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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, October 24, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 210

                            Headlines



D E N M A R K

ISS A/S: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating


F R A N C E

EUTELSAT SA: Moody's Raises Bank Loan Rating From 'Ba1'


G E R M A N Y

DECO 14: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Changes 'Ba2' CFR Outlook to Positive


G R E E C E

DRYSHIPS INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action in New York
NAVIOS ACQUISITION: Moody's Changes 'B2' CFR Outlook to Negative
YIOULA GLASSWORKS: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'CC'
* GREECE: Euro Zone Ministers Agree to Release EUR8BB Rescue Loan
* GREECE: Should Default to Cut Debt Load, Commerzbank Chief Says


H U N G A R Y

* HUNGARY: Draws Up Bill to Increase Bankruptcy Protection Period


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Gets First-Round Bids for Iceland Foods


I R E L A N D

GILLESPIE CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR15-Mil. Notes to 'B2'
LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: Moody's Raises Rating on E Notes to 'B1'
MAGI FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB-'
MANOR PARK: Goes Into Receivership, Owes EUR170 Million
MR BINMAN: Six Investors Express Interest in Business

SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'Bsf'
SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes


L U X E M B O U R G

GSC EUROPEAN: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
SKYPE GLOBAL: Moody's Raises Corp. Family Rating to 'Ba2'


N E T H E R L A N D S

LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Notes to 'Caa1'
MARCO POLO: Gets Final OK to Pay US$2MM Critical Vendors' Claims


R O M A N I A

TINA R: Expects to Submit Reorganization Plan by Year-End


R U S S I A

SIGMA CAPITAL: Declared Bankrupt by Commercial Court


S P A I N

CAM: Bank of Spain Postpones Sale Until After General Elections
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'Ba2'
EMPRESAS BANESTO: DBRS Assigns Series C Notes at 'C'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Turns Down Chinese Firms' Offer to Buy Business
SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Administrator Seeks to Halt Reorganization


U K R A I N E

SOTSKOMBANK: Central Bank Opts for Liquidation
* UKRAINE: Fitch Revises Outlooks on Six Companies to Stable
* UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings at 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABBEYCREST PLC: Defaults Payment of GBP311,400 Loan Installment
EQUINOX PLC: Fitch Affirms Rating on GBP7.7-Mil. Notes at 'Dsf'
DUNDEE FC: Ex-Director to Stand Trial on Fraud Charges in 2013
FYLDE DAIRIES: Enters Into Administration, Sells Assets
JOHN L ROBERTSON: Goes Into Liquidation Due to High Competition

MOUCHEL GROUP: Agrees to Sell Rail Business to Slash Debt
RANGERS FC: Owner Braces Club for a Pivotal Period
ROBINSON & SONS: Goes Into Administration, Cuts 118 Jobs
VEDANTA RESOURCES: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to $500-Mil. Bank Loan
VON ESSEN: Bath Priory Acquires Four Hotels

WOODSIDES BALLYCLARE: Goes Into Administration, Cuts Jobs


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Sankaty Advisors Bet It Will Gain in Country's Pain
* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 17 to October 21, 2011




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D E N M A R K
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ISS A/S: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit ratings on Denmark-based facilities services
provider ISS A/S (ISS) and related entities ISS World Services A/S
and ISS Financing PLC. "At the same time, we placed the ratings on
CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P related.

"In addition, we affirmed our 'B' issue ratings on ISS's EUR581.5
million subordinated facility (including the add-on notes) due
2016; on ISS Global A/S' EUR110.4 million issuance under the EUR2
billion unsecured euro medium-term note (EMTN) program due 2014;
and on ISS Financing's EUR525 million secured notes due 2014. We
placed these issue ratings on CreditWatch with positive
implications," S&P stated.

The rating actions follow the announcement by U.K.-based security
services company G4S PLC (BBB/Stable/A-2) of its intention to
acquire ISS from private equity firms EQT and Goldman Sachs
Capital Partners (see "U.K.-Based Security Services Company G4S
'BBB/A-2' Rtgs Affirmed Following Announcement To Acquire ISS;
Outlook Stable," published Oct. 19, 2011). "In our view, the
acquisition will have a positive effect on ISS, because G4S will
repay a substantial portion -- about GBP1.1 billion -- of ISS's
existing debt with the proceeds of G4S's recently launched share
rights issue. The acquisition will trigger the change-of-control
provisions in the documentation for the majority of ISS's
facilities. We anticipate that these facilities will be refinanced
using G4S's new acquisition facility," S&P related.

"We aim to review the CreditWatch placement following the
successful repayment of ISS's credit facilities. We would view any
reduction of ISS's currently heavy debt burden as positive for the
rating," S&P said.


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F R A N C E
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EUTELSAT SA: Moody's Raises Bank Loan Rating From 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the senior unsecured issuer
rating of Eutelsat S.A. to Baa2 from Baa3 and bank loan rating at
Eutelsat Communications S.A. to Baa3 from Ba1. The rating change
reflects both Eutelsat's continued good Ebitda growth resulting in
improved debt protection metrics (Debt/Ebitda at 2.6x as of June
2011) and Moody's expectation that the company will remain on a
solid growth trajectory in line with company guidance, providing
it with the financial flexibility to maintain leverage in line
with the category (Debt/Ebitda<3.25x). It is also based on the
agency's expectation that the company remains focused on growing
revenues mainly organically. The rating outlook is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's added that recent full year results to June 2011 (Revenue
+11.5%, Ebitda +11.9%) demonstrate Eutelsat's continued ability to
achieve good levels of revenue growth, generally in excess of its
revenue guidance. Despite some concerns over capacity growth ahead
of demand in the industry, Moody's believes that Eutelsat remains
well positioned to deliver growth broadly in line with guidance
(above 7% CAGR over the next three years). The company should
benefit from an active launch program (6 satellites between the
end of 2011 and 2014), the related further expansion into faster
growing markets of CEE, Africa, Middle East and Asia and from
growth in newer applications (HD, 3D).

Eutelsat's leverage as measured by Debt/Ebitda (as adjusted by
Moody's) reached 2.6x in the full year to June 2011, reduced from
3.0x twelve months earlier due to Ebitda growth and the
application of insurance proceeds from the loss of the W3B
satellite to debt reduction. Moody's expects the company to fund
future capex from its own operating cash flows and to continue to
operate a progressive dividend policy. In addition, Moody's
believes that Eutelsat may consider add-on acquisitions from time
to time. Organic expansion and growth through partnerships such as
the collaboration with Russian operator RSCC appear however more
likely in the near-term. In any case, the Baa2 rating is based on
the assumption that the company will calibrate discretionary cash
outflows so that there will be no substantial deterioration in
Ebitda-based leverage.

Eutelsat's ratings further acknowledge the company's strong
business position as a multi-regional Fixed Satellite Services
(FSS) provider with a large constellation of satellites,
significant in-orbit redundancy and broad client diversity.
Eutelsat enjoys (i) joint (together with SES SA) market leadership
in satellite-distributed video content in Europe (ii) a
substantial, mainly video-based contract backlog and (iii) good
growth prospects from its expansion in faster growing regional
markets and demand for HD programming. However, the ratings are
also cognizant of Eutelsat's exposure to industry-typical
technology risks and are tempered by near-term constraints on the
company's free cash flow generation from the company's ongoing
capex program and a high dividend payout.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Eutelsat will
remain on a solid growth trajectory in the near to intermediate
term with Ebitda margins (as measured by Eutelsat) to remain above
77%, in line with company guidance, and manage discretionary
outflows (dividends, capex) in such a way that metrics for the
rating category can be maintained. The stable outlook also
incorporates Moody's expectation that Eutelsat will demonstrate
capacity for free cash flow generation over the next years.

Given free cash flow absorption through shareholder remuneration
and capex Moody's does not expect any upgrade pressure to develop
over the intermediate term.

The introduction of an aggressive financial policy by Eutelsat
leading to increased cash outflows towards acquisitions/
shareholder remuneration such that the Debt/Ebitda ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's) exceeds 3.25x on a sustained basis and/or a
significant deterioration in operating performance (growth
rate/margins) would lead to pressure on the ratings.

Moody's believes Eutelsat's liquidity position is solid. The
company had cash and cash equivalents of EUR137 million as of June
30, 2011, which together with availability under the company's
EUR450 million revolving credit facility (due 2015; undrawn as of
June 30 2011) is sufficient to fund Eutelsat's near-term
operational needs.

Eutelsat has no material refinancing requirements before June 2013
when EUR1.5 billion of bank facilities fall due at Eutelsat
Communications and a EUR300 million revolver at Eutelsat
Communications (currently undrawn) will fall away. Moody's would
expect Eutelsat to arrange for timely refinancing of these
facilities. The ratings also reflect Moody's expectation that the
company will aim to simplify its existing corporate structure over
time and that refinancing of Eutelsat group's existing senior
unsecured bank debt (2013) will to a material extent be undertaken
at the Eutelsat S.A. level.

The last rating action was implemented on March 3, 2011, when
Moody's changed the outlook on Eutelsat's ratings to positive from
stable.

The principal methodology used in rating Eutelsat was the Global
Communications Infrastructure Rating Industry Methodology
published in June 2011.

Eutelsat S.A. is a 96% owned operating company of Eutelsat
Communications S.A. Headquartered in Paris, France, and covering
more than 90% of the worldwide population with commercialized
capacity on 27 satellites located at 20 geostationary orbital
positions, Eutelsat is a leading FSS (fixed satellite services)
provider.


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G E R M A N Y
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DECO 14: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained DECO 14 - Pan Europe 5's class A to C
notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and has affirmed the class D,
E and F, as follows:

  -- EUR855.9m class A-1 (XS0291363272) 'AAAsf'; RWN maintained
  -- EUR159.0m class A-2 (XS0292121802) 'AAsf'; RWN maintained
  -- EUR64.6m class A-3 (XS0292122289) 'AA-sf'; RWN maintained
  -- EUR99.4m class B (XS0291365137) 'Asf'; RWN maintained
  -- EUR64.6m class C (XS0291365566) 'BBsf'; RWN maintained
  -- EUR100.8m class D (XS0291367182) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Rating 'RR3'
  -- EUR25.8m class E (XS0291367422) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Rating 'RR6'
  -- EUR11.9m class F (XS0291368156) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
     Recovery Rating 'RR6'

The RWN has been maintained to reflect the continuing high degree
of uncertainty created by the ongoing legal action against the
borrowers on the WOBA loan (38.6% by portfolio balance) by the
City of Dresden.  The affirmations reflect the broadly unchanged
collateral performance across all loans since the last rating
action in October 2010.  Moreover, now that an appraisal reduction
has been called on the defaulted DD Hilden loan, Fitch expects the
note repayment to switch from modified to fully-sequential at the
next interest payment date (IPD) on account of the likely interest
deferral on the class F notes.  This would mitigate the high
degree of balloon risk in the pool for senior noteholders.

The legal action against the borrowers on the WOBA loan remains
outstanding. The City of Dresden has filed a request for
arbitration and initiated legal proceedings against various WOBA
entities, claiming EUR1.084 billion under the 2006 WOBA sale and
purchase agreement. Both claims are based on 74 unit sales that
occurred between 2007 and 2010.  The city alleges that the sales
did not fully comply with a requirement to pass on to the
respective purchasers certain restrictions in respect of future
sales of the units.  WOBA engaged Hengeler Mueller as its legal
counsel, in order to form its legal response.  In June 2011, the
relevant WOBA entities issued responses to the complaints, issued
counterclaims, and sued the city and the city's Finance Mayor for
damages.  The local court in Dresden set a deadline of 8 September
2011 for the City of Dresden to reply to the responses and
counterclaims.  To date, no information has been made public
regarding the city's response.

The Sofia Business Park loan (4.3% by portfolio balance) is
scheduled to mature in January 2012. While the servicer continues
to be in discussions with the borrower with regards to the
repayment of the loan, the Fitch loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of
86.8% indicates that refinancing could prove problematic.
Although the loan documentation does not provide for extension,
Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch ('CPS2-') has granted a number of
non-contractual extensions while acting as primary servicer.
Should it grant an extension here, the interest coverage of 2.09x
suggests the potential to extract value by capturing excess cash
over time.  If instead the borrower does redeem, proceeds will
only go to the class D notes.

The pool is exposed to significant bullet repayments in coming
years, with 83% of the pool balance scheduled to mature in 2013
and 2014.  With the exception of WOBA and GA 1 MF, all the LTV
ratios are estimated by Fitch to be in excess of 100%, which
reflects the speculative grade ratings on the junior notes.  Legal
bond maturity is 2020, which provides the servicer with some time
and flexibility to work out problem loans.


HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Changes 'Ba2' CFR Outlook to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on Hornbach Baumarkt AG's Ba2 corporate family rating
(CFR) and probability-of-default rating (PDR). The Ba3 rating on
the company's EUR250 million worth of senior unsecured notes due
in 2014 remains unchanged.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The outlook change reflects Hornbach's success in weathering the
difficult market conditions in recent years and its ability to
strengthen its key credit metrics over time, benefitting from a
degree of recovery in the German DIY retail market," says
Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice President-Senior Credit Officer
and lead analyst for Hornbach. "The company reported like-for-like
(LFL) sales growth of 7.1% in Germany while a modest reduction of
0.5% outside the country during the six months ending August 2011,
representing a 3.8% LFL growth at consolidated group level over
the period. As a result of its prudent financial policy, Hornbach
was able to strengthen its liquidity profile and improve its
financial metrics, reporting at the latest available reporting
date (August 2011) a retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt ratio of
21.5% (18.5% at FYE February 2011), interest coverage of 2.6x
(2.4x) and an EBITA margin of 6.5% (6.2%)," adds Mr. Leschiutta.
Hornbach's financial leverage also improved, to 4.6x (4.9x),
although this is still seen as high for a mid-Ba rating.

"Although we expect Hornbach to resume its stores network
expansion program, the positive outlook incorporates Moody's
expectation that Hornbach will finance its capex requirements with
internal sources, without recourse to additional debt, and that
key credit metrics will further strengthen over the short to
medium term," continues Mr. Leschiutta. In Moody's view, upward
pressure on the ratings could result from Hornbach's success in
maintaining LFL revenue growth in Germany on a sustainable basis
and in controlling the volatility of its Eastern European
operations, resulting in an adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio trending
towards 4.0x and an EBITA/interest expenses ratio remaining above
2.5x. On the other hand, although unlikely at this stage, downward
pressure could be exerted by declining LFL sales and/or margin
pressure due to adverse market conditions, causing financial
leverage trending towards 5.5x.

Overall, Hornbach's current Ba2 CFR reflects its strong market
position in its domestic market, a growing international presence
and a good track record in executing its strategy, reflected by
the company's ability to grow more rapidly than the market through
its domestic operations. The rating is also supported by the
company's conservative financial policy, its solid liquidity
profile and its flexibility in cutting investments in store
openings to adapt to changing market conditions. The rating is,
however, constrained by the relatively high financial leverage of
the group and the likelihood that any significant deleverage might
be slowed down by the group restarting its store expansion program
over the next years. The rating is also supported by Hornbach's
solid liquidity profile thanks to the EUR533.5 million of cash on
balance sheet as of August 31, 2011 and an undrawn EUR200 million
five-year credit facility, together with other minor committed and
uncommitted lines, which are seen more than enough to cover the
company's upcoming capital investments, dividend payments and
short-term debt maturities.

The Ba3 rating on Hornbach's EUR250 million senior unsecured notes
due in 2014 is based on both the company's overall probability of
default, to which Moody's assign a probability of default rating
(PDR) of Ba2, and Moody's loss-given-default (LGD) assessment of
the notes, which is LGD4, 69%. The one-notch differential reflects
the presence of secured debt within the company's capital
structure, which ranks ahead of the notes.

Ratings affected are:

- Issuer: Hornbach Baumarkt AG

- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Hornbach was the Global
Retail Industry Methodology, published in June 2011.

Hornbach Baumarkt AG is the fourth-largest DIY retailer in
Germany, with approximately EUR3.0 billion in revenues as of
August 31, 2011 on a last-12-months (LTM) basis. As of the same
date, the company operated 134 DIY megastores with garden centers
in Europe, the majority of which are located in Germany (91
stores), and enjoyed an increasing presence in other European
countries, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Romania (the remaining 43 stores). Hornbach's
international sales accounted for approximately 43% of its total
sales as of the six months ending August 2011.


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G R E E C E
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DRYSHIPS INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action in New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A putative shareholder class action lawsuit captioned Litwin v.
OceanFreight, Inc., et. al, was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on Oct. 13,
2011, against OceanFreight Inc., DryShips Inc., Ocean Rig UDW
Inc., Pelican Stockholdings Inc., and the directors of
OceanFreight.  The plaintiff alleges violations of the Securities
and Exchange Commission proxy rules and breach of fiduciary duties
by the directors of OceanFreight, purportedly aided and abetted by
the other defendants, in connection with OceanFreight's agreement
to merge with Pelican, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DryShips.  The
complaint sets out various alternative remedies, including an
injunction barring the merger, rescission, or actual and punitive
damages.

The lawsuit has not been served on the defendants.  The defendants
believe that the complaint is without merit and, if served, intend
to defend the lawsuit vigorously.

In connection with the proposed merger of OceanFreight with
DryShips, Ocean Rig filed a registration statement on Form F-4
with the SEC that was declared effective on Oct. 12, 2011.  The
Form F-4 contains a proxy statement/prospectus and other
documents.  OceanFreight mailed the proxy statement/prospectus
contained in the Form F-4 to its shareholders on Oct. 17, 2011.
The Form F-4 and proxy statement/prospectus contain important
information about DryShips, Ocean Rig, OceanFreight, the merger
and related matters.

In addition to the Form F-4 was filed by Ocean Rig, the proxy
statement/prospectus and the other documents filed with the SEC in
connection with the merger, DryShips and OceanFreight are
obligated to file annual reports with, and submit other
information to, the SEC.

                         About DryShips Inc.

Based in Greece, DryShips Inc. -- http://www.dryships.com/--
-- owns and operates drybulk carriers and offshore oil
deep water drilling units that operate worldwide.  As of
Sept. 10, 2010, DryShips owns a fleet of 40 drybulk carriers
(including newbuildings), comprising 7 Capesize, 31 Panamax and 2
Supramax, with a combined deadweight tonnage of over 3.6 million
tons and 6 offshore oil deep water drilling units, comprising of 2
ultra deep water semisubmersible drilling rigs and 4 ultra deep
water newbuilding drillships.

DryShips's common stock is listed on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market where it trades under the symbol "DRYS".

On Nov. 25, 2010, DryShips Inc. entered into a waiver letter
for its US$230.0 million credit facility dated Sept. 10, 2007,
as amended, extending the waiver of certain covenants through
Dec. 31, 2010.

In its audit report on the Company's financial statements for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2010, Deloitte, Hadjipavlou Sofianos &
Cambanis S.A., noted that the Company's inability to comply with
financial covenants under its original loan agreements as of
Dec. 31, 2009, its negative working capital position and other
matters raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a
going concern.

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2011, showed
US$7.86 billion in total assets, US$4.03 billion in total
liabilities, and US$3.83 billion in total equity.


NAVIOS ACQUISITION: Moody's Changes 'B2' CFR Outlook to Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the B2 corporate family rating (CFR), probability-of-
default rating (PDR) and senior secured rating of Navios Maritime
Acquisition Corporation. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the
ratings at B2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The negative outlook was prompted by the heavy vessel investments
that the company has decided to initiate at a time when the tanker
market is under pressure. While Moody's acknowledges that these
acquisitions of new ships were made at reasonable prices, it
nonetheless will strain Navios Acquisition credit metrics in the
intermediate time. The ratings were affirmed as Moody's believes
that the ratings can still accommodate credit metrics that are
weak for the rating category. The main reason is that Moody's
takes into account the temporary mis-matching between investment
outlays made by the Company to acquire the vessels and correlated
revenues. However any interruption in the charter-out activity of
the new vessels that will be delivered and/or a renegotiation of
the long term contracts already in place, could result in negative
rating action.

"Today's rating action also reflects Moody's concerns that,
despite improving product tanker supply fundamentals, global
economic uncertainty may constrain future transportation volumes
in the product tanker segment" says Marco Vetulli, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Navios
Acquisition.

"Unlike the oil tanker market, demand in the clean shipping market
is still mainly driven by the level of consumption in Europe and
US, which is likely to remain lower in the next two years compared
with expectations only few months ago," adds Mr. Vetulli.

"Against this backdrop of weaker-than-expected transportation
volumes, the likelihood that product tanker rates will not improve
from the current level has risen substantially," concludes Mr.
Vetulli.

WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING DOWN/UP

Any interruption in the charter-out activity of the new vessels
that will be delivered and/or a renegotiation of the long term
contracts already in place (contrarily to expectations) could
result in a negative rating action. In that context, the inability
to demonstrate a positive inflection in credit metrics by FYE2012,
with Debt to EBITDA around 8.5 times or/and FFO interest coverage
close to 2.5 times, could pressure the rating as it would indicate
a decline in the charter out activity, and hence incapability of
the Company to sustain a path to a strong metrics profile that
Moody's expects for 2013, when all the vessels currently in order
will be delivered and fully operational for the full year.

Moreover, as Navios Acquisition is currently weakly positioned in
the B2 rating a further increase in the company's debt due to new
capital outlays will trigger an immediate downgrade of the current
CFR as well as any unexpected concerns with regard to liquidity or
refinancing.

The outlook on the ratings could be stabilized if market
conditions were to allow Navios Acquisition to (i) establish a
track record of solid operating performance, conservative
financial planning and liquidity management; and (ii) reduce its
leverage while increasing its margins and free cash flow
generation (eg with debt to EBITDA ratio of no more that 7X and
FFO/Interest coverage above 2.5X).Positive pressure on Navios
Acquisition's ratings could arise if the company were to
demonstrate the ability to deleverage such that (i) debt/EBITDA
were sustained below 5.5x; (ii) FFO interest coverage were to
approach 3.5x; and (iii) RCF/net debt were to approach the mid-
teens in percentage terms.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Navios Acquisition was
the Global Shipping Industry Methodology published in December
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Navios Maritime Acquisition Corporation (NNA), a company listed on
NYSE, was created in 2008 as an acquisition vehicle of the group
Navios. After two years of silent activity, the company became
fully operational in May 2010 with the acquisition of 13 tankers
(11 product tankers and two chemical tankers). Furthermore, during
the past 12 months, Navios Acquisition concluded the acquisition
in September 2010 of seven very large crude carrier (VLCC)
tankers, and acquired other six product tankers. Navios
Acquisition's main shareholder and sponsor is Navios Maritime
Holding Inc.(NM) (B1 stable), which currently has voting rights of
45.0% of Navios Acquisition. Navios Acquisition's revenues
totalled US$33.6 million at financial year ended 2010.


YIOULA GLASSWORKS: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Greece-based glass container manufacturer Yioula
Glassworks S.A. (Yioula) to 'CC' from 'SD' (selective default).
The outlook is negative.

"At the same time, we affirmed our issue rating of 'CC' on
Yioula's senior unsecured notes," S&P stated.

"The upgrade reflects our view that Yioula has reduced immediate
liquidity risk following the group's public statement that it has
extended its EUR15 million loan from Piraeus Bank (Piraeus;
CCC/Negative/C) to Dec. 31, 2011. As the loan was not extended or
repaid before its previous maturity date of Sept. 26, 2011, this
constituted a payment default under our criteria, but this
designation no longer applies following the extension," S&P
stated.

"However, we still believe that the extended Piraeus loan
represents a near-term refinancing risk. The group continues to
face significant liquidity issues, and relies on external
financing from strained Greek markets. As such, in our view,
Yioula could have further refinancing issues in the near term,"
S&P said.

Management has stated that a term sheet has been drawn up to
extend the EUR15 million Piraeus loan to June 2015 on an
amortizing basis, but this extension is not yet finalized. "We
consider that successful late refinancing negotiations are not
unusual for Yioula. However, there is a significant risk
that the Piraeus loan will not be extended further on Dec. 31,
2011, or that it will again only be extended for a short period,"
S&P stated.

"In our view, a further deterioration of Yioula's liquidity
position is possible as a result of the group's near-term
refinancing risk and dependence on external financing from
strained Greek markets. Furthermore, Yioula faces an uncertain
operating environment in its core markets over the near to medium
term. We could lower the long-term corporate credit rating to 'SD'
(selective default) in the near term if Yioula were to fail to
refinance or renew the Piraeus loan before it falls due on Dec.
31, 2011," S&P related.

"We could consider revising the outlook to stable if Yioula were
to improve its liquidity position, mainly by refinancing the
Piraeus loan for a longer period; and/or if it were to improve
free cash flow generation and tackle its financial covenant risk,"
S&P said.


* GREECE: Euro Zone Ministers Agree to Release EUR8BB Rescue Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur Beesley at The Irish Times reports that euro zone on Friday
night agreed to release a crucial EUR8 billion rescue loan to
Greece, a move which comes as EU leaders ready a risky plan to
increase the investor losses in its second bailout.

According to The Irish Times, the ministers said the new loan
would be released to Greece in the first half of November, pending
approval by the board of the International Monetary Fund.

Greece needs this money to avert bankruptcy, but the payment was
delayed for weeks amid disputes between the EU-International
Monetary Fund troika over the failure of the government to execute
promised reforms, The Irish Times says.

Attention has now shifted to new arrangements in the country's
second bailout to increase the losses borne by creditors, The
Irish Times notes.

The ministers, as cited by The Irish Times, said that the second
rescue will include "an appropriate combination of additional new
official financing and private sector involvement".  However,
there was no agreement on the extent of losses to be imposed on
the country's private creditors, The Irish Times notes.

EU authorities have been angling to increase the "haircut" to some
50% from 21% in the original deal agreed in July, The Irish Times
discloses.

However, a senior European diplomat said the IMF has been arguing
for a loss of up to 60% as it believes the economic projections
from the EU Commission to be too optimistic, according to The
Irish Times.

Crucial in this debate is a new report on Greece's debt from the
troika which says that bigger investor losses will be required to
bring its debt back to a sustainable footing, The Irish Times
says.


* GREECE: Should Default to Cut Debt Load, Commerzbank Chief Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Kirchfeld and Oliver Suess at Bloomberg News report that
Commerzbank AG Chief Executive Officer Martin Blessing said Greece
should default to reduce its debt load as governments sought to
persuade lenders to take bigger writedowns on their Greek bond
holdings.

Mr. Blessing, speaking in an interview with Bild newspaper, said
Greece should declare itself insolvent and begin restructuring,
Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, he said that lowering
the value of sovereign bonds won?t be sufficient to relieve the
burden.

European leaders plan to hold two summits within four days,
starting Oct. 23, to resolve the crisis, Bloomberg discloses.
Financial institutions may be forced to sell assets and reduce
lending to comply with tougher capital requirements in the face of
more writedowns, Bloomberg states.

Commerzbank had the most sovereign risks related to Greece of any
German bank after FMS Wertmanagement, the bad bank in charge of
winding down Hypo Real Estate Holding AG assets, at the end of
June, according to company reports, Bloomberg notes.

"Blessing is telling the truth, every bank that can afford it
should fully write down its Greek debt holdings," Bloomberg quotes
Konrad Becker, a Munich-based analyst at Merck Finck & Co., as
saying.  "While it won't be cheap for Commerzbank, in the long
term it would make sense.  It's better to have a painful break
than to draw out the agony."

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the discussions
said that governments may unleash as much as EUR940 billion to
fight the debt crisis, seeking to break a deadlock between Germany
and France.  Leaders are trying to stop contagion spreading to
Spain and Italy as the turmoil pushes Greece closer to default,
roils global markets and dents confidence in the survival of the
17-nation currency, Bloomberg says.

Alongside plans for a larger rescue fund, European leaders are
holding talks with representatives of global bank lobby group
Institute of International Finance, including Deutsche Bank Chief
Executive Officer Josef Ackermann, to push Greek bondholders to
accept losses on the country?s sovereign debt that go beyond the
roughly 21% agreed on in July, Bloomberg notes.  Mr. Blessing, as
cited by Bloomberg, said in the interview that the agreement
"failed to solve the problem".

In a separate report, Bloomberg News' Mark Dean relates that a
French-German split over Europe's rescue strategy emerged as
finance ministers prepare to meet in Brussels on Oct. 21 under
pressure to craft a solution to the region?s debt crisis.
With a summit scheduled two days later, a disagreement over the
European Central Bank's role threatens to stymie progress on the
banking and economic questions needed to deliver the comprehensive
strategy demanded by global policy makers, Bloomberg says.

French Finance Minister Francois Baroin disclosed to reporters the
depth of the disagreement over the ECB which, along with Germany,
has rejected using its balance sheet to bolster the EUR440 billion
(Us$607 billion) European Financial Stability Facility, Bloomberg
recounts.

While Germany endorsed enabling the EFSF to insure a portion of
cash-strapped nations' bond sales, Mr. Baroin, as cited by
Bloomberg, said France wants to turn it into a bank that could tap
the ECB.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


* HUNGARY: Draws Up Bill to Increase Bankruptcy Protection Period
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing business daily Napi Gazdasag, reports that a
bill drawn up by Hungary's Ministry of Public Administration and
Justice would extend the maximum period of time companies may ask
for protection from their creditors from 90 to 120 days.

According to MTI-Econews, the paper said on Thursday that the bill
also places greater accountability on managers who attempt to
deceive creditors.

The number of bankruptcy protection procedures in Hungary is
negligible, perhaps because of the practice of moving assets in
companies under mandatory liquidation into another company,
MTI-Econews notes.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Gets First-Round Bids for Iceland Foods
-----------------------------------------------------------
Andrea Felsted, Anousha Sakoui and Daniel Schaefer at The
Financial Times report that the auction of Iceland Foods got off
to a strong start after big private equity groups and supermarkets
submitted first-round bids for the frozen food business, which has
been put up for sale by its majority Icelandic owners.

Supermarkets Wm Morrison and Asda expressed interest, while this
was also expected from Farmfoods, a rival frozen foods business,
the FT discloses.

Private equity groups TPG, Bain, Blackstone and BC Partners also
submitted their first-round bids, with initial offers valuing the
company at GBP1.3 billion to GBP1.5 billion, the FT relates.

According to the FT, people familiar with the situation said more
interest from private equity groups could follow after Wednesday's
deadline.

However, Malcolm Walker, chief executive and founder of Iceland
Foods, who with management owns 23% of the business, has not put
in a first-round bid, the FT notes.

Mr. Walker is not thought to be keen to pay above the GBP1 billion
he bid for Iceland Foods more than a year ago, the FT says.  He
also has the right to match any offer that is made to acquire the
business, the FT states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 16,
2011, The Financial Times related that Rothschild is advising
Mr. Walker, while Bank of America Merrill Lynch is one of the
banks appointed by the Resolution Committee of Landsbanki to sell
its 67% stake in Iceland Foods.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


GILLESPIE CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR15-Mil. Notes to 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Gillespie CLO PLC:

  EUR97,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2023 (current outstanding balance of EUR86,976,516), Upgraded
  to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR65,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable
  Funding Multi-Currency Notes due 2023 (current outstanding
  balance of GBP17,774,243, $22,915,458, and EUR14,969,918
  unfunded), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
  Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR40,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR26,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR20,700,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
  Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
  B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023 (current outstanding balance of EUR14,748,992),
  Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating action
in October 2009. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down from
approximately EUR94 million to approximately EUR87 million since
the last rating action in October 2009. In addition, the Class A-2
notes have been paid down from 56 million EUR-equivalent to 51
million EUR-equivalent (EUR15 million of which is currently
unfunded). Based on the August 2011 trustee report, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
131.60%, 118.65%, 109.30%, and 102.67%, respectively, versus
August 2009 levels of 125.71%, 114.61%, 106.44%, and 100.39%,
respectively. Moody's also notes that the Class E notes are no
longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance, including principal proceeds, of EUR231
million (including EUR15 million unfunded amount), GBP19 million,
and US$24 million, defaulted par of EUR10.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.8% (implying a WARF of 3204), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.1%, and a
diversity score of 36.These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends, and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Gillespie CLO PLC, issued in August 2007, is a multi-currency
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans denominated in Euros, British pounds, and
U.S. dollars.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
June 2011. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for
a copy of this methodology.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2. Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

3. Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

4. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse of reported
and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor and
diversity score. As part of the base case, Moody's considered
weighted average spread levels higher than the covenant levels due
to the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

5. Currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR
denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will
have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available
to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

Further information on Moody's analysis of this transaction is
available on www.moodys.com.


LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: Moody's Raises Rating on E Notes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by LightPoint Pan-European
CLO 2006 p.l.c.:

EUR23,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR20,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2022,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR9,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to
B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR309 million,
defaulted par of EUR0.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.20% (implying a WARF of 3060), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.46%, and a diversity
score of 48. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 p.l.c., issued in January 2007,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans issued by European obligors.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon and diversity score.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


MAGI FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all classes of Magi Funding I PLC's outstanding EUR238.91 million
notes.

"Since our last review in January 2010, driven by the failure of
the class B and C par value coverage tests, the issuer has
continued to amortize the class A notes using available principal
and interest proceeds. The class A notes have repaid by about
EUR3.77 million since our last review. From the information
reported by the trustee, we note that about 94% of the repayment
was effected using interest proceeds, while the remaining 6%
constituted available principal proceeds. In our view, the
amortization of class A, using in particular a significant portion
of interest proceeds, contributed to an increase in the ratio of
performing liabilities versus rated facilities outstanding" S&P
stated.

"On the asset side, we have observed that the majority of the
assets that we considered defaulted in January 2010 have been
restructured. These restructurings involved write-downs and the
conversion of debt for non-eligible instruments. In aggregate,
from the information we received from the manager, we believe that
the amount of par recovered from the assets that we considered
defaulted in January 2010 was 59%, which exceeded our expectation
of 39%," S&P stated.

Currently, defaulted assets amount to EUR4.50 million, compared
with EUR12.27 million in January 2010.

"In our opinion, the factors contributed to an increase in the
credit enhancement available for all the rated notes. As a result,
we consider that the class A, B, and C notes can sustain higher
ratings than previously assigned," S&P said.

"We have also observed a positive rating migration of the
portfolio. Our analysis shows that the proportion of assets rated
in the 'CCC' category has decreased to 4.61% from 7.52% since our
last rating action," S&P related.

"None of the ratings was affected by either the largest obligor
default test or the largest industry default test, two
supplemental stress tests we introduced as part of our criteria
update (see 'Update To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For
Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17,
2009)," S&P said.

"The Bank of New York Mellon (AA/Stable/A-1+) acts as account bank
and custodian. We have applied our counterparty criteria and, in
our view, The Bank of New York Mellon is appropriately rated to
support the new ratings (see 'Counterparty And Supporting
Obligations Methodology And Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6,
2010)," S&P stated.

Magi Funding I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms. The portfolio does not currently include any non-
euro assets.

Ratings List

Magi Funding I PLC
EUR300 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

Class               Rating
           To                   From

A          AA- (sf)             A+ (sf)
B          BBB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
C          BBB- (sf)            BB- (sf)


MANOR PARK: Goes Into Receivership, Owes EUR170 Million
-------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at Irish Times reports that Manor Park Homes is
in receivership with debts of EUR170 million after the company's
directors told its bank that the business could not repay the
money.

Bank of Scotland Ireland appointed Tom Kavanagh of Kavanagh
Fennell as receiver to the business after its directors invited
the finance institution to take control of the company, as it was
unable to repay its debts, according to Irish Times.  The report
relates that Manor Park owes an estimated EUR170 million to the
bank.  The debt is secured against company assets.

Irish Times notes that sources said that the firm has no other
liabilities and that both staff and the majority of trade
creditors have been paid up to date.  Irish Times relays it has
bonds in place to cover any costs to local authorities for
providing roads, drainage and other such services to the company's
developments.

The houses it built are insured and covered under the Premier
Guarantee scheme, Irish Times notes.

The report says that the company's problems are a result of the
combination of debt, collapsed values and falling sales and cash
flows, that closed other players in its sector including McInerney
Holdings and Taggart Homes.

Manor Park Homes is a high-profile house builder.


MR BINMAN: Six Investors Express Interest in Business
-----------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that the High Court was
told on Thursday six investors have indicated an interest in
investing in Mr. Binman, a development which might help ensure its
survival as a major employer in the Munster region.

Bank of Scotland, the group's main banker and largest creditor,
strongly opposed the application to confirm examinership for the
group, The Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, Paul Sreenan SC, for the bank, said
it would not provide any more funding, the group's companies had
no reasonable prospect of survival and the court should appoint a
receiver immediately.

Ms. Justice Mary Finlay Geoghegan was on Friday expected to
conclude the hearing of the group's petition for examinership, The
Irish Times notes.  The court was told that the company's
difficulties and insolvency were due to several factors, including
the recession, increased competition, significant costs of
expansion and the refusal of the bank to provide further
financing, The Irish Times relates.

Bank of Scotland is the only creditor opposing examinership and
among the largest creditors supporting the petition are Greenstar,
owed EUR2.5 million, and a group of BES investors, owed
EUR965,000, The Irish Times states.

Rossa Fanning, for interim examiner William O'Riordan, provided
the court with an interim report expressing the examiner?s view
that the group had a reasonable prospect of survival, The Irish
Times discloses.

Mr. Binman is an Ireland-based waste disposal group.  The company
employs 331 people directly and approximately 280 indirectly.  It
also operates the local authorities' waste-gathering services in
Limerick city.


SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following seven classes of
floating- and fixed-rated secured notes issued by SVG Diamond
Private Equity plc (SVG), a securitization of existing limited
partnership interests and future commitments to private equity
funds, which is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.:

  -- Eur40,000,000 class A1, due March 19, 2026, at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $55,000,000 class A2, due March 19, 2026, at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- Eur58,500,000 class B1, March 19, 2026, at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $26,300,000 class B2, due March 19, 2026, at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- Eur15,000,000 class C, due March 19, 2026, at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- Eur40,000,000 class M1, due March 19, 2026, at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $49,000,000 class M2, due March 19, 2026, at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

According to the Aug. 31, 2011, trustee report, SVG's unfunded
commitment exposure was reduced by EUR38.50 from the prior review
to an outstanding balance of EUR115.24 million.  This amount is
currently covered by cash / liquid investments of EUR100.75
million and liquidity facilities totaling EUR93.40 million.  The
liquidity facilities expire on the September 2026 final maturity
date of the notes and are currently cash collateralized due to a
downgrade event of the facilities provider on Sept. 15, 2008.
Amounts may be borrowed under the facility to fund the payment of
senior expenses or fund capital calls provided that the remaining
undrawn amounts available under the facility would be sufficient
to cover the senior expenses arising in the six-month period
subsequent to the payment of the call with the amount of such
expenses being determined by the Portfolio Administrator in its
reasonable commercial judgment.  The liquidity facilities have not
been drawn to date on the transaction.

The ratings assigned to the class A, B and C notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive timely payment of interest
and ultimate repayment of principal.  The ratings assigned to the
class M notes address the likelihood that investors will receive
ultimate payment of interest and principal.  A third-party
liquidity facility has been structured to ensure timely payment of
transaction expenses and interest on the class A, B and C notes.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated March 26,
2010, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG
transaction and its underlying collateral. Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 22% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 50% for buyout
funds and approximately 40% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities. Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains or losses
from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and adjust its base
case loss assumptions accordingly.

SVG is a securitization of existing limited partnership interests
and new commitments to private equity funds.  Due to SVG having
recently entered its amortization period, the fund does not
currently have the ability to enter into new commitments but may
fund remaining undrawn commitments.

As of Aug. 31, 2011, approximately 98% of the portfolio was
invested in buy-out funds while the remaining 2% was invested in
venture capital funds.  The transaction was invested in 63 funds
managed by 42 managers, with fund vintages ranging from 1993-2008,
and over 50% invested in funds of a 2005 or later vintage.  As of
the same date, the portfolio was meeting all of its
diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to individual
managers, funds, vintages and currencies.

SVG is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd (SVG). Headquartered in London
with offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SVG Capital plc. Established in 2001, SVG is a
global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of June 30, 2011, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of EUR3.6 billion. SVG has
50 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S.  SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on SVG's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

Fitch seeks monthly portfolio holdings information and semi-annual
financial statements for the fund from The Bank of New York Mellon
(trustee) and SVG Advisers, Ltd., respectively, to conduct
surveillance against ratings guidelines and maintain its ratings.


SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these seven classes of floating- and
fixed-rated secured notes issued by SVG Diamond Private Equity II
plc (SVG II), a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and future commitments to private equity funds, which is
managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.:

  -- Eur55,000,000 class A-1, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at
     'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$71,600,000 class A-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at
     'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Eur76,500,000 class B-1, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at
     'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$40,000,000 class B-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at
     'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- US$47,800,000 class C, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- Eur43,000,000 class M-1, Feb. 1, 2024, remains at 'CCCsf';
  -- US$20,300,000 class M-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, remains at
     'CCCsf'.

The affirmations reflect a stabilized NAV since Fitch's last
review in October 2010, as well as adequate near-term liquidity
relative to unfunded commitments.  Between Oct. 29, 2010 and
Aug. 31, 2011, the market value of SVG II's invested portfolio
increased by 11% to EUR414.40 million from EUR372.17 million,
according to the respective trustee reports, as the fund continued
its rebound from mid-2009 valuation lows following cost cutting
and balance sheet strengthening of underlying portfolio companies.
The NAV performance of the transaction has been in line with
Fitch's expectations since the October 2010 review.

According to the Aug. 31, 2011, trustee report, SVG II's unfunded
commitment exposure was reduced by EUR48.67 million from the prior
review to an outstanding balance of EUR113.09 million.  This
amount is currently covered by cash / liquid investments of
EUR15.13 million and liquidity facilities totaling EUR101.39
million.  The liquidity facilities expire on the September 2024
final maturity date of the notes and are currently cash
collateralized due to a downgrade event of the facilities provider
on Sept. 15, 2008.  Amounts may be borrowed under the facility to
fund the payment of senior expenses or fund capital calls provided
that the remaining undrawn amounts available under the facility
would be sufficient to cover the senior expenses arising in the
six-month period subsequent to the payment of the call with the
amount of such expenses being determined by the Portfolio
Administrator in its reasonable commercial judgment.  SVG II has
drawn Eur13.28 million from the liquidity facility to date,
according to the Aug. 31, 2011 trustee report.  Fitch will
continue to monitor SVG II's cash position going forward to
determine if ratings on any of the above-referenced notes could be
affected due to increased capital call activity and weak
distribution performance.

The ratings on the notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive timely payment of interest on the classes A and B
notes, ultimate payment of interest on the classes C and M notes
and ultimate repayment of principal on all classes of notes.  A
third-party liquidity facility has been structured to ensure
timely payment of interest and expenses on the class A and B
notes.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated March 26,
2010, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG II
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 22% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 50% for buyout
funds and approximately 40% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains or
losses from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and adjust
its base case loss assumptions accordingly.

SVG II is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and new commitments to private equity funds.  Due to a
decline in NAV, SVG II entered into an Early Amortization Erosion
Event in March 2009 whereby the re-investment period was
terminated prior to its scheduled date of March 2011.  As such,
the fund does not currently have the ability to enter into new
commitments but may fund remaining unfunded commitments.  As of
Aug. 31, 2011, approximately 83% of the portfolio was invested in
buy-out funds while 14% was invested in mezzanine-focused funds
and 3% was invested in venture capital funds. The transaction was
invested in 75 funds managed by 52 managers, with vintages ranging
from 1976-2008, and over 81% invested in funds of a 2005 or later
vintage.  As of the same date, the portfolio was meeting all of
its diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to individual
managers, funds, vintages and currencies.

SVG II is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd (SVG).  Headquartered in
London with offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of SVG Capital plc.  Established in 2001, SVG is
a global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of June 30, 2011, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of EUR3.6 billion.  SVG has
50 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S. SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on SVG II's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

Fitch seeks monthly portfolio holdings information and semi-annual
financial statements for the fund from The Bank of New York Mellon
(trustee) and SVG Advisers, Ltd., respectively, to conduct
surveillance against ratings guidelines and maintain its ratings.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


GSC EUROPEAN: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by GSC European CDO I-R:

   -- EUR35M Class A2B Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
      A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.4M Class C1 Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
      B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class C2 Zero Coupon Accreting Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20.3M Class D Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
      Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12.5M Class E Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
      Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- EUR7M Class W Combination Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class C2 Customised Rated Notes, Upgraded to
      B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's Investors Service has also confirmed the ratings of these
notes issued by GSC European CDO I-R:

   -- EUR37M Class A1 Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Confirmed at
      Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR140M Class A2A Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Confirmed
      at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR25M Class A3 Revolving Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR16.8M Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Confirmed at
      Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
W, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal
amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the
Rated Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. For Class Z and Class C2, the
'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of
the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

GSC European CDO I-R, issued in December 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by GSCP (NJ), LP. This transaction will be in reinvestment
period until December 2012. It is predominantly composed of senior
secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios.

Today's actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in December 2009. The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
125.47%, 111.80%, 103.29% and 98.39%, respectively in August 2011,
versus October 2009 levels of 118.36%, 106.10%, 98.71% and 94.54%,
respectively. Moody's also notes that the Class D and Class E
overcollateralization tests are in breach as of August 2011
reporting date.

Reported WARF has increased from 2922 to 3540 between October 2009
and August 2011. The change in reported WARF understates the
actual credit quality improvement because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010. In addition, securities rated Caa or lower
make up approximately 21% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, defaulted securities total about EUR11.5 million of
the underlying portfolio compared to EUR34.5 million in
October 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR292.8 million,
defaulted par of EUR23.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 26.24% (consistent with a WARF of 3290), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.77% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average
spread of 2.97%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 92% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. In addition,
due to the significant concentration of assets rated Caa and
below, Moody's also considered a stressed scenario by defaulting
these assets with a recovery rate of 40% to 64%.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 71% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension
of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, and diversity score. However, as part of
the base case, Moody's considered spread level higher than the
covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported
and covenant levels.

5) Management continuity: GSC Group, Inc. has filed a motion with
the bankruptcy court to sell its investment management contracts.
Until a new manager is appointed GSC will continue to manage the
transaction under Chapter 11 protection.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


SKYPE GLOBAL: Moody's Raises Corp. Family Rating to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating of
Skype Global S.a.r.l. to Ba2 with a stable outlook from B1
following completion of the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft
Corporation ("Microsoft", Aaa/Stable Senior Unsecured Rating) on
October 13, 2011. The ratings upgrade reflects Moody's view that
the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft materially enhances Skype's
standalone credit profile, even though Microsoft did not formally
guarantee Skype's debt. The magnitude of the rating's lift has
been capped at two notches based on Moody's published methodology
to rating non-guaranteed subsidiaries. Following these upgrades,
given the announced closing of the acquisition and the repayment
of Skype's facilities, all ratings for Skype will also be
withdrawn.

Upgrades:

Issuer: Skype Global S.a.r.l.

Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba2 from B1

Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba3 from B2

Issuer: Springboard Finance LLC

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to Ba2 (LGD3-
34%)from B1 (LGD3-34%)

Ratings Rationale

Concurrent with this rating action, Moody's upgraded the various
instrument ratings of Skype's subsidiary, Springboard Finance LLC,
as listed above, in accordance with Moody's loss given default
methodology. Finally, Moody's said it will withdraw all ratings
for Skype and its subsidiaries as Microsoft has used cash on hand
to repay the outstanding amounts under Skype's credit facilities.
This concludes the ratings review commenced when the acquisition
agreement between Microsoft and Skype was announced in May 2011.

The principal methodology used in rating Skype was the Global
Telecommunications Rating Methodology published in December 2010.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Skype, located in Luxembourg, is a leading internet communications
company with revenues of approximately $930 million for twelve
months ending 6/30/2011.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Notes to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Leveraged Finance Europe Capital I B.V.:

Issuer: Leveraged Finance Europe Capital I B.V.

   -- EUR64.5M Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to
      A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR14M Class III-A Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to
      Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M Class III-B Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded
      to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR15M (initial issuance amount; with current outstanding
      amount of EUR 10.407M) Class IV-A Mezzanine Fixed Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M (initial issuance amount; with current outstanding
      amount of EUR 2.775M) Class IV-B Mezzanine Floating Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital I B.V., issued in November 2001,
is a single currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed
by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio
is managed by BNP Paribas. This transaction has now passed the
reinvestment period in November 2009. The portfolio assets are
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

Today's actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class I notes have been paid down by
approximately 3% or EUR5.16 million since the rating action in
December 2009. However, due to the proportion of assets in the
portfolio rated Caa1 and below as well as the amount of assets
reported as defaulted, the overcollateralization ("OC") ratio of
the two most senior classes (Class I and Class II) have slightly
decreased since the last rating action in December 2009. As of the
latest trustee report dated 31 August 2011, the OC ratio related
to Class II and Class III are reported at 117.14% and 108.85%,
respectively, versus October 2009 levels of 117.52% and 109.37%,
respectively. In contrast, the Class IV overcollateralization
ratio has increased to 103.48% August 2011 from 101.91% October
2009 reported level. Part of this increase has been driven by the
partial redemption of Class IV notes due to the diversion of
interest amounting to EUR4.08 million (21.47% of initial Class IV
balance), since last rating action in December 2009, following the
failure of Class IV OC test. Class IV OC test has not been cured
yet as of August 2011 reporting date.

Reported WARF has increased from 2698 to 2865 between October 2009
and August 2011. However, the change in reported WARF understates
the actual credit quality improvement because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 269.8
million, defaulted par of EUR18.23 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.9% (consistent with a WARF of 2885), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.04% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 33 and a weighted
average spread of 3.21%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90.1% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy, especially as 15.23% of
the portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Ireland, Spain and
Italy and 2) the large concentration of speculative-grade debt
maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could significantly accelerate or
slow down subject to market conditions and this may have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. In particular,
amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high levels of
prepayments in the loan market or asset sales or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


MARCO POLO: Gets Final OK to Pay US$2MM Critical Vendors' Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James M. Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York authorized, on a final basis, Marco
Polo Seatrade B.V., et al., to pay or honor prepetition
obligations to foreign vendors, service providers and governments
and certain critical vendors.

The Debtors are authorized to, among other things:

   -- pay all or part of the prepetition claims of critical
   vendors, in an aggregate amount not to exceed, $2 million;

   -- make full or partial payment to a critical vendor from the
   final critical vendor fund only to the extent (i) that the
   Debtors deem, in the exercise of their business judgment that
   such payment is necessary to ensure that the particular
   critical vendor will provide necessary goods and services to
   the Debtors on a postpetition basis; and (ii) the obligation
   to the critical vendor is due and payable by the Debtors at
   the time of payment; and

   -- issue postpetition checks and make postpetition fund
   transfer requests to replace any prepetition checks and
   prepetition transfers to critical vendors that may be
   dishonored by any bank.

                        About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing commercial
and technical vessel management services to third parties. Founded
in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the name of Seaarland
Shipping Management and maintains corporate Headquarters in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets consist of six
tankers that are regularly employed in international trade, and
call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million
on July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the
two other vessels.

Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J.
Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy
counsel.  The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.

The petition said assets and debt are both more than
US$100 million and less than US$500 million.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


TINA R: Expects to Submit Reorganization Plan by Year-End
---------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Tina R Distributie's administrator Casa de
Insolventa Transilvania (CITR) said the company has started
insolvency proceedings last month and could submit a
reorganization plan by the end of the year.

According to SeeNews, CITR said in a press release on Thursday
that the reorganization plan will include closing down
unprofitable stores and opening new ones as well as renegotiating
the lease contracts.

CITR said new investors may enter the company's shareholder
structure, SeeNews relates.

The company posted a net loss of RON3.7 million (US$1.2
million/EUR854,000 euro) in 2010, SeeNews says, citing finance
ministry data.

Tina R is a Romanian fashion retailer.  It operates nine stores.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SIGMA CAPITAL: Declared Bankrupt by Commercial Court
----------------------------------------------------
Russian Legal Information Agency (RAPSI) reports that a commercial
court has declared Sigma Capital Partners bankrupt.

RAPSI says the court has launched six-month bankruptcy proceedings
against Sigma.  Its bankruptcy administrator's report will be
considered on April 9, 2012.

According to the report, Sigma claims the ownership of a 32-
percent stake in the SMARTS telecommunications company.

However, its creditors voted during their first meeting to launch
bankruptcy proceedings.  Sigma's bankruptcy administrator reported
on Thursday that the company has no property and its liabilities
amount to RUB2.64 billion ($85 million), RAPSI relays.

RAPSI relates that the bankruptcy administrator said that no signs
of fraudulent bankruptcy have been uncovered at the company and
its insolvency cannot be restored.  Additionally, the report
notes, the company is not operating and its only remaining
employee is its director.

A representative of Sigma's primary creditors said at the meeting
that the company's sole asset is its $140 million in receivables,
including accounts receivable from Angentro Trading and
Investments, according to RAPSI.

The creditors believe that their interests can only be protected
by auctioning the receivables, the report adds.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAM: Bank of Spain Postpones Sale Until After General Elections
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that the Bank of Spain
has decided to delay the sale of troubled savings bank Caja de
Ahorros del Mediterraneo until after the country's Nov. 20 general
elections, after some bidders asked for more time to prepare
binding offers, two people familiar with the process said.


CASTILLA-LA MANCHA: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term ratings of
nine Spanish regions, two Basque provinces and five government-
related ratings by one or two notches. The outlook on the ratings
is negative. At the same time, the rating of Castilla--La Mancha
was downgraded by five notches to Ba2 from A3 and remains on
review for downgrade.

The rating actions conclude the review for possible downgrade
initiated for eight ratings on July 29, 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades of Spanish sub-sovereigns were prompted by:

(i) Moody's downgrade of the government of Spain to A1 from Aa2
with a negative outlook on October 18, 2011. For full details,
please see Moody's press release 'Moody's downgrades Spain's
government bond rating to A1, negative outlook'.

(ii) Growing liquidity pressures. Large financing needs alongside
constrained access to long-term funding sources have forced
regions to deplete their cash reserves, extensively use short-term
credit lines, and expand their commercial debt obligations.

(iii) Persistent fiscal imbalances due to the regions' difficulty
in reining in their cost bases significantly. Spanish regions, on
average, recorded a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 1.2% in H1 2011,
against the deficit target of 1.3% for the full-year. Moreover,
poor national economic prospects for 2012-13 will limit regional
tax proceeds -- about three-quarters of their budgets -- and
complicate fiscal consolidation plans.

- ENTITIES RATED ABOVE THE SOVEREIGN

The downgrades of the Basque entities' ratings (Basque Country,
Diputacion Foral de Guipuzcoa and Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia) by
two notches to Aa3 with negative outlook from Aa1 reflect the same
economic pressures that prompted the sovereign rating downgrade.
However, the Basque entities' unique and constitutionally
protected tax regime currently allows them to retain enough credit
strength to maintain their ratings one-notch above that of the
sovereign. In addition, their limited borrowing needs this year
and next limit the impact of difficult market conditions on their
financial performances.

- ENTITIES RATED AT THE SOVEREIGN LEVEL

The downgrades of Extremadura, Galicia and Madrid's ratings by two
notches to A1 with negative outlook -- in line with the sovereign
-- from Aa2 reflect Moody's opinion that these regions do not have
the required fiscal maneuverability nor the institutional strength
to maintain a rating above the sovereign. Comparable rating levels
with the sovereign reflect the financial and operational linkages
between these regions and the central government as well as
similarly constrained economic and financing environments weighing
on their credit profiles.

- ENTITIES RATED BELOW THE SOVEREIGN

The downgrade by one notch of Catalunya's ratings to Baa2 with
negative outlook from Baa1 reflects its significant liquidity
pressures, as the region's extensive financing needs come in the
context of an increasingly difficult market environment and
constrained access to long-term funding sources. However, Moody's
notes that Catalunya, unlike some of its peers, has taken measures
to rein in costs and sees its fiscal trajectory as progressively
stabilizing, as illustrated by its deficit of 1.0% of its GDP at
end-H1 2011 (vs. 1.2% in H1 2010). The continuation of this trend
would bring Catalunya's deficit closer to the target set by the
central government in the next few years.

The two-notch downgrade of the ratings of Andalucia and Castilla y
Le¢n (to A2 negative from Aa3), Murcia (to Baa1 negative from A2),
and Generalitat de Valencia (to Baa2 negative from A3) reflects
the pressures on their fiscal positions and the ordinal ranking of
their credit quality relative to the sovereign. The relative
ranking continues to reflect differing financial, economic and
institutional strengths, which ultimately translate into diverse
capabilities to withstand a deteriorating operating environment
and successfully implement austerity measures.

The downgrade of Castilla-La Mancha by five notches to Ba2 from A3
reflects recently disclosed features which Moody's considers
incompatible with an investment-grade rating. In particular, they
refer to the structural and substantial weakening in the region's
financial fundamentals, largely as the result of the emergence of
unexpectedly large deficits and commercial liabilities following a
recent audit of its accounts. This adds significant liquidity
pressure and exacerbates the continued deterioration in the
region's fiscal and debt metrics, which are amplified by its very
high dependence on credit line facilities -- a negative credit
feature in the current funding environment.

The region's stock of commercial liabilities is forecasted to
reach around EUR3.1 billion at YE2011 or 59% of the region's
operating revenue. Poor accountability and inadequate checks and
balances have fostered inefficiencies within the administration,
which itself has been unable to provide adequate estimates of its
fiscal performances over the past year. Moreover, the region's
stock of commercial debt is likely to take several years to
absorb. As Castilla-La Mancha is unlikely to record a budget
surplus for some time, repaying its commercial obligations will
require it to incur more costly financial debt or may even require
financial support from the central government.

- RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE OF CASTILLA-LA MANCHA

The Ba2 rating of Castilla-La Mancha is on review for downgrade.
While acknowledging that the new regional government elected in
May has drafted ambitious saving measures -- notably the reduction
of operating expenses by approximately 20% by the end of 2012 --
the review will examine the feasibility of the proposed measures.
In addition, the rating agency will focus on the region's plans to
finance its large commercial obligations, including outstanding
payments to two shadow toll road projects.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The outlook is negative for all other rated Spanish sub-
sovereigns, reflecting (i) Spain's weak economic growth prospects,
which will likely continue to adversely affect the regional tax
base; and (ii) uncertainty associated with the regions' ability to
meet its forthcoming borrowing requirements at an affordable cost
in the context of constrained market conditions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Stabilization of the outlooks or an upgrade to the ratings would
require (i) the stabilization or upgrade of the sovereign rating;
and (ii) detailed plans from the regional administrations to
restore their fiscal performances and reverse debt ratios.

Further deterioration of the operating environment in Spain that
would put pressure on the sovereign rating would also negatively
affect the ratings of the Spanish sub-sovereigns. Additionally,
failure of any individual sub-sovereign to progress towards fiscal
consolidation targets would add pressure to that specific rating.

RATINGS AFFECTED

These regional and local governments are affected by the rating
action:

- Basque Country: long-term issuer and debt ratings downgraded to
Aa3 from Aa1; outlook negative

- Diputacion Foral de Guipuzcoa: long-term issuer rating
downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1; outlook negative

- Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia: long-term issuer rating downgraded
to Aa3 from Aa1; outlook negative

- Comunidad Autonoma de Galicia: long-term issuer rating
downgraded to A1 from Aa2; outlook negative

- Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid: long-term issuer rating downgraded
to A1 from Aa2; outlook negative

- Junta de Extremadura: long-term issuer rating downgraded to A1
from Aa2; outlook negative

- Junta de Andalucia: long-term issuer and debt ratings downgraded
to A2 from Aa3; outlook negative

- Junta de Castilla y Leon: long-term issuer and debt ratings
downgraded to A2 from Aa3; outlook negative

- Comunidad Autonoma de Murcia: long-term issuer and debt ratings
downgraded to Baa1 from A2; outlook negative

- Region of Valencia: debt ratings downgraded to Baa2 from A3;
outlook negative; short-term rating downgraded to Prime-3 from
Prime-2

- Castilla-La Mancha: long-term issuer and debt ratings downgraded
to Ba2 from A3; under review for downgrade

- Catalunya: long-term issuer rating downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
outlook negative; short-term rating downgraded to Prime-3 from
Prime-2

These government-related ratings are affected:

- Consorcio de Transportes de Bizkaia: long-term issuer rating
downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1 in line with Basque Country 's
downgrade; outlook negative.

- Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas: debt ratings downgraded to
Baa2 from A3, in line with the Generalitat de Valencia's
downgrade; outlook negative.

- Notes of CACSA and Universities of Valencia (Universidad de
Valencia, Universidad de Alicante, Universidad Jaume 1 de
Castellon and Universidad Politecnica de Valencia): downgraded to
Baa2 from A3, in line with the Generalitat de Valencia's
downgrade; outlook negative.

- Notes of Feria Valencia: underlying rating downgraded to Baa2
from A3 with a negative outlook (A and B Certificates); the rating
of Feria Valencia's notes remains at Aa3/negative, in line with
the financial guarantee provided by Assured Guarantee (Europe) Ltd
(formerly, Financial Security Assurance (UK) Ltd).

METHODOLOGIES USED

The methodologies used in this rating were Regional and Local
Governments Outside the US published in May 2008,The Application
of Joint-Default Analysis to Regional and Local Governments
published in December 2008, and Government-Related Issuers:
Methodology Update published in July 2010.


EMPRESAS BANESTO: DBRS Assigns Series C Notes at 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited ("DBRS") has assigned provisional ratings to
the Notes issued by Empresas Banesto 6, F.T.A. (the "Issuer"), as
follows:

    * EUR935 million Series A Notes: AAA (sf)
    * EUR165 million Series B Notes: BBB(low) (sf)
    * EUR264 million Series C Notes: C (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco Espanol
de Credito, S.A. ("Banesto") to large corporations and small and
medium enterprises ("SMEs") domiciled in Spain.  As of September
28, 2011, the transaction's provisional pool included 5,731 loans
with a weighted average life of 2.5 years, a weighted average
maturity of 3.4 years and a notional amount of
EUR1,185.9 million.  At closing, the Originator will select the
final portfolio of EUR1,100.0 million from above mentioned
provisional pool.

The above ratings are provisional.  The final rating will be
issued upon receipt of executed versions of the governing
transaction documents.  To the extent that the documents and
information provided by Empresas Banesto 6, F.T.A., Santander de
Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. and Banesto and/or their agents to
DBRS as of this date differ from the executed versions of the
governing transaction documents, DBRS may assign a lower final
rating to the Notes, or may avoid assigning a final rating to the
Notes altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

    * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination,
through the Reserve Fund and excess spread. The current credit
enhancement of 39% and 24% is sufficient to support the AAA (sf)
and BBB (low) (sf) ratings on the Series A Notes and the Series B
Notes, respectively.

-- The Series C Notes has been issued for the purpose of funding
the cash Reserve Fund. The Reserve Fund has been initially set at
24% of the aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes,
or EUR 264 million.  The Reserve Fund is available to cover
shortfalls in the senior expenses, interest and principal
throughout the life of the Notes.

-- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced, except for required
payments to cover interest and principal shortfalls, unless:

     -- the transaction is at least two years old;

     -- the Reserve Fund is at least 48% of the outstanding
        aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes and
        in any case not less than EUR 132 million.

-- In addition, the Reserve Fund will not be allowed to amortise
if:

     -- the balance of the Reserve Fund is not at the minimum
        required level as of the previous period; or,

     -- the outstanding balance of assets in arrears for more
        than 90 days is less than 1% of the total outstanding
        balance of the performing assets.

    * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the approved
terms.  For this transaction, the provisional rating of the Series
A Notes addresses the timely payment of interest and the payment
of principal on or before the Legal Final Maturity Date on
September 17, 2033, as defined in the transaction documents.  The
provisional ratings of the Series B and Series C Notes address the
ultimate payment of interest and the payment of principal on or
before the Legal Final Maturity Date on  September 17, 2033, as
defined in the transaction documents.  The payments of interest
and principal on the Notes will be made quarterly, generally on
the 17th day of March, June, September and December.  The first
payment date is scheduled for
December 19, 2011.

    * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
to perform their respective duties and the quality of origination,
underwriting and servicing practices.

    * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the trust
and the non-consolidation of the special purpose vehicle, as well
as the consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer, as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS's analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com

The sources of information used for these ratings include parties
involved in the rating, including but not limited to Empresas
Banesto 6, F.T.A., Santander de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. and
Banesto.  DBRS considers the information available to it for the
purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory quality.

This is the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLOs, please see
European Disclosure Requirements, located at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/235269


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Turns Down Chinese Firms' Offer to Buy Business
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that Saab Automobile's
chances of avoiding bankruptcy dwindled after the two Chinese
companies that had agreed to invest in the company instead offered
to buy it for a token sum.

According to Bloomberg, people with knowledge of the matter said
that Pang Da Automobile Trade Co. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus
Automobile, which had planned to buy a combined 53.9% stake in
Saab's parent Swedish Automobile NV, made the offer after speaking
to the person overseeing Saab's court-administered reorganization.
The two Chinese companies had previously offered to invest EUR245
million (US$338 million) to help Saab stave off bankruptcy,
Bloomberg notes.

Saab, which has produced few cars since it first halted production
in March because of a lack of money, avoided bankruptcy last month
after a Swedish court granted the voluntary reorganization,
Bloomberg recounts.

The people said Saab has turned down the offer from Pang Da and
Youngman and insisted that the two stick to the original
agreement, Bloomberg relates.

"Any plan is possible during the process of reorganization,"
Bloomberg quotes Pang Qinghua, chairman of Pang Da, as saying in a
telephone interview on Friday.  "It's possible for new proposals
popping up during the process."

"All three parties are trying to find the most beneficial plan,"
Pang Caiping, executive director of Youngman's passenger gar
group, as cited by Bloomberg, said by telephone.

Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review says that though Saab's parent
declined an offer from its Chinese partners to buy Saab and its
U.K. distribution arm, it was continuing talks to restore the
troubled Swedish car maker's finances and allow it to resume
production.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 21.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Administrator Seeks to Halt Reorganization
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that Swedish Automobile NV
said Saab Automobile may be forced to exit creditor protection
because its administrator will apply to end the reorganization
against the will of the cash-strapped Swedish carmaker.

Saab has been informed that attorney Guy Lofalk will apply with
the Vaenersborg District Court in Sweden to terminate the
restructuring, Bloomberg discloses.  According to Bloomberg,
Zeewolde Netherlands-based Swedish Automobile said on Thursday in
a statement that the carmaker will contest the decision and ask
for a new administrator.

Saab, which has produced few cars since it first halted production
in March because of a lack of money, staved off bankruptcy after a
Swedish court on Sept. 21 granted the carmaker's request for
protection from creditors, Bloomberg recounts.  The court had been
scheduled to meet Oct. 31 to decide whether the reorganization can
carry on, Bloomberg notes.

For the reorganization to continue, the court must see that Saab
has cash to pay for immediate expenses, Bloomberg states.  The
company said earlier on Thursday that it received a US$70 million
funding pledge from North Street Capital LP, a Greenwich,
Connecticut-based private equity firm, Bloomberg recounts.  Those
funds, which consist of a loan and share sale, were aimed at
ensuring the continuity of the reorganization, Bloomberg says.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


SOTSKOMBANK: Central Bank Opts for Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News reports that Ukraine's
central bank said it decided to liquidate PAT KB Sotskombank after
it failed to restore financial stability following the 2008 global
credit crisis.

The Kiev-based Natsionalnyi Bank Ukrainy appointed Nataliya
Khorolenko as a temporary administrator to assume control at
Sotskombank in order to stabilize it in March 2009, Bloomberg
recounts.  According to Bloomberg, the central bank said on Friday
on its Web site that Ms. Khorolenko will now supervise the
liquidation process.


* UKRAINE: Fitch Revises Outlooks on Six Companies to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised six Ukrainian companies' Outlooks to
Stable from Positive, following the agency's rating action on
Ukraine's sovereign ratings.  The agency affirmed Ukraine's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'B' and Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.  Ukraine's Country
Ceiling was affirmed at 'B'.

The rating actions are as follows:

DTEK Holdings Limited

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive.  The rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'.

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive

  -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';
     Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

  -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- National senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'

Metinvest B.V.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive. The rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive

  -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';
     Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

  -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)' ; Outlook
     Stable

  -- National Short-term rating: affirmed at 'F1+(ukr)'

Ferrexpo Plc

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive. The rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR was affirmed at 'B'. In
     addition, Ferrexpo's foreign currency senior unsecured rating
     and Ferrexpo Finance plc.'s guaranteed notes (GNs) issue
     senior unsecured rating are affirmed at 'B' with a Recovery
     Rating (RR) of 'RR4'.

MHP S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive. This rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Senior unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B';
     Recovery Rating of 'RR4'

Outstanding bonds are jointly guaranteed on a senior basis by
several group subsidiaries, including OJSC Myronivsky
Hliboproduct, the group's intermediate holding company.
Guarantors collectively represent in excess of 90% of MHP's
consolidated revenues and total assets.

OJSC Myronivsky Hliboproduct (MHP S.A.'s 99.9% owned subsidiary)

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive. This rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook
     Stable

Kernel Holding SA

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive. This rating remains
     constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B'.

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook
     Stable


* UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings at 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on Ukraine's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to Stable
from Positive and affirmed the Long-term IDRs at 'B' and Short-
term IDR at 'B'.  Fitch has simultaneously affirmed Ukraine's
Country Ceiling at 'B'.

"The balance of risks facing Ukraine is now better reflected by a
Stable Outlook, following an increase in sovereign external
borrowing costs and associated concerns about external financing,
as well as the impact of a forecast slowdown in global growth,"
says Charles Seville, Director in Fitch's Sovereign group.

The ratings were assigned a Positive Outlook in July 2011. Since
then, the agency has revised down its forecasts for global growth
and increased investor risk aversion has led many emerging market
currencies to weaken against the US dollar.

Fitch has previously noted that Ukraine's combination of exposure
to the pro-cyclical steel industry, de facto pegged exchange rate
and domestic policy risks make it more vulnerable than most
emerging markets to a deterioration in the external environment.
External financing risks weigh on the rating.  Ukraine has a high
gross external debt of 77% of GDP, and a large external financing
requirement.  Its program with the IMF has remained off-track
since March.

In September, international reserves at the National Bank of
Ukraine (NBU) fell by 8%, or USD3bn, to USD35bn, slightly above
where they ended 2010.  Reserves have come under pressure from a
widening current account deficit, which is forecast to reach 4.5%
of GDP in 2011, and from a flight to foreign currency cash by the
private sector.  Intensification of these trends would increase
the likelihood of depreciation in the hryvnia.

While greater exchange rate flexibility might be desirable,
depreciation would worsen the country's solvency ratio (up to 60%
of sovereign debt is foreign currency denominated or linked).  It
would also make private sector debts more difficult to service and
pose additional risks for the financial sector.

The government budget is performing ahead of target so far in 2011
and the deficit is on course to reach around 4.5% of GDP.  The
government intends to reduce the deficit further in 2012.
However, the 2011 overall deficit exceeds the target of 3.5% of
GDP set out in the standby arrangement with the IMF, mainly
because state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz is set to make
losses equivalent to 1.5% of GDP in the absence of adjustment to
natural gas tariffs to households.  The IMF agreement is off-track
largely because the government has not raised gas prices to
households as agreed.

A resumption of IMF lending would help Ukraine meet external
financing challenges in 2012, when it starts to face substantial
repayments to the IMF of previous lending, and would underpin
confidence ahead of the 2012 legislative elections.  The agreement
offers SDR10 billion (US$15 billion) in balance of payments
support through 2012 conditional on a number of fiscal and
structural reforms. Budget financing plans for next year assume
access to external market borrowing.

The signing of a free trade agreement with the EU, which had been
scheduled for December 2011 could well be delayed, with an
associated cost in terms of investment and trade.  Relations with
the EU have soured since a Ukrainian court sentenced opposition
party leader and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to a
prison term in October for exceeding her authority in negotiating
a gas pricing and supply agreement with Russia.

Renewed pressure on the currency, a shortfall in external
financing or a severe deterioration in the external environment
could result in downward pressure on the rating.  Positive rating
action could result if sources of external financing are secured
and confidence is maintained, which would favor sustained real GDP
growth and narrowing of the fiscal deficit.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABBEYCREST PLC: Defaults Payment of GBP311,400 Loan Installment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Abbeycrest plc said it was unable to make the first installment of
GBP311,400 in the loan facility it secured in May 2011.  The first
installment was due Oct. 21.

On May 4, 2011, Abbeycrest plc revised the termination
arrangements with lessor, Moorgarth Property Investments Limited,
regarding the leases over Abbeycrest's former head office and car
park at Wilmington Grove, Leeds.

Under these arrangements, Abbeycrest and Moorgarth agreed to the
surrender of the Company's leasehold interests in the Property on
Sept. 28, in consideration for which Abbeycrest entered into a
loan facility letter dated May 4, 2011, secured by way of a third
ranking fixed and floating charge over the assets of the Company
and its subsidiaries.

The board of Abbeycrest said that, in light of continuing
challenging trading conditions, the Company has been in
negotiations with Moorgarth, with a view to agreeing a
rescheduling of the repayment profile under the Moorgarth Facility
Letter, including the first instalment of GBP311,400 which was due
on Sept. 28, 2011.

Moorgarth has provided the Company with written confirmations
temporarily postponing the requirement to repay the first
instalment.  Following termination of these negotiations, the
Company has informed Moorgarth that it will not be making the
payment of the first instalment on Oct. 21, 2011, being the date
on which the latest temporary postponement expires.

Under the terms of the intercreditor deed dated May 4, 2011,
between Abbeycrest and others, Moorgarth and Burdale Financial
Limited, Moorgarth is unable to take any action to recover the
GBP311,400 without the prior written consent of Burdale, which has
not been given.

The board confirms that the Group's facilities with Burdale remain
available at the date of this announcement and Burdale remains
supportive.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing The Telegraph,
reported on Jan. 4, 2011, that Abbeycrest plc said the rise in
gold prices had caused it to breach its lending terms.  According
to The Telegraph, Simon Ashton, the group's executive chairman
brought in by lender Burdale Financial to fix the company in 2008,
blamed the difficulties on the soaring price of gold and poor
margin controls at one division.

                        About Abbeycrest plc

Abbeycrest plc (LON:ACR) is a United Kingdom-based company.  It is
engaged in jewelry designer, manufacturer and distributor.  The
company has operations in United Kingdom, Thailand and Hong Kong.


EQUINOX PLC: Fitch Affirms Rating on GBP7.7-Mil. Notes at 'Dsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these ratings on Equinox (Eclipse 2006-
1) plc:

  -- GBP186.6m class A (XS0259279585) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- GBP17.2m class B (XS0259280088) affirmed at 'BBBsf; Outlook
     Negative

  -- GBP18.1m class C (XS0259280161 affirmed at 'BBsf; Outlook
     Negative

  -- GBP20.9m class D (XS0259280591) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
     Rating revised to 'RR4' from 'RR2'

  -- GBP7.7m class E (XS0259280674) affirmed at 'Dsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR6'

The affirmations reflect that there has been no major change in
the overall credit quality of the loan pool.  The maintained
Negative Outlook reflects some uncertainty regarding the Ashbourne
Portfolio, whose sole tenant, Southern Cross (SC), is in
administration.

In July 2011, Fitch learned that SC was discontinuing operations
in the 90 nursing homes comprising the collateral for the loan.
In order to cover the costs of an orderly transition, the special
servicer, lenders and landlords have accepted the borrower's
request to suspend interest and principal payments for the next
two IPDs.  Interest payments on the bonds will be covered by
liquidity facility drawings in the interim.

The securitized portion of the whole loan, which accounts for 29%
of the CMBS portfolio, has a reported LTV ratio of 56% (based on a
November 2010 valuation).  While 21% has already been written off
the reported value since the earlier valuation in 2008, Fitch
believes that further market value declines are likely in light of
the operational concerns affecting the sector as a whole.
Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the
commercial terms that will be granted to the next operators in
this portfolio.

The Macallan portfolio loan (7.9%) is in the process of being
accelerated, with the three remaining assets securing the loan
soon to be liquidated.  The securitized loan currently has a
reported loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 408%, indicative of limited
recovery prospects.  Fitch estimates that recoveries will result
in a write-off of the Class E notes.  In addition, Fitch now
expects greater losses on the Class D notes, as reflected in the
revision of the recovery rating to RR4 (31%-50% recovery) from RR2
(71%-90%).

The largest loan in the pool (at 30%) is Royal Mint Court. It is
secured by a four building office complex of the same name located
in Tower Bridge, London.  The main tenant is Barclays Bank plc
('AA-'/'F1+'/RWN), accounting for 61% of passing rent on leases
expiring in December 2013, shortly after loan maturity in October
2013.  This exposes the issuer to the residual property value.
Fitch estimates an LTV of 95%, well in excess of the reported
figure.

The Avocado Court Portfolio loan (7%) and the Ocean Park Portfolio
loan (2.4%) are both currently on the servicer watchlist due to
their projected interest coverage ratios falling below the cash
trap triggers (although not the covenanted minimums).  As a
result, all surplus cash is being trapped pending a cure of the
respective breaches.

The other five loans securitized in the transaction have shown
relatively stable performance over the past year.


DUNDEE FC: Ex-Director to Stand Trial on Fraud Charges in 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------
stv news reports that Giovanni di Stefano, a controversial lawyer
and former Dundee Football Club director accused of defrauding
clients out of GBP140,000, will not stand trial until 2013.

Mr. Di Stefano appeared at Southwark Crown Court to deny ten
counts of obtaining money transfers by deception, one count of
attempting to obtain a money transfer by deception and one count
of theft, according to stv news.

The report relates that Mr. Di Stefano also plead not guilty to
three counts of acquiring criminal property, one count of using
criminal property and two counts of fraud.  All the offences are
alleged to have been committed between June 2004 and June 2009.

stv news, citing court documents, relates Mr. Di Stefano defrauded
Paula Gregory-Dade out of GBP120,000 by claiming he was a
qualified Italian lawyer between June and November 2004.  stv news
relates that Mr. Di Stefano lasted six months as a director at
Dens Park from August 2003 to January 2004, before he left after
the club went into administration.

As Dundee again faced financial difficulties late last year, di
Stefano told STV he would have "no problem" taking over the club,
so long as he had "dictatorial command" of the Dark Blues, the
report says.

stv news relates that Mr. Di Stefano is also charged with
pocketing GBP10,000 from Christine Smith to represent her husband
Michael at a sentencing hearing in December 2005 and during his
subsequent appeal against conviction.

Mr. Di Stefano is said to have attempted to pocket EUR10,000 from
Laurent Penchef in the same way, the report notes.

stv news discloses that prosecutors allege the Italian also stole
a convertible BMW 325i from BMW Financial Services and dishonestly
acquired GBP83,000.  It is also claimed he had access to criminal
proceeds of more than GBP70,000 in a Lloyds TSB account, stv news
relates.

Mr. Di Stefano is accused of abusing his position as a legal
advisor to Stafford William Gillies Freeborn and Alberto and Linda
Sgoluppi, stv news notes.

Mr. Di Stefano is expected to stand trial on January 14, 2013.
Judge Alistair McCreath remanded Mr. Di Stefano, of North Stream,
Marchside, Canterbury, in Kent, on bail ahead of his next
appearance for a directions hearing in January 2012, the report
adds.

                    About Dundee Football Club

Dundee Football Club -- http://www.thedees.co.uk/-- is a Scottish
football club.

                              *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
October 18, 2010, Agence France-Presse said Dundee Football Club
was placed into administration on Oct. 14, 2010, after failing to
pay a GBP365,000 (US$583,525) tax bill.  The report related that
Dundee had no option but to accept administration after being
unable to negotiate the payment and the process was finally
confirmed on.


FYLDE DAIRIES: Enters Into Administration, Sells Assets
-------------------------------------------------------
Farmers Guardian reports that administrators of Fylde Dairies said
there is no business as such to try and sell.

How much creditors might receive would be determined largely by
the proceeds of an online auction of tangible assets, according to
Farmers Guardian.

The report notes that joint administrators are Lila Thomas and
David Acland of Preston-based Begbies Traynor (Central), who said
a report to creditors, was normally produced within about eight
weeks of their appointment.  Farmers Guardian relates that in this
case, the list of creditors included the bank, supplying farmers
and processors.

It is understood most of Fylde Dairies milk producers are now
supplying another local processor, Farmers Guardian notes.

Headquartered in Lancashire, Fylde Dairies is a milk buyer
company.  The business was set up by Howey Hegarty more than four
years ago and had around 14 supplying producers on the Lancashire
Fylde.


JOHN L ROBERTSON: Goes Into Liquidation Due to High Competition
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at business7.co.uk reports that John L Robertson
Limited, a 130-year-old Dundee furniture store, had gone into
liquidation with the loss of 16 jobs.

The businesses, which operate from a landmark four-storey store on
Barrack Street, Dundee, will close with immediate effect, the
report says.

According to the report, administrators Begbies Traynor said the
Dundee store will remain open for at least another week to sell
off the remaining furniture stock, the company's main assets.

business7.co.uk relates that Begbies Traynor said the family-run
business has struggled to compete with other high street and
online retailers.

The business reported losses of GBP96,000 for the year to May 2011
on turnover of GBP1.1 million against a loss of GBP29,000 the
previous year on turnover of GBP1.3 million.  Early estimates put
debt owed to creditors at around GBP400,000.

The report says the building in Dundee is not owned by Robertsons
and there is believed to be "significant" rental arrears owed to
the building's owner.

John L Robertson, which has been trading in Dundee since 1881,
also runs the subsidiaries Robertsons' House Furnishers and
Robertsons' Interiors.


MOUCHEL GROUP: Agrees to Sell Rail Business to Slash Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that Mouchel Group has
agreed to sell its rail business as it seeks to slash its GBP87
million net debt burden amid crisis talks with banks.

According to the FT, the company has raised GBP3.4 million in cash
by selling the rail division to Sinclair Knight Merz, an
Australian rival.

The disposal is expected to be the first of many as the group
attempts to reassure lenders following a profit warning, which
sent the shares down more than 30% in a day.

Mouchel was forced to knock GBP8.6 million (US$13.6 million) off
profits estimates as a result of "over-optimistic" accounting on
local authority contracts and a pensions error by a council
client's auditors, the FT recounts.  It is likely to breach loan
agreements unless it can renegotiate terms with lenders, the FT
says.

The FT notes that analysts said the sale would provide only a
small contribution towards reducing the company's GBP87.4 million
debt pile and meeting a deadline agreed with its banks of repaying
GBP30 million by the end of May 2012.

Mouchel Group plc -- http://www.mouchel.com/-- is a consulting
and business services company supporting clients in developing and
managing their infrastructure assets.  The Company operates in
three segments: Government Services, Regulated Industries and
Highways.


RANGERS FC: Owner Braces Club for a Pivotal Period
--------------------------------------------------
Peter Jardine at MailOnline reports that Rangers Football Club PLC
owner Craig Whyte admitted that the next two months could be among
the most pivotal in the club's proud 139-year history.

The Ibrox outfit expect to hear the result of the outstanding
GBP49 million tax case soon -- and, if the dreaded outcome
transpires, it could send them hurtling into administration,
according to MailOnline.

The report relates that Mr. Whyte has admitted that, depending on
the outcome of the Her Majesty Revenues and Customs case, he may
not even exercise an avenue of appeal if he feels the best
strategy to take the SPL champions forward is to tackle the issue
now -- depending on the size of any bill.

Mr. Whyte spoke to Sportsmail in the wake of a BBC investigation
which instantly prompted a bullish legal defense by the
businessman, MailOnline says.

MailOnline discloses that case is now likely to run and run, as
will the bitter courtroom battle with former Chief Executive
Martin Bain.  The report relates that Mr. Bain, who has had
GBP480,000 worth of Ibrox assets frozen, is claiming GBP1.3
million in damages following his sacking.

However, the Court of Session agreed not to hear the case in full
until July next year, while Rangers also have a counter claim
against Mr. Bain, MailOnline says.

MailOnline relays that Mr. Whyte expects the tax issue to be in
the public domain long before then and believes that, by
Christmas, there will be a clearer picture on the club's immediate
and medium-term future.

"We will see what happens over the next two months. . . . They are
clearly going to be important for us at Rangers.  It is a crucial
period," MailOnline quoted Mr. Whyte as saying.

                    About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


S ROBINSON & SONS: Goes Into Administration, Cuts 118 Jobs
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that S Robinson & Sons has gone into
administration cutting 118 jobs in the process.

S Robinson & Sons said it had experienced cashflow difficulties
after a decline in orders from the construction industry,
according to BBC News.

The report notes that part of the company, Robinsons Agriculture,
has been sold, safeguarding 17 jobs.

Twelve people have been kept on to help administrators wind down
the business, BBC News relates.

"In common with many in this sector the economic environment has
had an adverse impact on the order book. . . . Despite the best
efforts of all involved it was not possible to find a solution for
the whole business although we were pleased to secure a sale of
the subsidiary company which preserved 17 jobs," BBC News quoted
Will Wright from administrators KPMG as saying.

S Robinson & Sons is a Derby engineering firm.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to $500-Mil. Bank Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB' issue rating
to a US$500 million bank loan that Vedanta Resources PLC (foreign
currency BB/Negative/--) unconditionally and irrevocably
guarantees. Monte Cello Corp. N.V. (not rated), a wholly owned
subsidiary of Vedanta, will take out the loan and advance the
proceeds to its parent. Vedanta will use the amount to refinance
debt of US$353 million, and make interest and dividend payments of
US$138 million.

"The rating on the bank loan, due in 2018, is the same as the
corporate credit rating on Vedanta because we do not notch down
issue ratings for subordination of debt in India. Further,
Vedanta's cash flow diversity reduces structural subordination
with the holding company organizational structure," S&P stated.

The rating on Vedanta reflects the company's aggressive debt-
funded growth strategy, increasing operational risks in some
businesses, exposure to volatile commodity prices, and limited
backward integration in aluminum and copper. The company's
increasing diversity in cash flows, favorable market
position, low-cost operations in India, and strong project
pipeline partly offset these weaknesses.

"In our view, the bank loan demonstrates Vedanta's continued
ability to access debt markets for refinancing. However, the
partial use of the loan proceeds to service debt and pay dividends
to shareholders emphasizes Vedanta's preference to incur
additional debt rather than service debt through cash sent
upstream from subsidiaries," S&P stated.

"Vedanta's willingness to send cash upstream is untested. The
company has not needed sizable cash receipts from its subsidiaries
due to a delay in the closure of the acquisition of Cairn India
Ltd. (not rated). The subsidiaries had a total cash balance of
US$7.8 billion as of March 31, 2011. However, cash receipts from
the subsidiaries have lagged our expectations. We estimate that
Vedanta will require about US$500 million of annual interest
payments due to its heavy reliance on holding company debt to fund
the Cairn acquisition," S&P stated.

"Vedanta's production volumes of zinc, alumina, and copper from
India in the six months ended September 2011 (first half of fiscal
2012) match our expectations. While aluminum and power production
was below our expectations, production should increase in the
second half of fiscal 2012 due to capacity additions in the power
segment and corrective measures in the aluminium business," S&P
said.

"Vedanta's iron-ore production in India and copper production in
Zambia fell short of our expectation. A Supreme Court ban on
mining and direct sales of iron ore in Karnataka hampered
Vedanta's production in India. Copper production at Zambia was hit
by a drop in custom smelting due to reduced availability of
concentrate. Our base-case scenario assumes lower commodity
prices than current rates. We therefore believe that the recent
fall in commodity prices will not affect our base-case forecast,"
S&P related.

"The negative outlook reflects our view of Vedanta's: (1) large
debt burden and its sizable debt maturity over the next two years;
(2) need to send significant cash upstream or refinance; and (3)
increased operating risk, which could slow growth in cash flow,"
S&P said.


VON ESSEN: Bath Priory Acquires Four Hotels
-------------------------------------------
meetpie.com reports that four of the properties owned by hotel
chain von Essen have been acquired by The Bath Priory Limited from
the administrators Ernst and Young.

Lower Slaughter Manor, Amberley Castle, Buckland Manor and
Washbourne Court have been purchased by The Bath Priory, according
to meetpie.com

"I am very proud to be the custodian of these four new hotels
which will over the next few years be redirected and refurbished
to the highest of standards in comfort and hospitality under the
Brownsword Hotels umbrella," the report quoted new owner Andrew
Brownsword as saying.

The remaining hotels in the von Essen group will continue to trade
as usual and it is expected further sale announcements will follow
soon, meetpie.com adds.

von Essen hotel chain owns 28 luxury hotels in the UK and France.

                           *     *     *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 25,
2011, BBC News said the holding company of the von Essen hotel
chain has appointed accountants Ernst & Young as administrators.
SoGlos.com related that von Essen is reported to have debts of
more than GBP25 million.  SoGlos.com noted that while
administrators have been appointed and the portfolio of hotels are
expected to be sold off either as a group or as individual
properties, the hotels are all expected to continue to trade as
usual.


WOODSIDES BALLYCLARE: Goes Into Administration, Cuts Jobs
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Woodsides Ballyclare Ltd has gone into
administration after facing increasing competition from the big
supermarkets.

The company closed its Carrickfergus outlet in 2010 and also made
some redundancies in Ballyclare, BBC News recalls.

The report relates that the Ballyclare shop is still open and
continuing to trade for now.

The firm's accounts show that it lost more than œ300,000 in both
2009 and 2010, BBC News notes.

A note in the 2010 accounts said the biggest risks facing the
company were the difficult economic circumstances coupled with a
large supermarket chain opening nearby, the report discloses.

BBC News notes that the independent retail sector in Northern
Ireland has been under pressure due to weak consumer spending.

Government figures released suggest that retail spending in
Northern Ireland has fallen by nearly 10% over the last year, the
report says.

Woodsides Ballyclare Ltd is a retail business in Ballyclare.  It
operates the town's SuperValu store.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Sankaty Advisors Bet It Will Gain in Country's Pain
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Sankaty Advisors
is betting that Europe's pain will be its gain.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 17 to October 21, 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                   Coupon     Maturity  Currency    Price
------                   ------     --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT           5.470    8/28/2013      EUR     60.38
BAWAG                      5.430    2/26/2024      EUR     66.04
BAWAG                      5.310    2/12/2023      EUR     69.10
BAWAG                      5.400    2/12/2023      EUR     69.64
HAA-BANK INTL AG           5.250   10/27/2015      EUR     69.63
HAA-BANK INTL AG           5.270     4/7/2028      EUR     60.63
IMMOFINANZ                 4.250     3/8/2018      EUR      3.40
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.750    4/30/2021      EUR     70.34
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.170    7/29/2015      EUR     66.63
OESTER VOLKSBK             5.270     2/8/2027      EUR     56.13
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.810    7/29/2025      EUR     60.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.730   12/11/2023      EUR     71.47
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            4.500    9/28/2035      EUR     51.82
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.470    2/28/2028      EUR     65.06
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.500   12/29/2023      EUR     69.68

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP             4.000     6/1/2016      EUR     20.04
IDEAL STANDARD I          11.750     5/1/2018      EUR     71.95
IDEAL STANDARD I          11.750     5/1/2018      EUR     71.00

CYPRUS
------
AVANGARDCO INVES          10.000   10/29/2015      USD     77.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.625     2/3/2020      EUR     71.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    2/26/2019      EUR     71.44
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600   10/23/2018      EUR     71.40
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    4/23/2018      EUR     71.62
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.100    1/29/2018      EUR     73.98
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    9/28/2017      EUR     71.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.600    4/15/2017      EUR     74.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     4/2/2017      EUR     72.56
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    2/15/2017      EUR     72.73
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     1/4/2017      EUR     72.91
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    7/11/2016      EUR     73.89
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.000     6/9/2016      EUR     74.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     6/2/2016      EUR     73.90
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    3/30/2016      EUR     74.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           3.750    11/1/2015      EUR     72.97
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    10/9/2016      EUR     73.24
MARFIN POPULAR             4.350   11/20/2014      EUR     50.13

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500     2/3/2016      TRY     73.62
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR     46.34

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.250    6/28/2040      CAD     24.45
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR     73.32
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   10/27/2016      TRY     68.02
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR     66.97
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR     49.05
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    3/17/2025      CAD     61.10
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR     74.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR     60.21
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/16/2017      TRY     72.24
TALVIVAARA                 4.000   12/16/2015      EUR     74.62

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM             4.970     4/1/2015      EUR     11.29
ALCATEL-LUCENT             5.000     1/1/2015      EUR      3.11
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG           6.720     1/1/2015      EUR      4.82
ASSYSTEM                   4.000     1/1/2017      EUR     20.33
ATOS ORIGIN SA             2.500     1/1/2016      EUR     50.16
BNP PARIBAS                2.890    5/16/2036      JPY     61.04
CALYON                     6.000    6/18/2047      EUR     20.20
CALYON                     5.800   10/29/2029      USD     70.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET           3.500     1/1/2014      EUR     38.10
CAP GEMINI SOGET           1.000     1/1/2012      EUR     41.97
CGG VERITAS                1.750     1/1/2016      EUR     25.59
CLUB MEDITERRANE           5.000     6/8/2012      EUR     12.74
CLUB MEDITERRANE           6.110    11/1/2015      EUR     17.85
CMA CGM                    8.500    4/15/2017      USD     41.00
CMA CGM                    8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     40.67
CMA CGM                    8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     41.22
CMA CGM                    8.500    4/15/2017      USD     49.00
CNP ASSURANCES             6.875    9/30/2041      EUR     70.01
CNP ASSURANCES             6.000    9/14/2040      EUR     68.20
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.000   12/23/2030      USD     66.93
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.400    12/9/2030      USD     64.00
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.690   11/26/2030      USD     66.83
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.080   11/23/2030      USD     61.17
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.450    11/9/2030      USD     64.63
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.910    11/3/2030      USD     60.72
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.350   10/29/2030      USD     63.77
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300   10/22/2030      USD     63.48
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.250   10/18/2030      USD     62.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300   10/12/2030      USD     61.15
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300    10/7/2030      USD     63.39
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.850    9/17/2030      USD     59.22
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.270     8/5/2030      USD     63.47
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.850    6/30/2031      USD     67.32
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.830    6/30/2031      USD     67.13
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.610    6/15/2031      USD     65.10
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.650    6/10/2031      USD     65.51
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.850    5/27/2031      USD     67.40
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.880     4/8/2031      USD     69.35
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.220    3/17/2031      USD     71.23
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.150    2/11/2031      USD     70.49
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.950    1/19/2031      USD     69.00
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.050    1/14/2031      USD     69.93
CREDIT AGRICOLE            4.500   12/22/2019      EUR     70.42
CREDIT LOCAL FRA           3.750    5/26/2020      EUR     59.79
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           5.037     8/4/2020      EUR     66.01
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.110    9/18/2018      EUR     67.39
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.500    2/25/2020      EUR     64.12
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.550     4/2/2020      EUR     64.31
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           1.000   12/23/2024      EUR     60.95
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           2.875    4/23/2030      CHF     72.40
EURAZEO                    6.250    6/10/2014      EUR     55.61
EUROPCAR GROUPE            9.375    4/15/2018      EUR     61.00
EUROPCAR GROUPE            9.375    4/15/2018      EUR     61.22
FAURECIA                   4.500     1/1/2015      EUR     21.64
FONCIERE REGIONS           3.340     1/1/2017      EUR     73.32
GROUPAMA SA                7.875   10/27/2039      EUR     46.42
INGENICO                   2.750     1/1/2017      EUR     41.31
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2014      EUR     18.06
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2015      EUR     16.97
NEXANS SA                  4.000     1/1/2016      EUR     57.96
NOVASEP HLDG               9.750   12/15/2016      USD     43.00
ORPEA                      3.875     1/1/2016      EUR     43.39
PAGESJAUNES FINA           8.875     6/1/2018      EUR     68.36
PAGESJAUNES FINA           8.875     6/1/2018      EUR     68.13
PEUGEOT SA                 4.450     1/1/2016      EUR     25.39
PIERRE VACANCES            4.000    10/1/2015      EUR     70.99
PUBLICIS GROUPE            1.000    1/18/2018      EUR     48.14
PUBLICIS GROUPE            3.125    7/30/2014      EUR     35.78
RHODIA SA                  0.500     1/1/2014      EUR     51.95
SOC AIR FRANCE             2.750     4/1/2020      EUR     20.49
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.860    4/26/2031      USD     69.66
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.910    3/16/2031      USD     69.90
SOCIETE GENERALE           6.010    3/15/2031      USD     70.88
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.940    3/14/2031      USD     70.20
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.860    3/11/2031      USD     69.40
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.900    3/10/2031      USD     69.84
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.920    3/17/2031      USD     69.99
SOITEC                     6.250     9/9/2014      EUR      7.49
TEM                        4.250     1/1/2015      EUR     51.27
THEOLIA                    2.700     1/1/2041      EUR      9.34

GERMANY
-------
BAYERISCHE HYPO            5.000   12/21/2029      EUR     71.94
BAYERISCHE LNDBK           4.500     2/7/2019      EUR     74.08
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.600    4/14/2023      EUR     68.55
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.640    1/30/2024      EUR     66.12
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.450    2/20/2023      EUR     67.80
COMMERZBANK AG             6.360    3/15/2022      EUR     69.13
COMMERZBANK AG             6.300    3/15/2022      EUR     68.98
COMMERZBANK AG             6.460    6/24/2022      EUR     69.32
COMMERZBANK AG             5.000   10/30/2017      EUR     74.81
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           5.010    3/11/2031      USD     74.23
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           5.050    3/10/2031      USD     74.68
DEUTSCHE BK LOND           5.000    7/21/2033      USD     74.24
DEUTSCHE BK LOND           4.750   12/16/2030      USD     73.83
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN           5.300   11/20/2023      EUR     68.01
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.210    6/20/2022      EUR     67.97
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.180    2/28/2023      EUR     65.21
DRESDNER BANK AG           7.160    8/14/2024      EUR     69.11
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.550    4/14/2020      EUR     74.25
DRESDNER BANK AG           5.700    7/31/2023      EUR     62.77
DRESDNER BANK AG           5.290    5/31/2021      EUR     64.72
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.000    2/25/2020      EUR     71.79
DRESDNER BANK AG           7.350    6/13/2028      EUR     67.60
EUROHYPO AG                6.490    7/17/2017      EUR      4.25
EUROHYPO AG                5.110     8/6/2018      EUR     67.00
EUROHYPO AG                3.830    9/21/2020      EUR     54.13
EUROHYPO AG                5.560    8/18/2023      EUR     57.13
GOTHAER ALLG VER           5.527    9/29/2026      EUR     68.70
HAPAG-LLOYD                9.750   10/15/2017      USD     70.33
HAPAG-LLOYD                9.750   10/15/2017      USD     74.00
HECKLER & KOCH             9.500    5/15/2018      EUR     73.36
HECKLER & KOCH             9.500    5/15/2018      EUR     71.00
HEIDELBERG DRUCK           9.250    4/15/2018      EUR     65.88
HEIDELBERG DRUCK           9.250    4/15/2018      EUR     65.01
HSH NORDBANK AG            4.375    2/14/2017      EUR     50.91
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           4.500     7/9/2013      EUR     63.02
L-BANK FOERDERBK           0.500    5/10/2027      CAD     50.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.800    2/23/2037      JPY     41.05
LB BADEN-WUERTT            5.250   10/20/2015      EUR     27.63
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN           5.875    2/10/2016      EUR     68.48
Q-CELLS                    6.750   10/21/2015      EUR      0.87
QIMONDA FINANCE            6.750    3/22/2013      USD      1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK           6.600    5/29/2022      EUR     65.38
SOLARWORLD AG              6.125    1/21/2017      EUR     58.87
SOLARWORLD AG              6.375    7/13/2016      EUR     64.50
TAG IMMO AG                6.500   12/10/2015      EUR      7.70
TUI AG                     2.750    3/24/2016      EUR     35.92
TUI AG                     5.500   11/17/2014      EUR     55.64

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.301    8/12/2014      EUR     36.00
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.057    3/26/2013      EUR     45.22
ATHENS URBAN TRN           5.008    7/18/2017      EUR     35.93
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.851    9/19/2016      EUR     35.50
FAGE DAIRY IND             7.500    1/15/2015      EUR     71.13
FAGE DAIRY IND             7.500    1/15/2015      EUR     71.13
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.300    7/25/2030      EUR     25.73
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.900    7/25/2025      EUR     23.58
HELLENIC REPUB             5.000    3/11/2019      EUR     38.13
HELLENIC REPUB             6.140    4/14/2028      EUR     42.88
HELLENIC REPUB             2.125     7/5/2013      CHF     50.38
HELLENIC REPUB             5.200    7/17/2034      EUR     42.38
HELLENIC REPUB             4.625    6/25/2013      USD     73.50
HELLENIC REPUB             4.590     4/8/2016      EUR     34.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    5/20/2014      EUR     37.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500    1/11/2014      EUR     37.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.520    9/30/2013      EUR     40.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.000    8/20/2013      EUR     38.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.427    7/31/2013      EUR     40.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI           7.500    5/20/2013      EUR     42.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    5/20/2013      EUR     40.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.506    3/31/2013      EUR     44.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.100    8/20/2012      EUR     41.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI           1.000    6/30/2012      EUR     65.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.250    6/20/2012      EUR     67.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.250    5/18/2012      EUR     44.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    3/20/2012      EUR     51.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    9/20/2037      EUR     29.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.900     7/3/2013      EUR     44.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.020    9/13/2016      EUR     37.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.225     3/1/2017      EUR     37.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900    4/20/2017      EUR     36.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    7/20/2017      EUR     35.83
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.675    10/9/2017      EUR     38.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    7/20/2018      EUR     35.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.000    7/19/2019      EUR     36.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500   10/22/2019      EUR     36.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.250    6/19/2020      EUR     37.46
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900   10/22/2022      EUR     29.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.700    3/20/2024      EUR     29.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.300    3/20/2026      EUR     29.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.600    7/20/2016      EUR     36.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700   11/10/2015      EUR     38.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.702    9/30/2015      EUR     37.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.100    8/20/2015      EUR     36.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700    7/20/2015      EUR     36.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.113    9/30/2014      EUR     36.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.500    8/20/2014      EUR     36.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.985    7/25/2014      EUR     35.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500     7/1/2014      EUR     36.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    9/20/2040      EUR     29.43
NATL BK GREECE             3.875    10/7/2016      EUR     56.16

GUERNSEY
--------
CALYON FIN GUER            6.000     9/4/2029      USD     71.04
CREDIT AGRICOLE            5.600    2/25/2030      USD     67.54

HUNGARY
-------
OTP BANK                   5.270    9/19/2016      EUR     74.86

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.580    4/28/2028      EUR     55.07
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000    2/12/2030      EUR     49.56
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           4.875    6/29/2017      EUR     73.53
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000     3/1/2030      EUR     49.52
ALLIED IRISH BKS          12.500    6/25/2035      GBP     67.75
ALLIED IRISH BKS           4.000    3/19/2015      EUR     74.22
ALLIED IRISH BKS           5.625   11/12/2014      EUR     72.63
ANGLO IRISH BANK           4.000    4/15/2015      EUR     73.78
BANESTO FINANC             5.000    3/23/2030      EUR     68.68
BANK OF IRELAND            5.600    9/18/2023      EUR     46.38
BANK OF IRELAND            4.473   11/30/2016      EUR     61.63
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      EUR     63.25
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      GBP     33.75
BANK OF IRELAND            3.585    4/21/2015      EUR     68.38
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.760     9/7/2029      EUR     51.98
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.400    11/6/2029      EUR     49.39
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.450     3/1/2030      EUR     49.02
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.360   10/12/2029      EUR     49.16
DEPFA ACS BANK             4.900    8/24/2035      CAD     67.06
DEPFA ACS BANK             3.250    7/31/2031      CHF     73.10
DEPFA ACS BANK             0.500     3/3/2025      CAD     39.79
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037      USD     69.25
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.000    2/25/2015      EUR     74.88
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.000    3/10/2015      EUR     73.04
ONO FINANCE II            11.125    7/15/2019      EUR     74.00
ONO FINANCE II            11.125    7/15/2019      EUR     73.79
UT2 FUNDING PLC            5.321    6/30/2016      EUR     60.38

ITALY
-----
BANCA MARCHE               4.360     1/4/2022      ITL     72.22
BANCA MARCHE               5.125    5/14/2024      ITL     72.00
BANCA MARCHE               4.000     7/9/2020      EUR     72.79
BANCA MARCHE               3.900    8/17/2020      EUR     71.93
BANCA MARCHE               3.700     9/1/2020      EUR     70.76
BANCA MARCHE               3.600   11/12/2020      EUR     69.49
BANCA MARCHE               4.000    1/10/2021      EUR     71.31
BANCA MARCHE               4.000    5/26/2021      EUR     70.46
BANCA MARCHE               5.500    9/16/2030      EUR     69.34
BANCA POP MILANO           3.500    6/30/2018      EUR     74.75
BANCA POP MILANO           4.000    4/23/2020      EUR     71.89
BANCA POP VICENT           4.970    4/20/2027      EUR     71.34
BANCO POPOLARE             6.375    5/31/2021      EUR     73.97
BTPS                       4.000     2/1/2037      EUR     70.41
BTPS I/L                   2.550    9/15/2041      EUR     63.17
BTPS I/L                   2.350    9/15/2035      EUR     63.56
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.000    4/15/2015      EUR     74.88
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.000     8/5/2015      EUR     72.88
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.000     9/2/2015      EUR     72.38
CASSA RISP FERRA           3.500     3/5/2016      EUR     67.13
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.000    11/2/2016      EUR     65.00
CASSA RISP FERRA           3.400    9/17/2017      EUR     59.38
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.575     2/2/2017      EUR     66.00
CASSA RISP FERRA           3.000    1/18/2015      EUR     73.50
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.500    11/2/2020      EUR     53.75
COMUNE DI MILANO           4.019    6/29/2035      EUR     73.62
DEXIA CREDIOP              4.790   12/17/2043      EUR     69.22
MONTE DEI PASCHI           5.750    9/30/2016      GBP     72.78
REP OF ITALY               2.000    9/15/2062      EUR     45.27
REP OF ITALY               4.850    6/11/2060      EUR     68.02
REP OF ITALY               2.200    9/15/2058      EUR     50.36
REP OF ITALY               1.850    9/15/2057      EUR     43.71
REP OF ITALY               2.870    5/19/2036      JPY     62.07
REP OF ITALY               4.490     4/5/2027      EUR     72.75
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     60.17
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     60.23
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     60.25
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     60.22
TELECOM ITALIA             5.250    3/17/2055      EUR     64.42
UGF ASSICURAZION           5.660    7/28/2023      EUR     66.88
UNICREDIT SPA              5.050    4/25/2022      EUR     74.81
UNICREDITO ITALI           5.000     2/1/2016      GBP     70.06

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL              7.250     4/1/2014      EUR     22.80
BEVERAGE PACK              9.500    6/15/2017      EUR     76.10
CONTROLINVESTE             3.000    1/28/2015      EUR     67.78
ESPIRITO SANTO F           6.875   10/21/2019      EUR     51.97
KION FINANCE               7.875    4/15/2018      EUR     75.13
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     14.46
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     14.83

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE          11.750    10/1/2005      USD      0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    4/27/2016      TRY     72.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/17/2016      TRY     72.84
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/25/2016      TRY     71.76
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2016      TRY     71.55
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    9/15/2016      TRY     70.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500     3/3/2021      NZD     64.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021      NZD     63.75
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR     43.86
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR     43.45
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    2/24/2025      CAD     60.45
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014      USD     35.38
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014      USD     34.25
BRIT INSURANCE             6.625    12/9/2030      GBP     54.94
CEMEX FIN EUROPE           4.750     3/5/2014      EUR     67.53
EDP FINANCE BV             4.125    6/29/2020      EUR     74.81
ELEC DE CAR FIN            8.500    4/10/2018      USD     56.38
FINANCE & CREDIT          10.500    1/25/2014      USD     50.00
FRIESLAND BANK             4.210   12/29/2025      EUR     68.49
INDAH KIAT INTL           12.500    6/15/2006      USD      0.01
ING BANK NV                4.200   12/19/2035      EUR     67.95
IVG FINANCE BV             1.750    3/29/2017      EUR     66.89
LEHMAN BROS TSY            4.870    10/8/2013      USD     33.00
MARFRIG HLDG EUR           8.375     5/9/2018      USD     72.50
NATL INVESTER BK          25.983     5/7/2029      EUR     19.39
NED WATERSCHAPBK           0.500    3/11/2025      CAD     59.84
NIB CAPITAL BANK           4.510   12/16/2035      EUR     62.08
POLYSINDO FIN              9.375    7/30/2007      USD      0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.500    6/16/2025      EUR     66.54
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           5.750    5/26/2014      EUR     16.39
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           1.375    2/28/2012      EUR     35.08
RBS NV EX-ABN NV           2.910    6/21/2036      JPY     72.97
SIDETUR FINANCE           10.000    4/20/2016      USD     68.13
SNS BANK                   6.625    5/14/2018      EUR     73.62
SNS BANK                   6.250   10/26/2020      EUR     58.52
SRLEV NV                   9.000    4/15/2041      EUR     66.15
TJIWI KIMIA FIN           13.250     8/1/2001      USD      0.00

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS              0.500     5/9/2030      CAD     46.75
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR     71.72
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR     74.83
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR     74.39
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR     73.32
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR     72.31
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016      TRY     70.01
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR     60.43
NORSKE SKOGIND             6.125   10/15/2015      USD     55.67
NORSKE SKOGIND             6.125   10/15/2015      USD     56.50
NORSKE SKOGIND            11.750    6/15/2016      EUR     54.50
NORSKE SKOGIND            11.750    6/15/2016      EUR     53.88
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.000    6/26/2017      EUR     44.49
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD     40.63
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD     40.63
RENEWABLE CORP             6.500     6/4/2014      EUR     56.36

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG           9.250   10/13/2014      EUR     71.00
BANCO COM PORTUG           5.625    4/23/2014      EUR     68.14
BANCO COM PORTUG           3.750    10/8/2016      EUR     65.22
BANCO COM PORTUG           4.750    6/22/2017      EUR     66.21
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    9/15/2016      EUR     67.76
BANCO ESPIRITO             6.875    7/15/2016      EUR     65.25
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    1/26/2017      EUR     65.78
BANCO ESPIRITO             3.375    2/17/2015      EUR     74.13
BANCO ESPIRITO             6.160    7/23/2015      EUR     70.63
BANCO ESPIRITO             3.875    1/21/2015      EUR     69.69
BRISA                      4.500    12/5/2016      EUR     73.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.500   11/13/2017      EUR     69.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.165     7/8/2016      EUR     67.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.570    8/12/2016      EUR     72.09
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.455    8/20/2017      EUR     60.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           3.875    12/6/2016      EUR     66.69
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.250    1/27/2020      EUR     63.89
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    2/14/2016      EUR     67.60
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    3/14/2016      EUR     69.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.090     6/8/2016      EUR     67.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.400    10/8/2019      EUR     59.28
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.320     8/5/2021      EUR     53.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.980     3/3/2028      EUR     52.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.380    10/1/2038      EUR     51.42
COMBOIOS DE PORT           4.170   10/16/2019      EUR     53.33
METRO DE LISBOA            4.799    12/7/2027      EUR     59.78
METRO DE LISBOA            4.061    12/4/2026      EUR     55.19
METRO DE LISBOA            7.300   12/23/2025      EUR     73.61
METRO DE LISBOA            5.750     2/4/2019      EUR     61.08
MONTEPIO GERAL             5.000     2/8/2017      EUR     61.00
PARPUBLICA                 4.191   10/15/2014      EUR     69.88
PARPUBLICA                 3.500     7/8/2013      EUR     78.25
PARPUBLICA                 4.200   11/16/2026      EUR     42.63
PARPUBLICA                 3.567    9/22/2020      EUR     45.87
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD     70.30
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD     70.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.375    6/16/2014      EUR     72.77
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.600   10/15/2014      EUR     70.26
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.350   10/15/2015      EUR     68.10
PORTUGUESE OT'S            6.400    2/15/2016      EUR     72.13
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.200   10/15/2016      EUR     63.66
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.450    6/15/2018      EUR     58.78
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.750    6/14/2019      EUR     57.82
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.800    6/15/2020      EUR     56.92
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.850    4/15/2021      EUR     54.63
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.950   10/25/2023      EUR     54.02
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.100    4/15/2037      EUR     49.42
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.350   10/16/2017      EUR     58.77
REFER                      4.000    3/16/2015      EUR     45.38
REFER                      5.875    2/18/2019      EUR     57.75
REFER                      4.047   11/16/2026      EUR     49.02
REFER                      4.250   12/13/2021      EUR     48.00
REFER                      4.675   10/16/2024      EUR     50.50

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA                17.500    5/23/2012      RUB      0.38
ARIZK                      3.000   12/20/2030      RUB     49.65
BELON-FINANS               0.010    2/23/2012      RUB     85.01
DVTG-FINANS               17.000    8/29/2013      RUB     55.55
DVTG-FINANS                7.750    7/18/2013      RUB     20.29
IART                       8.500     8/4/2013      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                     17.000    9/17/2012      RUB      5.00
MOSMART FINANS             0.010    4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
NOK                       12.500    8/26/2014      RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA           1.000   12/17/2012      RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE             9.000    6/12/2012      RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC                   7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     69.00
RBC OJSC                   7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     67.01
RBC OJSC                   3.270    4/19/2018      RUB     38.00
SAHO                      10.000    5/21/2012      RUB      3.00
SATURN                     8.500     6/6/2014      RUB      1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS           10.500    3/27/2012      RUB      3.40
TERNA-FINANS               1.000    11/4/2011      RUB      9.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750   12/14/2022      EUR     67.55
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.750    5/25/2027      EUR     68.76
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.250   10/25/2023      EUR     70.85
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750    6/30/2025      EUR     61.59
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.000    3/24/2021      EUR     74.83
BANCAJA                    1.500    5/22/2018      EUR     64.43
BANCO BILBAO VIZ           6.025     3/3/2033      EUR     59.46
BANCO BILBAO VIZ           4.500    2/16/2022      EUR     72.82
BBVA SUB CAP UNI           2.750   10/22/2035      JPY     45.82
CAJA CASTIL-MAN            1.500    6/23/2021      EUR     59.58
CAJA MADRID                4.125    3/24/2036      EUR     68.12
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           3.875    5/23/2025      EUR     62.05
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           4.250    4/10/2031      EUR     58.19
CEDULAS TDA A-4            4.125    4/10/2021      EUR     74.67
CEDULAS TDA A-5            4.250    3/28/2027      EUR     62.67
CEMEX ESPANA LUX           8.875    5/12/2017      EUR     63.34
CEMEX ESPANA LUX           9.250    5/12/2020      USD     69.50
CEMEX ESPANA LUX           8.875    5/12/2017      EUR     63.38
CEMEX ESPANA LUX           9.250    5/12/2020      USD     70.13
COMUN AUTO CANAR           4.200   10/25/2036      EUR     65.77
COMUN AUTO CANAR           3.900   11/30/2035      EUR     62.58
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           4.063   11/23/2035      EUR     63.90
COMUNIDAD MADRID           4.300    9/15/2026      EUR     73.42
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.690   10/28/2034      EUR     70.94
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.220    4/26/2035      EUR     65.37
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.750    3/24/2016      CHF     68.23
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.125    10/1/2014      CHF     76.16
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.315    9/10/2015      CHF     70.20
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.355   11/10/2015      CHF     69.20
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.965     9/8/2039      JPY     58.81
GENERAL DE ALQUI           2.750    8/20/2012      EUR     69.00
IM CEDULAS 5               3.500    6/15/2020      EUR     72.42
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           2.570   10/22/2021      CHF     68.82
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           3.250    6/28/2024      CHF     68.16
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            3.065    7/29/2039      JPY     61.76
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            4.250   10/31/2036      EUR     64.37
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            3.170    7/29/2039      JPY     63.75
JUNTA LA MANCHA            3.875    1/31/2036      EUR     55.00
MAPFRE SA                  5.921    7/24/2037      EUR     64.35
SPANISH GOV'T              4.200    1/31/2037      EUR     74.33
XUNTA DE GALICIA           4.025   11/28/2035      EUR     73.96

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/17/2027      USD     56.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.000    12/7/2011      USD     10.16
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    1/25/2028      USD     56.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR     74.85
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.130    1/10/2012      USD      9.59
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR     73.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED           6.500    1/27/2012      USD      6.94
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR     71.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/29/2016      TRY     69.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/25/2016      ZAR     70.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    1/27/2012      USD      4.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/26/2016      ZAR     70.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/29/2015      TRY     73.79
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    2/28/2012      USD      7.85
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD     10.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD      9.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.750    3/23/2012      USD      8.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.250    4/27/2012      USD      8.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/20/2016      ZAR     70.14
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000   10/21/2011      USD      9.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/30/2016      ZAR     69.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/5/2018      AUD     74.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    6/12/2012      USD      7.06
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/26/2021      AUD     61.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    11/4/2011      USD      7.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/25/2021      ZAR     43.44

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CRED SUIS NY               9.000   10/12/2012      USD     22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH              2.875    2/20/2012      CHF     61.06
UBS AG                     9.640   11/14/2011      USD     10.55
UBS AG                    10.530    1/23/2012      USD     36.29
UBS AG                     8.380    3/20/2012      USD     32.03
UBS AG                     8.720    3/20/2012      USD     26.79
UBS AG                     9.250    3/20/2012      USD     11.34
UBS AG                    10.070    3/23/2012      USD     27.66
UBS AG                    12.350    3/27/2012      USD     23.65
UBS AG                    13.300    5/23/2012      USD      2.76
UBS AG                    13.700    5/23/2012      USD     11.14
UBS AG                    14.000    5/23/2012      USD      7.00
UBS AG                    10.960    7/20/2012      USD     22.93
UBS AG                    11.760    7/31/2012      USD     25.45
UBS AG                    12.040    7/31/2012      USD     34.60
UBS AG                     9.500    8/10/2012      USD     27.82
UBS AG                    11.960    8/14/2012      USD     35.49
UBS AG                    15.240    8/23/2012      USD     27.47
UBS AG                    10.910     9/7/2012      USD     41.08
UBS AG                    10.200    10/1/2012      USD     71.89
UBS AG                    10.500   10/15/2012      USD     67.33
UBS AG                    10.000    8/23/2013      USD     14.14
UBS AG JERSEY             10.140   12/30/2011      USD     14.50
UBS AG JERSEY              3.220    7/31/2012      EUR     38.38

UKRAINE
-------
LVIV CITY                  9.950   12/19/2012      UAH     91.06

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS           5.000    8/26/2030      USD     60.48
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.000   11/16/2012      EUR     67.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           6.000    6/20/2014      EUR     52.25
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           3.250    2/25/2013      EUR     61.13
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           5.500    6/20/2013      EUR     61.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.500    6/21/2013      EUR     57.25
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.400    2/12/2013      EUR     64.25
BAKKAVOR FIN 2             8.250    2/15/2018      GBP     71.60
BAKKAVOR FIN 2             8.250    2/15/2018      GBP     71.50
BANK NADRA                 8.000    6/22/2017      USD     73.69
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.408     2/9/2027      JPY     58.13
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.359    3/27/2029      JPY     53.59
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.000    2/22/2021      JPY     71.40
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.189    3/12/2022      JPY     67.87
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.340   12/28/2026      JPY     57.70
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.250    8/29/2031      USD     72.82
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    9/28/2012      USD      9.76
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    9/11/2012      USD      9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    9/11/2012      USD     10.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.500    8/31/2012      USD     18.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    8/31/2012      USD     31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000    8/28/2012      USD      9.27
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.400    7/31/2012      USD      9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC           11.000    7/27/2012      USD      7.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC            7.000    7/27/2012      USD      9.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.000    7/20/2012      USD      7.62
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    6/29/2012      USD      9.25
BARCLAYS BK PLC           13.050    4/27/2012      USD     25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC           12.950    4/20/2012      USD     23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.950    4/20/2012      USD     16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.650    1/31/2012      USD     34.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    1/31/2012      USD      9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.350    1/23/2012      USD     26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.550    1/23/2012      USD     10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.000     6/3/2041      USD     68.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC            6.330    9/23/2032      GBP     73.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.800    7/31/2012      USD     25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.200    8/29/2031      USD     73.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.230    8/26/2031      USD     73.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.200    8/25/2031      USD     73.43
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.100    5/26/2031      USD     74.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.750    9/14/2026      GBP     73.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000   10/16/2012      USD      9.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.500   10/16/2012      USD      9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC           14.000    10/1/2012      USD      9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000    10/1/2012      USD      9.47
BEAZLEY GROUP LT           7.250   10/17/2026      GBP     73.57
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           4.910     2/1/2047      EUR     73.33
CEVA GROUP PLC            10.000    6/30/2018      EUR     59.25
CEVA GROUP PLC             8.500    6/30/2018      EUR     57.00
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.875    3/28/2033      GBP     68.75
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.750    12/2/2024      GBP     70.66
CONSORT HEALTH             2.068    6/19/2042      GBP     71.82
DISCOVERY EDUCAT           1.948    3/31/2037      GBP     71.92
EFG HELLAS PLC             4.375    2/11/2013      EUR     59.30
EFG HELLAS PLC             5.400    11/2/2047      EUR     10.25
EFG HELLAS PLC             6.010     1/9/2036      EUR     32.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           5.000    12/2/2021      EUR     21.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.350    7/22/2014      EUR     36.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013      EUR     55.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           5.000    12/2/2021      EUR     21.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           5.100    12/9/2021      EUR     21.13
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.375    9/26/2031      GBP     62.17
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.875     5/9/2025      GBP     62.89
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.875    2/15/2021      GBP     66.21
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.500    12/6/2018      GBP     70.10
ESSAR ENERGY               4.250     2/1/2016      USD     65.33
EX-IM BK OF UKRA           5.793     2/9/2016      USD     72.00
F&C ASSET MNGMT            6.750   12/20/2026      GBP     62.95
GALA ELECTRIC CA          11.500     6/1/2019      GBP     68.27
GALA ELECTRIC CA          11.500     6/1/2019      GBP     68.38
HBOS PLC                   4.500    3/18/2030      EUR     62.11
HBOS PLC                   5.374    6/30/2021      EUR     69.43
HBOS PLC                   4.375   10/30/2019      EUR     72.02
INEOS GRP HLDG             7.875    2/15/2016      EUR     70.90
INEOS GRP HLDG             7.875    2/15/2016      EUR     69.97
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.975    9/15/2024      GBP     70.21
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.375    3/12/2020      EUR     73.42
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           6.439    5/23/2020      EUR     71.24
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           6.385    5/12/2020      EUR     71.37
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           8.500     6/7/2032      GBP     69.29
LLOYDS TSB BANK            5.750     7/9/2025      GBP     73.52
LOUIS NO1 PLC              8.500    12/1/2014      EUR     68.00
LOUIS NO1 PLC             10.000    12/1/2016      EUR     62.30
LOUIS NO1 PLC             10.000    12/1/2016      EUR     62.38
MATALAN                    9.625    3/31/2017      GBP     51.38
MATALAN                    9.625    3/31/2017      GBP     51.66
MAX PETROLEUM              6.750     9/8/2013      USD     53.93
NATIONWIDE BLDG            5.600    8/19/2030      USD     69.53
NEW HOSPITALS ST           1.777    2/26/2047      GBP     55.45
NOMURA BANK INTL           0.800   12/21/2020      EUR     65.39
NORTH HOUSING              8.750    5/11/2037      GBP    140.08
NORTHERN ROCK              4.574    1/13/2015      GBP     69.00
NORTHERN ROCK              5.750    2/28/2017      GBP     54.88
OTE PLC                    7.250     4/8/2014      EUR     72.41
OTE PLC                    4.625    5/20/2016      EUR     63.55
PIRAEUS GRP FIN            4.000    9/17/2012      EUR     63.34
PRIVATBANK                 5.799     2/9/2016      USD     65.01
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.350    1/23/2017      EUR     72.55
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           5.168    6/29/2030      EUR     50.07
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.625    9/22/2021      EUR     60.95
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.100    8/11/2023      EUR     73.44
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           2.300   11/26/2024      JPY     64.85
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.692     6/9/2025      EUR     67.22
THOMAS COOK GR             7.750    6/22/2017      GBP     73.84
TUI TRAVEL PLC             4.900    4/27/2017      GBP     72.61
TXU EASTERN FNDG           6.450    5/15/2005      USD      0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN             6.542    3/30/2021      GBP     69.17
UNIQUE PUB FIN             5.659    6/30/2027      GBP     61.33


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *