TCREUR_Public/111017.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, October 17, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 205



BDZ: "Technically Insolvent," Transport Minister Says


* DENMARK: Most Banks Likely to Fail Risky Lending Audit


JUKAT EESTI: Da Vinci Invest Seeks Bankruptcy for Firm


KCA DEUTAG: Moody's Upgrades CFR to B3; Outlook Positive
QIMONDA AG: Infineon Adds Provisions Relating to Insolvency


EIRCOM GROUP: Second Lien Lenders to Propose Debt-for-Equity Swap
GSC EUROPEAN: S&P Says 'CCC'-Rated Assets Decreased to 11.06%
NASH POINT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba3'
TAURUS CMBS: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-sf'


AVG HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Definitive 'B1' Rating to Term Loan
ST. PAUL'S CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'


ASMITA GARDENS: Alpha Bank Files Insolvency Petition


ACRON JSC: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
B&N BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on B2 Currency Deposit Ratings
SVIAZ BANK: S&P Assigns 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
TRANSOIL LLC: Moody's Says Acquisition Could Be Credit Negative


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Receives First Payment of Youngman Bridge Loan


* CITY OF DNIPROPETROVSK: S&P Assigns 'B' Local Currency Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALNWICK COMMUNITY: DP Builders Manager Says Demise Not Its Fault
AMBERFIELD SCHOOL: To Go Into Liquidation; Owes GBP1 Million
BROKER ASSISTANCE: MD Buys Firm Out of Administration
CLUB DIANA: Five Businessmen Buy Firm Out of Administration
DISCOVER LEISURE: Goes Into Administration, 250 Jobs at Risk

GP WILLIAMS: Goes Into Administration, Owes GBP30 Million
ICON ENERGY: In Administration Due to Proven Energy's Collapse
LINFORD GROUP: Ceases Trading Due to Insolvency
LUSTY GLAZE: Faces Insolvency, No Funds to Pay Redundancy Bill
PREMIER FOODS: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'

PRIESTLEY CENTRE: In Liquidation; Seeks Buyer for Building
SOUTHERN CROSS: Burstow Warned on Problems Prior to Collapse
UROPA SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B2a Notes
* UNITED KINGDOM: More Construction Firms in Administration


* EUROPE: Banks That Failed Stress Tests Need Urgent Financing
* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 10 to October 14, 2011



BDZ: "Technically Insolvent," Transport Minister Says
----------------------------------------------------- reports that Transport Minister Ivaylo Moskovski
declared the Bulgarian State Railway company BDZ to be
"technically insolvent."

"BDZ is in a technical bankruptcy, and we are now faced with a
huge challenge to take actions that can help heal the company,"
the Transport Minister declared after Thursday's meeting with
syndicate leaders chaired by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and
Finance Minister Simeon Djankov, relates.

Bulgaria's major trade unions continue to threaten an all-out
railway strike as little compromise on their demands has been
reached with the government, notes.

Mr. Moskovski assuaged fears that the state company will run out
of money to pay the salaries of its employees,
discloses.  According to, he said the Transport
Ministry is mulling the shutting down of some railway lines along
routes where alternative transport means can be employed with the
help of State Executive Agency "Automobile Administration", a
subdivision of the ministry.

"The talks between the syndicates and the BDZ management will
continue [this] week as well," quotes the Minister of
Transport as saying.

Vladimir Vladimirov, Chair of the Board of BDZ stated in turn that
the government is making progress with a reform package, and that
the major concern of the unions for a new collective labor
contract is only one of the issues on the agenda,
recounts. relates that he declared "Our goal is to
carry out the reforms and sign a collective labor contract so that
in 2012 BDZ won't generate losses.  If our talks continue, I think
we will reach an agreement."

According to, Mr. Vladimirov explained that "BDZ is
incapable of paying old debts as well as of covering its
operational losses.  The first step for saving the company will be
not to generate operational losses in 2012.  We need to optimize
all activities in order to free funding, and cover old debts."

In addition to the looming general strike, the situation at the
Bulgarian railways is worsening on all fronts after Transport
Ministry sources revealed that BDZ was about to collapse since
German bank KfW demanded back 50 diesel and electric Siemens
trains bought by the Bulgarian government after 2003 because the
BDZ management had violated the purchase contract and had not paid
its installments since 2010, discloses.

Finance Minister Simeon Djankov revealed the massive debts of the
BDZ company total BGN771 million, recounts.  Of
those, BGN531 million are debts to financial institutions, notes.  This revelation came in the wake of an
announcement in September 2011 that for the time being the World
Bank has refused to grant the Bulgarian railways an urgently
needed loan of BGN460 million, which was negotiated in December
2010, states.

According to, another major issue of dispute on the
agenda is the proposed privatization of BDZ Freight Services,
which is traditionally more profitable than the passenger services
of the state company.

Mr. Moskovski vowed to keep up the dialogue and consultations with
the syndicates as the privatization procedure for BDZ Freight
Services is going on, relates.


* DENMARK: Most Banks Likely to Fail Risky Lending Audit
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark's
bank watchdog says most banks being audited as part of a campaign
to clamp down on risky lending will fail an inspection due to be
completed by January.

The Financial Supervisory Authority's review covers lenders
identified by the regulator as "risky" and "in seven out of 10
inspections, we insist on either higher writedowns or higher
solvency requirements," Bloomberg quotes Ulrik Noedgaard, director
general at the FSA, as saying in an interview.

According to Bloomberg, the regulator has warned banks it is
stepping up risk management demands and will no longer tolerate
what Mr. Noedgaard has characterized as "optimistic" reported
writedowns.  Standard & Poor's warned in July that as many as 15
Danish banks may fail before the country's crisis is over,
Bloomberg recounts.  Henning Kruse Petersen, chairman of the
state-backed bank resolution unit, has said Denmark has about 75
too many regional banks, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg says Danish banks are Scandinavia's worst performing as
the industry struggles to emerge from the fallout of a burst
housing bubble and a frozen funding market.  A deepening debt
crisis and looming credit crunch in Europe threaten to exacerbate
financial stresses in Denmark, Bloomberg states.

Adding to pressure on Danish banks is the expiry of a state-backed
guarantee on their debt, Bloomberg notes.  Lenders need to
refinance about DKK158 billion (US$29 billion) by 2013 and will
rely on a DKK400 billion central bank liquidity lifeline to stay
afloat, according to Bloomberg.  The government has said it will
only extend individual guarantees in the event of mergers under
its consolidation bill, Bloomberg notes.


JUKAT EESTI: Da Vinci Invest Seeks Bankruptcy for Firm
Baltic Business News, citing Aripaev, reports that Da Vinci Invest
is seeking to declare Jukat Eesti bankrupt.

"What else can you do if the second party responds after 1.5 years
since receiving the initial claim that the company's all shares
and goods are pledged to the bank and we have no money," BBN
quotes Andrus Braunbrueck, owner of Da Vinci Invest, as saying.

According to BBN, Mr. Braunbrueck said Jukat may have debts of
around EUR70,000.  The court has named a temporary bankruptcy
trustee and seized brandnames Juku Manguasjakeskus and Kaks Karu,
BBN discloses.

Tomas Palevicius, board member of Jukat Eesti, denied that the
company was bankrupt and claimed that the bankruptcy claim was
unclear, BBN relates.  He said that his company has never signed a
contract with Da Vinci Invest, BBN notes.

Estonia-based Jukat Eesti is the owner of Juku toy store chain.


KCA DEUTAG: Moody's Upgrades CFR to B3; Outlook Positive
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 corporate family rating
(CFR) and Caa1 probability of default rating (PDR) to KCA Deutag
Alpha Limited ("KCA Deutag" and the new name for Turbo Alpha
Limited). It has concurrently withdrawn the Caa1 CFR and Caa2 PDR
from KCA Deutag Alpha II Limited. At the same time, Moody's has
confirmed the B3 rating on KCA Deutag's senior credit facilities.
The outlook on all ratings is positive.


The ratings upgrade follows the successful completion on 30 March
2011 of a restructuring, including equitizing mezzanine debt as
well as the injection of US$550 million of new equity into the
group, of which US$300 million was used to pay down senior debt.
The ratings and outlook also reflect the increase in assets
following the acquisition of Global Tender Barges Pte Ltd ("GTB")
in August 2011.

"KCA Deutag's ratings upgrade reflects its improved credit metrics
following the restructuring earlier this year," says Douglas
Crawford, Moody's lead analyst for KCA Deutag. "Although the
company suffered weak performance in the mobile offshore drilling
unit division in the past, the positive outlook reflects the
expectation that the company's increase in capital expenditure and
ramp up of its land rig fleet as well as the addition of the GTB
rigs should enable it to further de-lever going forward."

KCA Deutag reported revenue of US$1.3 billion and EBITDA of US276
million for the year ended December 2010, a decrease of 16% and
14% respectively over the previous year, driven by a fall in
activity in the mobile offshore drilling unit division (MODU).
Despite continuing declines in the MODU division, Moody's expects
revenue to increase in 2011, following the acquisition of GTB and
the ramp up of the 20 land rigs without contracts. However, the
rating agency still expects adjusted gross leverage to end 2011 at
over 5x.

The withdrawal of ratings of KCA Deutag Alpha II Limited and
assignment of a new CFR and PDR at the same level as the senior
secured facilities (KCA Deutag Alpha Limited) solely reflects the
reorganization of the group as a result of the

Moody's regards KCA Deutag's current liquidity as adequate for its
requirements. The company had unrestricted cash of US$92 million
as of August 2011 and US$115 million in availability under its
US$75 million Revolving Credit Facility and US$40 million Working
Capital Facility that mature in 2015. However, although Moody's
notes that free cash flow is expected to be negative through 1H
2012, there are no debt amortization payments due as the term
loans have bullet maturities in 2016 and 2017. Moreover, following
the restructuring, covenant headroom is expected to be adequate at
around 20%.

Moody's would consider a rating upgrade if KCA Deutag's adjusted
debt/EBITDA were to fall below 4.5x while maintaining sufficient
headroom under the bank covenants.

Conversely, the outlook could be stabilized if the expected
deleveraging does not materialize or market conditions worsen.
Additionally, the CFR could face downward pressure if adjusted
debt/EBITDA rises to 6x or if the liquidity profile deteriorates.

The principal methodology used in rating KCA Deutag was the Global
Oilfield Services Rating Methodology published in December 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Registered in England/Wales, UK, KCA Deutag Alpha Limited. is a
holding company for KCA Deutag, a provider of onshore and offshore
drilling services as well as engineering services to both IOCs and
NOCs in international markets. Its ultimate owner is a consortium
led by Pamplona Capital Management and several former Mezzanine
Debt Holders. In 2010, KCA Deutag Alpha Limited reported
consolidated revenues of around US$1.3 billion.

QIMONDA AG: Infineon Adds Provisions Relating to Insolvency
Infineon Technologies AG on October 14 announced preliminary
results for the fourth quarter of the 2011 fiscal year, the
outlook for the first quarter of the 2012 fiscal year and
additional provisions relating to the insolvency of its subsidiary
Qimonda AG.

According to preliminary results for the quarter ended
September 30, 2011, sales of EUR1.038 billion came in essentially
flat with the previous quarter.  Total Segment Result stood at
EUR195 million, down from EUR212 million in the third quarter of
the 2011 fiscal year.  The company's guidance given on
July 28, 2011 called for at least flat turnover and for broadly
unchanged Total Segment Result relative to the third quarter of
the 2011 fiscal year.

Economic uncertainty in light of the European debt crisis and
resulting financial market turmoil drove increasing caution on the
part of Infineon's customers over the course of the quarter. As a
result, Infineon was not able to record revenue growth for the
quarter.  In addition, service agreements expired, under which
Infineon provided services for its former wireless mobile phone
business.  Both factors combined caused the sequential decline in
Segment Result.

For the first quarter of the 2012 fiscal year, while demand in the
automotive markets should remain benign, Infineon expects customer
caution to characterize business in the Industrial & Multimarket
and now also Chip Card & Security end markets.  In total, Infineon
anticipates a mid to high single-digit percentage sequential
revenue decline at a mid teens percentage for Total Segment Result

"In an increasingly challenging market environment we are holding
up well operationally as compared to our peers in the last
quarter," says Peter Bauer, CEO of Infineon.  "We closed an
excellent financial year at all time high revenues and margins.
Our focus on energy efficiency, mobility and security will allow
us to perform very solidly in the now running fiscal year and
throughout the entire economic cycle."

Finally, Infineon also announced that it has taken additional
provisions within its result from discontinued operations totaling
EUR150 million in connection with the insolvency proceedings of
its subsidiary Qimonda.  These provisions were taken after the
insolvency administrator had detailed several claims during the
last quarter.

Infineon will provide additional detail on all above matters as
well as the outlook for the full 2012 fiscal year when it reports
its final results for the fourth quarter and the 2011 fiscal year
on November 16, 2011.


EIRCOM GROUP: Second Lien Lenders to Propose Debt-for-Equity Swap
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that some of the
lenders owed EUR3.7 billion by Eircom Group will table a takeover
proposal as early as this week.

The Eircom story features half a dozen classes of investors all
locked in a battle to come out on top when Eircom "restructures"
its balance sheet, Irish Independent notes.

Analysts say any viable plan must wipe out at least a billion of
debt, according to Irish Independent.

One group in the mix are "second lien" lenders owed EUR350
million, Irish Independent discloses.  The Irish Independent has
learnt that they will offer to swap their loans for a stake in
Eircom, probably alongside managers and Eircom's employees, at
talks today.

The loans might then be reinstated, but without interest payments,
cutting the yearly cost to Eircom, Irish Independent notes.  The
talks are with the top-ranked lenders, not the company or its
owners, Irish Independent states.

Kingmakers in the Eircom talks are the top ranked 'first lien'
lenders owed EUR2.36 billion, Irish Independent discloses.

They are first in line to be repaid and have better loan security
than other investors, Irish Independent notes.

The 'first lien' have the deciding vote over any restructuring
plans so any other group that can secure their support stands a
good chance of recovering money from the Eircom crisis, Irish
Independent says.

On Monday, the second lien lenders will outline their rival plan
to representatives of the top group, Irish Independent discloses.

The second lien lenders are expected to propose taking a loss on
their own loans in exchange for a share in the company, Irish
Independent states.  It is not yet clear if they will offer to put
any new money into the company but it will leave the top Eircom
lenders loss free, Irish Independent notes.0

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 16,
2011, The Irish Times related that Eircom's senior lenders agreed
to a three-month waiver of the covenants relating to EUR2.7
billion worth of debt owed to them by the company.  The waiver
prevents a debt default by Eircom and allows the Irish telecoms
group the breathing space to restructure its loans, The Irish
Times said.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

GSC EUROPEAN: S&P Says 'CCC'-Rated Assets Decreased to 11.06%
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AA- (sf)' its credit
ratings on GSC European CDO V PLC's outstanding EUR208.16 million
class A1 and A2 notes.

"Since we last reviewed this transaction in December 2009 (see
'Transaction Update: GSC European CDO V PLC,' published Dec. 17,
2009), the class A overcollateralization test, as described in the
transaction documents, has been failing. As a result, the issuer
has used interest proceeds to amortize the class A1 and A2 notes.
These classes of notes, which rank pari-passu, have repaid about
EUR9.99 million since our previous review," S&P related.

"On the assets side, we note that the amount of assets that we
consider as defaulted has reduced to 1.73% from 5.84% of the total
collateral since our last review. Furthermore, our analysis also
shows that the amount of assets rated in the 'CCC' category
('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has decreased to 11.06% from 15.09%
since our last review," S&P said.

"As a result, we consider that the level of credit enhancement
available to the class A1 and A2 notes is now consistent with
higher ratings than previously assigned. We have therefore raised
our rating on these classes of notes to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A+
(sf)'," S&P said.

"We note that the issuer currently holds EUR2.46 million of
unhedged non-euro-denominated assets. The portfolio manager has
confirmed that it will not enter into any currency swap for these
assets. Therefore, we did not give credit to these assets in our
cash flow model," S&P said.

"None of the ratings was affected by either the largest obligor
default test or the largest industry default test -- two
supplemental stress tests that we introduced as part of our
criteria update (see 'Update To Global Methodologies And
Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published
Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P said.

BNP Paribas Securities Services (AA/Negative/A-1+) acts as account
bank and custodian. Citibank N.A. (A+/Negative/A-1) and Credit
Suisse International (A+/Stable/A-1) currently provide currency
swaps on an aggregate of EUR20.2 million non-euro-denominated
assets. "We have applied our 2010 counterparty criteria and, in
our view, the participants to the transaction are appropriately
rated to support a 'AA- (sf)' rating (see 'Counterparty and
Supporting Obligations Methodology and Assumptions,' published on
Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

GSC European CDO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-
grade corporate firms.

Ratings List

Class              Rating
         To                     From

GSC European CDO V PLC
EUR310 Million Floating-Rate Notes

A1       AA- (sf)               A+ (sf)
A2       AA- (sf)               A+ (sf)

NASH POINT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Nash point CLO:

Issuer: Nash Point CLO

   -- EUR428.5M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR35M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR35M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR17.5M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR22.5M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible


Nash point CLO, issued in July 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European and US loans. The portfolio is managed
by Sankaty Advisors, LLC. This transaction will be in reinvestment
period until July 25, 2012. It is predominantly composed of senior
secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a stronger
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated September 2011,
the WARF is currently 2715 compared to 3008 in the November 2009
report, and securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately
6.4% of the underlying portfolio versus 10.4% in November 2009.
However, the reported WARF understates the actual improvement in
credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1 September

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR580 million],
defaulted par of EUR9.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 28.00% (consistent with a WARF of 2800), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 45.2% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 57 and a weighted average
spread of 2.92%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 87.5% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming a weighted average spread
consistent with the midpoint between reported and covenanted
values as its base case.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

1) Moody's also notes that around 31.4% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. For risks and stresses
associated with the use of credit estimates, please refer to the
report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations, published in June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

TAURUS CMBS: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-sf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all note classes of Taurus CMBS (Pan-
Europe) 2006-3 plc's class A floating-rate notes as follows:

  -- EUR49.5m class A due May 2015 (XS0274566420) downgraded to
     'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR17.1m class B due May 2015 (XS0274569523) downgraded to
     'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

  -- EUR6.1m class C due May 2015 (XS0274570372) downgraded to
     'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

  -- EUR3.0m class D due May 2015 (XS0274570703) downgraded to
     'B-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

The downgrades reflect lower recovery prospects on the Triumph
loan and a stronger expectation that repayment of the other loan,
K-Berg, will be on a pro-rata basis in spite of the likely prior
default of the Triumph loan.  A combination of reduced loss-
absorbing credit enhancement for senior bonds with higher expected
losses accounts for the downgrades.  The outlook of the class B to
D notes has been revised to negative pending information on the
special servicer's work-out strategy for Triumph. Both loans are
due in early 2013.

The availability of finance for loans secured by German secondary
properties has tightened since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2010.  The Triumph loan, which includes a EUR13.4m B-note,
is estimated to have a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) well in excess of
100% and is therefore unlikely to repay at maturity.  Bond
maturity being in May 2015 means there is limited time within
which the special servicer can renegotiate with the borrower,
which makes legal action more likely than in other cases.  While
not of prime quality, the collateral comprises a single mainly
retail asset in an urban location in Berlin, so its disposition
could be executed without excessive delay -- provided no major
impediments arise from the legal process or as a result of the
complexity of the A/B debt package.

Underlying borrower costs have increased over the life of the
loan, a fact that is not reflected in reported net operating
income (NOI).  While there has been no material change since 2010,
neither have costs reverted to the previous levels, which suggests
that there is a higher structural component to them.  This and the
lack of certainty surrounding a likely work-out rule out the
highest rating on the class A note, although Fitch continues to
believe it is amply collateralized to warrant a high investment
grade rating.

Although the Triumph loan is likely to be in payment default by
the time K-Berg matures in April 2013, it is necessary for this to
persist for over one interest payment date (IPD) to switch
principal pay to a fully-sequential basis.  On this basis Fitch
believes there is a risk that the K-Berg funds will be applied
pro-rata, which strips out some subordination for the classes A, B
and C.  This reinforces the deterioration in fundamentals
described above.

The Triumph loan is secured by the MZ Centre, a large asset used
primarily for retail purposes located in Markisches Viertel, a
mainly residential area in northern Berlin.  The asset consists of
one main shopping centre arranged across a number of buildings as
well as four smaller satellite neighborhood shopping centers.
Fitch estimates a securitized LTV of around 120%.  Although NOI
featuring in the servicer reports is EUR6 million, this does not
include all irrecoverable costs; the actual NOI figure, which is
not publically available information, is materially lower than

The K-Berg loan is secured by a property comprising 10 detached
light industrial/office buildings in Bergdietikon (a catchment
area of Zurich) constructed over various stages between 1959 and
2003.  The property is fully-occupied and is the headquarters of
Soudronic AG, a Swiss company specializing in metal packaging and
automotive welding technologies, on a lease expiring in December
2020.  There have been no issues with the loan since closing.
Fitch's estimated market value of CHF46.5 million (78%/89%
securitized/whole loan LTV) represents a 16% market value decline
since closing.  In line with other Swiss loans, which have
generally performed strongly, Fitch expects this loan to repay in
full at maturity.

The balance of the EPIC loan repaid in full at maturity in 01/2011
and proceeds were allocated pro rata on the February 2011 IPD.
Fitch had expected the loan to repay in full.

Taurus CMBS (Pan Europe) 2006-3 PLC is a securitization currently
comprising three commercial mortgage loans originated by
subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch & Co. ('A+'/RWN/'F1+'), which closed
in November 2006.


AVG HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Definitive 'B1' Rating to Term Loan
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B1 rating to the
US$235 million Term Loan B raised by AVG Holding Cooperatief U.A
and its subsidiary, AVG Technologies N.V.


The final terms of the facilities are in line with the drafts
reviewed for the provisional ratings assignments.

The principal methodology used in rating AVG Holding Cooperatief
U.A was the Global Software Industry Rating Methodology published
in May 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in the Netherlands, AVG is a leading provider of
security software, serving individual consumers and small and
medium-sized businesses. AVG is the world's fourth-largest
Internet security company in terms of installed user base, which
includes approximately 100 million active users. According to AVG,
in the year ended 31 December 2010, the company generated revenues
and adjusted EBITDA of US$217 million and US$94.5 million,

ST. PAUL'S CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by St. Paul's CLO I B.V:

Issuer: St. Paul's CLO I B.V.:

   -- EUR211.05M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.8M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR17.28M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.05M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6.35M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class W Combination Notes due 2023 (currently EUR
      3.62M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR8M Class X Combination Notes due 2023 (currently EUR
      6.10M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes W
and X, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal
amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the
rated coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee. Whilst mention of the Rated Coupon was not
included in the press release issued at closing, dated 21 June
2007, the ratings of combination notes W and X do address the
Rated Coupon and the Rated Coupon has been incorporated in Moody's
analysis both at closing and in all subsequent rating actions.


St. Paul's CLO I B.V, issued in May 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 15 July 2014. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans (88%) as well as mezzanine loans,
second lien loans, CLO securities and HY bonds (12%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in November 2009. The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
127.61%, 118.69%, 110.61% and 108.03%, respectively, versus
September 2009 levels of 125.35%, 116.58%, 108.65% and 106.11%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

The reported WARF has increased from 2810.62 to 2865.52 between
September 2009 and August 2011. The change in reported WARF
understates the actual credit quality improvement because of the
technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 295.61
million, a weighted average default probability of 23.79%
(consistent with a WARF of 3031), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 45.08% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 37 and a weighted average spread of 3%. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's
assumed that 87% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured
corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the
remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 10%.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 61% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread and diversity score.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations, published in June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


ASMITA GARDENS: Alpha Bank Files Insolvency Petition
SeeNews, Romanian daily Ziarul Financiar, reports that Asmita
Gardens residential complex in the Romanian capital Bucharest may
start insolvency proceedings following a request filed by Alpha

According to SeeNews, the daily said Local Alpha Bank, which has
financed the project with EUR70 million (US$96.6 million), filed
the insolvency request on Oct. 10.

The sale of apartments in the EUR120 million residential complex
was halted six months ago, SeeNews recounts.


ACRON JSC: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Acron's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B+'.  The agency has
affirmed Acron's long-term national rating at 'A (rus)' and its
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.  Fitch has also affirmed
the Local currency Senior Unsecured rating for the RUR3.5bn,
RUR3.75bn and RUR3.75bn bond issues at 'B+', Recovery Rating
'RR4', and assigned the Local currency Senior Unsecured rating to
the RUR3.5bn bond issue (matures in November 2013) at 'B+',
Recovery Rating 'RR4'.  The Outlooks on all Long-term ratings are

The affirmations reflect Fitch's view that Acron's financial
profile should offer sufficient headroom to withstand expected
supply-driven pricing pressure and support capex plans in 2012.
The company's liquidity position has improved materially on the
back of the market recovery over the past twelve months.  As
anticipated, Acron has also been able to access debt capital
markets to refinance upcoming maturities and to fund its phosphate
mining project.

The ratings also reflect Acron's progress on the Oleniy Ruchey
phosphate project, which remains on time and budget to come
onstream in late H112.  Natural gas, apatite concentrate
(phosphate rock) and potash costs accounted for nearly 50% of the
Russian plants' COGS in 2010, and Fitch regards the company's
dependency on dominant suppliers as a key constraint on the
ratings.  The ongoing investment program focuses on vertical
integration and should improve the security of supply and input
costs control in the mid to long-term.  Supply and pricing risks
for apatite concentrate are partially mitigated by the supply
contract with JSC Apatit (NR), Russia's leading phosphate
producer, and the Russian potash prices regulations by the Federal
Antimonopoly Service.

Fitch expects Acron to demonstrate mid 30% revenue growth in 2011
and margins improvement driven primarily by the fertilizer price
rally. Nevertheless, the agency expects a noticeable price
correction in 2012 followed by a soft recovery resulting in a one-
digit forecasted revenue growth in 2012-2014.  Input costs
inflation will also result in moderate EBITDAR margin erosion in
the medium term, although Fitch expects margins to remain above
the 20% level.

Underlying cost inflation will be driven by the liberalization of
electricity, rail and natural gas prices in Russia.  Fitch expects
wholesale natural gas tariffs to grow by 15% in the medium-term,
which will negatively affect the cost position of Russian nitrogen
fertilizer producers.  This is partly mitigated by Acron's
efficiency improvements which have yielded a reduction in natural
gas consumption to 1,098 m3 per tonne of ammonia in 2010, from
1,158 m3 per tonne in 2008.

Fitch forecasts Acron's leverage to continue improving in 2011,
driven by improved operating performance.  Fitch assesses Acron's
liquidity and debt maturity structure as strong.  However, Fitch
has concerns that the funding of pending projects may negatively
affect the leverage position in the mid-term.  In particular, the
financing structure of Acron's two potash projects in Urals,
Russia and Saskatchewan, Canada is not fully clarified yet.  Fitch
expects associated cash outflows to start affecting the free cash
flow significantly but not before 2013.

A positive rating action could be driven by the successful
execution of the phosphate project and Acron's commitment to
further improvement of vertical integration of its supply chain.
Deleveraging leading to sustained funds from operations (FFO) net
adjusted leverage of 2.0x, or neutral to positive free cash flow
through the market cycle could also lead to a positive rating

A significant weakening in product prices or demand with the
EBITDAR margin falling below 20%, or significant investments
activities resulting in an increase of Acron's FFO net adjusted
leverage to above 3.5x on a sustained basis would result in a
negative rating action.

B&N BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on B2 Currency Deposit Ratings
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the B2 long-term local and foreign currency deposit
ratings of B&N Bank. The bank's Not-Prime short-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings and E+ standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) were affirmed. The bank's BFSR maps to B2
on the long-term scale. The outlook on the BFSR and short-term
deposit ratings is stable.

Moody's assessment is largely based on B&N Bank's publicly
reviewed financial statements for 1H 2011 prepared under audited
IFRS, as well as the bank's non-public management reports for that


The negative outlook on B&N Bank's long-term deposit ratings
reflects Moody's concerns over (i) the increasing level of single-
name and industry concentrations in the bank's loan portfolio,
(ii) low profitability and (iii) weak capitalization, all of which
represent key constraining factors to the bank's ratings.

During 2010 and 1H 2010, B&N Bank froze lending to SME and retail
customers, and provided "big ticket" loans to corporate customers
and sectors in which it has historically strong expertise. Thus
the single-name concentration in the bank's loan portfolio have
increased, with top-20 credit exposures accounting for over 550%
of Tier 1 equity as of July 1, 2011, while combined exposure to
the construction and real estate sectors remained high at 350% of
Tier 1 equity 350% of Tier 1 equity (over 360% and 250%,
respectively, at YE2009). Against the background of low
profitability both in 2010 and 1H 2011 and 30% loan growth in
2010, the bank's Tier 1 capital adequacy decreased to 7.3% as of 1
June 2011 from 9.7% at year-end 2009, rendering the bank more
vulnerable to potential deterioration of its highly concentrated
loan book. Following a RUB1.5 billion Tier 1 capital injection
received in September 2011, Moody's expects concentration levels
to decrease -- albeit remaining one of the highest compared to B2
rated peers.

At the same time, B&N Bank sought to restructure its business
model towards the SME and retail segment; the bank also made
considerable investment in the development of IT, and risk and
product infrastructure. This resulted in growth of the cost-to-
income ratio to 103% in 1H 2011, while return on assets (RoA) was
reported at less than 0.5%. The improvement in asset quality --
with overdue loans decreasing to 5.3% of gross portfolio --
enabled the bank to reduce provisioning coverage and thus report a
marginal profit in 1H2011 compared to a loss of RUB761 million in

Sluggish growth expectations for the Russian economy and thus
challenging credit conditions have caused the rating agency to
express concerns over the execution risks associated with B&N
Bank's lending strategy. Failure to implement this strategy or
failure to reduce loan book concentrations, coupled with further
deterioration in the bank's capitalization, could lead to a
downgrade of the long-term deposit ratings.

At the same time, Moody's notes positively that B&N Bank
maintained its strong retail deposit franchise, ranked 20th among
Russian retail deposit-takers as of July 1, 2011. Although
individual deposits can be withdrawn by customers before
contractual maturity (in accordance with Russian legislation), the
bank maintains an ample liquidity cushion. Liquid assets accounted
for 32% of total assets at July 1, 2011, enabling the bank to
withstand potential deposit run.


The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology, published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology, published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, B&N Bank reported total assets of
US$3.8 billion under reviewed IFRS at 1H 2011 (YE2010: US$3.6
billion) and net income of US$4 million at 1H 2011 (1H 2010: net
loss US$24 million).

SVIAZ BANK: S&P Assigns 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings to Russia-based Sviaz-Bank.
The outlook is stable.

"At the same time we assigned our 'ruAA-' Russian national scale
rating to the bank," S&P related.

"The ratings on Sviaz-Bank reflect our view of the risky operating
environment in Russia and very high concentrations in the bank's
loan book and funding base, as well as the bank's high growth
appetite, poor earnings generation capacity, and moderate
capitalization. These negative factors are partly offset by the
support Sviaz-Bank receives from its parent, state-controlled
Vnesheconombank (VEB; foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-3; local
currency BBB+/Stable/A-2), the bank's well-established
relationships with core clients, and its better-than-average
resilience to a loss of confidence in the market," S&P stated.

"With total assets of Russian ruble (RUB) 165.8 billion (about
$5.9 billion) as of June 30, 2011, Sviaz-Bank ranks among the top
30 financial institutions in Russia. The bank focuses on
commercial banking services for corporate clients and has well-
established connections with a number of state-owned companies,"
S&P said.

"We classify Sviaz-Bank as a 'strategically important" subsidiary
of VEB, given its link with VEB and our expectation that VEB will
be a stable medium-term shareholder that is willing and able to
provide timely support if needed. Therefore, we add three notches
of support to Sviaz-Bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)," S&P

"We think that Sviaz-Bank's asset quality is adequate, with gross
nonperforming loans at about 5.5% of total loans as of June 30,
2011. Loan-loss reserves are a satisfactory 6% of total loans.
Risk concentrations are extremely high, with the 10 largest
borrowers contributing about 48.9% of the loan book and about
248% of adjusted total equity. We believe this is partly
compensated, however, by the relatively good quality of the
borrowers," S&P related.

"We view the bank's liquidity position as adequate. The loan-to-
deposit ratio was 97.5% as of June 30, 2011. The bank's funding
profile is stable, but very high funding concentrations persist,
with the top 20 depositors contributing more than 50% of total
liabilities. Nevertheless, we still think that the bank
is less confidence sensitive than its peers because of its long-
term relationships with key clients," S&P said.

"Sviaz-Bank's capitalization is moderate, in our view. Standard &
Poor's risk-adjusted capital ratio (RAC) for the bank stood at
6.3% before diversification adjustments as of Dec. 31, 2010. We
expect the RAC ratio to decrease, owing to planned business
growth," S&P related.

"Sviaz-Bank's earnings generation capacity is weak, in our view,
reflecting the bank's relatively narrow business franchise, which
makes it vulnerable to margin pressure. We believe that the bank's
limited earning generation capacity is one of its major rating
constraints," S&P said.

"The outlook reflects our expectation that Sviaz-Bank will
continue to develop within its chosen market niche and keep its
'strategically important' status within VEB, at least for the next
three to five years," S&P related.

"We might raise our assessment of the bank's SACP if its earnings
improved sustainably and if it reduced concentrations,
particularly in the loan book," S&P said.

"We might lower our SACP assessment if we observed an unexpected
rapid deterioration in asset quality. A more substantial
deterioration in the RAC ratio could also trigger a negative
rating action," S&P said.

"We might also take a negative rating action if the bank's ties
with VEB were to weaken, leading us to reassess Sviaz-Bank's group
status," S&P said.

Sviaz-Bank may benefit from a state-led project to establish a
postal bank, although this is not yet certain. The current ratings
do not factor in any possible developments related to the postal
bank project.

TRANSOIL LLC: Moody's Says Acquisition Could Be Credit Negative
Moody's Investors Service has said that it would view as credit
negative for Transoil LLC (Ba3, stable outlook) its potential
acquisition of a 75% minus two shares stake in Russia's major rail
cargo operator, Freight One JSC. This follows the announcement by
Transoil that it has submitted an application to participate in
the auction for this stake. The auction is to be conducted by
Russian Railways, the current owner of 100% minus one share in
Freight One, on October 28, 2011.

In Moody's view, the acquisition would be credit negative for
Transoil, assuming that it makes a successful bid for the stake
and that it goes on to finance the transaction with debt.
Transoil's credit metrics would likely be negatively affected
following completion of the acquisition, given that the initial
auction price of RUR125 billion (nearly US$4 billion) represents
8.8x the company's EBITDA at end-2010. Transoil's leverage,
measured as debt/EBITDA, was moderate in financial year 2010,
standing at 2.2x at end-2010. However, going forward, the company
has limited headroom within the current rating for an increase in

Nevertheless, Moody's recognises that the acquisition would
materially strengthen Transoil's position in the freight railway
transportation market in Russia, by expanding its customer base
and diversifying its activities into new cargo segments.

However, given the scale of the possible transaction, it would
also bring with it substantial integration costs, as Freight One
is eight times larger than Transoil in terms of railcar fleet in
operation. A further consideration is that Freight One will likely
require significant investment to renovate its railcar fleet over
the medium term. The average age of its fleet was 19 years at end-
2010, compared with the Russian industry average of around 18
years and Transoil's relatively young tank car fleet, aged 10

Moody's will continue to monitor developments with regard to the
auction process and Transoil's plans with respect to potentially
financing the acquisition, should the company be successful in its

Transoil's ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that
Moody's considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer,
such as the company's (i) business risk and competitive position
compared with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure
and financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to
intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against
other issuers both within and outside Transoil's core industry and
believes Transoil's ratings are comparable to those of other
issuers with similar credit risk.

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Transoil is a major tank car
operator in Russia, operating a fleet of 29,436 tank cars (at end-
2010). In 2010, Transoil transported 59 million tonnes of oil and
oil products and generated RUB67.8 billion (US$2.2 billion) of
revenue. More than 70% of this revenue came from three Russian oil
companies: Rosneft (Baa1, stable outlook), Gazprom Neft (Baa3,
stable outlook) and Surgutneftegas. Transoil is majority-owned by
a group of companies controlled by Mr. Gennady Timchenko.

Freight One JSC is the largest freight railway transportation
company in Russia, with a fleet of 242,997 railcars of various
types (at end-2010). In 2010, it transported 302 million tonnes of
cargo and generated revenue of RUR103.5 billion (US$3.4 billion).
Currently, 100% minus one share in Freight One is owned by Russian


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Receives First Payment of Youngman Bridge Loan
Christina Zander at the Wall Street Journal reports that Swedish
Automobile NV, owner of Saab Automobile AB, said Thursday it has
received the first payment of a EUR70 million bridging loan from
its Chinese partner Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile Co.,
throwing a financial lifeline to the troubled car maker which is
restructuring its operations under bankruptcy protection.

"We are now confident we have the money we need during the
restructuring period," the Journal quotes Gunilla Gustavs,
spokeswoman at Saab Automobile, as saying.

Saab Automobile is depending on the loan to continue its
restructuring process, the Journal notes.  Companies aren't
allowed to take out new credit lines during any restructuring, the
Journal states.  Saab automobile needs the money to pay wages as
Sweden's state wage guarantee -- an insurance scheme providing
salaries for employees of companies who are either bankrupt or
undergoing a restructure -- runs out on Oct. 21, the Journal

The company signed an agreement with Youngman on Sept. 12, under
which the cash-starved car maker would borrow EUR70 million from
Youngman in exchange for non-exclusive rights in Saab Automobile's
Phoenix architecture technology, the Journal recounts.  According
to the Journal, the money from the bridge loan should, according
to the initial agreement, have been made available to Saab
Automobile by Sept. 26, more than two weeks ago.

Saab's Mr. Gustavs said the delay was partly due to a bank holiday
in China, but Swedish daily Dagens Industri reported, according to
unnamed sources, that Youngman didn't feel confident enough in the
collateral and needed more time to understand the Saab technology,
the Journal notes.  According to the Journal, The newspaper also
said the initial bridge loan agreement had to be renegotiated as a
result of this and that Saab Automobile, so far, has only received
about EUR10 million of the EUR70 million agreed.

Swedish Automobile said that further payments under an amended and
final bridge loan agreement were expected to be made last week and
by Oct. 22, the Journal relates.  The company also said it plans
to repay the bridge loan with the proceeds of the EUR245 million
equity investments by Youngman and another Chinese investor, Pang
Da Automobile Trade Co., which are still subject to approval by
relevant authorities, the Journal notes.

Saab Automobile's survival depends on these approvals and the
company has previously said it expected clearance from China's
National Development and Reform Commission by Oct. 14, but
Mr. Gustavs said it might take longer than that, according to the

It is still unclear when production at Saab Automobile's
Trollhattan plant, halted since April, will be able to restart,
the Journal states.  A restructuring plan for the company's
continued business is scheduled for presentation to its creditors
on Oct. 31, the Journal discloses.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Saab has sought creditor protection to give it time until a
promised investment of EUR245 million from car firms Pangda
Automobile Trade Co. Ltd. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile
gets the nod from Chinese authorities.

Saab on Sept. 19 said it has arranged EUR70 million (US$96
million) in bridge financing with the help of a Chinese

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 20.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


* CITY OF DNIPROPETROVSK: S&P Assigns 'B' Local Currency Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned a 'B' long-term local
currency and a 'uaA-' Ukraine national scale debt rating to a
proposed Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 50 million (about $6 million)
senior unsecured bond to be issued by the Ukrainian City of
Dnipropetrovsk. "At the same time, we assigned a '4' recovery
rating to the proposed bond, indicating our expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery in the event of a payment default," S&P

The UAH50 million debt issue will be due in 2014. The bond will
have fixed coupon payments of less than 14.5% per year. The city
plans to place the bond by year-end 2011.

"We understand the proceeds from the bond will be used to finance
road infrastructure development," S&P said.

"According to our criteria, the issue rating on bonds with a '4'
recovery rating is on par with the issuer credit rating. The
rating on Dnipropetrovsk's upcoming bond is therefore equalized
with the 'B' long-term issuer credit rating on the city," S&P

                         Recovery Analysis

"The recovery rating on the proposed bond is based on a
hypothetical scenario, where, in our view, a default would be
triggered by the city's inability to refinance because of turmoil
in domestic financial markets, and those markets would become
inaccessible for local and regional governments. This would
potentially be combined with materialization of risks related to
guarantees the city has issued on debt of its government-related
entities (GREs) and the need to cover their payables," S&P said.

"Under this scenario, we expect city's debt to expand to 12% of
operating revenues in 2012," S&P related.

"Under our hypothetical default scenario, the city would not
likely be able to secure funds to cover interest or meet calls on
guarantees against loans to its GREs without access to the
liquidity markets. This would be exacerbated by only modest
willingness to postpone other expenditures to repay debt. When
under pressure, the city might prefer to finance vital utilities
and salaries instead of debt service," S&P stated.

The recovery rating takes into consideration our base-case opinion
on the city's very weak financial flexibility, lack of large
assets available for sale, spending pressures, and only average
priority of debt service against other expenditures. Very limited
support from the sovereign under a systemic default scenario also
pressures the recovery rating.

"The recovery rating is supported by our base-case expectation
that Dnipropetrovsk's debt and debt service will remain modest
over the next few years," S&P said.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALNWICK COMMUNITY: DP Builders Manager Says Demise Not Its Fault
Northumberland Gazette reports that Ewan Paterson, managing
director of Amble-based DP Builders Ltd., has categorically stated
that his firm was not responsible for an overspend which led to
Alnwick Community Development Trust going into administration.

Mr. Paterson spoke out after the demise of the Trust was publicly
blamed on factors including the 'spiralling costs' of creating the
new youth hostel on Green Batt, according to Northumberland

The report notes that planning permission was given last October
by Northumberland County Council for the conversion of the former
social services building into a 57-bed facility, which was carried
out by DP.  But on September 21, financial difficulties forced the
Trust into administration, Northumberland Gazette relates.  As
well as the hostel overspend, a loss of key funding streams was
also blamed for its problems, the report relays.

"As principal contractors for the youth hostel project, we
completed the project two weeks after the original contract
completion date, having been granted a three-week extension for
the severe weather last year and suspension of works --
effectively, one week early. . . . The final figure within the
building contract between ourselves and the Trust had an overspend
of 3.5% above the original contract value.  This overspend was
made up of extra works added to the contract while it was under
way, which we carried out in good faith. . . . The spiraling costs
mentioned may have been attributed to the project by the Trust,
but they never formed any part of our contract with them," the
report quoted Mr. Paterson as saying.

The Trust has now had its affairs put into the hands of Gosforth-
based administrators Tait Walker, Northumberland Gazette says.

AMBERFIELD SCHOOL: To Go Into Liquidation; Owes GBP1 Million
BBC News reports that parents have begun a campaign to try to save
Amberfield School at Nacton which has announced it is to close at
the end of October.  The fee-paying Suffolk school will go into
liquidation due to "unsustainable financial losses" and debts of
GBP1 million, the report says.

"This difficult economic climate has made it increasingly
difficult to keep afloat.  We didn't recruit enough pupils in the
summer and opened the school in September in good faith, but there
is no good time to close the school," BBC News quotes Alistair
Lang, chairman of governors, as saying.

"We've spent many hours trying to find investors, buyers, ways of
extending the life of the school and it was a horrible decision to

According to the report, parents held a meeting to set up a
campaign to save the school, whose former pupils include the
artist Maggi Hambling.

Amberfield School is an independent day school for girls aged 2-16
years and boys aged 2-7 years.  The school has 157 pupils, 32
teaching staff and 23 non-teaching staff.

BROKER ASSISTANCE: MD Buys Firm Out of Administration
Martin Friel at Insurance Age reports that Broker Assistance
Managing Director Jon Ralph has purchased the claims handling part
of the company from administrators.

The future of the remainder of the firm, which has entered
administration, remains unclear, according to Insurance Age.

Mr. Ralph has purchased the company's motor insurance claims
handling arm, Broker Assistance Insurance Services Limited (BAIS)
for an undisclosed sum, the report notes.

Mary Vancura at Business Sale reports that administrators are
reportedly carrying out an urgent search for a buyer with
experience in motor claims work to take on stricken claims
management company, Broker Assistance.

The news of the company's plight was confirmed by the Auto Body
Professionals Club (ABP), which had been closely following Broker
Assistance's financial situation, and had reported that it was
facing "great business difficulty," according to Business Sale.
The report relates that APB confirmed that it had been contacted
by administrators acting for the company -- thought to be from
Leonard Curtis.

The news of the collapse has come just months after Broker
Assistance won the lucrative contract to run the AA's accident
management, the report adds.

The company, which is headquartered in Warrington, Cheshire, was
founded in 2004 by Jon Ralph.  It employs 120 members of staff. It
is closely linked with legal firm, Irwin Mitchell, which owns an
87 per cent stake of the company.

CLUB DIANA: Five Businessmen Buy Firm Out of Administration
Evening Telegraph reports that five businessmen from
Wellingborough have bought Club Diana out of administration,
taking over the running of the venue, which will now be
refurbished and modernized.

The club closed at the start of June following financial
difficulties, and a total of 30 staff members were made redundant,
according to Evening Telegraph.

The report notes that the club's name will change slightly to
Diana's and the new owners hope to reopen the gym by December 1.

Club Diana in Finedon Road, Wellingborough is a leisure center.

DISCOVER LEISURE: Goes Into Administration, 250 Jobs at Risk
Yorkshire Post reports that Discover Leisure has gone into
administration putting 250 jobs at risk in the process.

Mark Firmin and Paul Flint of KPMG were appointed joint
administrators of Discover Leisure, and its trading subsidiary
Signlease, according to Yorkshire Post.

The report notes that the administrators said they were seeking a
sale of the business, but have closed it in the short term while
they pursue offers.

Yorkshire Post discloses that a number of redundancies are
anticipated and will be confirmed in the coming days.

"Discover has faced a difficult market over an extended period of
time, with persistently depressed consumer demand for high value
discretionary items in particular.  While it is regrettable that
we have had to close the dealerships over the weekend, we are
working towards a solution to rescue some or all of the business,"
the report quoted Mr. Firmin, KPMG's Northern head of
Restructuring, as saying.

Earlier in the day, shares in Discover Leisure, which employs 250
staff across the north of England, were suspended after the
caravan retailer admitted it was unlikely to secure vital funds
needed to keep it trading, the report relays.

Yorkshire Post says the company has been hit by consumers'
reluctance to spend on big ticket items.

Yorkshire-based caravan and motorhome retailer Discover Leisure
trades from sites in York, Newbald, Delamere, Chorley, Darlington
and Birtley.

GP WILLIAMS: Goes Into Administration, Owes GBP30 Million
BBC News reports that GP Williams has been placed into

The firm's accounts for the year ending December 2009 suggest it
owes banks more than GBP30 million, according to BBC News.  The
report relates that they also showed accumulated losses of almost
GBP3 million.

In September, Anglo Irish Bank appointed receivers to properties
owned by the firm at Church Street in Irvinestown and Ardvarney
Road in Ederney, BBC News notes.  The report relates that planning
files indicate that the Ederney site had planning permission for
45 houses.

BBC News discloses that the firm's website suggests it currently
has houses for sale on developments in Irvinestown,
Ballinamallard, Enniskillen, Lisnarick, Castle Caldwell, Bangor
and Rubane.  The report relays that as well as Anglo Irish, the
firm also had borrowings from AIB/ First Trust.

The bursting of a house price bubble has had severe economic
consequences in Northern Ireland, BBC News notes.

A series of builders and developers have gone bust, individuals
have been declared bankrupt and thousands of construction jobs
have been lost, the report adds.

GP Williams is a housing firm.  Its registered office in Belfast,
has been operating since 2000.

ICON ENERGY: In Administration Due to Proven Energy's Collapse
BBC News reports that Icon Energy had entered voluntary
liquidation "as a direct result" of Proven Energy appointing a
receiver and ceasing to trade last month.

Proven went into administration after a defect was identified in
its P35-2 model, affecting 500 customers, according to BBC News.

BBC News notes that Icon Energy went into voluntary liquidation
after losing out to Kingspan Renewables in a bid to take over

"Icon directors and key staff are in ongoing discussions with the
liquidators and are attempting to find a way of securing ongoing
employment for all staff and minimizing any losses for clients and
creditors alike," Icon said in a statement on its Web site, BBC
News relates.

More than 50 jobs were lost at Proven Energy after it went into
administration last month, BBC News discloses.  However, 20 jobs
were safeguarded when Kingspan Renewables bought Proven Energy's
business and assets, the report adds.

Headquartered in Milnathort near Kinross, Icon Energy is a wind
turbine installer.

LINFORD GROUP: Ceases Trading Due to Insolvency
BBC News reports that The Linford Group Ltd has ceased trading
with the loss of 240 jobs.

Richard Goodwin, of Birmingham-based corporate recovery firm
Butcher Woods, is handling the insolvency, BBC says.

"The company is unfortunately another casualty of the difficulties
currently being faced in the construction industry," BBC quotes
Mr. Goodwin as saying.  "We are doing what we can to work with all
parties involved to maximize realizations."

BBC relates that Mr. Goodwin said the redundancies were with
"immediate effect".

According to the report, Mr. Goodwin added efforts would be made
to find building firms to buy existing contracts the company had
which he said were at various stages of completion.

Headquartered in Lichfield, The Linford Group Ltd carried out
specialist work in the construction industry across the UK.  The
company had been in business for 40 years.

LUSTY GLAZE: Faces Insolvency, No Funds to Pay Redundancy Bill
BBC Cornwall reports that Lusty Glaze Ltd, a company which runs
activities at a beach in Newquay, is facing insolvency.

The company's workers have been given redundancy notices, BBC
Cornwall says.

BBC relates that company director Howard Wilkinson said in letters
job losses were imminent.  It is thought up to 15 people work at
the complex, the report notes.

According to BBC, the letters sent out by Mr. Wilkinson said that
there were "no funds available to make a redundancy payment or to
pay any notice or accrued holiday payments".

A number of Cornish companies have told the BBC they are owed
money by Lusty Glaze.

Lusty Glaze Ltd operates a "leisure and education complex" on the
north coast of Cornwall.

PREMIER FOODS: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Premier Foods plc's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The Outlook is Negative.

The downgrade reflects the latest deterioration in Premier Foods'
financial performance, as outlined in its interim management
statement released on 7 October 2011. Like-for-like revenues and
volumes declined by 3.6% and 8% respectively in the three month
period ended September 30, 2011.  Full year EBITDA and free cash
flow (FCF) are likely to be significantly below Fitch's
expectations, leading to a revision of the lease-adjusted net
debt/EBITDAR expectation for FYE2011 and beyond.

The Negative Outlook reflects Premier Foods' continuing
underperformance relative to the mature and increasingly
competitive UK packaged food market and the possibility of further
revenue declines and margin erosion over the next six months.  In
addition it reflects the uncertainty surrounding ongoing banking
facility negotiations and the pace and timing of potential future

Fitch expects Premier Foods' 2012 financial performance to benefit
from somewhat lower commodity pricing pressure and as some of the
one-off events of early 2011 fall away.  Nevertheless, Premier
Foods has acknowledged that it will be required to increase brand
investment and promotions in order to maintain its volumes and
pricing.  This will require Premier Foods to demonstrate
stabilization in its pricing power towards the major supermarkets.
Such concerns are industry wide as explained in Fitch's comment
'US/European Packaged Food Companies Testing Resilience'.
However, the latest reporting suggests that the company is
underperforming the market and with nearly 50% of trading profit
earned in Q4 any slowing of momentum entering this period can be
of more significance that other quarters.

As current bond market conditions are not conducive to any
meaningful issuance activity, it now appears that the company will
be reliant on the renegotiation of the existing facilities, which
mature in December 2013, and that a bond issue will likely be
postponed to 2012.  With banking covenants stepping up over the
next few quarters a covenant breach is possible, which could limit
negotiation potential while increasing the cost of debt.
Nevertheless a successful renegotiation of the existing facilities
would be viewed favorably.

Fitch now expects the group's lease-adjusted net debt/EBITDAR to
be around 5.0x in FYE11.  Ratings pressure could occur should the
group's lease adjusted net debt/EBITDAR remain above this level on
a sustained basis with further evidence of erosion in FCF.

Fitch would expect to see a stabilization of the Outlook should
the proposed disposals of non-core brands lead to a material de-
leveraging without diluting margins.  This would need to be
combined with the maintenance of a positive FCF margin of at least
6%, sustainable leverage between 4.0x-4.5x and a successful
renegotiation of banking covenants.

Fitch considers Premier Foods' liquidity to be satisfactory, with
access to GBP213 million as at the end of Q311 and is supported by
modestly positive FCF generation and limited debt maturities over
the short term.

PRIESTLEY CENTRE: In Liquidation; Seeks Buyer for Building
Telegraph & Argus reports that a historic theatre company faces
becoming homeless after the building it has occupied since 1929
goes up for sale.

Telegraph & Argus relates that a buyer is being sought for the
freehold premises of Bradford Playhouse after The Priestley Centre
for the Arts, which owned and ran the theatre, went into
liquidation last month with debts of GBP300,000.

It is hoped that selling the premises in Chapel Street, Little
Germany, which is valued at about GBP370,000, will realize enough
to clear the debts of The Priestley Centre for the Arts company,
the report relays.

According to the report, initial interest in the site has already
been shown by a couple of parties.

Chris Wood, of Cleckheaton-based Clough Corporate Solutions, has
been appointed liquidator of The Priestley Centre for the Arts and
last month agreed a deal to secure the short-term future of the
theatre, enabling it to continue operating as normal, the report

Telegraph & Argus relates that as part of the arrangement a newly-
formed company, Be Wonderful Ltd, was granted a license to trade
from the premises and honor existing bookings while the property
is for sale.

Clough Corporate Solutions is working with property consultants
Michael Steel & Co to find a buyer for the building, the report
notes.  But there is no guarantee that, if sold, it will remain as
a theatre.

The Priestley Centre for the Arts operates a 290 seat proscenium
arch theatre in West Yorkshire, England.

SOUTHERN CROSS: Burstow Warned on Problems Prior to Collapse
Kiran Stacey and Simon Mundy at The Financial Times report that
Paul Burstow, the social care minister, was repeatedly warned last
year about the problems at Southern Cross before it went bankrupt
but refused requests to meet the care home company's chief
executive to discuss the matter.

In a series of letters seen by the FT, Jamie Buchan, Southern
Cross chief executive, warned the minister that the UK's biggest
care home operator was facing financial pressures and asked for a
meeting to discuss it further.  He was rebuffed with minimal
explanation, the FT notes.

The FT relates that Mr. Buchan's first warning came on August 3
2010, when he wrote: "I want to outline the potential financial
pressures which reductions in government spending place on the
Southern Cross business model," and warned about "the ongoing
viability of our business".

According to the FT, he also said: "During the period 2003-2009
the company expanded rapidly via acquisition but latterly, over-
extended itself.  The next few years will be very difficult . . .
Despite the increasing standards of care delivered in our homes,
we still suffer from unfavorable legacy sentiment."

Mr. Buchan requested a meeting with Mr. Burstow and sent a follow-
up letter on September 24, also asking to meet, the FT recounts.

Mr. Burstow gave no written reply until October 14, the FT
discloses.  According to the FT, in that letter, the minister
outlined the policies the coalition government was taking on
social care but refused the request to meet, saying: "I am afraid
that due to the pressures on my diary at the moment, I am unable
to accept your invitation."

Southern Cross made further requests to meet Department of Health
officials but these were again refused, the FT notes.

William Laing, chief executive of Laing & Buisson, the healthcare
consultancy, said he found it "quite astonishing" that Mr. Burstow
had never met Mr. Buchan, the FT relates.  According to the FT, he
said that the warnings in Mr. Buchan's letter about Southern
Cross's financial situation "should have set alarm bells" ringing.

BBC News reports that 250 homes, or a third of Southern Cross care
homes, have been transferred to new operators.  The transfer, BBC
relates, would be followed by further transfers in October and

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 4,
2011, BBC News related that 250 homes, or a third of Southern
Cross care homes, have been transferred to new operators.
Southern Cross was the UK's biggest care home operator, with 752
homes, but ran into difficulties when it was unable to pay its
rent to landlords, BBC recounted.  In July, the firm said it was
to cease trading after all of its landlords said they wanted to
leave the group, BBC disclosed.  The first "wave" of homes have
been transferred to about 18 different operators, BBC said.  Its
largest landlord, NHP, which owns 249 of the homes, will be
included in the second wave, BBC noted.  NHP is forming a new
company, HC-One, with turnaround specialists Court Cavendish to
run the homes itself, according to BBC.

Southern Cross Healthcare provides residential and nursing care.
It also operates homes that specialize in treating people with
dementia, mental health problems and learning disabilities.

UROPA SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B2a Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 18 tranches of Uropa Securities plc
2007-1 and 2008-1, a series of UK non-conforming RMBS

The affirmations reflect the underlying collateral's stable
performance, the low current stock of repossessed properties and
the level of credit enhancement available to the notes.

The arrears levels in both series have stabilized as the loans,
which are predominately floating-rate-based, currently benefit
from the low interest rate environment.  At the latest interest
payment date (IPD) the volume of loans in arrears by three months
or more (3m+) was 11.4% of the outstanding collateral balance for
Uropa 2007-1 and 8.8% for Uropa 2008-1.

The underlying assets' stable performance has helped limit
repossession activity in 2010 and 2011.  This is supported by a
decrease in the roll-through rate of delinquent loans that
deteriorate into repossession.  These factors have contributed to
the stock of unsold repossessions (that built up during the credit
crisis) decreasing to more manageable levels, at 0.38% and 0.48%
of the collateral balance in Uropa 2007-1 and 2008-1,
respectively.  As a result, the transactions have experienced a
lower level of losses each period and excess spread has been able
to cure or reduce the respective principal deficiency ledgers
(PDL).  The Uropa 2007-1 class B2a PDL was cured in July 2010 and
the reserve fund has been at its target level for the last four
IPDs.  As of the latest interest payment date (IPD) in September
2011, the PDL balance on the unrated class D note for Uropa 2008-1
has declined to GBP3.9 million compared to a peak of GBP4.6
million in March 2011.

Uropa 2007-1 features a reserve fund and a liquidity facility
which can no longer amortize because the cumulative loss trigger
has been breached.  This could benefit the transaction in the
future as it will allow for increased credit enhancement build up
and protection from possible liquidity shortfalls.

Unlike Uropa 2007-1, Uropa 2008-1 does not feature a reserve fund.
Instead it has a liquidity reserve which only covers senior
expenses and certain interest shortfalls. However, Uropa 2008-1
does benefit from the subordination provided by the collateralized
but unrated class B, C and D notes.

The rating actions are as follows:

Uropa Securities plc Series 2007-01B:

  -- Class A1a (ISIN XS0311801806): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A1b (ISIN XS0311805203): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A1c (ISIN XS0311806862): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0311807167): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A3a (ISIN XS0311807753): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A3b (ISIN XS0311808561): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A4a (ISIN XS0311809452): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class A4b (ISIN XS0311809882): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0311810385): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0311811193): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0311813058): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0311815855): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR2'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0311816150): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR2'

  -- Class B1b (cross currency swap): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     Recovery Rating of 'RR2'

  -- Class B2a (ISIN XS0311816408): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR3'

Uropa Securities plc Series 2008-1:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0406658624): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class M1 (ISIN XS0406667534): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class M2 (ISIN XS0406668938): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook

* UNITED KINGDOM: More Construction Firms in Administration
Iain Laing at The Journal reports that the number of property and
construction companies falling into administration in the third
quarter of this year has risen yet again.

Accountancy Deloitte research showed that the latest figures from
accountancy Deloitte show the number of firms to collapse between
July and September rose by 11% to 117 compared with 105 in the
same period last year, according to The Journal.

"The property and construction sectors have been two sectors
hardest hit by the economic uncertainty. . . .Rising energy prices
and significant cuts to public and private sector building
projects have brought a large amount of planned projects to a
grinding halt.  The next quarter is going to continue to be tough
for the construction sector and will particularly hit medium-
sized firms as opposed to the larger national contractors. . . .
The property market continues to remain flat, and reflects the
current concerns around unemployment and declining incomes.  While
it is welcome news that the Bank of England's new mortgage
approval figures for August 2011 increased to 52,000 -- the
largest approval rate in any month since December 2009, the
housing market still remains subdued. . . . The favorably low
interest rates have done little to stimulate sales in the housing
market, as tough credit conditions have locked thousands of first-
time buyers out of the market, with only those with a substantial
deposit able to get a mortgage approved. . . . We are already
seeing sentiment turning and property yields falling off which is
being evidenced by deals either not completing or "price chipping"
by purchasers before they commit to complete.  Therefore, I am
afraid the next quarter is not going to bring any relief from the
pressures that property and construction companies are currently
facing," The Journal quoted Dan Butters, partner in real estate at
Deloitte in the North East, as saying.


* EUROPE: Banks That Failed Stress Tests Need Urgent Financing
According to Bloomberg News' David Whitehouse, French finance
minister Francois Baroin said on Europe1 radio station Friday that
nine European banks that failed stress tests are in need of urgent

* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 10 to October 14, 2011

Issuer               Coupon     Maturity  Currency      Price
------               ------     --------  --------      -----

BA CREDITANSTALT       5.470    8/28/2013      EUR       60.13
BAWAG                  5.400    2/12/2023      EUR       70.38
BAWAG                  5.310    2/12/2023      EUR       69.85
BAWAG                  5.430    2/26/2024      EUR       67.12
ERSTE BANK             3.680    8/10/2020      EUR       72.41
ERSTE GROUP            5.000    9/30/2019      EUR       66.17
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.250   10/27/2015      EUR       64.38
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.270     4/7/2028      EUR       62.12
IMMOFINANZ             4.250     3/8/2018      EUR        3.39
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.750    4/30/2021      EUR       70.21
OESTER VOLKSBK         5.270     2/8/2027      EUR       57.66
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.810    7/29/2025      EUR       59.88
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.170    7/29/2015      EUR       63.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.470    2/28/2028      EUR       66.00
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        4.500    9/28/2035      EUR       52.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.500   12/29/2023      EUR       69.68
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.730   12/11/2023      EUR       71.44

REPUBLIC OF BELA       8.750     8/3/2015      USD       74.05
REPUBLIC OF BELA       8.950    1/26/2018      USD       72.93

ECONOCOM GROUP         4.000     6/1/2016      EUR       19.82

AVANGARDCO INVES      10.000   10/29/2015      USD       71.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    7/11/2016      EUR       73.46
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     6/2/2016      EUR       73.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    3/30/2016      EUR       74.22
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.000     6/9/2016      EUR       74.24
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.100    1/29/2018      EUR       73.30
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600    4/23/2018      EUR       70.89
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600   10/23/2018      EUR       70.59
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600    2/26/2019      EUR       70.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.625     2/3/2020      EUR       70.36
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.350     6/9/2020      EUR       74.66
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       3.750    11/1/2015      EUR       72.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    10/9/2016      EUR       72.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     1/4/2017      EUR       72.36
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    2/15/2017      EUR       72.19
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     4/2/2017      EUR       72.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.600    4/15/2017      EUR       74.16
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    9/28/2017      EUR       71.14
MARFIN POPULAR         4.350   11/20/2014      EUR       50.25

SAZKA                  9.000    7/12/2021      EUR       59.33

FIN-DANISH IND         4.910     7/6/2021      EUR       53.00
JYSKE BANK A/S         7.000    5/29/2024      EUR       59.41
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR       45.91

MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR       74.11
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR       59.81
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    3/17/2025      CAD       60.96
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR       48.85
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.250    6/28/2040      CAD       24.45
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/16/2017      TRY       72.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR       66.75
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR       73.07
TALVIVAARA             4.000   12/16/2015      EUR       75.23

AIR FRANCE-KLM         4.970     4/1/2015      EUR       11.27
ALCATEL-LUCENT         5.000     1/1/2015      EUR        3.28
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG       6.720     1/1/2015      EUR        4.98
ASSYSTEM               4.000     1/1/2017      EUR       20.30
ATOS ORIGIN SA         2.500     1/1/2016      EUR       51.68
AXA SA                 5.250    4/16/2040      EUR       74.14
BNP PARIBAS            2.890    5/16/2036      JPY       65.04
CALYON                 5.800   10/29/2029      USD       68.62
CALYON                 6.000    6/18/2047      EUR       13.98
CAP GEMINI SOGET       1.000     1/1/2012      EUR       41.97
CAP GEMINI SOGET       3.500     1/1/2014      EUR       38.40
CGG VERITAS            1.750     1/1/2016      EUR       25.76
CLUB MEDITERRANE       5.000     6/8/2012      EUR       13.28
CLUB MEDITERRANE       6.110    11/1/2015      EUR       18.01
CMA CGM                8.500    4/15/2017      USD       42.45
CMA CGM                8.875    4/15/2019      EUR       44.00
CMA CGM                8.500    4/15/2017      USD       32.03
CMA CGM                8.875    4/15/2019      EUR       42.92
CNP ASSURANCES         6.875    9/30/2041      EUR       69.25
CNP ASSURANCES         6.000    9/14/2040      EUR       68.16
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.950    1/19/2031      USD       67.47
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300   10/12/2030      USD       59.66
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.150    2/11/2031      USD       68.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.880     4/8/2031      USD       67.88
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.220    3/17/2031      USD       69.72
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.650    6/10/2031      USD       64.08
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.610    6/15/2031      USD       63.68
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300    10/7/2030      USD       61.88
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850    5/27/2031      USD       65.94
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.830    6/30/2031      USD       65.70
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850    6/30/2031      USD       65.89
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.350   10/29/2030      USD       62.26
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.910    11/3/2030      USD       59.27
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.450    11/9/2030      USD       63.12
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300   10/22/2030      USD       61.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.250   10/18/2030      USD       61.46
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.080   11/23/2030      USD       59.70
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.690   11/26/2030      USD       65.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.400    12/9/2030      USD       62.50
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.000   12/23/2030      USD       65.40
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.050    1/14/2031      USD       68.40
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.850    9/17/2030      USD       57.77
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.270     8/5/2030      USD       61.96
CREDIT AGRICOLE        4.500   12/22/2019      EUR       60.76
CREDIT LOCAL FRA       3.750    5/26/2020      EUR       59.17
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.550     4/2/2020      EUR       63.66
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       5.037     8/4/2020      EUR       65.40
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.500    2/25/2020      EUR       63.55
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.110    9/18/2018      EUR       66.92
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       2.875    4/23/2030      CHF       72.40
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       1.000   12/23/2024      EUR       58.70
EURAZEO                6.250    6/10/2014      EUR       55.28
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375    4/15/2018      EUR       58.86
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375    4/15/2018      EUR       59.38
FAURECIA               4.500     1/1/2015      EUR       22.87
FONCIERE REGIONS       3.340     1/1/2017      EUR       73.63
GROUPAMA SA            7.875   10/27/2039      EUR       41.80
INGENICO               2.750     1/1/2017      EUR       42.03
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2014      EUR       17.62
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2015      EUR       16.53
NEXANS SA              4.000     1/1/2016      EUR       59.69
NOVASEP HLDG           9.750   12/15/2016      USD       43.00
ORPEA                  3.875     1/1/2016      EUR       43.37
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875     6/1/2018      EUR       70.38
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875     6/1/2018      EUR       70.76
PEUGEOT SA             4.450     1/1/2016      EUR       26.18
PIERRE VACANCES        4.000    10/1/2015      EUR       71.06
PUBLICIS GROUPE        3.125    7/30/2014      EUR       36.79
PUBLICIS GROUPE        1.000    1/18/2018      EUR       48.66
RHODIA SA              0.500     1/1/2014      EUR       52.00
SOC AIR FRANCE         2.750     4/1/2020      EUR       20.45
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.900    3/10/2031      USD       68.32
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860    3/11/2031      USD       67.89
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.940    3/14/2031      USD       68.69
SOCIETE GENERALE       6.010    3/15/2031      USD       69.35
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.910    3/16/2031      USD       68.39
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.920    3/17/2031      USD       68.48
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860    4/26/2031      USD       68.16
SOITEC                 6.250     9/9/2014      EUR        7.92
TEM                    4.250     1/1/2015      EUR       51.68
THEOLIA                2.700     1/1/2041      EUR        9.90

BAYERISCHE HYPO        5.000   12/21/2029      EUR       73.06
BAYERISCHE LNDBK       4.500     2/7/2019      EUR       73.01
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.640    1/30/2024      EUR       67.08
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.600    4/14/2023      EUR       69.34
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.450    2/20/2023      EUR       68.56
COMMERZBANK AG         4.000   11/30/2017      EUR       33.69
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000    3/30/2018      EUR       33.52
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000    4/20/2018      EUR       33.53
COMMERZBANK AG         6.300    3/15/2022      EUR       69.97
COMMERZBANK AG         6.360    3/15/2022      EUR       70.11
COMMERZBANK AG         6.460    6/24/2022      EUR       70.37
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.050    3/10/2031      USD       71.17
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.010    3/11/2031      USD       70.73
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.080    3/14/2031      USD       71.47
DEUTSCHE BANK AG       5.000     6/1/2031      USD       73.51
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.220    2/17/2031      USD       74.33
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.210    2/25/2031      USD       74.18
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.250    2/18/2031      USD       74.65
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.200    2/22/2031      USD       74.09
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       4.750   12/16/2030      USD       70.50
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.220    2/15/2031      USD       74.34
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.170     3/2/2031      USD       73.74
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.120    3/15/2031      USD       73.13
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.170    2/25/2031      USD       73.74
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.220    2/23/2031      USD       74.30
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.050    3/16/2031      USD       72.36
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.000    7/21/2033      USD       71.49
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       5.140     3/3/2031      USD       73.41
DEUTSCHE BK SING       4.860    6/30/2031      USD       70.36
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN       5.300   11/20/2023      EUR       68.90
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.350    6/13/2028      EUR       70.04
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.290    5/31/2021      EUR       65.43
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.000    2/25/2020      EUR       72.49
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.700    7/31/2023      EUR       64.20
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.160    8/14/2024      EUR       71.04
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.180    2/28/2023      EUR       66.46
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.210    6/20/2022      EUR       69.00
EUROHYPO AG            5.560    8/18/2023      EUR       58.50
EUROHYPO AG            5.110     8/6/2018      EUR       67.38
EUROHYPO AG            3.830    9/21/2020      EUR       55.25
EUROHYPO AG            6.490    7/17/2017      EUR        4.38
GOTHAER ALLG VER       5.527    9/29/2026      EUR       68.54
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750   10/15/2017      USD       68.63
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750   10/15/2017      USD       73.90
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500    5/15/2018      EUR       69.13
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500    5/15/2018      EUR       69.10
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250    4/15/2018      EUR       64.50
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250    4/15/2018      EUR       65.07
HSH NORDBANK AG        4.375    2/14/2017      EUR       50.16
IKB DEUT INDUSTR       4.500     7/9/2013      EUR       64.03
L-BANK FOERDERBK       0.500    5/10/2027      CAD       50.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.800    2/23/2037      JPY       39.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT        5.250   10/20/2015      EUR       27.70
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN       5.875    2/10/2016      EUR       67.99
Q-CELLS                6.750   10/21/2015      EUR        1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE        6.750    3/22/2013      USD        1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK       6.600    5/29/2022      EUR       66.88
SOLARWORLD AG          6.125    1/21/2017      EUR       58.00
SOLARWORLD AG          6.375    7/13/2016      EUR       62.48
TAG IMMO AG            6.500   12/10/2015      EUR        7.78
TUI AG                 2.750    3/24/2016      EUR       35.66
TUI AG                 5.500   11/17/2014      EUR       56.26

ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.057    3/26/2013      EUR       47.95
ATHENS URBAN TRN       5.008    7/18/2017      EUR       35.62
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.851    9/19/2016      EUR       35.33
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.301    8/12/2014      EUR       36.95
FAGE DAIRY IND         7.500    1/15/2015      EUR       74.13
FAGE DAIRY IND         7.500    1/15/2015      EUR       74.13
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.300    7/25/2030      EUR       29.33
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.900    7/25/2025      EUR       22.57
HELLENIC REPUB         5.200    7/17/2034      EUR       30.75
HELLENIC REPUB         6.140    4/14/2028      EUR       41.50
HELLENIC REPUB         2.125     7/5/2013      CHF       49.38
HELLENIC REPUB         4.625    6/25/2013      USD       64.25
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000    3/11/2019      EUR       38.38
HELLENIC REPUB         4.590     4/8/2016      EUR       35.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.985    7/25/2014      EUR       36.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.500    8/20/2014      EUR       37.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500     7/1/2014      EUR       37.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700    7/20/2015      EUR       37.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300    3/20/2012      EUR       50.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.113    9/30/2014      EUR       37.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250    6/20/2012      EUR       70.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       1.000    6/30/2012      EUR       67.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.100    8/20/2012      EUR       42.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.100    8/20/2015      EUR       38.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.702    9/30/2015      EUR       37.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700   11/10/2015      EUR       38.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.600    7/20/2016      EUR       37.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.506    3/31/2013      EUR       44.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    5/20/2013      EUR       40.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.020    9/13/2016      EUR       37.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250    5/18/2012      EUR       45.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    9/20/2040      EUR       28.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    9/20/2037      EUR       29.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.300    3/20/2026      EUR       29.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.700    3/20/2024      EUR       28.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900   10/22/2022      EUR       28.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.250    6/19/2020      EUR       37.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500   10/22/2019      EUR       37.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.000    7/19/2019      EUR       36.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    7/20/2018      EUR       36.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.675    10/9/2017      EUR       39.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300    7/20/2017      EUR       36.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900    4/20/2017      EUR       36.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.225     3/1/2017      EUR       38.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.900     7/3/2013      EUR       44.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.427    7/31/2013      EUR       40.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.000    8/20/2013      EUR       39.43
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.520    9/30/2013      EUR       42.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500    1/11/2014      EUR       37.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    5/20/2014      EUR       37.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI       7.500    5/20/2013      EUR       44.01
NATL BK GREECE         3.875    10/7/2016      EUR       55.76

CALYON FIN GUER        6.000     9/4/2029      USD       69.51
CREDIT AGRICOLE        5.600    2/25/2030      USD       66.01

OTP BANK               5.270    9/19/2016      EUR       75.53

AIB MORTGAGE BNK       4.875    6/29/2017      EUR       73.25
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.580    4/28/2028      EUR       55.70
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000    2/12/2030      EUR       50.18
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000     3/1/2030      EUR       50.14
ALLIED IRISH BKS       4.000    3/19/2015      EUR       73.18
ALLIED IRISH BKS      12.500    6/25/2035      GBP       34.63
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625   11/12/2014      EUR       72.15
ANGLO IRISH BANK       4.000    4/15/2015      EUR       74.18
BANESTO FINANC         5.000    3/23/2030      EUR       69.90
BANK OF IRELAND        4.473   11/30/2016      EUR       62.00
BANK OF IRELAND        5.600    9/18/2023      EUR       46.88
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020      GBP       39.00
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020      EUR       56.75
BANK OF IRELAND        3.585    4/21/2015      EUR       68.88
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.760     9/7/2029      EUR       52.68
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.450     3/1/2030      EUR       49.93
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.400    11/6/2029      EUR       50.07
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.360   10/12/2029      EUR       49.85
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125    3/16/2037      USD       67.28
DEPFA ACS BANK         3.250    7/31/2031      CHF       72.61
DEPFA ACS BANK         4.900    8/24/2035      CAD       67.19
DEPFA ACS BANK         0.500     3/3/2025      CAD       39.81
EBS BLDG SOCIETY       4.000    2/25/2015      EUR       74.86
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.000    3/10/2015      EUR       73.62
ONO FINANCE II        10.875    7/15/2019      USD       69.00
ONO FINANCE II        10.875    7/15/2019      USD       69.00
ONO FINANCE II        11.125    7/15/2019      EUR       74.40
ONO FINANCE II        11.125    7/15/2019      EUR       74.50
UT2 FUNDING PLC        5.321    6/30/2016      EUR       58.52

BANCA MARCHE           4.000    5/26/2021      EUR       71.66
BANCA MARCHE           5.500    9/16/2030      EUR       72.38
BANCA MARCHE           5.125    5/14/2024      ITL       74.21
BANCA MARCHE           4.360     1/4/2022      ITL       73.79
BANCA MARCHE           4.000    1/10/2021      EUR       72.44
BANCA MARCHE           3.600   11/12/2020      EUR       70.55
BANCA MARCHE           3.700     9/1/2020      EUR       71.82
BANCA MARCHE           3.900    8/17/2020      EUR       73.00
BANCA MARCHE           4.000     7/9/2020      EUR       73.89
BANCA POP LODI         5.250     4/3/2029      EUR       74.07
BANCA POP MILANO       3.100    9/30/2017      EUR       74.74
BANCA POP MILANO       3.500    6/30/2018      EUR       73.97
BANCA POP MILANO       4.000    4/23/2020      EUR       70.62
BANCA POP MILANO       3.250    6/30/2017      EUR       74.87
BANCA POP MILANO       4.500    4/18/2018      EUR       74.43
BANCA POP VICENT       4.970    4/20/2027      EUR       71.56
BANCO POPOLARE         6.375    5/31/2021      EUR       71.47
BTPS                   4.000     2/1/2037      EUR       70.85
BTPS I/L               2.350    9/15/2035      EUR       64.22
BTPS I/L               2.550    9/15/2041      EUR       63.16
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.500    11/2/2020      EUR       53.50
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.400    9/17/2017      EUR       59.00
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.575     2/2/2017      EUR       65.50
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000    11/2/2016      EUR       64.50
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.500     3/5/2016      EUR       66.63
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000     9/2/2015      EUR       71.88
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000    4/15/2015      EUR       74.38
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.000    1/18/2015      EUR       73.00
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000     8/5/2015      EUR       72.38
COMUNE DI MILANO       4.019    6/29/2035      EUR       72.00
DEXIA CREDIOP          4.790   12/17/2043      EUR       69.06
INTESA SANPAOLO        2.882    4/20/2020      EUR       74.01
MONTE DEI PASCHI       5.750    9/30/2016      GBP       71.94
REP OF ITALY           2.870    5/19/2036      JPY       68.03
REP OF ITALY           4.490     4/5/2027      EUR       73.97
REP OF ITALY           1.850    9/15/2057      EUR       44.70
REP OF ITALY           2.200    9/15/2058      EUR       51.45
REP OF ITALY           4.850    6/11/2060      EUR       68.99
REP OF ITALY           2.000    9/15/2062      EUR       46.28
ROMULUS FINANCE        5.441    2/20/2023      GBP       68.70
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR       60.67
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR       61.00
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR       60.95
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR       60.79
TELECOM ITALIA         5.250    3/17/2055      EUR       63.91
UGF ASSICURAZION       5.660    7/28/2023      EUR       64.52
UNICREDIT SPA          4.750    4/26/2020      EUR       73.37
UNICREDIT SPA          5.000    4/21/2021      EUR       74.27
UNICREDIT SPA          5.050    4/25/2022      EUR       73.29
UNICREDITO ITALI       5.000     2/1/2016      GBP       66.53

ARCELORMITTAL          7.250     4/1/2014      EUR       23.18
BEVERAGE PACK          9.500    6/15/2017      EUR       71.38
BEVERAGE PACK          9.500    6/15/2017      EUR       72.75
CONTROLINVESTE         3.000    1/28/2015      EUR       67.48
DEXIA LDG BANQUE       3.750   10/20/2025      EUR       75.15
ESPIRITO SANTO F       6.875   10/21/2019      EUR       52.03
GCL HOLDINGS           9.375    4/15/2018      EUR       72.38
GCL HOLDINGS           9.375    4/15/2018      EUR       72.33
KION FINANCE           7.875    4/15/2018      EUR       72.99
KION FINANCE           7.875    4/15/2018      EUR       72.88
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014      EUR       14.38
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014      EUR       14.21
ZINC CAPITAL           8.875    5/15/2018      EUR       71.63
ZINC CAPITAL           8.875    5/15/2018      EUR       70.67

APP INTL FINANCE      11.750    10/1/2005      USD        0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR       43.23
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500     3/3/2021      NZD       64.70
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    9/15/2016      TRY       72.75
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2016      TRY       74.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR       43.58
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/25/2016      TRY       74.36
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/29/2021      NZD       64.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    2/24/2025      CAD       60.41
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500    5/15/2014      USD       31.75
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500    5/15/2014      USD       36.00
BRIT INSURANCE         6.625    12/9/2030      GBP       54.85
CEMEX FIN EUROPE       4.750     3/5/2014      EUR       63.83
CLONDALKIN BV          8.000    3/15/2014      EUR       74.50
DEXIA FUNDING          5.875     2/9/2017      GBP       75.36
EDP FINANCE BV         4.900    10/1/2019      USD       74.81
EDP FINANCE BV         4.125    6/29/2020      EUR       74.24
EDP FINANCE BV         4.900    10/1/2019      USD       75.00
ELEC DE CAR FIN        8.500    4/10/2018      USD       55.34
FINANCE & CREDIT      10.500    1/25/2014      USD       50.00
FRIESLAND BANK         4.210   12/29/2025      EUR       69.44
INDAH KIAT INTL       12.500    6/15/2006      USD        0.01
ING BANK NV            4.200   12/19/2035      EUR       68.16
IVG FINANCE BV         1.750    3/29/2017      EUR       66.72
KBC IFIMA NV           4.200    8/16/2020      EUR       74.75
MAGYAR TELECOM         9.500   12/15/2016      EUR       75.69
MARFRIG HLDG EUR       8.375     5/9/2018      USD       77.39
NATL INVESTER BK      25.983     5/7/2029      EUR       22.58
NED WATERSCHAPBK       0.500    3/11/2025      CAD       60.58
NIB CAPITAL BANK       4.510   12/16/2035      EUR       66.47
POLYSINDO FIN          9.375    7/30/2007      USD        0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       4.500    6/16/2025      EUR       66.26
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       5.750    5/26/2014      EUR       19.95
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       1.375    2/28/2012      EUR       60.87
RABOBANK               5.276    2/28/2035      EUR       81.55
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       5.000    2/27/2037      EUR       67.20
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       2.910    6/21/2036      JPY       72.98
SIDETUR FINANCE       10.000    4/20/2016      USD       68.13
SNS BANK               6.250   10/26/2020      EUR       57.92
SNS BANK               6.625    5/14/2018      EUR       75.61
SRLEV NV               9.000    4/15/2041      EUR       61.98
TJIWI KIMIA FIN       13.250     8/1/2001      USD        0.00

EKSPORTFINANS          0.500     5/9/2030      CAD       45.51
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR       60.08
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR       71.51
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/29/2016      TRY       73.06
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR       72.18
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR       73.12
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR       74.20
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR       74.64
MARINE HARVEST         4.500    2/23/2015      EUR       72.87
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033      USD       40.63
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033      USD       40.63
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125   10/15/2015      USD       56.63
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125   10/15/2015      USD       56.63
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750    6/15/2016      EUR       56.78
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.000    6/26/2017      EUR       46.46
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750    6/15/2016      EUR       55.25
RENEWABLE CORP         6.500     6/4/2014      EUR       54.39

BANCO COM PORTUG       5.625    4/23/2014      EUR       68.00
BANCO COM PORTUG       3.750    10/8/2016      EUR       65.69
BANCO COM PORTUG       4.750    6/22/2017      EUR       66.24
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.875    1/21/2015      EUR       68.72
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600    1/26/2017      EUR       65.51
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600    9/15/2016      EUR       67.50
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.875    7/15/2016      EUR       64.85
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.375    2/17/2015      EUR       73.90
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.160    7/23/2015      EUR       70.00
BRISA                  4.500    12/5/2016      EUR       72.83
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.250    1/27/2020      EUR       63.39
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.320     8/5/2021      EUR       52.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.980     3/3/2028      EUR       52.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.380    10/1/2038      EUR       52.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.455    8/20/2017      EUR       59.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       3.875    12/6/2016      EUR       66.80
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.570    8/12/2016      EUR       72.73
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.165     7/8/2016      EUR       66.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.090     6/8/2016      EUR       66.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.750    2/14/2016      EUR       67.91
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.400    10/8/2019      EUR       60.09
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.750    3/14/2016      EUR       68.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.500   11/13/2017      EUR       68.13
CAIXA GERAL FR         3.384   12/15/2014      EUR       74.50
METRO DE LISBOA        4.799    12/7/2027      EUR       58.94
METRO DE LISBOA        5.750     2/4/2019      EUR       60.68
METRO DE LISBOA        4.061    12/4/2026      EUR       54.51
METRO DE LISBOA        7.300   12/23/2025      EUR       73.20
MONTEPIO GERAL         5.000     2/8/2017      EUR       59.88
PARPUBLICA             4.191   10/15/2014      EUR       69.63
PARPUBLICA             3.500     7/8/2013      EUR       79.38
PARPUBLICA             3.567    9/22/2020      EUR       44.63
PARPUBLICA             4.200   11/16/2026      EUR       39.38
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500    3/25/2015      USD       70.02
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500    3/25/2015      USD       70.08
PORTUGUESE OT'S        6.400    2/15/2016      EUR       73.80
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.375    6/16/2014      EUR       73.81
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.600   10/15/2014      EUR       71.45
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.350   10/15/2015      EUR       69.26
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.200   10/15/2016      EUR       65.33
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.350   10/16/2017      EUR       60.73
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.450    6/15/2018      EUR       60.54
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.750    6/14/2019      EUR       59.39
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.800    6/15/2020      EUR       58.31
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.850    4/15/2021      EUR       56.54
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.950   10/25/2023      EUR       57.15
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.100    4/15/2037      EUR       49.55
REFER                  4.675   10/16/2024      EUR       44.75
REFER                  4.047   11/16/2026      EUR       48.85
REFER                  4.250   12/13/2021      EUR       45.25
REFER                  5.875    2/18/2019      EUR       57.50
REFER                  4.000    3/16/2015      EUR       43.50

APK ARKADA            17.500    5/23/2012      RUB        0.38
ARIZK                  3.000   12/20/2030      RUB       49.09
DVTG-FINANS           17.000    8/29/2013      RUB       55.55
DVTG-FINANS            7.750    7/18/2013      RUB       20.29
IART                   8.500     8/4/2013      RUB        1.00
MIRAX                 17.000    9/17/2012      RUB        4.00
MOSMART FINANS         0.010    4/12/2012      RUB        1.81
NOK                   12.500    8/26/2014      RUB        5.00
PENOPLEX-FINANS       14.000   11/21/2014      RUB       74.01
PROMPEREOSNASTKA       1.000   12/17/2012      RUB        0.01
PROTON-FINANCE         9.000    6/12/2012      RUB       65.00
RBC OJSC               7.000    4/23/2015      RUB       68.50
RBC OJSC               3.270    4/19/2018      RUB       38.40
RBC OJSC               7.000    4/23/2015      RUB       71.50
SAHO                  10.000    5/21/2012      RUB        3.00
SATURN                 8.500     6/6/2014      RUB        1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS       10.500    3/27/2012      RUB        3.40
TERNA-FINANS           1.000    11/4/2011      RUB        9.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.000    3/24/2021      EUR       74.25
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750   12/14/2022      EUR       66.84
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.250   10/25/2023      EUR       70.37
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750    6/30/2025      EUR       60.69
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.750    5/25/2027      EUR       68.04
BANCAJA                1.500    5/22/2018      EUR       64.53
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       6.025     3/3/2033      EUR       60.16
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       4.500    2/16/2022      EUR       73.30
BANCO PASTOR           4.550    7/31/2020      EUR       73.07
BBVA SUB CAP UNI       2.750   10/22/2035      JPY       44.12
CAJA CASTIL-MAN        1.500    6/23/2021      EUR       59.80
CAJA MADRID            4.125    3/24/2036      EUR       67.99
CAJA MADRID            4.000     2/3/2025      EUR       74.91
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       4.250    4/10/2031      EUR       57.63
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       3.875    5/23/2025      EUR       61.58
CEDULAS TDA A-4        4.125    4/10/2021      EUR       74.33
CEDULAS TDA A-5        4.250    3/28/2027      EUR       61.93
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       8.875    5/12/2017      EUR       60.13
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250    5/12/2020      USD       70.50
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       8.875    5/12/2017      EUR       60.17
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250    5/12/2020      USD       69.13
COMUN AUTO CANAR       4.200   10/25/2036      EUR       64.80
COMUN AUTO CANAR       3.900   11/30/2035      EUR       61.69
COMUNIDAD BALEAR       4.063   11/23/2035      EUR       64.88
COMUNIDAD MADRID       4.300    9/15/2026      EUR       72.89
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.125    10/1/2014      CHF       74.99
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.750    3/24/2016      CHF       68.20
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.315    9/10/2015      CHF       69.43
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.355   11/10/2015      CHF       68.50
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.965     9/8/2039      JPY       58.65
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.220    4/26/2035      EUR       64.49
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.690   10/28/2034      EUR       69.53
GENERAL DE ALQUI       2.750    8/20/2012      EUR       71.18
IM CEDULAS 5           3.500    6/15/2020      EUR       72.13
IM CEDULAS 7           4.000    3/31/2021      EUR       74.53
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       2.570   10/22/2021      CHF       69.30
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       3.250    6/28/2024      CHF       68.78
INSTITUT CATALA        4.250    6/15/2024      EUR       74.78
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.170    7/29/2039      JPY       63.59
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        4.250   10/31/2036      EUR       64.66
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.065    7/29/2039      JPY       61.60
JUNTA LA MANCHA        3.875    1/31/2036      EUR       54.36
MAPFRE SA              5.921    7/24/2037      EUR       64.22

STENA AB               5.875     2/1/2019      EUR       74.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.250    4/27/2012      USD        8.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.750    3/23/2012      USD        7.99
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/26/2016      ZAR       69.67
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    9/20/2016      ZAR       69.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    9/30/2016      ZAR       69.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012      USD        8.97
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/25/2021      ZAR       42.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/26/2021      AUD       61.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/17/2027      USD       57.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500     3/5/2018      AUD       74.13
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012      USD       10.32
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500    2/28/2012      USD        7.49
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000    1/27/2012      USD        4.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    1/25/2028      USD       57.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.130    1/10/2012      USD        9.59
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.000    12/7/2011      USD       10.16
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000    11/4/2011      USD        7.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000   10/21/2011      USD        9.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR       73.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR       71.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR       74.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500    6/12/2012      USD        7.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/29/2016      TRY       72.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/25/2016      ZAR       69.78
SWEDISH EXP CRED       6.500    1/27/2012      USD        6.72

CRED SUIS NY           9.000   10/12/2012      USD       22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH          2.875    2/20/2012      CHF       59.37
UBS AG                13.300    5/23/2012      USD        2.76
UBS AG                13.700    5/23/2012      USD        8.80
UBS AG                14.000    5/23/2012      USD        7.00
UBS AG                10.960    7/20/2012      USD       22.44
UBS AG                12.040    7/31/2012      USD       34.60
UBS AG                11.760    7/31/2012      USD       25.45
UBS AG                11.960    8/14/2012      USD       35.49
UBS AG                 9.500    8/10/2012      USD       27.82
UBS AG                10.910     9/7/2012      USD       41.08
UBS AG                15.240    8/23/2012      USD       27.47
UBS AG                10.200    10/1/2012      USD       71.89
UBS AG                10.000    8/23/2013      USD       14.14
UBS AG                 8.380    3/20/2012      USD       32.03
UBS AG                 8.720    3/20/2012      USD       26.79
UBS AG                 9.250    3/20/2012      USD       11.34
UBS AG                10.070    3/23/2012      USD       27.66
UBS AG                 9.640   11/14/2011      USD       10.55
UBS AG                10.530    1/23/2012      USD       36.54
UBS AG JERSEY          3.220    7/31/2012      EUR       40.15
UBS AG JERSEY         10.140   12/30/2011      USD       14.50

LVIV CITY              9.950   12/19/2012      UAH       92.62

ABBEY NATL TREAS       5.000    8/26/2030      USD       57.11
AIR BERLIN             8.250    4/19/2018      EUR       75.79
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.400    2/12/2013      EUR       66.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       3.250    2/25/2013      EUR       63.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       5.500    6/20/2013      EUR       64.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.500    6/21/2013      EUR       60.00
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       6.000    6/20/2014      EUR       55.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.000   11/16/2012      EUR       69.88
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250    2/15/2018      GBP       70.00
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250    2/15/2018      GBP       70.92
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.408     2/9/2027      JPY       71.31
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.359    3/27/2029      JPY       67.84
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.340   12/28/2026      JPY       71.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.550    1/23/2012      USD       10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.350    1/23/2012      USD       26.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250    1/31/2012      USD        9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.650    1/31/2012      USD       34.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/28/2012      USD        9.76
BARCLAYS BK PLC       13.050    4/27/2012      USD       25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC       12.950    4/20/2012      USD       23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.950    4/20/2012      USD       16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    6/29/2012      USD        8.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.000    7/20/2012      USD        7.87
BARCLAYS BK PLC        7.000    7/27/2012      USD        9.04
BARCLAYS BK PLC       11.000    7/27/2012      USD        7.88
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.400    7/31/2012      USD        9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.800    7/31/2012      USD       25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000    8/28/2012      USD        9.27
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250    8/31/2012      USD       31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.500    8/31/2012      USD       18.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/11/2012      USD        9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/11/2012      USD        9.90
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.000     6/3/2041      USD       66.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC        6.330    9/23/2032      GBP       71.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.250    8/29/2031      USD       69.91
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200    8/29/2031      USD       70.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.230    8/26/2031      USD       70.48
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200    8/25/2031      USD       70.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.390     8/4/2031      USD       72.69
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.100    5/26/2031      USD       71.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.420     5/5/2031      USD       72.76
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.750    9/14/2026      GBP       72.17
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000   10/16/2012      USD        9.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.500   10/16/2012      USD       10.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC       14.000    10/1/2012      USD        9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000    10/1/2012      USD        9.47
BEAZLEY GROUP LT       7.250   10/17/2026      GBP       73.15
CEVA GROUP PLC         8.500    6/30/2018      EUR       57.88
CEVA GROUP PLC        10.000    6/30/2018      EUR       58.50
CITY OF KYIV           9.375    7/11/2016      USD       74.63
CITY OF KYIV           9.375    7/11/2016      USD       74.01
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.875    3/28/2033      GBP       67.49
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.750    12/2/2024      GBP       70.37
CONSORT HEALTH         2.068    6/19/2042      GBP       71.69
DISCOVERY EDUCAT       1.948    3/31/2037      GBP       71.65
EFG HELLAS PLC         5.400    11/2/2047      EUR       10.63
EFG HELLAS PLC         6.010     1/9/2036      EUR       32.50
EFG HELLAS PLC         4.375    2/11/2013      EUR       60.90
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.100    12/9/2021      EUR       22.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.000    2/28/2013      EUR       57.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.000    2/28/2013      EUR       57.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.350    7/22/2014      EUR       38.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.000    12/2/2021      EUR       23.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.000    12/2/2021      EUR       22.88
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.500    12/6/2018      GBP       68.63
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875    2/15/2021      GBP       65.99
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875     5/9/2025      GBP       62.63
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.375    9/26/2031      GBP       61.50
ESSAR ENERGY           4.250     2/1/2016      USD       65.17
EX-IM BK OF UKRA       5.793     2/9/2016      USD       71.00
F&C ASSET MNGMT        6.750   12/20/2026      GBP       62.97
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500     6/1/2019      GBP       67.67
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500     6/1/2019      GBP       67.88
HBOS PLC               4.500    3/18/2030      EUR       62.62
HBOS PLC               5.374    6/30/2021      EUR       68.35
HBOS PLC               4.375   10/30/2019      EUR       71.86
HEALTHCARE SUPP        2.067    2/19/2043      GBP       73.84
HSBC BANK PLC          4.750    3/24/2046      GBP       73.39
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875    2/15/2016      EUR       70.75
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875    2/15/2016      EUR       71.38
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       6.439    5/23/2020      EUR       71.13
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.625   10/14/2020      EUR       72.83
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.975    9/15/2024      GBP       69.68
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.375    3/12/2020      EUR       73.38
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       8.500     6/7/2032      GBP       71.57
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       6.385    5/12/2020      EUR       71.13
LLOYDS TSB BANK        5.750     7/9/2025      GBP       72.90
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000    12/1/2016      EUR       62.13
LOUIS NO1 PLC          8.500    12/1/2014      EUR       68.50
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000    12/1/2016      EUR       62.13
MATALAN                9.625    3/31/2017      GBP       60.88
MATALAN                9.625    3/31/2017      GBP       61.14
MAX PETROLEUM          6.750     9/8/2013      USD       52.36
NATIONWIDE BLDG        5.600    8/19/2030      USD       70.65
NEW HOSPITALS ST       1.777    2/26/2047      GBP       55.16
NOMURA BANK INTL       0.800   12/21/2020      EUR       63.60
NORTH HOUSING          8.750    5/11/2037      GBP      138.60
OTE PLC                7.250     4/8/2014      EUR       71.65
OTE PLC                4.625    5/20/2016      EUR       63.66
PHONES4U FINANCE       9.500     4/1/2018      GBP       74.38
PHONES4U FINANCE       9.500     4/1/2018      GBP       74.02
PIRAEUS GRP FIN        4.000    9/17/2012      EUR       64.96
PRIVATBANK             5.799     2/9/2016      USD       65.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.350    1/23/2017      EUR       73.59
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.625    9/22/2021      EUR       61.13
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.100    8/11/2023      EUR       73.35
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       2.300   11/26/2024      JPY       64.54
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.692     6/9/2025      EUR       65.61
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       5.168    6/29/2030      EUR       61.99
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       5.250   11/14/2033      EUR       74.82
THOMAS COOK GR         7.750    6/22/2017      GBP       69.00
TUI TRAVEL PLC         4.900    4/27/2017      GBP       71.89
TXU EASTERN FNDG       6.450    5/15/2005      USD        0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN         6.542    3/30/2021      GBP       69.04
UNIQUE PUB FIN         5.659    6/30/2027      GBP       60.00


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *