orderly settlement and instead file for bankruptcy protection
after a court ruled that creditors with rejected claims can seek

The Reykjavik District Court ruled on July 19 that ALMC hf,
formerly Straumur-Burdaras Investment Bank hf, must pay Stapi
Pension Fund ISK5.2 billion (US$45 million) even though its claim
was filed after a deadline set by the bank.  According to
Bloomberg, Arni Tomasson, who heads Glitnir's resolution
committee, said that the decision will encourage more creditors
whose claims had been deemed invalid to seek repayment and
threatens to postpone indefinitely efforts to settle.

"If this ruling is upheld in the Supreme Court, it will open the
floodgates of claims from everyone and anyone who believes he or
she has unfinished business with the banks," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Tomasson as saying in a phone interview in Reykjavik.
"Everyone gets a hunting license.  It might be better for us to
seek bankruptcy protection than to seek a composition agreement.
Everything will change if this ruling is upheld."

Iceland's failed banks have yet to start repayment on the
US$85 billion they defaulted on in 2008, leaving creditors such as
Deutsche Bank AG and BNP Paribas SA in the lurch, Bloomberg notes.

The Supreme Court hasn't yet set a date for hearing the case,
Bloomberg states.  Even if the District Court's ruling is
overturned, "there'll be delays in the process, as we now have to
wait for the Supreme Court to rule on this matter," Mr. Tomasson,
as cited by Bloomberg, said.

Bloomberg notes that under Iceland's Bankruptcy Act, should the
banks seek bankruptcy protection, they will come under pressure to
sell off assets as fast as possible instead of waiting for the
best price and they won't be free to invest cash funds.  That
could leave fewer funds to be divided between investors, Bloomberg

While the Icelandic state never defaulted on its obligations, most
bank bondholders will get little more than a quarter of what
they're owed, Bloomberg says, citing prices quoted on the
Web site of Reykjavik-based brokerage H.F. Verdbref.


ALLIED IRISH: Sells Jersey Unit to Capita Group for GBP12.5-Mil.
RTE News reports that Allied Irish Banks plc has agreed to sell
AIB Jerseytrust Limited to the Capita Group for GBP12.5 million
(EUR14.3 million) in cash.

According to RTE, the deal is subject to approval by the Jersey
Financial Services Commission and the Jersey Competition
Regulatory Authority.

The sale is part of AIB's program of asset sales aimed at reducing
its size and improving its financial position, RTE notes.

                About Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount of
CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

As reported by the TCR on May 31, 2011, KPMG, in Dublin, Ireland,
noted that there are a number of material economic, political and
market risks and uncertainties that impact the Irish banking
system, including the Company's continued ability to access
funding from the Eurosystem and the Irish Central Bank to meet its
liquidity requirements, that raise substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company reported a net loss of EUR10.16 billion on
EUR1.84 billion of interest income for 2010, compared with a net
loss of EUR2.33 billion on $2.87 billion of interest income for

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2011, showed EUR126.87
billion in total assets, EUR120.01 billion in total liabilities
and EUR6.86 billion total shareholders' equity including non-
controlling interest.

ANTHRACITE EURO: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Three Note Classes
Moody's has affirmed five classes of Notes issued by Anthracite
Euro CRE CDO 2006-1 plc due to the key transaction parameters
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2042, Affirmed at Caa3
(sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2042, Affirmed at Ca (sf);
previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2042,
Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to C

Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2042,
Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009 Downgraded to C

Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2042,
Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009 Downgraded to C

Ratings Rationale

Anthracite Euro CRE CDO 2006-1 plc is a revolving CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (32.3% of the pool balance), B-Notes (42.6%), C-
Notes (14.3%) and mezzanine loans (10.8%). As of the May 31, 2011
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to EUR233.5 million from EUR276.0 million at issuance,
with the paydown directed to the Class A Notes, as a result of
failing the Class A/B par value test. All of the assets are
located in the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Finland and
France. All collateral is hedged into Euros in order to make
payments on the Notes.

There are fourteen assets with par balance of EUR93.3 million
(31.5% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Obligations as of the May 31, 2011 Trustee report. Eleven of these
assets (64.8% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS, two assets are
B-Notes (25.0%) and one asset is a mezzanine loan (10.3%).
Defaulted Securities that are not CMBS are defined as assets which
are 60 or more days delinquent in their debt service payment.
Defaulted Obligations that are CMBS are defined as CMBS Securities
where there is a payment default as defined by the Underlying
Instrument. While there have been limited realized losses to date,
Moody's does expect significant losses to occur once they are

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically
modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for
managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations (97% of the pool balance). The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within a
collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,377.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
followsBaa1-Baa3 (1.0% of the deal balance), Ba1-Ba3 (2.0%), B1-B3
(9.2%), and Caa1-C (87.8%). WARR is the par-weighted average of
the mean recovery values for the collateral assets in the pool.
Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 14.3%.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
14% to 4% or up to 24% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 0 to 2 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Other methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.

EIRCOM GROUP: Mum on Reports of Likely Examinership
According to Irish Independent's Donal O'Donovan, Eircom Group on
Thursday night refused to comment on reports it could seek an
examinership if efforts to find an agreed solution to its debt
crisis fail.

The refusal to comment comes after a report on the news service
Capital Structure, which noted that Eircom was "assessing the pros
and cons of an examinership" if talks with lenders owed
EUR3.75 billion fail to come up with a plan for the company, Irish
Independent relates.

According to the reports, a source close to the company said
examinership could be an option if Eircom could not reach
agreement with lenders and shareholders on how to restructure its
EUR3.75 billion of debt, Irish Independent notes.

In spite of the report, most people in the market, including
lenders to the company, think an examinership for Eircom is highly
unlikely, Irish Independent states.

A source among the senior lenders to Eircom, as cited by Irish
Independent, said the company could write off some debts through a
less disruptive and more predictable process in the English
courts, if it needs to cut the total amount owed without paying
off lenders.

Sources among the lenders that spoke to the Irish Independent said
they don't think examinership is the right process to "right size"
the debt burden, not only because it is unpredictable but also
because the regime in the UK explicitly favors lenders.

At the moment, the focus of the lenders is on Eircom's decision to
seek a waiver for a possible breach of the company's covenant
tests later this month, The Irish Independent relates.

Talks on agreeing to a waiver got under way last week and need to
be finalized within the next three weeks or the company will be at
risk of a technical default on its most senior debt even though it
is up to date with debt repayments, Irish Independent discloses.

A formal request for the waiver is expected this week, Irish
Independent says.

Irish Independent notes that a spokesman for Eircom said lenders
have now begun to receive their copies of an independent business
review of the company prepared by accountants Ernst & Young in
recent days.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

EIRCOM GROUP: Restructuring Plan to Hit Subordinated Debt Holders
Joachim Johannsen, Mario Oliviero and Chiara Elisei at The
Financial Times, citing Debtwire, report that Eircom Group's new
business plan projections leaves little doubt as to what the Irish
telecom group's subordinated debt holders would face in a planned
debt restructuring.

The plan, presented on July 29 to senior lenders, put the writing
on the wall -- over EUR1 billion of debt could be written off with
severe losses for investors in the company's junior debt tranches,
the FT relays.

The FT relates that the company said negative macroeconomic
headwinds, including emigration, unemployment and personal debt,
reduced government and consumer spending in Ireland, severely
impacted past profitability.  According to the FT, two sources
familiar with the situation said that the worse is yet to come --
next year's earnings are expected to decline about 15% to
EUR553 million from EUR647 million in 2011, while revenues will
total EUR1.6 billion in 2012.  The FT notes that two other sources
said the group has approximately EUR2.7 billion of debt, of which
EUR2.38 billion is first lien.

The plan's forecasts suggest an unflatteringly low valuation for
Ireland's largest telecommunications group, the FT states.  At an
earnings multiple as low as 4x, Eircom ranks at the very low end
of the valuation scale in comparison with European counterparts,
according to the FT.

As Eircom struggled with its debt issues, management, alongside
majority shareholders Singapore Technologies Telemedia (STT), an
affiliate of Singaporean wealth fund Temasek, and the Employee
Share Ownership Trust (ESOP), joined forces over recent months to
identify solutions, the FT relates.

Anticipating bad news, a group of second lien lenders in early
July approached the company and sought a premature peek of the
business plan and an independent business review by accounting
firm Ernst & Young, the FT recounts.

The investors, CVC Cordatus, Intermediate Capital Group (ICG),
Invesco, Deutsche Bank and Silver Point Capital, and their advisor
Moelis -- proposed to work with STT and senior lenders to back the
business with additional money, and if necessary, convert their
holdings into equity, the FT discloses.

The company, however, announced on July 29 that shareholders are
supportive of management's business plan and their willingness to
make a sizeable money injection if needed, according to the
sources, the FT notes.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

JUST MOBILE: Opts for Liquidation After Funding Efforts Fail
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Just Mobile has
decided to wind down its operation just 10 months after the
company was launched.

The decision was taken after it failed to secure follow-on funding
that would have sustained the business until it reached breakeven
next year, The Irish Times relates.

Just Mobile is believed to have been seeking to raise about
EUR2 million from investors, The Irish Times says.

As of August 8, Just Mobile subscribers will no longer be able to
make calls or send texts but will be able to receive them, The
Irish Times discloses.  The service will be discontinued
altogether on August 19, the report notes.

Five full-time staff will be made redundant while the decision
also affects up to 15 people at outsourcing groups who provided
support services to company, The Irish Times states.

According to The Irish Times, company founder Donal Lawless said
about EUR2 million had been lost on the business.

Just Mobile was launched in October 2011 as a pre-pay virtual
operator, piggybacking on Vodafone's network.

PALMER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on $2.012-Bil. Notes to 'CC(sf)'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings to
'CC(sf)' from 'CCC-(sf)' on eight classes of notes in Palmer
Square 2 PLC.

The rating actions follow recent developments that S&P has
observed in the transaction, including:

    An event of default under the terms and conditions of the
    notes, triggered when the transaction's class A event of
    default test ratio fell below 101%; and

    Continuing deterioration in the credit quality of the
    transaction's portfolio.

"Using the ratings on the underlying assets that we consider
appropriate in our analysis, we note that the proportion of assets
rated 'AA-' or higher has fallen to 13.8% compared with 19.2% in
January 2011, and the proportion of assets rated 'CCC+' or lower
now accounts for 65.3% of the portfolio compared with 61.1% in
January 2011," S&P related.

"Based on our analysis, we now consider it likely that all classes
of notes, except the class X notes, will experience principal
losses. We have therefore lowered our ratings on classes A1, A2,
and A3 to 'CC' (sf), indicating that in our opinion the notes are
highly vulnerable to nonpayment," S&P said.

Palmer Square 2 PLC is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) with
a portfolio of primarily U.S. structured finance securities. The
transaction closed in October 2005.

Ratings List

Class           To                   From

Palmer Square 2 PLC
$2.012 Billion Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A1-M-A          CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A1-M-B          CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A1-Q-A          CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A1-Q-B          CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A2-A            CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A2-B            CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A3-A            CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A3-B            CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)

PARTHOLON CDO: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B1'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Partholon CDO 1 plc:

Issuer: Partholon CDO I PLC

   -- EUR271.443M Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR9M Class A-3 Zero Coupon Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR31.432M Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to A3
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR2.25M Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M Class B-3 Zero Coupon Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR28.45M Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to B1
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7.75M Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class S Combination Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M Class R Combination Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR24M Class J Combination Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class S,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 3.0% per annum accrued on the Rated Balance on the
preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all payments made
from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments. For Classes J and R which do not accrue
interest, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus
the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such
date, either through interest or principal payments. The Rated
Balance may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional
amount reported by the trustee.

Ratings Rationale

Partholon CDO 1 plc, issued in October 2003, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly leveraged European loans. The portfolio is managed by The
Governor & Company of the Bank of Ireland. This transaction
completed its reinvestment period on 09 January 2009. It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of deleveraging of the senior notes since the rating
action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include adjustments to the equity cash-flows haircuts
applicable to combination notes.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 and A-3 notes have been paid down
by approximately 45% or EUR126.4 million since the rating action
in December 2009. As a result of the deleveraging, the
overcollateralization ratios have since increased. Moody's used
the data in the latest trustee report dated July 5, 2011 (after
accounting for the EUR91.477,324 principal repayment of the Class
A-1 and A-3 notes on July 15, 2011) to calculate the Class A/B and
Class C overcollateralization ratios at 129.03% and 108.06%
respectively, compared to November 2009 trustee reported levels of
111.26% and 99.15% respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 252.179
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.71%
(consistent with a WARF of 3943), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 46.40% for a Aaa liability target rating, and a
diversity score of 28. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 91% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Moody's also notes that around 86% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the
   report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction
   maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the
   nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's
   maturity lags that of the liabilities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011The cash flow model used for
this transaction, whose description can be found in the
methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

QUINN INSURANCE: Premiums Down 44% Since Administration
Laura Noonan at Irish Independent reports that Quinn Insurance
Limited's commercial premiums have fallen by an average of 44%
since the company went into administration, despite criticisms
that the insurer was chronically under pricing risk when it was
controlled by Sean Quinn.

Quinn Insurance, however, said this stemmed from a "shift" in the
type of policies being written after a strategic decision to
peruse more "low-risk" business, according to Irish Independent.
The report relates the premium erosion is revealed in Quinn
Insurance data for the first 26 weeks of the year, which also
shows it attracted premiums of EUR110 million for the period, down
44% on the pre-administration half-year to end June 2009.

Irish Independent discloses that the sharpest fall in average
premiums was for new commercial business, where average premiums
dipped from EUR3,013 in the first half of 2009 to just EUR1,699 in
the same period this year.

The average premiums for commercial fleet renewals also fell
sharply, coming in at EUR6,407 for the 26 weeks to end June 2011,
against EUR9,957 for the first half of 2009, Irish Independent

The falls come as other insurers report hardening premiums. In a
statement issued last night, QIL said average premiums had come
down in both categories because of a "shift from higher-risk
industries to lower-risk and lower-premium activity," the report

Irish Independent says that private motor premiums for new
customers have also fallen considerably, with average premiums for
new business down from EUR1,102 in the first half of 2009 to
EUR876 in the first half of this year, though the fall for
renewals was a more muted EUR606 to EUR581.

The report relates that those falls are "due to a shift in our
traditional market of under-30s provisional licence holders to
more experienced drivers", QIL said, adding that the insurer had
made a "strategic" decision to target a "more mature market".

QIL's average premiums for household renewals rose from EUR243 to
EUR349 over the period, while household renewal premiums rose from
EUR230 to EUR306, mirroring an industry-wide trend triggered by
two years of freak weather claims, the report says.

Irish Independent relates that the data also charts a significant
fall off in QIL's overall business in Ireland, with gross written
premiums dipping by 44% to EUR110 million.  QIL last night said
the fact the insurer was now only writing private motor business
in the North "would obviously explain" the fall off," the report

The data shows that private motor business, which is still being
written in both territories, was responsible for about EUR43
million of the EUR87 million fall off in business between the
first half of 2009 and the first half of 2011, the report relays.

Irish Independent adds that QIL also claimed that the reduction in
Northern Ireland's offerings "would obviously explain" a fall in
enquiries into premiums.

                      About Quinn Insurance

Quinn Insurance is owned by Sean Quinn, Ireland's richest man, and
his family.  The company has more than 20% of the motor and health
insurance market in Ireland.  Employing almost 2,800 people in
Britain and Ireland, it was founded in 1996 and entered the UK
market in 2004.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, The Irish
Times said the Financial Regulator put Quinn Insurance into
administration in March 2010 after his office discovered
guarantees had been provided by the insurer's subsidiaries as far
back as 2005 on Quinn Group debts of more than EUR1.2 billion.
The regulator said the guarantees reduced the amount the firm had
in reserve to protect policyholders against possible claims,
putting 1.3 million customers at risk, according to The Irish

SUPERQUINN: Suppliers to Get Paid From Credit Insurance Policies
Barry O'Halloran at Irish Times reports that some Superquinn
suppliers who lost out when the banks placed the company in
receivership are set to be paid from credit insurance policies
taken out on sales to the grocery chain.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 20, 2011,
Reuters said RTE News reported Superquinn was put into
receivership by a syndicate of banks, including Allied Irish
Banks, Bank of Ireland, and National Irish Bank after building up
debts of more than EUR400 million (US$561 million).  Kieran
Wallace and Eamonn Richardson, representatives of professional
services firm KPMG, have been appointed as receivers to the firm.

Credit insurer Atradius said it would be paying out on claims
worth "several million" to some of the chain's suppliers who were
not paid for their goods as a result of the receivership,
according to Irish Times.  The report relates that the
multinational's country manager, Stuart Ramsden, confirmed that
Atradius would be paying out on claims made by suppliers.

However, Irish Times notes that the insurer was not in a position
on Aug. 4 to say how much it would paying out nor could it say how
many of the chain's suppliers it has covered.  An unnamed
spokeswoman said it was still processing claims as its cover only
applied if payment had not been made after a defined period of
time, the report relays.

Irish Times discloses that the receivers said they would pay for
stock held by the company and anything supplied during the period
of the receivership.  However, the report notes, the receivers
could not pay for goods the chain had sold but for which the group
had yet to pay.

                       About Superquinn

Superquinn is one of Ireland's largest domestic retailers.  It
employs around 2,800 people in 23 stores around the country.
Superquinn is owned by Select Retail Holdings, which bought the
retailer for EUR350 million in 2005.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 20, 2011,
Reuters said RTE News reported Superquinn was put into
receivership by a syndicate of banks, including Allied Irish
Banks, Bank of Ireland, and National Irish Bank after building up
debts of more than EUR400 million (US$561 million).  Kieran
Wallace and Eamonn Richardson, representatives of professional
services firm KPMG, have been appointed as receivers to the firm.


THINK3 INC: Italian Trustee Seeks to Take Over in Chapter 15
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,
reports that Think3 Inc., a developer of computer-aided design
software, will give U.S. Bankruptcy Judge H. Christopher Mott in
Austin, Texas, a chance to decide whether executives in the U.S.
or an Italian bankruptcy trustee has the right to control the
company and its reorganization.

Think3 sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Case No.
11-11252) in May in Austin, its hometown, three months after
creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the
company in a court in Bologna, Italy.  The company didn't oppose
the involuntary bankruptcy, according to the Italian trustee.

The Italian trustee filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
Case No. 11-11925) for Think3 in bankruptcy court in Austin on
Aug. 1, claiming she has the right to control the company's
restructuring through the Italian court.

According to the report, the Italian trustee noted that the court
in Texas is being asked by U.S. managers to sell property that is
being administered in a different manner by the court in Italy.
She said she has made "substantial progress towards a possible
reorganization or sale for the benefit of creditors."

Chapter 15 affords a U.S. bankruptcy court the ability to assist a
bankruptcy primarily pending elsewhere.  Relief in Chapter 15
isn't automatic.  For the Chapter 15 petition to succeed, the
Italian trustee must convince the judge in Austin that Italy is
home to the "foreign main proceeding."  In general terms, Italy is
the controlling court if the principal assets, principal business
activities or head office is in Italy.

Since the Italian bankruptcy was filed, there have been continuing
disputes over the right to control the company's assets.  ESW
Capital LLC acquired Think3 in September.  The primary debt is a
US$23 million tax liability in Italy.

THINK3 INC: Chapter 15 Case Summary
Chapter 15 Petitioner: Dr. Andrea Ferri

Chapter 15 Debtor: think3 Inc.
                   6011 W. Courtyard Drive
                   Austin, TX 78730

Chapter 15 Case No.: 11-11925

Type of Business: The debtor is a company that provides design and
                  Modeling software.

Chapter 15 Petition Date: August 1, 2011

Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court
       Western District of Texas (Austin)

Debtor's Counsel: Wesley W. Yuan, Esq.
                  DUANE MORRIS LLP
                  1330 Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 800
                  Houston, TX 77056
                  Tel: (713) 402-3911
                  Fax: (713) 513-5848

Estimated Assets: US$10,000,001 to US$50,000,000

Estimated Debts: US$10,000,001 to US$50,000,000

The Company did not file a list of creditors together with its

Previous Chapter 11 filing by the Debtor:

        Entity                        Case No.       Petition Date
        ------                        --------       -------------
Think3 Inc.                           11-11252            05/18/11


INDIGOLD CARBON: Moody's Corrects 'Ba3' Rating to Ba3 From WR
Moody's Investors Service is correcting the ratings for Indigold
Carbon (Netherlands) BV's Corporate Family Rating to Ba3 from WR
and Probability of Default Rating to Ba3 from WR.

Moody's also is correcting the ratings for Indigold Carbon USA,
Inc.'s $75mm senior secured revolving credit facility due 2016 to
Ba3 (LGD3, 42%) from WR and $500mm senior secured term loan A due
2016 to Ba3 (LGD3, 42%) from WR. The outlook is stable.

The principal methodology used in rating Indigold Carbon was the
Global Chemical Industry Rating Methodology published in December
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

The ratings were previously withdrawn on June 27, 2011, due to an
internal administrative error.


BANCO ITAU: Moody's Withdraws 'D+' BSFR & (P)Ba1 Jr. Debt Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of Banco
Itau BBA International for business reasons:

* bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of D+
* long-term debt and deposit ratings of Baa2
* short-term debt and deposit ratings of Prime-2
* senior subordinated debt rating of Baa3
* junior subordinated debt rating of (P)Ba1

The outlook on all ratings before the rating withdrawal was
stable. Moody's notes that Banco Itau BBA International has no
rated preference shares outstanding.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for business reasons.

The last rating action was on May 17, 2010, when Moody's
downgraded the bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+
(mapping to a BCA of Baa3) from C- (mapping to a BCA of Baa2), the
long-term debt and deposit rating to Baa2 from Baa1, the senior
subordinated debt to Baa3 from Baa2 and the junior subordinated
debt to Ba1 from Baa3, while maintaining the short-term rating at
Prime-2. The outlook on all ratings was changed to stable from the
previous review for possible downgrade.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal, Itau reported total unaudited
consolidated assets of EUR5.2 billion as of March 31, 2011.


CEZ VANZARE: On Verge of Liquidation
Ziarul Financiar reports that CEZ Vanzare is on the brink of being
closed down because it can't recover a debt of RON330 million
(EUR78 million) from state-run rail company CFR.

CEZ Vanzare is the retail division of energy company CEZ Romania.


IM PASTOR 3: Moody's Cuts Rating EUR10MM D Certificate to 'Ca'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of all notes
issued by IM Pastor 3 (IM 3) and class A and B notes issued by IM
Pastor 4 (IM 4).

The ratings of class A and B notes in IM 3 and the senior notes in
IM 4 were placed on review for possible downgrade on 25 March 2011
following the downgrade of Banco Pastor to Ba1.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due to worse than expected performance of the
collateral. The rating actions also reflects Moody's negative
sector outlook for Spanish RMBS and the weakening of the macro-
economic environment in Spain.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pools, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement (MILAN Aaa CE) and the lifetime
losses (expected loss), as well as the transaction structure and
any legal considerations as assessed in Moody's cash flow
analysis. The expected loss and the Milan Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, used in the cash-flow model to rate European RMBS

Portfolio Expected Loss:

Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss expectation for IM 3 and
IM 4 taking into account the collateral performance to date as
well as the current macroeconomic environment in Spain.

The collateral performance in IM 3 and IM 4 has deteriorated
further since the last rating review in January 2010, when Moody's
took action on the senior and junior notes issued by IM 3 and all
notes issued by IM 4. Credit trends in IM 3 and IM 4 continue to
under-perform arrears and defaults experienced by similarly
seasoned low LTV Spanish RMBS and both transactions are performing
worse than anticipated as of the last rating review.

Loans in 90 days to 12 months in arrears represented 2.14% and
2.08% of current pool balance in IM 3 and IM 4 respectively in
June 2011. Moody's notes that the share of defaulted loans
continued to increase steadily since last rating review.
Cumulative 12 months delinquency reached 4.42% and 4.92% of
original pool in IM 3 and IM 4 respectively in June 2011, up from
2.81% and 3.14% respectively in IM 3 and IM 4 in December 2009

The weak performance of IM 3 and IM 4 has been mainly driven by
the exposure to loans originated via external channels,
particularly in the region of Valencia and Catalonia.
Additionally, non-Spanish borrowers (representing about 12% and 8%
of current pool balance respectively) have been affected by
difficult economic conditions such as increasing unemployment and
declining house prices. Loans to non-Spanish nationals are
experiencing significantly higher defaults than loans granted to
Spanish borrowers.

Recoveries have been slow to materialize. Cumulative recoveries so
far represent about 12% of total cumulative defaults. The rapidly
increasing levels of write-offs and slow pace of the recovery
ultimately resulted in draws to the reserve fund in both
transactions and build-up in unpaid principal deficiencies ledgers
(PDL) in IM 3 (EUR21.5 million) and in IM 4 (EUR15.4 million) as
at the last payment date. The unpaid PDLs currently represent 6%
and 3% of current pool balance of IM 3 and IM 4 respectively.
Available funds in both transactions will ultimately increase as
recoveries from written-off loans are collected and repossessed
properties are sold. However, Moody's remain concerned about the
uncertainties relating to the timing and the amount of recoveries.
The increasing level of defaults and slow pace of the recoveries
suggest that the unpaid PDL will not be cured rapidly. The
amortization of the mezzanine and junior notes is likely to remain
sequential as a consequence of the breach of pro-rata amortization

Moody's expect the portfolio credit performance to continue to be
under stress, as Spanish unemployment remains elevated. Moody's
believe that the anticipated tightening of Spanish fiscal policies
is likely to weigh on the recovery in the Spanish labor market and
constraint further Spanish households finances. Moody's has also
concerns over the timing and degree of future recoveries in a
weaker Spanish housing market. On the basis of the continued
increase in write-offs in the transactions and Moody's negative
sector outlook for Spanish RMBS, Moody's has updated the portfolio
expected loss assumption to 2.8% of original pool balance in IM 3
and 3.5% in IM 4, up from respectively 1.8% and 2.4% as of January


Moody's has assessed the loan-by-loan information for IM 3 and IM
4 to determine the MILAN Aaa CE. Moody's has revised its MILAN Aaa
CE assumptions to 10% in both transactions, up from 7.5%
respectively as at the last rating review The increase in the
MILAN Aaa CE reflects the high geographical concentration on the
Mediterranean coast, the exposure to loans originated via broker
and to new residents.

Appointment of EOS Spain as Back-up Servicer

Both transactions have been restructured to include back-up
servicing arrangement. Under the signed BUS agreements, EOS Spain
will act as the new servicer upon the request from the management
company (InterMoney) and commits to act as BUS within six month of
receiving the request from InterMoney. EOS Spain is a debt
collection company sold by Banco Pastor to the EOS Group in
September 2009. EOS Spain employs over 150 employees and include
banks, utilities and telephone companies among its clients. EOS
Spain already manages all delinquent loans of Banco Pastor's
portfolio. EOS Spain is one of the 43 companies under the EOS
Group umbrella. The EOS Group, a subsidiary of the Otto Group, was
formed in 1974 and its headquarters are in Germany. The EOS Group
is a financial service provider covering three business units:
information management, arrears management and receivables
management. The EOS Group, and its parent the Otto Group are non-
rated entities. Moody's notes that the management companies will
coordinate the appointment of replacement servicer if the primary
servicer or BUS are not able to perform their duties. The
management companies also act as an independent cash manager and
will be able to use available funds, including reserve fund, to
support timely payments on the notes in case of a temporary
servicer disruption.

Moody's notes that the appointment of EOS as back up servicer
mitigates payment disruption risk in these two transactions as
described in Moody's rating guidance entitled "Global Structured
Finance Operational Risk Guidelines: Moody's Approach to Analyzing
Performance Disruption Risk." EOS Spain commits to act as back-up
servicer within six month of receiving the request from the
management companies.

The Operational Risk Guidelines described in this press release
complement the applicable principal methodologies for each asset
class. To identify the primary methodology for each of the asset
classes of the affected transactions, please refer to the index of
methodologies under the research and ratings tab on

Transaction Features

IM 3 and IM 4 closed in June 2005 and June 2006 respectively. Both
transactions are backed by a portfolio of first-ranking mortgage
loans secured on residential properties located in Spain, for an
overall balance at closing of EUR 1 billion (IM 3) and EUR 920
million (IM 4). The securitized mortgage portfolios benefit from a
relatively low weighted average LTV (currently 56% and 57%
respectively), with no loan exceeding 80% LTV at closing. The two
pools are fairly exposed to the Mediterranean coast. A significant
portion of the pools has been originated via brokers or other
external channels, representing between c. 30% and 40% of pool
balance in both transactions.

For details on the deals structures, please refer to the "IM
Pastor 3" and "IM Pastor 4" new issue reports.

Some remedial actions were taken following the downgrade of
counterparties in the transactions:

Accounts Bank and Paying Agent: Bankinter (A2/P1) now replaces
Banco Sabadell (A3/P2) as Paying Agent and Bank Account Provider
in IM 3 and IM 4 following the downgrade of Banco Sabadell on 24
March 2011.

Hedging agreement: Banco Pastor acts as swap counterparty in IM 4
with payment obligations under the swap guaranteed by Banco
Popular Espanol (A2/P1). Banco Pastor has informed Moody's that
the Confederacion Espanola de Cajas de Ahorro (CECA, A1 (on review
for possible downgrade) /P1) will act as swap counterparty.
Moody's will monitor the compliance of the transactions with the
current Moody's framework (see "Framework for De-Linking Hedge
Counterparty Risks from Global Structured Finance Cash Flow
Transactions Moody's Methodology", published 18 October 2010).
CECA (A1(on review for possible downgrade)/P1) acts as the swap
counterparty in IM 3.


The primary methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa, published in
October 2009. Please see the Credit Policy page on
for a copy of this methodology.

Other methodology used in this rating was Moody's Updated
Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS, published in October 2009.

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes. The rating agency's ratings
address only the credit risks associated with the transaction.
Moody's has not addressed non-credit risks, which may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

List of Actions

Issuer: IM PASTOR 3 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria

   -- EUR961M A Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Mar 25, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR17M B Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Mar 25, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR12M C Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
      Jan 29, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- EUR10M D Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
      Jan 29, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: IM PASTOR 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR886M A Certificate, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
      Mar 25, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR17.9M B Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on Jan 29, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Nears Long-Term Funding Deal with U.S. Investor
Christina Zander at Dow Jones Newswires reports that Saab
Automobile is looking to close a long-term funding deal with a
U.S. investor.

According to Dow Jones, the Swedish daily Dagens Industri cited an
anonymous source as saying an unnamed U.S. investor is planning to
take an ownership stake in Saab Automobile.

Saab Automobile's chief executive and major shareholder,
Victor Muller, declined to comment on the reports, Dow Jones

With an annual production of up to 126,000 cars, Saab's current
models include the 9-3 (available as a convertible or sport
sedan), the luxury 9-5 sedan (also available in a sport wagon),
and the seven-passenger 9-7X SUV.  As it prepared to separate from
General Motors, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection in February
2009.  A year later, in February 2010, GM sold Saab to Dutch
sports car maker Spyker Cars for about US$400 million in cash and


* TURKEY: Moody's Says Post-Election Policies to Affect Rating
Growing domestic and external imbalances will, if left unchecked,
begin to adversely affect Turkey's rating trajectory, says Moody's
Investors Service in a new Special Comment published on Aug. 3.
The resilience of Turkey's economic and fiscal fundamentals during
the global financial crisis has underpinned the positive outlook
on the country's Ba2 rating, but a lack of corrective action on
domestic and external imbalances could stall positive rating

The Turkish economy's robust growth rate has contributed to an
improving fiscal position. At the same time, domestic and external
imbalances have been growing. Turkey's large current account
deficit is a particular issue, as the government is now financing
its deficit using sources of capital that are more volatile. In
Moody's opinion, Turkey is therefore susceptible to sudden shocks
or shifts in investor sentiment.

Now that Turkey's elections are over, Moody's expects that the
policy environment will be relatively dynamic and that the
direction of fiscal and monetary policy will be important for the
rating trajectory over the next 12 months. The rating could be
upgraded if Turkey's fiscal fundamentals improve further, with a
fiscal and monetary policy stance that reverses recent growth in
internal and external imbalances, including a narrowing in the
current account deficit.

In Moody's view, Turkey's more immediate challenge is to
strengthen its resilience to external shocks by restraining
domestic demand. This will generate larger primary surpluses and
reduce its debt levels. At the same time, additional measures
could include a narrowing of its external imbalance and the
accumulation of a larger buffer of both private and official
foreign-exchange reserves.

If vulnerabilities continue to increase -- such as the large
current account deficit, growing inflationary pressures and strong
credit growth -- and external buffers diminish or remain the same,
Turkey's resilience could be undermined. This, in turn, could
cause downward pressure on the credit.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HOOKWAYS LIMITED: Faces liquidation Amid High Fuel Cost
BBC News reports that Hookways Limited is facing going into
liquidation due to continuous rises in fuel costs.

Liquidators Begbies Traynor said Hookways was due to go into
liquidation on August 23.

BBC relates that the liquidators said creditors had been informed
and they were also keen to talk to anyone interested in the

"It is no surprise that the sector, hit by the very high cost of
fuel, is facing such severe difficulties," BBC quotes Ian Walker
and John Kelly, of Begbies Traynor, as saying.  "Hookways has
survived previous recessions but have found this one just too

Exeter-based Hookways Limited is a coach company.  It has more
than 50 vehicles and employs 70 people.  The company, which was
started in 1929 and is also a tour operator.

NATIONWIDE CHRISTIAN: Enters Insolvency Proceedings
Lisa Campbell at The Bookseller reports that The Nationwide
Christian Trust (NCT), the parent company of Living Oasis
bookshops, has entered insolvency.

The Bookseller relates that suppliers were issued with an
insolvency notice for The Nationwide Christian Trust, signed by
its owner Ray George, on August 1.  The first meeting for
creditors will take place in Essex on August 17, the report notes.

Along with running the 19 former Wesley Owen bookshops under the
name Living Oasis, the NCT also ran courses and events at Mulberry
House in High Ongar, Essex, according to The Bookseller.

In the last four months, The Bookseller says, the Living Oasis
shop portfolio has fallen from 19 to two, with only Harrogate and
Watford branches left trading.

Mr. George told The Bookseller the Christian bookselling chain had
been put up for sale.

"We have lost GBP1.2 million in the last year and we are pulling
out of book retailing.  It is us too much for us to continue with,
we cannot face these losses," Mr. George told The Bookseller.  He
indicated the NCT had borne the brunt of the financial strain.

The Nationwide Christian Trust is a UK based organization, seeking
to help people find The Lord and strengthen them in their
spiritual lives through books, DVD's, CD's and Christian greeting

PRIMROSE ASSOCIATES: London Police Drops Probe Into Owner
Sam Macdonald at MoneyMarketing reports that City of London Police
will take no further action against Peter Carron, a former St
James's Place adviser and owner of liquidated Primrose Associates,
after dropping its investigation into alleged fraudulent use of
over GBP4 million of client funds.

Mr. Carron advised SJP clients to invest in his firms Primrose
Associates, Comment Technologies and Evaluate Technologies,
MoneyMarketing notes.

According to MoneyMarketing, London city police said the 41-year-
old male had been released from police bail.

"A 41-year-old man was arrested on 15 July 2010 on suspicion of
fraud offences. He has been released from police bail. After
reviewing the case the Crown Prosecution Service decided there was
insufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of a conviction.
City of London Police will take no further action," the statement
said, according to MoneyMarketing.

Primrose Associates was placed into liquidation on June 21 and
John Kelmanson, joint liquidator of the company, has said that
GBP4 million of client money was passed from Primrose Associates
to another business, Evaluate Technologies, which has also gone
into liquidation.

Primrose Associates is a mortgage broker based in London.

ROYAL BANK: Posts GBP1.4-Bil. Net Loss in First Half 2011
Gavin Finch at Bloomberg News reports that Royal Bank of Scotland
Group Plc, Britain's biggest government-controlled bank, swung
into loss in the first half after writing down the value of its
Greek debt and setting aside funds to compensate insurance

According to Bloomberg, Edinburgh-based RBS said in a statement on
Friday that the net loss was GBP1.4 billion (US$2.3 billion),
compared with a profit of GBP9 million in the year-earlier-period.

RBS, bailed out by the government after its purchase of ABN Amro
Holding NV in 2007, set aside GBP850 million to compensate clients
who were improperly sold personal-loan insurance, Bloomberg

RBS's net loss widened to GBP897 million in the second quarter
from a GBP528 million loss in the first three months of the year,
Bloomberg notes.

                            About RBS

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) -- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc
(NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks.  The
company's activities are organized in six business divisions:
Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and
United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising
Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS
Insurance and Manufacturing.  On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings
B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V.,
Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and
controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding
N.V. (ABN AMRO).  In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire
interest in Global Voice Group Ltd.

STERLING HELICOPTERS: Applies for Liquidation
BBC News reports that Sterling Helicopters, a Norfolk-based
helicopter company formerly used by the East Anglian Air Ambulance
(EAAA), has applied to be put in liquidation.  PKF (UK) LLP has
been appointed as liquidator.

Creditors Toby Blackwell Limited and the EAAA have applied to
court to place the company in liquidation, BBC says.

BBC relates that PKF is hoping a new business will take over.

"There is a slim chance that we will be able to salvage the
company and we hope that a new business will emerge from the
former home of the EAAA," BBC quotes Matt Howard, corporate
recovery partner of PKF, as saying.

Sterling Helicopters is a helicopter charter company based at
Norwich Airport.  The company has 19 members of staff.  Sterling
operated the EAAA and Norfolk Police Air Services until February

* UK: One in Three law Centers Set to Shut Down
Jonathan Rayner and Catherine Baksi at Law Society Gazette reports
solicitors have predicted that at least a third of law centers
will close if government plans to cut legal aid funding go ahead
this autumn.

The warning came after Law for All, went into administration,
weeks after the Immigration Advisory Service also collapsed,
according to Law Society Gazette.

Julie Bishop, director of the Law Centres Federation, said 18 of
the 56 law centers nationwide were particularly susceptible to
closure, because legal aid accounts for more than 60% of their
revenue, the report notes.  Legal aid rates will be cut by 10%
across the board this October, Law Society Gazette discloses.

The report notes that Ms. Bishop's concerns were echoed by Bob
Nightingale, chief executive of the London Legal Support Trust,
who added that 'many more' than a third was likely to cease

Ms. Bishop said the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)'s removal of welfare
advice and most debt, employment and housing advice from the scope
of legal aid will slash the number of clients receiving help from
law centers each year from 120,000, to just 40,000, Law Society
Gazette discloses.

Law Society Gazette notes that Anne McNicholas, supervising
solicitor at Paddington Law Centre, said it was facing a GBP45,000
cut in its local authority funding on top of legal aid cuts. She
said it was not clear how the centre could survive.

Law Society Gazette relates that Law Society President John Wotton
said that the law centre closures would mean there was 'no true
access to justice'.

The report notes that the MoJ is to provide a GBP20 million fund
to help law centers to make the transition to the new tighter
funding regime.  However, law centre solicitors suggested this
would not be enough to keep them afloat, the report relates.

An unnamed MoJ spokesman said the not-for-profit sector was not
exempted from the need to make more efficient use of taxpayers'
money within the legal aid system, Law Society Gazette discloses.
The MoJ has set up a transition fund that will make 107m
available to the wider voluntary sector, he added.

Last week, social welfare provider Law for All blamed the
impending 10% legal aid cuts and the burden of LSC bureaucracy for
its decision to go into administration, Law Society Gazette

An unnamed LSC spokesman said its priority was to work with the
firm's administrators to ensure clients receive the help they
need, Law Society Gazette says.

Earlier in July, national not-for-profit provider the Immigration
Advisory Service also went into administration, citing legal aid
cuts as a reason for its closure, the report adds.


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 80 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took credit rating actions on
80 European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO)

Specifically, S&P:

    Affirmed its ratings on 45 tranches,

    Lowered its ratings on 28 tranches,

    Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
    six tranches, and

    Lowered and kept on CreditWatch negative its rating on one

A full list of rating actions is accessible for free at:

"The rating actions are part of our regular monthly review of
synthetic CDOs. The actions incorporate, among other things, the
effect of recent rating migration within reference portfolios and
recent credit events on several corporate entities," S&P related.

"Where losses in a portfolio have already exceeded the available
credit enhancement or where, in our opinion, it is highly likely
that this will occur once final valuations are known, we have
lowered our ratings to 'CC' because we consider the likelihood
that the noteholders will not receive their full principal to be
high, but has not yet happened," S&P said.

"For those transactions where our September 2009 criteria (see
'Update To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash
Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published on Sept. 17, 2009) are not
applicable, we have run our analysis on the appropriate Evaluator
models (versions 2.7 and 4.1). For the transactions where the
September 2009 criteria are applicable, our analysis has been run
on Evaluator version 5.1," S&P said.

"The rating actions and the CreditWatch updates follow two
reviews. The first review was of the CreditWatch placements made
on July 20, 2011 (see 'S&P Takes CreditWatch Actions On European
Synthetic CDOs After Running June 2011 Month-End SROC Figures'),"
S&P related.

For the second review, we run SROC (synthetic rated
overcollateralization) for scenarios that project the current
portfolio 90 days into the future, assuming no asset rating

"For the transactions run on version 5.1, we have also run the top
obligor and industry test SROCs at the current rating level. The
'largest obligor default test' assesses whether a CDO tranche has
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand specified combinations
of underlying asset defaults based on the ratings on the assets.
The 'largest industry default test' assesses whether the CDO
tranche rated 'AAA' to 'AA-' has sufficient credit enhancement to
withstand the default of all obligors in the transaction's largest
industry," S&P said.

"In addition to the supplemental tests, and the Monte Carlo
default simulation results, we may consider certain factors such
as credit stability and rating sensitivity to modeling parameters
when assigning ratings to CDO tranches. We assess these factors
case-by-case and may adjust the ratings to a rating level that is
different to that indicated by the quantitative results alone,"
S&P said.

"For any tranches to which the updated counterparty criteria is
applicable, where our ratings pass SROC and all the applicable
supplemental tests but are higher than one rating level above the
ICR of the lowest-rated counterparty to which they are exposed, we
have kept them on CreditWatch negative," S&P related.

                           What Is SROC?

One of the main steps in our rating analysis is the review of the
credit quality of the securitized assets. "SROC is one of the
tools we use for this purpose when rating and surveilling ratings
assigned to most synthetic CDO tranches. SROC is a measure of the
degree by which the credit enhancement (or attachment point) of a
tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate assumed for a given rating
scenario. It is comparable across different tranches of the same
rating," S&P said.

Changes in SROC capture any developments in the major influences
on a tranche's creditworthiness: The credit quality of a reference
portfolio, improvement or deterioration of ratings in the
reference portfolio, credit events, and time decay. "When SROC is
100%, we believe that there is exactly sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the rating on a tranche," S&P said.

"When SROC is less than 100%, it indicates that the current credit
enhancement may not be sufficient to maintain the current tranche
rating, in our opinion. If [Wednes]day's SROC is less than 100%,
but the 90 day projection indicates that the SROC would return to
a level above 100% at that time, we usually maintain the rating at
its current level and it remains on CreditWatch negative. However,
where there is a difference of several notches in the rating level
at which [Wednes] day's SROC is passing and the level at which
SROC passes in 90 days, rather than maintaining its current rating
and keeping the CreditWatch negative placement, we may decide to
lower the rating and keep it on CreditWatch negative. If, on the
other hand, the projection indicates that the SROC would remain
below 100%, we may lower the rating, subject to our criteria (see
'Related Criteria And Research')," S&P said.

If the current SROC of a tranche would be greater than 100% at a
higher rating level than the current rating, we may raise our
rating, subject to our criteria (see 'Related Criteria And
Research')," S&P added.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 1 to August 5, 2011

Issuer                  Coupon     Maturity  Currency    Price
------                  ------     --------  --------    -----

BA CREDITANSTALT          5.470    8/28/2013      EUR     70.75
HAA-BANK INTL AG          5.250   10/27/2015      EUR     73.25
IMMOFINANZ                4.250     3/8/2018      EUR      3.79
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.900    8/18/2025      EUR     66.00
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.170    7/29/2015      EUR     69.88
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.810    7/29/2025      EUR     61.00
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           4.500    9/28/2035      EUR     69.21

CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    3/30/2016      EUR     64.99
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    10/9/2016      EUR     63.17
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     1/2/2016      EUR     66.15
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750    12/2/2015      EUR     67.17
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          3.750    11/1/2015      EUR     64.54
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750    9/30/2015      EUR     68.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.600   10/26/2016      EUR     70.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     1/4/2017      EUR     63.07
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    2/15/2017      EUR     63.06
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     4/2/2017      EUR     63.01
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.250     6/9/2015      EUR     71.32
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000    4/20/2015      EUR     74.23
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.600    4/15/2017      EUR     65.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000    2/28/2015      EUR     75.09
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.100    1/29/2018      EUR     65.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600    4/23/2018      EUR     63.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    9/28/2017      EUR     62.97
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600    2/26/2019      EUR     64.95
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100    6/24/2019      EUR     72.66
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    7/11/2016      EUR     63.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.000     6/9/2016      EUR     64.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     6/2/2016      EUR     64.01
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   10/23/2018      EUR     64.37
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100    4/20/2020      EUR     72.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.350     6/9/2020      EUR     68.65
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000     6/9/2021      EUR     68.40
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.625     2/3/2020      EUR     63.47
MARFIN POPULAR            4.350   11/20/2014      EUR     75.13
REP OF CYPRUS             4.750    2/25/2016      EUR     68.00

KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500     2/3/2016      TRY     72.85
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR     46.83
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    3/17/2025      CAD     58.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.250    6/28/2040      CAD     24.00
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR     70.24
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR     47.13
MUNI FINANCE PLC          1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR     63.43
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR     56.53
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    9/24/2020      CAD     73.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR     69.27
MUNI FINANCE PLC          1.000    2/27/2018      AUD     76.11

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970     4/1/2015      EUR     11.99
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000     1/1/2015      EUR      3.41
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720     1/1/2015      EUR      5.31
ASSYSTEM                  4.000     1/1/2017      EUR     20.79
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500     1/1/2016      EUR     49.54
CALYON                    6.000    6/18/2047      EUR     24.56
CAP GEMINI SOGET          1.000     1/1/2012      EUR     41.74
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500     1/1/2014      EUR     38.98
CGG VERITAS               1.750     1/1/2016      EUR     26.58
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110    11/1/2015      EUR     19.19
CLUB MEDITERRANE          5.000     6/8/2012      EUR     15.11
CMA CGM                   8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     56.67
CMA CGM                   8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     53.43
CMA CGM                   8.500    4/15/2017      USD     58.20
CMA CGM                   8.500    4/15/2017      USD     80.35
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          1.000   12/23/2024      EUR     64.28
EURAZEO                   6.250    6/10/2014      EUR     56.38
FAURECIA                  4.500     1/1/2015      EUR     23.00
INGENICO                  2.750     1/1/2017      EUR     39.01
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125    7/31/2015      EUR     16.31
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125    7/31/2014      EUR     17.02
NEXANS SA                 4.000     1/1/2016      EUR     61.07
NOVASEP HLDG              9.625   12/15/2016      EUR     57.03
ORPEA                     3.875     1/1/2016      EUR     45.36
PEUGEOT SA                4.450     1/1/2016      EUR     28.95
PUBLICIS GROUPE           3.125    7/30/2014      EUR     34.45
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000    1/18/2018      EUR     48.33
RHODIA SA                 0.500     1/1/2014      EUR     51.97
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750     4/1/2020      EUR     20.30
SOITEC                    6.250     9/9/2014      EUR      8.84
TEM                       4.250     1/1/2015      EUR     53.73
THEOLIA                   2.700     1/1/2041      EUR     10.56

BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.640     6/6/2025      EUR     78.16
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.230    8/28/2020      EUR     78.15
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          3.990    7/29/2016      EUR     77.95
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.240    1/24/2017      EUR     78.16
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          3.910    9/14/2017      EUR     75.64
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.160   10/31/2017      EUR     76.68
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.060   11/24/2017      EUR     76.21
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.550    10/4/2018      EUR     78.38
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.440    8/30/2019      EUR     78.27
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.480     3/3/2026      EUR     75.91
COMMERZBANK AG            4.000   11/30/2017      EUR     63.00
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000    4/20/2018      EUR     65.96
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000    3/30/2018      EUR     65.97
EUROHYPO AG               6.490    7/17/2017      EUR      5.75
EUROHYPO AG               5.560    8/18/2023      EUR     69.75
EUROHYPO AG               3.830    9/21/2020      EUR     64.63
HSH NORDBANK AG           4.375    2/14/2017      EUR     68.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR          6.550    3/31/2012      EUR     18.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK          0.500    5/10/2027      CAD     53.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.800    2/23/2037      JPY     69.80
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.500    1/30/2034      EUR     71.32
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.250   10/20/2015      EUR     28.67
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN          5.875    2/10/2016      EUR     59.03
Q-CELLS                   6.750   10/21/2015      EUR      1.99
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750    3/22/2013      USD      2.38
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375    12/6/2012      EUR     26.13
TAG IMMO AG               6.500   12/10/2015      EUR      8.05
TUI AG                    2.750    3/24/2016      EUR     46.50
TUI AG                    5.500   11/17/2014      EUR     65.26

ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.301    8/12/2014      EUR     57.38
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.851    9/19/2016      EUR     54.03
ATHENS URBAN TRN          5.008    7/18/2017      EUR     54.67
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.057    3/26/2013      EUR     66.18
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.300    7/25/2030      EUR     42.04
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.900    7/25/2025      EUR     40.54
HELLENIC REPUB            5.000    3/11/2019      EUR     54.00
HELLENIC REPUB            4.590     4/8/2016      EUR     53.25
HELLENIC REPUB            5.200    7/17/2034      EUR     49.63
HELLENIC REPUB            6.140    4/14/2028      EUR     53.00
HELLENIC REPUB            2.125     7/5/2013      CHF     74.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.100    8/20/2012      EUR     71.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.300    3/20/2026      EUR     49.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.506    3/31/2013      EUR     70.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    5/20/2013      EUR     65.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI          7.500    5/20/2013      EUR     68.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.900     7/3/2013      EUR     67.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.427    7/31/2013      EUR     64.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.000    8/20/2013      EUR     61.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.520    9/30/2013      EUR     62.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500    1/11/2014      EUR     60.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    5/20/2014      EUR     58.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500     7/1/2014      EUR     58.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.985    7/25/2014      EUR     53.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.500    8/20/2014      EUR     57.31
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.113    9/30/2014      EUR     53.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700    7/20/2015      EUR     55.97
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.100    8/20/2015      EUR     58.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.702    9/30/2015      EUR     51.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700   11/10/2015      EUR     50.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.600    7/20/2016      EUR     56.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.020    9/13/2016      EUR     51.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.225     3/1/2017      EUR     53.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900    4/20/2017      EUR     57.29
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300    7/20/2017      EUR     57.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.675    10/9/2017      EUR     54.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    7/20/2018      EUR     56.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.000    7/19/2019      EUR     56.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.161    9/17/2019      EUR     51.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500   10/22/2019      EUR     57.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.250    6/19/2020      EUR     58.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900   10/22/2022      EUR     52.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.700    3/20/2024      EUR     48.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    9/20/2037      EUR     46.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    9/20/2040      EUR     46.41
NATL BK GREECE            3.875    10/7/2016      EUR     64.17

AIB MORTGAGE BNK          4.875    6/29/2017      EUR     72.02
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.580    4/28/2028      EUR     52.05
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000    2/12/2030      EUR     46.66
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000     3/1/2030      EUR     46.63
ALLIED IRISH BKS          4.000    3/19/2015      EUR     73.84
ALLIED IRISH BKS          5.625   11/12/2014      EUR     71.50
ALLIED IRISH BKS         12.500    6/25/2035      GBP     24.38
ANGLO IRISH BANK          4.000    4/15/2015      EUR     70.17
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000    2/12/2020      GBP     35.33
BANK OF IRELAND           5.600    9/18/2023      EUR     33.88
BANK OF IRELAND           4.473   11/30/2016      EUR     50.88
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000    2/12/2020      EUR     30.00
BANK OF IRELAND           3.780     4/1/2015      EUR     72.78
BANK OF IRELAND           3.585    4/21/2015      EUR     62.25
BANK OF IRELAND           4.000    1/28/2015      EUR     74.37
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.360   10/12/2029      EUR     48.81
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.760     9/7/2029      EUR     51.73
BK IRELAND MTGE           3.250    6/22/2015      EUR     74.37
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.450     3/1/2030      EUR     49.00
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.400    11/6/2029      EUR     49.03
DEPFA ACS BANK            4.900    8/24/2035      CAD     67.48
DEPFA ACS BANK            0.500     3/3/2025      CAD     39.86
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125    3/16/2037      USD     76.00
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125    3/16/2037      USD     78.24
EBS BLDG SOCIETY          4.000    2/25/2015      EUR     73.11
IRISH GOVT                5.400    3/13/2025      EUR     69.48
IRISH GOVT                5.000   10/18/2020      EUR     69.35
IRISH GOVT                4.500    4/18/2020      EUR     68.59
IRISH GOVT                5.900   10/18/2019      EUR     74.45
IRISH GOVT                4.400    6/18/2019      EUR     69.93
IRISH GOVT                4.500   10/18/2018      EUR     71.92
IRISH LIFE PERM           4.000    3/10/2015      EUR     69.13
IRISH NATIONWIDE          6.250    6/26/2012      GBP     70.00

BANCA POP ALTO            2.080    7/14/2020      EUR     64.07
BTPS                      4.000     2/1/2037      EUR     69.50
BTPS I/L                  2.350    9/15/2035      EUR     69.56
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.000    11/2/2016      EUR     73.88
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.400    9/17/2017      EUR     69.75
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.500     3/5/2016      EUR     74.13
CITY OF TURIN             5.270    6/26/2038      EUR     72.76
COMUNE DI MILANO          4.019    6/29/2035      EUR     68.70
INTESA SANPAOLO           1.750    1/19/2026      EUR     68.05
REP OF ITALY              4.850    6/11/2060      EUR     72.14
REP OF ITALY              2.000    9/15/2062      EUR     53.52
REP OF ITALY              2.870    5/19/2036      JPY     61.13
REP OF ITALY              2.200    9/15/2058      EUR     59.22
REP OF ITALY              1.850    9/15/2057      EUR     52.79
ROMULUS FINANCE           5.441    2/20/2023      GBP     72.64
SARDINIA REGION           4.022   11/28/2035      EUR     73.74
TELECOM ITALIA            5.250    3/17/2055      EUR     73.21

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250     4/1/2014      EUR     24.86
ESPIRITO SANTO F          6.875   10/21/2019      EUR     57.50
LIGHTHOUSE INTL           8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     25.47
LIGHTHOUSE INTL           8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     25.67
APP INTL FINANCE         11.750    10/1/2005      USD      0.01

BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/17/2016      TRY     71.75
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    4/27/2016      TRY     71.19
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR     44.84
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    2/24/2025      CAD     59.23
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    5/25/2016      TRY     70.78
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR     45.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/29/2021      NZD     63.17
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500     3/3/2021      NZD     63.53
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    6/22/2016      TRY     70.29
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/29/2021      USD     75.85
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500    5/15/2014      USD     79.95
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500    5/15/2014      USD     71.13
BRIT INSURANCE            6.625    12/9/2030      GBP     64.97
DGS INTL FIN BV          10.000     6/1/2007      USD      0.01
EDP FINANCE BV            4.125    6/29/2020      EUR     73.30
ELEC DE CAR FIN           8.500    4/10/2018      USD     59.93
FRIESLAND BANK            4.210   12/29/2025      EUR     74.61
INDAH KIAT INTL          12.500    6/15/2006      USD      0.01
NATL INVESTER BK         25.983     5/7/2029      EUR     20.64
NED WATERSCHAPBK          0.500    3/11/2025      CAD     58.63
NIB CAPITAL BANK          4.510   12/16/2035      EUR     66.96
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          4.500    6/16/2025      EUR     71.89
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750    5/26/2014      EUR     43.54
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375    2/28/2012      EUR     71.71
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          2.910    6/21/2036      JPY     72.50
SIDETUR FINANCE          10.000    4/20/2016      USD     69.25
TJIWI KIMIA FIN          13.250     8/1/2001      USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS             0.500     5/9/2030      CAD     45.93
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   12/18/2015      ZAR     73.77
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    1/27/2016      ZAR     73.13
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR     72.59
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR     72.18
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR     71.21
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR     72.80
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR     69.74
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR     59.83
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/29/2016      TRY     72.66
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125   10/15/2033      USD     55.13
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.000    6/26/2017      EUR     55.12
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125   10/15/2033      USD     55.13

BANCO BPI                 1.000    4/10/2014      EUR     74.07
BANCO COM PORTUG          5.625    4/23/2014      EUR     73.07
BANCO COM PORTUG          4.750    6/22/2017      EUR     69.28
BANCO COM PORTUG          3.750    10/8/2016      EUR     68.45
BANCO ESPIRITO            6.160    7/23/2015      EUR     73.38
BANCO ESPIRITO            6.875    7/15/2016      EUR     68.13
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600    9/15/2016      EUR     73.37
BANCO ESPIRITO            3.875    1/21/2015      EUR     72.87
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600    1/26/2017      EUR     71.85
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          3.875    12/6/2016      EUR     70.97
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.380    10/1/2038      EUR     51.94
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.980     3/3/2028      EUR     66.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.250    1/27/2020      EUR     66.14
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.400    10/8/2019      EUR     52.86
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.455    8/20/2017      EUR     73.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.050    4/26/2016      EUR     70.98
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.750    2/14/2016      EUR     62.23
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.500    1/19/2016      EUR     70.31
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          3.511    10/7/2014      EUR     74.47
METRO DE LISBOA           5.750     2/4/2019      EUR     58.29
METRO DE LISBOA           4.799    12/7/2027      EUR     46.30
METRO DE LISBOA           4.061    12/4/2026      EUR     52.66
METRO DE LISBOA           7.300   12/23/2025      EUR     60.25
MONTEPIO GERAL            5.000     2/8/2017      EUR     60.13
PARPUBLICA                4.200   11/16/2026      EUR     46.50
PARPUBLICA                4.191   10/15/2014      EUR     72.38
PARPUBLICA                3.567    9/22/2020      EUR     47.75
PARPUBLICA                3.500     7/8/2013      EUR     75.00
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500    3/25/2015      USD     71.08
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500    3/25/2015      USD     73.19
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.350   10/16/2017      EUR     60.46
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.750    6/14/2019      EUR     59.69
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.200   10/15/2016      EUR     64.36
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.800    6/15/2020      EUR     59.31
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.850    4/15/2021      EUR     57.41
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.950   10/25/2023      EUR     56.25
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.100    4/15/2037      EUR     52.76
PORTUGUESE OT'S           6.400    2/15/2016      EUR     72.73
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.350   10/15/2015      EUR     66.18
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.600   10/15/2014      EUR     73.44
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.375    6/16/2014      EUR     75.59
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.450    6/15/2018      EUR     60.30
REFER                     4.675   10/16/2024      EUR     47.00
REFER                     4.047   11/16/2026      EUR     47.81
REFER                     4.000    3/16/2015      EUR     57.38
REFER                     5.875    2/18/2019      EUR     57.38
REFER                     4.250   12/13/2021      EUR     45.13

APK ARKADA               17.500    5/23/2012      RUB      0.38
ARIZK                     3.000   12/20/2030      RUB     52.74
DVTG-FINANS              17.000    8/29/2013      RUB     55.55
DVTG-FINANS               7.750    7/18/2013      RUB     20.29
ENERGOMASH-FINAN         13.000   11/22/2011      RUB      0.02
IART                      8.500     8/4/2013      RUB      1.00
M-INDUSTRIYA             12.250    8/16/2011      RUB      9.03
MIG-FINANS                0.100     9/6/2011      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                    17.000    9/17/2012      RUB      2.00
MOSMART FINANS            0.010    4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
NOK                      10.000    9/22/2011      RUB     49.90
NOK                      12.500    8/26/2014      RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA          1.000   12/17/2012      RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE            9.000    6/12/2012      RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC                  3.270    4/19/2018      RUB     53.99
RBC OJSC                  7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     69.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     70.00
SAHO                     10.000    5/21/2012      RUB      0.03
SATURN                    8.500     6/6/2014      RUB      1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS          10.500    3/27/2012      RUB      3.40
TERNA-FINANS              1.000    11/4/2011      RUB      0.01

AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750    6/30/2025      EUR     60.93
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750   12/14/2022      EUR     69.22
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.750    5/25/2027      EUR     68.81
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.250   10/25/2023      EUR     71.04
BANCAJA                   1.500    5/22/2018      EUR     66.82
BANCO PASTOR              4.550    7/31/2020      EUR     72.67
CAJA CASTIL-MAN           1.500    6/23/2021      EUR     61.47
CAJA MADRID               5.020    2/26/2038      EUR     73.62
CAJA MADRID               4.125    3/24/2036      EUR     64.14
CAJA MADRID               4.000     2/3/2025      EUR     71.37
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          4.250    4/10/2031      EUR     59.95
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          3.875    5/23/2025      EUR     63.60
CEDULAS TDA A-4           4.125    4/10/2021      EUR     75.37
CEDULAS TDA A-5           4.250    3/28/2027      EUR     62.16
COMUN AUTO CANAR          4.200   10/25/2036      EUR     62.93
COMUN AUTO CANAR          3.900   11/30/2035      EUR     59.94
COMUNIDAD ARAGON          4.646    7/11/2036      EUR     73.82
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          4.063   11/23/2035      EUR     61.06
COMUNIDAD MADRID          4.300    9/15/2026      EUR     71.61
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.690   10/28/2034      EUR     66.68
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.220    4/26/2035      EUR     61.41
GENERAL DE ALQUI          2.750    8/20/2012      EUR     75.21
IM CEDULAS 5              3.500    6/15/2020      EUR     73.05
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          3.250    6/28/2024      CHF     75.08
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.570   10/22/2021      CHF     73.65
INSTITUT CATALA           4.250    6/15/2024      EUR     72.33
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           4.250   10/31/2036      EUR     67.10
JUNTA LA MANCHA           3.875    1/31/2036      EUR     51.17
SPANISH GOV'T             4.200    1/31/2037      EUR     71.26
XUNTA DE GALICIA          4.025   11/28/2035      EUR     69.38

SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.750    3/23/2012      USD      8.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.250    4/27/2012      USD      8.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500    6/12/2012      USD      9.69
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000     3/9/2012      USD     10.26
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500    2/28/2012      USD      8.77
SWEDISH EXP CRED          8.000    1/27/2012      USD      7.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED          6.500    1/27/2012      USD      8.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED          2.130    1/10/2012      USD      9.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED          2.000    12/7/2011      USD     10.33
SWEDISH EXP CRED          8.000    11/4/2011      USD      7.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED          8.000   10/21/2011      USD      9.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.000    8/12/2011      USD     10.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR     72.51
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR     71.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR     69.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    6/29/2016      TRY     67.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500     3/5/2018      AUD     73.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000     3/9/2012      USD      9.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/25/2021      ZAR     48.94
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   12/17/2027      USD     56.77
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    1/25/2028      USD     55.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/25/2016      ZAR     72.24

CRED SUIS NY              8.000     8/3/2012      USD     56.60
CYTOS BIOTECH             2.875    2/20/2012      CHF     68.25
UBS AG                    9.250    3/20/2012      USD     13.83
UBS AG                   10.070    3/23/2012      USD     35.34
UBS AG                   13.300    5/23/2012      USD      4.00
UBS AG                   14.000    5/23/2012      USD      7.99
UBS AG                   11.760    7/31/2012      USD     27.15
UBS AG                   10.530    1/23/2012      USD     39.81
UBS AG JERSEY             3.220    7/31/2012      EUR     40.73
UBS AG JERSEY            10.360    8/19/2011      USD     51.48
UBS AG JERSEY            10.140   12/30/2011      USD     14.79
UBS AG JERSEY            11.150    8/31/2011      USD     38.35
UBS AG JERSEY             9.450    9/21/2011      USD     49.91

LVIV CITY                 9.950   12/19/2012      UAH     95.47

ABBEY NATL TREAS          5.000    8/26/2030      USD     71.02
BARCLAYS BK PLC          12.950    4/20/2012      USD     23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.950    4/20/2012      USD     16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.650    1/31/2012      USD     42.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.250    1/31/2012      USD      9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.350    1/23/2012      USD     26.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.550    1/23/2012      USD     11.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC           7.500    9/22/2011      USD     17.12
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.750    9/22/2011      USD     71.74
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.000     6/3/2041      USD     75.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.500    8/31/2012      USD     29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.800    7/31/2012      USD     26.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.400    7/31/2012      USD     11.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000    7/27/2012      USD     10.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC           7.000    7/27/2012      USD      9.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000    7/20/2012      USD     10.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000    6/29/2012      USD     10.08
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.875    3/28/2033      GBP     70.53
DISCOVERY EDUCAT          1.948    3/31/2037      GBP     72.45
EFG HELLAS PLC            6.010     1/9/2036      EUR     32.25
EFG HELLAS PLC            4.375    2/11/2013      EUR     71.95
EFG HELLAS PLC            5.400    11/2/2047      EUR     23.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.350    7/22/2014      EUR     57.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.000    2/28/2013      EUR     70.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.000    2/28/2013      EUR     70.50
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.375    9/26/2031      GBP     68.72
F&C ASSET MNGMT           6.750   12/20/2026      GBP     73.07
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500     6/1/2019      GBP     73.17
HBOS PLC                  6.000    11/1/2033      USD     76.27
HBOS PLC                  6.000    11/1/2033      USD     76.27
HBOS PLC                  4.500    3/18/2030      EUR     71.54
HEALTHCARE SUPP           2.067    2/19/2043      GBP     75.30
NEW HOSPITALS ST          1.777    2/26/2047      GBP     60.74
NOMURA BANK INTL          0.800   12/21/2020      EUR     66.80
NORTHERN ROCK             5.750    2/28/2017      GBP     70.70
PIRAEUS GRP FIN           4.000    9/17/2012      EUR     72.78
PUNCH TAVERNS             8.374    7/15/2029      GBP     64.14
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.692     6/9/2025      EUR     72.19
UNIQUE PUB FIN            6.464    3/30/2032      GBP     56.50
UNIQUE PUB FIN            5.659    6/30/2027      GBP     72.98
WESSEX WATER FIN          1.369    7/31/2057      GBP     33.15


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *