TCREUR_Public/111021.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 21, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 209

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sells ATC Electric Drive Unit to Wolong


A Z E R B A I J A N

INT'L BANK OF AZERBAIJAN: Moody's Cuts Sub. Debt Rating to 'Ba2'


B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: Completes Agreements to Sell Belgian Banking Unit


G E R M A N Y

TS CO. MIT: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6.3MM F Notes to 'C (sf)'


I R E L A N D

A|WEAR: Hilco Acquires Business; Future Plans Uncertain
RMF EURO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class V Notes at 'BB (sf)'


I T A L Y

BANCASAI SPA: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
FIAT SPA: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'
TAURUS CMBS: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on EUR16.5MM F Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY: S&P Assigns 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

H.E.A.T. MEZZANINE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR18.4MM Notes to B2


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARES EUROPEAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
JUBILEE VII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba3'
MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Judge OKs Deal to Wipe Away US$48-Mil. Claim


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ATRIUM EUROPEAN: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
DISCOVER LEISURE: Cuts 70 Jobs at Coppull Site
GREAT HALL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Tranches at 'CCCsf'
KEYDATA INVESTMENT: FSC Pursues Independent Financial Advisers
MOTOR BOOKS: Enters Into Company Voluntary Arrangement

ORMEAU BATHS: Taps Insolvency Expert; Likely to Close
PREMIER FOODS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
PROVEN ENERGY: Kingspan Renewables Buys Firm Out of Receivership
STAGELIVE (PETERBOROUGH): Goes Into Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

* Strategic Value Raises $750MM for New Special Situations Fund
* BOOK REVIEW: Partners




                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sells ATC Electric Drive Unit to Wolong
---------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Jonathan Tirone, A-Tec Industries
AG's bankruptcy administrator on Wednesday said in a statement
that the company sold 98% of its ATB electric drive unit to
China's Wolong Investment GmbH, a subsidiary of the Asian nation's
Wolong Group.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 4,
2011, Bloomberg related that Wiener Boerse said in an e-mailed
statement that A-Tec had its shares suspended indefinitely in
Vienna one day after the company's bankruptcy administrator
exercised its right to liquidate A-Tec's assets.  A-Tec said its
administrator Matthias Schmidt exercised his right to start
liquidating the group after it failed to raise by Sept. 30 funds
required under a restructuring agreed with creditors last year,
Bloomberg disclosed.

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,
Austria.


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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


INT'L BANK OF AZERBAIJAN: Moody's Cuts Sub. Debt Rating to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded these global scale
ratings of International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA): long-term and
short-term local currency deposit ratings to Ba1/Not Prime from
Baa3/Prime-3, long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt
rating to Ba1 from Baa3, and long-term foreign currency
subordinated debt rating to Ba2 from Ba1. The outlook on these
long-term ratings has been changed to negative from stable.

At the same time, Moody's downwardly revised IBA's standalone
creditworthiness to B3 from B2 and changed the outlook on its
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+ to negative
from stable. The long-term foreign currency deposit rating of Ba2
was affirmed with a stable outlook.

Moody's rating action is largely based on IBA's audited financial
statements for 2010, prepared under IFRS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of IBA's supported ratings is driven by the negative
pressure on the bank's standalone creditworthiness -- as reflected
in the downward revision of the bank's standalone credit strength
B3, compared to B2 previously -- resulting from a material
deterioration in capitalization, asset quality and profitability.

In accordance with audited 2010 IFRS accounts, IBA reported a
Total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and Tier 1 capital ratio of
7.97% and 5.1%, respectively, as of December 31, 2010. According
to the audited report, IBA was in breach of the minimum capital
level required by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) (which
stipulates 6% for Tier 1 and 12% for Total CAR), and financial
covenants related to its external borrowings totalling AZN461
million (US$583 million), or 11.2% of total liabilities. Moody's
notes that this amount was reclassified as being 'on demand' as
the breach of covenants in the loan agreements entitles lenders to
accelerate respective debt.

IBA informed Moody's about an expected special subordinated loan
from the CBA (scheduled for end-October/November 2011), which will
improve IBA's statutory capital and bring its capital adequacy
ratios into compliance with statutory requirements. However, the
bank's Tier 1 ratio (calculated in accordance with Basel I) will
not change, and will remain below the minimum requirements set by
the CBA. Moody's notes that IBA's persistently weak capitalization
and low internal capital generation leaves limited room for
unexpected losses and provides a weak and low cushion to support
future growth.

The negative outlook on IBA's supported local currency deposit and
foreign currency debt ratings reflects (i) Moody's expectation
that IBA's privatization process (announced early in 2011) will be
completed within next 12-18 months and (ii) the likelihood that
the rating agency will reduce its assessment of the probability of
systemic support which will lead to a reassessment of the
supported ratings.

In addition, any further material adverse changes in the bank's
risk profile, particularly significant impairment of the bank's
liquidity position, and any failure to recapitalize the bank or
maintain control over its asset quality could also put negative
pressure on IBA's ratings.

At the same time, Moody's says that privatizing IBA could be
positive for the bank's standalone credit strength if the bank (as
a result of privatization) improves its transparency and corporate
governance, and also bolsters capitalization and reduces
concentration levels.

Moody's says that IBA benefits from the very high probability of
systemic support considering its government ownership, large
market shares and systemic importance for Azerbaijan's economy.
IBA's supported ratings currently benefit from a multi-notch
uplift from its standalone credit strength of B3.

Moody's also notes that in 2010 IBA reported a net loss of
AZN110.6 million as a result of material increase of provisions
and weakening interest margins. According to IBA's audited IFRS,
loans overdue more than 90 days and restructured loans accounted
for 12% and 13% of gross loans respectively at YE2010. The level
of loan loss reserves (LLR) formed under IFRS accounted for around
16.5% of gross loans covering 130% of non-performing loans.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

As of YE2010, IBA reported total assets of AZN4.35 billion ,
shareholders equity of AZN250.4 million, and net loss of AZN110.6
million according to its consolidated IFRS (audited).


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA SA: Completes Agreements to Sell Belgian Banking Unit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Taylor at Bloomberg News reports that Dexia SA completed
agreements to sell its Belgian banking unit and French municipal-
lending division to state-owned companies, moving closer to a full
breakup as part of plans to rescue the lender.

According to Bloomberg, Dexia said in an e-mailed statement on
Thursday that Dexia Bank Belgium will be sold for EUR4 billion
(US$5.5 billion) to the Societe Federale de Participations et
d'Investissement, or SFPI, acting on behalf of the Belgian state.
The company will sell the French municipal-lending unit to Caisse
des Depots et Consignations and La Poste, Bloomberg discloses.

Belgium and France are dismantling the firm, once the world's
leading lender to municipalities, after the company could no
longer fund itself as the sovereign-debt crisis dried up short-
term financing, Bloomberg notes.  The two countries, along with
Luxembourg, agreed to provide a EUR90 billion, 10-year guarantee
to cover Dexia's funding needs on Oct. 9, Bloomberg recounts.

Rescuing Dexia has become critical to preventing contagion in the
region's banking industry, Bloomberg states.  Dexia's balance
sheet, with total assets of about EUR518 billion at the end of
June, is about the size of the entire banking system in Greece and
larger than the combined assets of financial institutions bailed
out in Ireland in the last 2 1/2 years, according to Bloomberg.

The proceeds of the sale of Dexia Bank Belgium will be principally
allocated to the early repayment of loans granted by Dexia Bank
Belgium to its related companies, Dexia SA and Dexia Credit Local,
Bloomberg says.

The company, as cited by Bloomberg, said intra-group financing
granted by Dexia Bank Belgium to other group entities will be
maintained and gradually reduced according to the terms of the
sale agreement.

Bloomberg notes that Dexia said Caisse des Depots, the manager of
France?s principal state retirement funds, will own 65% of the
French municipal business and La Poste 5%.  According to
Bloomberg, the company said the two sales would reduce its balance
sheet by a total of EUR209 billion as of June 30, 2011.  The firm
said that it will reduce the bank's holdings of sovereign debt in
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain to EUR12 billion from
EUR21 billion, Bloomberg notes.

Dexia SA -- http://www.dexia.com/-- is a Belgian-based bank and
insurance carrier that focuses on Public and Wholesale Banking,
providing local public finance actors with banking and financial
solutions, and on Retail and Commercial Banking in Europe, mainly
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Turkey.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


TS CO. MIT: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6.3MM F Notes to 'C (sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of these
notes issued by TS Co.mit One CLO:

Issuer: TS Co.mit One GmbH SSD CLO

EUR10.2M D Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 27,
2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR11.3M E Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 27,
2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

EUR6.3M F Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

EUR446.3M A Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2006
Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR15M B Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2009
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR13.9M C Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2009
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

This transaction is a static cash flow CDO with a partially
amortizing portfolio of Certificates of Indebtedness
(Schuldscheindarlehen). The Certificates of Indebtedness represent
senior unsecured debt of the borrowers with various maturity
dates. The scheduled maturity date of this transaction passed in
June 2011, but due to restructurings some loans remain performing
with maturities after this date.

At closing the portfolio consisted of 396 Certificates amounting
to EUR503 million but has since amortized considerably, with 34
Certificates remaining outstanding amounting to approx. EUR39.5
million. Of these 34 loans, ten issuers summing to EUR12.2 million
are performing, although four of the performing loans summing to
EUR6.1 million have experienced principal deficiency events and
are considered Caa/Ca. Due to amortizations, Classes A, B and C
have been repaid, and the current outstanding amount of Class D
has been reduced to EUR7.2 million.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
some credit deterioration and greater clarity regarding likely
recoveries from the portfolio which will be available to repay the
outstanding notes.

TS Co.mit One has experienced EUR9.6 million of principal
deficiency events since last rating action (October 27, 2009). The
principal deficiency ledger (PDL) has increased to EUR14.7 million
from EUR10.1 million at the last rating action. Including EUR6.1
million of restructured loans which have been classified as
principal deficiency events, the relevant size of the pool was
considered to amount to EUR12.2 million.

Due to the low number of performing loans as a percentage of the
total pool and the impact recovery assumptions from defaulted
/restructured assets have on the notes, default scenarios were not
simulated. Analysis was based on loss given default scenarios
taking into account future cash flows and the deal waterfall, and
different recovery scenarios. This focused on the continuing
performance of restructured loans in the pool with an internal
bank rating equivalent to Caa2. Based on information provided by
Commerzbank in the Investor report dated September 27, and
observed recoveries in the transaction, recoveries were considered
to be close to zero for insolvent issuers, but likely to reach 50%
amongst the currently performing loans that have experienced
principal deficiency events.

In the process of determining the ratings, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses including
stresses on recoveries likely to be received from weaker obligors
in the pool. To ensure repayment of the Class D notes, the
transaction is reliant on some recoveries from insolvent issuers
and/or sales proceeds from long dated assets that mature beyond
the legal maturity in June 2013. The nominal amount of these
assets is EUR3.5 million based on the latest Investor report dated
September 2011. The notes ratings are sensitive to the actual
recovery rates that will be observed on the restructured/defaulted
assets, as well as the liquidation value obtained for such long
dated assets.

Moody's notes that this transaction is also subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1)
uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and 2)
the large concentration of issuers in the pool.

The methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations published in June 2011. Please see
the Credit Policy page on http://www.moodys.comfor a copy of this
methodology.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default
published in November 2009.

Moody's did not use model in the analyses of this transaction.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


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I R E L A N D
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A|WEAR: Hilco Acquires Business; Future Plans Uncertain
-------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that A|wear has been sold to a UK group
called Hilco, which specializes in distressed restructurings.

According to The Irish Times, no financial details were released
on Tuesday although Hilco said it would provide A|wear with
"extended working capital facilities to facilitate the business's
financial needs."

A|wear was sold by Brown Thomas in 2007 for a reported EUR70
million to a consortium comprising UK private equity group Alchemy
Partners and management, who took a 20% stake in the business, The
Irish Times recounts.

The deal was backed with debt provided by Ulster Bank, The Irish
Times notes.  It was not clear on Tuesday if Ulster Bank had
agreed to write off some or all of this debt as part of the
transaction with Hilco, The Irish Times states.

Like most retailers in Ireland, A|wear has struggled in the
recession, The Irish Times notes.  Latest accounts for Maple Topco
Ltd, A|wear's parent company, show revenues declined to EUR44.8
million in the year to the end of January 2010 from EUR58.1
million in the previous 12 months, The Irish Times discloses.

The company made a loss for the year of EUR17.8 million compared
with a loss of EUR4.7 million in the previous 12 months, The Irish
Times relates.

Maple Topco's bank borrowings amounted to EUR34.4 million at the
end of that financial year, according to The Irish Times.

A|wear said on Tuesday that total sales in 2010 reached EUR48
million, The Irish Times notes.

Hilco's plans for A|wear were not clear on Tuesday, The Irish
Times states.  According to The Irish Times, sources suggested the
retail business could be sold on quickly by Hilco or even broken
up.

A|wear is an Irish fashion retailer.


RMF EURO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class V Notes at 'BB (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all rated classes of notes in RMF Euro CDO IV PLC.

"The rating actions follow a review of RMF Euro CDO IV, which
included the application of our 2010 counterparty criteria, in
addition to credit and cash flow analyses," S&P related.

"In our opinion, the current levels of credit support available to
all classes of notes are commensurate with our current ratings on
the notes. We have therefore affirmed our ratings on all classes
of notes in this transaction," S&P stated.

"From our analysis, we have observed that overcollateralization
test results, the credit quality of the pool, and the weighted-
average spread earned on the collateral pool have all improved
since our last rating action in December 2009, (see Transaction
Update: RMF Euro CDO IV PLC, published on Dec. 17, 2009)," S&P
stated.

"We have also observed that the balance of the collateral pool and
outstanding balance of the class I notes have reduced. Overall, we
have observed a small improvement in the level of credit
enhancement available to each rated class of notes in the
transaction as well as a small reduction in the stressed default
rate generated by our CDO Evaluator credit model. We have also
noted that the weighted-average recovery rates, which we consider
to be appropriate, have reduced since our last review in 2009,"
S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. We
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using various
default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability rating
category, in conjunction with different interest stress
scenarios," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the credit enhancement available to each tranche
remains consistent with the current ratings assigned to each class
of notes, taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses
and our 2010 counterparty criteria. We have therefore affirmed our
ratings on all of the rated notes," S&P stated.

"None of the notes were constrained by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test we
introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (see 'Update to Global
Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published on Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P related.

"We have applied our 2010 counterparty criteria and, in our view,
the participants in the transaction are appropriately rated to
support the ratings on the notes (see 'Counterparty And Supporting
Obligations Methodology And Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6,
2010)," S&P said.

"We will publish a transaction update on this transaction in due
course," S&P related.

Ratings List

RMF Euro CDO IV PLC
EUR444 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

Class                     Rating

I                         AA+ (sf)
II                        A+ (sf)
III                       BBB+ (sf)
IV-A                      BB+ (sf)
IV-B                      BB+ (sf)
V                         BB (sf)


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I T A L Y
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BANCASAI SPA: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the ratings on multiple
Italian financial institutions.

"The rating actions result from our review of the implications of
a tougher-than-previously-anticipated macroeconomic and financial
environment for the Italian banks," S&P said.

"In our opinion, renewed market tensions in the eurozone's
periphery, particularly in Italy, and dimming growth prospects
have led to further deterioration in the operating environment for
Italian banks. We also think the cost of funding for Italian banks
will increase noticeably because of higher yields on Italian
sovereign debt. Furthermore, we expect the higher funding costs
for both banks and corporates to result in tighter credit
conditions and weaker economic activity in the short-to-medium
term," S&P related.

"We do not believe that this difficult operating climate is
transitory or that it will be easily reversed. In our view,
funding costs for Italian banks and corporates will remain
noticeably higher than those in other eurozone countries unless
the Italian government implements workable growth-enhancing
measures and achieves a faster reduction in the public sector debt
burden. Consequently, we envisage a situation where the Italian
banks may well be operating with a competitive disadvantage versus
their peers in other eurozone countries. At the same time, we
think all banking systems across the eurozone, including Italy,
may raise their commitment to reinforcing banks' capitalization,"
S&P related.

"In our view, these developments are significantly different from
the expectations we had previously factored into our ratings on
Italian banks (see 'Italian Banks Are Facing A Tricky Recovery,'
published April 14, 2011 on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit
Portal). In our view, Italian banks' profitability could decline
in the next couple of years, given the likely sizable increase in
their funding costs, volatility in the capital markets, and
reduced prospects for credit growth. We are also of the view that
Italy's slowing economic growth in 2012 could impede improvements
in Italian banks' asset quality and further strain their
creditworthiness," S&P related.

"We have also revised our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) on the Republic of Italy's banking system to Group 3 from
Group 2 (see 'Italy Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
Revised Down To 3 From 2 On Heightened Economic Risk"). Our BICRA
rankings integrate our view of the strengths and weaknesses of a
country's banking system compared with those of other countries.
The BICRA change reflects our view of the increased economic and
industry risks that Italy is facing and their impact on its
banking system. The change incorporates the revision of our
economic risk score, a subcomponent of the BICRA, for Italy to '3'
from '2'," S&P said.

"The  rating actions follow our previous downgrades of other
Italian banks in September 2011, after we lowered our sovereign
ratings on Italy (see 'Italy Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'A/A-
1' On Weaker Growth Prospects, Uncertain Policy Environment;
Outlook Negative', published Sept. 19, 2011, and 'Seven
Downgrades And Eight Outlook Revisions To Negative On Italian
Banks After Sovereign Downgrade,' published Sept. 21, 2011),:" S&P
related.

"Our ratings on 22 out of 43 Italian financial institutions carry
negative outlooks. These reflect the negative outlook on the
Republic of Italy and/or the potential for downside risk in our
current expectations, either because the macroeconomic environment
could deteriorate or because the effect on an individual bank's
financial profile under our baseline scenario could be greater
than expected," S&P stated.

Ratings List

                       To                   From
Downgraded
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
Counterparty Credit Rating
                       BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Stable/A-2
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa SCRL
Credito Bergamasco
Banca Aletti & C. SpA
                       BBB/Stable/A-2       A-/Negative/A-2
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa
                       A-/Stable/A-2        A/Negative/A-1
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna S.C.
                       BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Stable/A-2
Banca Popolare di Milano SCRL
Banca Akros SpA
                       BBB+/Negative/A-2    A-/Stable/A-2
Banca Carige SpA       BBB+/Negative/A-2    A-/Negative/A-2
Banca Popolare di Vicenza ScpA
                       BBB/Stable/A-2       BBB+/Stable/A-2
Credito Emiliano SpA   BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Stable/A-2
Veneto Banca SCPA      BBB/Negative/A-2     BBB+/Negative/A-2
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Teramo SpA
                       BB+/Negative/B       BBB/Negative/A-2
Cassa di Risparmio di Cento SpA
                       BB+/Stable/B         BBB-/Stable/A-3
Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige
                       BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Stable/A-2
Banca di Bologna       BB+/Stable/B         BBB-/Stable/A-3
Iccrea Holding SpA
Iccrea Banca SpA
Iccrea BancaImpresa SpA
                       BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Negative/A-2
Agos-Ducato SpA        A-/Negative/A-2      A/Negative/A-1
Farmafactoring SpA     BBB-/Stable/A-3      BBB/Stable/A-2
Banca Mediocredito del Friuli-Venezia Giulia SpA
                       BBB+/Stable/A-2      A-/Negative/A-2
BancaSai SpA           BB/Negative/B        BB+/Negative/B

Outlook Revised
                       To                   From
Banca di Credito Cooperativo San Marzano di San Giuseppe S.c.r.l.
                       BBB-/Negative/A-3    BBB-/Stable/A-3

CreditWatch Status Revised To Negative
                       To                   From
Dexia Crediop SpA      BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2   BBB+/Watch Dev/A-2

Affirmed
                       To
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA
Banca IMI SpA
Banca Infrastrutture Innovazione e Sviluppo SpA (BIIS)
Cassa di Risparmio in Bologna SpA
UniCredit SpA
UniCredit Bank AG
UniCredit Bank Austria AG
UniCredit Leasing SpA
                       A/Negative/A-1
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA
                       A+/Negative/A-1
Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza SpA
                       A+/Negative/A-1
Mediobanca SpA         A/Negative/A-1
Banca Fideuram     A/Negative/A-1
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Conversano S.c.r.l
                       BBB-/Stable/A-3
FGA Capital SpA        BBB/Negative/A-3
Findomestic Banca SpA  A/Negative/A-1
Istituto per il Credito Sportivo
                       A/Negative/A-1
Istituto Centrale delle Banche Popolari Italiane SpA
CartaSi SpA            BBB/Stable/A-2
Eurofidi Scpa          BBB/Negative/A-2


FIAT SPA: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Fiat Spa's (Fiat) Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BB' from
'BB+', and removed them from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).  The
agency has also downgraded Fiat Finance & Trade Ltd, S.A.'s (FFT)
senior unsecured rating to 'BB' from 'BB+' and removed from RWN.
Fiat's Short-term IDR has been affirmed at 'B'.  The Outlook on
Fiat's Long-term IDR is Negative.

"The current ratings are based on Fiat's standalone credit profile
but incorporate heightened short-term risks for Fiat from its
combination with Chrysler LLC in an increasingly challenging
environment for the group," says Emmanuel Bulle, Senior Director
in Fitch's European Corporates group.  "Chrysler has a weaker
credit profile than Fiat and sustained benefits to Fiat from this
deal should only accrue in the medium- to long-term."

Fitch acknowledges the strict financial ring-fencing around
Chrysler, of which Fiat currently owns 53.5% on a fully diluted
basis (expected by Fiat to increase to 58.5% by year-end), the
lack of central treasury, the absence of cross-guarantees on the
other company's debt, and Chrysler's favorable debt maturity
profile (no material debt repayment before 2016).  This ensures
that Fiat does not have an obligation of a material, direct and
immediate financial support to Chrysler.

From an operational standpoint, the combination of Fiat and
Chrysler should enable the new entity to lift output and generate
economies of scale.  Synergies should stem from joint purchasing,
the use of common vehicle architectures and engines as well as
joint R&D costs and should help bolster Fiat's profitability.  The
group will also benefit from improved geographic exposure and a
bolder product range thanks to highly complementary markets and
products.

However, the agency believes that the planned increasing
operational and strategic integration of the two companies point
to a higher likelihood of mutual direct and indirect support
should one of the partners run into financial difficulty.  In
particular, Chrysler may require financial, technical,
operational, and/or human resources help from Fiat and this may
ultimately disrupt Fiat's underlying operations at a time when
pressure is intensifying on Fiat's standalone business.
Chrysler's technology, product range and geographic
diversification have become central to Fiat's strategy and
Fitch considers it increasingly unlikely that Fiat could abandon
Chrysler.

The ratings also reflect Fiat's intrinsic weaknesses including a
high reliance on the Italian and Brazilian markets, only a
marginal presence in high-potential, fast-growing, China, India,
Russia and in the profitable premium market, and the continuing
weakness of Lancia and Alfa Romeo.  Fitch highlights the
increasing challenge to boost or even maintain revenue, operating
profit and cash generation in weakening markets.  Fiat's market
share declined substantially in its core domestic market, Italy,
from approximately 34% in mid-2009 when Fiat benefited from
scrapping incentives, to less than 30% now.  The agency is
concerned that it could take time before global sales and market
shares recover, notably as some new models' launches have been
delayed in past years and competition in Fiat's main markets will
intensify.  The group will need to materially increase capex and
R&D compared with 2010 as part of its efforts to invest in new
models and rejuvenate its product line.

Fiat's profitability is supported chiefly by its operations in
Brazil and its light-commercial vehicles (LCV) business.
Nonetheless, Fiat's market dominance of the Brazilian market is
likely to be challenged as new entrants and existing players fight
for market share, whereas the growth rate in this market is
expected to decline somewhat following a period of robust growth.
Increased economic uncertainty and a potential decline in
corporate confidence are likely to have a negative impact on LCV
sales.

Liquidity at end-June 2011 was robust. Fiat's EUR12.2 billion in
unrestricted cash and equivalents largely cover EUR5.2 billion of
debt maturing in the following 12 months as well as negative free
cash flow (FCF) as projected by Fitch in 2011.  Reported cash at
end-June 2011 included a EUR1 billion fully drawn credit line
maturing in February 2012.  This credit facility has been replaced
by a new EUR1.95 billion line maturing in 2014, which is currently
undrawn.  However, Fiat's reported liquidity would decrease if
Fiat were to exercise its option to purchase 40% or all of VEBA
Trust's original interest in Chrysler between
July 2012 and June 2016 for an as-yet unknown amount, but this is
not Fitch's current central case and would be treated as event
risk.

The Negative Outlook reflects execution risk from the combination
with Chrysler and the challenges facing Fiat in its core markets
in Italy and Brazil.  A downgrade could occur if revenue and
operating margins do not develop as expected. In particular, group
and FGA's operating margins falling below 3% and 2% on a sustained
basis could be negative.  A downgrade could also be triggered by
mounting liquidity issues, gross leverage remaining above 4x on a
sustained basis and by evidence of tangible support to Chrysler.
Positive rating action is unlikely in the near-term given
increasing macro-economic challenges and execution risk of the
combination with Chrysler, but could be driven in the future by
sustained FCF and higher margins at FGA and group level.


TAURUS CMBS: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on EUR16.5MM F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade these Classes of Notes issued by TAURUS CMBS No.2 S.r.l.
(amounts reflect initial outstandings):

EUR24.8M C Notes, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned
Aa3 (sf)

EUR29M D Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

EUR24.7M E Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2010 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

EUR16.5M F Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class G Notes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default probability
of the securitized loans (both during the term and at maturity) as
well as Moody's value assessment for the properties securing these
loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss expectation
for the securitized pool. The review action takes into account
Moody's updated central scenarios as described in Moody's Special
Report "EMEA CMBS: 2011 Central Scenarios."

The review action has been prompted by (i) the lower Moody's
property value estimate that is driven by the decline in net cash
flows and increased vacancy levels, (ii) the difficult Italian
investment market environment for larger properties, which form
the majority of the portfolio and subsequent increased uncertainty
on the planned property sales going forward, (iii) the increased
refinancing risk assessment and (iv) the negative implications of
Moody's three-notch downgrade of the rating of the government of
the Republic of Italy to A2 with a negative outlook especially for
the Class C Notes.

The only remaining loan in the pool, the Bernice Loan, matures in
July 2015. The borrower intends to sell the whole portfolio over
the loan term. Up to July 2012, the loan is only amortized by
prepayments following property disposals and thereafter the
borrower will amortize the loan in seven half yearly instalments.
In the analysis, Moody's has given only limited benefit to the
scheduled amortization and believes that the refinancing risk of
this loan has increased compared to its last assessment in 2010.
This adjustment of the refinancing risk assessment is primarily
due to the decline in property values and its expectation that
commercial real estate lending markets will only slowly recover
from 2013 onwards.

Moody's will conclude its transaction review after it has
finalized (i) its analysis of the net cash flows of the property
portfolio and the value of the portfolio, combined with (ii) its
reassessment of the refinancing risk of the loan and (iii) the
impact of Moody's three-notch downgrade of the rating of the
government of the Republic of Italy to A2 with a negative outlook.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MORE
Portfolio) published April 2006, and Update on Moody's Real Estate
Analysis for CMBS Transaction in EMEA. published
June 2005.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior review is summarized in a Press
Release dated August 6, 2010. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on August 16, 2011.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY: S&P Assigns 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings and
'kzBBB' Kazakhstan national scale rating to JSC Insurance Co.
Kazkommerts-Policy. The outlook is stable.

"The ratings reflect our view of Kazkommerts-Policy's adequate
operating results and capitalization, supported by extremely
strong risk-based capital adequacy," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Ekaterina Tolstova. "These positive factors are offset by
the company's weak competitive position in international terms and
its limited financial flexibility."

Kazkommerts-Policy, a universal insurance company, was established
in 1996. The current shareholder structure was adopted in 2008 and
the company's ultimate shareholder is Kazkommertsbank (JSC) (KKB;
B/Stable/C). "We consider Kazkommerts-Policy to be a strategically
important subsidiary of its parent, KKB, based on our group
methodology. However, our assessment of the company's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) is higher than our rating on KKB. We believe
the regulatory framework provides some protection for the company
in the event of adverse intervention from its parent.
Consequently, the rating on Kazkommerts-Policy reflects its SACP.
Nevertheless, the rating cannot be more than one notch higher than
the rating on KKB," S&P related.

"We assess Kazkommerts-Policy's competitive position as weak
overall, constrained by a relatively small premiums base in
international terms and high industry and country risks in
Kazakhstan," S&P stated.

"With gross premiums written (GPW) of Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 16.4
billion (about $110 million) in 2010, Kazkommerts-Policy is the
second largest player in Kazakhstan's insurance market after
Eurasia Insurance Co. (BB/Stable/--), whose GPW was KZT18.8
billion (about $128 million). We note that the company's
gross results are quite volatile, owing to civil liability
fronting business," S&P said.

"We consider the operating performance of Kazkommerts-Policy to be
adequate and supported by good underwriting and investment
results. Although the gross combined ratio was volatile, mainly
because of fronting business, the net combined ratio is quite
stable. It was 81% in 2010 after 78% in 2009," S&P said.

"Investment income has been stable, except during the financial
market turmoil in 2009. In our view, the quality and mix of
Kazkommerts-Policy's investment portfolio are adequate. However,
the portfolio is exposed to significant credit risk, some market
risks, and shows a concentration of Kazakh issuers," S&P said.

"We believe that Kazkommerts-Policy's capitalization is generally
adequate, reflecting extremely strong risk-based capital adequacy.
In our view, however, there is some dependence on reinsurance
protection, the quality of which we consider to be adequate," S&P
related.

"We view Kazkommerts-Policy's financial flexibility as weak,
constrained by its parent's current financial profile. However, we
regard the company's adequate internal capital generation as
positive," S&P said.

"The outlook is stable because we expect that Kazkommerts-Policy
will be able to maintain its competitive standing in the Kazakh
insurance market, while showing sound operating results and
keeping capital adequacy at least very strong," said
Ms. Tolstova.

"We envisage that the net combined ratio will not exceed 90% in
2011-2012 and that gross technical results will likely be
volatile," S&P said.

"A negative rating action could follow if we saw a significant
deterioration of the company's competitive position and quality of
reinsurance protection or if operating results weakened, reflected
in net combined ratios of more than 100%. If we were to perceive
the ultimate shareholder's actions as having a negative influence
on the company's operating results or infringing the rights of
policyholders, we would also consider a negative rating action. In
addition, negative rating actions on the parent, KKB, could lead
to similar rating actions on Kazkommerts-Policy. In such a case,
our rating on Kazkommerts-Policy would likely be at most one notch
higher than that on its parent," S&P said.

Positive rating actions are unlikely at this stage, in view of the
credit profiles of Kazkommerts-Policy and KKB.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


H.E.A.T. MEZZANINE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR18.4MM Notes to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and confirmed the ratings
of two classes of notes issued by H.E.A.T. Mezzanine (compartment
2). The notes affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: H.E.A.T Mezzanine S.A. (Compartment 2)

EUR218.4M A Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 25,
2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR10M (currently EUR7.2 million rated balance) Combo Notes,
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The rating of the Combination Note addresses the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the combo
note, which does not accrue interest, the 'Rated Balance' is equal
at any time to the principal amount of the Combination Note on the
Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue
Date to such date, either through interest or principal payments.
The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the
outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

H.E.A.T Mezzanine S.A. (Compartment 2) is a static CDO of a
portfolio of German SME mezzanine loans with bullet maturities
which are due to redeem in April 2013. The closing portfolio of
EUR280 million has been reduced to a performing pool of EUR198
million from defaults and early terminations, based on the report
dated July 21, 2011. The amount of outstanding Class A notes is
currently EUR183.0 million from an initial EUR218.4 million due to
deleveraging.

The main driver of the downgrade is the deterioration of two
companies with an aggregate notional of EUR9 million, for which
restructuring discussions are still ongoing based on the latest
Trustee report dated July 2011.In the event these two issuers
restructure with a haircut assumption of 50% and excluding further
repayments of the Class A, the overcollateralization level of the
Class A notes would be reduced from the current level of 109.8% to
107.4%, corresponding to a nominal overcollateralization cushion
of EUR13.5 million. This calculation gives credit to the
additional EUR3 million from a principal deficiency event that was
previously restructured.

Given the high individual obligor concentration in the pool, (the
largest issuer in the pool has an exposure of EUR12.5 million),
the ratings of the notes are very sensitive to decreases in
overcollateralization levels.

In addition, although the majority of the portfolio companies have
exhibited credit quality improvement since the last rating action
based on the updated Riskcalc edfs using 2010 financial
statements, the notes ratings are driven by the performance of the
weakest issuers. In its analysis, Moody's assumed that 27.1% to
31.5% of the pool (equivalent to a Caa1 rating) would be likely to
face refinancing difficulties or insolvencies over the coming
years to scheduled maturity.

The high default probability associated with the pool is partially
mitigated by the recovery credits given to companies where there
is a potential for restructuring.

In assessing the potential recoveries on these companies, Moody's
gave credit to the length of time between the legal and scheduled
maturities, which allows more time for the issuer to receive
recoveries from the portfolio companies. Moody's considered
various scenarios including a maximum recovery level of 50%
(reflecting the potential for restructuring), for a quarter of the
pool, while the remainder would be expected to recover 0% upon
default.

The analysis of the underlying pools' credit quality was based on
updated individual credit assessments by RisckCalc using annual
financial statement data for each obligor in the respective pools
as well as on information on individual obligors provided by the
Transaction Adviser. The latest available financial data of nearly
all of the obligors dates from the financial year 2010. RiskCalc
is an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV. The results
obtained from the RiskCalc model were initially translated to
Moody's rating scale and adjusted by one notch where necessary in
order to compensate for the absence of credit indicators such as
rating reviews, outlooks and adjustments factoring in cyclical
developments in the economy.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties include:

1) Low portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors that are rated non investment grade, especially when they
experience jump to default. Due to the pool's lack of granularity,
Moody's supplements its base case scenario with individual
scenario analysis.

2) Potential for elevated refinancing difficulty regarding the
subordinated debt instruments in this portfolio, particularly
among obligors with weaker credit quality.

3) Recoveries: recoveries so far have been low on this portfolio,
but an amendment to the transaction to enable restructurings in
2010 could lead to higher than expected recoveries in future.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations published in
September 2009 and Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in
Europe published in February 2007.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARES EUROPEAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Ares European CLO III B.V.:

   -- EUR49.5M Class A3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR21M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR21M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR22M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ares European CLO III B.V., issued in July 2007, is a multi
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Ares Management, L.P. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until August 2014. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009. The Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 138.3%, 127.2%, 117.7%, 110.3% and 102.8%
respectively, versus September 2009 levels of 136.7%, 125.7%,
116.3%, 109.0% and 101.6%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a stronger
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated September 2011,
the WARF is currently 2515 compared to 2545 in the September 2009
report, and securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately
5.1% of the underlying portfolio versus 6.8% in September 2009;
however, the reported WARF understates the actual improvement in
credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on
September 1, 2010. Moody's notes that all collateral quality tests
are in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR327.8 million,
defaulted par of EUR0.32 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.5% (consistent with a WARF of 2600), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.2% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted average
spread of 3.0%. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Moody's also notes that around 47% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Risks and relevant
stresses associated to credit estimates are described in the
report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

4) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

5) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, and diversity score. However, as part of
the base case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the
covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported
and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for
a copy of this methodology.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Cadogan Square CLO IV B.V.:

   -- EUR343.75M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR25M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR15M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2023,
      Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR22.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR26.25M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.75M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR3M Class X Combination Notes due 2023 (currently
      EUR2.45M Outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M Class W Combination Notes due 2023, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class X,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee. Moody's has withdrawn its rating on the Class W
combination notes because it has been split back into its original
components and are no longer outstanding.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Cadogan Square CLO IV B.V., issued in May 2007, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Credit Suisse Alternative Capital Inc. This transaction
will be in reinvestment period until 24 July 2013. It is composed
of senior secured loans (81%), second lien loans (12%), CLO
securities (3.5%), high yield bonds (2%) and mezzanine loans
(1.5%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios due to deleveraging of the senior
notes since the rating action in July 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's notes that the Class A notes have been paid down by
approximately 5%, or EUR18.8 million, since the last rating action
in July 2009. Over the same period, the overcollateralization
ratios have increased. As of the latest trustee report dated 20
September 2011, the Class A/B and Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 126.12%, 118.79%,
111.25% and 106.43%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels of
116.94%, 110.46%, 103.76% and 99.45%, respectively. All
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a better
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF"). As of the latest trustee
report dated September 2011, the WARF is currently 2912, compared
to 2929 in the June 2009 report. However, the reported WARF
understates the actual improvement in credit quality because of
the technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR469.3 million,
defaulted par of EUR5.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 23.98% (consistent with a WARF of 2876), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 43.04% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted average
spread of 3.12%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 81% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread and diversity score. However, as part of
the base case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the
covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported
and covenant levels.

4) Moody's also notes that around 62% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

5) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction maturity such
an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the nature of the
asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
that of the liabilities. Moody's notes that the underlying
portfolio includes a CLO security that matures after the maturity
date of the notes and makes up a modest 0.53% of the underlying
reference portfolio. For this assets, a liquidation value of 30%
was applied.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


JUBILEE VII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actionS on these notes
issued by Jubilee CDO VII B.V.:

   -- EUR50M Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR30M Class C Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR31M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR20M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Jubilee CDO VII B.V., issued in November 2006, is a multiple
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until November 20, 2012. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Reported WARF has increased from 2605 to 2869 between July 2009
and August 2011. However, this reported WARF overstates the actual
deterioration in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities total
about EUR9.93 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
EUR3.0 million reported in July 2009. Moody's notes that
overcollateralization ratios have marginally deteriorated, with
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios reported
at 131.16%, 120.79% and 111.67%, respectively, versus July 2009
levels of 132.47%, 122.14% and 113.10%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR467.782
million, defaulted par of EUR9.930 million, a weighted average
default probability of 20.02% (consistent with a WARF of 2864), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.0% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted
average spread of 3.0%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted
average rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
Moody's considered spread and coupon levels higher than the
covenant levels. Moody's also supplemented its base case analysis
by considering a diversity score of 33, due to the large
difference between the reported and covenant levels.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's notes that around 50% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Judge OKs Deal to Wipe Away US$48-Mil. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hilary Russ at Bankruptcy Law360 reports that a New York
bankruptcy judge approved a deal Tuesday allowing Marco Polo
Seatrade BV to wash away a US$48 million claim that stemmed from a
sinking oil tanker project it had undertaken with German bank
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale.

According to Law360, the compromise settles an out-of-court
dispute that, if left unresolved, could have threatened to drown
Marco Polo in litigation over whether to maintain its portion of
ownership in the Sudtank project, which was a 2007 loan agreement
between Marco Polo, other shareholders and NordLB.

                         About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing
commercial and technical vessel management services to third
parties.  Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the
name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate
headquarters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets
consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in
international trade, and call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million
on July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the
two other vessels.

Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J.
Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy
counsel.  The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.

Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC is the claims and noticing agent.

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. disclosed US$11,732,762 in assets and
US$331,832,769 in liabilities.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ATRIUM EUROPEAN: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Atrium European Real Estate Limited's
(Atrium) Outlook to Positive from Stable and affirmed its Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+', senior unsecured rating
at 'BB+' and Short-term IDR at 'B'.

"Fitch expects Atrium's financial metrics to remain resilient and
stable in the next two years, despite two major shopping centre
acquisitions in 2011," says Jean-Pierre Husband, a Director in
Fitch's EMEA Corporate Finance team.  "The Positive Outlook
reflects Atrium's substantial progress in resolving outstanding
litigation claims, which is a prerequisite for any upgrade of the
ratings."

Fitch believes Atrium's EBIT NIC should settle between a still
comfortable 5.0x and 5.5x in 2011-2013 (including the Prague and
Promenada, Poland shopping centre acquisitions completed this
year) despite the agency's assumption of higher interest costs on
bank debt during the period. Fitch expects Atrium to maintain an
EBIT NIC of above 2.0x for an investment grade rating.

Net leverage should also stay moderate in the next three years
(loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of between 5% and 25%) and below
industry averages in the short to medium term (LTVs of around 35%-
45%).  This allows Atrium some financial flexibility, although
recent acquisitions have used secured debt, which may constrain
the group's unsecured asset cover. Fitch expects Atrium to
diversify its access and sources of funding in the next two to
three years.

The contentious position between Meinl Bank AG (Meinl) and Atrium
was resolved in June 2011, with all claims and lawsuits against
each other withdrawn.  Fitch notes that Atrium made no cash
payments under this settlement. The companies also agreed to sever
all business ties and new bond trustees were appointed.

The ratings are constrained by the remaining outstanding
litigation regarding the share buybacks in 2007.  Although Fitch
believes that the ultimate liability to the owners and management
is limited, there is still some residual uncertainty and Atrium's
ability to issue new bonds may be constrained.  The resolution of
all residual litigation claims would be a strong positive towards
the restoration of an investment grade rating for the group.

Atrium's EBIT net interest cover (NIC) improved to 7.7x in 2010
(8.6x at H111) from 2.7x in 2009.  This was due to stable rental
income, reduced property costs and lower interest payments,
resulting from high-coupon bond buybacks.

Gross rental income increased by 1.8% in 2010 (+14.5% at H111
compared to H110), as Atrium restricted temporary letting
discounts in Russia and improved occupancy rates.  This positive
trend is underlined by increased occupancy across the group's CEE
shopping centre portfolio, now at 96.6% at H111 (94.6% at H110).

At June 30, 2011, while the group had no undrawn committed debt
facilities, Atrium had EUR210 million of cash deposits available,
sufficient to pay the outstanding development costs and total debt
maturities of EUR51 million in H211 and 2012. With only
EUR8 million of committed development spending, Atrium's liquidity
remains relatively strong (with a liquidity score of around 4.1x
at H111).  A liquidity score of at least 1.75x is considered
appropriate for a return to a 'BBB-' IDR rating.


DISCOVER LEISURE: Cuts 70 Jobs at Coppull Site
----------------------------------------------
Chorley Guardian reports that 70 people have lost their jobs at
Discover Leisure caravan retailer in Coppull.

Workers at Discover Leisure caravan retailer in Coppull were told
they were likely to be made redundant, after the firm announced it
was closing the site, according to Chorley Guardian.

Chorley Guardian says 70 out of the 76 workers were told they were
being let go.

One unnamed worker told the Chorley Guardian in an interview that
he knew things had been bad for a number of years but said nobody
realized the true extent.

"It's terribly regrettable that the Chorley site has had to close
because of the economic circumstances," the report quoted Coppull
councillor Matthew Crow as saying.


GREAT HALL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Tranches at 'CCCsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all but two tranches of Great Hall
Mortgages No.1 Plc, a series of three UK non-conforming
transactions.

The affirmations reflect the continued improvement in asset
performance over the past year.  The majority of the loans in the
three pools have reverted to variable rates, which are linked to
either the Bank of England Base Rate (BBR) or LIBOR.  In Fitch's
view, the current low interest rate environment has led to
improved borrower affordability, as evidenced by the declining
trend in three-month plus arrears across all three transactions.
As of the last interest payment date, loans in arrears by three
months or more ranged from 5.4% (GHM 2007-1) to 6.4% (GHM 2006-1).
This is significantly lower than the level associated with most UK
non-conforming RMBS transactions and has contributed to a further
decline in repossessions during 2011.

In addition, unsold repossessions remain at a low and manageable
level.  Coupled with low period repossessions, this has meant that
losses incurred from the sale of repossessed properties have been
low.  This has allowed each transaction's reserve fund to remain
at its target level and has contributed to annualized excess
spread levels of 1.1%, 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively. Furthermore,
the breach of the reserve fund amortization triggers on all three
transactions supports the build up of credit enhancement in the
future, though this is expected to be limited due to the current
low prepayment rates.

The downgrade of GHM 2007-2's class C notes to 'BB+sf' from
'BBBsf' reflects Fitch's view that despite the improving
performance, the current level of credit enhancement available to
these tranches is not commensurate with an investment grade
rating.  The agency's view is supported by the high weighted-
average loan-to-value ratio of the collateral and the high
proportion of loans in high debt-to-income categories.

Performance is considered sufficiently robust to warrant a Stable
Outlook on all tranches.  However, Fitch has identified two key
concerns.

Firstly, each transaction is unhedged with respect to BBR/LIBOR
basis risk.  This exposes the transactions to the risk of further
divergence between the two reference rates, particularly as loans
that reference BBR account for a significant portion of the three
pools.  As of September 2011, this proportion ranged from 52.3%
(GHM2007-2) to 66.2% (GHM2007-1).  The discrepancy between LIBOR
and BBR has increased in recent months; however, the level of
excess spread is currently sufficient to cover this mismatch.

Secondly, the recent acknowledgement of waterfall misallocations
raises concerns about the cash management processes of the Great
Hall Mortgages Series.  It was reported in September 2011 that
prepayment funds had previously been incorrectly allocated to the
revenue waterfall instead of the principal waterfall.  This was
corrected on the latest interest payment date by allocating a
portion of the excess spread to the principal waterfall, which
resulted in a lower reported level of excess spread this period on
all three transactions.

The rating actions are as follows:

Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 plc (Series 2006-1):

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0276086393) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0276092797) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ba (ISIN XS0276086989) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Bb (ISIN XS0276093332) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ca (ISIN XS0276087524) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Cb (ISIN XS0276093928) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Da (ISIN XS0276088506) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Db (ISIN XS0276095030) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ea (ISIN XS0276089223) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable

Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 plc (Series 2007-1):

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0288626525) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0288627507) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ba (ISIN XS0288628224) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Bb (ISIN XS0288628810) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ca (ISIN XS0288629545) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Cb (ISIN XS0288630121) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Da (ISIN XS0288630394) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Db (ISIN XS0288630550) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ea (ISIN XS0288630808) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR2'

Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 plc (Series 2007-2):

  -- Class Aa (ISIN XS0308354504) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ab (ISIN XS0308354843) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ac (ISIN XS0308462141) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ba (ISIN XS0308356970) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ca (ISIN XS0308357358) downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class Cb (ISIN XS0308355733) downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class Da (ISIN XS0308357788) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Db (ISIN XS0308356111) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ea (ISIN XS0308357861) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating revised to 'RR3' from 'RR2'
  -- Class Eb (ISIN XS0308356467) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating revised to 'RR3' from 'RR2'


KEYDATA INVESTMENT: FSC Pursues Independent Financial Advisers
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports that the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme is pursuing independent financial advisers who recommended
clients invest in the now-collapsed investment firm Keydata
Investment Services.

Keydata Investment, which was regulated by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA), designed and distributed structured investment
products via a network of independent financial advisers, on
behalf of Luxembourg-based company Lifemark.  It was put into
administration by the regulator in June 2009, leaving 30,000
investors with GBP450 million worth of losses, according to the
guardian.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Dan
Schwarzmann and Mark Batten of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP were
appointed joint administrators of Keydata on June 8, 2009.  The
appointment was made based on an application to court by the FSA
on insolvency grounds.

The guardian notes that in April 2011, Norwich & Peterborough
Building Society -- whose advisers sold Keydata products to more
than 3,000 customers between 2005 and 2009 -- was fined GBP1.4
million and given a GBP51 million compensation bill by the FSA
after being found guilty of the "widespread mis-selling" of
Keydata's complex investment products to older people.

N&P paid victims compensation of their initial investment, plus
interest, with any income or other payments received deducted.
This was, in some cases, better than FSCS payouts, which now have
a limit of GBP85,000 per person, the guardian says.  In total, the
report relates that the Keydata collapse landed the FSCS with a
compensation bill of over GBP300 million much of which has been
paid for by the investment industry in the form of increases in
funding to the FSCS.

Now, the FSCS is looking to make up for any shortfall by pursuing
independent financial advisers across the country who recommended
clients invest in Keydata, the guardian discloses.

According to financial advice trade publication IFAOnline.co.uk,
firms who receive a letter from FSCS lawyers are being invited to
enter into a "constructive dialogue" with the FSCS before it
issues formal proceedings, the guardian relates.  Protective
proceedings have been issued by the FSCS for recovery of the
payments, the report adds.

Keydata Investment Services Ltd. designs, distributes and
administers structured investment products.  Keydata operates from
three locations, being London, Glasgow and Reading and administers
its own products as well as portfolios for third parties.


MOTOR BOOKS: Enters Into Company Voluntary Arrangement
------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that the Stoke office of insolvency firm
Begbies Traynor has arranged a company voluntary arrangement (CVA)
for Motor Books.

According to Insider Media, the company said "a number of
decisions and issues" had led to it reaching an insolvent
position.

Bob Young and Steve Currie, partners at corporate recovery
specialists Begbies Traynor's Stoke office, arranged a Company
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), allowing the company to continue
trading, Insider Media notes.

"Expanding into stores in Bournemouth, Swindon and Oxford had not
proven successful over the years -- the business was left with a
bad debt of GBP17,000 on the Oxford premises -- but in 2010 the
company suffered a further serious blow when its principal
supplier of motoring titles, Menoshire, suddenly ceased trading.
"Motor Books had a long trading history with Menoshire and
preferential trading terms.  It was not able to fill this gap
quickly and on the same commercial terms with multiple book
wholesalers and consequently turnover slumped from GBP798,235 in
2009 to GBP644,942 in 2010," Insider quotes Mr. Young as saying.

Under the CVA, the proposals provide for all creditors to be paid
in full over a five-year period, Insider Media notes.

Motor Books is a London-based independent bookstore.


ORMEAU BATHS: Taps Insolvency Expert; Likely to Close
-----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the chairman of the board of the Ormeau
Baths gallery has said an insolvency practice has now been
appointed to judge the viability of the gallery.

According to the news agency, the insolvency expert will look at
the accounts and contracts in the gallery and make a
recommendation, possibly within days.

The gallery in Belfast city centre is known to have financial
problems and it is understood to be likely to close, the report
says.

BBC News relates that the gallery has been getting GBP300,000 a
year from the Arts Council but has struggled to raise enough
private sponsorship to supplement its grant.

A final decision will be made by the board, as soon as the
insolvency report is received, according to BBC News.

The Ormeau Baths Gallery was opened by the Arts Council in 1995.
The gallery was created in what had been a public bathhouse and
swimming pool.  In the past it hosted high profile exhibitions of
the work of leading artists such as Gilbert and George and Yoko
Ono.


PREMIER FOODS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate
credit rating on U.K. packaged food producer Premier Foods PLC to
'BB-' from 'BB'. "At the same time, we placed the rating on
CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P stated.

"The downgrade reflects our view of Premier Foods' increasing
sensitivity to raw material price inflation, as reflected in its
year-to-date performance. In the third quarter of 2011, group
sales were GBP477 million, down 3.6% on the prior year, with
volumes down 8%," S&P stated.

In S&P's view, these results reflect these factors:

    Premier Foods' sensitivity to actions by retailers in
    response to price increases such that the company was unable
    to maintain its volumes for at least two quarters. This
    sensitivity is greater than we had originally anticipated.

    Weak consumer sentiment in the U.K., which is causing
    retailers and manufacturers to change their pricing and
    promotional strategies, along with frequent changes in
    product mix.

    The uncertain outlook for raw material prices.

The downgrade also reflects the revision of our assessment of
Premier Food's business risk to fair from satisfactory. This, in
turn, reflects the company's declining profitability and its
deteriorating market position in the branded food sector.

"As a result of operating developments since the start of 2011,
Premier Foods' debt-reduction program is likely to proceed more
slowly than we had originally anticipated. Earlier this year, we
anticipated that Premier Foods would be able to improve its debt
metrics materially with noncore business disposals, and by
repaying debt with free operating cash flow. However, increasing
commodity prices affected cash flow generation in 2011. We also
believe that noncore asset disposals could prove difficult to
effect in the tough macroeconomic environment. As such, we
estimate that Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA will
remain close to 4.5x in 2011, which we view as commensurate with
the current rating," S&P said.

"We assess Premier Foods' liquidity profile as less than adequate
under our criteria. This reflects tight (5%-15%) covenant headroom
under the company's existing banking facilities. We see a risk
associated with Premier Foods' ability to restore adequate
covenant headroom, which we specify as a 15%-30%
range in our criteria," S&P related.

"We aim to review the CreditWatch placement within the next three
months, depending on the timing of the outcome of management's
negotiations with the banks for a covenant reset," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating if Premier Foods were unable to reset
its covenants. Additional pressure on the rating could stem from
further deterioration in operating performance or slower debt
reduction than we anticipate, which could result in Premier Foods
being unable to maintain its debt protection metrics in line with
the 'BB-' rating," S&P said.

"We could affirm the rating if the company were able to resolve
its liquidity issues and reset its covenant headroom. This would
translate into an ability to generate operating cash flow to
maintain the stability of the capital structure over the medium
term, alongside adequate covenant headroom," S&P related.


PROVEN ENERGY: Kingspan Renewables Buys Firm Out of Receivership
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Ranscombe at The Scotsman reports that Proven Energy was
sold by its receivers on Oct. 12, saving 20 jobs.

According to The Scotmsan, the company, which fell into
receivership last month with the loss of 55 jobs, was sold to
Dublin-listed Kingspan Renewables for an undisclosed sum.

Blair Nimmo and Tony Friar, joint receivers at accountancy firm
KPMG, said anyone with any claims relating to warranties needed to
contact them and not Kingspan, The Scotsman relates.

Ayrshire-based Proven Energy is a wind turbine maker.


STAGELIVE (PETERBOROUGH): Goes Into Liquidation
-----------------------------------------------
The Peterborough Evening Telegraph reports that StageLive
(Peterborough) Ltd, the company behind Peterborough?s Broadway
theatre, on Tuesday went into liquidation, leaving a trail of
unpaid debts estimated to total at least GBP262,160.

StageLive (Peterborough), the firm which has rented the theatre
since November last year, was officially wound up after creditors
agreed to put it into the hands of insolvency practitioners
Harrisons Business Recovery and Insolvency Specialists, the ET
says.

According to the report, the move follows months of speculation
about the future of StageLive (Peterborough) after shows were
cancelled without warning and all the directors of the firm
resigned leaving ticket holders in the dark about whether they
would get their money back.

At a creditors meeting held at the Ramada Hotel, in Thorpe Wood,
Peterborough, a report compiled for the liquidators, the
directors, John Coxwell and another firm called StageLive Group
Ltd, was shown that stated their estimated amount owing to
creditors was GBP262,160.

Mr. Coxwell and his son Paul Parker, who is described as a
consultant to StageLive (Peterborough), attended the meeting but
refused to comment on the plight of the firm, the ET notes.

But Paul Walker, a director from Harrisons, said the final amount
owing could be nearly GBP500,000 and that it was unlikely that
creditors would get their money back as the firm had minimal
assets.

Stagelive (Peterborough) Ltd is a UK-based theatrical venue owner
and operator.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Strategic Value Raises $750MM for New Special Situations Fund
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Strategic Value
Partners raked in $750 million so far for its second special
situations fund that will target European distressed credit, said
a person familiar with the situation.


* BOOK REVIEW: Partners
-----------------------
Editors: Arnold D. Kaluzny, Howard S. Zuckerman, and Thomas C.
Ricketts, III, with the assistance of Geoffrey B. Walton
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 255 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

The content of Partners: Forming Strategic Alliances in Health
Care comes from a November 1993 conference in Chapel Hill, NC,
that was held in conjunction with the Clinton Administration's
proposals for sweeping change in the nation's healthcare system.
The conference was attended by 80 of the nation's top healthcare
administrators, academicians, physicians, and lawyers.

In a foreword to the book, which is a reprint of a 1995
publication, Kenneth F. Thorpe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Health Policy at the Department of Health and Human Services at
the time, conveys the Clinton Administration's position that
strategic alliances are of particular value in healthcare.  Not
surprisingly, strategic alliances were to play an important role
in the Administration's proposals for healthcare reform.  The
Administration's approach did not get far politically and thus did
not bring reform.  Nonetheless, the healthcare field has come to
recognize the pertinence and value of strategic alliances, which
have been embraced in business fields where change in consumer
interests, technology, research, delivery systems, and other areas
is ongoing.  In sections that are well-organized, both topically
and with internal references, the fundamentals and benefits of
strategic alliances are explained.  The book also offers
instructive experiences in forming and administering such
alliances.

Strategic alliances were not simply an approach touted by the
Clinton Administration as a way of effecting healthcare reform.
Nor were strategic alliances a theory arising from the business
conditions and challenges at the time.  Strategic alliances were,
instead, a widespread arrangement to deal with the business
environment of the early 1990s.  This environment continues to
this day, with no end in sight.  For the most part, today's
healthcare industry is characterized by new, often problematic,
opportunities and challenges in greatly expanding markets that can
be changed overnight by a financial report or research finding,
new legislation and regulation, or the introduction of new
technology.  Howard Zuckerman, one of the editors, expresses it
well, saying that the healthcare industry is a "turbulent
environment [where] companies around the globe and across a
multitude of industries are turning to alliances as a cooperative,
interorganizational mechanism for adaptation." Strategic alliances
uniquely enable participating organizations to extend their
operational reach and work toward desirable strategic ends.
Strategic alliances have thus become more than an ad hoc
arrangement to help healthcare organizations get through a tough
stretch or resolve a pressing problem.  Strategic alliances have
been incorporated into the healthcare field as an ever-present
operational and strategic consideration.  In the contemporary
environment of continual change and unpredictable developments,
many organizations face circumstances where strategic alliance is
necessary to stay timely and competitive. As Zuckerman notes,
"Strategic alliances are designed to achieve strategic purposes
not attainable by a single organization, providing flexibility and
responsiveness while retaining the basic fabric of participating
organizations."

The rationale to form strategic alliances is the same for
healthcare organizations as it is for other business entities.
Organizations form strategic alliances because they recognize
their value in engendering flexibility and bringing access to an
ever-broadening array of resources and markets.  As Barry Stein,
president of Goodmeasure, Inc., notes, these are not trivial
benefits, but are essential considerations of any corporation that
hopes to remain relevant and vibrant.  Healthcare organizations of
all sizes and in all markets can enjoy the benefits offered by
strategic alliances.  Says Stein, "Alliances tend to be
particularly important in unfamiliar markets.  For larger
organizations trying to enter local markets, it is sound practice
to build local alliances because local knowledge and connections
are valuable.  Smaller organizations in local markets can take
advantage of network ties outside their traditional boundaries to
tap broader or perhaps global sources of materials, capital, or
expertise."

While strategic alliances offer enhanced operational capabilities
and higher strategic goals to practically every healthcare
organization, such advantages are not gained automatically.  Apart
from whether strategic alliances prove fruitful, the inevitable
management issues can be difficult to resolve.  If an alliance is
to be workable and beneficial, certain challenges have to be met
by experienced, capable businesspersons.  Some alliances come
apart; and some do not fulfill their purposes. Even for strategic
alliances that work, the management complexities are enormous. As
one participant in the conference observed, the "rewards . . .
must be incredible to justify all the extra short-term costs that
go along with them."  Partners: Forming Strategic Alliances in
Health Care identifies the pros and cons of strategic alliances
and offers advice and commentary on how to eliminate or minimize
difficulties so healthcare organizations can partake of the
rewards that strategic alliances singularly make possible.

Arnold D. Kaluzny, Howard S. Zuckerman, and Thomas C. Ricketts III
are all professors in university health policy and administration
departments.  Geoffrey B. Walton is a top executive with Strategic
Integration and Practice Operations at Sun Health, an Arizona
company.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *