TCREUR_Public/111007.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, October 7, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 199

                            Headlines



B E L A R U S

BELARUSIAN NATIONAL: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B-'


B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: Breakup May Leave Little Value for Shareholders


F R A N C E

REXEL SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B-' Corporate Credit Ratings


G R E E C E

HELLENIC TELECOMS: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to 'B2'
* GREECE: Rescue Fund to Be Used as Last Resort, Merkel Says


H U N G A R Y

* HUNGARY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Banks for Downgrade


I R E L A N D

GSC EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Ratings on Three Note Classes
TBS INTERNATIONAL: Receives Non-Compliance Notice from Nasdaq


I T A L Y

BERICA 6: Moody's Confirms Rating on EUR8.565M D Notes at 'B3'


N E T H E R L A N D S

LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2'
PDM CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'


R U S S I A

INSURANCE CO: S&P Reassesses Stand-alone Credit Profile to 'bb+'
SOVCOMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating


S P A I N

CAJA VITAL: Moody's Reviews Rating on 'D+' BFSR for Upgrade
NCG BANCO: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Bank Financial Strength Rating


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Has Yet to Receive EUR70-Mil. Bridge Financing


U K R A I N E

AVTOSBOROCHNIY ZAVOD: Cherkasy Starts Bankruptcy Proceedings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRICK UP: Goes Into Administration, Restaurant Case Delayed
LIMAVADY GEAR: Sean Blaney Rescues Firm Out of Administration
PEDLEY FURNITURE: Employees Lose Jobs as Firm Goes Bust
* UK: Banks Increasingly Likely to Pull Plug on Retailers


X X X X X X X X

* Nervous Hedge Funds Hit Resistance on European-Bank Trades
* Germany, Spain Snuff Hopes for E.U. Super-Bailout Option
* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement




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B E L A R U S
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BELARUSIAN NATIONAL: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Belarusian National Reinsurance Organization (Belarus Re) to 'B-'
from 'B' and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications where they had been placed on June 3, 2011. The
outlook is negative.

"We downgraded Belarus Re because we downgraded the Republic of
Belarus (B-/Negative/C)," S&P said.

"The rating on Belarus Re reflects its stand-alone credit profile,
which we assess at 'b-'. We believe that the possibility of timely
and sufficient extraordinary government support in case of need
remains limited, given Belarus' ongoing dependence on external
funding due to large current account deficits and a very low level
of usable reserves," S&P said.

"Nevertheless, we still assess Belarus Re's role for the
Belarusian economy as 'important', because it enjoys a monopoly
position in the Belarusian insurance market as the sole provider
of reinsurance protection. We assess Belarus Re's link with the
Belarusian government as 'very strong' because the government
owns 100% of Belarus Re via the Belarusian Ministry of Finance,"
S&P said.

The ratings on Belarus Re continue to reflect Standard & Poor's
view of the high economic and industry risks of operating in
Belarus.

These rating constraints are offset by Belarus Re's adequate
capitalization; competitive advantages from its monopoly position
in Belarus' reinsurance market; significant regulatory authority
stipulated by legislation; and marginal operating results.

"The negative outlook mirrors the outlook on Belarus. In line with
our methodology, we would not normally rate domestic insurers
higher than the local currency rating on the sovereign in which
they are domiciled," S&P related.

Further rating actions on Belarus Re could result from changes to
the sovereign local currency ratings on Belarus.

"Consequently, if we lowered the sovereign local currency rating
on Belarus further, it would likely trigger a downgrade of Belarus
Re," S&P said.

"Likewise, if we were to revise the outlook on the sovereign to
stable, it would likely lead to the revision of the outlook on
Belarus Re to stable," S&P related.


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA SA: Breakup May Leave Little Value for Shareholders
---------------------------------------------------------
Fabio Benedetti-Valentini and John Martens at Bloomberg News
report that about 15 years after the French-Belgian bank was
created in a cross-border merger and after about EUR100 billion in
public guarantees and funds kept the lender afloat in the 2008-
2009 period, France and Belgium were set to announce yesterday a
plan to split up its assets in a manner designed to avoid
injecting more capital.

Dexia's planned breakup to protect its Belgian depositors and its
municipal-lending business in France may leave little value for
its shareholders, Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, two people with knowledge of the plans
said that under an option favored by France, Dexia SA may be left
holding a "bad bank" with the lender's worst assets, while Belgium
assumes control of operations in that country and state entities
in France buy up the French municipal-lending business.

"Whether or not this structure would benefit shareholders depends
on the prices France and Belgium would pay for their national
assets," Bloomberg quotes AlphaValue Bank analyst Christophe
Nijdam as saying.  "One should bear in mind that the two states
are judge and jury as they are the majority direct and indirect
shareholders of Dexia."

Belgian entities own 44% of Dexia and French state-linked ones
hold 26%, Bloomberg discloses.

In the first step toward its dismantling, Dexia yesterday said
there's an investor interested in its profitable retail and
private banking unit in Luxembourg, Bloomberg recounts.

"It's hard to tell how much Dexia is worth, but shareholders are
ruined, with the core assets in France and Belgium back at their
starting blocks," Francois Chaulet, who helps manage EUR250
million at Paris's Montsegur Finance, as cited by Bloomberg, said.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 6,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Dexia plans to pool its troubled
assets into a "bad bank" with Belgian and French government
guarantees to protect depositors and its municipal-lending
business.  Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme told reporters in
Brussels on Tuesday that the Belgian-French lender bailed out by
the two governments in 2008 will put its "legacy" division, which
held EUR113 billion (US$150 billion) of assets at the end of June,
into the bad bank, Bloomberg disclosed.  The creation of a
separate entity with government guarantees may help shield Dexia's
banking units and avoid a repeat of the 2008 taxpayer-funded
capital infusion, Bloomberg said.  Belgium and France on Tuesday
said that they will take "all necessary measures" to protect
clients and will guarantee Dexia's loans, Bloomberg recounted.
Both governments have stakes in the bank following its 2008
bailout, Bloomberg noted.

                         About Dexia SA

Dexia SA -- http://www.dexia.com/-- is a Belgian bank specialized
in retail banking and local public finance.  The Bank offers a
range of banking services for individual customers, small and
medium-sized enterprises and institutional clients.  It has four
divisions: Asset Management, Personal Financial Services, Treasury
and Financial Markets, and Investor Services.  The Asset
Management division offers products ranging from traditional and
alternative funds to socially responsible investments.  The
Personal Financial Services segment focuses on banking and
insurance products, including both life and non-life insurance
products.  Through its Treasury and Financial Markets division,
Dexia is present in the capital markets and provides support to
the entire Group.  The Investor Services segment offers various
services to shareholders, such as fund and pension administration.
Through its subsidiaries, Dexia SA is active in over 30 countries,
including Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Turkey, France, Australia
and Japan.


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F R A N C E
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REXEL SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B-' Corporate Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
based electrical parts distributor Rexel S.A. to positive from
stable. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB-' long-term and 'B'
short-term corporate credit ratings on Rexel," S&P said.

"In addition, we affirmed our 'BB-' issue ratings on Rexel's
cumulative EUR1.5 billion revolving credit facilities (RCFs) and
EUR650 million and EUR500 million senior unsecured notes. The
recovery ratings on all these instruments are unchanged at '4',"
S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects Rexel's strong operating
performance so far in 2011, with sales growing by 7.3% and the
EBITDA margin improving to 5.4% in the first half of 2011.
Furthermore, the outlook revision is based on our opinion that the
group's credit metrics will remain strong for the current ratings,
including funds from operations (FFO) to debt in the high teens,
over the next year. FFO to debt was 19.6% for the 12 months to
June 30, 2011," S&P related.

"In our view, Rexel can maintain these credit metrics despite an
anticipated pick-up in acquisition activity. Management has
indicated that it has a spending capacity of EUR400 million for
acquisitions. However, actual acquisition spending has been
limited so far this year, with about EUR50 million reported in the
first half of 2011. While we believe that investing the full
EUR400 million this year would utilize some of the rating
headroom, we do not assume this is likely in our base-case credit
scenario. In our view, this spending could be accommodated at a
higher rating if it were spread over the next two years, in the
absence of a severe deterioration of end-market conditions --
which we currently do not anticipate -- for the remainder of 2011
and 2012," S&P stated.

"Rating upside is conditional on the sustainability of credit
measures commensurate with a 'BB' rating -- for instance, FFO to
debt in the high teens. It is also be conditional on our
assessment that the group's financial strategy and shareholder
policies could be accommodated at a higher rating. The group's
shareholder structure largely consists of private equity investors
with only 26.9% of publicly traded shares. We note that Rexel's
shareholder structure could be subject to change as the current
private equity investors have been invested in the group for a
number of years," S&P related.

"In our opinion, Rexel has demonstrated an ability to generate
sound cash flow from operations and a willingness to use part of
its discretionary cash flow to deleverage further. This, in turn,
should further cushion the group's credit metrics, which are
strong for the current ratings. Therefore, we believe that Rexel
could maintain its credit metrics at their current level despite a
return to moderate acquisition activity. This is provided Rexel
does not undertake large acquisitions or adopt a more aggressive
financial policy, which may be dictated by a potential change in
ownership," S&P said.

"A revision of the outlook to stable would likely be driven by
significantly weaker end-market conditions than we currently
anticipate and/or more aggressive debt-funded spending activity
that utilizes the headroom at the current rating," S&P related.


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G R E E C E
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HELLENIC TELECOMS: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------Moody's
Investors Service has downgraded to B2 from B1 the corporate
family rating (CFR) of Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation
S.A. (OTE). The downgrade is based on Moody's increasing concerns
related to the macroeconomic deterioration in Greece, recently
revised lower GDP for this year and also for next year and the
likely further negative effect of new austerity measures on
consumer spending. In Moody's view, this could further affect
OTE's revenue trend and cash-flow generation though Moody's
believes management is carefully adjusting its cost base.

Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded to B2 from B1 (i) the
senior unsecured ratings on the global medium-term notes (GMTN)
and global bonds issued by OTE Plc (OTE's fully and
unconditionally guaranteed subsidiary); and (ii) OTE's probability
of default rating (PDR).

All the long-term ratings have a negative outlook and the short-
term debt ratings remain Not Prime.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A.

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B2 from B1

Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B2 from B1

Issuer: OTE PLC

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to (P)B2
from (P)B1

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B2 from B1

Moody's also maintains the following ratings on OTE PLC:

BACKED Commercial Paper (domestic currency) ratings of NP

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is driven by further macroeconomic deterioration
in Greece, which Moody's expects to lead to a continuing
deterioration in OTE's operating performance.

"We expect OTE's operating performance to continue to be severely
affected by adverse macroeconomic conditions, intense competition
across all segments and increasing challenge to further reduce
costs while revenues are falling sustainably," says Carlos Winzer,
a Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for OTE. "These
factors, as well as the expected further contraction in domestic
consumption due to the Greek government's new austerity measures,
will continue to affect OTE's revenues, cash flow generation and,
in turn, its financial ratios beyond the level of tolerance for
the previous rating," explains Mr. Winzer. " This is despite the
fact that management continues to implement cost cutting measures
and Moody's continues to factor into OTE's overall rating the
support it receives from Deutsche Telekom (Baa1 RRU)."

Moody's expects OTE's main business lines to suffer double-digit
revenue declines during 2011, which will deepen the deterioration
experienced by the company during 2010, when full-year group
revenue fell by 8%. OTE will continue to reduce its operational
expenditure and contain capital expenditure at around EUR650
million. However, the company's EBITDA margin could deteriorate
further, possibly by around two percentage points, and its cash
flow from operations will come under pressure. In addition,
Moody's anticipates a further deterioration in OTE's cash-flow-
related metrics over the short to medium term. For example,
Moody's expects that the company's retained cash flow
(RCF)/adjusted gross debt will be below 20% and its gross adjusted
debt/EBITDA above 3.5x.

These weakened financial metrics, though they might appear at this
point in time as moderate in normal macro-economic conditions,
suggest high financial risk in the context of a shrinking cash-
flow base. Indeed, this financial risk is also increased by the
low visibility of OTE's future cash flow generation capacity, as
well as Moody's uncertainty as to the extent to which the company
will continue to be affected by the very challenging market
environment in Greece. More specifically, as indicated above,
Moody's believes that prolonged double-digit declines in OTE's
revenue and EBITDA, with weak prospects of recovery, will exert
substantial pressure on the ability of the company's management to
contain any deterioration in its cash flow generation. The
company's financial metrics will therefore continue to be
negatively affected in the intermediate term.

Although OTE has covered refinancing requirements throughout 2012
-- the company has debt maturities of about EUR2 billion in 2013.
Though OTE's market positions appear as solid and the financial
debt remains sustainable, the access to financial and bank markets
might remain challenging for OTE, and this posses additional risks
factored into the rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

In the absence of a more explicit statement of support from
Deutsche Telekom, Moody's currently expects no upward pressure on
OTE's ratings in the short term. However, positive pressure on the
ratings could develop over time if the macroeconomic environment
improves such that (i) Moody's perceives that it would favorably
affect OTE's operating performance on a sustainable basis; and
(ii) the company's free cash flow is sufficient to allow at least
a stabilization of credit metrics.

The negative outlook on OTE's ratings reflects the high degree of
uncertainty with regard to macroeconomic conditions in Greece, as
well as the lack of any sustainable recovery prospects for OTE's
financial metrics in the medium term. Moody's could downgrade the
ratings further if (i) macroeconomic conditions in Greece
deteriorate further, potentially affecting OTE's performance
beyond Moody's current expectations; (ii) the country's financial
and banking system is severely disrupted with potential
implications on OTE's liquidity; or (iii) OTE's operating
performance deteriorates further such that, for example, the
company's gross adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio exceeds 4.0x without
reasonable prospects of reversing the trend.

METHODOLOGIES USED

The principal methodology used in rating Hellenic
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) was the Global
Telecommunications Industry Methodology published in December
2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Given that the government has reduced its stake in OTE to below
20%, the "Government-Related Issuers" methodology no longer
applies.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, Hellenic Telecommunications
Organisation SA (OTE) is the Greek incumbent full-service
telecommunications provider, servicing 3.7 million fixed access
lines, 1.2 million fixed-line broadband connections and some 7.7
million mobile customers in Greece. In addition to its wireless
operations in Greece, the company offers mobile telephony services
to customers in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania through Cosmote,
Greece's leading provider of mobile telecommunications services,
and a number of subsidiaries. All of these command leading
positions in their respective markets., OTE also offers wireline
services in Romania through RomTelecom and has a significant
minority interest in Serbia's incumbent operator, Telekom Srbija.
In addition, OTE provides satellite broadcasting services in
Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, India and
Pakistan. In 2010, OTE had total revenues of EUR5.5 billion and
reported EBITDA of EUR1.7 billion.


* GREECE: Rescue Fund to Be Used as Last Resort, Merkel Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Czuczka and Rebecca Christie at Bloomberg News report that
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Europe's rescue fund will
only be used as a last resort to save banks and investors may have
to take deeper losses as part of a Greek rescue.

Ms. Merkel's comments, her most explicit on banks' role in
fighting the debt crisis since the spillover from Greece began to
threaten France and Italy, followed talks with European Commission
President Jose Barroso in Brussels, Bloomberg relates.

"Time is running out" to establish if recapitalization is
necessary, Ms. Merkel, as cited by Bloomberg, said.  Bloomberg
notes that she said troubled banks need to first seek capital on
their own and national governments will help if that's not
possible.

"If a country cannot do it using its own resources and the
stability of the euro as a whole is put at risk because the
country has difficulties, then there's the possibility of using
the EFSF," the European Financial Stability Facility, Bloomberg
quotes Ms. Merkel as saying.  Ms. Merkel, as cited by Bloomberg,
said using the rescue fund is "always tied to a certain
conditionality."

Signals that European politicians may step up efforts to aid banks
and push investors to accept bigger losses as part of a Greek
bailout reflect international pressure to end the debt crisis and
domestic opposition to expanding rescues, Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, Ms. Merkel said that she supports
recapitalizing European banks "if there is a joint assessment that
the banks aren't adequately capitalized" and finance officials
develop "uniform criteria".  She said that Germany is ready to
discuss possible bank aid at this month's EU summit, Bloomberg
notes.


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H U N G A R Y
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* HUNGARY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Banks for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR) of six Hungarian
banks and the debt and deposit ratings of seven Hungarian banks.
The banks are: OTP Bank NyRt, OTP Mortgage Bank, K&H Bank,
Budapest Bank, FHB Mortgage Bank, Erste Bank Hungary and MKB Bank.

The review for downgrade was prompted by the recently approved
law, which gives foreign-currency mortgage borrowers the option to
repay the full outstanding amount at exchange rates below market
rates. The review will assess the impact of the law on a bank by
bank basis, taking into account: (i) the level of exposure to
foreign-currency mortgages; (ii) the take-up rate by borrowers;
(iii) the level of profitability; and (iv) the capital buffers
available. Moody's anticipates that there are considerable
differences between the rated banks with respect to these metrics.

In addition, the review will focus on Moody's assumptions of the
likelihood of systemic and parental support for Hungarian banks
given the overall weakening support environment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's says that the review for downgrade was prompted by a
government law, approved on 19 September, which gives foreign-
currency mortgage borrowers the option to repay the full
outstanding amount at exchange rates below market rates. As
foreign-denominated loans account for 70% of mortgage lending,
Moody's believes that the approved law will likely trigger losses
for the banks and impact their capital positions. Based on a 30%
total take-up rate, Moody's estimates that the conversion at the
current market rates would imply a possible loss up to 300 basis
points of the regulatory capital adequacy ratio of the system,
which was equal to 13.8% in June 2011. However, Moody's
anticipates that the potential impact varies significantly among
the rated banks.

The newly approved framework allows borrowers to voluntarily repay
in a lump sum (by end of February 2012) their foreign-currency
mortgages. The exchange rates proposed -- HUF180 to one Swiss
franc and HUF250 to one euro -- are 36% and 19% below current
market rates of around HUF246 and HUF298, respectively, thereby
imposing haircuts and triggering losses for the lenders.

Moody's notes that the number of borrowers who might take
advantage of the option is highly uncertain, because many eligible
borrowers may be unable or unwilling to convert their loans for
the following reasons: (i) repayments depend on the stretched
borrowers' ability to either mobilize enough cash savings, or to
find banks willing to provide refinancing in forints; and (ii) the
average interest rate on forint-based loans is significantly
higher than for foreign-currency loans.

Moody's also acknowledges that the government's scheme adds stress
to a banking system already under significant pressure, reflected
by deteriorating asset quality and weak profitability. This
additional scheme will exert negative pressure on the banks'
standalone credit profiles and may constrain the banking sector's
capacity to contribute to economic growth.

In addition, following the ongoing macroeconomic challenges and
the effect of the euro-area debt crisis, the National Bank of
Hungary has reduced its 2011 GDP growth expectations for Hungary
to 1.6%, from 2.6% in June, and has lowered the growth estimates
for 2012 to 1.5%, from 2.7% in June. Unemployment is expected to
remain above 10%. This indicates continuous asset quality
challenges for banks.

SYSTEMIC AND PARENTAL SUPPORT COMES UNDER INCREASING SCRUTINY

Moody's notes that the average (asset-weighted) deposit rating for
Hungarian banks is Baa3, as many banks benefit by an average of
two notches of uplift from their current standalone BFSR due to
parental support assumptions, and two banks benefit by one notch
of uplift from their standalone BFSR due to systemic support
assumptions.

The newly approved government law represents a sizeable move away
from the principles of contract law. This, together with a set of
government policy decisions since 2010 that include a punitive
banking tax and regulations that still restrict repossessions of
collateral on delinquent mortgages, have been adding pressure to
lenders and are creating increasing uncertainty on the likelihood
of systemic support for Hungarian banks.

Around 80% of the Hungarian banking system is owned by foreign
banks. For some of the parent banks, their Hungarian operations
form part of a larger network in Central and Eastern Europe from
which they derive a portion of their profits. Moody's does not
expect the foreign parents of the rated banks to immediately alter
their commitment to Hungary. However, the rating agency
acknowledges that these banks' strategic priorities and cost-
benefit rationales are being increasingly affected by government
policy decisions that are making the business environment in
Hungary more difficult and less attractive to international
investors.

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

OTP Bank

- Local-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating Baa3 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency subordinated debt rating (Lower Tier 2) Ba1 was
placed on review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency junior subordinated debt rating (Upper Tier 2)
Ba2 (hyb) was placed on review for downgrade

- D+ BFSR (mapping to Baa3 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

OTP Mortgage Bank

- Local-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- D+ BFSR (mapping to Baa3 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

K&H Bank

- Local-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- D BFSR (mapping to Ba2 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

Budapest Bank

- Local-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency deposit ratings Baa3/Prime-3 were placed on
review for downgrade

- D- BFSR (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

FHB Mortgage Bank

- Local-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba1 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba1 was placed on
review for downgrade

- D BFSR (mapping to Ba2 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

Erste Bank Hungary

- Local-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba1 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba1 was placed on
review for downgrade

- D- BFSR (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale) was placed on
review for downgrade

MKB Bank

- Local-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba2 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating of Ba2 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating Ba2 was placed on
review for downgrade

- Foreign-currency subordinated debt rating (Lower Tier 2) B1 was
placed on review for downgrade

- E+ BFSR maintains a stable outlook, but its corresponding
standalone rating of B1 was placed on review for downgrade

CORRECTION OF HYBRID INSTRUMENT LABELLING

Moody's has attached the "hyb" indicator to the rated hybrid
instrument issued by OTP Bank and relabelled this security as
"junior subordinated". Due to an internal administrative error,
this instrument was inadvertently mislabelled as "subordinated"
when it was initially rated on November 20, 2006 and the hybrid
indicator (hyb) was not later added to the rating in accordance
with Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions published in May 2011.

The instrument affected by the correction is:

EUR500 million perpetual junior subordinated debt (Upper Tier 2)
(ISIN: XS0274147296)

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in rating OTP Mortgage Bank, K&H Bank,
Budapest Bank, FHB Mortgage Bank, and Erste Bank Hungary were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

The methodologies used in rating OTP Bank and MKB Bank were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009. Please see the
Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these
methodologies.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, OTP Bank reported consolidated
total assets of HUF9,712 billion (EUR36.3 billion) as of 30 June
2011.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, OTP Mortgage Bank reported
consolidated total assets of HUF1,681 billion (EUR6.02 billion) as
of 31 December 2010.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, K&H Bank reported consolidated
total assets of HUF2,922 billion (EUR10.9 billion) as of 30 June
2011.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, Budapest Bank reported
consolidated total assets of HUF887 billion (EUR3.31 billion) as
of 30 June 2011.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, FHB Mortgage Bank reported
consolidated total assets of HUF839.8 billion (EUR3.14 billion) as
of 30 June 2011.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, Erste Bank Hungary reported
consolidated total assets of HUF3,300 billion (EUR12.3 billion) as
of 30 June 2011.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, MKB Bank reported consolidated
total assets of HUF2,939 billion (EUR11.01 billion) as of 30 June
2011.


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I R E L A N D
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GSC EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Ratings on Three Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by GSC European CDO V PLC:

Issuer: GSC European CDO V PLC

   -- EUR75M (initial issuance amount, with current outstanding
      amount of EUR 70.325M) Class A1 Delayed Draw Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR147M (initial issuance amount, with current outstanding
      amount of EUR 137.838M) Class A2 Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR44M (initial issuance amount, with current outstanding
      rated balance amount of EUR38.695M) Class B1 Subordinated
      Notes due 2023, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR29M (initial issuance amount, with current outstanding
      rated balance amount of EUR25.5M) Class B2 Subordinated
      Notes due 2023, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M (initial issuance amount, with current outstanding
      rated balance amount of EUR4.397M) Class B3 Subordinated
      Notes due 2023, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class P Combination Notes, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Class B1, Class B2 and Class B3 Notes address
the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal final
maturity. The 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Class B Notes on the Issue Date increased
by the Rated Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on
the Rated Balance on the preceding payment date minus the
aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date,
either through interest or principal payments.

The Class P Combination Notes are no longer outstanding and
therefore its rating has been withdrawn.

RATINGS RATIONALE

GSC European CDO V PLC, issued in May 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by GSC
ACQUISITION HOLDINGS, LLC, an affiliate of Black Diamond Capital
Management, L.L.C.. This transaction will be in reinvestment
period until 15 May 2013. It is predominantly composed of senior
secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratio since the rating action in July 2009,
which has been however partially offset by the weak performance of
the transaction portfolio. The weak portfolio performance
significantly impacts the analysis of the junior equity tranches.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes and rated
equity

The overcollateralization ratio of the Class A Notes have improved
since the rating action in July 2009. The Class A
overcollateralization ratio was reported at 129.67% versus June
2009 reported (where July 2009 rating actions were based on) level
of 121.89%. The overcollateralization test is currently in
compliance.

Moody's confirmed the current ratings of Class B notes considering
the weak credit performance of the current portfolio and in
particular the current level of assets with a credit quality
equivalent to Caa or lower. Assets Caa or lower still constitute a
large portion of the pool, making up approximately 13.38% of the
underlying portfolio (versus 16.93% in June 2009), which is deemed
high compared to the current collateralization of class B notes
and the limited capacity of the transaction to generate excess
spread.

The reported WARF is currently 3258 compared to 2770 in the June
2009 report However, this reported WARF overstates the actual
deterioration in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR273.7 million,
defaulted par of EUR12.36 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.27% (consistent with a WARF of 3030), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.50% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average
spread of 2.98%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 93.7% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant levels due to
the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


TBS INTERNATIONAL: Receives Non-Compliance Notice from Nasdaq
-------------------------------------------------------------
TBS International plc, on Sept. 28, 2011, received formal
notification from The Nasdaq Stock Market that it was not in
compliance with Nasdaq's continued listing standard under Nasdaq
Listing Rule 5450(a)(1).  The Company failed to meet this listing
standard because the closing bid price for the Company's ordinary
shares for each trading day in the 30-day period from Aug. 16,
2011, to Sept. 27, 2011, was less than US$1.00.  The Company has
180 days, or until March 26, 2012, to regain compliance by having
the closing bid price of the Company's ordinary shares be at least
US$1.00 for 10 consecutive trading days.  If the Company fails to
regain compliance, Nasdaq will provide written notification to the
Company that the Company's ordinary shares will be subject to
suspension and delisting procedures.  During the 180 day cure
period, and subject to compliance with the Nasdaq's other
continued listing standards, the Company expects that its ordinary
shares will continue to be listed on Nasdaq.

The Company intends to actively monitor the bid price of its
ordinary shares and, if its ordinary shares do not trade at a
level likely to result in the Company regaining compliance during
the cure period, will consider available options to regain
compliance with Nasdaq's continued listing requirements.  Such
options may include modifications of the Company's outstanding
debt obligations or a reverse stock split.

                   About TBS International plc

Dublin, Ireland-based TBS International plc (NASDAQ: TBSI)
-- http://www.tbsship.com/-- provides worldwide shipping
solutions to a diverse client base of industrial shippers through
its Five Star Service: ocean transportation, projects,
operations, port services and strategic planning.  The TBS
shipping network operates liner, parcel and dry bulk services,
supported by a fleet of multipurpose tweendeckers and
handysize/handymax bulk carriers, including specialized heavy-
lift vessels and newbuild tonnage.  TBS has developed its
franchise around key trade routes between Latin America and
China, Japan and South Korea, as well as select ports in North
America, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

The Company's selected balance sheet data at June 30, 2011, showed
US$662.84 million in total assets, US$336.38 million in total
debt, and US$268.43 million in total shareholders' equity.

The Company reported a net loss of US$247.76 million on US$411.83
million of total revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010,
compared with a net loss of US$67.04 million on US$302.51 million
of total revenue during the prior year.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  PwC believes
that the Company will not be in compliance with the financial
covenants under its credit facilities during 2011, which under
the agreements would make the debt callable.  According to PwC,
this has created uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to
fulfill its financial commitments as they become due.

As reported in the TCR on Feb. 8, 2011, TBS International on
Jan. 31, 2011, announced that it had entered into amendments to
its credit facilities with all of its lenders, including AIG
Commercial Equipment, Commerzbank AG, Berenberg Bank and Credit
Suisse and syndicates led by Bank of America, N.A., The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc and DVB Group Merchant Bank (the "Credit
Facilities").  The amendments restructure the Company's debt
obligations by revising the principal repayment schedules under
the Credit Facilities, waiving any existing defaults, revising
the financial covenants, including covenants related to the
Company's consolidated leverage ratio, consolidated interest
coverage ratio and minimum cash balance, and modifying other
terms of the Credit Facilities.

The Company currently expects to be in compliance with all
financial covenants and other terms of the amended Credit
Facilities through maturity.

As a condition to the restructuring of the Company's credit
facilities, three significant shareholders who also are key
members of TBS' management agreed on Jan. 25, 2011, to provide up
to US$10 million of new equity in the form of Series B Preference
Shares and deposited funds in an escrow account to facilitate
satisfaction of this obligation.  In partial satisfaction of this
obligation, on Jan. 28, 2011, these significant shareholders
purchased an aggregate of 30,000 of the Company's Series B
Preference Shares at US$100 per share directly from TBS in a
private placement.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BERICA 6: Moody's Confirms Rating on EUR8.565M D Notes at 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of the Class
A2, Class C and Class D notes and has downgraded the Class B notes
issued by Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l. (Berica 6). A detailed
list of ratings affected by this action is provided at the end of
the press release.

The rating of the Class A2 notes was placed on review following
the implementation on March 2 2011 of Moody's rating guidance
entitled "Global Structured Finance Operational Risk Guidelines:
Moody's Approach to Analyzing Performance Disruption Risk". The
Class B, Class C and Class D notes were placed on review on May
20, 2011 because of worse-than- expected collateral performance.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action concludes the review and takes into account :
(i) the deterioration of the collateral performance since the
latest review of the assumptions, (ii) the structural changes put
in place to mitigate operational risk in the structure and (iii)
the increased credit enhancement available in the structure
following the repurchase of defaulted loans by the originator.

The future losses (expected loss) and the Moody's Individual Loan
Analysis (MILAN) Aaa Credit Enhancement (Milan Aaa CE) are the two
key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, which is used in the cash flow model to rate European RMBS
transactions.

Moody's confirmation of the senior note is mainly driven by the
measures put in place to mitigate operational risk and by the
increase of the available credit enhancement in the structure. The
main rationale for the downgrade of the Class B note is the
revision of the expected loss assumption and the increase in the
MILAN Aaa CE that is not sufficiently offset by the increase in
the credit enhancement. The rating action takes into account the
likelihood that the interest deferral triggers are breached for
both Class B and C and also the likely amortization of Class D
notes .

Portfolio Expected Loss

Moody's has reassessed its expected loss assumption for Berica 6
taking into account the collateral performance to date as well as
the current macroeconomic environment in Italy. Berica 6 is
performing worse than anticipated as of the last rating action on
10 March 2009. The cumulative defaults as a percentage of the
original portfolio balance amount to 6.17% , up from 3.8% as of
the payment date in January 2009. 90+ delinquencies are stable at
4% of the current balance. Considering the current amount of
cumulative defaults together with a roll rate analysis for the non
defaulted pool Moody's has increased its cumulative default rate
assumptions to 9.5% from 6.7% of the closing pool balance. After
also having updated the severity assumption the expected loss has
been increased to 3.0% from 2.5% of the current pool balance.

MILAN Aaa CE

The MILAN Aaa credit enhancement assumption has been revised to
11.5% up from 8.2%. The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa credit
enhancement increase are: (i) the exposure to foreigner borrowers
corresponding to approximately 25% of the current pool balance,
which according to the default data that Moody's has received from
the BPVI group has experienced default rates three times higher
than borrowers born in Italy; and (ii) the relatively high portion
of loans that are more the 90 days in arrears delinquent (3.9% of
the loans in the portfolio). After the repurchase of the defaulted
loans the credit enhancement available to the Class A2 is
approximately 16.8%.

Operational Risk

The mortgage loans in the transaction were originated by Banca
Popolare di Vicenza S.c.p.A. (BPVI) and Banca Nuova S.p.A. (BN)
and they both act as servicer for their part of the portfolio with
BPVI (not rated) acting as Master Servicer for the whole
portfolio. The issuer will appoint a back-up servicer to the
transaction should the servicer's credit profile not fulfill the
criteria defined in a confidential side letter. In this side
letter an agreement will be signed between Securitisation Services
SpA, acting as BUS-facilitator, BPVI and the issuer, whereby the
BUS-facilitator is obliged to monitor the credit profile of BPVI.
In Moody's opinion the variables that are mentioned in the
agreement have a similar forward looking value as a public rating.
If the BUS-facilitator finds that the credit profile of BPVI was
at a level below a comparable investment grade institution, or if
the BUS-facilitator were not to receive relevant updated
information, then BPVI would no longer fulfill the criteria
defined in the agreement. In that case the BUS-facilitator will
step in and help find a BUS to be appointed to the transaction.

Furthermore, should the Servicer Report not be available at any
payment date, continuity of payments for rated notes will be
assured as the Calculation Agent, on a best effort basis, will
prepare the payment report on estimates: in this case only the
amounts of interest to the rated notes and items in priority
thereto will be paid.

Additional credit enhancement in the transaction following the
repurchase of defaulted loans by the originators

BPVI and BN have agreed to purchase from the issuer approximately
EUR39.0 million (BPVI purchase around EUR36.0 million and BN
around EUR3.0 million) of defaulted mortgage loans. The price is
equal to the current principal amount outstanding of the mortgage
loans plus any accrued interest and unpaid interest and fees.
Moody's has concluded that the potential claw back risk is
sufficiently mitigated by the certificates of solvency provided by
the purchasers to the issuer. For a detailed analysis of this risk
please refer to the press release "Moody's updates on Berica 6
Residential MBS S.r.l., Italian RMBS", dated December 23, 2009.

The proceeds of the repurchase of defaulted loans will be applied
as revenue funds to the interest waterfall. The priority of
payment has been amended so that instead of leaking out as
deferred consideration to the Class E noteholders the proceeds
will be credited to the Cash Reserve. As of the next interest
payment date the cash reserve will be replenished to its target
amount, which is expected by BPVI to be around EUR16.6 million. An
additional amount of EUR21.5 will also be retained and credited to
the Cash Reserve. The resulting cash reserve will correspond to
around 5.6% of the Class A2, Class B and Class C notes and will
also provide additional liquidity to the structure.

Pro-Rata amortization and amortization of the Class D notes

The Servicer has confirmed that as of the next payment date the
amortization of the notes will switch to pro-rata since all the
conditions for switching to pro-rata are expected to be satisfied
after the repurchase of the defaulted loans.

In addition after the repurchase is completed the Cumulative Net
Default Ratio will be equal to 0% and the Cash Reserve will be
allowed to amortize as it is expected to be filled up to its
target. All amounts released from the cash reserve will be applied
to redeem the Class D notes. BPVI has estimated that around EUR300
thousand of the Cash Reserve will be used to redeem the Class D
Notes as of the next payment date. Moody's notes that the
amortization of the Class D notes will reduce the amount of credit
enhancement available in the structure. The amortization of the
class D notes in each period will be equal to the difference
between EUR8 million plus 1.3% of the then current balance of the
Class A to Class C notes at that payment date and the amount
calculated in the same way at the previous payment date.

Interest Subordination Triggers on the Class B and Class C notes

In case the Cumulative Defaults Ratio is greater than 12% then the
interest payments on the Class B and the Class C notes will be
made junior to the amounts due on Principal Deficiency Ledger. The
Cumulative Default Ratio is calculated as the total amount of
defaulted loans since the inception of the deal and will not be
modified by the repurchase of the defaulted assets.

RATING METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodologies used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa,
published in October 2009. Other methodologies used in this rating
were Moody's Approach to Rating Italian RMBS, published in
December 2004 and Revising Default/Loss Assumptions Over the Life
of an ABS/RMBS Transaction published in December 2008. Please see
the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these
methodologies.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal at par with respect to the Class A2, Class B
and Class C notes on or before the legal final maturity date of
the notes. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

LIST OF AFFECTED SECURITIES

Issuer: Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l.

   -- EUR1185M A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar
      2, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR42.8M B Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May
      20, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR28.6M C Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on May
      20, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR8.565M D Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May
      20, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Leopard CLO IV B.V.:

   -- EUR26.25M Euro 26,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating
      Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR15.5M Euro 15,500,000 Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7M Euro 7,000,000 Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable
      Fixed Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20.65M Euro 20,650,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR11.25M Euro 11,250,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Euro 10,000,000 Class O Combination Notes due 2022
      (currently EUR6.11M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded
      to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6M Euro 6,000,000 Class W Combination Notes due 2022
      (currently EUR4.33M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded
      to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade Review for Possible
      Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class W,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. For Class O, the 'Rated Balance'
is equal at any time to the principal amount of the Combination
Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made
from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Leopard CLO IV B.V., issued in May 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by M&G
Investment Management Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 23 February 2012. The portfolio is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans (83.1%) as well as
some second lien loans (14.1%), mezzanine loans (2%) and HY bonds
(0.8%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The reported WARF has increased from 2539 to 2813 between October
2009 and August 2011. However, the change in reported WARF
understates the actual credit quality improvement because of the
technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on 1 September 2010. The
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in December 2009. The Class A/B, Class C
and Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 126.89%, 117.71%, 110.39% and 106.77%, respectively, versus
October 2009 levels of 124.32%, 115.33%, 108.15% and 104.61%,
respectively and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 365.64
million, defaulted par of EUR 3.23 million, a weighted average
default probability of 20% (consistent with a WARF of 2833), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.88% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted
average spread of 3.04%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 82% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. Because approximately 14% of non first lien
loans assets in the portfolio are second-lien loans, Moody's also
considered a scenario with a higher weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 45.14% for a Aaa liability rating. This is
assuming that the second-lien loans would recover 25% upon default
instead of 10%.

In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 65% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread and diversity score. However, as part of
the base case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the
covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported
and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


PDM CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------Moody's
Investors Service has confirmed and upgraded the ratings of these
notes issued by PDM CLO I B.V.

Issuer: PDM CLO I B.V.

   -- EUR208,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023 Notes (current notional of 202,553,709), Confirmed
      at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR11,250,000 Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR17,250,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR16,500,000 Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR13,500,000 Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

PDM CLO I B.V issued in June 2008, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by Permira
Debt Managers Limited and will be in its reinvestment period until
February 2015.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have slightly
increased since the last rating action in May 2011. The Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 139.25%, 131.93%, 122.08%, 113.94% and 108.05%
respectively, versus April 2011 levels of 136.82%, 129.62%,
119.95%, 111.95% and 106.16% respectively. All related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Reported WARF has remained relatively stable between June 2011 and
August 2011, changing from 2726 to 2709.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 282.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 22.54%
(consistent with a WARF of 2937), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 43.90% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 30 and a weighted average spread of 2.85%. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's
assumed that 78% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured
corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, whilst 17% of the
portfolio exposed to non first-lien loan corporate assets would
recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Because the transaction has a substantial remaining reinvestment
period, Moody's also supplemented its base case analysis by
considering a possible extension of the actual weighted average
life of the portfolio by up to three years.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 68% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average spread.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


INSURANCE CO: S&P Reassesses Stand-alone Credit Profile to 'bb+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB-' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Russia-based insurance company CJSC Insurance Co. Transneft (IC
Transneft). The outlook is stable. "At the same time, we affirmed
our 'ruAAA' Russia national scale ratings. We have revised our
assessment of IC Transneft's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to
'bb+' from 'bb'," S&P related.

"The revision of the SACP reflects our opinion that IC Transneft
has improved its financial profile, including its investments,
liquidity, operating performance, and financial flexibility," S&P
said.

The long-term rating on IC Transneft incorporates a one-notch
uplift from the SACP to reflect support from IC Transneft's
ultimate parent, Russia-based pipeline operator OAO AK Transneft
(Transneft, BBB/Stable/--).

"The ratings on IC Transneft also reflect our view of the
company's long-standing and strategic business relationship with
Transneft, its good capitalization, and good operating
performance. These positive factors are offset by IC Transneft's
relatively small size and limited franchise in the open market, as
well as a degree of credit and counterparty concentration risk
in its investment portfolio," S&P related.

"We derive the ratings on IC Transneft from its SACP, and add a
one-notch uplift based on our assessment of support from its
ultimate owner Transneft. In line with our criteria, we rate IC
Transneft primarily from a parent-subsidiary perspective, taking
as a reference the SACP on Transneft. The stable outlook reflects
our expectation that IC Transneft will continue to maintain a
strong relationship with Transneft while showing sound operating
results and adequate capitalization levels supported by adequate
reinsurance protection. We expect that IC Transneft will be able
to maintain combined ratios below 80%, which compares well with
its regional peers," S&P related.

Because the ratings on IC Transneft are at the same level as the
SACP of its parent Transneft, a positive rating action is
unlikely. Furthermore, a positive reassessment of Transneft's SACP
would not necessarily result in a positive rating action on IC
Transneft without improvement in the latter's SACP.

A significant deterioration of earnings, capitalization, or
quality of IC Transneft's investment portfolio could lead to a
negative rating action. "Although we currently consider it
unlikely that Transneft would change its supportive stance toward
its insurance subsidiary, such a scenario could place downward
pressure on the ratings. We could remove the one-notch uplift to
the ratings on IC Transneft if we negatively reassess the parent's
SACP," S&P stated.


SOVCOMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these scale ratings to
Sovcombank: an E+ standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR), and B2 long-term and Not Prime short-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on Sovcombank's IFRS
financial statements for 2010 (audited) and for the first six-
months of 2011 (unaudited).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, Sovcombank's E+ BFSR, which maps to B2 on
the long-term scale, reflects the bank's: (i) high credit risk
appetite combined with the concentrated single-name exposures in
the loan book and securities portfolio in which the 20 largest
credit exposures exceed 200% of Tier I capital, (ii) high exposure
to single-sector risk, given its status as a monoline consumer
lender (consumer loans accounted for 54% of the gross loan book as
of end-June 2011 and (iii) excessive appetite for market risk,
whereby investments in securities (predominantly single-B rated
bonds) historically exceed 200% of the bank's Tier I capital.

However, Moody's notes that Sovcombank's ratings are underpinned
by: (i) the bank's established business franchise in the consumer
lending segment, which, in addition to the wide and geographically
diversified distribution network (213 branches in 30 Russian
regions), exhibits high profitability and strong operating
efficiency (return on average assets: 6.3%; cost-to-income ratio:
26.6% -- H1 2011 data), and (ii) the high return on equity (47.7%
in H1 2011).

Sovcombank's B2 local and foreign-currency deposit ratings do not
incorporate any systemic support, and are based on the bank's B2
standalone credit strength.

According to Moody's, any possible upgrade of Sovcombank's ratings
will be contingent on the bank's ability to reduce the level of
its single-name exposures combined with a lower appetite for
market risk.

Conversely, the rating agency observes that negative pressure
could be exerted on Sovcombank's BFSR and long-term deposit
ratings in the event of: (i) any performance deterioration of the
bank's key business segment, i.e. consumer lending or (ii) any
increase in the bank' appetite for market or liquidity risk.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007. Please see the
Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these
methodologies.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Sovcombank reported total assets
of RUB45.7 billion (US$1.6 billion) under IFRS (unaudited) as of
end-June 2011, up 5.5% compared to YE2010. The bank's net profit
totalled RUB1.4 billion (US$50 million) as of end-June 2011, a
130% increase compared to end-June 2010.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAJA VITAL: Moody's Reviews Rating on 'D+' BFSR for Upgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
upgrade the Baa3 long-term debt and deposit ratings, the Ba1
subordinated debt rating and the D+ (mapping to Ba1 on the long-
term scale) bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of Bilbao
Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK). Moody's also placed BBK's Prime-3 short-term
debt and deposit ratings on review for possible upgrade.

At the same time, Moody's has placed on review for possible
downgrade the A3 long-term debt and deposit ratings and the C
(mapping to a A3 on the long-term scale) BFSR of Caja de Ahorros
de Vitoria y Alava (Caja Vital). Caja Vital's short-term debt and
deposit ratings have been affirmed at Prime-2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating announcement reflects the approval by the assemblies of
BBK, Caja Vital and Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Guipuzkoa
y San Sebastian (Kutxa, unrated), on September 16 and 23, 2011,
respectively, to create a new commercial bank named Kutxa Bank
S.A. (Kutxa Bank) to which the three savings banks will transfer
all of their assets and liabilities except the social welfare. The
capital of Kutxa Bank will be 57% owned by BBK, 32% by Kutxa and
11% by Caja Vital.

Upon the completion of the transfer, the savings banks will no
longer conduct any type of banking activities and will only be
responsible for managing their social welfare projects, which will
be funded through the dividends paid by the new bank. Kutxa Bank
will be liable for all the debt obligations of BBK, Caja Vital and
Kutxa.

Moody's decision to place BBK's ratings on review for possible
upgrade is driven by Moody's view that the combined entity
emerging after the integration with Caja Vital and Kutxa is likely
to have a stronger credit profile than BBK's standalone credit
strength. Moody's preliminary assessment of the creditworthiness
of Kutxa Bank is based on the current standalone credit strength
of BBK and Caja Vital, as well as on the financial information
publicly disclosed by Kutxa.

Moody's also believes that the new group is likely to have weaker
financial fundamentals relative to those currently displayed by
Caja Vital. To reflect a potentially lower rating for the combined
entity, all of Caja Vital's ratings except the short-term debt and
deposit Prime-2 ratings have been placed on review for possible
downgrade.

FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

Moody's rating review will focus on:

* An assessment of the expected losses embedded in Kutxa Bank's
  asset portfolios. This will provide a key input to the
  determination of the new entity's risk absorption capacity, its
  ability to withstand a deterioration in its loan book, and its
  capacity to generate capital through stressed core earnings and
  other capital-growth initiatives.

* The credit risk concentration (by borrower and industry) as a
  percentage of Tier-1 and pre-provision income of Kutxa Bank.

* The ability of the new entity to address debt maturities in
  light of the ongoing system-wide constraints to access the
  capital markets for long-term funding.

* The pro-forma risk-adjusted recurring profitability and cost
  efficiency indicators of the combined entity.

* Kutxa Bank's corporate governance (i.e., related-party lending
  as a percentage of its Tier-1 capital).

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007 and Moody's
Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt
published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Bilbao, Spain, BBK reported total consolidated
assets of EUR 45.2 billion as of 30 June 2011.

Headquartered in Vitoria, Caja Vital reported total consolidated
assets of EUR 8.6 billion as of 30 June 2011.

Headquartered in San Sebastian; Kutxa reported total consolidated
assets of EUR 20.9 billion as of 30 June 2011.


NCG BANCO: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned long and short-term debt
and deposit ratings of Baa3/Prime-3 and a standalone bank
financial strength rating of D+ (mapping to Ba1 on the long-term
scale) to a new entity, NCG Banco. All of the ratings of NCG Banco
are on review for possible downgrade, reflecting the challenges
that NCG Banco faces in terms of its deteriorating funding
metrics, asset quality and profitability.

The rating assignment follows the transfer (effective as of 14
September 2011) of the financial business of the savings bank,
Caja de Ahorros de Galicia, Vigo, Ourense y Pontevedra
(Novacaixagalicia) to NCG Banco. Moody's rates NCG Banco's dated
subordinated debt Ba1, its junior subordinated debt Ba2 (hyb), its
preferred shares at B2 (hyb), and government-guaranteed debt at
Aa2.

At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn Novacaixagalicia's D+ BFSR
(which mapped to Ba3 on the long-term scale), the Baa3/Prime-3
long and short-term deposit ratings and the Baa3 long-term issuer
rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Following the transfer of the financial business, the ratings
assigned to NCG Banco are at the same level as those formerly
assigned to Novacaixagalicia. Following the transfer, NCG Banco is
liable for the deposits and debt obligations of Novacaixagalicia.
All of Novacaixagalicia's other ratings have subsequently been
withdrawn.

NCG Banco, a wholly owned subsidiary of Novacaixagalicia, was
created as part of the savings bank's recapitalisation plan, which
involves the transfer of Novacaixagalicia's financial business to
a commercial bank, a precondition imposed by the recent Royal
Decree 2/2011 for savings banks if they are to receive public
funds in the form of capital, as these institutions do not have
share capital.

Following the transfer of the financial business,
Novacaixagalicia's role is to manage the social welfare projects
financed through dividends paid by NCG Banco; it also acts as the
holding company of NCG Banco.

RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

The rating review reflects the weaker financial profile of the
bank, even after taking into account the EUR2,465 million capital
injection committed by the state-owned fund ("FROB", Fund for the
Orderly Restructuring of the Banking System) as part of the
entity's recapitalization plan that was presented to Bank of Spain
at end-April 2011. Despite the clear benefits of the FROB's
capital injection, Moody's notes that it may not sufficiently
protect NCG Banco against further expected losses under a more
conservative scenario, in the context of the entity's weak risk-
absorption capacity and Spain's weak economic outlook. The rating
agency believes that NCG Banco will continue to face important
challenges given the bank's deteriorating asset quality, funding
metrics and profitability.

For H1 2011, NCG Banco's net income decreased to EUR26 million
compared with EUR107 million at end-December. Asset quality
continues to deteriorate, with a problem loan ratio of 7.5% at
end-June 2011, above the system average of 6.4%; and a non-earning
asset ratio (problem loans plus real-estate assets owned by the
bank, as a percentage of its loan book) of 14% at end-June 2011.

The review for downgrade on NCG Banco's senior debt and deposit
ratings of Baa3 reflects the review for downgrade on its
standalone credit profile. Moody's rating review will focus on
these issues:

i) The degree of systemic support, via its new majority
shareholder (FROB).

ii) The commitment of the FROB to provide alternative liquidity if
needed, as NCG Banco presents sizable refinancing requirements
over the next 12 months.

iii) The bank's medium-term strategy as part of its
recapitalization plan and incorporation of the FROB as majority
shareholder.

iv) The impact on NCG Banco's standalone credit profile of a
greater-than-expected deterioration in its risk-absorption
capacity.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Vigo, Spain, NGC Banco had total assets of
EUR76.1 billion as of end-June 2011.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Has Yet to Receive EUR70-Mil. Bridge Financing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Veronica Ek at Reuters reports that Saab Automobile has not yet
received the EUR70 million (US$93 million) worth of bridge
financing it needs to survive while it restructures under court
protection.

Saab, which has scarcely produced a car for six months, said in
mid-September the money was part of a license agreement with
Chinese car firm Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile, Reuters
recounts.

"The money has not come in yet.  We originally thought it would
take about two weeks.  The process is ongoing, and we will give
information as soon as we have the money", Saab spokesman Eric
Geers told Reuters.  "It is hard to say exactly when this process
will be finished.  But it will be soon," he added.  He would not
comment on how long Saab, owned by Swedish Automobile, could make
it without the funds.

In a separate report, The Local relates that China's Geely, owner
of Volvo Cars, has indicated an interest in acquiring a stake in
Saab.

According to the Dagens Nyheter (DN) newspaper, Saab's Chinese
partner Youngman, which had previously promised to pay the cash-
strapped car maker SEK640 million (US$93 million), may be backing
out of the deal.

Instead, Geely, which acquired Volvo from Ford in 2010, has
expressed an interest in Saab.

According to The Local, a source told Dagens Nyheter (DN)
newspaper that "One sign of this is that Geely has approached
Saab's reconstructor, lawyer Guy Lofalk."

Mr. Lofalk, the court-appointed administrator of Saab's
reconstruction, recently visited China as a part of his work on
Saab's reorganization, The Local relates.

According to DN, Geely has been watching Saab's struggles with
interest, but has stayed cautious about entering the fray, The
Local notes.

However, amid fears that a Saab bankruptcy could mean the end of
the brand, the Chinese automaker appears to view ownership as a
viable option, The Local states.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Saab has sought creditor protection to give it time until a
promised investment of EUR245 million from car firms Pangda
Automobile Trade Co. Ltd. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile
gets the nod from Chinese authorities.

Saab on Sept. 19 said it has arranged EUR70 million (US$96
million) in bridge financing with the help of a Chinese
guarantee.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
ToolsAB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 20.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


AVTOSBOROCHNIY ZAVOD: Cherkasy Starts Bankruptcy Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------------
Concorde Capital, citing Interfax, reports that the Economic Court
of Cherkasy region started bankruptcy proceedings against
Avtosborochniy Zavod #3.

Avtosborochniy Zavod #3 is a subsidiary of Bogdan Motors.  The
company was created in 2005 as part of an investment project in
Cherkasy, with a planned annual capacity of 15,000 trucks, which
ended in 2008 and cost around UAH100 million.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRICK UP: Goes Into Administration, Restaurant Case Delayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
thisisbath.co.uk reports that a health and safety case against the
Hole in the Wall has been delayed after its owner, Brick Up Ltd.,
went into administration.

Bath and North East Somerset Council's environmental health team
had been pursuing charges relating to kitchen hygiene standards
and out of date food being served at the Hole in the Wall, in
George Street, according to thisisbath.co.uk.

The report notes that the case has once again been adjourned, and
the council is now assessing how best to move forward.

Hole in the Wall has strenuously denied the eight charges, which
relate to February of this year and include allegations that
portions of steak and guinea fowl which were past their use by
date were found in the kitchen, the report discloses.

The news agency notes that Hole in the Wall said the council
damaged the business by continuing with the legal action despite
improvements at the restaurant.

Senior Trading Standards Officer Robin Wood said the council was
looking at the case and discussing how best to proceed, the report
says.

The Hole in the Wall is now under new ownership and remains open
for business but no information has been revealed about the buyer,
the report adds.


LIMAVADY GEAR: Sean Blaney Rescues Firm Out of Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Belfast Telegraph reports that businessman Sean Blaney said he
aims to bring jobs and engineering skills back to the North West
after rescuing Limavady Gear Company's plant and premises in the
region.

Sean Blaney fought off severe competition from overseas buyers to
the firm, according to Belfast Telegraph.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 26,
2010, BBC News said that The Limavady Gear Company has gone into
administration, putting 27 jobs at risk.  A significant number of
redundancies will be made, BBC said, citing the company's
administrators.

Belfast Telegraph notes that Mr. Blaney plans to restart the
business as 'Blaney Gears' and invest and expand in the company's
capabilities, products and services.  The report relates that
Mr. Blaney said that he hopes to recruit five staff following the
launch of the business in a fortnight's time and aims to employ up
to 20 people within the company in the next three years.

Based at the former Seagate factory, The Limavady Gear Company is
an engineering firm.  The firm specializes in precision
engineering and manufacturing for heavy industry.


PEDLEY FURNITURE: Employees Lose Jobs as Firm Goes Bust
-------------------------------------------------------
saffronwaldenweeklynews.co.uk reports that administrators of
Pedley Furniture International Limited said that the remaining 33
employees at the Saffron Walden firm have been made redundant
after a sale of the Shire Hill business fell through.

The hotel furniture business was put in the hands of
administrators in July following "cash flow difficulties,"
according to saffronwaldenweeklynews.co.uk.

"Since we were appointed as joint administrators to Pedley
Furniture International on July 22, our aim has been to sell the
business as a going concern. . . . to this end, we entered into a
licence agreement with MJM, an established furniture manufacturer
based in Northern Ireland, to continue production through
September.  Despite conducting extensive discussions with MJM
regarding a sale, unfortunately MJM has confirmed that it will not
be purchasing Pedley Furniture International. . . . We have not
been able to find any other parties interested in acquiring the
business so it is with regret that we have had to make the
employees redundant," Jason Baker, joint administrator from FRP
Advisory LLP, said in a statement obtained by the news agency.

Pedley Furniture International Limited operates a hotel furniture
business.


* UK: Banks Increasingly Likely to Pull Plug on Retailers
---------------------------------------------------------
Claer Barrett at The Financial Times reports that insolvency
professionals claim that banks are increasingly likely to pull the
plug on struggling retail businesses as conditions worsen across
the sector.

According to the FT, falling sales, rising inflation, increased
discounting and freak weather events are squeezing retail margins,
leaving smaller chains vulnerable to a cash flow crisis.

In such a volatile trading environment, quarterly tests on banking
covenants can easily be broken, the FT states.

"In the last five months, we have had a steady stream of small
retailers coming to our door asking if we'd care to buy some
equity for a credit line as their banks are telling them they have
no more headroom," the FT quotes one director of a fund that
invests in distressed businesses as saying.

The problems are by no means confined to the listed retail sector,
the FT notes.  Privately owned retailers are considered to be more
vulnerable, and those with pre-existing health conditions are the
most at risk of losing the support of their lenders, according to
the FT.

Insolvency professionals are nervously preparing to revisit
restructuring deals struck in the aftermath of the credit crunch
in 2008 that are now coming unstuck due to tough trading
conditions, the FT discloses.

For retailers with cash flow issues, a big squeeze from a tax
demand or quarterly rental payment falling due could be enough to
tip them over the edge, the FT says.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Nervous Hedge Funds Hit Resistance on European-Bank Trades
------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review that in another sign of market
participants exercising caution amid fragile market conditions, a
number of hedge funds late last month tried to reduce their
exposure to European banks with Credit Suisse Group using
derivatives, but the Swiss dealer declined to take some of their
trades, according to a person familiar with the matter.


* Germany, Spain Snuff Hopes for E.U. Super-Bailout Option
----------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that an idea that
tantalized global financial markets sank into the tar pit of
European decision making.


* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement
---------------------------------------------------------
Authors:  Robert J. Buchanan, Ph.D., and James D. Minor, J.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 300 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

With Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement, Buchanan, a
professor in the School of Public Health at Texas A&M, and Minor,
an attorney, have come up with an invaluable resource for lawyers
and anyone else seeking an introduction to the legal and social
issues related to Medicare and Medicaid.  The administrative costs
of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement have been a heated topic of
debate among public officials and administrators of provider
healthcare organizations, especially health maintenance
organizations.  Although inflation and the use of costly medical
technology are key factors in the rise in Medicare and Medicaid
costs, some control can be gained through appropriate compliance,
using more efficient procedures and better detection of fraud.
This work is a major guide on how to go about doing this.
Though mostly a legal treatise, Legal Aspects of Health Care
Reimbursement, first published in 1985, also offers commentary
through legislative and regulatory analyses, thereby explaining
how healthcare reimbursement policies affect the solvency and
effectiveness of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
In discussing how legislation and regulations affect the solvency
and effectiveness of government-provided healthcare, the authors
offer insight into the much-publicized and much-discussed issue of
runaway healthcare costs.  Buchanan and Minor do not deny that
healthcare costs are out of control and are onerous for the
government and ruinous for many individuals.  But healthcare
reimbursement policies are not the cause of this, the authors
argue.  To make their case, they explain how the laws and
regulations in different areas of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs create processes that are largely invisible to the
public, but make the programs difficult to manage financially. The
processes are not well thought out nor subject to much quality
control, with the result that fraud is chronic and considerable.

The areas of Medicare covered in the book are inpatient hospital
reimbursement, long-term care, hospice care, and end-stage renal
disease.  The areas of Medicaid covered are inpatient hospital and
long-term care plus abortion and family planning services. For
each of these areas, the authors discuss the conditions for
receiving reimbursement, the legislation and regulations regarding
reimbursement, the procedures for being reimbursed, the major
areas of reimbursement (for example, capital-related costs,
dietetic services, rental expenses); and court cases, including
appeals.  Reimbursement practices of selected states are covered.
For each of the major areas of interest, the chapters are
organized in a manner that is similar to that found in reference
books and professional journals for attorneys and accountants.
Laws and regulations are summarized and occasionally quoted with
expert background and commentary supplied by the authors.  With
regard to court cases and rulings pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid, passages from court papers are quoted, references to
legal records are supplied, and analysis is provided. Though the
text delves into legal issues, it is accessible to administrators
and other lay readers who have an interest in the subject matter.
Clear chapter and subchapter titles, a table of cases following
the text, and a detailed index enable readers to use this work as
a reference.

The value of this book is reflected in the authors' ability to
distill great amounts of data down to one readable text.  It
condenses libraries of government and legal documents into a
single work.  Answers to questions of fundamental importance to
healthcare providers -- those dealing with qualifications,
compliance, reimbursable costs, and appeals -- can be found in one
place. Timely reimbursement depends on proper application of the
rules, which is necessary for a provider's sound financial
standing. But the authors specify other reasons for writing this
book, to wit: "Providers should have a general knowledge of the
law and should not rely on manuals and regulations exclusively."
By summarizing, commenting on, and citing cases relating to
principal provisions of Medicare and Medicaid, the authors
accomplish this objective.

The authors also cover the topic of fraud with respect to both
Medicare and Medicaid, offering both a legal treatment and
commentary.  At the end of each chapter is a section titled
"Outlook," which contains a discussion of government studies,
changes in healthcare policy, or other developments that could
affect reimbursement.  Although this work was published over two
decades ago, much of this discussion is still relevant today.
Finally, the book is a call for change.  The authors remark in
their closing paragraph: "Given the increasing for-profit
orientation of the major segments of the health care industry,
proprietary providers should be particularly responsive to new
efficiency incentives" in reimbursement.  In relation to this,
"policymakers [should] develop reimbursement methods that will
encourage providers to become more efficient."

Robert J. Buchanan is currently a professor in the Department of
Health Policy and Management in the School of Rural Public Health
at the Texas A&M University System Health Sciences Center.  James
D. Minor, a former law professor at the University of Mississippi,
has his own law practice.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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