TCREUR_Public/110912.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Monday, September 12, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 180

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

TELENET NV: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Penta Investments to Lodge Takeover Bid


F R A N C E

CMA CGM: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
LATECOERE SA: Hasn't Found Potential Partner to Reduce Debt
RHODIA: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Ratings From 'BB/B'


G E R M A N Y

FRESENIUS MEDICAL: Moody's Rates US$800MM-US$1BB Notes at (P)Ba2


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Bondholders Challenge "Priority Status"


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Finance Minister Seeks Meeting with ECB on Debt
CELF LOW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba3'
IRISH POST: Campaign to Save Newspaper Underway


N E T H E R L A N D S

MARCO POLO: Hearing on DIP Loan, Cash Collateral Set for Sept. 15


P O R T U G A L

SAGRES SOCIEDADE 1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
* PORTUGAL: One Third of Public Hospitals Insolvent


S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D/E'


S P A I N

CAJA DE AHORROS: Spain's Central Bank Kicks Off Sale Process


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Swedish Court Rejects Creditor Protection Bid


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CASTLE INN: Hunt for Buyer Continues
HEX HOLDINGS: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer for Assets
OCEAN VIEW: Founder Banned as Company Director for 9 Years
PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: Future Could be Thrown Into Turmoil
SIMCLAR GROUP: Union Holds Meeting for Former Employees

WEAVERING CAPITAL: SFO Drops Probe, Causes Shock & Anger
* UK: 8% of Retail Business Owners Likely to Enter Insolvency


X X X X X X X X

* German Court Rejects Challenges to Greece & Eurozone Bailout
* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 5 to September 9, 2011


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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TELENET NV: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Telenet NV's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDRs) at 'BB' and Short-term IDR at 'B'.  The Outlook on
the Long-term IDR is Stable.

Telenet's ratings take into account the company's strong market
position in triple-play telecom services in the Flanders region
of Belgium, a region that covers 60% of the country's population.
Telenet is the region's dominant or incumbent provider of pay TV,
the leading provider of high-speed internet and the region's
second-largest provider of voice telephony.  Therefore, Telenet
has a visible revenue base, a significant amount of which derives
from customer subscriptions.  Low levels of churn, solid
performance in consistently improving the number of services
taken by an individual customer (revenue generating unit
(RGU)/subscriber) and the migration of its analogue TV customers
to digital, all contribute to what Fitch considers to be solid
"second incumbent"-like qualities.

A dividend policy, in part driven by majority shareholder,
Liberty Global International (LGI) and capex requirements that
are likely to see investment remain high for a number of years,
are constraining factors on free cash flow and consequently the
ratings.

Majority ownership by LGI continues to exert dividend pressure
and is likely to push leverage higher.  The publicly stated
leverage target is between 3.5x and 4.5x.  Management have stated
that it expects dividends to remain in the EUR500 million region
until cash taxes start to otherwise absorb some of the company's
cash flow -- expected from 2014.  This is the single most
ratings-material factor, given management's strong track record
of managing the business.

Although leverage is likely to rise, it remains acceptable for
the ratings, subject to the ongoing delivery of operating
performance.  Taking into account the EUR506 million capital
distribution in August pro forma net debt (including finance
leases)/EBITDA, based on 2Q11 results, was 3.8x, comfortable for
a 'BB'-rated cable operator.  Potential cash flow pressures --
from mobile spectrum acquisition, Belgium soccer rights and most
importantly dividends -- are likely to result in this metric
trending into the 4.2x-4.3x range over the next two years.  A
more conservative dividend policy would likely prompt positive
ratings pressure.

A leverage metric consistently trending in the 4.3x - 4.5x range
would prompt concern and potential negative action, subject to
the conditions leading to such a trend (eg. operational
underperformance) as well as the speed and magnitude of
management's response to such developments.

Telenet exhibits solid growth of triple-play services. However, a
significant number of customers are still single play customers
and therefore continue to offer strong RGU/sub and average
revenue per user growth potential.  The RGU/sub metric currently
stands at 1.94, whereas cable operators in the UK and Spain are
at significantly higher levels, suggesting further scope in the
metric for Telenet.

Belgium is the only cable market so far where the regulator has
proposed unbundling the cable network.  Despite objections from
the EC (and strong resistance from Telenet), the BIPT (Belgium's
communications regulator) is pushing ahead with plans to open up
cable to allow analogue TV and broadband provided by unbundlers.
While Telenet expects legal wrangling to postpone any practical
implementation until end-2012, this would set a precedent and
establish a fairly negative regulatory tone towards the cable
industry.  Fitch considers that the main beneficiary of such a
development would be Belgacom, already successful with its IPTV
product, with the development potentially allowing the incumbent
to offer faster broadband speeds and a stronger TV offer in those
areas where its VDSL capabilities are potentially compromised
from a network perspective.

Telenet is achieving solid traction in growing mobile
subscribers. At Q211, the company had 221,000 mobile subscribers.
The company's subsidized smartphone strategy includes the iPhone
4 (the Belgium market is otherwise unsubsidized) and plays to the
company's data-focused high-end subscriber target market.
Telenet took 14% market share of post-paid additions in Q211,
without a prepaid base to migrate.  Fitch notes the success of
the mobile strategy is likely to dilute margins over the medium
term given that an MVNO mobile business is typically lower
margin.

Unusually for a cable operator, Telenet has acquired 2G and 3G
spectrum, at a total cost of EUR103 million payable in
installments between 2011 to 2020.  However, management has
confirmed it will not invest significant capex -- choosing to use
the acquired spectrum in conjunction with its virtual mobile
network operator network partner (currently Mobistar).  The
spectrum Telenet acquired is similar to that of both Mobistar and
Base, which potentially helps in agreeing future partnership
terms with either of these mobile network operators.  Telenet's
use of 3G spectrum will be focused on data usage, which
management believes is an under-served market at present.

Liquidity is solid, with balance sheet cash (pro-forma for the
July 2011 debt exchange and August shareholder distribution)
estimated by Fitch at approximately EUR280m, while the company
has an undrawn revolving credit facility in the amount of EUR158m
maturing in December 2016.  Refinancing activity over the past
year has left the company an average debt maturity of 8.4 years
and one of the strongest maturity profiles in the European cable
peer group.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Telenet N.V. senior secured bank facility:
     affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Telenet Finance Luxembourg S.C.A. EUR500m due 2020:
     affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Telenet Finance Luxembourg II S.A. EUR100m due 2016:
     affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Telenet Finance III Luxembourg S.C.A. EUR300m due 2021:
     affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Telenet Finance IV Luxembourg S.C.A. EUR400m due 2021:
     affirmed at 'BB+'


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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SAZKA AS: Penta Investments to Lodge Takeover Bid
-------------------------------------------------
Lenka Ponikelska at Bloomberg News reports that Penta Investments
Ltd., a Czech private equity group, and E-Invest, led by investor
Martin Ulcak, will bid for Sazka AS.

According to Bloomberg, Penta partner Marek Dospiva and Ulcak on
Thursday said at a joint press conference in Prague that Penta
and E-Invest will lodge their bids with a solicitor rather than
submit them to the company's administrator, Josef Cupka, as
required by the tender rules.  Penta and E-Invest will also lodge
the amount offered to Komercni Banka AS rather than to the bank
named by the administrator and ask Mr. Cupka to open and assess
their offers, Bloomberg notes.

"If Penta fails to proceed with their offer according to tender
rules, we will consider their bid irrelevant," Bloomberg quotes
Sazka administrator spokeswoman Lenka Ticha as saying by phone on
Thursday.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 24,
2011, Bloomberg News related that the Prague Municipal Court,
which placed Sazka in bankruptcy in May, approved the terms for
the company's tender proposed by its administrator and the
creditors' committee.  The terms include a CZK500 million
(US$29.35 million) deposit from each bidder before doing due
diligence on the company, Bloomberg disclosed.  The price offered
by bidders will be the main criterion for choosing the new owner,
Bloomberg noted.  The administrator, as cited by Bloomberg, said
that the rules of the tender also include a fine of CZK1.5
billion if the winner fails to get an approval of anti-
monopoly bodies to take over Sazka.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in
the Czech Republic.


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F R A N C E
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CMA CGM: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
based container ship operator CMA CGM S.A. to negative from
stable. "At the same time, we affirmed the 'B+' long-term issuer
credit rating, and the 'B-' issue rating on the US$475 million
senior unsecured notes due 2017 and the EUR325 million senior
unsecured notes due 2019 issued by CMA CGM. The recovery rating
on these notes is unchanged at '6', indicating our expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery for noteholders in the event of a
payment default," S&P stated.

"The outlook revision reflects CMA CGM's weak operating
environment in the first six months of the year, and our view
that its cash flow protection measures may now fall short of the
levels we consider commensurate with the current rating," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Izabela Listowska. "The negative
outlook also reflects our view that CMA CGM will likely need to
take preventative action to avoid breaching its financial
covenant tests, due in December, and that a failure to do so well
ahead of time is likely to adversely affect our rating."

Along with its industry peers, CMA CGM's earnings have come under
pressure this year, owing to an inflation of operating costs and
lower freight tariffs, particularly on Asia-Europe trades. In the
first half of 2011, the group's reported operating expenses
increased by about 20% on the previous year, aggravated by a
significant rise in bunker fuel costs. While the company's
volumes grew above the industry average at about 9%, this was
insufficient to offset these cost increases.

CMA CGM therefore reported a considerably declined EBITDA (net of
gains on asset disposals) in first-half 2011 at US$321 million
from US$1.05 billion a year earlier. "Its EBITDA margin (net of
gains on asset disposals) also fell significantly to 4.4% from
15.5%. Based on actual half-year results to June 30, 2011, and
our own estimates for the second half of the year, we now
forecast that the EBITDA margin will be just over 5% for the full
year, which is well below our original forecasts of about 10%,"
S&P related.

"Given the anticipated ongoing difficult trading conditions,
aggravated by slowing economy and volatile operating costs, we
believe that CMA CGM's operating margins could remain depressed
so that the group might not be able to achieve credit measures we
view as commensurate with the current rating over a prolonged
period," said Ms. Listowska.

"We could consider a downgrade, for example, if the company
continued to face sustained competitive pressure on freight
tariffs and/or elevated cost inflation that would constrain a
recovery in profitability. We believe that CMA CGM could also
come under rating pressure if confronted with tight covenant
headroom and a risk of a breach. We believe that such risks, if
not properly rectified, could trigger early repayment of certain
debt facilities. Although in our view CMA CGM would take
proactive action to repair a breach, failure to rectify it could
trigger a downgrade," S&P stated.


LATECOERE SA: Hasn't Found Potential Partner to Reduce Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' DBR Small Cap reports that Latecoere SA still hasn't
entered final discussions with a potential partner with an aim to
reduce its debt load, the head of the Company's supervisory
board, Pierre Gadonneix, said.  Latecoere SA is a French
aeronautical supplier.


RHODIA: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Ratings From 'BB/B'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Belgian
chemical company Solvay S.A. to 'BBB+' from 'A-'.  The 'A-2'
short-term corporate credit rating was affirmed.

"At the same time, we raised the long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings on Rhodia to 'BBB+/A-2' from 'BB/B', equalizing
them with those on its now 100% parent Solvay. In addition,
Rhodia's senior unsecured issue ratings were raised to 'BBB+'
from 'BB'," S&P stated.

"We removed the long-term ratings on Solvay from CreditWatch,
where they were placed with negative implications on April 5,
2011. We also removed the long- and short-term ratings on Rhodia
from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on April 5, 2011," S&P stated.

"Solvay's leverage (on a net debt basis) is now much higher
following the sizable EUR6.6 billion (enterprise value)
acquisition of Rhodia. Under our base line scenario, we foresee a
2012-2013 adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt ratio in
the low- to mid-30s. The year-end 2011 ratio will likely be
weaker because Rhodia at that point will only be three-month
consolidated. We would see FFO to debt of at least 35% as
commensurate with the rating. In our credit scenario, we now work
with a slightly lower midcycle 2012-2013 EBITDA assumption of
about EUR1.8 billion-EUR1.9 billion, because we expect softer
European and global growth. We also forecast Solvay's adjusted
debt at EUR4.2 billion-EUR4.5 billion in the coming years,
comprising mainly an unadjusted net financial debt of about
EUR2.2 billion and a sizable (tax-effected) EUR1.7 billion
pension deficit. Key financial strengths are in our opinion the
group's strong liquidity, which we expect will remain that way,
comprising a long-ended debt maturity and ample liquidity
sources. We anticipate a favorable financial policy, for example
with thin net acquisitions until credit metrics improve in line
with the rating," S&P related.

"We have raised the business risk profile of Solvay to the high
end of the 'satisfactory' category. We view Rhodia as a good
strategic fit because it grants Solvay a strong global presence,
including over 40% of sales from high-growth emerging markets; a
more balanced mix of industrial/commodity and specialty
chemicals, roughly equally split; and finally, a more diversified
end-market mix, with lower reliance on automotive and
construction," S&P noted.

The negative outlook reflects the limited rating headroom, with
FFO to debt likely to remain below the level we see as
commensurate with the rating until end-2012, and diminished
visibility about future EBITDA margins and growth given
potentially weaker economic prospects. "We also see that the
company has limited flexibility to deleverage, if desired,
because of planned high near-term capital spending. That said,
margin resilience, growth prospects, and cost savings from
synergies may be better than we have factored in. At the current
rating level, we see adequate profit resilience through the cycle
and an adjusted ratio of FFO to debt of at least 35%, measured
under conservative midcycle conditions, which we currently
estimate at EUR1.8 billion in EBITDA, as commensurate with the
current rating. We factor in only thin acquisitions, if any,
until credit metrics improve, unless disposals or other tangible
measures offset their negative impact," S&P related.

"Negative rating pressures could arise over the next 18-24 months
if margin declines were more severe (below 14%, excluding equity
affiliates) than the modest softening we currently factor in,
which could occur in case of a downturn. They could also arise if
we expected adjusted FFO to debt to drop to 30% or below in 2012,
without near-term recovery prospects or management actions.
Finally, we have assumed that Solvay will gradually apply its
large initial cash balances to debt reduction rather than
acquisitions," S&P noted.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if Solvay is able to
deliver stronger EBITDA in 2012 than we currently assume in our
credit scenario, combined with an increased likelihood that the
company can meet our expectations for adjusted FFO to debt.
Evidence of stronger growth or higher free cash flow from 2013
than what we assume could also be positive," S&P stated.


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FRESENIUS MEDICAL: Moody's Rates US$800MM-US$1BB Notes at (P)Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P) Ba2
rating to the following proposed bond issuances of finance
companies wholly owned by Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA:
in total between US$800 and US$1000 million worth of senior
unsecured notes by Fresenius Medical Care US Finance II, Inc. and
FMC Finance VIII S.A.

FME, together with Fresenius Medical Care Deutschland GmbH and
the intermediate holding company Fresenius Medical Holdings,
Inc., guarantees the notes. The senior unsecured notes are
expected to be used for acquisitions, to refinance short-term
debt and for general corporate purposes.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding
the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review of the final
documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign definitive ratings
to the proposed senior unsecured notes. A definitive rating and
assigned LGDs may differ from provisional ones.

Ratings Rationale

"The (P) Ba2 rating on the new senior unsecured notes to be
issued at the level of the financing subsidiaries reflects the
instrument's relative position in the capital structure of FME,"
says Alex Verbov, a Moody's Vice President and lead analyst for
FME. "The notes benefit from a downstream senior guarantee by
FME, and upstream guarantees by Fresenius Medical Care Holdings
Inc. and Fresenius Medical Care Deutschland GmbH, in line with
the outstanding senior unsecured notes of various finance issuers
in the group," adds Mr. Verbov.

FME's Ba1 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) is supported by (i) its
absolute scale, vertical integration and a very strong market
position as a leading global provider of dialysis products and
private dialysis services; (ii) continued favorable industry
growth trends and recurring non-cyclical nature of its revenues;
(iii) high profitability levels; and (iv) good financial
flexibility.

The rating is constrained by (i) FME's relatively high adjusted
financial leverage; (ii) the company's exposure to tightening
healthcare budgets, potential regulatory changes, changes in the
payer mix or government investigations , which could have an
impact on the FME's profitability; (iii) a pure-play focus on the
dialysis market, albeit operating through the whole value chain;
(iv) high regional concentration on the key US market; (v) a
recently increasing appetite for acquisitions to complement
organic growth, which are to a large degree debt financed
resulting in continued reliance on access to capital markets; and
(vi) a financial policy which at times of increased acquisition
activity can lead to short term liquidity pressures.

Following a period of limited external growth activity and
continued deleveraging, FME started to become more active again
in 2010 when around US$750 million was spent on acquisitions.
This trend continued well into 2011 as also reflected by the
recently announced sizeable acquisitions of American Access Care
and Liberty Dialysis Holdings Inc, (together valued at US$2.1
billion) to be completed in Q3/2011 and Q1/2012 respectively.
Moody's expects that these acquisitions, although fitting
strategically, will lead to increase of debt/EBITDA ratio to
around 3.6x (around 2.9x per Company reporting) for both 2011 and
2012 which is slightly above Moody's threshold of 3.5x for the
current rating. The rating incorporates the assumption that FME's
leverage will in the intermediate term return to levels which are
commensurate with the Ba1 rating. This should be driven by the
application of free cash flows to debt reduction and the
additional contribution of the acquired entities to EBITDA. While
Moody's takes comfort from the company's track record of
deleveraging following acquisition-driven peaks in leverage as
well as from the successful integration track record and the
stability of its business, Moody's notes that there is currently
no major headroom left under the Ba1 rating.

The issuance of the proposed notes is in line with the previously
stated plan of FME to tap the capital market and helps to improve
company's currently somewhat stretched liquidity profile. Moody's
expects FME to raise further funds in the course of Q1 2012 to
ensure adequate funding for the acquisitions as well as short
term debt maturities.

Downgrades:

   Issuer: FMC Finance VII S.A.

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
      LGD5, 76% from LGD5, 73%

   Issuer: Fresenius Medical Care Finance VI S.A., Lux

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
      LGD5, 76% from LGD5, 73%

   Issuer: Fresenius Medical Care US Finance, Inc.

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
      LGD5, 76% from LGD5, 73%

Upgrades:

   Issuer: Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA

   -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to LGD2, 21%
      from LGD2, 22%

Assignments:

   Issuer: FMC Finance VIII S.A.

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned (P)Ba2,
      LGD5, 76%

   Issuer: Fresenius Medical Care US Finance II, Inc

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned (P)Ba2,
      LGD5, 76%

The Ba2 (LGD5, 76%) rating for the proposed issuance of over
US$800 million worth of senior unsecured notes is rated two
notches below the Baa3 (LGD 2, 21%) rating for the group's
US$4.0 billion worth of senior credit facilities and one notch
below FME's Ba1 CFR.

The credit facilities, guaranteed on a senior basis by major
intermediary holding and selected operating companies, are
secured by a share pledge of some of the group's operating
subsidiaries and importantly by a springing lien on substantially
all assets, which becomes effective if FME's senior secured debt
rating deteriorate below the Ba3 category. The ratings of the
senior unsecured notes, on the other hand, reflect the effective
subordination of these instruments to the extent of the value of
the collateral securing the US$ 4.0 billion credit facilities.
Moody's also notes that while the senior unsecured notes benefit
from downstream guarantees of FME as well as from upstream
guarantees by Fresenius Medical Care Deutschland GmbH and
Fresenius Medical Care Holdings Inc., the latter is an
intermediary holding company with limited direct cash generation.
At the same time non-guarantor subsidiaries account, on an
unconsolidated basis, for c.79% of operating income as per June
2011, attributed to FME's corporate structure and significant
number of smaller foreign operations.

In Moody's view, downward rating pressure would likely be the
result of: (i) unfavorable reimbursement changes in core markets
or changes in payer mix, affecting the group's profit generation;
(ii) an increase in financial leverage, evidenced by a
debt/EBITDA ratio sustainably above 3.5x and a CFO/debt ratio
below 15%; (iii) failure to ensure adequate funding to cover
short term debt maturities as well as pending acquisitions or
(iv) material litigation.

Given the strategy of FME to grow the business externally, an
upgrade of the rating is currently unlikely. A rating upgrade
would require a change in the financial policy of FME towards
lower external growth and a change in the management of short
term liquidity. In addition, it would require enhanced regional
diversification, which appears somewhat challenging in the medium
term, profitability at current levels (EBIT-margin in the high
teens) and the generation of positive free cash flow applied to
debt reduction contributing to gradual improvements in leverage
towards 3.0 times debt/EBITDA and CFO/ debt approaching 20%.

FMC 's ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's
considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as
the company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared
with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and
financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to
intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against
other issuers both within and outside FMC's core industry and
believes FMC's ratings are comparable to those of other issuers
with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

FMC is the world's leading provider of dialysis products and
dialysis services, with 2010 revenues of US$12 billion. The
company is a vertically integrated player with operations as a
dialysis service provider, a dialysis product manufacturer for
its own dialysis clinics and a supplier of dialysis products to
external dialysis service providers. FMC is controlled by
Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA (rated Ba1, stable), which owns slightly
more than 30% of the company but controls 100% of the general
partner of FMC, given FMC's legal status as a
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA; partnership limited by
shares).


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LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Bondholders Challenge "Priority Status"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rowena Mason at The Telegraph reports that British councils and
the UK bank bail-out fund will defend their right to get back the
entire GBP5 billion they lost in the Icelandic banking crash
against a group of hedge funds and other creditors who claim they
should get a share of the money.

Bondholders owed US$4 billion (GBP2.5 billion), including hedge
funds Arrowgrass, GLG and Varde, are challenging the "priority"
status awarded to the local councils and the bail-out scheme by
one of the banks, Landsbanki, in a test case which was due to
start on Sept. 8 in the Supreme Court of Iceland, the Telegraph.

These holders of Landsbanki debt are unhappy that they are
further down the list of creditors than the UK public bodies, the
Telegraph discloses.

Currently, bondholders will get nothing and the UK public bodies
will get almost all of their money back, when Landsbanki's assets
are fully liquidated, the Telegraph notes.

The bondholders believe everybody should get around a third of
their money back, the Telegraph states.

Local authorities lost around GBP1 billion when Landsbanki,
Glitnir and Kaupthing failed in October 2008, the Telegraph
recounts.  Although a small proportion has been paid back to the
them, they are still waiting for the bulk of their money, the
Telegraph states.

Represented by Bingham McCutcheon, the bondholders were expected
to argue that Iceland should never have passed an emergency law
that retrospectively prioritized some creditors over others, the
Telegraph relates.

Although the test case is related just to Landsbanki, it also has
implications for future judgments to be made about creditors of
Glitnir and Kaupthing, the Telegraph notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 5,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Iceland declared a three-year
dispute with the U.K. and the Netherlands to be history after it
promised to pay out US$11.4 billion from the estate of failed
Landsbanki to cover all foreign depositor losses.  The most
recent valuation of Landsbanki's assets shows the lender, which
failed in October 2008 together with the rest of Iceland's
financial system, will have enough funds to pay back more than
double the US$5.3 billion backed by depositor guarantees,
Bloomberg said, citing a report published by the bank's
resolution committee on Sept. 8.  The so-called Icesave dispute,
named after the high-yielding Internet accounts Landsbanki
offered abroad, had soured Iceland's relations with the U.K. and
the Netherlands after the bank's collapse left about 350,000
foreign depositors in the lurch, Bloomberg noted.  Economy
Minister Arni Pall Arnason said Landsbanki can probably start
paying claimants later this year, according to Bloomberg.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


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ANGLO IRISH: Finance Minister Seeks Meeting with ECB on Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur Beesley at The Irish Times reports that Minister for
Finance Michael Noonan is seeking a meeting with European Central
Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet as he attempts to avoid
repaying a US$1 billion (EUR711.4 million) debt owed by Anglo
Irish Bank.

The Minister declared three months ago that the International
Monetary Fund was supporting his effort to impose big losses on
the holders of unguaranteed, unsecured senior bonds in Anglo, The
Irish Times recounts.  Such bonds are a form of loan raised by
banks on international money markets to fund their own lending
operations, The Irish Times discloses.  According to The Irish
Times, they enjoy the highest form of legal protection against
default and the holders have no right to other Anglo assets if
the debt is not repaid. Neither are these bonds covered by the
State banking guarantee.

The Government believes the bondholders should not be repaid with
taxpayers' money, given the acute financial pressure on the
State, The Irish Times notes.

The Government has previously imposed big losses on the holders
of junior or subordinate bonds in Ireland's banks which have
lower legal protection against default, The Irish Times recounts.

The total amount of unguaranteed senior unsecured debt in Anglo
and Irish Nationwide is roughly EUR3.8 billion, The Irish Times
discloses.  The next such repayment falls due on November 2, two
days after Mr. Trichet leaves office, according to The Irish
Times.  A further EUR1.25 billion must be redeemed in January,
The Irish Times notes.  The Minister, who claims support for his
stance, has said the difficulty with the plan lies in the ECB's
attitude, The Irish Times relates.

                     Irish Nationwide Merger

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 1,
2011, BreakingNews.ie related that The European Commission
cleared a bailout plan for Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish
Nationwide Building Society.  BreakingNews.ie disclosed that the
proposal, which was submitted for approval in January, provides
for the merger of the two troubled institutions and their winding
down over the next 10 years.  Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide
jointly received EUR34.7 billion in capital injections from the
State to cover losses on property loans, BreakingNews.ie noted.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products
and solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.


CELF LOW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by CELF Low Levered Partners plc.

Issuer: CELF Low Levered Partners plc.

   -- EUR70.5M Class A-1 Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
      Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR86.5M Class A-2 Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating
      Rate Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR86.5M Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 4
      March 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR26.5M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR14M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR30M initial issuance amount (with current rated balance
      outstanding of approximately EUR21.6M) Class D-1
      Subordinated Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR22M initial issuance amount (with current rated balance
      outstanding of approximately EUR13.8M) Class D-2
      Subordinated Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19M initial issuance amount (with current rated balance
      outstanding of approximately EUR11.9M) Class D-3
      Subordinated Notes due 4 March 2024, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of Class D-1, Class D-2 and Class D-3 Notes address
the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal final
maturity. The 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Class D-1, Class D-2 and Class D-3 on the
Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the
Issue Date to such date, either through interest or principal
payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the
outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee. In
particular, the outstanding rated balance of Class D-2 and Class
D-3 reflect a reduction which occurred in 2010 following the
partial liquidation of the OAT strips backing D-2 and D-3
respectively.

Ratings Rationale

CELF Low Levered Partners plc., issued in January 2007, is a
single currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by
a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by CELF Advisors LLP. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until March 4, 2014. The transaction
portfolio is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in May 2010.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes and rated
equity tranches.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have been
stable since the rating action in May 2010. The Class A, Class B
and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 136.53%,
123.13% and 117.06%, respectively, versus March 2010 levels of
136.54%, 123.14% and 117.07%, respectively. All related
overcollateralization tests have been in compliance since closing
except for the reinvestment diversion test, which is currently
failing by approximately 2% in absolute terms.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a stronger
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated July 2011,
securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 7.85% of the
underlying portfolio versus 18.69% in March 2010. In addition,
the current reported WARF is 2817 compared to 2993 in the March
2010 report. However, the reported WARF understates the actual
improvement in credit quality because of the technical transition
related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates,
as announced in the press release published by Moody's on
September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR330 million,
defaulted par of EUR14 million (with assumed weighted average
recovery rate of 16.63% which corresponds to the current market
value of the defaulted assets), a weighted average default
probability of 19.66% (consistent with a WARF of 2777), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.31% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted
average spread of 3.05%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 86% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

2) Moody's also notes that around 65% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score. However, as part of the sensitivity case,
   Moody's considered spread and coupon levels higher than the
   covenant levels due to the large difference between the
   reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


IRISH POST: Campaign to Save Newspaper Underway
-----------------------------------------------
Antoinette Kelly at IrishCentral reports that a campaign to save
the Irish Post newspaper in Britain is underway.

IrishCentral relates that a public meeting was held on Sept. 7 at
the Commons to discuss possible alternatives to ceasing
publication.

According to the report, the event was hosted by the all-party
parliamentary group on the Irish in Britain, chaired by Labour MP
Chris Ruane.  Several of the Post's ten staff spoke.

IrishCentral, citing the Guardian blogger Greenslade, says MP
Chris Ruane had already sponsored an earlier motion which was
supported by Mark Durkan, Paul Flynn, Greg Mulholland, Paul
Murphy and Robert Walter.

IrishCentral notes that the motion expresses its: "concern at the
sudden decision of the Cork-based Thomas Crosbie Holdings to
close the longest running, largest circulation community weekly
newspaper for the Irish in the UK."  It described the ex-pat
newspaper as a central pillar of the Irish community, the report
notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on
Aug. 22, 2011, The Irish Times said the biggest selling
Irish community newspaper in Britain, the Irish Post, went into
liquidation.  Berkshire-based FPM Accountants has been appointed
liquidator to the newspaper by owner Thomas Crosbie Holdings
(TCH).

Established in 1970 by Clare-born journalist Breandan Mac Lua and
accountant Tony Beatty, the Irish Post employs 10 full-time
employees.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


MARCO POLO: Hearing on DIP Loan, Cash Collateral Set for Sept. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
will convene a hearing on Sept. 15, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. (ET) to
consider Marco Polo Seatrade B.V., et al.'s request to obtain
debtor-in-possession financing, and use the prepetition lenders'
cash collateral.  Objections, if any, are due Sept. 9, 2011, at
4:00 p.m.

The Debtors asked the Court for authorization:

   a. to borrow up to US$2,400,000 in principal amount, on an
      interim basis, and up to US$4,800,000 in principal amount,
      on a final basis, of postpetition financing;

   b. to grant certain priming liens and superpriority claims to
      the DIP lender to secure the Debtors' obligations under the
      DIP agreement;

   c. for the DIP Lender to require repayment of the DIP Facility
      in full or conversion into equity pursuant to a plan of
      reorganization, or any combination of the foregoing, upon
      an event triggering the Stated Maturity Date in accordance
      with the DIP Agreement; and

   e. to schedule a final hearing on Sept. 30, to consider entry
      of a final order.

The Debtors relate that they were able to acquire postpetition
financing on favorable terms from Futmarine, B.V., a non-debtor
joint venture 50% owned by MPS, whose only assets are two
unencumbered bank accounts holding about $4.89 million.  The cash
is the net proceeds generated by the sale of unfinished shipping
assets and will be used to provide the DIP facility.

The Debtors will use the money to fund new voyages, operate their
businesses and administer these cases, the Debtors believe that
the DIP Facility will enable them to maximize the value of their
assets for the benefit of all stakeholders.

As of the Petition Date, the Debtors had prepetition secured
indebtedness of approximately US$211,743,838, consisting of
these:

   a. Credit Agricole Facility: US$89,743,8385 outstanding under
      that certain loan agreement, dated as of Sept. 22, 2005,
      among MPS, the several lenders party thereto from time to
      time, and Credit Agricole, as agent; and

   b. Royal Bank of Scotland Facility: US$117,664,9536
      outstanding under that certain loan agreement, dated as of
      Aug. 14, 2007, among MPS, the several lenders party thereto
      from time to time, and RBS as agent.

Summary of the proposed material terms of the DIP Documents:

DIP Credit Agreement Parties:

   Borrower: Seaarland Shipping Management B.V.

   Guarantors: Marco Polo Seatrade B.V., Magellano Marine C.V.
   and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

   DIP Lender: Futmarine B.V. or its designee.

Maturity:

   The DIP Facility terminates on the earliest to occur of:
   (i) Aug. 1, 2012; (ii) the effective date of any plan of
   reorganization with respect to any obligor; (iii) the date of
   conversion of any case to a case under Chapter 7 of the
   Bankruptcy Code; (iv) the date of any termination of the
   exclusivity period for any obligor; and (v) the date of any
   appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or other disinterested
   person with expanded powers.

Standby Nature; Use of Proceeds:

   The Debtors plan to use the cash collateral of the prepetition
   lenders.  During the term of the cash collateral order, the
   Borrower will be entitled to draw on the DIP Facility.  After
   any termination of the cash collateral Order, the Borrower
   will be entitled to draw on the DIP Facility (i) to pay
   necessary expenses to operate, insure and maintain the vessels
   and (ii) to pay other administrative expenses, including
   allowed professional fees and expenses of the Debtors.

   To the extent the Prepetition Lenders have final allowed
   adequate protection claims under the cash collateral Order for
   a diminution in value, the Borrower will be required to draw
   on the DIP Facility to pay the claims.

Interest Rates:

   Borrower to pay 5% interest per annum, which will accrue and
   be payable on the Stated Maturity Date.

Liens and Priorities:

   DIP Liens.  The obligations of the Borrowers under the DIP
   Facility will be secured by these liens:

     a. First Priority Liens. The DIP Facility will be secured by
        a perfected first priority security interest and lien on
        all now owned or hereafter acquired assets and property
        of the obligors.

     b. Junior Priority Liens.  The DIP Facility will be secured
        by a perfected junior security interest and lien on the
        DIP Collateral to the extent that such DIP Collateral is
        subject to valid, perfected and unavoidable liens that
        were in existence immediately prior to the Petition Date.

     c. Priming Liens.  The DIP Facility will be secured by a
        perfected first priority priming security interest and
        lien on the DIP Collateral ahead of (i) the liens
        securing the Credit Agricole Collateral, (ii) the liens
        securing the RBS Collateral, (iii) any actual or asserted
        rights of setoff by the Prepetition Lenders, and (iv)
        liens or interests of any other party other than those
        holding valid, perfected and not avoidable maritime liens
        under applicable law for "necessaries" (but excluding any
        such liens asserted by any of the parties referred to in
        the foregoing clauses (i) through (iv)).

   Adequate Protection. Substantially, the same as provided in
   the cash collateral order, but subject to the DIP Liens and
   the DIP Facility Administrative Priorities.

   Carve-Out on certain expenses.

                     Cash Collateral Objection

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed its limited
objection to the Debtors' cash collateral motion.  The Committee
related that since its formation, it has not had an opportunity
to investigate the claims and liens asserted by Credit Agricole
Corporate and Investment Bank and The Royal Bank of Scotland, plc
and the extent, validity, or enforceability of the asserted
claims and liens.

According to the Committee, Credit Agricole Corporate and
Investment Bank and The Royal Bank of Scotland plc each assert
liens on the Debtors' vessels and upon related cash collateral.

The Committee requested (i) that it be afforded a sufficient
opportunity to review, comment and be heard on any final cash
collateral order(s) and budget(s) before their entry; and (ii)
that the Court condition entry of any final cash collateral
order(s) on the requested changes and clarifications sought.

Based upon its review of the interim cash collateral order, the
Committee submitted that the entry of any final cash collateral
order must be conditioned on, among other things:

   -- Any adequate protection liens provided to CA and RBS will
      exclude avoidance actions and the proceeds thereof;

   -- Any adequate protection liens and adequate protection
      superpriority claims will be subject to the adequate
      protection condition (i.e., valid only to the extent
      that the senior lenders' prepetition claims exist, are
      valid, prior to all others, and not subject to defense,
      offset, avoidance or subordination);

   -- The carve-out for Committee professionals for allowed fees
      and expenses after use of cash collateral is terminated
      will be no less than US$50,000; and

   -- Any reports or statements provided to a senior lender will
      be simultaneously provided to the Committee professionals.

The Committee is represented by:

         BLANK ROME LLP
         Marc E. Richards, Esq.
         The Chrysler Building
         405 Lexington Avenue
         New York, NY 10174
         Tel: (212) 885-5000

            Objections to A.P. Moller-Maersk's Request

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Credit Agricole, and the
Committee objected to A.P. Moller-Maersk's request to condition
the Debtors' use of cash collateral on providing adequate
protection or, in the alternative, providing relief from the
automatic stay.

RBS related that as a threshold matter, Maersk has failed to
sustain its burden of proof.  Mere allegations by Maersk of
having made a prima facie case do not supplant proof of the
alleged property interest under applicable non-bankruptcy laws,
RBS asserted.

Additionally, Maersk's asserted security interest is contradicted
by the RBS Loan Agreement and the Tripartite Assignments, each of
which includes a negative pledge concerning the assets pledged to
RBS.

The Committee stated that Maersk stated that the letter
assignment creates a protectible interest in the Debtors' cash
collateral. Based on its motion, the interest could be in the
nature of a transfer of ownership, a lien granted, or a setoff.
The Maersk Motion does not specify as much.

According to Credit Agricole, Maersk has failed to allege or
prove that its alleged security interest has obtained priority
over the security interest of Credit Agricole.  Maersk has also
failed to show what consideration was given to the Debtors for
the alleged grant of the security interest.

Credit Agricole noted that pursuant to the Tripartite Assignment,
it has a security interest in the Debtor's assets.  Credit
Agricole stated that as security for amount borrowed under the
loan agreement, MPS as owner, Debtor Magellano Marine C.V. as
operator and Credit Agricole (as successor-in-interest to Calyon)
as security trustee entered into a Tripartite Assignment dated
Sept. 26, 2005, with respect to, inter alia, the earnings of the
vessel DIANA, owned by MPS.  In the Tripartite Assignment, the
Debtors MPS and Megallano granted a security interest in the
earnings of he vessel DIANA, including any pool revenues, and the
Debtors assigned all their rights and interests in the earnings
and pool revenues to Credit Agricole.

RBS is represented by:

         Gregory M. Petrick, Esq.
         Ingrid Bagby, Esq.
         Sharon J. Richardson, Esq.
         One World Financial Center
         New York, NY 10281
         Tel: (212) 504-6000
         Fax: (212) 504-6666
         E-mail: gregory.petrick@cwt.com
                 ingrid.bagby@cwt.com
                 sharon.richardson@cwt.com

Credit Agricole is represented by:

         Alfred E. Yudes, Jr., Esq.
         Jane Freeberg, Sarma, Esq.
         WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS (New York) LLP
         1133 Avenue of the Americas, 11th Floor
         New York, NY 10036
         Tel: (212) 922-2200
         Fax: (212) 922-1512

                        About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing
commercial and technical vessel management services to third
parties.  Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the
name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate
headquarters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets
consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in
international trade, and call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million
on July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the
two other vessels.

Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J.
Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy
counsel.  The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.

The petition noted that the Debtors' assets and debt are both
more than US$100 million and less than US$500 million.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SAGRES SOCIEDADE 1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions in
SAGRES Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos S.A.'s Series DOURO
MORTGAGES NO. 1, Series DOURO MORTGAGES NO. 3, and Series DOURO
MORTGAGES NO. 4.

Specifically, S&P has:

  -- In DOURO 1, lowered ratings on the class B, C, and D
     notes and affirmed rating on the class A notes;

  -- In DOURO 3, lowered ratings on the class B, C, and D notes,
     raised rating on the class E notes, and affirmed rating on
     the class A notes; and

  -- In DOURO 4, affirmed rating on the class A notes.

"On March 29, 2011, we lowered our long-term sovereign credit
rating on Portugal to 'BBB-' (see 'Research Update: Republic of
Portugal Ratings Lowered To 'BBB-/A-3' On ESM Lending Conditions;
Outlook Neg; Teleconf Today At 4:30PM BST'). We subsequently
revised our assessment of Portuguese country risk and how it
might affect the notes that we rate in securitizations backed by
Portuguese assets," S&P stated.

"Under our criteria, the maximum rating differential between
issuers or transactions and the related European Monetary Union
(EMU) sovereign is six notches (see 'Nonsovereign Ratings That
Exceed EMU Sovereign Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions,' April
8, 2011). We therefore concluded that ratings on securitization
notes backed by Portuguese assets should be no higher than 'AA-
(sf)'," S&P stated.

"Consequently, on April 1, 2011, we lowered to 'AA- (sf)' our
ratings on all Portuguese asset-backed securities (ABS) and
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) notes rated 'AA
(sf)' or above, with the exception of notes that are guaranteed
by the European Investment Fund (AAA/Stable/A-1+) (see 'Ratings
Lowered On 68 Tranches In 48 Portuguese ABS And RMBS
Transactions.')," S&P related.

DOURO Mortgages 1, 3, and 4 are Portuguese RMBS transactions that
securitize loans originated by Banco BPI S.A.  Therefore, due to
the country risk, the highest potential rating on the notes in
DOURO 1, 2, and 3 is 'AA- (sf)'.

"The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow analysis and
the application of our updated subsidy stresses relating to the
proportion of loans in each pool that carries a government
subsidy, under which the government pays a portion of the
interest due on loans (only if the borrower meets its
obligations)," S&P related.

"Following our downgrade of Portugal, there is an increased risk
that the government will not be able to meet all subsidy
payments, in our opinion, and therefore we have updated our
assumptions regarding the amount of subsidized interest that will
be lost on these loans," S&P said.

                              DOURO 1

"For DOURO 1, 25% of the pool contains government-subsidized
loans. We have affirmed our rating on the class A notes because,
after applying our updated subsidy stresses, our analysis
indicates that there is sufficient credit enhancement to maintain
the current rating on the notes," S&P stated.

Credit enhancement has reduced for all classes of notes, due to
the notes paying pro rata and the reserve fund amortizing.
"Furthermore, total arrears are higher in DOURO 1 than in any
other DOURO transaction. Following the results of our cash flow
analysis, we have lowered our ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes," S&P related.

                             DOURO 3

"For DOURO 3, 15% of the pool contains government-subsidized
loans. We have affirmed our rating on the class A notes because,
after applying our updated subsidy stresses, our analysis
indicates that there is sufficient credit enhancement to maintain
the current rating on the notes," S&P stated.

Credit enhancement is increasing slowly, due to the notes paying
pro_rata. Furthermore, total arrears are increasing. "Following
the results of our cash flow analysis, we have lowered our
ratings on the class B, C, and D notes," S&P related.

"We have raised our rating on the class E notes because they get
paid down via excess spread and we believe it is likely that they
will be paid down within the next year. Although there is a large
amount of excess spread being generated each quarter, the rating
was constrained to 'A- (sf)' due to the risk that this could be
eroded by losses in light of the current economic uncertainty in
Portugal," S&P said.

                             DOURO 4

"The DOURO 4 transaction is still in its revolving period and the
maximum allowable proportion of subsidized loans during this
period is 15%. We have therefore used this proportion in our
analysis. We have affirmed our rating on the class A notes
because, after applying or subsidy stresses, our analysis
indicates that there is sufficient credit enhancement to maintain
the current rating on the notes," S&P stated.

Ratings List

Class              Rating
            To                From

SAGRES SOCIEDADE DE TITULARIZACAO DE CREDITOS S.A.
SERIES DOURO MORTGAGES NO. 1
EUR1.509 Billion Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A           AA- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B           BBB+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)          AA- (sf)
D           BB- (sf)          AA- (sf)

SAGRES SOCIEDADE DE TITULARIZACAO DE CREDITOS S.A.
SERIES DOURO MORTGAGES NO. 3
EUR1.515 Billion Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A           AA- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B           BBB- (sf)         AA- (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)          A (sf)
D           BB- (sf)          BBB (sf)

Rating Raised

E           A- (sf)           BBB- (sf)

SAGRES SOCIEDADE DE TITULARIZACAO DE CREDITOS S.A. SERIES
DOURO MORTGAGES NO. 4
EUR1.523 Billion Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A           AA- (sf)


* PORTUGAL: One Third of Public Hospitals Insolvent
---------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Health Minister Paulo Macedo said a third of
Portugal's public hospitals are insolvent and the government will
have to slash the National Health Service budget by 11% next
year, more than double the agreed reduction under the EU/IMF
bailout terms.

The government had agreed to cut healthcare spending by 5% in
2012 under the terms of its EUR78-billion bailout, Reuters says.

"Spending cuts are not a whim or a strategy, it is a dire
necessity.  The hospitals will not survive under this reality,"
Mr. Macedo told a parliamentary commission, according to Reuters.

"A third of public hospitals are in technical insolvency,"
Reuters quoted Mr. Macedo as saying.  The 41 public hospitals
that are managed as separate state companies had losses worth
EUR222 million last year and that number was likely to reach
EUR300 million this year, he added.

Reuters relates that Portugal's bailout agreement stipulates the
state's healthcare spending is to be cut by EUR550 million until
2013.

According to the news agency, Mr. Macedo said the proposed
additional cut would take the overall savings to EUR750 million.
Operating costs at hospitals will be slashed by EUR400 million
this year and next year, instead of the initially envisaged
EUR200 million, Reuters notes.


=====================================
S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O
=====================================


PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D/E'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ProCredit Bank (Serbia)'s (PCS)
ratings.

The bank's IDRs and Support Rating reflect Fitch's view of the
potential support available from the bank's 83.3% shareholder,
Frankfurt-based ProCredit Holding AG (PCH; 'BBB-'/Stable), which
at end-H111 had total assets and equity of around EUR5 billion
and EUR429 million, respectively.  PCH'S IDRs and Support Ratings
in turn reflect the agency's view of the potential support
available from its institutional shareholders, in particular from
a group of international financial institutions (IFIs), which are
key voting shareholders.

PCS's foreign currency IDRs are constrained by Serbia's 'BB-'
Country Ceiling.  Consequently, its foreign currency IDRs could
be upgraded or downgraded if Fitch's view of the sovereign risks
changed.

PCS's Viability Rating considers the difficult operating
environment, the bank's pressured performance in 2010 as well as
the deterioration in its loans/deposits ratio to a high 164% at
end-June 2011.  However, this is balanced by PCS's reasonable
capital ratios and acceptable asset quality, which remains
significantly better than the sector average.  Upside potential
to the Viability Rating is currently limited given the operating
environment.  However, Fitch notes that ongoing improvement in
the bank's performance and the successful expansion of its retail
funding base could put upward pressure on the Viability Rating.

PCS's Viability Rating is also enhanced by its relatively strong
management, solid corporate governance and robust risk management
systems and practices, which ensue from it being part of the
ProCredit group of banks.

PCS's moderate performance in 2010 mainly reflected a high level
of loan impairment charges and a high cost base.  However, it was
also due to flat net interest income, despite a sharp drop in
interest expense in 2010, resulting from a tightening loan yield
as PCS has exited the higher-yielding "micro" loan segment in
line with group strategy.

Fitch notes that PCS has remained profitable throughout the
global financial crisis.  Furthermore, net profit rose sharply in
H111 as restructuring efforts start to pay off. PCS's performance
should pick up on the back of loan growth, lower interest expense
-- as the bank focuses its customer deposit strategy on stable
retail customer deposits -- and a stabilizing net interest margin
(NIM).  Nevertheless, the bank's NIM will remain under pressure
given intense competition in the Serbian banking sector.

In addition, Fitch believes that loans overdue by 30 days or more
appear to be close to or at their peak.  Consequently, loan
impairment charges are budgeted to fall sharply in 2012.

The rating actions are as follows:

PCS:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

  -- Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB-';


=========
S P A I N
=========



CAJA DE AHORROS: Spain's Central Bank Kicks Off Sale Process
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Bjork at Dow Jones Newswires reports that Spain's
central bank kicked off the sale of Caja de Ahorros del
Mediterraneo a day after the bailed-out lender disclosed huge
losses and triggered new fears about the health of the country's
ailing savings banks.

According to Dow Jones, people familiar with the situation said
that the Bank of Spain's adviser in the sale, Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, is distributing sales documents to potential
bidders, asking them to present nonbinding offers by the end of
the month.  They said the response has been lukewarm so far, Dow
Jones notes.

The people said that the central bank hopes to wrap up the sales
process by the end of October, Dow Jones relates.

Preliminary results, published on Sept. 5, showed the bank's
balance sheet had deteriorated much more than previously thought;
it lost EUR1.14 billion in the first six months, Dow Jones
discloses.  The bank's bad loans soared to 19% of total lending
at the end of June, after its new central bank administrators
reviewed the loan book, doubling the 8.5% past-due loan ratio
disclosed by CAM in March, Dow Jones states.

One potential buyer is CaixaBank SA, the Barcelona-based lender
with the biggest branch network in Spain, Dow Jones.  It has
hired U.S. investment bank J.P. Morgan Chase to advise on a
potential bid, Dow Jones says, citing people familiar with the
matter.  One of the people familiar with the situation cautined
that an offer is far from certain, Dow Jones notes.

Some foreign lenders, including Barclays PLC and BNP Paribas SA
have looked at CAM in the past, but it is unclear if they will
join the upcoming auction, according to Dow Jones.

Several private-equity firms have also asked for a look at CAM's
books, Dow Jones recounts.  But bankers say they believe buyout
firms won't be able to offer as high a price because they can't
realize the same cost savings that banks could achieve by
combining operations, Dow Jones states.

Eight lenders went through CAM's books before it was seized by
the central bank in July, but all balked as authorities were
initially unwilling to provide protection against potential loan
losses, Dow Jones discloses.

Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM) is a savings bank that
attracts deposits and provides commercial banking services in
Spain.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Swedish Court Rejects Creditor Protection Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander and Johan Carlstrom at Bloomberg News report that a
Swedish court rejected Saab Automobile's petition for protection
from creditors, increasing the risk that the 64-year carmaker may
be headed for bankruptcy as suppliers and workers seek the money
they're owed.

According to Bloomberg, the Vaenersborg District Court on
Thursday ruled against the request for a voluntary reorganization
that Trollhaettan, Sweden-based Saab filed on Wednesday in a bid
to win time to raise money to restart operations and avoid a
bankruptcy petition.  Saab said it will appeal the decision,
Bloomberg notes.

"It seems unclear how the company will be able to solve the
liquidity crisis and continue the business," Bloomberg quotes
Judge Cecilia Tisell as saying in the decision she wrote with two
colleagues.  "The company's possibilities to successfully
reorganize the business don't appear to be better than they were
in 2009."

Saab Chief Executive Officer Victor Muller, who personally
persuaded GM to sell Saab to his company, said in an interview on
Wednesday that a court rejection of the application would mean a
"clear risk" of bankruptcy, Bloomberg relates.  The CEO, as cited
by Bloomberg, said on Thursday that he'll retain the best lawyers
and is "determined to see this through."

Mr. Muller on Wednesday said that Saab owes suppliers about
EUR150 million, adding that the carmaker is "pretty" close to
securing a bridge loan, Bloomberg relates.

Saab first halted production in late March, and assembly at the
main factory in Trollhaettan has been quiet since early June,
Bloomberg recounts.  The company was unable to pay wages last
month, prompting unions to start a process that could have led to
a bankruptcy declaration, Bloomberg discloses.  The unions halted
that move Wednesday to support the reorganization request,
Bloomberg states.

Separately, Bloomberg News' Ola Kinnander reports that Saab's
biggest union, IF Metall, will wait a "few days" before it moves
ahead with its own bankruptcy petition, after a Swedish court
rejected the carmaker's appeal for protection from creditors.

"This is incredibly sad, I had not expected this," Bloomberg
quotes union spokesman Hakan Skott as saying on Thursday.  "We
can't wait very long, the members have to be paid."

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 29,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Saab delayed paying wages for
the third month in a row.  Saab was scheduled to pay factory
workers on Aug. 25 and administrative employees on Aug. 26,
Bloomberg disclosed.  The Swedish government's Debt Enforcement
Agency started collection proceedings last month at the request
of component suppliers with unpaid bills, Bloomberg recounted.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CASTLE INN: Hunt for Buyer Continues
------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the hunt for a buyer for Castle Inns'
assets continues.

The portfolio, which includes the Sportsters Bar in Stirling and
12 pubs and clubs, has been put up for sale, according to BBC
News.  The report relates portfolio also includes City Nightclub
and Sportsters Bar brands in Falkirk, Perth and Edinburgh, along
with the Fubar Nightclub in Stirling.

The report notes that the businesses are up for sale
individually, in lots, or as a single portfolio.

BBC News discloses that Gary Louttit, a partner with Graham and
Sibbald, said this was "a rare opportunity to purchase a
portfolio of high quality bars and nightclubs, all of which are
established businesses with very impressive trading patterns."
The report relates that Mr. Louttit added that discussions were
already at "an advanced stage with a number of operators" and he
believed the pubs would be sold soon.


Meanwhile, Sterling Observer relates that Fubar Nightclub will
not close in the near future, a representative told officials
recently.

The claim was made by a solicitor speaking on behalf of the
Maxwell Place venue at a meeting of the region's licensing board
last week, according to Sterling Observer.

Sterling Observer notes that parent company Castle Inns lodged an
objection to a bid by Upper Craigs bar, the Kilted Kangaroo, to
extend their opening hours to 2:00 a.m. on Thursdays and 3:00
a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays.

While the application was in the process of being unanimously
rejected, Fubar's legal spokesperson acknowledged the mounting
rumors swirling around the club, Sterling Observer says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 12,
2011, Neil Gerrard at Caterersearch.com said that LT Pub
Management has been appointed to manage the estate of in-
administration Castle Inns.  LT Pub Management has been running
the estate as a going concern since that date on behalf of
administrator Deloitte ahead on any potential sale of the
business, according to Caterersearch.com.  Morning Advertiser
said that Castle Inns has fallen into administration after facing
"significant cashflow difficulties" in recent months.
Administrator Deloitte said all Castle Inns' sites will continue
to trade, "with a view to selling the business as a going
concern," according to Morning Advertiser.  Morning Advertiser
noted that Deloitte is willing to consider selling the sites
individually or as a group.

Castle Inns is the operator of around a dozen bars and nightclubs
in Scotland along with Edinburgh's biggest club City.  It was
founded in 1983 by brothers Paul and Stephen Smith.  It currently
employs 400 full and part-time staff.


HEX HOLDINGS: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer for Assets
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Rose at AM Online reports that administrators from MCR have
been called in to Hex Holdings, a nationwide distributor of
refinish materials to bodyshops.

Matt Ingram and John Whitfield, partners at corporate
restructuring firm MCR, were appointed joint administrators for
the company on Sept. 6.

"The auto industry as a whole is a crucial part of "UK Plc",
contributing GBP8.5 billion added value to the economy. However,
there is no doubt that the supply chain throughout the sector is
still feeling the cold reality of the broader economic climate
both here and abroad. . . . We can confirm that at this stage the
business is continuing to trade whil[le] a buyer is sought," AM
Online quoted Mr. Ingram as saying.

Leicestershire-based Hex Holdings is a nationwide distributor of
refinish materials to bodyshops.


OCEAN VIEW: Founder Banned as Company Director for 9 Years
----------------------------------------------------------
Rob Smyth at burtonmail.co.uk reports that Ocean View Properties
Founder Colin Thomas was deemed 'unfit' after the Insolvency
Service completed an investigation following the collapse of his
company.  Mr. Thomas has been banned from being a company
director for nine years after pocketing almost GBP14 million
'without regard for his customers,' the report says.

According to the report, the findings revealed that Mr. Thomas's
firm took GBP23 million from customers for a Spanish development
that it did not own, did not have a building license for, and
never undertook any construction work on.

It was also revealed that Mr. Thomas received GBP13.8 million,
despite the firm being insolvent, and paid his partner Michelle
De Havilland another GBP650,000, "although she had no
professional qualifications and provided no tangible services,"
reports burtonmail.co.uk.

"We can confirm following an unfit conduct investigation into
Colin Thomas that he has been banned from being a company
director for nine years," burtonmail.co.uk quotes a spokesman for
the Government body as saying.  "He will not be able to serve in
this role until May 10, 2020."

Ocean View was placed into compulsory liquidation at the request
of accountants Grant Thornton in 2009.


PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: Future Could be Thrown Into Turmoil
----------------------------------------------------
Matt Morris at footballtradedirectory.com reports that the future
of League Two club Plymouth Argyle could be thrown into turmoil
as the Football League meets to discuss the club's current
administration.

The Pilgrims have been in crisis since being placed into
administration last year, the club's players recently agreed to
take a deferment on their wages and the man who is hoping to buy
the cash strapped club has threatened to withdraw his offer for
the club unless the Football League ratify his offer at the
meeting, according to footballtradedirectory.com.

The report notes that businessman Kevin Heaney's proposal, under
Bishop International, would buy Plymouth's Home Park stadium and
the surrounding areas for GBP6 million, a deal which would wipe
out Argyle's debts.  Mr. Heaney, the report relates, would then
sell the football side of the business to Peter Ridsdale for a
nominal fee.

But with reports suggesting that the administrators are looking
at alternative offers for the club, Mr. Heaney has said he could
walkaway from the club, footballtradedirectory.com says.

"If they (the administrators) are not going to get this deal over
the line . . . . then Peter and I will walk away from the deal,"
Heaney said on bbc.co.uk in an interview,
footballtradedirectory.com discloses.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 8,
2011, the High Court has placed Plymouth Argyle Football Club has
been placed into administration.  Brendan Guilfoyle, Christopher
White and John Russell of The P&A Partnership have been appointed
as administrators.  The TCR-Europe, citing The Guardian, reported
on March 3, 2011, that Plymouth Argyle directors have been warned
that the club needs an injection of around GBP3 million if it is
not to be placed into administration.  Peter Ridsdale, who is
acting as an independent adviser to Argyle's board, has told the
directors that the club does not have the money to meet its
liabilities and that they are "in denial" about the seriousness
of its problems, The Guardian related.

Plymouth Argyle Football Club, commonly known as Argyle, or by
their nickname, The Pilgrims, is an English professional football
club based in Central Park, Plymouth.  It plays in Football
League One, the third division of the English football league
system.


SIMCLAR GROUP: Union Holds Meeting for Former Employees
-------------------------------------------------------
Dunfermlinepress reports that Gary Fitzpatrick reports that a
meeting was held in Dunfermline to advise former and current
employees of Simclar Group about their rights after the firm went
into administration.

The Community trade union organised the event at the King Malcolm
Hotel offering legal advice and MSP John Park addressed the
workforce, according to Dunfermlinepress.

The report notes that the Mid Scotland and Fife MSP has
previously called for called for owners to contribute towards
redundancy payments when their companies go bust.

Dunfermlinepress discloses that Mr. Park said he had also been
contacted by workers who claimed they were being intimidated
after saying they were going to join the trade union.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 29,
2011, BBC News related that Simclar Group has gone into
administration putting more than 200 jobs at risk in the process.
The administrators from Deloittes are expected to keep Simclar,
which owns operations in China and the US, running while it seeks
buyers for the business, according to BBC News.  BBC News notes
that Simclar Group ran into problems when planned launches for
new products, including an energy-saving plug, were delayed.

Dunfermline-based Simclar Group supplies wiring, looms and sheet
metal products to major electronics firms.  Simclar Group was
formed in May 2001 and is the parent company of a subcontract
manufacturing group with operations in the UK, USA, Mexico and
China.  The UK operations supply a number of blue chip customers,
including Bombardier and Alexander Dennis.


WEAVERING CAPITAL: SFO Drops Probe, Causes Shock & Anger
--------------------------------------------------------
City A.M. reports that investors and liquidators have reacted
with shock after the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) dropped a two-
and-a-half-year probe into a hedge fund that collapsed with
US$639 million (GBP399.86 million) under management.

The SFO said there was "not a reasonable prospect of conviction"
after studying evidence on London-based Weavering Capital (UK),
which went into administration in 2009, according to City A.M.

City A.M. notes that the move comes days after a Cayman Islands
court ruled in a civil case between the fund's liquidators and
two directors that Weavering's fund manager Magnus Peterson had
committed fraud and that the fund had made "fictitious"
transactions to inflate assets and conceal losses.

It also comes ahead of legal action being taken in the UK by the
liquidators against Peterson and other Weavering directors and
employees, the report relates.

City A.M. notes that Geoffrey Bouchier, one of the liquidators,
described the SFO's decision as "deeply disappointing".

Mt. Peterson could not be contacted but said in a statement that
the allegations against him were "groundless" and that he intends
to appeal the Cayman ruling, the report says.  Last month a
Cayman court awarded damages of US$111 million against fund
directors Stefan Peterson and Hans Ekstrom, the report discloses.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 20,
2009, SFO conducted searches on two residential properties (one
in Kent, the other in Surrey) assisted by the City of London
Police, in connection with its investigation into an alleged
fraud involving the recently collapsed hedge fund, Weavering
Capital.  Two men, aged 43 and 45, were arrested and have been
taken to a police station for questioning.  The investigation is
currently focused on certain interest rate swap transactions
between the Macro Fund and a company registered in the British
Virgin Islands, Weavering Capital Fund Limited, which appears to
be a related third party, and which inflated the apparent Net
Asset Value of the Macro Fund.

Weavering Capital (UK) Limited is an English incorporated
investment management firm, which went into administration on
March 19, 2009, whose primary function was to act as investment
advisor to a Cayman Islands incorporated hedge fund, Weavering
Macro Fixed Income Fund Limited ("the Macro Fund").  Liquidators
were appointed over the Macro Fund on March 19, 2009.  The Macro
Fund was understood to have funds under management of around
US$639 million in late 2008.


* UK: 8% of Retail Business Owners Likely to Enter Insolvency
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Mercury, citing figures released by R3, the Association of
Business Recovery Professionals, reports that 41% of retail
business owners hold concerns over debt and insolvency and 8%
said that they are very likely to enter into insolvency in the
next 12 months.

The average for all sectors is at two per cent, the report says.

"The pressure on retailers is two-fold," the Mercury quotes R3
regional chair Nick Keitley, of commercial law firm Bond Pearce,
as saying. "As consumers have less money to spend, stores are
discounting their prices to get people through their doors -- this
is at a time when inflation and rising commodity prices have
increased retailers costs."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* German Court Rejects Challenges to Greece & Eurozone Bailout
--------------------------------------------------------------
RTE News reports that Germany's Constitutional Court has rejected
a series of legal challenges aimed at blocking Germany's
participation in bail-out packages for Greece and other euro zone
countries.

According to RTE, the court said the country's parliament must
have a bigger say in future rescues.

The country's highest court in Karlsruhe said the German
government must seek the approval of parliament's budget
committee before granting such aid, a requirement which could
further slow down Europe's response to the debt crisis, RTE
relates.

In addition, the court ruled that parliament must have
"sufficient influence" over the conditions attached to future
rescue deals, RTE notes.  The court also ruled that it may not
approve deals that could lead to an unforeseeable burden on
future parliaments, RTE states.  RTE says the judges also
insisted that parliament may not approve any deal that leads to a
pooling of national debt, apparently ruling out the idea of
"eurobonds."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday's court ruling
confirmed Berlin's policies during the debt crisis, RTE notes.

The European Commission welcomed the German constitutional
court's decision to uphold euro zone bail-outs, saying the ruling
has an important impact on efforts to overcome the debt crisis,
RTE discloses.

"This ruling confirms the compatibility with the German
constitution with measures taken so far in this context," RTE
quotes commission spokeswoman Pia Ahrenkilde Hansen as saying.
"It has an important bearing on the capacity of the Union and of
its member states to act, to surmount the sovereign debt crisis
affecting certain member states."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 5 to September 9, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon    Maturity Currency   Price
------                ------    -------- --------   -----
BA CREDITANSTALT        5.470   8/28/2013     EUR    66.50
BAWAG                   5.430   2/26/2024     EUR    74.39
ERSTE BANK              3.680   8/10/2020     EUR    77.47
HAA-BANK INTL AG        5.250  10/27/2015     EUR    68.88
HAA-BANK INTL AG        5.270    4/7/2028     EUR    70.17
IMMOFINANZ              4.250    3/8/2018     EUR     3.54
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.170   7/29/2015     EUR    67.75
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810   7/29/2025     EUR    64.25
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.270    2/8/2027     EUR    65.73
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         5.470   2/28/2028     EUR    71.73
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500   9/28/2035     EUR    57.65
ECONOCOM GROUP          4.000    6/1/2016     EUR    20.16
IDEAL STANDARD         11.750    5/1/2018     EUR    72.83
IDEAL STANDARD         11.750    5/1/2018     EUR    74.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000   1/20/2015     EUR    74.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        3.750    6/3/2013     EUR    75.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500  10/23/2013     EUR    77.04
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.000    1/9/2014     EUR    75.22
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.000   1/20/2014     EUR    76.66
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   2/26/2014     EUR    74.97
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000  11/18/2014     EUR    75.36
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000    1/3/2015     EUR    74.89
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    1/4/2017     EUR    65.17
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000   2/28/2015     EUR    74.53
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000   4/20/2015     EUR    74.16
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.250    6/9/2015     EUR    71.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.750   9/30/2015     EUR    69.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        3.750   11/1/2015     EUR    63.51
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.750   12/2/2015     EUR    68.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    1/2/2016     EUR    67.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   3/30/2016     EUR    67.11
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    6/2/2016     EUR    66.39
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.000    6/9/2016     EUR    67.57
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   7/11/2016     EUR    66.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   10/9/2016     EUR    65.62
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.600  10/26/2016     EUR    72.43
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   2/15/2017     EUR    64.95
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    4/2/2017     EUR    64.76
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.600   4/15/2017     EUR    66.68
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   9/28/2017     EUR    63.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.100   1/29/2018     EUR    65.73
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600   4/23/2018     EUR    63.42
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600  10/23/2018     EUR    63.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600   2/26/2019     EUR    62.90
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.100   6/24/2019     EUR    69.84
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.625    2/3/2020     EUR    58.14
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.100   4/20/2020     EUR    69.76
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.350    6/9/2020     EUR    65.84
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.000    6/9/2021     EUR    65.67
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        6.500   8/25/2021     EUR    67.03
MARFIN POPULAR          4.350  11/20/2014     EUR    52.88
REP OF CYPRUS           4.375   7/15/2014     EUR    68.46
REP OF CYPRUS           4.750   2/25/2016     EUR    58.66
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500  12/14/2020     ZAR    50.26
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   3/17/2025     CAD    61.45
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   6/30/2017     ZAR    67.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/27/2018     ZAR    60.60
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  11/25/2020     ZAR    50.92
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250   6/28/2040     CAD    24.64
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/26/2016     ZAR    73.58
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    2/9/2016     ZAR    74.54
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970    4/1/2015     EUR    11.78
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000    1/1/2015     EUR     3.31
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720    1/1/2015     EUR     5.11
ASSYSTEM                4.000    1/1/2017     EUR    20.46
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500    1/1/2016     EUR    49.94
CALYON                  6.000   6/18/2047     EUR    18.94
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000    1/1/2012     EUR    41.83
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500    1/1/2014     EUR    37.76
CGG VERITAS             1.750    1/1/2016     EUR    25.85
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110   11/1/2015     EUR    18.06
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000    6/8/2012     EUR    12.97
CMA CGM                 8.500   4/15/2017     USD    47.38
CMA CGM                 8.500   4/15/2017     USD    80.35
CMA CGM                 8.875   4/15/2019     EUR    46.93
CMA CGM                 8.875   4/15/2019     EUR    47.25
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.830   6/30/2031     USD    74.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850   6/30/2031     USD    74.51
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.850   9/17/2030     USD    65.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.270    8/5/2030     USD    70.11
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300  10/12/2030     USD    67.78
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.250  10/18/2030     USD    69.66
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300  10/22/2030     USD    70.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.350  10/29/2030     USD    70.49
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.910   11/3/2030     USD    67.15
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.450   11/9/2030     USD    71.42
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.080  11/23/2030     USD    67.75
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.690  11/26/2030     USD    73.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.400   12/9/2030     USD    70.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.000  12/23/2030     USD    73.98
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850   5/27/2031     USD    74.56
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.650   6/10/2031     USD    72.56
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.610   6/15/2031     USD    72.12
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300   10/7/2030     USD    70.07
CREDIT LOCAL FRA        3.750   5/26/2020     EUR    74.26
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000  12/23/2024     EUR    60.95
EURAZEO                 6.250   6/10/2014     EUR    55.79
FAURECIA                4.500    1/1/2015     EUR    22.05
GROUPAMA SA             7.875  10/27/2039     EUR    64.53
INGENICO                2.750    1/1/2017     EUR    42.54
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2014     EUR    17.69
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2015     EUR    16.66
NEXANS SA               4.000    1/1/2016     EUR    59.85
ORPEA                   3.875    1/1/2016     EUR    45.40
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875    6/1/2018     EUR    73.13
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875    6/1/2018     EUR    72.95
PEUGEOT SA              4.450    1/1/2016     EUR    26.33
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000   1/18/2018     EUR    48.14
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125   7/30/2014     EUR    34.54
RHODIA SA               0.500    1/1/2014     EUR    51.89
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750    4/1/2020     EUR    20.31
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860   4/26/2031     USD    71.84
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.940   3/14/2031     USD    72.36
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.920   3/17/2031     USD    72.15
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.910   3/16/2031     USD    72.06
SOCIETE GENERALE        6.010   3/15/2031     USD    73.05
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860   3/11/2031     USD    71.54
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.900   3/10/2031     USD    71.99
SOITEC                  6.250    9/9/2014     EUR     8.52
TEM                     4.250    1/1/2015     EUR    53.97
THEOLIA                 2.700    1/1/2041     EUR    10.54
BAYERISCHE HYPO         5.000  12/21/2029     EUR    71.76
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.640   1/30/2024     EUR    74.15
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000   3/30/2018     EUR    46.11
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000   4/20/2018     EUR    46.07
COMMERZBANK AG          6.300   3/15/2022     EUR    73.93
COMMERZBANK AG          6.360   3/15/2022     EUR    74.08
COMMERZBANK AG          6.460   6/24/2022     EUR    74.20
COMMERZBANK AG          4.000  11/30/2017     EUR    45.31
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.700   7/31/2023     EUR    67.15
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.180   2/28/2023     EUR    69.82
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.350   6/13/2028     EUR    71.55
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.160   8/14/2024     EUR    73.82
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.290   5/31/2021     EUR    69.44
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.210   6/20/2022     EUR    72.81
EUROHYPO AG             6.490   7/17/2017     EUR     5.13
EUROHYPO AG             5.560   8/18/2023     EUR    61.13
EUROHYPO AG             3.830   9/21/2020     EUR    58.00
EUROHYPO AG             5.110    8/6/2018     EUR    72.63
GOTHAER ALLG VER        5.527   9/29/2026     EUR    73.25
HECKLER & KOCH          9.500   5/15/2018     EUR    73.00
HECKLER & KOCH          9.500   5/15/2018     EUR    72.13
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250   4/15/2018     EUR    64.38
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250   4/15/2018     EUR    64.34
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375   2/14/2017     EUR    53.90
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        4.500    7/9/2013     EUR    70.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500   5/10/2027     CAD    55.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250  10/20/2015     EUR    28.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.800   2/23/2037     JPY    67.20
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN        5.875   2/10/2016     EUR    70.02
Q-CELLS                 6.750  10/21/2015     EUR     1.61
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750   3/22/2013     USD     2.38
RHEINISCHE HYPBK        6.600   5/29/2022     EUR    70.00
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375   12/6/2012     EUR    20.25
TAG IMMO AG             6.500  12/10/2015     EUR     7.81
TUI AG                  2.750   3/24/2016     EUR    36.03
TUI AG                  5.500  11/17/2014     EUR    54.12
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301   8/12/2014     EUR    45.80
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851   9/19/2016     EUR    44.64
ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008   7/18/2017     EUR    44.71
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.057   3/26/2013     EUR    54.72
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900   7/25/2025     EUR    35.03
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300   7/25/2030     EUR    34.06
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140   4/14/2028     EUR    39.13
HELLENIC REPUB          4.625   6/25/2013     USD    78.91
HELLENIC REPUB          2.125    7/5/2013     CHF    70.13
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590    4/8/2016     EUR    43.63
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   3/11/2019     EUR    47.38
HELLENIC REPUB          3.187    7/7/2024     EUR    42.21
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200   7/17/2034     EUR    37.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   9/20/2037     EUR    33.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   9/20/2040     EUR    34.20
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.900    7/3/2013     EUR    51.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI        7.500   5/20/2013     EUR    50.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500   8/20/2014     EUR    45.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985   7/25/2014     EUR    46.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    7/1/2014     EUR    46.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   5/20/2014     EUR    45.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500   1/11/2014     EUR    45.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.520   9/30/2013     EUR    49.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.000   8/20/2013     EUR    46.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   7/20/2018     EUR    42.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.427   7/31/2013     EUR    55.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   5/20/2013     EUR    49.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.506   3/31/2013     EUR    63.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.100   8/20/2012     EUR    55.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI        1.000   6/30/2012     EUR    70.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   4/20/2017     EUR    44.12
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225    3/1/2017     EUR    47.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020   9/13/2016     EUR    46.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600   7/20/2016     EUR    43.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250   6/20/2012     EUR    73.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250   5/18/2012     EUR    57.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   3/20/2012     EUR    57.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700  11/10/2015     EUR    44.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   7/20/2017     EUR    45.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702   9/30/2015     EUR    45.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100   8/20/2015     EUR    44.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   7/20/2015     EUR    43.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113   9/30/2014     EUR    46.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000   7/19/2019     EUR    44.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500  10/22/2019     EUR    44.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250   6/19/2020     EUR    44.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900  10/22/2022     EUR    41.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700   3/20/2024     EUR    36.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.590    4/3/2018     EUR    45.08
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300   3/20/2026     EUR    36.55
NATL BK GREECE          3.875   10/7/2016     EUR    60.00
CREDIT AGRICOLE         5.600   2/25/2030     USD    74.33
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        4.875   6/29/2017     EUR    73.19
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580   4/28/2028     EUR    50.22
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   2/12/2030     EUR    44.79
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    3/1/2030     EUR    44.76
ALLIED IRISH BKS        4.000   3/19/2015     EUR    73.09
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625  11/12/2014     EUR    71.72
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2035     GBP    23.50
ANGLO IRISH BANK        4.000   4/15/2015     EUR    71.94
BANK OF IRELAND         3.780    4/1/2015     EUR    73.76
BANK OF IRELAND         3.585   4/21/2015     EUR    61.63
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020     EUR    30.25
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020     GBP    44.13
BANK OF IRELAND         5.600   9/18/2023     EUR    37.25
BANK OF IRELAND         4.473  11/30/2016     EUR    53.63
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450    3/1/2030     EUR    44.39
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.360  10/12/2029     EUR    44.34
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400   11/6/2029     EUR    44.54
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760    9/7/2029     EUR    47.06
BK IRELAND MTGE         3.250   6/22/2015     EUR    74.43
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500    3/3/2025     CAD    39.47
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900   8/24/2035     CAD    66.74
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037     USD    73.88
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.000   2/25/2015     EUR    71.46
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.000   3/10/2015     EUR    71.23
IRISH NATIONWIDE        6.250   6/26/2012     GBP    74.38
UT2 FUNDING PLC         5.321   6/30/2016     EUR    72.02
BANCA POP LODI          5.250    4/3/2029     EUR    73.95
BANCO POPOLARE          6.375   5/31/2021     EUR    74.39
BTPS                    4.000    2/1/2037     EUR    73.14
BTPS I/L                2.350   9/15/2035     EUR    68.69
BTPS I/L                2.550   9/15/2041     EUR    67.84
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019   6/29/2035     EUR    71.91
DEXIA CREDIOP           4.790  12/17/2043     EUR    72.14
REP OF ITALY            2.000   9/15/2062     EUR    50.63
REP OF ITALY            1.850   9/15/2057     EUR    49.93
REP OF ITALY            2.870   5/19/2036     JPY    68.28
REP OF ITALY            2.200   9/15/2058     EUR    56.12
REP OF ITALY            4.850   6/11/2060     EUR    72.84
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017     EUR    73.61
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017     EUR    74.13
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017     EUR    74.45
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017     EUR    74.08
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250   3/17/2055     EUR    67.80
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250    4/1/2014     EUR    23.55
CONTROLINVESTE          3.000   1/28/2015     EUR    73.50
ESPIRITO SANTO F        6.875  10/21/2019     EUR    55.22
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014     EUR    14.33
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014     EUR    14.46
UBI BANCA INT           8.750  10/29/2012     EUR    66.55
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750   10/1/2005     USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/3/2021     NZD    65.11
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021     NZD    64.74
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   6/22/2021     ZAR    48.24
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   5/12/2021     ZAR    48.30
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   2/24/2025     CAD    61.65
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500   5/15/2014     USD    58.50
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500   5/15/2014     USD    54.88
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625   12/9/2030     GBP    58.42
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500   4/10/2018     USD    57.13
FINANCE & CREDIT       10.500   1/25/2014     USD    79.25
FRIESLAND BANK          4.210  12/29/2025     EUR    71.29
INDAH KIAT INTL        12.500   6/15/2006     USD     0.01
ING BANK NV             4.200  12/19/2035     EUR    68.40
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983    5/7/2029     EUR    16.26
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500   3/11/2025     CAD    62.52
NIB CAPITAL BANK        4.510  12/16/2035     EUR    60.20
PORTUGAL TEL FIN        4.500   6/16/2025     EUR    68.14
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        1.375   2/28/2012     EUR    50.69
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750   5/26/2014     EUR    33.22
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        2.910   6/21/2036     JPY    66.19
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        5.000   2/27/2037     EUR    74.70
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000   4/20/2016     USD    68.13
SNS BANK                6.250  10/26/2020     EUR    74.69
SRLEV NV                9.000   4/15/2041     EUR    67.64
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250    8/1/2001     USD     0.00
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500    5/9/2030     CAD    48.82
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   5/25/2016     ZAR    74.48
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   5/25/2018     ZAR    62.30
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   7/26/2016     ZAR    74.27
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   7/29/2016     ZAR    72.97
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.000   6/26/2017     EUR    50.48
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750   6/15/2016     EUR    59.84
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750   6/15/2016     EUR    60.00
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125  10/15/2015     USD    60.13
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125  10/15/2015     USD    60.13
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125  10/15/2033     USD    43.00
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125  10/15/2033     USD    43.00
BANCO COM PORTUG        5.625   4/23/2014     EUR    70.10
BANCO COM PORTUG        4.750   6/22/2017     EUR    68.12
BANCO COM PORTUG        3.750   10/8/2016     EUR    68.14
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600   9/15/2016     EUR    72.31
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600   1/26/2017     EUR    70.49
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.160   7/23/2015     EUR    72.63
BANCO ESPIRITO          3.875   1/21/2015     EUR    70.47
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.875   7/15/2016     EUR    68.50
BRISA                   4.500   12/5/2016     EUR    75.06
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750   3/14/2016     EUR    73.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.500   1/19/2016     EUR    73.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.050   4/26/2016     EUR    74.14
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.090    6/8/2016     EUR    71.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750   2/14/2016     EUR    64.81
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.165    7/8/2016     EUR    73.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        3.875   12/6/2016     EUR    69.09
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.455   8/20/2017     EUR    68.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.500  11/13/2017     EUR    72.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400   10/8/2019     EUR    55.44
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250   1/27/2020     EUR    66.95
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380   10/1/2038     EUR    52.32
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.980    3/3/2028     EUR    53.63
CAIXA GERAL FR          3.384  12/15/2014     EUR    74.88
COMBOIOS DE PORT        4.170  10/16/2019     EUR    58.88
METRO DE LISBOA         5.750    2/4/2019     EUR    60.97
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061   12/4/2026     EUR    47.06
METRO DE LISBOA         7.300  12/23/2025     EUR    61.67
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799   12/7/2027     EUR    47.24
MONTEPIO GERAL          5.000    2/8/2017     EUR    61.13
PARPUBLICA              3.567   9/22/2020     EUR    49.38
PARPUBLICA              4.200  11/16/2026     EUR    46.38
PARPUBLICA              4.191  10/15/2014     EUR    69.38
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500   3/25/2015     USD    72.19
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500   3/25/2015     USD    72.03
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850   4/15/2021     EUR    58.79
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100   4/15/2037     EUR    50.56
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.450   6/15/2018     EUR    65.36
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.800   6/15/2020     EUR    62.78
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.200  10/15/2016     EUR    69.87
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.350  10/16/2017     EUR    65.80
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.750   6/14/2019     EUR    63.90
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.350  10/15/2015     EUR    72.25
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.950  10/25/2023     EUR    58.93
REFER                   5.875   2/18/2019     EUR    62.25
REFER                   4.000   3/16/2015     EUR    51.13
REFER                   4.250  12/13/2021     EUR    47.25
REFER                   4.675  10/16/2024     EUR    53.50
APK ARKADA             17.500   5/23/2012     RUB     0.38
ARIZK                   3.000  12/20/2030     RUB    51.03
DVTG-FINANS            17.000   8/29/2013     RUB    55.55
DVTG-FINANS             7.750   7/18/2013     RUB    20.29
IART                    8.500    8/4/2013     RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  17.000   9/17/2012     RUB    27.01
MOSMART FINANS          0.010   4/12/2012     RUB     1.81
NOK                    10.000   9/22/2011     RUB    49.90
NOK                    12.500   8/26/2014     RUB     5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA        1.000  12/17/2012     RUB     0.01
PROMTRACTOR-FINA        0.010  10/18/2011     RUB     1.10
PROTON-FINANCE          9.000   6/12/2012     RUB    65.00
RAZGULYAY-FINANS       17.000   9/27/2011     RUB     1.00
RBC OJSC                7.000   4/23/2015     RUB    70.55
RBC OJSC                7.000   4/23/2015     RUB    68.01
RBC OJSC                3.270   4/19/2018     RUB    42.00
SAHO                   10.000   5/21/2012     RUB    65.01
SATURN                  9.250   9/20/2011     RUB     1.00
SATURN                  8.500    6/6/2014     RUB     1.01
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500   3/27/2012     RUB     3.40
TERNA-FINANS            1.000   11/4/2011     RUB     0.05
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.000   3/24/2021     EUR    75.22
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750   5/25/2027     EUR    69.14
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   6/30/2025     EUR    61.84
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.250  10/25/2023     EUR    70.83
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750  12/14/2022     EUR    68.67
BANCAJA                 1.500   5/22/2018     EUR    67.10
BANCO PASTOR            4.550   7/31/2020     EUR    73.57
BBVA SUB CAP UNI        2.750  10/22/2035     JPY    72.64
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500   6/23/2021     EUR    60.33
CAJA MADRID             4.000    2/3/2025     EUR    74.84
CAJA MADRID             4.125   3/24/2036     EUR    66.88
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        4.250   4/10/2031     EUR    59.11
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        3.875   5/23/2025     EUR    63.77
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250   3/28/2027     EUR    63.84
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900  11/30/2035     EUR    62.23
COMUN AUTO CANAR        4.200  10/25/2036     EUR    65.34
COMUNIDAD BALEAR        4.063  11/23/2035     EUR    64.27
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300   9/15/2026     EUR    73.30
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.355  11/10/2015     CHF    73.06
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.315   9/10/2015     CHF    73.97
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220   4/26/2035     EUR    64.02
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.750   3/24/2016     CHF    72.02
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.690  10/28/2034     EUR    69.51
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750   8/20/2012     EUR    71.34
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500   6/15/2020     EUR    73.70
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        3.250   6/28/2024     CHF    73.79
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        2.570  10/22/2021     CHF    72.69
INSTITUT CATALA         4.250   6/15/2024     EUR    74.21
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         5.150   5/24/2034     EUR    74.48
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         4.250  10/31/2036     EUR    63.41
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875   1/31/2036     EUR    54.50
MAPFRE SA               5.921   7/24/2037     EUR    65.97
XUNTA DE GALICIA        4.025  11/28/2035     EUR    72.29
STENA AB                5.875    2/1/2019     EUR    74.00
STENA AB                5.875    2/1/2019     EUR    73.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.250   4/27/2012     USD     7.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/5/2018     AUD    74.72
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/25/2021     ZAR    45.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/26/2021     AUD    62.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750   3/23/2012     USD     7.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012     USD     9.16
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012     USD     9.96
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500   2/28/2012     USD     7.29
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   1/27/2012     USD     7.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500   1/27/2012     USD     7.99
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500  12/17/2027     USD    59.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130   1/10/2012     USD     9.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   1/25/2028     USD    59.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   11/4/2011     USD     6.78
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000   12/7/2011     USD    10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   6/29/2016     TRY    73.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/25/2016     ZAR    71.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/26/2016     ZAR    71.84
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   6/14/2016     ZAR    73.26
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/3/2016     ZAR    74.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   9/30/2016     ZAR    71.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500   6/12/2012     USD     8.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000  10/21/2011     USD     9.16
CRED SUIS NY            8.000    8/3/2012     USD    56.60
CYTOS BIOTECH           2.875   2/20/2012     CHF    52.74
UBS AG                 13.300   5/23/2012     USD     3.23
UBS AG                 13.700   5/23/2012     USD     8.80
UBS AG                 14.000   5/23/2012     USD     6.69
UBS AG                 10.960   7/20/2012     USD    23.63
UBS AG                 11.760   7/31/2012     USD    25.02
UBS AG                 12.040   7/31/2012     USD    34.60
UBS AG                 11.960   8/14/2012     USD    35.49
UBS AG                 15.240   8/23/2012     USD    28.70
UBS AG                 10.910    9/7/2012     USD    41.08
UBS AG                  7.470   10/1/2012     EUR    66.84
UBS AG                  9.110   10/1/2012     EUR    67.20
UBS AG                  9.640  11/14/2011     USD    12.06
UBS AG                 10.530   1/23/2012     USD    39.04
UBS AG                  8.380   3/20/2012     USD    32.03
UBS AG                  9.250   3/20/2012     USD    10.83
UBS AG                 10.070   3/23/2012     USD    27.66
UBS AG                  7.100   9/26/2011     EUR    70.74
UBS AG                  8.310   9/26/2011     EUR    70.78
UBS AG                 12.660   9/26/2011     EUR    69.70
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140  12/30/2011     USD    14.61
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220   7/31/2012     EUR    35.75
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450   9/21/2011     USD    49.91
LVIV CITY               9.950  12/19/2012     UAH    95.57
ABBEY NATL TREAS        5.000   8/26/2030     USD    64.25
BAKKAVOR FIN 2          8.250   2/15/2018     GBP    70.13
BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772    2/7/2035     EUR    66.97
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800   9/22/2011     USD    15.57
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750   9/22/2011     USD    71.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500   9/22/2011     USD    17.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350   1/23/2012     USD    26.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   6/29/2012     USD     8.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.000   7/20/2012     USD     7.54
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.000   7/27/2012     USD     8.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC        11.000   7/27/2012     USD     7.74
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400   7/31/2012     USD    10.21
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800   7/31/2012     USD    25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   8/31/2012     USD    33.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500   8/31/2012     USD    29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   9/11/2012     USD     9.92
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.100   5/26/2031     USD    73.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.390    8/4/2031     USD    74.66
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.200   8/25/2031     USD    72.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.230   8/26/2031     USD    72.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.200   8/29/2031     USD    72.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.250   8/29/2031     USD    72.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.000    6/3/2041     USD    66.74
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.950   4/20/2012     USD    16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950   4/20/2012     USD    23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550   1/23/2012     USD    10.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   1/31/2012     USD     9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650   1/31/2012     USD    34.34
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910    2/1/2047     EUR    70.44
CEVA GROUP PLC         10.000   6/30/2018     EUR    75.13
CEVA GROUP PLC          8.500   6/30/2018     EUR    69.25
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875   3/28/2033     GBP    67.55
EFG HELLAS PLC          4.375   2/11/2013     EUR    72.79
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010    1/9/2036     EUR    32.88
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400   11/2/2047     EUR    21.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000   2/28/2013     EUR    70.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000   2/28/2013     EUR    70.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.350   7/22/2014     EUR    55.50
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875    5/9/2025     GBP    64.88
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.500   12/6/2018     GBP    71.28
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875   2/15/2021     GBP    67.14
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375   9/26/2031     GBP    60.72
ESSAR ENERGY            4.250    2/1/2016     USD    68.70
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750  12/20/2026     GBP    67.02
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500    6/1/2019     GBP    70.81
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500    6/1/2019     GBP    70.40
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033     USD    71.81
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033     USD    71.81
HBOS PLC                4.500   3/18/2030     EUR    68.91
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067   2/19/2043     GBP    72.76
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        6.439   5/23/2020     EUR    69.52
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        7.975   9/15/2024     GBP    70.76
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        7.588   5/12/2020     GBP    74.01
LBG CAPITAL NO.2        8.500    6/7/2032     GBP    70.34
LBG CAPITAL NO.2        6.385   5/12/2020     EUR    69.36
MATALAN                 9.625   3/31/2017     GBP    69.15
MATALAN                 9.625   3/31/2017     GBP    69.50
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800  12/21/2020     EUR    61.55
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750   2/28/2017     GBP    66.33
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574   1/13/2015     GBP    77.94
OTE PLC                 4.625   5/20/2016     EUR    65.65
PIRAEUS GRP FIN         4.000   9/17/2012     EUR    71.72
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        5.168   6/29/2030     EUR    63.89
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.692    6/9/2025     EUR    68.58
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        2.300  11/26/2024     JPY    73.23
SKIPTON BUILDING        5.625   1/18/2018     GBP    67.33
THOMAS COOK GR          7.750   6/22/2017     GBP    72.88
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.450   5/15/2005     USD     0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.542   3/30/2021     GBP    71.77
UNIQUE PUB FIN          5.659   6/30/2027     GBP    60.31


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *