TCREUR_Public/110819.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, August 19, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 164

                            Headlines




A U S T R I A

HYPO ALPE: Makes EUR71.6MM Net Profit in First Half 2011


B U L G A R I A

MILKY WAY: Files for Voluntary Bankruptcy; Owes BGN4.5 Million


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Prague Court Approves Sale by Tender


D E N M A R K

* DENMARK: Regional Banks Take Step to Generate Cash


G E R M A N Y

KIRCHMEDIA GMBH: Litigation Over 2002 Bankruptcy Continues


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Plans to Cut Workforce by 27% Next Year
EIRCOM GROUP: Creditors Claim Company is Insolvent
IMS COMPUTERS: Court Appoints Interim Examiner
MERCATOR CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to 'Caa1'
RMF EURO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class V Notes to 'Ba3'


I T A L Y

* Euro Zone Probably Wouldn't Survive Insolvent Italy: Oettinger


N E T H E R L A N D S

CAIRN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
DUCHESS IV: S&P Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'CCC-'
INVESCO MEZZANO: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2'
MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Can File Schedules & Statements Til Sept. 12
NEPTUNO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa2'


R U S S I A

BANK OF MOSCOW: US$14 Billion State Bailout Questioned
KIT FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating


S P A I N

SANTANDER FINANCIACION: S&P Ups Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Official Debt Collection Probe Launched


U K R A I N E

FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Affirms Foreign Currency IDRs at 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRITISH ARAB: Fitch Maintains BB Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
NITENITE: Administrators Seek to Sell Hotel as Going Concern
PREMIER TELESALES: Set to Enter Liquidation
PRESBYTERIAN MUTUAL: DUP Leader Challenges Banks Over Collapse
TRAFALGAR NEW HOMES: Issues 12 Million Ordinary Shares Under CVA


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Leveraged Management Buyouts




                            *********


=============
A U S T R I A
=============


HYPO ALPE: Makes EUR71.6MM Net Profit in First Half 2011
--------------------------------------------------------
Michael Shields at Reuters reports that Hypo Group Alpe Adria
made a first-half net profit for the first time since 2007 as bad
debt costs fell sharply and business picked up in its core
southeastern Europe market.

The nationalized Austrian bank earned EUR5.2 million (US$7.33
million) after tax and minority interests even after net interest
income fell 13% due to non-performing loans and as it scaled back
lending under orders from the EU, Reuters discloses.  Including
the positive impact of fair-value adjustments on its own debt, it
swung to a net profit of EUR71.6 million from a loss of nearly
EUR500 million a year earlier, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, Chief Executive Gottwald Kranebitter called
the results "a significant milestone in convincing the European
Commission of our ability to survive."

The Commission, which cleared state aid for Hypo and is vetting
its restructuring plans, last year questioned whether the bank
could keep going, Reuters relates.

Hypo repaid some state-backed debt, reducing national and
provincial guarantees by EUR1.4 billion to EUR19.7 billion and
leaving it with EUR2.2 billion in excess liquidity, Reuters
states.

Still, the bank had EUR9.6 billion in non-performing loans on its
books at mid-year, and it acknowledged it would not have passed
this year's European bank stress tests, Reuters notes.  Its Tier
One capital held steady at 6.6% of risk-weighted assets,
according to Reuters.

Reuters says Hypo Alpe Adria, which had to be rescued in late
2009 to stave off a collapse that would have shaken the region,
is in the process of winding down non-core assets and selling its
businesses in Austria and Italy to focus on emerging Europe.

Prosecutors in Germany, Austria, and Croatia are investigating
former managers, shareholders and business partners of Hypo and
former owner BayernLB on suspicion they lined their pockets at
the expense of the banks, Reuters discloses.

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB.  It
is active in banking and leasing with a balance sheet of
EUR43 billion.  In banking, HGAA serves both corporate and retail
customers and offers services ranging from traditional lending
through savings and deposits to complex investment products and
asset management services.

                          *     *     *

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG continues to carry a bank
financial strength rating of 'E' and a subordinated debt rating
of 'Ba1' from Moody's Investors Service with negative outlook.


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


MILKY WAY: Files for Voluntary Bankruptcy; Owes BGN4.5 Million
--------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing data from the country's commercial registry,
reports that Milk Way has filed for voluntary bankruptcy.

According to SeeNews, Milk Way said in a filing to the commercial
registry on Aug. 11 that the company has amassed over
BGN4.5 million (US$3.3 million/EUR2.3 million) in debts to the
state, affiliates and suppliers.

Milk Way said that the company had difficulty implementing its
development strategy and marketing its products at competitive
prices during the ongoing economic crisis, SeeNews notes.

Milk Way is a dairy company based in Kazanlak, in southern
Bulgaria.


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


SAZKA AS: Prague Court Approves Sale by Tender
----------------------------------------------
Lenka Ponikelska at Bloomberg News reports that the sale of Sazka
AS may start in a "few days" after the Prague Municipal Court
approved conditions for a tender proposed by a creditors'
committee.

According to Bloomberg, Lenka Ticha, a spokeswoman for bankruptcy
administrator Josef Cupka, said that the court approved on
Wednesday a proposal by the creditors' committee to sell bankrupt
Sazka by tender where all prospective bidders will be asked to
provide a deposit of CZK500 million (US$29.6 million).

The bidders will have to provide the deposit within three weeks
after the sale is announced and will have another two weeks to
file their bids, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Cupka, as cited by Bloomberg, said earlier that the price
offered will be the main criteria for choosing the new owner.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, CTK said
Sazka's bankruptcy took effect on May 30, 2011.  The decision on
Sazka's bankruptcy was made at a meeting of its creditors on
May 27, CTK related.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in
the Czech Republic.


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


* DENMARK: Regional Banks Take Step to Generate Cash
----------------------------------------------------
Tasneem Brogger and Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News
report that Denmark's regional banks are cutting lending and
selling off assets to generate cash needed to escape an
international funding wall as policy makers grope for measures to
boost liquidity.

Denmark's bank industry is still reeling from the fallout of two
regional bank failures this year that triggered the European
Union's toughest resolution laws and resulted in senior creditor
losses, Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg notes that while the government is working on measures
to allow lenders to sidestep the bill, banks still face liquidity
shortages.  The central bank this week responded by extending its
collateral terms indefinitely, as policy makers hammer out the
details of proposals to ease Denmark's banking crisis, Bloomberg
relates.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


KIRCHMEDIA GMBH: Litigation Over 2002 Bankruptcy Continues
----------------------------------------------------------
Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News reports that Rolf Breuer, former
chief of Deutsche Bank AG, was yesterday set to face trial on
claims he lied to judges.

Leo Kirch blamed Mr. Breuer for the downfall of his media group,
KirchMedia GmbH, Bloomberg says.

The trial in Munich was part of a nine-year fight over comments
Mr. Breuer made to Bloomberg TV in 2002 about how creditworthy
Mr. Kirch's media group was, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Kirch, once one of Germany's biggest media tycoons, claimed
Mr. Breuer's remarks precipitated the company's bankruptcy and
filed claims totaling at least EUR3.3 billion (US$4.8 billion),
Bloomberg relates.  The lawsuits continue in spite of Mr. Kirch's
death a month ago, Bloomberg states.

The bank and Mr. Breuer, who both rejected a EUR775 million
settlement over the civil litigation proposed by a judge in
March, deny any wrongdoing, Bloomberg notes.

                           About KirchMedia

Headquartered in Ismaning, Germany, KirchMedia GmbH --
http://www.kirchmedia.de/-- was the country's second largest
media company prior to its insolvency filing in June 2002.  The
firm's collapse, caused by a US$5.7 billion debt incurred during
an expansion drive, was Germany's biggest since World War II.
Taurus Holding is the former holding company for the Kirch
group.  The case is docketed under Case No. 14 HK O 1877/07 at
the Regional Court of Munich.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ANGLO IRISH: Plans to Cut Workforce by 27% Next Year
----------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock and Francess McDonnell at The Irish Times report
that Anglo Irish Bank's plans to cut its workforce by 27% by the
end of next year as part of a wider move to wind down its
operations by 2020.

Staff were told Wednesday morning that the bank, which now also
incorporates Irish Nationwide, wants to cut up to 350 jobs out of
a workforce of 1,280, The Irish Times relates.  This will bring
to at least 3,450 the number of redundancies at the main State-
supported, Irish-owned banks by the end of 2012, The Irish Times
notes.

These will be the first tranche of job cuts as Anglo moves
towards winddown, The Irish Times says.  Anglo and Irish
Nationwide are operating under the Irish Bank Resolution
Corporation name since their merger was approved earlier this
year, The Irish Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, under plans to gradually stop
operating, Anglo will wind down its various loan books over the
next decade and sell off its Irish wealth-management division.
It is in the process of selling its US loan book -- having
received first round bids from a number of interested parties --
and plans to offload its wealth management arm in Ireland, which
employs about 40 staff, The Irish Times states.  The failed
State-owned bank is also targeting the orderly wind-down of its
UK commercial loan book over the next five years, with the sale
of any residual loans after that point, The Irish Times notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 1,
2011, BreakingNews.ie related that The European Commission
cleared a bailout plan for Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish
Nationwide Building Society.  BreakingNews.ie disclosed that the
proposal, which was submitted for approval in January, provides
for the merger of the two troubled institutions and their winding
down over the next 10 years.  Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide
jointly received EUR34.7 billion in capital injections from the
State to cover losses on property loans, BreakingNews.ie noted.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products
and solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.


EIRCOM GROUP: Creditors Claim Company is Insolvent
--------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that a committee representing so-called
PIK note loanholders in Eircom has written to the board of its
Cayman Islands-based parent stating they have every reason to
believe the company is insolvent.

In the latest twist to the Eircom financial saga, the loanholder
committee has also questioned how the parent company intends to
repay its debt, The Irish Times says.

The committee has also accused the directors of being in breach
of their duty of care towards the loanholders and has warned that
it will take legal or other action if necessary to protect its
position, according to The Irish Times.

The Irish Times has learned that the letter was delivered by hand
in the Cayman Islands yesterday to ERC Ireland Preferred Equity
Ltd, the ultimate parent company of Eircom and the entity that
issued the loan notes.

"The committee believes that the directors of the company are not
taking active and independent steps to safeguard the interests of
the company's creditors, the holders of the PIK notes, and are
putting those interests at risk by their failure to do so," the
letter stated, The Irish Times reports.

The Irish Times says the letter also stated that the directors
have a duty of care to creditors ahead of shareholders and that
they have lost faith in the board's ability to look after their
interests, The Irish Times relays.

The Irish Times notes that the PIK (payment-in-kind) noteholders
are on the bottom rung of the ladder in terms of Eircom's
creditors and the general consensus is they face having their
near EUR670 million in loans wiped out.

To date, Eircom has declined to engage with the PIK noteholders
on its financial restructuring, but has opened talks with a
committee representing senior lenders, The Irish Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, Eircom has debts of nearly
EUR4 billion and has begun consultations with its shareholders --
Singapore-based STT and the employee Esot -- and its senior
creditors about a financial restructuring.

This is based on a new business plan, drawn up by the company's
management team led by chief executive Paul Donovan, the report
notes.

The Irish Times says the move by the PIK noteholders will be seen
as a gambit to force the company to engage actively with them on
the financial restructuring, which has gathered pace in recent
weeks.

The Irish Times states that speculation has mounted that Eircom
might even seen to enter examinership -- which would give it
protection against its creditors for a period of time -- or other
forms of restructuring to resolve its financial difficulties if
an agreement cannot be reached with its creditors.

It is not clear what legal action the noteholders might pursue
against Eircom's parent, but it could include seeking a winding
up of the company, The Irish Times says.  In addition,
noteholders might await the outcome of the financial
restructuring and seek damages for any losses they will have
incurred by that time, The Irish Times notes.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


IMS COMPUTERS: Court Appoints Interim Examiner
----------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that an interim examiner has been
appointed to IMS Computers Ltd, IMS Holdings Ltd, and Integrated
Medical Solutions Ltd.

According to the report, the group is now in financial trouble
because of fears that its sole shareholder, Daresbury Services
Group, is insolvent.

The court heard IMS lost a EUR5 million contract with a major
healthcare service provider last month because of Darsbury's
problems, BreakingNews.ie relays.

BreakingNews.ie notes that Ms. Justice Elizabeth Dunne has agreed
to a petition by company directors to appoint an interim examiner
until August 29 when there will be a full hearing of the case.

Based in Glenageary, Co Dublin, Integrated Medical Solutions
provides software and critical support for dealing with patient
records in hospitals.  The group employs 66 people.


MERCATOR CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Mercator CLO III Limited:

Issuer: Mercator CLO III Limited:

   -- EUR199.5M Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR31.5M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18M Class A-3 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR18M Class B-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10.9M Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Mercator CLO III Limited, issued in August 2007, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by NAC management (Cayman) Limited. This transaction will
be in reinvestment period until 15th October 2013. It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action. The
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in December 2009. The Class A-2, Class A-
3 and Class B-1 overcollateralization ratios are reported at
124.04%, 114.40% and 106.15%, respectively, versus October 2009
levels of 117.55%, 108.67% and 100.99%, respectively. Moody's
also notes that the Class A-3 and Class B-1 Notes are no longer
deferring interest and that all previously deferred interest on
these classes has been paid in full.

WARF has increased from 2993 to 3091 between October 2009 and
June 2011. The change in reported WARF understates the actual
credit quality improvement because of the technical transition
related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates,
as announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010. In addition, securities rated Caa or lower make
up approximately 7.7% of the underlying portfolio versus 17.3% in
October 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR262.974
million, defaulted par of EUR7.189 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.05% (consistent with a WARF of 2920), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.12% for a Aaa
liability target rating, and a diversity score of 31. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 87.8% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and] 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CLOs as a result
of the recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap
termination in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 56% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   assets assumed to be defaulted by Moody's may create
   volatility in the deal's overcollateralization levels.
   Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision
   to work out versus sell defaulted assets create additional
   uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming
   the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in order
   to account for potential volatility in market prices

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the difference between the reported and covenant
   levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RMF EURO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class V Notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by RMF Euro V PLC:

EUR275,000,000 Class I Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR110,000,000 Revolving Facility due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

EUR48,900,000 Class II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR20,800,000 Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2023, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR33,000,000 Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR17,100,000 Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2023, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR6,000,000 Class R Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to A2
(sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

EUR15,000,000 Class Q Combination Notes due 2023, Withdrawn
(sf); previously on April 5, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class R,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee. Class Q is being withdrawn because the
notes have been repaid.

Ratings Rationale

RMF Euro V PLC, issued in April 2007, is a multi currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European leveraged loans. The portfolio is
managed by Pemba Credit Advisers This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 4 April 2013. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in September
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
the collateral amortization profile, and (2) adjustments to the
equity cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action. In
Moody's view, positive developments coincide with reinvestment of
sale proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated
recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into substitute
assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in September 2009. As of the latest
trustee report dated July 2011 the Class I/II, Class III and
Class IV overcollateralization ratios are reported at 124.0%,
117.8% and 109.1% respectively, versus September 2009 levels of
118.6%, 112.8% and 104.8%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

The change in reported WARF understates the actual credit quality
improvement because of the technical transition related to rating
factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in
the press release published by Moody's on 1 September 2010. In
addition, securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately
10.1% of the underlying portfolio versus 16.85% in September 2009
according to Moody's. Additionally, defaulted securities total
about EUR 0.04million of the underlying portfolio compared to
EUR26.4 million in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR528.6
million, defaulted par of EUR0.04 million, a weighted average
default probability of 23.6% (consistent with a WARF of 2946), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.7% for a Aaa
liability target rating, and a diversity score of 40. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 91.3% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 61.9% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per
   the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's assumed the worse of reported and
   covenanted values for weighted average rating factor, weighted
   average spread, and diversity score.

3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
   assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a
   direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to
   the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
   tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. Other factors used in this rating are described
Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions (October 15, 2009)

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


* Euro Zone Probably Wouldn't Survive Insolvent Italy: Oettinger
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Fairless at Dow Jones Newswires reports that Guenther
Oettinger, European Commissioner for energy, said in an interview
published Monday that the euro-zone would "probably" blow up if
Italy were to become insolvent.  Mr. Oettinger is also a member
of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU party.

Dow Jones relates that Mr. Oettinger told German daily
Handelsblatt that if Italy had financial difficulties, the
country would no longer be able to contribute to Europe's rescue
fund, the European Financial Stability Facility.  That would be a
"problem", he said.

Mr. Oettinger said Italy must therefore strictly implement its
new savings program and cut its budget deficit below 3% earlier
than currently planned, according to Dow Jones.  The EU must put
pressure on Italy to ensure it sticks to this course, he said.

Mr. Oettinger, as cited by Dow Jones, added that the size of the
EFSF doesn't need to be increased because it is easily big enough
to fund Portugal, Greece, and Ireland.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CAIRN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Cairn CLO II:

Issuer: Cairn CLO II:

   -- EUR60M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR33.2M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR25.6M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR24M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19.2M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20M Combination Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The rating of the Combination Notes has been withdrawn following
the full exchange of the notes for their underlying components in
June 2011.

Ratings Rationale

Cairn CLO II, issued in August 2007, is a multi currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by Cairn
Capital Limited. This transaction will be in reinvestment period
until October 2013. It is predominantly composed of senior
secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
due to (i) the application of Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011; (ii) an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating
action in July 2009; (iii) Moody's corrected inputs regarding the
notional amount of the non-Euro liabilities; and (iv)
improvements in transaction performance.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile, and (2) adjustments to the
equity cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

The actions also reflect the correction of an inaccurate
numerical input with respect to the notional amount of the non-
Euro liabilities at the time of the last rating action on 14
August 2009. Had this not occurred, the ratings of the Cairn CLO
II notes would have likely been higher at that time as the total
liability notional amount was overestimated by 2.9%. As a result,
the rating of the Class C notes may have been up to two notches
higher while the Class A-2, Class B and Class D notes may have
been up to one notch higher. The updated inputs have been taken
from the last available Trustee report at the time of the
analysis.

Moody's notes that this action also reflects improvements of the
transaction performance since the last rating action. In Moody's
view, positive developments coincide with reinvestment of sale
proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated recoveries
realized on defaulted securities) into substitute assets with
higher par amounts.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in July 2009.The Class B, Class C, Class
D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
131.5%, 120.3%, 111.4% and 105.1% respectively, versus June 2009
levels of 125.1%, 114.7%, 106.4% and 100.6%, respectively, and
all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.

Reported WARF has slightly increased from 2721 to 2886 between
June 2009 and June 2011.

However, this reported WARF overstates the actual deterioration
in credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010. Additionally, there is currently EUR0.4 million
of defaulted securities in the underlying portfolio compared to
EUR 19.8 million in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR364,725
million with EUR0.4 million defaulted par, a weighted average
default probability of 24.7% (consistent with a WARF of 2966), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.2% for a Aaa
liability target rating, and a diversity score of 35. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 88% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Moody's also notes that around 62% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per
   the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.

4) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
   assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a
   direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to
   the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
   tranches.

5) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

6) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


DUCHESS IV: S&P Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Duchess IV CLO B.V.'s revolving loan facility and class A-1, B,
C, and D notes, and removed from CreditWatch positive the ratings
on classes B and C. "At the same time, we affirmed our rating on
the class E notes," S&P said.

"These rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance. We have observed an increase in credit enhancement,
which, in our view, supports the higher ratings assigned to the
revolving loan facility and classes A-1, B, C, and D," S&P
related.

"Our ratings on the class D and E notes were constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test that we introduced as part of our criteria update
(see 'Update To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For
Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17,
2009). None of the ratings was affected by the largest industry
default test, another of our supplemental stress tests," S&P
said.

"We have applied our counterparty criteria and, in our view, the
participants to the transaction are appropriately rated to
support the ratings on the notes (see 'Counterparty and
Supporting Obligations Methodology and Assumptions,' published on
Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

Duchess IV CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

Ratings List

Class                          Rating
                          To             From

Duchess IV CLO B.V.
EUR525 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

Revolving loan facility   AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-1                       AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)
B                         A (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                         BBB (sf)       BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                         B+ (sf)        B (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E                         CCC- (sf)


INVESCO MEZZANO: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Invesco Mezzano B.V.:

Issuer: Invesco Mezzano B.V.:

   -- EUR 254,500,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR 10,500,000 Class B Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR 19,250,000 Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR 10,000,000 Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR 16,750,000 Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Invesco Mezzano B.V. issued in October 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Invesco Asset Management. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 15 November 2013. Current portfolio is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in October
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain
credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in
receiving information required for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in October 2009. According to
the trustee latest report dated 30 June 2011, the reported Class
A, Class B, Class D, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are 129.08%, 123.94%, 115.36%, 111.35% and 106.29%,
respectively, versus September 2009 reported levels (where the
October 2009 rating actions were based on) of 122.64%, 117.73%,
109.67%, 105.905 and 99.84%, respectively. All related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. Moody's
also notes that the WARF movement has improved compared to the
last rating action. However, the reported WARF understates the
actual improvement in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010. Currently, there is no defaulted assets in
the portfolio.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR329.5
million, defaulted par of EUR0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22% (consistent with a WARF of 2864) a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.09% and a
diversity score of 42.The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 83.90% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 17.44% of the
portfolio assets being exposed to Italy, Spain or Ireland; and 2)
the large concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing
between 2012 and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers to
refinance. CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the
manager's investment strategy and behavior; and 2) divergence in
legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different
transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average spread,
   and diversity score.

3) Credit estimate concentration: Around 63.1% of the current
   collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit
   quality has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Can File Schedules & Statements Til Sept. 12
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
extended the deadline of Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. and certain of
its affiliates for an additional 30 days, or 45 days from the
Petition Date, to file their schedules of assets and liabilities,
schedules of current income and expenditures, schedules of
executory contracts and unexpired leases and statements of
financial affairs.

Pursuant to Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 1007(c)
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Debtors would
be required to file the Schedules and Statements within 14 days
after the Petition Date.  However, the Court is authorized to
extend the filing deadline for cause by Bankruptcy Rules 1007(c)
and 9006(b).

The Debtors said they were forced to file for bankruptcy with
less than 24 hours' notice.  The Debtors said the scope and
complexity of their businesses, coupled with the limited time and
resources available to them to gather the required information
and prepare and file their Schedules and Statements, warrant an
extension of the filing deadline.  While the Debtors have
commenced, and are in the process of, gathering the necessary
information, it will be close to impossible to properly and
accurately complete and file the Schedules and Statements within
the 14-day period after the Petition Date as provided by
Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c).

                    About Marco Polo Seatrade

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing
commercial and technical vessel management services to third
parties.  Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the
name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate
headquarters in Amsterdam, Netherlands.  The primary assets
consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in
international trade, and call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost $1.8 million on
July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the two
other vessels.

Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J.
Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy
counsel.  The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.

The petition said assets and debt are both more than US$100
million and less than US$500 million.


NEPTUNO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Neptuno CLO II B.V:

Issuer: Neptuno CLO II B.V.:

   -- EUR308.5M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR28M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
      Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR23M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR23M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Neptuno CLO II B.V., issued in December 2007, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio composed of a majority of senior secured European loans
but also with approximately 25% of non senior secured loans
including mezzanine loans, second lien loans, HY bonds and CLO
securities. The portfolio is managed by Bankia. This transaction
will be in its reinvestment period until 16 January 2013.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain
credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward
looking indicators as well as time lags in receiving information
required for credit estimate updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR402.3
million, defaulted par of EUR7.84 million, a weighted average
default probability of 20.86% (consistent with a WARF of 2683), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.43% for a Aaa
liability target rating, and a diversity score of 36. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 75% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
10%. Because approximately 6.5% of non first lien loans assets in
the portfolio are second-lien loans, Moody's also considered a
scenario with a slightly higher weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 42.40% for a Aaa liability rating. This is
assuming that the second-lien loans would recover 25% upon
default instead of 10%.

In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy especially as 16.1% of
the portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Italy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation
of CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 58% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per
   the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
   analyzed  defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread and diversity score.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK OF MOSCOW: US$14 Billion State Bailout Questioned
------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Times reports that people close to Andrei Borodin,
the former president of the Bank of Moscow, said that the US$14
billion bail-out of the collapsed lender was a vastly inflated
move aimed at tightening the grip of VTB Bank.

The people argued that the bail-out was politically motivated and
part of a carve-up of Moscow assets following the controversial
ousting of Yury Luzhkov as the city's mayor last year, the FT
discloses.

VTB spent US$3.7 billion on acquiring the city government's 46.5%
stake in Bank of Moscow in February, the FT recounts.  The state-
controlled bank then battled to take control from the management
team of Mr. Borodin, a close ally of Mr. Luzhkov, only to claim
it had found a morass of bad loans on its balance sheet, the FT
relates.

"Bank of Moscow never should have got a state bail-out because
there was no run on the bank and there were no problems with
creditors.  The bail-out was not to Bank of Moscow but to the
shareholders of the bank, which is clear evidence that all the
problems are artificial and in fact the state aid is directed to
someone else," the FT quotes one of the people close to
Mr. Borodin as saying.

AKB Bank Moskvy OAO (Bank Moskvy OAO or Bank of Moscow OJSC) --
http://www.bm.ru/-- is a Russia-based financial institution,
which offers a wide range of services to its clients including
corporate banking, retail banking and investment banking
services.

The Bank operates through numerous branches.  It is a part of the
Association of Russian Banks (ARB) and other organizations.  In
addition, AKB Bank Moskvy OAO has 13 subsidiaries and two
affiliated companies.  As of May 14, 2009, the Bank was 43.99%
owned by the Moscow City Government.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 13,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of JSC
Bank of Moscow: standalone bank financial strength rating to E+
(mapping to B2 on the long-term scale) from D-, long-term local
and foreign currency debt and deposit ratings to Ba2 from Ba1,
and long-term foreign currency subordinated debt rating to Ba3
from Ba2.  The short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not-
Prime has been affirmed.  The outlook on the stand-alone and
long-term supported ratings is negative.


KIT FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia's OJSC Kit Finance Investment
Bank (KF) a Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' with a
Stable Outlook.

The bank's Long-term IDR and Support Rating reflect the potential
support which KF may receive if needed from its ultimate parent
JSC Russian Railways (RR, 'BBB'/Stable).  However, Fitch
considers the propensity of such support to be only moderate
given KF's complex and non-transparent shareholding structure,
the non-strategic nature of RR's investment in the bank and the
shareholder's intention to dispose of the bank during the Long-
term rating's time horizon.

KF's 'b-' Viability Rating reflects the bank's limited franchise,
high balance sheet concentrations, and its considerable amount of
impaired assets originated under the former management (12.5% of
end-H111 assets).  It also reflects its vulnerable
capitalization, with its performance largely dependent on
securities appreciation and the limited track record following
the bank's failure in 2008.

Since then, KF has been subject to a program of financial
recovery, approved by the Russian Central Bank and overseen by
RR.  The program allows KF to gradually create reserves against
its impaired assets (which were originated under the former
management) in a period until end-H114.  In many cases, KF's
impaired loans are secured by the former Kit Finance Group's non-
core assets.  The extent to which KF will need to create further
provisions will largely depend on its ability to foreclose and
dispose of these assets.  Loans issued under the current
management are yet to season and in the medium term, arrears in
this portfolio are likely to increase from current levels (4%
overdue by 30 days at end-H111).

KF is highly dependent on funding provided by state-owned bodies
to support the bank's recovery.  At end-5M11, such facilities
accounted for a high 61% of liabilities.  Capitalization has been
supported by RUB4bn of equity injections from the bank's new
shareholders and RUB10bn of subordinated loan from shareholders.
The bank's regulatory capital ratio was 18.9% at end-5M11.
However, the agency estimates that this would be much lower if
legacy impaired assets were fully provided, but still remains
higher than the regulatory minimum.  Performance has been largely
affected by high gains on securities appreciation while the net
interest margin remains lower than operating expenses.

KF is a St-Petersburg-based bank which focuses on corporate
lending, and was the 37th-largest by assets in Russia at end-
Q111.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR: assigned at 'B'; Stable Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR: assigned at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: assigned 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: assigned '4'


=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER FINANCIACION: S&P Ups Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating on
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Financiacion 1's class
D notes to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'D (sf)'. The class A, B, C, E, and F
notes are unaffected.

"The rating action follows our discovery of an analytical error
leading to our July 1, 2011 rating action on this transaction,
when we lowered the rating on the class D notes to 'D (sf') from
'CCC- (sf)'. According to the most recent data available for the
transaction, the class D notes had not missed a scheduled
interest payment on the April 2011 interest payment date," S&P
said.

"On discovering this error, we raised the rating on the class D
notes to 'CCC- (sf)', the rating prior to our July 1 downgrade.
The rating action reflects the most recent data available for the
transaction as of July 2011," S&P said.

The transaction closed in December 2006 and is now highly
seasoned with a pool factor of 13%. The paydown of the underlying
assets has triggered the amortization of the most senior class of
notes as the notes are paying principal on a sequential basis.
Due to this redemption feature, the level of credit enhancement
has significantly increased for the class A, B, and C notes, on
account of the subordination of the junior rated classes.
"However, as the class D and E notes are undercollateralized,
they are not providing the same level of support to the class A,
B, and C notes as we consider the class D and E notes to be
nonperforming, according to our rating definitions. In addition,
these classes do not benefit from the support of the reserve
fund, which is now fully depleted. The class F notes were issued
to fund the reserve fund at closing, and were therefore never
backed by the underlying assets," S&P said.

As of the latest payment date, July 2011, the transaction has
accumulated a EUR41.4 million principal redemption shortfall,
which is the difference between the available remaining principal
receipts and the accrued redemption amount (i.e., the difference
between the principal pending payments on the class A, B, C, D,
and E notes and the outstanding balance of the performing
assets).

The class D notes are not asset-backed, according to the
transaction's current level of undercollateralization. However,
the class D notes' interest-deferral trigger (based on principal
redemption shortfall) has not been breached, and the class D
notes have not missed scheduled interest payment on the July 2011
interest payment date.

The class E and F notes had already defaulted in August 2009 and
July 2009. Since their interest payment defaults, neither of
these classes has paid any of the defaulted interest.

Santander Financiacion 1's notes, issued in 2006, are backed by a
portfolio of Spanish consumer loans originated by Banco Santander
S.A. (AA/Negative/A-1+).

Ratings List

Class              Rating
           To                 From

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Financiacion 1
EUR1,914.3 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

D          CCC- (sf)          D (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A          AAA (sf)
B          A+ (sf)
C          BB- (sf)
E          D (sf)
F          D (sf)


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Official Debt Collection Probe Launched
--------------------------------------------------------
Agence France Presse reports that Swedish authorities on
Wednesday launched an official debt collection probe of Saab
Automobile, whose bills have been piling up for months, in a step
that could end in bankruptcy.

The probe launched Wednesday by the Swedish Enforcement
Administration, or Kronofogden, only concerns SEK369,000
(EUR40,000, US$58,000) in unpaid bills to two suppliers but the
agency said it would likely be expanded within the next few days
to include claims from 14 other suppliers unless Saab can pay in
time, AFP relates.

Kronofogden's Hans Ryberg told AFP the two first suppliers to see
their claims result in an official debt collection probe were
Sweden's Infotiv, owed SEK224,000, and Norway's Kongsberg, owed
SEK145,000.

According to AFP, the agency said that in all, the 16 suppliers
have reported that Saab owes them SEK42 million but others are
likely to soon follow suit and the final sum could swell by
dozens of millions of kronor.  With its probe, Kronofogden aims
to determine if Saab has enough cash or assets to meet its
obligations, AFP states.

"It is not impossible that it has the money since (parent
company) Swedish Automobile has conducted a new share offering,"
AFP quotes Mr. Ryberg as saying.

"If we see that Saab does not have the means to pay its
suppliers, they could ask a court that the company be declared
bankrupt," he added.

He said it usually took Kronofogden between one and three months
after the beginning of its probe to file its report, AFP notes.

Separately, Johan Ahlander at Reuters reports that debt
enforcement agency is preparing to seize assets of Saab in an
attempt to recover at least SEK4 million (US$625,000)owed to
parts suppliers.

"We have contacted Saab's banks," Reuters quotes Mr. Ryberg, an
official at the Swedish Enforcement Authority as saying on
Wednesday.

The agency can now seize assets, including any cash in Saab's
bank accounts, Reuters notes.

Car production at the cash-strapped company, rescued in early
2010 by Netherlands-based Swedish Automobile, ground to a
standstill in April because suppliers who had not been paid
refused to deliver components, Reuters recounts.

Saab's next big test comes at the end of the month when it is due
to pay wages to its roughly 3,600 employees, a bill that could
run to millions of dollars, Reuters states.

A number of suppliers have turned to the authorities to get their
money with some 370,000 Swedish crowns (US$58,000) immediately
outstanding after final demands from Sweden's debt collection
agency, Reuters discloses.

The amount due for immediate payment was expected to rise to
SEK4 million yesterday, Mr. Ryberg, as cited by Reuters, said,
and is expected to rise further.

A Saab spokeswoman declined to comment on the actions of the debt
collectors office but said executives were working hard to raise
additional money for the company, Reuters notes.

With an annual production of up to 126,000 cars, Saab's current
models include the 9-3 (available as a convertible or sport
sedan), the luxury 9-5 sedan (also available in a sport wagon),
and the seven-passenger 9-7X SUV.  As it prepared to separate
from General Motors, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection in
February 2009.  A year later, in February 2010, GM sold Saab to
Dutch sports car maker Spyker Cars for about US$400 million in
cash and stock.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Affirms Foreign Currency IDRs at 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised UK-incorporated Ukrainian iron ore
pellets producer Ferrexpo Plc's rating Outlook to Positive from
Stable and affirmed its Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'B' and Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
In addition, Ferrexpo Finance plc.'s guaranteed notes (GNs) issue
senior unsecured rating was affirmed at 'B' with a Recovery
Rating (RR) of 'RR4'.

In H111, Ferrexpo reported strong revenue growth, mainly on the
back of higher iron ore prices, with the EBITDA margin recovering
to 45.3%, from 20% at FYE09.  Fitch expects current high iron ore
prices to lead to continued strong cash generation in FY11, with
EBITDA recovering to above US$650 million, up from US$586 million
at FYE10.  However, volume growth is expected to be minimal, as
the company is operating at full capacity.  Over the medium-term,
capacity expansion will be the main driver of revenue growth,
with prices expected to normalize closer to the historical
average over coming years.

The revision of the Outlook to Positive reflects the fact that
Ferrexpo's Long-term foreign currency IDR and senior unsecured
ratings are constrained by Ukraine's sovereign ratings
('B'/Positive), and follows the revision of the Outlook on the
sovereign rating to Positive from Stable in July 2011.

The ratings are supported by Ferrexpo's extensive iron ore
reserve base and the company's plans to develop new projects by
2014, which will enable the company to increase production
volumes of iron ore pellets over the next three years by more
than 33%.  The company is considered cost-competitive among
global iron ore producers, with low average cash costs providing
some financial flexibility in a commodity price downturn
scenario.  The ratings also reflect Ferrexpo's favorable
geographic location for servicing Europe, the Middle East and the
growing Chinese market and its access to Black Sea ports.  The
company furthermore has a good track record of maintaining a
stable financial policy, which is reflected in consistent credit
metrics and strong cash flows, despite the inherent cyclicality
of the mining industry.

However, the ratings remain constrained by the concentration of
sales in a single commodity, iron ore pellets, which exposes the
company to fluctuations in iron ore prices and cyclical demand
factors.  The company also remains reliant on one key mining
asset, and is exposed to high end-user concentration of sales
with three key customers accounting for the majority of total
sales volume in 2010.  Fitch notes that the company is
diversifying its customer base, which will partially mitigate
adverse effects from the possible deterioration in the operating
and financial performance of these large customers on Ferrexpo's
credit profile.  Furthermore, the company's limited scale of
operations (with EBITDAR below USD1bn) could constrain financial
flexibility, particularly in the event of a further industry
downturn, although Fitch takes some comfort that flexibility
exists in the execution of the planned five-year capital
expenditure program.

Ferrexpo remains significantly exposed to domestic mining cost
inflation (notably rising electricity and gas prices) and
exchange rate fluctuations, although the company's low cost
position partially mitigates this threat over the next two years
to end-2012.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRITISH ARAB: Fitch Maintains BB Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained British Arab Commercial Bank's
(BACB) 'BB' Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and 'bb'
Viability Rating on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating actions are as follows:

-- Long-term IDR at 'BB'; RWN maintained
-- Short-term IDR at 'B'; RWN maintained
-- Viability Rating at 'bb'; RWN maintained
-- Individual Rating at 'D'; RWN maintained
-- Support Rating affirmed at '5'

BACB's ratings are driven by its currently sound liquidity and
capitalization, but also factor in that a substantial part of its
business, and also of its deposit base, are Libyan.  As a result
of the ongoing uncertainty in Libya and the consequent impact on
BACB, Fitch is currently maintaining the bank's ratings on RWN.

About three-quarters of the bank's deposits are from Libyan
institutions and are frozen by the international sanctions
currently applied to these entities.  BACB adopts a conservative
approach to the deployment of these deposits to minimize
liquidity risk.  Most of BACB's assets are invested in highly
liquid bank placements and securities, so it would be able to
meet even substantial deposit withdrawals, if necessary.

BACB has a robust risk management framework.  Due diligence
procedures at the bank have been enhanced, and an independent
third party approved by the FSA, Grant Thornton, has been
introduced into BACB's approval processes, to ensure that all
Libya-related payments are made in full compliance with the
enhanced due diligence procedures.

BACB remains profitable, although unsurprisingly profitability
has dropped since 2010.  There has been no new business
undertaken in Libya since early 2011, and unrest elsewhere in the
Middle East has also had a negative impact on business volumes.

London-based BACB was established in 1972. The bank is a niche
provider of short-term trade finance to wholesale customers in
the Middle East and North African markets.  Other areas of
activity include international payments, treasury and project and
term lending.  BACB is 83.5% owned by the Libyan Foreign Bank
(LFB). Despite BACB's majority ownership by the LFB,
international sanctions do not apply to BACB itself.


NITENITE: Administrators Seek to Sell Hotel as Going Concern
------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Eversham at Big Hospitality reports that Nitenite, the
windowless hotel concept that launched in Birmingham in 2006, is
looking for a new owner for its city-centered hotel following its
holding company's move to administration.  The report relates
that the business had been trading successfully, but was forced
into administration after suffering difficulties with cashflow.

The 104-bedroom hotel is now in the hands of administrators at
Zolfo Cooper who are hoping to sell it as going concern,
according to Big Hospitality.  The report relates that all 10
members of the staff have remained in their jobs.


PREMIER TELESALES: Set to Enter Liquidation
-------------------------------------------
The Shropshire Star reports that Premier Telesales is set to
enter liquidation, with debts believed to be topping GBP200,000.

The Shropshire Star quotes Debbie Young, network director of
Slough-based GK Telecom, as saying that, "All I have heard from
Premier is a letter stating they have ceased trading and a
suggestion, as we will be the biggest creditor over and above
HMRC, if we wish to put them into liquidation, and we don't."
The directors intended to go into voluntary liquidation, she
said.

GK Telecom had been acting as the company's distributor, the
report notes.

"There was no reason to suspect anything was particularly wrong,
and nothing to indicate this was going to happen," Ms. Young
said.

According to the report, the firm had 90 members of staff at its
peak, but was left with between 20 and 30 people after departures
including the laying-off of 30 staff two weeks ago.

Internet forums show a number of people dissatisfied with the
service provided by the firm.

Premier Telesales is a Telford telecoms firm.


PRESBYTERIAN MUTUAL: DUP Leader Challenges Banks Over Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------------
News Letter reports that first minister Peter Robinson confronted
several banks over claims they had played a key role in causing
panic that resulted in the collapse of Presbyterian Mutual
Society (PMS).

The information came to light after the Nationwide Building
Society defended what Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Member of
Parliament (MP) Jeffrey Donaldson described as an "insensitive"
advert, according to News Letter.

The report notes that the Nationwide advert features a newspaper
headline clipping which says "Presbyterian Mutual Society goes
into administration", with bold type underneath saying "Choose a
solid place for your money".

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, the
Financial
Times said the society had assets of around EUR300 million when
it was forced into administration in 2008 after suffering a run
of withdrawals at the onset of the global financial crisis.

The Treasury Select Committee later found PMS members had been
innocent victims of "a fatal regulatory gap" by government, News
Letter says.

Last month, the government lent savers GBP200 million, along with
a GBP25 million contribution from the Treasury, to allow them
access to most of their money while their property portfolio
recovers, the report discloses.

News Letter notes that Mr. Donaldson, who campaigned for the
rescue of the PMS, said it was not the first time banks, or in
this case a building society, had targeted PMS money.

"Clearly the Nationwide is going after PMS savers who have just
got their money. . . But it is particularly insensitive given the
role that some banks played in the collapse of the PMS . . . Some
banks called customers in 2008 and tried to frighten them into
removing their money from the PMS, thus precipitating the
crisis," the report quoted Mr. Donaldson as saying.

In 2009, the report recalls, following News Letter
investigations, a dozen PMS savers contacted Mr. Donaldson to
describe how the banks had pressured them to remove their money
from the mutual.

News Letter discloses that the British Bankers Association (BBA)
said the assembly finance committee asked banks about the PMS run
in January 2009, during which the banks denied any involvement.

"The BBA is not aware that any evidence [of alleged misconduct]
was subsequently presented to the banks," News Letter quoted an
unnamed spokesman as saying.

                  About Presbyterian Mutual Society

Presbyterian Mutual Society is based in Belfast, Northern
Ireland.


TRAFALGAR NEW HOMES: Issues 12 Million Ordinary Shares Under CVA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Further to the announcements made on November 16, 2010 and
November 30, 2010, and the proposal by the Administrators for a
Company Voluntary Arrangement of Trafalgar New Homes PLC for
consideration by Creditors and Shareholders, the Company
disclosed that 12,000,000 ordinary shares of 1p each were issued
on August 8, 2011 at an issue price of 1p each, in connection
with the Proposals.

Of the aforementioned 12,000,000 CVA Shares, 10,000,000 Ordinary
Shares have been allotted to creditors in satisfaction of
outstanding debts, and 2,000,000 Ordinary Shares have been
allotted to Central Corporate Finance LLP at an issue price of 1p
each, in relation to work performed on the Company Voluntary
Arrangement.  Central Corporate Finance LLP has also been
allotted 935,395 Ordinary Shares at an issue price of 1p each, in
satisfaction of outstanding debts, which are included in the
aforementioned 10,000,000 Ordinary Shares above.  Central
Corporate Finance LLP is controlled by Andrew Moore, who is a
Director of the Company, and as such the allotment of 2,935,395
Ordinary Shares to Central Corporate Finance LLP constitutes a
related party transaction.

Following the issue of the CVA Shares, Andrew Moore, through
Central Corporate Finance LLP is now interested in 2,935,395
Ordinary Shares, representing 14.14% of the voting rights in the
issued ordinary share capital of the Company.

3,578,467 of the CVA Shares have been issued to Robert McKendrick
at an issue price of 1p each, who is a Director of the Company,
in satisfaction of outstanding debts.  As such the allotment of
3,578,467 CVA Shares to Robert McKendrick constitutes a related
party transaction.  Following the issue of the CVA Shares,
Robert McKendrick is now interested in 5,592,467 Ordinary Shares,
representing 26.94% of the voting rights in the issued ordinary
share capital of the Company.

986,293 of the CVA Shares have been issued to SVS Securities plc,
in satisfaction of outstanding debts.  Following the issue of the
CVA Shares, SVS Securities plc is now legally and beneficially
interested in 1,335,087 Ordinary Shares, representing 6.43% of
the voting rights in the issued ordinary share capital of the
Company.

The CVA Shares will rank pari passu in all respects with the
existing fully paid Ordinary Shares.  The CVA Shares and the
existing Ordinary Shares each have one right to vote per share.
Following the issue of the CVA Shares, the Company will have
20,757,519 Ordinary Shares of 1p each in issue.

The above figure may be used by shareholders as the denominator
for the calculations by which they will determine if they are
required to notify their interest in, or a change to, their
interest in the Company.  The Company's total issued share
capital is now GBP207,575.19.

Any CVA Shares that have not, thus far, been claimed will be held
in trust for their owners by the Company's wholly owned
subsidiary, Trafalgar Distributions Limited.  The Company is
still in administration.  Further announcements will be made as
and when appropriate.

Trafalgar New Homes Plc is a United Kingdom-based company.  The
company is engaged in property development.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Leveraged Management Buyouts
-------------------------------------------
Edited by Yakov Amihud
Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2002
(reprint of 1989 book published by Dow Jones-Irwin).
268+xiii pages. $34.95 trade paper, ISBN 1-58798-138-6.

The twelve papers were first presented at a 1988 conference
sponsored by the Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of
Financial Institutions held at the New York University Leonard N.
Stern School of Business.  The papers by leading business figures
were "intended to expand the understanding of the causes and
consequences of leveraged management buyouts and to contribute to
the debate on the appropriate public policy to be applied" [from
the editor Amihud's Preface].  This aim involved the analyses of
leveraged management buyouts [MBO] by businesspersons who had
participated in such transactions, review of the latest academic
research on the topic, and a critical look at the relevant
regulatory proposals.  The interest in policy--i. e., government
policy--on MBO's is emphasized by the presence of the notable
Edward J. Markey--at the time the chairman of the
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommitte of the U. S. House of
Representatives--to give a paper on "Legislative Views on
Management Buyouts."  The participaton of Joseph A. Grundfest of
the Securities and Exchange Commission adds to this emphasis.
Other participants are outstanding lawyers and professors in the
fields of corporate finance and buyouts and one participant from
Goldman, Sachs.

When the conference was held and the book published shortly
thereafter in the late 1980s, leveraged buyouts were occurring
across the United States business landscape in "unprecedented
levels, both in number and in size of transaction."  One recalls
that this was the latter years of the two Reagan presidential
terms during which entrepreneurialism, deregulation, mergers and
acquisitions, and other practices for new kinds of business
growth were officially encouraged.  The Reagan policies created a
new business environment.  MBOs were a part of this.

Resembling for the most part the leveraged buyouts (LBOs) which
were occurring widely at the time, MBOs were distinguished within
this activity in that "the incumbent management [of the firm
being bought out] acquires a substantially greater proportion of
the firms' equity than it previously had and the public firm is
merged into the privately owned firm that usually continues to
operate the acquired firm as an independent company."  Oftentimes
particular assets and sometimes whole divisions of the acquired
firm are sold off.  The firm acquiring a company is "normally a
group of investors [who formed] a shell holding corporation,
whose equity is privately held."  Such investors would have a
great deal more latitude in making acquisitions and in selling
off parts of an acquired company than in typical mergers-and-
acquisitions between companies for the purposes of symbiosis or
efficiencies in operations for example.  The managers of a
company more or less take this position toward their company in a
leveraged management buyout.

The concerns and questions raised especially by leveraged
management buyouts in the late 1980s are the same ones as today.
Then as now, MBOs "inspire the question of fairness and the
question of whether this form of restructuring has real economic
benefits."  The papers try to answer these questions though no
definitive answers can be given since questions of fairness and
economic benefits raise further questions about fairness and
benefits for whom; and also business conditions are continually
changing leading to new perspectives and assessments of leveraged
management buyouts.

The severe United States' recession with global repercussions
starting in 2008 once again raises such ethical and economic
questions.  The closing words of Roberta Romano of the Yale Law
School in her paper "Management Buyout Puzzles" still apply:
"Although we have learned a great deal about MBOs, in my
estimation, we are still groping in the dark." As in many
matters, there are no permanent answers or positions.  Some MBOs
are right and beneficial, while others are wrong and harmful.
The learned papers of this collection help readers weigh which
MBOs are which type.

Yakov Amihud is the Ira Leon Rennett Professor of Entrepenurial
Finance at the NYU Stern School of Business who has written on
corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and securities'
trading.


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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G.
Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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