TCREUR_Public/110812.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, August 12, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 159

                            Headlines



G E R M A N Y

SILVER TOWER: Fitch Lifts Rating on EUR60-Mil. Loan From 'BBsf'
VG MICROFINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Senior CDO Notes to 'B+sf'


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Reform Program Stalls; Bond Swap Extension Likely


H U N G A R Y

WOSSALA HOTEL: In Liquidation; Owes HUF4.9 Billion


I R E L A N D

DUNCANNON CRE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
QUINN INSURANCE: Crowne Plaza Hotel for Sale at GBP35++ Million
SALMONCITA ENTREPRISES: Missing Building Dispute Stalls Wind-Up


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Senior Unsecured Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

DEMATIC SA: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to US$300MM Sr. Sec. Notes
INTELSAT SA: Incurs US$214.4 Million Net Loss in Second Quarter


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC DE: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Class E Notes
GOLDFISH MASTER: Fitch May Cut Rating on Class C Notes to 'Bsf'
JUBILEE CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
MARCO POLO: Seeks Extra Funding to Protect Tanker Ships
MOSCOW STARS: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'BBsf'


R U S S I A

BANK URALSIB: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
CENTER-INVEST BANK: Moody's Upgrades Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
CENTRAL COMM'L: Fitch Withdraws B- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
ROSPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'B2'
ROSPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts National Scale Rating to 'Baa1.ru'


S P A I N

SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Series B Notes
SANTANDER FINANCIACION: Moody's Rates Series C Notes at 'Ca'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: European Suppliers to Prepare Bankruptcy Request


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLACKS LEISURE: Appoints Peter Williams as Interim Chairman
BRITISH AIRWAYS: Moody's Affirms CFR at 'B1'; Outlook Positive
CASTLE INNS: LT Pub to Manage Estate on Administrator's Behalf
CDC LEISURE: Asset Sale Could Take Place Soon, Administrator Says
FIRE PLACE: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation

LLOYDS BANKING: Mike Fairey to Head Branches if Sun Wins Bidding
LOUGH ERNE: Resort Manager Jonathan Stapleton Resigns
SCARISBRICK HOTEL: Lancashire Firms Unlikely to Get Money Back
TUI AG: Stronger Sales in Northern Europe Boost 3rd Quarter Profit


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Vertical Integration


                            *********


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G E R M A N Y
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SILVER TOWER: Fitch Lifts Rating on EUR60-Mil. Loan From 'BBsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three tranche loan facilities entered
into by Silver Tower 125 Inc. as follows:

  -- EUR60m Tranche 1 Loan Facility upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf';
     Positive Outlook

  -- EUR60m Tranche 2 Loan Facility upgraded to 'Asf' from
     'BBBsf'; Positive Outlook

  -- EUR60m Tranche 3 Loan Facility upgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'BBsf'; Positive Outlook

The upgrade reflects the stable performance of the transaction and
the increased credit protection as a result of pool amortization
since the last rating action in March 2010.  Cumulative defaults
amount to 1% of the initial pool balance of EUR3 billion.
Realized losses amount to 0.6% of the initial pool balance and
have been absorbed by credit protection.

The credit protection available to the three facilities consists
of a bad debt ledger of EUR55.2 million and an excess spread
reserve of EUR36.5 million.  Furthermore, there is a discount of
currently EUR7.4 million, which results from the 2% purchase price
discount at which the assets were sold to the issuer.  Once the
assets repay at par, the discount translates into cash, which is
credited to the bad debt ledger, thus increasing the available
credit protection.  As the pool amortizes, the bad debt ledger
will be credited with additional cash, which will provide
additional credit support to the three facilities.  This is
reflected in the Positive Outlook assigned to the three
facilities.

As a result of the quick pool amortization since December 2009,
the large obligor concentrations have increased such that the
largest ten obligors make up 25% of the current pool.  While these
obligor concentrations are substantial, in the agency's view, the
available credit protection is sufficient to provide for a default
of a minimum number of large obligors.

Based on the amortization profile, the total pool balance is
likely to amortize to approximately EUR180 million in around one
year.  From then, the amortization proceeds will be applied to
redeem the three facilities in sequential order.  When the three
facilities start amortizing, the large obligor concentrations will
have further increased due to the fast pool amortization.  In the
agency's view, the additional credit protection resulting from the
pool amortization would be sufficient to provide for the increased
large obligor concentrations.

Fitch received a pool tape as of June 30, 2011.  In order to
analyse the quality of the portfolios, the agency used its
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM), which derives rating-dependent
default and recovery rates.  In Fitch's view, the current credit
enhancement of the rated facilities is sufficient to provide for
the expected losses in the upgraded rating scenarios.


VG MICROFINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Senior CDO Notes to 'B+sf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded VG Microfinance-Invest Nr. 1 GmbH's
senior CDO notes to 'B+sf' from 'BB+sf'.  The Outlook is Negative.
The downgrade reflects the fact that there has been no material
improvement in the portfolio since the last review in April 2009
when the transaction was downgraded and assigned a Negative
Outlook.  The agency remains concerned about the credit quality of
the portfolio, its maturity profile and its concentration risk.

Since the last review there has been one default.  While the
potential loss on the defaulted loan has already been covered by
excess spread captured by the transaction structural features,
breaches of covenants have been reported for three additional
loans.  In addition, all loans in the portfolio are all due to
mature shortly before the transaction's maturity.  If defaults are
concentrated just before the deal maturity, the transaction will
be unable to offset losses with excess spread.

The transaction benefits from generous structural protection
mechanisms through credit enhancement of 44% and also excess
spread.  Given these protections, the agency expects the notes to
be able to withstand at least 50% of default corresponding to five
of the largest obligors.

Fitch has assigned an Issuer Report Grade of 'Three Stars'
(satisfactory).  The trustee and servicer provide detail
information on each microfinance institution of the portfolio and
also payment waterfall when the notes' interest is due.

The transaction consists of subordinated credit exposure against
20 (initially 21) microfinance institutions globally distributed
across 15 jurisdictions.  The institutions were selected by
Deutsche Bank AG ('AA-'/Negative/'F1+') in its role as seller and
protection buyer.


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G R E E C E
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* GREECE: Reform Program Stalls; Bond Swap Extension Likely
-----------------------------------------------------------
Costas Paris and Alkman Granitsas at The Wall Street Journal
report that Greece's ambitious reform program suffered a double
setback Wednesday after it emerged that talks with the country's
creditors on a bond swap plan have stumbled and fresh data showed
a sharp increase in the budget deficit.

Citing poor private sector participation, officials, as cited by
the Journal, said that a plan to swap Greek government debt
maturing by 2020 into new, longer-dated securities, might be
extended to include bonds falling due in 2022 or even 2024.

According to the Journal, speaking in a radio interview, Greek
Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos confirmed that Greece was
struggling to "identify bonds worth EUR150 billion maturing by
2020, or a bit later than 2020," in order to realize its goals.

The Journal relates that a senior euro-zone official said the
amount pledged by bankers under the deal has so far totaled
"around EUR65 billion, which is below expectations."  He added
that a final agreement on the deal is now expected in September,
instead of August as originally hoped for, the Journal notes.

"The plan originally called for exchanging paper maturing until
2020," the Journal quotes the euro-zone official as saying.  "But
the participation by the private sector is poor so far, so it
could be stretched with bonds maturing in 2022 or even 2024."

In July, European Union leaders agreed to a new EUR109 billion
assistance program for Greece to cover its financing needs for the
next several years, the Journal recounts.  Central to the Greek
plan is a distressed-debt exchange whereby the country's private-
sector creditors agree to accept new bonds worth less than their
original holdings, the Journal discloses.

The plan calls for swapping some EUR135 billion in Greek
government bonds maturing between now and 2020 into new 15- and
30-year debt and, if realized, would slice EUR13.5 billion off of
Greece's total stock of EUR350 billion in public debt, the Journal
states.


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H U N G A R Y
=============


WOSSALA HOTEL: In Liquidation; Owes HUF4.9 Billion
--------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing regional daily Veszpremi Naplo, reports that a
liquidation procedure has been initiated against Wossala Hotel.

Wossala Hotels took out a HUF2.9 billion Swiss franc-denominated
loan to finance a renovation in 2005, MTI discloses.  According to
MTI, liquidator Mihaly Safrany told the paper that the company
paid back HUF1.1 billion in principal and interest but still owed
HUF4.9 billion because of the strengthening of the franc to the
forint.

Wossala Hotel operates the four-start Hotel Ramada in
Balatonalmadi.


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I R E L A N D
=============


DUNCANNON CRE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB
(sf)' its credit ratings on Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC's revolving
credit facility (RCF), and class X and A notes. "At the same time,
we lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our credit rating on the
class B notes. We have also affirmed all other ratings in the
transaction," S&P related.

"The rating actions follow our review of the assets that the
issuer owns. Duncannon CRE CDO I is a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction that closed in
2007. The issuer owns a series of subordinated commercial real
estate debt assets ('term loans'), commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) bonds, and corporate securitization securities,
for which we provide either ratings or credit estimates," S&P
related.

The collateral manager, on behalf of the issuer, can use available
cash, or drawings from the revolving credit facility, to purchase
further assets.

At present, the term loans form the largest portion of the
issuer's assets (48.8% by principal balance). "Apart from three
positions in this group, all are debt positions that are
subordinated to securitized loans in transactions that we rate.
Because these positions are subordinated to senior loans, we
believe that on average, the issuer's recovery from these
investments will be depressed, in some cases to zero. Our
weighted-average credit estimate on these positions is 'ccc+',"
S&P said.

The CMBS bonds form the second largest portion of Duncannon's
assets (43.4% by principal balance). "We rate all but one of these
positions and the weighted-average rating is 'BB+'. Our ratings
address timely payment of interest in addition to the ultimate
repayment of principal. Taking this into account, we have lowered
our ratings on some of the CMBS bonds to 'D' because the
respective issuers have failed to meet their timely interest
obligations. However, Duncannon CRE CDO I may still be able to
recover some of the principal amount outstanding under these
bonds. We have reflected this in our analysis by assuming
recoveries from these assets in higher rating scenarios," S&P
related.

The third portion of the pool comprises the operating company
securitization bonds (7.8% by debt balance). "In this group, the
weighted-average rating is also 'BB+' and we rate all nine
positions," S&P said.

"Based on our current ratings and credit estimates on Duncannon
CRE CDO I's assets, we believe that the issuer will not recover
sufficient amounts of principal from its assets to fully repay the
RCF and class A notes in an investment-grade scenario.
Accordingly, we have lowered our ratings on these classes by three
notches. Our estimated likelihood of full repayment of the
class B notes is lower, because these notes are subordinated to
the RCF and class A notes," S&P related.

For the positions that Duncannon CRE CDO I owns, the collateral
manager applies certain haircuts to the nominal amounts
outstanding under the assets, to reflect likely losses. As of the
most recent interest payment date, the average haircut was 18.2%.
After applying these haircuts, Duncannon CRE CDO I's assets are
only 2.2% higher than its RCF and class A, B, and C liabilities.
This constitutes a breach of the "second senior par value test,"
according to which an overcollateralization of 10% is required at
all times under the transaction documents. Duncannon CRE CDO I is
also in breach of the "mezzanine par value test" (which also
includes the class D notes) at 105%, because the ratio is only
87.2%. The interest diversion test (which includes the RCF and
class A, B, C, D, and E notes) also fails -- the trigger is 102%,
compared with an actual ratio of 79.1%, which signals that the
issuer currently has insufficient assets to fully repay these
classes of notes.

"We have also lowered our rating on the class X notes
because their interest payments rank pari passu with the most
senior class of notes," S&P said.

"We have affirmed our ratings on all other classes of notes in the
transaction because we continue to believe that they reflect the
current creditworthiness of the notes," S&P related.

Because of these trigger breaches, the issuer currently pays no
interest on and the class C notes and subordinated classes.
Instead, it uses the available funds to hyperamortize the class A
notes (i.e., accelerate the repayment schedule). "Our ratings on
the class C notes and subordinated classes address the ultimate
(rather than timely) payment of interest and payment of principal
no later than legal final maturity date. Consequently, we have not
lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)', despite the deferred interest
payments," S&P said.

Ratings List

Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC
EUR810 Million Senior and Mezzanine
Deferrable-Interest Floating-Rate Notes

Class                  Rating
            To                       From

Ratings Lowered

X           BB (sf)                  BBB (sf)
RCF         BB (sf)                  BBB (sf)
A           BB (sf)                  BBB (sf)
B           BB- (sf)                 BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C1          B (sf)
C2          B (sf)
D1          B- (sf)
D2          B- (sf)
D3          B- (sf)
E1          B- (sf)
E2          B- (sf)


QUINN INSURANCE: Crowne Plaza Hotel for Sale at GBP35++ Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cambridge News reports that the Crowne Plaza is being marketed for
sale by hospitality specialists Christie + Co on behalf of
administrators Grant Thornton at a guide price in excess of
GBP35 million after its owner Quinn Insurance Limited went into
administration.  The Crowne Plaza is currently owned by Quinn
Property Holding's subsidiary company Shamrock Public Houses
Limited.  Quinn Property Holdings is a subsidiary of Quinn
Insurance Limited.

Cambridge News notes that a statement from the administrators for
Quinn Insurance Limited (QIL), Grant Thornton, read: "The
Cambridge Crowne Plaza Hotel has been put up for sale as part of
the administrator's plans to dispose of all QIL's non-general
insurance business assets."

InterContinental Hotels is the brand owner and operational manager
for the hotel building and its management contract for the
building is due to expire, according to Cambridge News.  The
report relates that it operates the hotel under its brand Crowne
Plaza.

"They are continuing to operate the management contract on a
rolling contract until another investor is found, at which point
it will decide whether to retain the Crowne Plaza brand or put a
new brand on the hotel or get a new group in to manage the hotel
under a new brand," the report quoted Peter Fermoy, also from
Christie + Co, as saying.

                      About Quinn Insurance

Quinn Insurance is owned by Sean Quinn, Ireland's richest man, and
his family.  The company has more than 20% of the motor and health
insurance market in Ireland.  Employing almost 2,800 people in
Britain and Ireland, it was founded in 1996 and entered the UK
market in 2004.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, The Irish
Times said the Financial Regulator put Quinn Insurance into
administration in March 2010 after his office discovered
guarantees had been provided by the insurer's subsidiaries as far
back as 2005 on Quinn Group debts of more than EUR1.2 billion.
The regulator said the guarantees reduced the amount the firm had
in reserve to protect policyholders against possible claims,
putting 1.3 million customers at risk, according to The Irish
Times.


SALMONCITA ENTREPRISES: Missing Building Dispute Stalls Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ray Managh at Irish Examiner reports that a High Court judge has
asked legal parties in a business dispute to either prove to the
court the existence of a building or confirm its disappearance.

According to Irish Examiner, Mr. Justice John Quirke on Wednesday
said that he could make no order in a petition by a landlord to
wind up his tenant's company, Salmoncita Entreprises Ltd., until
the case of the missing building was resolved.

Barrister Eamon Marray, counsel for Salmoncita, told the court his
client's registered office existed at Walnut Lodge, Carysfort
Avenue, Blackrock, Dublin, Irish Examiner discloses.

The court heard that Salmoncita owns AKA bar and nightclub at 6-8
Wicklow Street, and rents its basement premises from Kilfoylan
Vale Ltd, South William Street, Dublin, Irish Examiner relates.

Kilfoylan Vale seeks to wind up Salmoncita on the alleged grounds
it continues to operate while insolvent and unable to pay its
debts, including a rent bill for EUR85,000, Irish Examiner says.

According to Irish Examiner, counsel for Kilfoylan Gary McCarthy
told the court his client had information that Walnut Lodge was
demolished some years ago and, although stated to be Salmoncita's
registered office, the building no longer existed.

Last week when he gave Kilfoylan Vale leave to serve its petition
to wind up Salmoncita through the ordinary post, Mr. Justice
Michael Peart was told the purported existing registered office
was, in fact, an old, partly-converted church or hall, Irish
Examiner recounts.

Mr. Marray, as cited by Irish Examiner, said that in accordance
with the Companies Act, a statutory letter of demand for money
owed and the petition to wind up a company must be served on a
company's registered office and this had not occurred.

George McLellan, company director of Kilfoylan Vale, claimed in an
affidavit that annual returns indicated Salmoncita was trading
while insolvent had a judgment against it for EUR28,800 and owed
commercial rates of EUR196,000, Irish Examiner recounts.


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K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Senior Unsecured Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Alliance Bank JSC's senior unsecured
notes Long-term rating at 'B-', and assigned the notes a Recovery
Rating at 'RR4'.  This announcement corrects Fitch's rating action
of June 21, 2011, which omitted to assign a Recovery Rating to the
notes.

Alliance's other ratings, which are unaffected by this action, are
as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign & local currency IDR: 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: 'cc'
  -- Individual Rating: 'E'
  -- Support Rating: '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'B-'
  -- Subordinated debt: 'CC'; Recovery Rating is 'RR6'


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L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DEMATIC SA: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to US$300MM Sr. Sec. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to B3, LGD3 (48%) from
provisional (P)B3 the rating of the US$300 million senior secured
guaranteed notes following the receipt of the final documentation
of the notes. The rating outlook is positive.

Ratings Rationale

Dematic's B3 rating primarily reflects: (i) high financial
leverage pro-forma of the group's refinancing and payout of
dividends to its owner with a pro-forma gross debt/EBITDA of 6.5x
as adjusted for the past 12 months period ending December 2010,
including only three months of consolidation of HK Systems; (ii)
small size and lack of product diversification; (iii) history of
poor operating performance and project execution albeit recently
improving; and (iv) the relatively lenient terms of the notes,
which allow incremental indebtedness and 50% dividend payout ratio
if unadjusted senior leverage does not exceed 3.2x (around 3.0x at
inception) and fixed coverage ratio is above 2.0x.

However, these negatives are partially offset by: (i) Dematic's
strong market position in the fragmented logistics and materials
handling solutions industry; (ii) improving cost position and
project execution since the business was acquired by Triton in
2006; (iii) a good level of geographical diversification, with
strong market positions in Europe and North America; (iv) the
service business (33% of revenues), which tends to be more stable
and offers higher margins, thereby mitigating the group's
vulnerability to cyclicality; (v) a customer base which mainly
consists of defensive food and retail companies; as well as (vi)
the strong barriers to entry protecting the logistics and material
handling solutions industry through the technological content
offered, the long-standing relationships existing with customers
and the requirement to have an established network close to
customers.

Moody's would consider upgrading its ratings if Dematic can
sustain current operating performance and cash flow generation
levels and apply free cash flow generation to debt repayments in
order to reduce Debt/EBITDA below 5.5x on a sustainable basis.

Conversely, a deterioration in operating performance through cost
overruns, and declining activity levels leading to a deterioration
in debt metrics with Debt/EBITDA trending above 7.0x would lead to
negative pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in rating Dematic S.A.was the
Global Manufacturing Industry Methodology published in December
2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Dematic (rated B3, positive) is a
leading provider of logistics and materials handling solutions,
with a strong focus on food, general merchandise and apparel
retail. Dematic operates under four business segments: (i)
Integrated Systems (design, delivery and assembly of customised
material handling equipment solutions); (ii) Product Solutions
(standardized material handling equipment); (iii) Customer
Services; and (iv) Logistics Operations (installation and
operation of warehouses). At the end of 2010 Dematic acquired HK
Systems for a consideration of EUR111 million, which is now fully
integrated into the Dematic organization except the Logistics
Operations division and will contribute to future growth. In
fiscal year 2010 (ending September 30), the group generated
revenues of EUR726 million and employed 4,137 people.

Dematic is owned by private equity fund Triton, which acquired the
business from Siemens in 2006.


INTELSAT SA: Incurs US$214.4 Million Net Loss in Second Quarter
---------------------------------------------------------------
Intelsat S.A. filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission its quarterly report on Form 10-Q, reporting a net loss
of US$214.48 million on US$642.44 million of revenue for the three
months ended June 30, 2011, compared with a net loss of
US$181.91 million on US$635.28 million of revenue for the same
period during the prior year.

The Company also reported a net loss of US$430.24 million on
US$1.28 billion of revenue for the six months ended June 30, 2011,
compared with a net loss of US$285.34 million on US$1.25 billion
of revenue for the same period a year ago.

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2011, showed
US$17.59 billion in total assets, US$18.28 billion in total
liabilities, US$1.90 million in non-controlling interest, and a
US$698.94 million total Intelsat S.A. shareholders' deficit.

"Business activity is strong, driven by favorable demand trends
for broadband infrastructure and media distribution for direct-to-
home (DTH) and cable applications.  Overall growth was muted in
the second quarter, as a result of reduced mobile satellite
services revenues in our government business and decreased network
services revenues.  Still, we experienced strong revenue growth of
9 percent in our government business and modest growth in our
media business, resulting in steady overall revenue and
maintenance of our 78 percent Adjusted EBITDA margin in the
period," said Intelsat CEO David McGlade.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available for free at:

                        http://is.gd/mjdbll

                          About Intelsat

Intelsat S.A., formerly Intelsat, Ltd., provides fixed-satellite
communications services worldwide through a global communications
network of 54 satellites in orbit as of Dec. 31, 2009, and ground
facilities related to the satellite operations and control, and
teleport services.  It had US$2.5 billion in revenue in 2009.

Luxembourg-based Intelsat S.A. carries 'B' issuer credit ratings
from Standard & Poor's.  It has 'Caa1' corporate family and
probability of default ratings from Moody's Investors Service.

Washington D.C.-based Intelsat Corporation, formerly known as
PanAmSat Corporation, is a fully integrated subsidiary of Intelsat
S.A., its indirect parent.  Intelsat Corp. had US$7.70 billion in
assets against US$4.86 billion in debts as of Dec. 31, 2010.

The Company reported a net loss of US$507.77 million on
US$2.54 billion of revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010,
compared with a net loss of US$782.06 million on US$2.51 billion
of revenue during the prior year.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC DE: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V., E-MAC DE 2006-I
B.V. and E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V.  The agency revised the outlook on
EMAC DE 2005-I B.V.'s class D notes to Stable from Negative.

The ratings actions are as follows:

E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0221900243): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0221901050): affirmed at 'Asf'; Stable
      Outlook

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0221902538): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0221903429): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0221904237): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating (RR) of 'RR5'

  -- Class F (ISIN XS0221922056): Paid in full

E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0257589860): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0257590876): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0257591338): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0257592062): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Negative
     Outlook

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0257592575): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; 'RR5'

  -- Class F (ISIN XS0257704717): Paid in full

E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V.:

  -- Class A1 (ISIN XS0276932539): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0276933347): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0276933859): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0276934667): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0276935045): affirmed at 'Bsf';Negative
     Outlook

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0276936019): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; 'RR5'

  -- Class F (ISIN XS0276936951): Paid in full

The transactions are securitizations of German residential
mortgage loans originated by GMAC-RFC Bank GmbH, which was renamed
Paratus AMC GmbH in 2011.

The affirmations reflect the transactions' performance in line
with Fitch's expectations.  The Outlook for class D of EMAC-DE
2005-I was revised to Stable from Negative given the relatively
better performance of this transaction with lower cumulative
losses and a higher excess spread, which have reduced concerns
about a further negative rating migration.

The balances of loans that are more than three months in arrears
have stabilized between 10% and 11.2% for the three transactions
as of the May payment date.  Fitch expects only moderate further
increases.  Current 'Bsf' default assumptions provide for a
sufficient buffer over the 3month+ arrears.  Historical recovery
rates as calculated from the information provided in monthly
reports were found to be commensurate with Fitch's expectations.

After having had almost no realized losses over the first four
years of the respective transactions' life, losses have since
accelerated but are in line with Fitch's expectations.  Cumulative
losses to date are at 2.6% (2005-I), 3.0% (2006-I) and 1.7% (2006-
II) of the initial asset balance (considering that 2006-II is the
youngest of the three transactions).  Losses have been almost
fully covered by excess spread for EMAC-DE 2005-I and 2006-II so
far.  The reserve fund levels for these two transactions are at or
very close to their target levels.  Only EMAC-DE 2006-I's reserve
fund was significantly drawn to cover losses on the last seven
payment dates. The reserve is now at around 50% of its target
level.

Over the past three years, there have been a number of changes in
the organizational structure around EMAC-DE transactions.  At the
end of 2008 the originator returned its banking license and
changed its name later to GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH.  In 2010
affiliates of funds managed by affiliates of Fortress Investment
Group acquired various residential mortgage businesses from
affiliates of Ally Financial (formerly GMAC).  Following this,
GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH was renamed to Paratus AMC GmbH (Paratus)
in February 2011.  GMAC-RFC Investments B.V., which has various
roles in the transaction, such as issuer administrator, seller,
potential provider of a servicing advance loan in case the issuer
requests such loan following an exercise of the investor's bond
put options and responsible for appointing servicers, was renamed
to CMIS Investments B.V. (CMIS) in May 2011.

There have been only minor changes to the servicing of loans
securitized in E-MAC DE transactions since the last review.
Paratus has taken over additional roles in the servicing of
delinquent loans and is now doing the special servicing together
with lawyers Paulus Westerwelle.  Primary servicing is still
conducted by Hypotheken Management GmbH (rated 'RPS2' by Fitch).


GOLDFISH MASTER: Fitch May Cut Rating on Class C Notes to 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
The rating actions follow the update of the agency's criteria for
rating RMBS transactions backed by the Nationale Hypotheek
Garantie (NHG) and the accompanying data request, as well as
recent updates in the program's documentation. Goldfish Master
Issuer securitizes NHG mortgages originated by the former Fortis
group.

The agency maintained the Goldfish program's notes on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN) on July 6, 2011, following publication of the
updated criteria. In the special report "Estimated Rating
Implications of the NHG Criteria Review", published on the same
date, Fitch reviewed the estimated rating implications for the
Goldfish Master Issuer notes and other NHG programs. This review
indicated that, subject to certain conditions as specified in the
report, the Class A ('AAAsf') and Class B ('AA-sf') notes' ratings
of the Goldfish program were likely to be maintained, while the
Class C ('A+sf') was likely to be downgraded to a 'Bsf' or lower
rating category.

The rating withdrawal is based on a number of factors. The issuer
informed the agency it will not provide the information requested
and needed to resolve the RWN on the NHG transactions. The data
required includes, among other things, an updated pool cut,
consent for the Waarborgfonds Eigen Woningen (WEW) to provide NHG
claim data to Fitch, historical performance for NHG loans and a
set-off exposure assessment. As this information is specific for
each originator and is not publicly available, Fitch believes
there is a lack of data required to maintain the ratings.
Furthermore, various changes have been made to the transaction and
following a decision on June 18, 2010 by noteholders to remove all
references to Fitch within transaction documentation, the agency
is no longer notified of these changes and the revised
documentation may no longer be in line with Fitch's relevant
criteria.


JUBILEE CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Jubilee CDO I-R B.V:

Issuer: Jubilee CDO I-R B.V.

   -- EUR74.25M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR72M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR43.2M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR33.75M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class P Combination Notes due 2024 (currently EUR
      3.876M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR8M Class Q Combination Notes due 2024 (currently EUR
      6.244M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class R Combination Notes due 2024 (currently EUR
      3.903M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
P, Q and R, which do not accrue interest, the 'Rated Balance' is
equal at any time to the principal amount of the Combination Note
on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from
the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or principal
payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the
outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

Moody's also confirms the rating on these notes:

   -- EUR594M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
      Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Jubilee CDO IR B.V., issued in May 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio
composed of a majority of senior secured European loans and
approximately 22% of non senior secured loans including mezzanine
loans, second lien loans and a few HY bonds. The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 30 July 2014.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 865.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.42%
(consistent with a WARF of 3104), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 41.07% for a Aaa liability target rating, and a
diversity score of 31. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 77.67% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. Because approximately 12% of
non first lien loans assets in the portfolio are second-lien
loans, Moody's also considered a scenario with a slightly higher
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.89% for a Aaa
liability rating. This is assuming that the second-lien loans
would recover 25% upon default instead of 10%. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 58% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the
   report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread and diversity score. However,
   as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread levels
   higher than the covenant levels due to the large difference
   between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


MARCO POLO: Seeks Extra Funding to Protect Tanker Ships
-------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' DBR Small Cap reports that Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. is
seeking emergency approval of a loan to stabilize its operations
while previously requested funding is held up in a dispute.

                          About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing commercial
and technical vessel management services to third parties.
Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the name of
Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate headquarters
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets consist of six
tankers that are regularly employed in international trade, and
call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate &
Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on the
cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the vessel was
authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit Agricole also
attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million on July 29.
The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the two other
vessels.

Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J.
Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy
counsel.  The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.

The petition said assets and debt are both more than US$100
million and less than US$500 million.


MOSCOW STARS: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'BBsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Moscow Stars B.V.'s notes, as follows:

  -- USD 56.59m class A (ISIN: XS0307297225), due December 2034
     upgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- USD 16.20m class B (ISIN: XS0307297811), due December 2034
     upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

The rating actions reflect the stable performance of the
collateral pool as well as structural note protection through a
provisioning mechanism and available credit enhancement for the
notes.

The transaction is a securitization of USD-denominated mortgage
loans originated by CB Moskommertsbank (MKB) (rated 'B-'/Outlook
Stable) which is owned by Kazakh Kazkommertsbank ('B-'/Outlook
Stable).

The rating of the class A notes is constrained by a maximum six-
notch uplift above the originator's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (i.e. at 'BBB-') according to Fitch's criteria addressing
legal risks in emerging market securitizations.  The upgrade of
the class A notes therefore reflects the highest possible rating
for this tranche.

The notes funding the portfolio have already amortized to 42% of
their initial balance and credit enhancement has accordingly
increased to 37.4% for the class A notes and 16.2% for the class
B.  The notes are amortizing on a sequential basis and the
transaction benefits from a provisioning mechanism whereby excess
spread is streamlined as principal distribution in respect of
principal defaults arising from collateral loss.

Defaults are defined as loans in arrears by more than 90 days and
are as such provisioned for on a rather conservative basis
crediting the PDL balance of class B.  Based on this definition,
the portfolio was hit particularly hard with cumulative defaults
increasing from 0.5% in Q409 to 4.5% in Q110 resulting in a
downgrade of the notes in Fitch's previous rating action.  The
performance has stabilized since and to date the portfolio has
posted cumulative gross defaults of 5.2% since inception in 2007.
It started recovering losses in April 2009 resulting in a
cumulative loss ratio of 4.1% as of July 2011.

Arrears by 0 to 90 days are at 4.2% of the pool balance and 11.2%
are in arrears by more than 90 days.

The reserve fund trigger was breached in February 2009 requiring
the reserve to double from the original US$9.9 million.  The
trigger is based upon available excess spread therefore trapping
at this time is limited.  Currently the reserve stands at US$11.9
million and would be expected to trap cash to the required amount
before subsequently amortizing.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK URALSIB: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Russian Bank Uralsib's and Uralsib
Leasing Group's (UL) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
'BB-' from 'B+' with Stable Outlooks.

The upgrade of Bank Uralsib's ratings reflects a significant
reduction in related party exposures and positive asset quality
dynamics.  The ratings also take into consideration the bank's
broad nationwide franchise, limited refinancing risk and currently
strong liquidity.  At the same time, the ratings are constrained
by weak core profitability, large holdings of equities and non-
core assets on the balance sheet and the uncertainty about new
equity contributions from the main shareholder.

Related party lending halved to RUB27 billion at end-2010 (equal
to 47% of Uralsib's equity), following the sale by the bank's
shareholder of Kopeika, a large retail supermarket chain.
However, about half of the current related party exposure is
represented by what is effectively equity exposure to Uralsib
Insurance, which is currently a loss-making business.  Fitch
regards the bank's refinancing of the shareholder's investment in
Uralsib Insurance as essentially a dividend payment from the bank.

Credit risk is mitigated by the bank's low name concentration and
moderate exposure to the construction segment.  Credit quality
strengthened materially on the back of Russia's economic recovery
and work outs of problem assets.  At end-2010 NPLs, defined by
Fitch as loans 90 days overdue, comprised 10.1% of the gross
portfolio (end-2009: 13.9%), and restructured loans accounted for
an additional c.10% (2009: 14%).

In addition, at end-2010 the bank had RUB20 billion (35% of
equity) tied up in investments in property, about half of which
are unfinished development projects.  Recovery of these assets is
not a near-term prospect, and will depend on the recovery of the
real estate market.  The bank's investment in the equity of
Russian oil company Lukoil ('BBB'/Stable) was also a sizable
RUB10.2 billion (18% of the bank's equity).

Fitch is concerned about the bank's persistently moderate core
profitability and the lack of any clear prospects for improving
it.  While the net interest margin is in line with peers, the bank
seems to under-utilize (or overinvest in) its human capital and
branch network, leading to a relatively high cost/income ratio.
Profitability may improve this year from a low level, as the asset
quality cycle has turned and business is expected to grow, but is
likely to remain a mid-term weakness.

Funding is a rating strength, with the loans/deposits ratio at 85%
at end-2010. Limited wholesale borrowings mean that refinancing
risk is low, while liquidity is currently comfortable.

The regulatory capital ratio was 12.9% at end-H111. However, the
consolidated Basel I ratios are generally stronger than the
regulatory ones (Tier 1 13.7% and total 18.1% at end-2010).  The
bank's management considers that no further capital contributions
will be required until end-2012.  Capitalization should be viewed
in light of sizable non-core investments and moderate internal
capital generation, but in Fitch's view is currently adequate for
the rating category.

Further positive rating action is unlikely, and would probably
require a significant reduction in non-core assets and related
party exposures and a sustainable improvement in core performance.
Downward pressure could arise from a renewed increase in exposure
to related parties or from a weakening in the bank's capital
position.

UL's ratings reflect the potential for support from Bank Uralsib,
which fully owns UL and consolidates it in its accounts.  In
Fitch's view, Bank Uralsib has a high propensity to support its
leasing subsidiary due to its strategic importance, common brand
and credit risk management integration. Bank Uralsib provided
liquidity and funding support to UL during the crisis.  UL
represented 6.4% of consolidated assets at end-2010 and operates
through about 50 outlets in Russia.

UL was loss-making on a standalone basis in 2010, while net
investments in leases contracted by 40%.  The negative financial
performance was caused by the lease portfolio amortization and
changes in accounting methodology, while Fitch notes positive net
interest in 2010.  Leases overdue by more than 90 days made up
13.3% of gross lease portfolio, while restructured exposures
accounted for further 43.6% at end-2010.

At end-Q111, Uralsib was the fourth-largest privately-owned
banking group in Russia, and thirteenth largest bank overall, with
about a 1.4% market share.  The bank has a large branch network
with more than 400 outlets.  Nikolay Tsvetkov controls a 98% stake
in Uralsib.

The rating actions are as follows:

Bank Uralsib

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
     Outlook Stable
  -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb-' from 'b+'
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '4'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'

Uralsib Leasing Group

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
     Outlook Stable
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
     Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: upgraded to '3' from '4'


CENTER-INVEST BANK: Moody's Upgrades Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term local
currency debt rating and the foreign currency deposit ratings of
Center-Invest Bank (CIB) to Ba3 from B1, while the standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) was upgraded to D- from E+. The
Not Prime short-term bank deposit ratings were affirmed.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned Ba3 long-term and Not Prime
short-term local currency deposit ratings to CIB.

Moody's said the upgrade of CIB's ratings is based on the bank's
audited financial statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, and its
H1 2011 unaudited results prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale

"The upgrade of CIB's ratings reflects a positive track record of
operations amid the global financial crisis, which highlights the
sustainability of the bank's business model and demonstrates its
resilience to the challenging operating environment," says Semyon
Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President and lead analyst for
the bank. "In addition, the currently sound financial metrics --
with a solid capital cushion and improving profitability metrics -
- further enhance the bank's ratings," adds Mr. Isakov. Other
factors that underpin CIB's ratings include (i) its adequate
corporate governance and risk management procedures, and (ii) the
low level of related-party lending, which position the bank
favourably among its peers.

As at YE2010, CIB's level of loan loss reserves reached 8.3%, a
level that is, in Moody's opinion, reasonably commensurate with
the bank's level of problem loans (9.0% at YE2010). In the first
six months of 2011, CIB's recently elevated provisioning costs
materially declined, thus raising the bank's bottom-line results
(CIB reported 2.0% return on average assets for the first six
months of 2011), a trend Moody's expects to continue going
forward. Other positive factors, along with the recently recovered
bottom-line results are: (i) strong net interest margin that
recently improved to 6% as cost of funding declined and (ii)
adequate level of capital adequacy (the Basel I capital adequacy
was 18.5% at end-June 2011). CIB's ratings are underpinned by the
above-mentioned sound financial profile, relatively good credit
underwriting standards and the bank's strong franchise in retail
and SME segments in its home region, all of which position the
bank favorably compared to its peers.

At the same time, Moody's notes that CIB's ratings continue to be
constrained by the limited geographical diversification of the
bank's business (largely confined to a single region of Russia
correlated with the performance of the agriculture sector) that --
along with the existing single-name and industry concentrations in
the loan book (top 20 loan exposures ranging between 150% and 200%
of the bank's Tier I capital) -- renders the bank's performance
vulnerable to the health of the local economy, the performance of
the largest borrowers and the historically unsustainable behavior
of retail depositors in the Russian regions.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Region, Russia, CIB
reported total assets of RUB49.9 billion (US$1.8 billion) under
IFRS (unaudited) as of end-June YE2011, up 3.3% compared to
YE2010. The bank's net profit totalled RUB508 million (US$18
million) in the first six months of 2011, a 634% increase compared
to the same period in 2010.


CENTRAL COMM'L: Fitch Withdraws B- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russia-based Central Commercial Bank's
(CCB) ratings, including its Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'/Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as the bank has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.  Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, the agency will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage of CCB.

For a recent update on CCB, see "Fitch Affirms Two Mid-sized
Russian Banks; Places Central Commercial Bank on Rating Watch
Negative", dated August 3, 2011 at www.fitchratings.com

The rating actions are as follows:

Central Commercial Bank:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'B-', RWN maintained;
     withdrawn

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B', RWN maintained;
     withdrawn

  -- National Long-term Rating: 'BB-(rus)', RWN maintained;
     withdrawn

  -- Viability Rating: 'b-', RWN maintained; withdrawn

  -- Individual Rating: 'D/E', RWN maintained; withdrawn

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'; withdrawn

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'; withdrawn


ROSPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings of Rosprombank to B2 from B1. The
outlook on the deposit ratings is negative. The bank's standalone
E+ bank financial strength rating (BFSR) and Not Prime short-term
deposit rating were affirmed, with a stable outlook. This rating
action concludes the review for downgrade on Rosprombank's ratings
initiated by Moody's on May 23, 2011.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on Rosprombank was triggered by Moody's recent
downgrade of the bank's controlling shareholder Marfin Popular
Bank Public Co Ltd (MPB; Cyprus) to Ba2/Not Prime/E+ (negative
outlook), from Baa3/Prime-3/D- (for details on MPB's downgrade,
please refer to the press release dated July 28, 2011 on
www.moodys.com). MPB's standalone credit strength was lowered to
B2 (mapped from the E+ BFSR), from Ba3.

When incorporating parental support into Rosprombank's ratings,
Moody's uses MPB's B2 standalone credit strength as the anchor for
parental support. As such, Moody's now considers that the capacity
of MPB to provide extraordinary support to Rosprombank in case of
need has somewhat weakened, resulting in the downgrade of
Rosprombank's deposit rating to B2 from B1. The deposit ratings of
the Russian bank now benefit from one notch of uplift due to
parental support (previously two notches of support). Moody's
further explained that any downgrade of MPB's standalone ratings
might lead to a downgrade of its Russian subsidiary's supported
ratings.

The rating agency also anticipates increased integration between
Rosprombank and MPB. In March 2011, MPB announced that it has
entered into an agreement to increase its participation in
Rosprombank to 99.927% from the current 50.003%; this transaction
is likely to be finalized in Q3 or Q4 2011. Although the outlook
on Rosprombank's standalone rating is stable, Moody's sees a
potential for upward pressure if integration with MPB proceeds
without setbacks, and if the Russian bank further improves its
asset quality, profitability, and business position. Moody's notes
that Rosprombank is likely to boost its profitability in 2011
following the sale of some of its impaired loans in March 2011,
positively affecting the bank's asset quality. This enabled the
bank to release provisions totalling RUB159 million (US$5.6
million) (16% of YE2010 core capital).

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodologies used in rating Rosprombank are Moody's
Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Rosprombank reported -- under
audited IFRS -- total consolidated assets of RUB9.7 billion at
YE2010. Rosprombank is a small subsidiary of MPB, accounting for
0.5% of group assets at YE2010.


ROSPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts National Scale Rating to 'Baa1.ru'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded the long-term
National Scale Rating (NSR) of Rosprombank to Baa1.ru from A2.ru.
The NSR carries no specific outlook.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on Rosprombank was triggered by Moody's recent
downgrade of the bank's controlling shareholder Marfin Popular
Bank Public Co Ltd (MPB; Cyprus) to Ba2/Not Prime/E+ (negative
outlook), from Baa3/Prime-3/D- (for details on MPB's downgrade,
please refer to the press release dated July 28, 2011 on
www.moodys.com). MPB's standalone credit strength was lowered to
B2 (mapped from the E+ BFSR), from Ba3.

When incorporating parental support into Rosprombank's ratings,
Moody's uses MPB's B2 standalone credit strength as the anchor for
parental support. As such, Moody's now considers that the capacity
of MPB to provide extraordinary support to Rosprombank in case of
need has somewhat weakened, resulting in the downgrade of
Rosprombank's NSR to Baa1.ru from A2.ru. Moody's further explained
that any downgrade of MPB's standalone ratings, should it occur,
might lead to a downgrade of its Russian subsidiary's supported
ratings.

The rating agency also anticipates increased integration between
Rosprombank and MPB. In March 2011, MPB announced that it has
entered into an agreement to increase its participation in
Rosprombank to 99.927% from the current 50.003%; this transaction
is likely to be finalized in Q3 or Q4 2011. Although the outlook
on Rosprombank's standalone rating is stable, Moody's sees a
potential for upward pressure if integration with MPB proceeds
without setbacks, and if the Russian bank further improves its
asset quality, profitability, and business position. Moody's notes
that Rosprombank is likely to boost its profitability in 2011
following the sale of some of its impaired loans in March 2011,
positively affecting the bank's asset quality. This enabled the
bank to release provisions totalling RUB159 million (US$5.6
million) (16% of YE2010 core capital).

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are
intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For further information
on Moody's approach to national scale ratings, please refer to
Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance published in August 2010
entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale
Ratings."

About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Rosprombank reported -- under
local GAAP -- total consolidated assets of RUB9.7 billion (US$318
million) at YE2010.


=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Series B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed these ratings of these ABS
notes issued by FTA Santander Empresas 9:

- Series A, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on 4 April 2011
  Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

- Series B, affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on 4 April 2011
  Definitive Rating Assigned Caa1 (sf)

Moody's has reviewed the above FTA Santander Empresas 9
transaction in conjunction with various amendments (the
Amendments) to the transaction documents effected on or about
09/08/11. At closing a cash reserve equal to EUR1,070 million was
funded through a subordinated loan provided by Banco Santander.
The issuer has now issued Series C notes and used the proceeds to
cancel the subordinated loan. The position in the waterfall for
the repayment of Series C notes will be the same as the
subordinated loan position (completely subordinated to the
interest and principal repayment of the Series A and B notes). At
this time, the Amendments will not, in and of itself, result in a
reduction or withdrawal of the current ratings on the Debt.

Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with
the proposed amendments, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion
as to whether these actions have, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders or counterparties. For the avoidance of
doubt, this affirmation relates to the execution documentation
provided to Moody's (SUPLEMENTO AL FOLLETO INFORMATIVO RELATIVO AL
"FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS SANTANDER EMPRESAS 9" (el
"Folleto") INSCRITO EN LOS REGISTRO OFICIALES DE LA CNMV EL 31 DE
MARZO DE 2011, August 2011) only and should not be taken to imply
that Moody's will not take a rating action in respect of the Notes
by virtue of any other events or circumstances that may be
continuing now or that arise in the future.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007.

Other factors used in this rating are described in Refining the
ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Defaults Assumptions in
the Rating Analysis of Granular SME Portfolios in EMEA, published
in March 2009 and Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME
Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa, published in June
2007.

Moody's will continue monitoring this rating. Any change in the
rating will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.


SANTANDER FINANCIACION: Moody's Rates Series C Notes at 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned this definitive rating to
the ABS notes issued by FTA Santander Financiacion 5:

-- Ca(sf) to EUR204.3M Series C Floating rate Notes, due 2040

Ratings Rationale

The subject transaction is a cash securitization of consumer loans
extended to borrowers resident in Spain. The portfolio consists of
unsecured consumer loans used for several purposes, such as new or
used car acquisition, property improvement/acquisition, financial
investments, business investments and other undefined or general
purposes.

At closing, a cash reserve equal to EUR204.3 million was funded
through a subordinated loan provided by Banco Santander. The
issuer has now issued Series C notes and used the proceeds to
cancel the subordinated loan. The position in the waterfall for
the repayment of Series C notes will be the same as the
subordinated loan position (fully subordinated to the interest and
principal repayment of the Series A and B notes).

The rating on the notes takes into account, among other factors,
(i) an evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans; (ii)
historical performance information; (iii) the swap agreement,
under which the swap counterparty will pay the weighted-average
margin on the notes plus an excess spread of 2.75%; (iv) the
credit enhancement provided by the excess spread; (v) the
provisions for the appointment of a back-up servicer; and (vi) the
legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

This deal benefits from several credit strengths, such as its
static structure and a short portfolio weighted average life of 3
years, as well as certain structural features such as the
appointment of a back up servicer upon loss of Baa3 by Banco
Santander S.A. (Santander). Moody's however notes that the
transaction features a number of credit weaknesses, as there is
some exposure to commingling risk (although partially mitigated by
the undertaking of Santander to fund a commingling reserve if it
is downgraded below Baa3) as well as reliance on Santander (rated
Aa2/P-1) to perform a multitude of roles in the transaction.
Moody's also took into account the worse than expected performance
of previous Santander transactions on the same sector. These
characteristics, amongst others, were considered in Moody's
analysis and ratings.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the score assigned for the Spanish Consumer loan sector. Some
notable features pertain to the "High" score for
"Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's Historical Performance Variability"
component, which considers the worse than expected performance of
previous Santander transactions; in particular, Santander
Financiacion 1 and Santander Financiacion 3 were downgraded in
2009. In addition, the "Disclosure of Securitization Performance"
component has been assigned a "Medium/High" score given the poor
performance disclosure for previous Santander transactions. In
particular, the investor report does not provide information on
cumulative gross 90+ days arrears/written off loans and cumulative
recovery data on 90+ days arrears/written off loans. For more
information on V Scores, please see the report "V Scores and
Parameter Sensitivities in the Global Consumer Loan ABS Sectors",
published in May 2009.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 17.0% for the initial portfolio, with a coefficient of
variation of 35% and a recovery rate of 30% as the main input
parameters for Moody's cash-flow model ABSROM. In its base case
scenario, Moody's also assumed a constant prepayment rate of 10%
and a sinus-shape timing of defaults, considering a 90 days
default definition.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions that was published in
July 2011.

The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS Analysis, published in
July 2000 and Historical Default Data Analysis for ABS
Transactions in EMEA, published in November 2005 were also used in
this rating. For more detailed information, please see Moody's
report of the transaction.

For rating this transaction Moody's used ABSROM (v.3.0.0) to model
the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. In the
cash flow model, once all of the asset-side modelling assumptions
are input, the model produces a series of default scenarios that
are weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio defaults. In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the
loss expected in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's assigned definitive ratings to Series A and B notes on
June 24, 2011. Please refer to the related announcement for the
parameters sensitivity analysis of this transaction.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: European Suppliers to Prepare Bankruptcy Request
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mia Shanley at Reuters, citing an auto industry as saying on
Wednesday, reports that some European suppliers are preparing to
demand Saab Automobile be declared bankrupt, hoping the threat
will pressure the carmaker into paying debts.

Car production at Saab, rescued from bankruptcy in early 2010 by
Netherlands-based Swedish Automobile, ground to a standstill in
April because suppliers who had not been paid refused to deliver
components, Reuters relates.

Lars Holmqvist, head of the European Association of Automotive
Suppliers, told Reuters that Spanish auto panels maker Matrici S.
Coop was preparing a bankruptcy request, claiming it is owed
EUR2 million (US$2.8 million).

"Some companies are waiting and having no answer.  Now, some have
heard that other companies have been paid partially.  Then they
are getting very upset," Reuters quotes Mr. Holmqvist as saying.
"They realize there is no other way but to try to demand
bankruptcy because obviously then Saab pays."

Reuters notes that Mr. Holmqvist said he had been contacted by
some German companies that say they are owed more than
EUR5 million each.  They, too, are looking to start the process to
demand bankruptcy, Reuters states.

Reuters relates that Saab spokesman Eric Geers said: "We know the
situation we are in.  We are working very hard to resolve this and
to get a more stable financing in place."

Mr. Geers, as cited by Reuters, said Saab wanted an agreement with
all suppliers to prevent more stoppages.

With an annual production of up to 126,000 cars, Saab's current
models include the 9-3 (available as a convertible or sport
sedan), the luxury 9-5 sedan (also available in a sport wagon),
and the seven-passenger 9-7X SUV.  As it prepared to separate from
General Motors, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection in February
2009.  A year later, in February 2010, GM sold Saab to Dutch
sports car maker Spyker Cars for about US$400 million in cash and
stock.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BLACKS LEISURE: Appoints Peter Williams as Interim Chairman
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mark Wembridge at The Financial Times reports that Blacks Leisure
has appointed an interim chairman a week after Sports Direct, the
largest shareholder in the outdoor retailer, ousted the incumbent
of 10 years.

Blacks Leisure, which is 21% owned by its larger rival, on
Thursday appointed Peter Williams as interim chairman to replace
David Bernstein, who stepped down on August 3, the FT relates.

At the troubled retailer's general meeting on July 27, Sports
Direct, which is controlled by Newcastle United owner Mike Ashley,
voted against the reappointment of Mr. Bernstein, the FT notes.

The departure of Mr. Bernstein left Julia Reynolds, chief
executive, without a chairman in her first week as chief executive
of Blacks Leisure, the FT states.

Blacks Leisure, as cited by the FT, said it had started the search
for a permanent chairman but did not indicate any a timescale.

Mr. Williams, the FT says, takes the chairmanship at a time when
Blacks Leisure is combating falling sales and a bleak trading
environment.  A series of store closures in 2009 has failed to
cushion the group from covenants on about GBP14 million of net
debt, forcing it to renegotiate its credit facility with the Bank
of Scotland this year, the FT discloses.

                      About Blacks Leisure

Headquartered in Northampton, Blacks Leisure Group plc --
http://www.blacksleisure.co.uk/-- is the parent company of its
subsidiaries, which are engaged in the retail and wholesale of
clothing and camping equipment.  The Company comprises two
segments: Outdoor and Boardwear.  Outdoor trades under the fascias
Blacks and Millets.  The trade is from retail stores in the
British  Isles, and the associated direct sale Internet sites.
Boardwear holds the United Kingdom licenses for O'Neill and Mambo
products to trade as a wholesale operation and from retail stores.
The stores retail brands are Peter Storm and Eurohike.  Other
brands sold include Berghaus, North Face, Merrell, Coleman,
Karrimor, Hi-Tec, Columbia and Craghoppers.  The Company's
subsidiaries include Blacks Outdoor Division Ltd, The Outdoor
Group Ltd and Sandcity Ltd.


BRITISH AIRWAYS: Moody's Affirms CFR at 'B1'; Outlook Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the B1 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) of British Airways plc, as
well as the respective B2 and B3 senior unsecured and subordinate
ratings. The outlook is changed to positive from stable.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows the substantial improvement in the
company's metrics over the past year. This reflects in part the
company's return to profitability in the first half of 2011 -- to
a reported profit of EUR210 million, excluding unallocated and
exceptional costs at International Consolidated Airlines Group
('IAG', not rated), under which BA now reports, from a loss of
GBP217 million the prior year, when it reported as a separate
entity. For IAG as a whole, Moody's notes that this improvement
reflects a revival in passenger yields, and in particular in the
North Atlantic premium segment, on which BA is heavily reliant.
For IAG, the growth in overall profits resulted in revenue growth
outpacing the significantly higher cost of fuel, which also
increased by about 35% year-on-year.

The rating action also reflects the earlier substantial reduction
in the company's pension deficit reported at its FY2010 year-end
results, which significantly improved the company's adjusted
credit metrics. This reduction emanated from a shift to CPI from
RPI in the calculation of its pension deficit obligations which,
along with pension contributions and market movements, contributed
to lowering the net aggregate deficit under its NAPS and APS
schemes by about GBP1.3 billion. Moody's had previously indicated
that this resulted in the company being more strongly-positioned
within its rating category (see 'Moody's: reduction in British
Airways' pension deficit has no immediate impact on ratings',
dated March 2, 2011).

As a result of these combined developments, Moody's estimates that
BA's adjusted gross leverage fell from 11.5 times as of FYE2010
(to March), to about 6 times as of December 2010, and to below 5
times as of June 2011. Moody's has previously indicated that
upward pressure on the rating could occur if leverage were to fall
below 6 times. Moody's rating for BA continues to reflect the
company on a stand-alone basis, as Moody's understands that no
cross guarantees between BA and Iberia are expected to be
implemented.

Moody's recognizes the ongoing dynamics on the industry's
profitability which may constrain further upward pressure to the
rating at this time. IAG has referred to a continued positive
outlook for the long-haul premium segment, but persistent weakness
in the non-premium segment. In addition, the group's fuel bill is
forecast at EUR5.2 billion in 2011, representing a one third
increase over 2010 (and in line with the first half year trend);
while IAG has indicated that the second half of 2011 will be
against a high comparable year-on-year; coupled with fuel hedge
unwinding; and weakness in markets such as Japan and the Middle
East.

The positive outlook therefore reflects Moody's view that metrics
are currently strong for the B1 rating, while factoring in the
potential for a degree of volatility over the medium term. Should
BA manage to sustain its adjusted gross leverage metric below 6
times in coming quarters, this could result in further upward
pressure on the rating. Although not expected at this time, should
earnings deteriorate with gross leverage trending above 6 times,
this would likely result in negative pressure on the rating or
outlook. Moody's ratings assume the continuation of a strong
liquidity profile, with no substantial weakening in the financial
profile of IAG which could require support from BA.

The principal methodology used in rating British Airways was
Global Passenger Airlines Industry methodology published in March
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

British Airways, based in Harmondsworth, United Kingdom, is
Europe's third largest airline carrier, and flying to over 150
destinations world-wide. For the twelve months to June 2011, the
company reported revenues of about GBP9.5 billion. Following a
merger with Iberia in January 2011, BA now reports as part of
International Consolidated Airlines Group S.A., which was
incorporated as a Spanish company with its shares trading on both
the London and Spanish Stock Exchanges.


CASTLE INNS: LT Pub to Manage Estate on Administrator's Behalf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Neil Gerrard at Caterersearch.com reports that LT Pub Management
has been appointed to manage the estate of in-administration
Castle Inns.

LT Pub Management has been running the estate as a going concern
since that date on behalf of administrator Deloitte ahead on any
potential sale of the business, according to Caterersearch.com.

"We have a strong background in working with administrators such
as Deloitte to manage businesses in administration and to advice
on the future business potential of any given unit.  Our
experienced team is working closely with the outlet managers and
staff to ensure that Castle Inns maximizes its trading potential,"
the report quoted Billy Buchanan, chief executive of LT Pub
Management, as saying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 22,
2011, Morning Advertiser said that Castle Inns has fallen into
administration after facing "significant cashflow difficulties" in
recent months.  Administrator Deloitte said all Castle Inns' sites
will continue to trade, "with a view to selling the business as a
going concern," according to Morning Advertiser.  Morning
Advertiser noted that Deloitte is willing to consider selling the
sites individually or as a group.

Castle Inns is the operator of around a dozen bars and nightclubs
in Scotland along with Edinburgh's biggest club City.  It was
founded in 1983 by brothers Paul and Stephen Smith.  It currently
employs 400 full and part-time staff.


CDC LEISURE: Asset Sale Could Take Place Soon, Administrator Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Heather McGarrigle at Belfast Telegraph reports that CDC Leisure
administrator John Hansen of KPMG filed a report suggesting that a
sale of the company's assets, which has been on the market since
March, is in the final stages.  Mr. Hansen said in the report that
"final negotiations at contract stage are ongoing," Belfast
Telegraph relates.

Mr. Hansen has received a number of offers for four of Belfast's
best-loved bars and music venues -- CDC Leisure and associated
company Tarwood, the Limelight, the Spring and Airbrake and Auntie
Annies -- after entering administration, according to Belfast
Telegraph.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 21,
2010, BBC News noted that John Hansen of KPMG was appointed
administrator of CDC Leisure Ltd on June 15.  Rumors over the
future of CDC Leisure began in January 2010 when a winding-up
petition was filed against it, but the matter never went to court.
CDC Leisure owes GBP7.7 million to the Irish bank, while other
creditors are owed GBP1.89 million, according to Belfast
Telegraph.

Belfast Telegraph relates that a 10-year lease has been signed and
finalized for the Spring and Airbrake.  The report notes that Mr.
Hansen also vacated rented storage properties once leases had
ended, cutting business costs.

Mr. Hansen has kept the venues trading in order to sell the
business as a going concern, Belfast Telegraph says.

The report relays that the four pubs and venues went on the market
at a fraction of the GBP13 million they were reportedly purchased
for in 2007.

CDC Leisure owns a chain of Belfast bars that includes iconic live
music venue, The Limelight.


FIRE PLACE: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
-------------------------------------------
North West Evening Mail reports that heating company The Fire
Place has gone into liquidation after owner Helen Doherty applied
for voluntary liquidation because of outstanding debts.

According to the report, Steve Knott, one of four directors at
Furness Heating Components in Abbey Road, Barrow, said local
heating firms had been forced to fight back against increasing
competition from cheap internet companies.

"It is a very tough time at the moment, especially during the
summer when business is quieter," the Evening Mail quotes
Mr. Knott as saying.

A meeting of The Fire Place's creditors took place at solicitors'
firm Temple Heelis in Kendal last week.

The Fire Place supplied and fitted gas fires, cookers, heaters and
central heating systems.


LLOYDS BANKING: Mike Fairey to Head Branches if Sun Wins Bidding
----------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Flanagan at The Scotsman reports that entrepreneur Hugh
Osmond has lined up Mike Fairey, the former deputy chief executive
of Lloyds TSB, to run the 600-plus Lloyds Banking Group branches
for which his Sun Capital Partners vehicle is bidding.

According to The Scotsman, Sun Capital, NBNK Investments and Co-
operative Bank, are understood to be the three parties who have
put indicative bids on the table for the branches Lloyds is
selling at the behest of the European Union.  Three other parties,
including Clydesdale Bank, are also in talks, The Scotsman notes.

The sale is in return for Lloyds's taxpayer recapitalization in
the wake of the 2008 credit crisis and acquisition of HBOS, The
Scotsman says.

It is said Mr. Fairey will become chairman of the new bank, which
will be Britain's sixth biggest player, if Sun Capital wins the
auction, The Scotsman states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 9,
2011, the Financial Times related that shares in Lloyds plunged to
less than half the price the UK government paid for them in its
GBP21 billion bail-out of Britain's biggest high-street bank at
the height of the global financial crisis.  Lloyds, which remains
41% owned by the government, fell further into the red in the
first half of the year, reporting a GBP3.25 billion pre-tax loss,
as the bank suffered a worsening of bad debt trends and took a
previously announced GBP3.2 billion provision to clear up its
share of the industry-wide misselling scandal involving payment
protection insurance, the FT disclosed.  The stock closed down 10%
at 34.99p on Aug. 4, compared with the average 74p price at which
the bail-out money was injected, the FT noted.

                 About Lloyds Banking Group PLC

Lloyds Banking Group plc -- http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/--
is a financial services group providing a range of banking and
financial services, primarily in the United Kingdom, to personal
and corporate customers.  The Company operates in four segments:
Retail, Wholesale, Wealth and International, and Insurance. Its
main business activities are retail, commercial and corporate
banking, general insurance, and life, pensions and investment
provision.  It also operates an international banking business
with a global footprint in over 30 countries.  Services are
offered through a number of brand, including Lloyds TSB, Halifax,
Bank of Scotland, Scottish Widows, Clerical Medical and Cheltenham
& Gloucester, and a range of distribution channels.  In March
2010, Capita Group Plc acquired Ramesys (Holdings) Ltd from Lloyds
Banking Group plc's Lloyds Bank.  In April 2011, Lloyds Banking
Group plc's LDC bought gas and chemicals business, A-Gas, and a
stake in UK2 Group, a Web hosting company.


LOUGH ERNE: Resort Manager Jonathan Stapleton Resigns
-----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Lough Erne resort Administrators KPMG said
that the resort's Manager Jonathan Stapleton is leaving his post
at the end of August to pursue other opportunities.

The hotel and golf facility was put into administration in May
with former owner Jim Treacy owing Bank of Scotland Ireland (BoSI)
GBP25 million, according to BBC News.  The report relates that The
Tifco Hotel Group, based in Dublin, has been appointed to run the
hotel.

As well as owning its own facilities, it manages a number of
insolvent hotels on behalf of administrators and receivers, BBC
News notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 17,
2011, Belfast Telegraph said John Hansen and Stuart Irwin of KPMG
have said the aim is to sell the luxury facility as a going
concern, saying "an experienced hotel operator" would keep the
resort trading, according to Belfast Telegraph.  The report
related that several industry experts have come forward to say the
banks could be to blame for the Lough Erne Resort's difficulties.

The Lough Erne is a five star hotel and golf resort that opened in
October 2007


SCARISBRICK HOTEL: Lancashire Firms Unlikely to Get Money Back
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Bristow at Ormskirk Advertiser reports that West Lancashire
firms are unlikely to recoup thousands of pounds owed to them when
Southport's Scarisbrick Hotel collapsed into administration.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 5,
2011, Liverpool Echo said that Manchester-based Britannia has
acquired Scarisbrick Hotel in Southport out of administration,
saving about 100 jobs in the process.  But suppliers fear they
could be left thousands of pounds out of pocket, according to
Liverpool Echo.

Under the deal, secured creditors are set to be repaid in full,
but local businesses will be left with pennies, according to
Ormskirk Advertiser.  The report relates that the Mullwood Wine
Company, Scotts Butchers and MA Forshaw were all owed money when
the iconic hotel went bust.

Ormskirk Advertiser relays that administrators BDO said secured
creditors, which are understood to be a major bank and brewery,
would be repaid in full.  "The administrators are currently
investigating the level of secured debt that the company has.  A
return to unsecured creditors is uncertain at this time," Ormskirk
Advertiser quoted BDO as saying.


TUI AG: Stronger Sales in Northern Europe Boost 3rd Quarter Profit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Wembridge at The Financial Times reports that stronger sales
in northern Europe have offset a poor performance at Tui Travel's
French division, boosting third quarter profit at the tour
operator.

The FT relates that London-listed Tui said the political unrest in
the Middle East and North Africa had continued to weigh on its
French sales, pushing the division to a GBP29 million loss in the
three months to June 30.

But Tui, as cited by the FT, said that sales in its northern
region -- which include the UK and Nordic businesses -- pushed the
tour group up by 57% to an underlying profit GBP88 million for the
quarter year-on-year, aided by the later timing of Easter and the
non-recurrence of last year's Icelandic volcanic ash disruption.

According to the FT, in response to the tough conditions facing
the French market, Tui said it would "consolidate the teams and
brands in France, with the aim of creating a single French
business with a long term viable future."

The FT notes that Peter Long, Tui chief executive, said the
merging of Tui's French businesses was in its early planning
stages and declined to give any additional details until the
group's full year results in December.

"We see considerable weakness in our French business," the FT
quotes Mr. Long as saying.  "France is very reliant on
destinations such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and bookings to
these countries are down 28%.

"We believe that this will remain challenging for the foreseeable
future."

                            About TUI

TUI AG -- http://www.tui-group.com/en/-- is a Germany-based
company mainly engaged in the tourism sector, focusing on the
markets of Central, Northern and Western Europe.  TUI owns a
network of travel agencies and tour operators, including air
tours, Thomson, First Choice and TUI Deutschland.  It also
operates several airlines, including Corsairfly, Thomsonfly and
First Choice Airways, among others.  The Company is structured
into three segments: TUI Travel, TUI Hotels and Resorts, and
Cruises.  TUI Travel comprises the Company's distribution, tour
operating, airline and incoming activities and services over 30
million customers in 180 countries.  The TUI Hotels and Resorts
division offers a portfolio of 238 hotels, located in Spain,
Greece, Egypt, France, Turkey, Tunisia, the Balearics and the
Caribbean, among others.  The Cruises sector comprises Hapag-Lloyd
Kreuzfahrten GmbH and TUI Cruises which provide luxury cruises,
and cruises within the German-speaking countries, respectively.

                            *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 19,
2011, Moody's Investors Service raised the Corporate Family Rating
and Probability of Default Rating of TUI AG to B3 from Caa1; the
unsecured rating and the subordinated ratings are also raised to
Caa1 and Caa2, respectively.  Moody's said the outlook is stable.
The rating action reflects Moody's view that the incremental
proceeds that have been received from Hapag-Lloyd following its
refinancing have improved the financial profile of TUI AG.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Vertical Integration
-----------------------------------
Author: Kathryn Rudie Harrigan
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 390 pages
List Price: US$34.95
Review by Henry Berry

The original title of Vertical Integration, Outsourcing, and
Corporate Strategy, first published in 1983, was Strategies for
Vertical Integration.  The updated title reflects the topic of
outsourcing that was discussed in the original material.  By the
early 1980s, when the book first appeared, the "old image of
vertical integration [was] outmoded," says the author.  The old
image saw vertical integration as "operations that are 100 percent
owned and physically interconnected and that supply 100 percent of
the firm's needs."  But this image of vertical integration rarely
fulfilled the expectations of a generation of business leaders.

Vertical integration was not only undesirable, it also could be
deceptive and shortsighted.  Vertical integration made many
companies too narrowly focused, complex, and inflexible and
burdensome to operate.  These are especially undesirable traits in
today's economy, which is characterized by market-share
fluctuations, lower start-up costs, fickle consumers, competition
from foreign corporations, the enhanced role of advertising and
marketing, and rapid technological developments affecting
corporate communication and distribution.

While vertical integration has become a much more risky aim in
today's diversified, decentralized economy, it nonetheless
continues to embody classic favorable business principles and
undisputed competitive advantages.  "The principle benefits of
vertical integration are economies of integration and cost
reduction made possible by improved coordination of activities,"
says the author.  But as Harrigan soon discovered from her
research, "firms sometimes undertake a more costly degree of
integration than may be required to cut costs."

Harrigan's text provides case studies of how companies have
implemented strategies for vertical integration.  These
strategies, which have ranged from the successful to the
unfortunate, cover sixteen business sectors, including petroleum
refining, pharmaceuticals, genetic engineering, personal
microcomputers, and the tailored-suits field of the clothing
industry.  The author looks at nearly two hundred companies within
these industries for guidance and lessons they offer.

In today's global economy, monopolies are discouraged by
government policies.  Thus, there are many more players, single
sources of raw materials can be unreliable, and corporations are
finding that it is more important to be responsive to changing
markets than to have a permanent identity or unvarying products.
As a corporate strategy, vertical integration can be successful if
implemented properly.  There is no monolithic model for vertical
integration; there is a large universe of possibilities with
respect to breadth, depth, and form.  With its expert analyses,
Harrigan's book is invaluable for high-stakes corporate decision-
makers who will sooner or later be faced with the question of
whether vertical integration is an appropriate corporate strategy.

Kathryn Rudie Harrigan has received fellowships and other honors
and recognition for her business leadership, membership on boards
of directors, and scholarly work in the field of business.  She
has written several other books and numerous articles.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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