TCREUR_Public/111003.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, October 3, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 195

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sale Talks Fail; CEO Scrambles to Raise Funds


B E L A R U S

* CITY OF MINSK: S&P Cuts Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to 'B-'


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CESKE A SLOVENSKE: Deutsche Fachverlag Opts to Halt Operations
VIA VERA: Declared Bankrupt by Liberec Court


D E N M A R K

FJORDBANK MORS: Jykes Bank Acquires Parts of Business


E S T O N I A

ONOFF ESTONIA: Acquired by Baltic Retail Group


G E R M A N Y

FLEET STREET: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCsf'
GEMS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on Two Tranches
PROVIDE DOMICILE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
PROVIDE VR: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Notes
TS CO.MIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'Csf'


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Transactions to 'B2'
* GREECE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Transactions


I R E L A N D

EIRCOM GROUP: Sr. Lenders May Take 25% Stake in Debt-Equity Swap


I T A L Y

BORMIOLI ROCCO: Moody's Rates EUR250-Mil. Notes Issuance at 'B1'
COLOMBO SRL: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on Class C Floating-Rate Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Bonds Hit Record Low on Debt Restructuring Fears


L U X E M B O U R G

SPIE BONDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
EURO GALAXY: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
WOOD STREET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B1'


N O R W A Y

SEVAN MARINE: Teekay to Acquire Equity Stake & Three Vessels


R U S S I A

SIBERIAN COAL: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba3'


U K R A I N E

* CITY OF DNIPROPETROVSK: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GALERIE 69: Goes Into Administration, Shuts Stores
MOTORAUCTIONS LEEDS: Administrators Battle to Sell Firm
NDS GROUP: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to US$15MM Credit Facility
RAEBURN HOUSE: Goes Into Administration, Ceases Trading
RANGERS FC: Will Go Into Administration, Owner Says


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 26 to September 30, 2011




                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sale Talks Fail; CEO Scrambles to Raise Funds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News reports that Penta Investments
Ltd. said talks with the A-Tec Industries AG failed and Chief
Executive Officer Mirko Kovats faced a midnight deadline to pay
creditors.

Mr. Kovats had until midnight on Sept. 30 to raise funds he needs
to pay creditors 47% of their claims, a quota agreed to in a
restructuring plan last year, according to Bloomberg.

Bloomberg relates that Wolfgang Hrobar, a member of A-Tec's
creditor committee said the sum needed to fulfill the plan stands
at EUR210 million (US$282 million).  Matthias Schmidt, the
insolvency administrator, must receive the sum by the end of
September, Bloomberg notes.  If he doesn't, he is mandated by
creditors to take control of A-Tec and break it up to raise as
much as possible, Bloomberg states.

A-Tec restarted negotiations with Penta on Sept. 22 after a
previous agreement to sell most of its assets to a group led by
Contor Industries GmbH fell short of the funds required to pay
creditors as Pakistani investor Alshair Fiyaz's Solstice
International dropped out of the deal, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Penta said in a statement on Friday that
the talks failed "due to the time constraints and due to the very
different expectations of parties involved."

Bloomberg notes that the e-mailed statement said "Penta
Investments is declaring its readiness and willingness to submit a
competitive and binding offer" to Mr. Schmidt "for particular
assets of A-Tec in due course."

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, related that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
A-Tec said in an Oct. 20 statement that it had filed for self-
administered reorganization proceedings at the Vienna Commercial
Court and appointed trustees for bondholders, Bloomberg
disclosed.  The company has a EUR798 million (US$1.11 billion)
revolving credit facility and EUR302 million in outstanding
bonds, according to Bloomberg data.

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,
Austria.


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B E L A R U S
=============


* CITY OF MINSK: S&P Cuts Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Belarusian City of Minsk to 'B-' from 'B'.
"We also removed the rating from CreditWatch, where it was placed
with negative implications on May 30, 2011. The outlook is
negative," S&P stated.

"The rating action follows our lowering of the ratings on the
Republic of Belarus (see 'Ratings On Republic of Belarus Lowered
To 'B-/C' On Funding Access Uncertainty; Outlook Negative,' Sept.
26, 2011). We view the institutional framework for Belarusian
local and regional governments as centralized, and because of this
we cap the long-term rating on Minsk at the level of the long-term
sovereign rating on Belarus (see 'Methodology: Rating A Regional
Or Local Government Higher Than Its Sovereign,' Sept. 9, 2009).
Under our methodology we assess the indicative credit level for
Minsk as 'b+' (see 'Methodology For Rating International Local And
Regional Governments,' Sept. 20, 2010)," S&P stated.

"The rating on Minsk continues to reflect our view of the city's
very limited budget predictability and flexibility, its large
infrastructure needs, and high contingent liabilities. Factors
supporting the rating are the city's status as the country's
largest administrative, financial, and commercial center; its
consistently very strong operating surplus; moderate debt burden;
and good liquidity," S&P said.

"We believe that the institutional framework under which
Belarusian regional governments operate is very centralized and
evolving, which limits the predictability and flexibility of
Minsk's financial policy. The central government defines the
types, rates, and bases of most taxes, sets norms of regional
spending through established social standards, limits regions'
budget deficits, and authorizes all borrowings," according to S&P.

"As Belarus' largest administrative, financial, and commercial
center, Minsk is wealthy and diversified relative to other
Belarusian cities, and we expect this will continue to support its
budgetary performance. Despite ongoing economic difficulties, the
city's official unemployment rate is low and its estimated GDP per
capita exceeds the national average by 1.5x. In our base-case
scenario, we assume that the city's economy will achieve sluggish
growth of about 1%-2% per year in 2011-2013. Contrary to the
national trend, the city's population is increasing and Minsk is
the main focal point for investments in Belarus," S&P stated.

"As a result, we expect the city will demonstrate a consistently
very strong budgetary performance with solid self-funding, despite
rising personnel and interest spending. We project the city's
operating surplus as a percentage of operating revenues will stay
at about 23% in 2011-2013, compared with 30% on average in 2005-
2010," S&P stated.

"Nevertheless, we note that private investment in Minsk is
limited, compelling the city itself to maintain high capital
spending both directly and via municipal companies, which exposes
it to large contingent liabilities. It has also committed to an
ambitious housing construction program and large-scale
infrastructure improvements ahead of hosting the World Ice Hockey
Championship in 2014. In our base case, we forecast that rising
infrastructure needs will increase the city's deficit after
capital accounts as a percentage of total revenues to 2.5% on
average in 2011-2013, from 0.5% for 2010," S&P related.

"We believe, however, that Minsk's large debt-raising capacity
will help it absorb rising capital spending with only modest debt
accumulation. We expect the city's tax-supported debt to increase
from about 10% of consolidated operating revenues in 2009, but to
remain below a modest 40% until 2014. Owing to rigid limits on its
deficit, Minsk has incurred limited direct debt over the past five
years in the form of short-term loans from the central government
and a few domestic bonds. Instead, it has increased its borrowings
through municipal companies. Nonetheless, we expect debt
accumulation at these companies to slow over the medium term," S&P
stated.

"Minsk's liquidity position has a neutral impact on our rating
assessment despite a recently announced devaluation of the
Belarusian ruble (BYR), which increased the city's tax-supported
debt. Our assessment of liquidity balances on-average high cash
reserves and a large cash-flow-generation capacity with uncertain
access to external liquidity and a weak domestic banking system,"
S&P said.

"We expect the city's cash and deposit holdings to continue to
exceed its debt service, including the redemption of city-
guaranteed bank loans of municipal companies and leasing payments
of its transport company, over the next 12 months. As of July 1,
2011, the city's cash on accounts and term deposits reached BYR908
billion (about $100 million, if a post-devaluation BYR/USD rate is
applied) while debt service for the next 12 months amounts to
about BYR500 billion. We don't expect Minsk's debt service,
including interest payments and redemption of domestic bonds and
guaranteed loans, to exceed a modest 7% of operating revenues
until 2013," S&P said.

"We view Minsk's access to external liquidity as uncertain, given
the weaknesses of Belarus' domestic capital market and its banking
system, the BICRA score of which we assess as '9' (1 being the
highest, 10 the lowest; see 'Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessments,' May 9, 2011)," S&P related.

"The negative outlook on the rating reflects that on the ratings
on Belarus. We would lower the rating on Minsk if the sovereign
ratings were lowered. Even if the sovereign rating remains
unchanged, we could lower the rating on Minsk within the next 12
months in the unlikely event of a significant weakening of the
city's liquidity position. This could result from a rapid
accumulation of short-term foreign-currency debt, either directly
or via municipal companies, amid worsening borrowing conditions.
This could occur if the city had to enlarge its capital program
without adequate cofinancing from the central government," S&P
stated.

"We could raise the rating on Minsk, however, if we were to raise
the ratings on Belarus and if Minsk's strong budgetary performance
and solid liquidity position were maintained, along with slowing
debt accumulation, in line with our base-case scenario," S&P
added.


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


CESKE A SLOVENSKE: Deutsche Fachverlag Opts to Halt Operations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Czech Publishers Association has told CTK that Ceske a slovenske
odborne nakladatelstvi (CON) was scheduled to end its activities
on Sept. 30.

CON's chief executive Vladimir Plachy has confirmed the
information for CTK.  Mr. Plachy said the reason behind the
closure is the strategic decision of international publishing
group Deutsche Fachverlag of which CON is part, CTK notes.

Ceske a slovenske odborne nakladatelstvi publishes magazines Food
Service, Maso, Moderni obchod and Textil.


VIA VERA: Declared Bankrupt by Liberec Court
--------------------------------------------
CTK, citing, information from the insolvency register, reports
that the Regional Court in Liberec has declared Via Vera bankrupt.

According to CTK, creditors can lodge their claims by Oct. 23.
Court proceedings will take place on Dec. 19, CTK discloses.

Via Vera declared insolvency at the beginning of July after it
failed to pay for air transport of its clients from Greece and
Turkey, CTK relates.  The insolvency petition was filed by company
owner Vera Krebsova, who filed for bankruptcy at the same time,
CTK recounts.

Via Vera is a Czech Republic-based travel agency.


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D E N M A R K
=============


FJORDBANK MORS: Jykes Bank Acquires Parts of Business
-----------------------------------------------------
Christian Wienberg at Bloomberg News reports that Jyske Bank A/S
said it agreed to buy parts of Fjordbank Mors A/S.

According to Bloomberg, Jyske Bank takes over a customer portfolio
consisting of about 47,000 clients with total loans and advances
of about DKK2.7 billion and total deposits of about DKK3.7
billion.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 28,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Denmark's government agreed to
take over Fjordbank which had requested to be bailed out June 24
after facing higher writedowns on bad loans.

Fjordbank Mors A/S is a Nykoebing Mors, Denmark-based bank.  It
was formed November 2010 in a merger of Morsoe Sparekasse A/S and
Morsoe Bank A/S.


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E S T O N I A
=============


ONOFF ESTONIA: Acquired by Baltic Retail Group
----------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course reports that Baltic Retail Group, Dennis Thomas
Sven Jansen's company, has acquired Onoff Estonia.

Onoff belonged 100% to Onoff Sverige AB, which in July this year
submitted a bankruptcy application in Sweden that was satisfied,
The Baltic Course discloses.  A total of 30 stores were bought by
the Expert store chain, the rest were closed, The Baltic Course
recounts.

According to The Baltic Course, Onoff was sold to Baltic Retail
Group with all rights, including new store concept that will be
implemented in Estonia.  The new owners also bought the right to
expand to other Baltic states, The Baltic Course notes.

Onoff Estonia is a home appliance and technical goods store chain.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


FLEET STREET: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Fleet Street Finance Two plc, as
follows:

  -- EUR592.4m class A (XS0268932836) due 2014 affirmed at 'BBsf;
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR166.5m class B (XS0268933487) due 2014 affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR140.1m class C (XS0268934451) due 2014 affirmed at
     'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'

  -- EUR96.9m class D (XS0268934618) due 2014 affirmed at 'CCsf';
     Recovery Rating 'RR6'

The affirmation follows the issuer's announcement that the
Oberpollinger property in Munich, considered one of the trophy
assets, has been sold for EUR194 million.  This will result in a
EUR186.9 million prepayment to the loan after costs and senior
expenses have been deducted.  All proceeds will be allocated on a
fully sequential basis, which means the class A balance will be
reduced to EUR405.5 million from EUR592 million on the October
2011 interest payment date (IPD).

Given the prime nature of the collateral the price-which exceeds
not only the allocated loan amount but also the original valuation
-- is unsurprising given that financing and investor demand remain
for such assets. This is not true of secondary-tertiary
collateral, which makes up a significant portion of the overall
portfolio.  Therefore although Fitch considers the sale as
positive, it does not believe it necessarily implies improved
prospects, except perhaps for the class A noteholders.  However, a
rating cap of 'BBsf' was applied to this tranche at the time of
the last rating action (in recognition of structural concerns),
which accounts for the lack of positive rating action.


GEMS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on Two Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Provide GEMS 2002-1's Class C tranche
and affirmed all other tranches of the synthetic German RMBS
transaction, as follows:

  -- Class A+ (ISIN XS0145700398) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0145700471) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0145701289) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0145701792) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating revised to 'RR3' from 'RR2'

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0145701875) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR6'

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0145702170) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR6'

As of August 2011, EUR54.0 million of reference claims were
reported as outstanding credit events.  Historically, prior to
allocating losses incurred from liquidation of loans, a
significant portion of credit events have been found to be
ineligible for loss allocation, as such loans did not meet the
eligibility criteria.  At certain rating scenarios, Fitch has
assumed that a percentage of the current EUR54.0 million worth of
credit events will be removed.  In rating scenarios above 'Asf',
all loans are considered as being eligible for loss allocation.

The proportion of loans that meet the eligibility criteria has
shown an increasing trend over time.  In addition, as all loans in
the collateral pool are second-charge, loss severities have been
high. Since March 2009, loss severities on liquidated loans have
exceeded 100% for all interest payment dates, except for one.

These reasons, in conjunction with the fact that already EUR10.3m
of losses have been allocated to the EUR14m of class E notes, have
resulted in Fitch downgrading the class C tranche to 'CCsf', as
the likelihood of loss allocation has increased.

As the pool continues to delever at an annualized rate of between
19% and 26%, the proportion of the pool made up by outstanding
credit events has increased, and currently stands at 23.10%.
Consequently, Fitch expects that future losses will mostly be
driven by the current balance of outstanding credit events, with
additional losses from the performing balance of the portfolio
expected to be more moderate.

The Outlook for the class B notes remains Negative due to the
possibility that losses attributed to outstanding credit events
are higher than the agency expects.  In addition, over the past
year the percentage of the pool that consists of loans to self-
employed borrowers and loans on investment properties have
marginally increased.  In the past, these two characteristics have
made a proportionally greater contribution to liquidated claims.

In contrast, borrower affordability is likely to improve over the
next two years as 37.7% of loans are expected to reset, in the
current low interest rate environment.  Over the past year, the
weighted average interest rate of the underlying loans has reduced
by 29bps due to resets.


PROVIDE DOMICILE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
PROVIDE Domicile 2009-1 GmbH's class B and C notes. "At the same
time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A+, A, D, and E notes,"
S&P related.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction's
performance. Credit support is provided by subordination and a
synthetic excess spread mechanism," S&P said.

"As per the latest investor report for the July 5, 2011 interest
payment date (IPD), cumulative losses increased to EUR271,784, but
we consider this a low amount. Losses peaked on the April 2011
IPD, at EUR194,643--0.02% of the then-current outstanding pool
balance, which excess spread has been able to cover fully to date.
Excess spread in this transaction equals 25 basis points per year
on the performing balance of the portfolio. The performing balance
makes up about 99% of the total pool balance," S&P said.

The notes in the Provide Domicile 2009-1 transaction pay down
sequentially. Therefore, while the transaction amortizes and the
class A to E notes remained at the same size as at closing, credit
enhancement provided by subordination has increased for the class
A+, A, B, C, and D notes since then.

"We have also observed 90+ day delinquencies of between 0.37% and
0.41% from July 2010 to April 2011, before they jumped to 0.60% of
the current pool balance. We also observed delinquencies of up to
60 days, which are below 0.18% of the current pool balance.
Delinquencies of up to 30 days are below 0.33% of the current pool
balance. Credit events amount to EUR8,548,126, about 0.93% of the
current pool balance. Furthermore, the transaction's recovery rate
stands at about 67%," S&P stated.

"Considering realized losses and delinquencies to date, and taking
into account historical recovery rates in this particular
portfolio, we have assessed the likelihood of future losses for
both the performing and nonperforming parts of the collateral
pool," S&P related.

"Following our review, we have therefore raised our ratings on the
class B and C notes due to increased credit support provided by
the class D and E notes and available excess spread," S&P said.

"We have affirmed our ratings on the class A+, A, D, and E notes,
as we consider the current credit support to be commensurate with
the ratings on these notes," S&P said.

The pool factor in the PROVIDE Domicile 2009-1 transaction (i.e.,
the current balance divided by the original balance) is down to
59%. "We will continue to monitor the development of credit events
and actual losses in the transaction," S&P related.

PROVIDE Domicile 2009-1 is a synthetic, partially funded, German
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction.

Ratings List

Class              Rating
            To                 From

PROVIDE Domicile 2009-1 GmbH
EUR133.7 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AA+ (sf)           AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)            A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A+          AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A           AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)
D           BBB (sf)           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)            BB (sf)


PROVIDE VR: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
PROVIDE VR 2002-1's class B and C notes. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A+, A, D, and E notes," S&P
stated.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the performance of the
transaction, which has credit support in the form of
subordination," S&P related.

"Our analysis considered realized losses and delinquencies to date
and, taking historical recovery rates in this portfolio into
account, we have assessed the likelihood of future losses for both
the performing and nonperforming parts of the collateral pool,"
S&P stated.

"PROVIDE VR 2002-1 has shown what we consider to be a poor
performance since closing, mainly caused by high amounts of losses
being applied to the transaction and by a low recovery rate.
However, since our latest full review of the PROVIDE VR 2002-1
transaction (see 'Ratings Lowered On PROVIDE VR 2002-1's Class D
And E German RMBS Notes Following Further Increase Of Loss
Allocation,' published Sept. 8, 2010), credit enhancement provided
by subordination has increased for the class A+, A, B, and C
notes, due to amortization. As the notes pay down sequentially,
credit enhancement increases relatively for the remaining notes,
although losses diminishing the subordinated tranches lessen this
effect," S&P related.

"We have observed delinquencies of more than 90 days, with
reported levels of between 0.24% and 0.52% since 2008, and they
are currently 0.35% of the pool balance. Credit events are
currently at EUR5.5 million, equaling 4.51% of the current pool
balance, after the 4.81% high this year -- a jump from the 3.50%
to 4.11% range between 2008 and the end of 2010," S&P related.

"As per the latest investor report as of Aug. 16, 2011, cumulative
losses have increased to what we consider to be a high amount of
about EUR14.5 million. Since August 2010, credit enhancement
provided to the class D notes has further decreased due to
occurred losses diminishing the size of first line of defense, the
class E tranche. Over the past year, losses have diminished the
class E tranche to EUR1,110,650, equaling 34% of the tranche's
original size of EUR3,300,000. However, losses per interest
payment date have diminished in absolute numbers since then," S&P
stated.

The transaction's recovery rate is about 34%, caused by the
relatively high portion of second-ranking mortgages, which
currently amount to 86.0% of the pool, versus 92.5% at closing.
The performing balance has been relatively stable at about 95% of
the total pool balance in the past couple of years.

"Following our review, we have raised our ratings on the class B
and C notes to 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' because of the increased
credit support provided by the class D and E notes," S&P related.

"We have affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A+ and A
notes, and our 'CCC- (sf)' and 'D (sf)' ratings on the class D and
E notes because we consider the current credit enhancement to be
commensurate with the ratings on these notes," S&P stated.

"The remaining proportion of PROVIDE VR 2002-1's original
principal is down to 19%. We will continue to monitor the
development of credit events and actual losses in the
transaction," S&P stated.

PROVIDE VR 2002-1 is a synthetic, partially funded, German
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction.

Ratings List

                  Rating
Class       To               From

PROVIDE VR 2002-1
EUR115.45 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AAA (sf)         AA (sf)
C           AA (sf)          A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A+          AAA (sf)
A           AAA (sf)
D           CCC- (sf)
E           D (sf)


TS CO.MIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'Csf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed TS Co.mit One GmbH's class D, E and F
notes, as follows:

  -- EUR7.2m class D secured notes (ISIN: XS0261662091): affirmed
     at 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating (RR) revised to 'RR-4' from
     'RR-6'

  -- EUR8.9m class E secured notes (ISIN: XS0261662174): affirmed
     at 'Csf'; 'RR-6'

  -- EUR5.0m class F secured notes (ISIN: XS0261662257): affirmed
     at 'Csf'; 'RR-6'

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view of the high levels of credit
risk for the outstanding classes of notes.  As of the September
2011 reporting date, the current pool factor is 7.9% of the
initial pool balance of EUR503 million.  The principal deficiency
ledger balance is EUR14.7 million compared to EUR15.7 million at
the last rating action in November 2010.  Currently, 34 loans are
outstanding.  However, almost 84% of them by notional are in the
lowest-rated bucket,. i.e. assets with high risk profile.  In the
agency's view, given the high-risk profile of the outstanding
asset pool, the cash flows will not be sufficient to redeem class
E and class F notes.  Fitch believes that a default on these
classes appears inevitable.  Since class D is senior to class E
and class F, it will firstly receive cash flows from the asset
pool, however in the agency's view, a default of class D appears
probable.

Fitch has revised the RR for the class D notes to 'RR-4' from 'RR-
6', thus denoting average recovery prospects given default.  RR
are issued on a scale of 'RR1' (highest) to 'RR6' (lowest) to
denote the range of recovery prospects of notes rated at or below
'CCCsf'.

The transaction is a cash securitization of certificates of
indebtedness (Schuldscheindarlehen) of German SMEs.  The portfolio
companies were selected by Commerzbank AG ('A+'/Stable/'F1+'), the
originator and servicer of the transaction.


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G R E E C E
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ALPHA BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Transactions to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B2 (sf) from Ba3 (sf)
the ratings of three structured finance transactions originated by
Alpha Bank AE (Alpha, rated Caa2, Non-Prime): Irida Plc,
Katanalotika Plc and Epihiro Plc. A detailed list of the rating
actions is provided at the end of this press release.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades follow the September 23, 2011 downgrade of Greek
banks, including Alpha ("Moody's downgrades the ratings of Greek
banks, concluding review initiated 25 July 2011".) and concludes
the rating review for all three transactions.

Moody's had placed the ratings of all three transactions on review
for downgrade as a result of the rating review of Alpha due to
high rating linkage between these transaction and Alpha. This
follows transaction document amendments that resulted in higher
linkage between the rating of the notes in the affected
transactions and those of Alpha. Through amendments that were
executed on June 21, 2011 (Epihiro and Katanolotika), and
August 10, 2011 (Irida), the issuer accounts, including the
reserve funds, were moved to Alpha from Citibank (rated A1, Prime-
1).

Moody's rating approach has considered a similar probability of
default for the bank and for the notes in the three downgraded
transactions. However, the ratings of the notes are three notches
above the bank's rating, as they reflect a lower expected loss on
the notes resulting from their senior secured position. In
particular, Moody's has considered the large amount of credit
enhancement (40% to 50%) that supports the rated notes in these
transactions, mostly as a result of the subordination of junior
notes.

The considerations described in this press release complement the
applicable principal methodologies for each transaction.

The principal methodology used in rating Katanalotika PLC was
Moody's Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions
published in July 2011. The principal methodology used in rating
Epihiro PLC was Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate
Collateralized Synthetic Obligations published in September 2009.
The principal methodology used in rating Irida PLC was Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe published in February
2007. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a
copy of these methodologies.

LIST OF AFFECTED TRANSACTIONS BY RELEASING OFFICE

Releasing Office:

Moody's Investors Service Ltd.
One Canada Square
Canary Wharf
London E14 5FA
United Kingdom

Issuer: EPIHIRO PLC (Athena Project)

   -- EUR1623M Euro 1,623,000,000 Class A Asset Backed Floating
      Rate Notes due January 2035 Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Jul 29, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IRIDA PLC

   -- EUR261.1M A Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug
      18, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Remained On Review for
      Possible Downgrade

Releasing Office:

Moody's France SAS

96 Boulevard Haussmann

75008 Paris

France

Issuer: KATANALOTIKA PLC

   -- EUR1109.6M A Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
      Jul 29, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

The lead analyst and rating office for each of the transactions
affected are generally different from the contact and office
listed at the end of this press release.


* GREECE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 10 tranches of 5 asset-
backed security (ABS) transactions, 14 tranches of 8 residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions and confirmed the
ratings of 2 ABS and 7 tranches of 5 RMBS transactions, backed by
Greek assets and serviced by Greek entities. At the same time,
Moody's downgraded to Ba1(sf) from Baa1(sf) the senior note
ratings of two Greek ABS transactions serviced by Cypriot
entities. Moody's maintained on review for downgrade its rating on
one ABS and one CLO transaction. The highest rating achievable for
a Greek structured finance transaction remains Ba1(sf).

The ratings are positioned such that an orderly restructuring of
Greek government debt would likely have no further impact on the
Greek structured finance ratings, with the exception of the highly
linked transactions noted below.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions follow Moody's downgrade to Caa1 from B1 of the
Greek government debt rating on June 1, 2011 and, to a lesser
extent, the ratings of Greek banks that act as key transaction
parties to B3 from Ba3 on June 3, 2011.

On May 13, 2011, Moody's downgraded to Ba1(sf) all Greek
structured finance transactions serviced by Greek entities, as a
result of the increased likelihood of high severity events that
will weaken structured finance transactions.

These events include: (i) a severe macroeconomic decline that will
hurt asset performance; and (ii) deterioration in the
creditworthiness of a sovereign or local bank, which will increase
the operational risk of a disruption in the performance of banks
acting as key transaction parties. Regardless of the structural
features or the amount of credit enhancement in place, structured
finance transactions are not immune to the risk of these high
severity events.

Following the downgrade of the Greek government debt rating,
Moody's considers that such high severity events now have an
increased likelihood of occurring. This occurrence could affect
the structured finance transactions serviced by Greek banks, as
well as those directly serviced by Cypriot entities operating in
Greece, which are backed by Greek assets. As a result, Moody's has
downgraded the ratings of the notes of the two Cypriot ABS deals.

Moody's reviewed each structured finance rating by comparing the
level of available credit enhancement with the pool losses that
could occur under such high severity events. The loss levels
assumed are: 20% for RMBS; 40% for consumer ABS; and 45% for
SME/leases transactions.

Moody's maintained at Ba1(sf) notes with credit enhancement levels
above these thresholds, while downgrading others with lower credit
enhancement depending on the gap between their credit enhancement
level and the relevant threshold. For example, in the case of two
RMBS transactions, Moody's confirmed at Ba1(sf) the senior notes
from Themeleion I Mortgage Finance Plc, with 23.7% credit
enhancement; whereas Moody's downgraded to B1(sf) from Ba1(sf) the
senior notes issued by Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc, with 10.3%
credit enhancement.

Moody's downgraded by two to three notches, to Ba3(sf) or B1(sf),
transactions with high linkage to the credit quality of servicers
(e.g. where the issuer accounts are held in Greek banks). These
rating actions followed Moody's downgrade of the banks to B3 from
Ba3, depending on the level of credit enhancement.

Finally, Moody's has maintained on review for possible downgrade
the Ba1(sf) ratings of two transactions originated by Alpha Bank
S.A. (B3, Non-Prime), Katanalotika Plc and Epihiro Plc. The review
follows the announcement by the originator that it is considering
amendments that will weaken the transaction structures. Were they
enacted, these amendments would create a high linkage between the
bank rating and that of the transactions and would likely result
in a further downgrade of these two transactions.

The orderly restructuring of Greek government debt would likely
have no further impact on the Greek structured finance ratings,
with the exception of the highly linked transaction noted above.
Any downgrade to the bank ratings may also lead to further
downgrades of highly linked structured finance transactions. Notes
rated in the Ba(sf) category could potentially suffer a temporary
payment disruption, but would benefit from sufficient credit
enhancement to support the likely further asset performance
deterioration.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS AND PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The determination of the highest achievable ratings and minimum
credit enhancement requirements described above complement the
applicable principal methodologies for each asset class.

The principal methodology used in rating RMBS transactions was
Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and
Africa, published in October 2009. The principal methodology used
in rating Consumer ABS transactions was Moody's Approach to Rating
Consumer Loan ABS Transactions, published in July 2011. The
principal methodology used in rating ABS SME transactions was
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published
February 2007.

LIST OF AFFECTED SECURITIES

ABS TRANSACTIONS

Issuer: ANAPTYXI 2006-1 PLC

   -- EUR1750M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR150M B Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR125M C Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR225M D Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Axia Finance PLC

   -- EUR1408.75M A Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
      previously on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Axia III Finance Plc

   -- EUR1670.1M A Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: DANEION 2007-1 PLC

   -- EUR1587.5M Class A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);
      previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IRIDA PLC

   -- EUR261.1M A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under
      Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Misthosis Funding Plc

   -- EUR363.9M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: PRAXIS I FINANCE PLC

   -- EUR493M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Praxis II Finance Plc

   -- EUR379.2M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Synergatis Plc

   -- EUR1414.5M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on May 13, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Downgrade

RMBS TRANSACTIONS

Issuer: Estia Mortgage Finance II PLC

   -- EUR1137.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc

   -- EUR897.7M A Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR23.8M B Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR28.5M C Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: KION Mortgage Finance No. 2 Plc

   -- EUR522.405M A Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: KION Mortgage Finance Plc

   -- EUR28.2M B Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR18M C Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR553.8M A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under
      Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Themeleion II Mortgage Finance Plc

   -- EUR37.5M B Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR690M A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR22.5M C Certificate, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Themeleion III Mortgage Finance Plc S.r.I.

   -- EUR40M M Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR20M B Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR40M C Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR900M A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Themeleion IV Mortgage Finance Plc

   -- EUR155.5M B Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR1352.9M A Certificate, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously
      on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under
      Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR46.6M C Certificate, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Themeleion Mortgage Finance PLC

   -- EUR32M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR24.5M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR693.5M A Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
      May 13, 2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      for Possible Downgrade


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


EIRCOM GROUP: Sr. Lenders May Take 25% Stake in Debt-Equity Swap
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Brennan at Bloomberg News reports that Eircom Group Ltd. may
cede a quarter of its shares to first-lien lenders in a debt
restructuring of Ireland's biggest phone company.

According to Bloomberg, people familiar with the talks said that
as part of the debt-for-equity swap proposal, senior creditors
would agree to write off some of their EUR2.36 billion (US$3.2
billion) of holdings for a 15 to 25% stake.

Eircom, saddled with EUR3.75 billion of debt following five
ownership changes in the last 12 years, said Sept. 15 its senior
lenders agreed to waive debt terms for three months as it seeks to
restructure its balance sheet, Bloomberg recounts.  Bloomberg
notes that the people said the company, owned by Singapore
Technologies Telemedia Pte. and an employee trust, is pursuing in
excess of EUR1.3 billion of debt writedowns across its lenders.

The people said holders of payment-in-kind securities, owed EUR643
million, bondholders due EUR350 million of floating-rate notes and
second-lien creditors owed EUR350 million, will bear the brunt of
burden-sharing, Bloomberg relates.

Five people said Eircom may file for protection from creditors
through a pre-packaged administration in a U.K. court, a pre-
arranged plan between a company and certain creditors to
reorganize debt, according to Bloomberg.  Another option is Irish
examinership, where a company secures court protection for a
maximum of 100 days as it seeks to restructuring its debts,
Bloomberg states.  The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said that a
restructuring agreement may take months.

Two of the people said Eircom's owners are expected to inject new
equity of EUR250 million to EUR300 million into the company as
part of a debt agreement, Bloomberg notes.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BORMIOLI ROCCO: Moody's Rates EUR250-Mil. Notes Issuance at 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B1 rating to
the EUR250 million senior secured notes maturing in 2018 recently
issued by Bormioli Rocco Holdings S.A. The outlook on the rating
is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation confirms the
provisional rating assigned on July 22, 2011. The terms and
conditions of Bormioli's notes issuance are in line with what
Moody's expected in its last rating action. The notes proceeds
have been used to repay borrowings under the senior acquisition
bridge, certain other indebtedness and to cover transaction
related fees and expenses. The B1 rating of the notes is one notch
below the Ba3 corporate family rating given the structural
subordination to certain debt and debt-like claims at the
subsidiary level, relating in particular to the group's EUR15
million revolving credit facility, trade payables, leasing and
pension obligations.

The Ba3 corporate family rating reflects the limited cyclicality
of most of Bormioli's end markets, which should support fairly
stable profit margins with good visibility of future cash flow
generation. The business profile is further supported by
Bormioli's established market positions and long-standing customer
relationships in the pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and food &
beverage industry, as well as relatively high entry barriers.
Moody's also positively note the resiliency of the business
through the recent macroeconomic recession, driven by the non-
discretionary nature of most of the products as well as the
group's solid track record in managing volatile input.

The rating is constrained by: (i) Bormioli's limited size relative
and its narrow product focus, though with a solid portion of value
added products; (ii) the regional focus on the Southwestern
European market; as well as (iii) the price competitive nature of
the industry, with both suppliers and customers holding
considerable bargaining power. In addition, input price management
is deemed to be a major challenge, as only a minor part of
Bormioli's contracts contain automatic pass-through mechanisms,
leaving the group exposed to individual negotiations with its
customers to preserve profitability.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectation of a continued
path of profitability improvements on the back of organic growth
and an improved product mix, as well as through capitalizing on
past investment activity. This should enable Bormioli to maintain
leverage close to 3 times Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA with
EBIT/Interest coverage above 2x over the coming quarters. The
stable outlook is also based on Moody's expectation that Bormioli
preserves a sufficient liquidity cushion and on the absence of
material debt financed acquisitions and shareholder distributions.

Upwards pressure could build up if Bormioli were able to grow
profitability as evidenced by EBITDA margin in excess of 20% and a
reduction in leverage, including achieving a debt/EBITDA ratio
below 3x on a sustainable basis. However, an upgrade to Ba2 would
also require a further strengthening of the business profile
through an extension of the group's scale through anticipated
organic volume growth and a further diversification away from the
group's stronghold in Southwestern Europe.

We could consider downgrading Bormioli if the group's
profitability were to come under pressure, resulting in EBITDA
margins declining to the mid teens and negative free cash flow
generation. Also, leverage in terms of debt/EBITDA weakening
towards 4x could put pressure on the rating.

Assignments:

   Issuer: Bormioli Rocco Holdings S.A.

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned B1

The principal methodology used in rating Bormioli Rocco Holdings
S.A. was the Global Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and
Plastic Containers Industry Methodology published in June 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Bormioli is an Italy-based producer of glass and plastic packaging
products used in the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industry as well
as in the food & beverage industry. Bormioli is also a
manufacturer of glass tableware for home and professional use,
with strong brand recognition in Italy. Bormioli generated sales
of EUR531 million and a reported EBITDA of EUR85 million in 2010
in nine plants with around 2,500 staff.


COLOMBO SRL: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on Class C Floating-Rate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit rating on
Colombo S.r.l's class A2 notes to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'.

"The rating action reflects our downgrade of the Region of Emilia-
Romagna (A/Negative) (see 'Ratings On 11 Italian LRGs Lowered To
'A'; City of Turin Outlook To Neg On Italy Downgrade; All Outlooks
Are Negative,' published Sept. 23, 2011). Loans to this region
currently account for more than 60% of Colombo's collateral
portfolio," S&P stated.

"Given the transaction's reliance on cash flows from these loans,
it is our opinion that the ratings on the transaction's notes
should not be at a level higher than the region's long-term
rating, currently 'A'," S&P related.

"Therefore, we have lowered our rating on the class A2 notes
accordingly. The ratings on Colombo's other classes of notes are
not higher than that on the region of Emilia-Romagna and they
remain unchanged," S&P said.

Colombo is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed
by a portfolio of loans to Italian regions, provinces,
municipalities, and other public-sector entities. The transaction
closed in August 2001. "The issuer repaid the class A1 noteholders
in full in 2003; we consequently withdrew our rating on these
notes (see 'Three Ratings Lowered In Cash Flow CDO Deal
Colombo Cash Flow CDO, One Rating Corrected and Withdrawn,'
published Nov. 19, 2010)," S&P said.

Ratings List

Colombo S.r.l.
EUR394.449 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class            Rating
           To              From

Rating Lowered

A2         A (sf)          A+ (sf)

Ratings Unchanged

B          A- (sf)
C          BB (sf)


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Bonds Hit Record Low on Debt Restructuring Fears
----------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News reports that BTA Bank's bonds
tumbled to a record low on Sept. 29, suggesting investors are
pricing in the possibility that the Kazakh lender that defaulted
in 2009 will restructure its debt for a second time.

BTA's dollar bonds due 2018 fell to 45.167 cents on the dollar at
9:37 p.m. on Sept. 29 in Almaty, sending the yield 103 basis
points, or 1.03%, higher to a record 32.229%, Bloomberg relates.

The bank's foreign debt is trading near levels that its securities
due 2015 reached in February 2009 when the Kazakh government was
forced to bail out what was then the nation's biggest lender,
Bloomberg data show.  BTA, which was taken over by a state-run
fund, defaulted on US$12 billion of debt before winning 92%
creditor approval of a restructuring plan in May 2010, Bloomberg
recounts.  The 2018 dollar notes were issued as part of the
restructuring, Bloomberg notes.

"The market is pricing in the implied probability of another
restructuring," Bloomberg quotes Mikhail Nikitin, an analyst at
Moscow-based Renaissance Capital, as saying by e-mail.

According to Bloomberg, Deputy Chief Executive Officer Berik
Otemurat said by e-mail on Sept. 29 that the drop in BTA bond
prices mirrors a trend on securities of other Kazakh bank issuers.
"Speculations" about the bank's ability to make a loan repayment
of US$175 million on Friday have "exacerbated" the decline, Mr.
Otemura, as cited by Bloomberg, said, adding that "those fears are
groundless."  He said that BTA continues to meet all its
obligations and is prepared to make a US$175 million payment on
the trade-financing loan, Bloomberg notes.

                         About BTA Bank

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO --
http://bta.kz/-- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.

The BTA Group is one of the leading banking groups in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks in
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkey.  In addition, the Bank maintains representative offices in
Russia, Ukraine, China, the United Arab Emirates and the United
Kingdom.  The Bank has no branch or agency in the United States,
and its primary assets in the United States consist of balances in
accounts with correspondent banks in New York City.

As of November 30, 2009, the Bank employed 5,043 people inside
and 4 people outside Kazakhstan.  It has no employees in the
United States.  Most of the Bank's assets, and nearly all its
tangible assets, are located in Kazakhstan.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


SPIE BONDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive B2 ratings to
Spie BondCo 3 S.C.A. The ratings impacted are the corporate family
rating (CFR), the probability of default rating (PDR) and the
ratings to senior secured credit facilities. Moody's definitive
ratings are in line with the provisional ratings assigned on July
26, 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assignment of definitive ratings follows the closing of the
acquisition of Spie by a consortium led by Clayton, Dubilier &
Rice together with Axa Private Equity and Caisse de Depot et
placement du Quebec on 30 August 2011 and the receipt of final
documentation for the bank loans. The final terms of the bank
loans are in line with the drafts reviewed for the provisional
(P)B2 instrument rating assignment.

The acquisition was funded by a combination of senior secured bank
loans and a EUR375 million 1-year high yield bridge facility in
conjunction with EUR856 million equity. The senior secured bank
loans comprise a EUR200 million six-year amortizing Term Loan A; a
EUR585 million seven-year bullet Term Loan B1; a EUR200 million
six-year Revolving Credit Facility (partially undrawn at closing)
and a EUR100 million six-year Acquisition/Capex Facility
(undrawn). EUR250 million seven-year Term Loan B2 designated as a
back-stop facility for the company's program of receivables
securitization was cancelled at closing after the rollover of the
company's securitization program. The bridge facility is
subordinated to senior secured bank facilities and is expected to
be replaced with the issuance of high-yield unsecured notes,
currently delayed due to adverse market conditions. The terms of
the bridge facility contain an extension clause to 7-year
unsecured term loans which may, at the option of the lenders, be
converted into exchange notes.

The principal methodology used in rating Spie BondCo 3 S.C.A. was
the Global Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology
published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Spie is a leading independent provider of multi-technical
services, operating primarily in Europe. For the year ended
December 31, 2010, 66% of Spie's consolidated revenues were
generated in France, 25% were generated in the rest of Europe and
9% in over 20 countries. Spie's main activity (77% of 2010 sales)
is the provision of electrical, heating ventilation and air
conditioning ("HVAC") and mechanical engineering services to a
wide range of industrial, commercial and public sector companies
through its Multi-technical Regional Services division ("MRS").
Spie's other businesses (23% of 2010 sales) are spread across
three specialized markets and encompass services in the Oil & Gas,
Nuclear and Communications sectors.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brit Insurance Limited's (BIL) Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) rating at 'A' with a Stable Outlook.  The
agency has also affirmed Brit Insurance Holdings N.V.'s (BIHNV)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' with a Stable
Outlook and its subordinated notes at 'BB+'.

The affirmations and Stable Outlook reflect the group's solid
financial profile, which is supported by a strong level of risk-
adjusted capitalization and strong underlying earnings.

The group reported an overall profit before tax for H111 of GBP6.8
million (H110: GBP77.5 million), despite incurring substantial
catastrophe-related losses.  The reported combined ratio,
excluding FX effects, was 104.8% (H110: 96.5%) with a 15.5
percentage point impact from catastrophe claims (H110: 7.1
percentage points).  Fitch views as positive the fact that the
group reported an improvement in the attritional claims ratio of
3.5 percentage points to 58.6% over the same period.

Brit Insurance was acquired on 9 March 2011 by Achilles
Netherlands Holdings B.V, a holding company majority owned by
funds managed by Apollo Management VII, L.P. and funds advised by
CVC Capital Partners Ltd.  Fitch continues to monitor the post
acquisition profile of the group, specifically that the
consolidated group adjusted leverage is maintained below 30% and
that Fitch risk-adjusted capitalization remains at a level at
least commensurate with the current ratings.

Fitch views positively actions taken by management to streamline
its operations and reduce costs following the change in ownership,
with underlying management expenses falling by 11.8% to GBP75.4
million in H111.  In addition, Fitch understands that Brit intends
to outsource a number of its non-core back and middle office
functions.  The agency currently has a credit-neutral view on
this, although it could develop into a positive rating driver if
it successfully improves the group's profitability.

Key rating triggers for a downgrade include failure to maintain
consolidated group leverage and capitalization at levels at least
commensurate with the current ratings.  A change to a more
aggressive strategy resulting in a significant loss of insurance
business arising from the change in ownership would also be viewed
negatively.

Fitch views a rating upgrade as unlikely in the near term given
the expected weakening in the insurer's underwriting performance
in 2011 and low interest rate environment.  In a longer-term
perspective, key rating triggers for an upgrade would be a marked
and sustained improvement in earnings, coupled with capitalization
in excess of the current rating level.


CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Cadogan Square CLO II B.V.:

   -- EUR281.3M Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR31.5M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR33.8M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR31.9M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR27.9M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR10.6M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6M Class Y Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A3
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5.4M Class X Combination Notes due 2022, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class Y,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee.

The rating of Class X has been withdrawn as the notes have been
split back to its original components.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Cadogan Square CLO II B.V., issued in June 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Credit Suisse Alternative Capital, Inc. This transaction will be
in reinvestment period until August 12 2012. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in November 2009. The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
128.64%, 117.75%, 109.63% and 106.83% respectively, versus
September 2009 levels of 127.18%, 116.46%, 108.47% and 105.71%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Reported WARF has increased from 2902 to 2991 between September
2009 and August 2011. The change in reported WARF understates the
actual credit quality improvement because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities total
about EUR8.3 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
EUR13.9 million in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR446.4 million,
defaulted par of EUR8.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 22.06% (consistent with a WARF of 3031), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 44.55% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average
spread of 3.09%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 85% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent
with the midpoint between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and] 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 57% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction maturity such
an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the nature of the
asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
that of the liabilities.

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


EURO GALAXY: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Euro Galaxy II CLO BV:

Issuer: Euro Galaxy II CLO BV

   -- EUR275M (initial issuance amount; with current outstanding
      amount of EUR270.8M) Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR36M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR27.5M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR13.5M Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class P Combination Note, Withdrawn (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

The withdrawal of the rating of Class P Combination Notes follows
the exchange of the EUR5M Class P Combination Notes for its
corresponding components in March 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Euro Galaxy II CLO BV, issued in July 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by Pinebridge.
This transaction will be in reinvestment period until 29 Oct 2014.
It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in November 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in November 2009. The Class B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
126.76%, 116. 33%, 109.77% and 105.74%, respectively, versus
October 2009 reported levels of 122,15%, 112.22%, 105.96% and
102.12%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance. Following the next payment date in
October 2011 a turbo repayment feature on Class E will become
effective. This feature will allow to divert 50% of the excess
interest proceeds available in order to redeem the outstanding
amount of Class E upon a breach of the Class E
overcollateralization test.

Improvement in credit quality is observed through a better average
credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In particular, as of
the latest trustee report dated August 2011, the WARF is currently
2834 compared to 2900 in the October 2009 report, and securities
rated Caa or lower make up approximately 5.52% of the underlying
portfolio versus 8.37%% in October 2009; However, the reported
WARF understates the actual improvement in credit quality because
of the technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on
September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR387.87
million, defaulted par of EUR3.68 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.63% (consistent with a WARF of 2856), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.27% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted
average spread of 2.89%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 98% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3) Collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest and
the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral quality
metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels. Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming the covenanted value of 38 for the
diversity score and assuming a lower proportion of senior secured
corporate assets in the portfolio. As part of the base case,
Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels
due to the large difference between the reported and covenant
levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


WOOD STREET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Wood Street CLO 1 B.V.:

   -- EUR36M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded
      to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR29.925M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR27.75M Class D1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR1.5M Class D2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10.575M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M (Rated Outstanding Balance EUR3.245M) Class Y
      Combination Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M (Rated Outstanding Balance EUR3.290M) Class Z
      Combination Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12M Class X Combination Notes, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class Y,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. For Classes W and Z the 'Rated
Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the
Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee.

The Class R Combination Notes are backed by French government
securities.

The rating of the Class X Combination Notes has been withdrawn due
to the class's exchange for its components.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Wood Street CLO 1 B.V., issued in September 2005, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 22 November 2011. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in December 2009. The Class AB, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
128.0%, 117.6%, 108.9%, and 106.1%, respectively, versus November
2009 levels of 125.4%, 115.3%, 106.9%, and 104.2%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance. None of the classes is deferring interest.

Reported WARF has increased from 2,670 to 2,888 between November
2009 and August 2011.

However, this reported WARF change mostly reflects the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010. Additionally, there are currently no
defaulted securities in the portfolio compared to EUR19.7 million
in November 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR443.7 million,
no defaulted assets, a weighted average default probability of
20.55% (consistent with a WARF of 2,931), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 46.2% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average spread of
3.24%. The default probability is derived from the credit quality
of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining
life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be
realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target
rating, Moody's assumed that 91.06% of the portfolio exposed to
senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default,
while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would
recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
modelled the transaction at its covenanted values and analyzed the
impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent with the
midpoint between reported and covenanted values and a diversity
between midpoint and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy, and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's notes that around 49% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors
bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress applicable
to concentrated pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach
to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published
in October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Deleveraging: A source of uncertainty in this transaction is
the pace at which the transaction will deleverage from unscheduled
principal proceeds. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


SEVAN MARINE: Teekay to Acquire Equity Stake & Three Vessels
------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Treloar and Eduard Gismatullin at Bloomberg News report
that Sevan Marine ASA agreed to sell an equity stake and three of
its vessels to Teekay Corp. as the company seeks to avoid
bankruptcy.

According to Bloomberg, Sevan Marine said on Friday in a statement
that Teekay will buy a "significant" stake through new shares.
The company, as cited by Bloomberg, said, Teekay will acquire
three floating production, storage and offloading units, their
charter contracts and finance the completion of the Sevan Voyageur
upgrade.  Hamilton, Bermuda-based Teekay said in a separate
statement that financial terms are expected to be released this
week, Bloomberg notes.

"The proposed transaction with Teekay represents a good solution
for all stakeholders," Bloomberg quotes Sevan Marine Chief
Executive Officer Carl Lieungh as saying in the statement.  "We
will also preserve our leading engineering and design capabilities
and intellectual property."

The agreement is subject to approval by Sevan bondholders,
shareholders and leaseholders, Bloomberg states.

Sevan Marine ASA is a Norwegian maker of floating oil-production
and storage vessels.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SIBERIAN COAL: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service raised the corporate family rating (CFR)
of Siberian Coal Energy Company OJSC to Ba3 from B1 and similarly
raised the rating for the company's RUR10 billion 9.35% Russian
Rouble Bonds to Ba3 (LGD4, 50%) from B1. The rating outlook is
stable. The upgrade was triggered by steadily improving financial
metrics, primarily as a result of strong Asian thermal coal
markets, and the company's recent de-merger of its power assets
and related corporate restructuring, which simplified its business
profile and ownership structure.

RATINGS RATIONALE

SUEK's Ba3 CFR reflects: 1) the company's role as a leading global
thermal coal producer; 2) its competitive operating costs; 3) vast
coal reserves and relatively simple geology; 4) a well-diversified
domestic and international customer base; 5) the stability of its
domestic sales due to the proximity of its mines to its power
generation customers and the essential nature of electricity; 6)
its control over a considerable portion of its transportation
infrastructure such that it is positioned to move coal efficiently
to the Pacific and European export markets; and 7) Moody's
expectation that it will expand its export sales without adding
additional debt, thus maintaining or improving its debt protection
measures.

At the same time, the Ba3 CFR reflects: 1) SUEK's increasing
exposure to volatile international coal prices and 2) to a lesser
extent, international freight rates; 3) the uncertainty
surrounding the lessening of Russia's subsidy of natural gas
prices, which favors natural gas over coal and other fuels for
electricity generation; 4) inefficiencies and capacity limitations
on the Russian rail network which could be a bottleneck and
require higher investments by the company; 5) a high degree of
refinancing risk over the next two years; 6) foreign exchange
risk; and 7) the ongoing need for the company to participate in
competitive auctions for new and expansion-related mining
licenses.

The stable rating outlook acknowledges SUEK's low-cost operations,
the stability associated with the domestic electric power
industry, the synergistic relationship SUEK has with many of its
domestic customers given the location of its mines, and Moody's
expectation that SUEK can finance its internal growth without
adding additional debt. A further upgrade would require the
continuation of recent operating performance -- unit cost and
operating margins -- while demonstrating the ability to
consistently achieve a ratio of CFO less dividends to debt in the
mid-to-high 20% range and hold debt to EBITDA leverage below 2.0x.

The Ba3 rating on the 9.35% Russian Rouble Bonds issued by SUEK
Finance reflects the benefit provided by a suretyship provided by
SUEK OJSC, the Bonds' pari passu ranking with SUEK's other senior
unsecured indebtedness, and the preponderance of similarly-ranked
debt in SUEK's capital structure. Moody's notes that the
suretyship provided carries the risks associated with the
developing nature of Russian legislation and the short history of
Russian Commercial Law.

The principal methodology used in rating Siberian Coal Energy
Company (SUEK), OJSC was the Global Mining Industry Methodology
published in May 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S.,
Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

SUEK is the largest thermal coal producer in Russia and among the
top 10 thermal coal exporters worldwide. The company has 5.9
billion tonnes of proved and probable coal reserves and operates
29 mines in seven geographic regions in Siberia and the Russian
Far East. In addition, the company owns rail infrastructure and a
coal terminal at the Vanino port. In 2010, it produced
approximately 89 million tonnes of coal utilizing high
productivity open pit (68% of 2010 production) and underground
(32%) methods. In 2010, coal exports represented 32% of SUEK's
tonnage and 63% of its coal revenues. Effective 30 April 2011, the
power generating assets of SUEK were de-merged from the coal
mining assets and, subsequently, the shareholding and legal
structure of the company simplified. In the first 6 months of
2011, sales from the "continuing operations" of SUEK were RUR82
billion (US$2.9 billion). The company's principal owners are
Messrs Andrey Melnichenko and Sergey Popov.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


* CITY OF DNIPROPETROVSK: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its issuer credit rating
on the Ukrainian City of Dnipropetrovsk to 'B' from 'B-' and its
Ukraine national scale rating to 'uaA-' from 'uaBBB-'. The outlook
is stable.

The rating actions reflect Dnipropetrovsk's cautious spending
growth under stronger revenues, supported by sovereign government
grants, as well as its still conservative approach to debt
accumulation and very modest to zero debt service over the next
two to three years.

The ratings reflect Ukraine's very weak public finance system,
resulting in the city's low financial flexibility and
predictability, material contingent liabilities related to
municipal utilities, and concentrated economy. These constraints
are mitigated by Dnipropetrovsk's zero to modest debt burden over
the next two to three years, stronger financial support from the
central government, and wealth levels that are higher than
Ukraine's average.

"The central government's control over the lion's share of the
city's revenues and expenditures and what we consider to be
Ukraine's volatile and underfunded system of public finance
significantly reduce Dnipropetrovsk's financial predictability and
flexibility," S&P stated.

Stronger operating grants from the central government, higher tax
receipts because of economic recovery, and the positive
contribution of new Ukrainian budget legislation all supported
Dnipropetrovsk's strong operating performance in the first half of
2011.

"Despite the improved revenue flow, the city's recently reelected
management has demonstrated adherence to cautious spending
policies. This will likely result in strong, although volatile,
operating margins exceeding 5% of operating revenues in the medium
term. The central government's willingness and ability to support
Dnipropetrovsk's vital infrastructure projects -- such as the
construction of highways and underground transport systems -- will
result in stronger capital revenues and only modest deficits of
just over 5% after capital accounts, in our view," S&P stated.

"Subject to the approval of the central government, the city's
tax-supported debt might somewhat increase in the medium term.
This is because the city plans to coguarantee a EUR236 million
loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD; AAA/Stable/A-1+) to the municipal metro company. However,
according to our base-case scenario, the city's total debt, which
includes the debt of non-self-supporting municipal companies and
an existing guarantee against an EBRD loan to the water utility,
is not likely to exceed 30% of consolidated operating revenues by
2013. This is because the EBRD projects are to be implemented in
stages, with a very gradual withdrawal of funds," S&P stated.

"The stable outlook indicates our expectation that, under our
base-case scenario, the city's adherence to cautious expenditure
policies and stronger central-government support are likely to
result in operating surpluses exceeding 5% and only modest
deficits after capital accounts over the medium term. This is
despite existing spending pressures. The outlook also factors in
the city's very low tax-supported debt and debt service in 2011-
2013," S&P stated.

Negative rating actions could follow if operating expenditures,
weaker revenues, or the municipal companies' financial position
put additional stress on the city's operating performance,
resulting in persistent operating deficits in the medium term.
"Another possible reason for a negative action would be debt
accumulation exceeding the levels envisaged in our base-case
scenario, resulting in refinancing risks," S&P said.

"We would consider positive rating actions if the city's budgetary
performance strengthened, in line with our upside scenario, in
particular, if combined with better visibility on the municipal
companies' payables. In the longer term, positive rating actions
will likely depend on the institutionalization of debt and
liquidity policies, coupled with improvements in Ukraine's
institutional framework," S&P added.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


GALERIE 69: Goes Into Administration, Shuts Stores
--------------------------------------------------
thisishullandeastriding.co.uk reports that Galerie 69 in Hull city
centre closed without warning last month, has gone into
administration, leaving customers fearing they may be left out of
pocket.

Galerie 69 owner Stephen Tarran has told the Mail he has no choice
but to put the company into administration after failing to secure
the support of his bank, according to the news agency.

"Unfortunately, due to the bank not helping us, we have had to
start the process of administration. . . . We have done as many
orders as we can, but anyone still without their furniture will
have to go through the administrators.  There is a three-week wait
before they will be appointed. . . . It's a really sad state of
affairs.  Our orders had just been improving, but we have been
squeezed by our bank. . . . I am still trying to find out what
other orders are coming through and we are still trying to contact
some people. . . . Those who paid by credit card will be able to
claim the money back but, for anyone else still out of pocket, I'm
afraid it will be in the hands of the administrators," Mr. Tarran
quoted thisishullandeastriding.co.uk as saying.

Galerie 69, based in Wright Street, has been around for 100 years
in one form or another and has been in the Tarran family for more
than 30 years.


MOTORAUCTIONS LEEDS: Administrators Battle to Sell Firm
-------------------------------------------------------
Yorkshire Post reports that Motorauctions Leeds has gone into
administration after 25 years of trading amid fears that a buyer
may not be found to take on the business.

Motorauctions Leeds is understood to have debts "in the high six
figures" and made 25 full and part-time staff redundant earlier
this month, according to Yorkshire Post.

Company directors called in administrators Begbies Traynor
following the loss of several commercial contracts.

Yorkshire Post notes that company spokeswoman said that no buyer
had been found for the business but there had been "substantial
interest" in Motorauctions Leeds' premises on Hillidge Road, close
to the M621.  That site is now likely to be sold separately from
the auction business, the report relates.

Yorkshire Post discloses that it is not known how many creditors
are owed money by the firm.

"The statement of affairs listing the assets and liabilities has
yet to be completed, but the management accounts suggest
liabilities will be in the high six digits. . . .At this stage it
is not known how that is broken down," Yorkshire Post quoted the
administrators' spokeswoman as saying.

There are concerns that car dealers whose vehicles were sold but
not paid for could lose money as a result of the firm going into
administration, Yorkshire Post says.

Motorauctions Leeds was an independent firm set up in 1986.  It
used to hold four car auction sales a week and fortnightly 4X4
sales along with dedicated fleet car sales for businesses.


NDS GROUP: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to US$15MM Credit Facility
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive Ba2 rating to the
US$75 million revolving credit facility (RCF), EUR183 million Term
Loan A and US$800 million Term Loan B raised by NDS Finance Ltd.
and its subsidiaries, NDS Holdings (Europe) Ltd. and NDS Treasury
(Americas), LLC.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The final terms of the facilities are in line with the drafts
reviewed for the provisional ratings assignments.

The principal methodology used in rating NDS Group Ltd. was the
Global Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology
published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

NDS is a leading provider of Pay-TV content security and delivery
services. NDS's systems enable Pay-TV operators to offer features
such as Digital Video Recorders, Electronic Programme Guides,
Video-on-Demand and "Over-the-Top" technologies such as internet
television. NDS is majority owned by private equity fund Permira
with 50.5% of the shares, News Corp. owning 48.5% and management
1%.


RAEBURN HOUSE: Goes Into Administration, Ceases Trading
-------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Raeburn House Hotel has gone into
administration and appointed Blair Nimmo and Tony Friar of KPMG as
joint administrators.

The owner's plan with Edinburgh Academicals Rugby Club to lease
extra ground to develop the hotel and build a new sports pavilion
and club house will not be pushed through.

"The Raeburn ceased trading approximately six years ago and since
then has been exploring opportunities to reinvent itself. . . .
Unfortunately the current climate limits developers undertaking
schemes similar to those envisaged by the Raeburn and Edinburgh
Academicals Rugby Club. . . . The Raeburn is located in a much
sought after location in the Stockbridge area of Edinburgh which
we are hopeful will attract prospective purchasers," BBC News
quoted Blair Nimmo, head of restructuring for KPMG in Scotland, as
saying.

The Edinburgh Academicals Rugby Club, formed in 1857, and is the
second oldest rugby football club in the world.

Raeburn House Hotel is an Edinburgh hotel beside Scotland's oldest
rugby club.


RANGERS FC: Will Go Into Administration, Owner Says
---------------------------------------------------
stv reports that Rangers Football Club PLC owner Craig Whyte has
said it is "obvious" the club will go into administration if they
lose the tax case, but insists the club will not go under.

Mr. Whyte told the Daily Telegraph newspaper in an interview that
he has ambition to take Rangers out of the Scottish Premier League
to secure the club's long-term sustainability, according to stv.

The report notes that Mr. Whyte believes the Glasgow club will win
the case against the Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs in
November, but administration would probably happen if they don't.

Asked about administration, which would mean an automatic ten-
point penalty in the SPL, he told the newspaper: "It is one of the
possibilities we have looked at, yes.  The choice, in terms of an
adverse finding, is pretty obvious really. . . . Whatever happens
Rangers will be moving forward.  I will not allow the club to go
bust. I can control the debt process absolutely, and whatever
happens Rangers is going to be there playing in the SPL at Ibrox,"
stv discloses.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 19,
2010, Goal.com, citing The Scotsman, said that Rangers Football
could be forced into administration with debts as high as GBP80
million after being hit with a GBP24 million tax bill.  According
to the report, the fine, handed by HM Revenue & Customs after an
investigation into offshore payments made to players during the
past decade, coupled with interest of GBP12 million, could reach
up to GBP54 million.  The report noted, The Scotsman said a source
from the club indicated that: "We're already struggling to pay
GBP30 million we owe the bank.  Another GBP50 million could tip us
in to the abyss of administration, the report added.

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 26 to September 30, 2011
---------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer               Coupon   Maturity  Currency   Price
------               ------   --------  --------   -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT       5.470  8/28/2013      EUR    61.50
BA CREDITANSTALT       5.000  3/22/2029      EUR    68.89
BAWAG                  5.430  2/26/2024      EUR    67.81
BAWAG                  5.400  2/12/2023      EUR    70.73
BAWAG                  5.310  2/12/2023      EUR    70.19
ERSTE GROUP            5.000  9/30/2019      EUR    75.46
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.270   4/7/2028      EUR    63.50
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.250 10/27/2015      EUR    63.75
IMMOFINANZ             4.250   3/8/2018      EUR     3.34
OBEROSTERR LB          5.000 10/28/2037      EUR    70.64
OBEROSTERR LB          5.000 10/24/2036      EUR    70.89
OBEROSTERR LB          5.000  4/25/2037      EUR    70.76
OBEROSTERR LB          5.000 10/22/2035      EUR    71.18
OBEROSTERR LB          5.000  4/23/2036      EUR    71.03
OESTER VOLKSBK         5.270   2/8/2027      EUR    58.95
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.810  7/29/2025      EUR    60.50
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.170  7/29/2015      EUR    63.38
RAIFF LB OBEROST       4.620  9/17/2030      EUR    63.72
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.730 12/11/2023      EUR    72.88
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.500 12/29/2023      EUR    71.06
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        4.500  9/28/2035      EUR    52.82
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.470  2/28/2028      EUR    66.44

BELARUS
-------
REPUBLIC OF BELA       8.950  1/26/2018      USD    71.12
REPUBLIC OF BELA       8.750   8/3/2015      USD    71.74

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP         4.000   6/1/2016      EUR    19.91
IDEAL STANDARD        11.750   5/1/2018      EUR    72.34
IDEAL STANDARD        11.750   5/1/2018      EUR    72.38
ONTEX IV               9.000  4/15/2019      EUR    72.51
ONTEX IV               9.000  4/15/2019      EUR    72.63

CYPRUS
------
AVANGARDCO INVES      10.000 10/29/2015      USD    76.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.500  8/25/2021      EUR    73.44
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.000   6/9/2021      EUR    71.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.350   6/9/2020      EUR    70.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.100  4/20/2020      EUR    74.92
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.625   2/3/2020      EUR    65.59
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.100  6/24/2019      EUR    74.62
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600  2/26/2019      EUR    67.37
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600 10/23/2018      EUR    67.47
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600  4/23/2018      EUR    67.84
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.100  1/29/2018      EUR    70.24
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500  9/28/2017      EUR    68.21
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.600  4/15/2017      EUR    71.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500   4/2/2017      EUR    69.06
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500   1/4/2017      EUR    69.41
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500  10/9/2016      EUR    69.81
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500  7/11/2016      EUR    70.36
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.000   6/9/2016      EUR    71.27
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500   6/2/2016      EUR    70.37
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500  3/30/2016      EUR    71.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500  2/15/2017      EUR    69.21
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.750  12/2/2015      EUR    72.48
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       3.750  11/1/2015      EUR    69.99
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.750  9/30/2015      EUR    73.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500   1/2/2016      EUR    71.64
MARFIN POPULAR         4.350 11/20/2014      EUR    53.75

DENMARK
-------
FIN-DANISH IND         4.910   7/6/2021      EUR    73.63
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500 12/14/2020      ZAR    44.97

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500 11/25/2020      ZAR    48.23
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.250  6/28/2040      CAD    24.52
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500  3/17/2025      CAD    61.79
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500  4/27/2018      ZAR    58.68
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000  6/30/2017      ZAR    65.47
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500  4/26/2016      ZAR    71.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   2/9/2016      ZAR    73.07

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM         4.970   4/1/2015      EUR    11.39
ALCATEL-LUCENT         5.000   1/1/2015      EUR     3.22
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG       6.720   1/1/2015      EUR     4.60
ASSYSTEM               4.000   1/1/2017      EUR    20.11
ATOS ORIGIN SA         2.500   1/1/2016      EUR    49.45
AXA SA                 5.250  4/16/2040      EUR    71.79
BNP PARIBAS            2.890  5/16/2036      JPY    69.65
CALYON                 6.000  6/18/2047      EUR    15.87
CALYON                 5.800 10/29/2029      USD    69.84
CAP GEMINI SOGET       3.500   1/1/2014      EUR    37.49
CAP GEMINI SOGET       1.000   1/1/2012      EUR    41.96
CGG VERITAS            1.750   1/1/2016      EUR    25.00
CLUB MEDITERRANE       6.110  11/1/2015      EUR    18.03
CLUB MEDITERRANE       5.000   6/8/2012      EUR    12.93
CMA CGM                8.500  4/15/2017      USD    40.83
CMA CGM                8.875  4/15/2019      EUR    40.67
CMA CGM                8.875  4/15/2019      EUR    40.47
CMA CGM                8.500  4/15/2017      USD    80.35
CNP ASSURANCES         6.000  9/14/2040      EUR    71.70
CALYON FIN GUER        6.000   9/4/2029      USD    70.71
CREDIT AGRICOLE        5.600  2/25/2030      USD    67.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300  10/7/2030      USD    63.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300 10/12/2030      USD    61.09
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.250 10/18/2030      USD    62.91
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300 10/22/2030      USD    63.40
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.350 10/29/2030      USD    63.69
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.910  11/3/2030      USD    60.67
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.450  11/9/2030      USD    64.56
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.080 11/23/2030      USD    61.13
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.690 11/26/2030      USD    66.77
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.400  12/9/2030      USD    63.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.000 12/23/2030      USD    66.89
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.050  1/14/2031      USD    69.89
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.950  1/19/2031      USD    68.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.150  2/11/2031      USD    70.46
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.220  3/17/2031      USD    71.23
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.880   4/8/2031      USD    69.37
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850  5/27/2031      USD    67.49
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.650  6/10/2031      USD    65.61
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.610  6/15/2031      USD    65.21
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.830  6/30/2031      USD    67.24
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.270   8/5/2030      USD    63.34
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850  6/30/2031      USD    67.43
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.850  9/17/2030      USD    59.14
CREDIT LOCAL FRA       3.750  5/26/2020      EUR    63.34
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.550   4/2/2020      EUR    68.24
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.110  9/18/2018      EUR    71.41
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       5.037   8/4/2020      EUR    69.94
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.500  2/25/2020      EUR    67.88
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       1.000 12/23/2024      EUR    57.59
EURAZEO                6.250  6/10/2014      EUR    55.23
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375  4/15/2018      EUR    59.13
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375  4/15/2018      EUR    59.32
FAURECIA               4.500   1/1/2015      EUR    21.13
FONCIERE REGIONS       3.340   1/1/2017      EUR    73.30
GROUPAMA SA            7.875 10/27/2039      EUR    39.70
INGENICO               2.750   1/1/2017      EUR    42.30
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125  7/31/2015      EUR    15.52
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125  7/31/2014      EUR    16.98
NEXANS SA              4.000   1/1/2016      EUR    57.77
ORPEA                  3.875   1/1/2016      EUR    43.59
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875   6/1/2018      EUR    66.75
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875   6/1/2018      EUR    66.99
PEUGEOT SA             4.450   1/1/2016      EUR    25.22
PUBLICIS GROUPE        1.000  1/18/2018      EUR    47.67
PUBLICIS GROUPE        3.125  7/30/2014      EUR    34.35
SOC AIR FRANCE         2.750   4/1/2020      EUR    20.35
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860  4/26/2031      USD    66.70
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.920  3/17/2031      USD    67.02
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.910  3/16/2031      USD    66.93
SOCIETE GENERALE       6.010  3/15/2031      USD    67.87
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.940  3/14/2031      USD    67.22
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860  3/11/2031      USD    66.44
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.900  3/10/2031      USD    66.86
SOITEC                 6.250   9/9/2014      EUR     7.74
TEM                    4.250   1/1/2015      EUR    52.17
THEOLIA                2.700   1/1/2041      EUR     9.99

GERMANY
-------
BAYERISCHE HYPO        5.000 12/21/2029      EUR    68.99
BAYERISCHE LNDBK       4.500   2/7/2019      EUR    75.00
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.450  2/20/2023      EUR    68.89
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.640  1/30/2024      EUR    67.57
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.600  4/14/2023      EUR    69.71
COMMERZBANK AG         6.360  3/15/2022      EUR    65.84
COMMERZBANK AG         6.300  3/15/2022      EUR    65.69
COMMERZBANK AG         6.460  6/24/2022      EUR    65.93
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000  4/20/2018      EUR    28.69
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000  3/30/2018      EUR    28.70
COMMERZBANK AG         4.000 11/30/2017      EUR    29.02
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000 10/30/2017      EUR    73.13
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.000   6/1/2031      USD    75.63
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.050  3/10/2031      USD    73.43
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.010  3/11/2031      USD    72.99
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.080  3/14/2031      USD    73.74
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.000  7/21/2033      USD    73.37
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       4.750 12/16/2030      USD    72.50
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.120  3/15/2031      USD    75.43
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.140   3/3/2031      USD    75.71
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.050  3/16/2031      USD    74.65
DEUTSCHE BK SING       4.860  6/30/2031      USD    71.56
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN       5.300 11/20/2023      EUR    69.37
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.350  6/13/2028      EUR    63.85
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.160  8/14/2024      EUR    65.64
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.700  7/31/2023      EUR    59.44
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.375   5/8/2018      EUR    74.69
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.180  2/28/2023      EUR    61.80
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.210  6/20/2022      EUR    64.63
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.290  5/31/2021      EUR    61.70
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.550  4/14/2020      EUR    71.63
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.000  2/25/2020      EUR    69.26
EUROHYPO AG            5.110   8/6/2018      EUR    66.38
EUROHYPO AG            6.490  7/17/2017      EUR     4.63
EUROHYPO AG            3.830  9/21/2020      EUR    53.00
EUROHYPO AG            5.560  8/18/2023      EUR    56.00
GOTHAER ALLG VER       5.527  9/29/2026      EUR    68.41
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750 10/15/2017      USD    68.63
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750 10/15/2017      USD    75.00
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500  5/15/2018      EUR    63.83
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500  5/15/2018      EUR    63.38
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250  4/15/2018      EUR    60.50
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250  4/15/2018      EUR    60.71
HSH NORDBANK AG        4.375  2/14/2017      EUR    50.60
L-BANK FOERDERBK       0.500  5/10/2027      CAD    54.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT        5.250 10/20/2015      EUR    28.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.800  2/23/2037      JPY    70.31
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN       5.875  2/10/2016      EUR    65.25
Q-CELLS                6.750 10/21/2015      EUR     1.21
QIMONDA FINANCE        6.750  3/22/2013      USD     1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK       6.600  5/29/2022      EUR    64.38
SOLARWORLD AG          6.375  7/13/2016      EUR    65.01
SOLARWORLD AG          6.125  1/21/2017      EUR    61.13
STYROLUTION GRP        7.625  5/15/2016      EUR    72.81
TAG IMMO AG            6.500 12/10/2015      EUR     7.68
TUI AG                 2.750  3/24/2016      EUR    34.08
TUI AG                 5.500 11/17/2014      EUR    51.22

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN       5.008  7/18/2017      EUR    38.72
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.851  9/19/2016      EUR    38.25
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.301  8/12/2014      EUR    38.31
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.057  3/26/2013      EUR    49.23
HELLENIC RAILWAY       4.500  12/6/2016      JPY    39.82
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.900  7/25/2025      EUR    25.50
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.300  7/25/2030      EUR    27.72
HELLENIC REPUB         2.125   7/5/2013      CHF    52.63
HELLENIC REPUB         5.200  7/17/2034      EUR    32.13
HELLENIC REPUB         6.140  4/14/2028      EUR    34.00
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000  3/11/2019      EUR    38.00
HELLENIC REPUB         4.590   4/8/2016      EUR    36.88
HELLENIC REPUB         4.625  6/25/2013      USD    52.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300  3/20/2012      EUR    57.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250  5/18/2012      EUR    51.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250  6/20/2012      EUR    71.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI       1.000  6/30/2012      EUR    69.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.100  8/20/2012      EUR    49.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.506  3/31/2013      EUR    46.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600  5/20/2013      EUR    46.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI       7.500  5/20/2013      EUR    50.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.900   7/3/2013      EUR    45.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.427  7/31/2013      EUR    42.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.000  8/20/2013      EUR    44.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.520  9/30/2013      EUR    44.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500  1/11/2014      EUR    42.34
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500  5/20/2014      EUR    41.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500   7/1/2014      EUR    39.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.985  7/25/2014      EUR    39.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.113  9/30/2014      EUR    40.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700  7/20/2015      EUR    40.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.500  8/20/2014      EUR    41.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.100  8/20/2015      EUR    41.31
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.702  9/30/2015      EUR    40.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600  9/20/2040      EUR    30.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500  9/20/2037      EUR    30.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.300  3/20/2026      EUR    31.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.700  3/20/2024      EUR    31.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900 10/22/2022      EUR    31.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.250  6/19/2020      EUR    39.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500 10/22/2019      EUR    39.31
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.000  7/19/2019      EUR    39.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600  7/20/2018      EUR    39.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.590   4/3/2018      EUR    43.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.675  10/9/2017      EUR    43.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300  7/20/2017      EUR    40.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900  4/20/2017      EUR    39.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.225   3/1/2017      EUR    42.34
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.020  9/13/2016      EUR    41.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.600  7/20/2016      EUR    40.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700 11/10/2015      EUR    39.13
NATL BK GREECE         3.875  10/7/2016      EUR    53.86

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000  2/12/2030      EUR    46.86
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       4.875  6/29/2017      EUR    73.04
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.580  4/28/2028      EUR    52.37
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000   3/1/2030      EUR    46.83
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625 11/12/2014      EUR    70.97
ALLIED IRISH BKS      12.500  6/25/2035      GBP    27.25
ANGLO IRISH BANK       4.000  4/15/2015      EUR    74.26
BANESTO FINANC         5.000  3/23/2030      EUR    73.82
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000  2/12/2020      GBP    50.25
BANK OF IRELAND        3.585  4/21/2015      EUR    67.13
BANK OF IRELAND        5.600  9/18/2023      EUR    45.75
BANK OF IRELAND        4.473 11/30/2016      EUR    60.75
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000  2/12/2020      EUR    58.88
BK IRELAND MTGE        3.250  6/22/2015      EUR    75.10
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.450   3/1/2030      EUR    47.82
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.760   9/7/2029      EUR    50.86
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.360 10/12/2029      EUR    48.07
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.400  11/6/2029      EUR    48.27
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125  3/16/2037      USD    74.45
DEPFA ACS BANK         4.900  8/24/2035      CAD    67.52
DEPFA ACS BANK         0.500   3/3/2025      CAD    40.30
EBS BLDG SOCIETY       4.000  2/25/2015      EUR    74.90
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.000  3/10/2015      EUR    74.68
ONO FINANCE II        10.875  7/15/2019      USD    70.00
ONO FINANCE II        10.875  7/15/2019      USD    70.00
ONO FINANCE II        11.125  7/15/2019      EUR    65.92
ONO FINANCE II        11.125  7/15/2019      EUR    65.06
UT2 FUNDING PLC        5.321  6/30/2016      EUR    59.15

ITALY
-----
BANCA MARCHE           4.000  1/10/2021      EUR    74.43
BANCA MARCHE           4.000  5/26/2021      EUR    73.71
BANCA MARCHE           5.500  9/16/2030      EUR    74.10
BANCA MARCHE           3.900  8/17/2020      EUR    74.87
BANCA MARCHE           3.600 11/12/2020      EUR    72.45
BANCA MARCHE           3.700   9/1/2020      EUR    73.68
BANCA POP LODI         5.250   4/3/2029      EUR    73.50
BANCA POP MILANO       3.500  6/30/2018      EUR    74.89
BANCA POP MILANO       4.000  4/23/2020      EUR    72.05
BANCA POP MILANO       4.500  4/18/2018      EUR    74.30
BANCO POPOLARE         6.375  5/31/2021      EUR    71.76
BTPS                   4.000   2/1/2037      EUR    72.89
BTPS I/L               2.350  9/15/2035      EUR    68.84
BTPS I/L               2.550  9/15/2041      EUR    66.66
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.000  1/18/2015      EUR    73.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000  4/15/2015      EUR    75.00
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000   9/2/2015      EUR    73.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000   8/5/2015      EUR    73.50
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.575   2/2/2017      EUR    70.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.400  9/17/2017      EUR    65.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.500  11/2/2020      EUR    69.88
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.500   3/5/2016      EUR    69.38
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000  11/2/2016      EUR    68.63
CIR SPA                5.750 12/16/2024      EUR    73.05
COMUNE DI MILANO       4.019  6/29/2035      EUR    74.27
DEXIA CREDIOP          4.790 12/17/2043      EUR    69.01
INTESA SANPAOLO        2.882  4/20/2020      EUR    73.53
MONTE DEI PASCHI       5.750  9/30/2016      GBP    69.90
REP OF ITALY           2.000  9/15/2062      EUR    48.98
REP OF ITALY           2.870  5/19/2036      JPY    68.49
REP OF ITALY           2.200  9/15/2058      EUR    54.35
REP OF ITALY           4.850  6/11/2060      EUR    71.14
REP OF ITALY           1.850  9/15/2057      EUR    48.30
SEAT PAGINE           10.500  1/31/2017      EUR    66.17
SEAT PAGINE           10.500  1/31/2017      EUR    65.69
SEAT PAGINE           10.500  1/31/2017      EUR    65.38
SEAT PAGINE           10.500  1/31/2017      EUR    65.57
TELECOM ITALIA         5.250  3/17/2055      EUR    65.49

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL          7.250   4/1/2014      EUR    22.81
BEVERAGE PACK          9.500  6/15/2017      EUR    67.50
BEVERAGE PACK          9.500  6/15/2017      EUR    66.08
CONTROLINVESTE         3.000  1/28/2015      EUR    68.34
ESPIRITO SANTO F       6.875 10/21/2019      EUR    52.51
KION FINANCE           7.875  4/15/2018      EUR    69.70
KION FINANCE           7.875  4/15/2018      EUR    69.75
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000  4/30/2014      EUR    15.00
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000  4/30/2014      EUR    14.83
UBI BANCA INT          8.750 10/29/2012      EUR    70.57

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE      11.750  10/1/2005      USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500   3/3/2021      NZD    65.74
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500  3/29/2021      NZD    65.37
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500  5/12/2021      ZAR    42.68
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500  6/22/2021      ZAR    42.40
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500  9/15/2016      TRY    73.87
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500  2/24/2025      CAD    62.24
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500  5/15/2014      USD    34.00
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500  5/15/2014      USD    33.75
BRIT INSURANCE         6.625  12/9/2030      GBP    55.14
CEMEX FIN EUROPE       4.750   3/5/2014      EUR    68.93
EDP FINANCE BV         4.900  10/1/2019      USD    72.08
EDP FINANCE BV         4.125  6/29/2020      EUR    72.45
EDP FINANCE BV         4.900  10/1/2019      USD    72.00
ELEC DE CAR FIN        8.500  4/10/2018      USD    54.17
FINANCE & CREDIT      10.500  1/25/2014      USD    50.00
FRIESLAND BANK         4.210 12/29/2025      EUR    68.83
INDAH KIAT INTL       12.500  6/15/2006      USD     0.01
ING BANK NV            4.200 12/19/2035      EUR    67.99
ING VERZEKERING        6.375   5/7/2027      EUR    71.53
IVG FINANCE BV         1.750  3/29/2017      EUR    67.57
MARFRIG HLDG EUR       8.375   5/9/2018      USD    64.02
NATL INVESTER BK      25.983   5/7/2029      EUR    22.62
NED WATERSCHAPBK       0.500  3/11/2025      CAD    61.89
NIB CAPITAL BANK       4.510 12/16/2035      EUR    66.78
POLYSINDO FIN          9.375  7/30/2007      USD     0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       5.000  11/4/2019      EUR    74.60
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       4.500  6/16/2025      EUR    65.51
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       5.750  5/26/2014      EUR    27.01
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       1.375  2/28/2012      EUR    38.38
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       2.910  6/21/2036      JPY    69.60
SIDETUR FINANCE       10.000  4/20/2016      USD    68.13
SNS BANK               6.250 10/26/2020      EUR    62.61
SNS BANK               6.625  5/14/2018      EUR    77.55
SRLEV NV               9.000  4/15/2041      EUR    60.27
TJIWI KIMIA FIN       13.250   8/1/2001      USD     0.00

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS          0.500   5/9/2030      CAD    47.32
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  5/25/2018      ZAR    59.10
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  7/29/2016      ZAR    70.54
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  7/29/2016      TRY    74.45
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  1/27/2016      ZAR    74.34
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500   3/1/2016      ZAR    73.72
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  3/24/2016      ZAR    73.28
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  5/25/2016      ZAR    72.17
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  7/26/2016      ZAR    71.40
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125 10/15/2033      USD    40.00
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125 10/15/2015      USD    62.13
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750  6/15/2016      EUR    56.75
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125 10/15/2015      USD    62.13
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.000  6/26/2017      EUR    46.90
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125 10/15/2033      USD    40.00
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750  6/15/2016      EUR    56.34
RENEWABLE CORP         6.500   6/4/2014      EUR    58.66
SEVAN MARINE ASA      14.000 12/22/2014      NOK    22.17

POLAND
------
POLAND-PAR CPN         3.000 10/27/2024      USD    72.35

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG       5.625  4/23/2014      EUR    68.77
BANCO COM PORTUG       3.750  10/8/2016      EUR    65.48
BANCO COM PORTUG       4.750  6/22/2017      EUR    66.68
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600  9/15/2016      EUR    66.45
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600  1/26/2017      EUR    64.44
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.875  7/15/2016      EUR    66.38
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.160  7/23/2015      EUR    70.88
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.375  2/17/2015      EUR    75.91
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.875  1/21/2015      EUR    68.99
BRISA                  4.500  12/5/2016      EUR    70.78
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.250  1/27/2020      EUR    63.93
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.380  10/1/2038      EUR    50.02
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.500 11/13/2017      EUR    67.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.400  10/8/2019      EUR    58.57
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.455  8/20/2017      EUR    72.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       3.875  12/6/2016      EUR    67.77
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.980   3/3/2028      EUR    50.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.750  2/14/2016      EUR    67.00
METRO DE LISBOA        7.300 12/23/2025      EUR    71.58
METRO DE LISBOA        4.061  12/4/2026      EUR    55.66
METRO DE LISBOA        5.750   2/4/2019      EUR    60.56
METRO DE LISBOA        4.799  12/7/2027      EUR    55.21
MONTEPIO GERAL         5.000   2/8/2017      EUR    61.00
PARPUBLICA             4.200 11/16/2026      EUR    39.25
PARPUBLICA             4.191 10/15/2014      EUR    69.50
PARPUBLICA             3.500   7/8/2013      EUR    76.88
PARPUBLICA             3.567  9/22/2020      EUR    45.25
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500  3/25/2015      USD    70.66
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500  3/25/2015      USD    70.78
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.800  6/15/2020      EUR    60.61
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.100  4/15/2037      EUR    48.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.950 10/25/2023      EUR    59.22
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.850  4/15/2021      EUR    59.28
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.600 10/15/2014      EUR    72.91
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.350 10/15/2015      EUR    70.65
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.200 10/15/2016      EUR    67.69
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.350 10/16/2017      EUR    63.03
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.750  6/14/2019      EUR    61.75
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.450  6/15/2018      EUR    62.10
REFER                  5.875  2/18/2019      EUR    57.88
REFER                  4.000  3/16/2015      EUR    39.88
REFER                  4.047 11/16/2026      EUR    48.35
REFER                  4.675 10/16/2024      EUR    46.50
REFER                  4.250 12/13/2021      EUR    45.25

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA            17.500  5/23/2012      RUB     0.38
ARIZK                  3.000 12/20/2030      RUB    48.44
BELON-FINANS           0.010  2/23/2012      RUB     0.02
DVTG-FINANS           17.000  8/29/2013      RUB    55.55
DVTG-FINANS            7.750  7/18/2013      RUB    20.29
IART                   8.500   8/4/2013      RUB     1.00
MIRAX                 17.000  9/17/2012      RUB     7.01
MOSMART FINANS         0.010  4/12/2012      RUB     1.81
NOK                   10.000  9/22/2011      RUB    49.90
NOK                   12.500  8/26/2014      RUB     5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA       1.000 12/17/2012      RUB     0.01
PROTON-FINANCE         9.000  6/12/2012      RUB    56.00
RBC OJSC               7.000  4/23/2015      RUB    74.99
RBC OJSC               3.270  4/19/2018      RUB    39.00
RBC OJSC               7.000  4/23/2015      RUB    69.00
SAHO                  10.000  5/21/2012      RUB     3.02
SATURN                 8.500   6/6/2014      RUB     1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS       10.500  3/27/2012      RUB     3.40
TERNA-FINANS           1.000  11/4/2011      RUB    25.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750 12/14/2022      EUR    68.79
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.250 10/25/2023      EUR    72.17
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.750  5/25/2027      EUR    69.80
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750  6/30/2025      EUR    62.53
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.000  3/24/2021      EUR    75.39
BANCAJA                1.500  5/22/2018      EUR    64.20
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       6.025   3/3/2033      EUR    72.40
BANCO PASTOR           4.550  7/31/2020      EUR    72.44
CAJA CASTIL-MAN        1.500  6/23/2021      EUR    58.99
CAJA MADRID            4.125  3/24/2036      EUR    69.23
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       4.250  4/10/2031      EUR    59.79
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       3.875  5/23/2025      EUR    63.74
CEDULAS TDA A-5        4.250  3/28/2027      EUR    63.69
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250  5/12/2020      USD    65.38
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       8.875  5/12/2017      EUR    75.75
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250  5/12/2020      USD    66.25
COMUN AUTO CANAR       3.900 11/30/2035      EUR    63.86
COMUN AUTO CANAR       4.200 10/25/2036      EUR    67.18
COMUNIDAD BALEAR       4.063 11/23/2035      EUR    66.19
COMUNIDAD MADRID       4.300  9/15/2026      EUR    73.98
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.315  9/10/2015      CHF    69.23
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.750  3/24/2016      CHF    67.51
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.690 10/28/2034      EUR    71.42
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.220  4/26/2035      EUR    66.30
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.965   9/8/2039      JPY    57.52
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.355 11/10/2015      CHF    68.25
GENERAL DE ALQUI       2.750  8/20/2012      EUR    71.41
IM CEDULAS 5           3.500  6/15/2020      EUR    74.31
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       3.250  6/28/2024      CHF    68.40
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       2.570 10/22/2021      CHF    69.10
INSTITUT CATALA        4.250  6/15/2024      EUR    75.75
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.065  7/29/2039      JPY    60.50
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.170  7/29/2039      JPY    62.47
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        4.250 10/31/2036      EUR    66.20
JUNTA LA MANCHA        3.875  1/31/2036      EUR    55.58
MAPFRE SA              5.921  7/24/2037      EUR    60.73
XUNTA DE GALICIA       4.025 11/28/2035      EUR    74.48

SWEDEN
------
STENA AB               5.875   2/1/2019      EUR    74.00
STENA AB               5.875   2/1/2019      EUR    73.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000 10/21/2011      USD     9.34
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  6/29/2016      TRY    73.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  8/26/2016      ZAR    69.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  8/25/2016      ZAR    69.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  6/14/2016      ZAR    70.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   3/3/2016      ZAR    72.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.250  4/27/2012      USD     7.14
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  9/30/2016      ZAR    68.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  9/20/2016      ZAR    73.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500 12/21/2015      ZAR    73.86
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  8/26/2021      AUD    63.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500 12/17/2027      USD    59.96
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  1/25/2028      USD    59.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  8/25/2021      ZAR    41.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.750  3/23/2012      USD     7.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000   3/9/2012      USD     8.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000   3/9/2012      USD    10.21
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500  2/28/2012      USD     7.49
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000  1/27/2012      USD     5.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED       6.500  1/27/2012      USD     6.78
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.130  1/10/2012      USD     9.55
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.000  12/7/2011      USD    10.08
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000  11/4/2011      USD     7.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500  6/12/2012      USD     7.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CRED SUIS NY           8.000   8/3/2012      USD    56.60
CRED SUIS NY           9.000 10/12/2012      USD    22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH          2.875  2/20/2012      CHF    56.13
UBS AG                 9.640 11/14/2011      USD    12.06
UBS AG                10.530  1/23/2012      USD    36.54
UBS AG                 8.380  3/20/2012      USD    32.03
UBS AG                 8.720  3/20/2012      USD    26.79
UBS AG                 9.250  3/20/2012      USD    10.83
UBS AG                10.070  3/23/2012      USD    27.66
UBS AG                 9.170  3/26/2012      EUR    71.18
UBS AG JERSEY         10.140 12/30/2011      USD    14.57

UKRAINE
-------
LVIV CITY              9.950 12/19/2012      UAH    92.43

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS       5.000  8/26/2030      USD    59.21
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       5.500  6/20/2013      EUR    72.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.400  2/12/2013      EUR    74.13
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       3.250  2/25/2013      EUR    71.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       6.000  6/20/2014      EUR    65.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.500  6/21/2013      EUR    69.13
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250  2/15/2018      GBP    68.75
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250  2/15/2018      GBP    68.64
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.340 12/28/2026      JPY    71.94
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.359  3/27/2029      JPY    69.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC       13.050  4/27/2012      USD    25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC       12.950  4/20/2012      USD    23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.420   5/5/2031      USD    73.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.100  5/26/2031      USD    72.21
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.390   8/4/2031      USD    73.53
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200  8/25/2031      USD    71.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.230  8/26/2031      USD    71.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200  8/29/2031      USD    70.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.250  8/29/2031      USD    70.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC        6.330  9/23/2032      GBP    74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.000   6/3/2041      USD    66.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.650  1/31/2012      USD    34.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250  1/31/2012      USD     9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.350  1/23/2012      USD    26.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.550  1/23/2012      USD    10.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC       14.000  10/1/2012      USD     9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000  10/1/2012      USD     9.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000  9/28/2012      USD     9.70
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000  9/11/2012      USD     9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000  9/11/2012      USD     9.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.500  8/31/2012      USD    18.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250  8/31/2012      USD    31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.800  7/31/2012      USD    25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.400  7/31/2012      USD    10.21
BARCLAYS BK PLC       11.000  7/27/2012      USD     7.43
BARCLAYS BK PLC        7.000  7/27/2012      USD     8.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.000  7/20/2012      USD     6.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000  6/29/2012      USD     8.56
BEAZLEY GROUP LT       7.250 10/17/2026      GBP    75.08
CEVA GROUP PLC        10.000  6/30/2018      EUR    59.13
CEVA GROUP PLC         8.500  6/30/2018      EUR    52.00
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.625 11/16/2021      GBP    79.97
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.750  12/2/2024      GBP    72.87
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.875  3/28/2033      GBP    68.25
EC FINANCE             9.750   8/1/2017      EUR    72.38
EC FINANCE             9.750   8/1/2017      EUR    71.00
EFG HELLAS PLC         6.010   1/9/2036      EUR    32.75
EFG HELLAS PLC         5.400  11/2/2047      EUR    15.38
EFG HELLAS PLC         4.375  2/11/2013      EUR    64.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.000  2/28/2013      EUR    64.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.350  7/22/2014      EUR    47.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.000  2/28/2013      EUR    64.00
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.500  12/6/2018      GBP    70.97
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875  2/15/2021      GBP    65.87
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875   5/9/2025      GBP    64.88
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.375  9/26/2031      GBP    60.38
ESSAR ENERGY           4.250   2/1/2016      USD    63.40
EX-IM BK OF UKRA       5.793   2/9/2016      USD    73.49
F&C ASSET MNGMT        6.750 12/20/2026      GBP    64.00
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500   6/1/2019      GBP    67.00
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500   6/1/2019      GBP    67.26
HBOS PLC               5.374  6/30/2021      EUR    71.04
HBOS PLC               4.500  3/18/2030      EUR    66.13
HSBC BANK PLC          4.750  3/24/2046      GBP    73.39
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875  2/15/2016      EUR    68.59
INEOS GRP HLDG         8.500  2/15/2016      USD    74.63
INEOS GRP HLDG         8.500  2/15/2016      USD    74.63
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875  2/15/2016      EUR    68.86
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.375  3/12/2020      EUR    70.34
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.867 12/17/2019      GBP    72.32
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.588  5/12/2020      GBP    73.13
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       6.439  5/23/2020      EUR    66.06
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.869  8/25/2020      GBP    72.73
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.625 10/14/2020      EUR    70.28
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.875  11/1/2020      USD    73.45
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.975  9/15/2024      GBP    67.18
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       6.385  5/12/2020      EUR    66.06
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       7.625  12/9/2019      GBP    71.44
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       7.875  3/19/2020      USD    73.00
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       9.000  7/15/2029      GBP    70.59
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       8.500   6/7/2032      GBP    65.19
LLOYDS TSB BANK        5.750   7/9/2025      GBP    75.20
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000  12/1/2016      EUR    64.13
LOUIS NO1 PLC          8.500  12/1/2014      EUR    66.63
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000  12/1/2016      EUR    64.34
MATALAN                9.625  3/31/2017      GBP    63.00
MATALAN                9.625  3/31/2017      GBP    63.25
MAX PETROLEUM          6.750   9/8/2013      USD    53.28
NATIONWIDE BLDG        5.600  8/19/2030      USD    74.44
NOMURA BANK INTL       0.800 12/21/2020      EUR    62.90
NORTHERN ROCK          5.750  2/28/2017      GBP    65.46
OTE PLC                7.250   4/8/2014      EUR    67.49
OTE PLC                4.625  5/20/2016      EUR    59.20
OTE PLC                5.000   8/5/2013      EUR    70.76
PHONES4U FINANCE       9.500   4/1/2018      GBP    73.00
PHONES4U FINANCE       9.500   4/1/2018      GBP    73.06
PIRAEUS GRP FIN        4.000  9/17/2012      EUR    68.38
PRIVATBANK             5.799   2/9/2016      USD    75.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       2.300 11/26/2024      JPY    72.28
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.625  9/22/2021      EUR    65.53
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       5.250 11/14/2033      EUR    71.91
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.350  1/23/2017      EUR    72.54
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.692   6/9/2025      EUR    66.06
THOMAS COOK GR         6.750  6/22/2015      EUR    71.78
THOMAS COOK GR         7.750  6/22/2017      GBP    64.81
TUI TRAVEL PLC         4.900  4/27/2017      GBP    68.62
TXU EASTERN FNDG       6.450  5/15/2005      USD     0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN         6.542  3/30/2021      GBP    69.59


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *