TCREUR_Public/111028.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, October 28, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 214

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

BDZ: Sells 515 Freight Railway Cars for BGN3.5 Million


D E N M A R K

* DENMARK: Prepares Bill to Clamp Down Banks


G R E E C E

* GREECE: EU Persuades Bondholders to Take 50% Losses on Debt


I R E L A N D

DRYDEN IX: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba1'


L U X E M B O U R G

APERAM SA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC NL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB- (sf)'
HYDE PARK: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
UPC FINANCING: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Rating to $500MM Facility


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: Quarter of State-Owned Companies Practically Bankrupt


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Delays Payment of Wages for Fourth Time
SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Terminates Funding Deals With Youngman, Pang Da


T U R K E Y

YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Negative


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLINTON CARDS: Swings to GBP10.7 Million Loss in FY2011
EUROPEAN HOME: Investor in Farepak Scheme Remains Unpaid
HARLOW TOWN FC: Owner Reassures Supporters Over Closure Threat
LUMINAR GROUP: Goes Into Administration, Shares Suspended
SEAFRANCE: Court Defers Decision Over Rescue Options


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Banks Need to Raise EUR106BB in Fresh Capital, EBA Says
* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds




                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


BDZ: Sells 515 Freight Railway Cars for BGN3.5 Million
------------------------------------------------------
BDZ has made a meager BGN3.5 million by selling a total of 515
freight railway cars, Novinite.com reports.

According to Novinite.com, Vladimir Vladimirov, head of BDZ's
board, said the management completed the deal for the sale of the
cars Monday.  Mr. Vladimirov stressed that the management has
developed a package of measures to save the technically bankrupt
company whose mounting debts have reached BGN771 million and keep
growing, Novinite.com.

Novinite.com says the reform package is to be presented to Finance
Minister Simeon Djankov, who recently froze the Bulgarian
government's talks with the World Bank for a badly needed loan of
BGN600 million for the railway sector in Bulgaria, including
BGN460 million for BDZ and BGN160 million for National Company
"State Infrastructure".

Mr. Djankov's major argument was that he would not pour a single
BGN until he sees actual reform in the state company, Novinite.com
notes.

BDZ is Bulgaria's state railway company.


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


* DENMARK: Prepares Bill to Clamp Down Banks
--------------------------------------------
Tasneem Brogger at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark is
preparing a bill designed to clamp down on banks that fail to
reveal the risks lurking on their balance sheets.

According to Bloomberg, Economy Minister Ole Sohn said in a
statement on his ministry's Web site on Wednesday that the
proposal will be presented before Christmas.

The announcement follows a report by the auditor general that
criticized the Financial Supervisory Authority for underestimating
the risky assets held by Amagerbanken A/S before the lender's
February failure, Bloomberg relates.  The collapse triggered the
European Union's first senior creditor losses within a resolution
framework and left most of Denmark's banks cut off from
international funding markets, Bloomberg notes.

"It's a criticism we're taking very seriously.  That's why we're
looking into tightening reporting rules in future," FSA Director
General Ulrik Noedgaard told broadcaster TV2.  "It's clear there
are challenges associated with the situation we have now and that
can lead to bank closures."

Mr. Sohn said that taxpayers won't have to foot the bill for the
error, Bloomberg notes.  The auditor general also found that the
FSA arrived at a different conclusion as to the scope of
Amagerbanken's risky operations from the state winding-up unit,
the Financial Stability Company, Bloomberg discloses.

"I have noted that the auditor finds it unfortunate that the FSA
and the Financial Stability Company had different views on
Amagerbanken," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Sohn as saying.

Both units are independent and regulated by their own laws,
meaning the ministry isn't in a position to give them
instructions, Mr. Sohn, as cited by Bloomberg, said, adding he
will investigate whether more can be done in future to avoid a
similar situation.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


* GREECE: EU Persuades Bondholders to Take 50% Losses on Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
James G. Neuger and Stephanie Bodoni at Bloomberg News report that
European leaders persuaded bondholders to take 50% losses on Greek
debt and boosted the firepower of the rescue fund to
EUR1 trillion (US$1.4 trillion), responding to global pressure to
step up the fight against the financial crisis.

Last-ditch talks with bank representatives led to the debt-relief
accord, in an effort to quarantine Greece and prevent speculation
against Italy and France from ravaging the euro zone and wreaking
global economic havoc, Bloomberg relates.

Measures include recapitalization of European banks, a potentially
bigger role for the International Monetary Fund, a commitment from
Italy to do more to reduce its debt and a signal from leaders that
the European Central Bank will maintain bond purchases in the
secondary market, Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg relates that ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet said the
steps "have to be fully implemented, as rapidly and effectively as
possible."


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


DRYDEN IX: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Dryden IX Senior Loan Fund 2005:

   -- US$262.5M Class A-1 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR115.1M Class A-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- US$34.1M Class B-1 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR3.4M Class B-2 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR2.7M Class B-3 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- US$74.15M (Current Notional Amount US$25,438,188) Dollar
      Fund Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR30.3M (Current Notional Amount EUR10,394,836) Euro Fund
      Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M (Current Notional Amount EUR0m) Lower Levered Fund
      Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Dollar Fund Note and the Euro Fund Note address
the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal final
maturity. The 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Fund Note on the Issue Date minus the
aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date,
either through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance
may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The rating of the Lowered Levered Fund note has been withdrawn as
the note has been fully unwound.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Dryden IX Senior Loan Fund 2005, issued in October 2005, is a
multi-currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly US Senior Secured loans. The portfolio is
managed by Pramerica Investment Management and will be in
reinvestment period until September 2012.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in January 2010.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the
modelling assumptions include standardizing the modelling of
collateral amortization profile.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
the rating action in Jan 2010. The Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 133.66%, and 121.38%,
respectively, versus November 2009 levels of 127.00%, and 115.50%,
respectively. All overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a stronger
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated September 2011,
the WARF is currently 2553 compared to 2688 in the Nov 2009
report, and securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately
7.84% of the underlying portfolio versus 13.91% in November 2009.
In addition, the reported WARF understates the actual improvement
in credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on
September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of US$358 million,
defaulted par of US$6.68 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.22% (consistent with a WARF of 2560), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.07% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 67 and a weighted average
spread of 2.75%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 91% of the portfolio
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent
with the midpoint between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 25% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction maturity such
an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the nature of the
asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
that of the liabilities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


APERAM SA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Luxembourg-based stainless steel producer Aperam S.A. to negative
from stable. At the same time, the 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating on the company was affirmed.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that Aperam's financial
flexibility is currently limited. It also reflects increased
uncertainties regarding the global economic environment that may
put further pressure on Aperam's financial metrics in 2012. In
particular, we believe that financial metrics would likely
deteriorate below the levels we consider commensurate with the
current rating in the event of an economic recession in Europe. We
currently estimate the probability of a new recession in Western
Europe next year at about 40% (see 'The Specter Of A Double Dip In
Europe Looms Larger," published Oct. 4, 2011).

The rating on Aperam reflects our expectation that, in the context
of slow economic growth in Europe assumed in our base-case
scenario, stainless steel industry conditions in 2012 will not
deteriorate substantially below 2010 and mid-year 2011 levels.
"Consequently, we anticipate that in such an economic climate,
Aperam's fully Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from operations
(FFO) to debt will remain at about 20%--in line with the lower end
of the 20%-30% range we consider commensurate with the current
rating," S&P related.

"The negative outlook reflects our view of the increased
likelihood of a weak stainless steel industry environment in 2012
that could weigh on Aperam's credit metrics," S&P said.

"In particular, we anticipate that in a double-dip recession
scenario, Aperam's EBITDA will decline to about US$300 million or
below in 2012. This is still substantially above the US$120
million achieved in 2009, because we base our estimate on current
low inventory levels compared with mid-2008, and on the
anticipated effect of management's rationalization efforts. In
this scenario, fully adjusted FFO to debt will deteriorate to 10%-
15% in 2012, despite expected working capital inflows and
management's potential initiatives to further cut costs and capex,
which is below the levels commensurate with the current rating,"
S&P related.

"We could revise the outlook back to stable if the industry
environment remains supportive in 2012 and the company maintains
FFO to debt within the 20%-30% range. This would also depend on
the profitability of Aperam's Brazilian operations, which have
declined in 2010-2011, as well as the effectiveness of
management's rationalization plan," S&P said.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC NL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB- (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------Standard
& Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on the class
D and E notes in E-MAC NL 2006-II B.V. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A, B and C notes," S&P related.

"The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that we have received,"
S&P said.

                        Credit Analysis

"Our credit analysis incorporates our standard Dutch criteria (see
'Dutch RMBS Market Overview And Criteria,' published on Dec 16,
2005)," S&P related.

"In addition, we also incorporate credit stability as an important
factor in our rating opinions. We consider whether we believe that
an issuer or security has a high likelihood of experiencing
unusually large adverse changes in credit quality under conditions
of moderate stress (see 'Methodology: Credit Stability Criteria,'
published on May 3, 2010)," S&P said.

"For Dutch transactions, we adjust our weighted-average loss
severities (WALS) by applying a 5% decrease in house prices and
giving full credit to the house price index (HPI). If there has
been an upward trend in arrears, we adjust our weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) by projecting arrears based on
historical data," S&P related.

"We have projected an additional 0.82% of 120+ day arrears, as we
have seen an upward trend in long-term arrears over the past
year," S&P said.

This transaction is structured such that the reserve fund can
amortize if there is no debit balance on the principal deficiency
ledgers.

The reserve fund started amortizing in July 2009; it is currently
at EUR1,787,387 and will continue amortizing to a floor of
EUR1,100,000.

"Our WAFF and WALS for the pool have increased for each rating
level since closing, due to an increase in the calculated
weighted-average loan-to-foreclosure value (WALTFV) to 79.52%, and
an increase in arrears to 1.02%," S&P said.

The available credit enhancement for the class D notes does not
mitigate the increase in required credit coverage as these notes
only benefit from credit enhancement provided by the amortizing
reserve fund. "We have therefore lowered to 'BB (sf)' our rating
on this class of notes as they are unable to maintain their
current ratings under our cash flow scenarios," S&P related.

The class E notes are excess spread notes, and are currently
paying down in line with the amortization of the reserve fund. The
transaction is structured such that if 90+ day arrears increase
above 2%, then the reserve fund would need to be topped up to
EUR7,425,000 before any excess spread could be used to pay down
the class E principal. "These notes are unable to maintain their
current rating under our cash flow stresses due to this trigger
being breached. Therefore, we have lowered our rating on the class
E notes to 'BB- (sf)'," S&P stated.

"In our view, the credit enhancement available for the class A, B,
and C notes mitigates the subsequent increase in required credit
coverage. Also, these notes pass our cash flow stresses at their
current rating levels. Therefore, we have affirmed our ratings on
the class A, B, and C notes," S&P related.

                       Counterparty Criteria

"We do not consider the bank agreements for E-MAC NL 2006-II to be
in line with our 2010 counterparty criteria as they do not include
an absolute commitment from the counterparty that it will replace
itself following a downgrade below our minimum required rating.
Therefore, under our criteria, the highest potential rating on the
notes in this transaction is equal to the issuer credit rating on
the bank account provider, The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V.
(A+/Stable/A-1) (see 'Ratings List Resolving European Structured
Finance Counterparty CreditWatch Placements - June 17, 2011
Review')," S&P related.

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                  From

E-MAC NL 2006-II B.V.
EUR456.131 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

D           BB (sf)             BBB (sf)
E           BB- (sf)            BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A           A+ (sf)
B           A+ (sf)
C           A (sf)


HYDE PARK: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Hyde Park CDO B.V.:

EUR29.5M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR14M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2022,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR42.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR20M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR11.5M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR21.9M Class T Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class T,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Hyde Park CDO B.V., issued in February 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European Leveraged loans. The portfolio is
managed by Blackstone Debt Advisors L.P. This transaction will be
in reinvestment period until June 14, 2012.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include 2 changing certain credit estimate stresses
aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking indicators as well
as time lags in receiving information required for credit estimate
updates if there are combos:, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Reported WARF has increased from 2679 to 2960 between June 2009
and September 2011.

The change in reported WARF masks the actual credit quality
stability because of the technical transition related to rating
factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in
the press release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. In
addition, securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 7.0%
of the underlying portfolio versus 7.1% in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR469.5 million,
defaulted par of EUR8.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.5% (consistent with a WARF of 2911), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.2% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 36 and a weighted average
spread of 3.19%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90.67% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent
with the midpoint between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance
may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment strategy and
behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 55.1% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. The risks and stresses
associated with the usage of credit estimates are described in a
report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009."

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor
and diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
the large difference between the reported and covenant levels and
also considered alternative sensitivity runs with a higher
diversity score than the covenant of 36 due to the difference with
the current diversity score of 41.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


UPC FINANCING: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Rating to $500MM Facility
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P) Ba3
rating to the USD500 million additional term loan facility AB due
in December 2017 being issued by UPC Financing Partnership. The
rating outlook is stable.

UPC Financing is an entity indirectly wholly-owned by UPC Holding
B.V. ('UPC'; CFR at Ba3/ Stable) and is an established borrower
under the UPC Bank Facility together with UPC Broadband Holding
B.V. ('UPC Broadband').

The proceeds of the new loan will be used to repay some of the
outstanding revolver drawings under the UPC Bank Facility.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The (P) Ba3 rating on the new term loan ('Facility AB') is in line
with the rating for the UPC bank facilities (rated Ba3) reflecting
the pari-passu status of this loan with the existing senior
secured bank facilities for UPC.

Facility AB will be documented in the Additional Facility
Accession Agreement which will set out the conditions precedent to
drawing and pursuant to which lenders will accede to the existing
UPC Broadband bank facility agreement. Thus facility AB will
benefit from the same security package and guarantees as the
existing bank debt facilities.

The current Ba3 corporate family rating reflects (i) UPC's
significant scale of operations and its geographical
diversification across European markets; (ii) its good operating
performance in Western Europe; and (iii) UPC's continued adherence
to its publicly stated financial policy of not exceeding 5.0x
Total Debt to EBITDA as enshrined in the terms and conditions of
its existing debt instruments.

However, the rating also takes into account the strong competition
in its countries of operations (notably in the CEE region).
Moody's ratings incorporate the fact that UPC is fully controlled
by Liberty Global Inc. (CFR at Ba3) and pursues a strategy whereby
it aims to keep the leverage close to its stated leverage
parameters thereby continuing to maintain tight headroom under its
financial covenants.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary credit
opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review
of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign a
definitive rating to the loan. A definitive rating may differ from
a provisional rating.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
should continue to at least maintain revenue and EBITDA while
managing towards the stated leverage target and, as a result, its
leverage should not increase materially above 5.0x Gross Debt to
EBITDA (as defined by Moody's).

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Positive ratings development would most likely result from
leverage decreasing and remaining solidly below 4.5x and moving
towards 4x on a Gross Debt to EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's)
basis on the back of strong operating performance.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Sustained weak operating performance in conjunction with an
increase in Gross Debt to EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) towards
5.5x could result in downward pressure. Furthermore weak liquidity
would put a downward pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in rating UPC Financing was the
Global Cable Television Industry Methodology published in
July 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

UPC is a pan-European cable provider, a principal subsidiary of
Liberty Global Inc. In 2010, the company generated EUR3.7 billion
in revenue and EUR1.8 billion in reported operating cash flow.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* ROMANIA: Quarter of State-Owned Companies Practically Bankrupt
----------------------------------------------------------------
According to Ziarul Financiar, a World Bank study revealed that a
quarter of Romania's 760 state-owned enterprises, like RADET, CFR
or Oltchim, are unprofitable, with nonviable assets and de facto
bankrupt, meaning almost 100,000 employees would be left jobless
if these companies were to close.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Delays Payment of Wages for Fourth Time
--------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that Saab Automobile
delayed paying monthly wages for a fourth time this year while
management negotiates a possible deal with two Chinese companies.

According to Bloomberg, spokesman Eric Geers said that Saab was
supposed to pay its 1,500 factory workers on Tuesday.  Saab has
received payments from the Swedish government to cover salaries
through Oct. 21, while the company must cover the rest of the
month itself, Bloomberg discloses.

"The only thing we know right now is that the salaries should have
been paid [Tues]day," Bloomberg quotes Darko Davidovic, counsel at
the IF Metall workers union, adding that the monthly salaries
including taxes to his members amount to about SEK40 million
(US$6.1 million.)

Mr. Geers, as cited by Bloomberg, said Saab management was set to
meet with Pang Da Automobile Trade Co. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus
Automobile Co. in Stockholm on Wednesday to continue investment
negotiations.

Bloomberg notes that Pang Qinghua, chairman of Pang Da, China's
biggest auto dealer by market value, said in an interview Oct. 24
that the parties "continue to look at new proposals."

On Oct. 26, 2011, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, related that Swedish Automobile NV said it has
given notice to terminate an agreement to sell a majority stake in
Saab to the two Chinese companies and rejected their offers to buy
all of the European carmaker.  Swedish Auto said in a statement on
Oct. 24 Pang Da and Youngman had "failed to confirm their
commitment" to the agreement and provide bridge funding.
According to Bloomberg, the Zeewolde, Netherlands-based carmaker
also found subsequent conditional offers from the two companies on
Oct. 19 and Oct. 22 to buy all of Saab "unacceptable," though
discussions are continuing.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 24,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Saab, which has produced few
cars since it first halted production in March because of a lack
of money, staved off bankruptcy after a Swedish court on Sept. 21
granted the carmaker's request for protection from creditors,
Bloomberg disclosed.  The court had been scheduled to meet
Oct. 31 to decide whether the reorganization can carry on,
Bloomberg noted.  For the reorganization to continue, the court
must see that Saab has cash to pay for immediate expenses,
Bloomberg stated.  The company said on Oct. 20 that it received a
US$70 million funding pledge from North Street Capital LP, a
Greenwich, Connecticut-based private equity firm, Bloomberg
recounted.  Those funds, which consist of a loan and share sale,
were aimed at ensuring the continuity of the reorganization,
Bloomberg said.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 21.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Terminates Funding Deals With Youngman, Pang Da
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Saab Automobile AB
inched closer to bankruptcy after it said it had terminated rescue
funding agreements with Chinese auto makers Youngman Lotus
Automobile Co. and Pang Da Automobile Trade Co., though the three
companies remained in talks.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 21.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B1 ratings of Yuksel
Insaat A.S. and changed the outlook on the ratings to negative
from stable. The following ratings were affected: B1 Corporate
Family Rating and Probability of Default Rating and the B1 rating
for the US$200 million senior notes due in 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change of Yuksel's rating outlook to negative reflects Moody's
concerns over Yuksel's weakening liquidity profile and operational
performance in the first half of 2011. "The change of outlook to
negative follows the deterioration of Yuksel's liquidity profile
and tighter covenant headroom of 5% as of
June 2011 under its debt to EBITDA incurrence covenant of 4 times,
which could limit Yuksel's future financing options," says Martin
Kohlhase, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for Yuksel.

"The change of outlook also reflects the more challenging
operating environment with a loss of revenue stemming from Libya
as well as related losses and unpaid receivables. This increases
the pressure to find alternative revenue sources from projects in
other countries where Yuksel has previously not been active,"
added Mr. Kohlhase.

Yuksel's B1 ratings are underpinned by the company's segment
diversity and high order backlog. Moody's understands that
management is currently pursuing a number of options to strengthen
its liquidity profile by largely pursuing small-scale asset
disposals. If these disposals are executed in a timely manner,
these proceeds could support Yuksel's equity contribution for the
Gebze Highway for which Yuksel has to make payments unless it
chooses to back out of the project. In the absence of steps to
reverse the downward trend Moody's sees a higher probability for a
downgrade. The ratings remain constrained by the moderate size of
the company compared to global peers and weak financial metrics
following foregone revenues of ca. US$170 million in Libya with
potential that lead to a decrease in profitability and cash flow.

Despite the weakened operational and financial performance, the
current ratings assume Yuksel will successfully stem its revenue
losses by winning new contracts as well as maintaining covenant
headroom. Should Yuksel not be able to shore up its liquidity
position to maintain funding options this could result in a
downgrade of the ratings.

The principal methodology used in rating Yuksel Insaat A.S. was
the Global Construction Methodology published in November 2010.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Yuksel Insaat A.S. (Yuksel), with corporate headquarters in
Ankara/Turkey, is among the ten largest construction companies in
Turkey. Established in 1963 by the Sazak and Sert families, Yuksel
has grown its revenue base from US$104 million in 2001 to US$875
million in 2010. The company still has a strong foothold in Turkey
where more than half of its revenues have been generated, but has
expanded into the MENA region as well as Central Asia over the
past years to diversify its revenue streams. More than two thirds
of Yuksel's completed contracts were related to buildings,
transportation and power, dam and industrial projects.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CLINTON CARDS: Swings to GBP10.7 Million Loss in FY2011
-------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that struggling retailer Clinton Cards has said
falling consumer confidence pushed it to a GBP10.7 million loss in
the year to July 31.  The loss compares with a pre-tax profit of
GBP11.97 million in the previous year, the report says.

BBC News relates that the company said like-for-like sales were
down 2.9% and revenue down 8% to GBP364 million.

The company said it had extended its credit facility with its
banks through to 2013, BBC News reports.

Clinton cards put its Birthdays Ireland business into liquidation
in March, the report notes.

Clinton Cards is a greetings card retailer.  The company owns 596
Clinton Cards shops and 127 Birthdays shops.


EUROPEAN HOME: Investor in Farepak Scheme Remains Unpaid
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Jackie Southby, who lost almost GBP8,500
when Christmas savings scheme Farepak went bust, has still not
received any compensation five years on.  Farepak is owned by
European Home Retail (EHR).

Ms. Southby is one of nearly 120,000 people who are owed GBP38
million in total after the firm went into administration,
according to BBC News.

The report recalls that the Christmas savings club first had
problems in June 2006 when it looked for extra funding, and went
into administration four months later.  BBC News relates that in
April 2010 a final financial offer of 15p in the pound was made to
customers following a settlement between the liquidators -- BDO
Stoy Hayward -- and Farepak's directors.

Customers of Farepak paid money monthly to the company as a
practical way to put cash aside for Christmas -- receiving hampers
and vouchers to use in shops, BBC News notes.

The report says that an unnamed spokeswoman for the liquidators
said the liquidation committee had concluded that it was "in the
creditors' interests" for them to continue to identify "whether
there are opportunities to secure further monies from other
parties" for the benefit of creditors.  The liquidation committee
was set up as directed by a court order and approved by Farepak's
customers and creditors, and represented all those who lost money
as a result of the collapse of Farepak, she added, BBC News
relays.


HARLOW TOWN FC: Owner Reassures Supporters Over Closure Threat
--------------------------------------------------------------
Harlow Star reports that Harlow Town Football Club co-owner Tommy
Cunningham has moved to reassure supporters that the club will not
be pushed into administration despite being threatened with
closure over unpaid tax bills.

Her Majesty Revenue & Customs has filed a petition to wind up the
business for failing to pay outstanding debts, according to Harlow
Star.  The club is set to present its case at the High Court on
November 14.

Harlow Star discloses that if it succeeds in convincing the judge
to issue a winding-up order, the club could fold unless the money
owed is paid up in full or a new buyer is found.

Mr. Cunningham told Harlow Star in an interview that the matter
was "in hand" and would be resolved.

"Since we've taken over we've had to deal with a lot of problems
and have worked extremely hard to bring stability and success to
the club . . . . This is just another issue that needs resolving.
. . . .I want to assure our loyal supporters that we have the
matter in hand and it will be dealt with. . . . There's absolutely
no need for anyone to worry about the club going into
administration because we will quite simply not let that happen,"
the report quoted Mr. Cunningham as saying.

                      About Harlow Town F.C.

Harlow Town Football Club is an English football club based in
Harlow, Essex.  The club currently plays in the Division One North
of the Isthmian League, after relegation from the Isthmian League
Premier Division in 2009.


LUMINAR GROUP: Goes Into Administration, Shares Suspended
---------------------------------------------------------
MK News reports that Luminar Group Holdings PLC has gone into
administration, saying it cannot meet its banking obligations.

Luminar Group said it could not pay back debts to Lloyds TSB Bank,
Barclays Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland which due to be
repaid on Oct. 26, according to MK News.  The report relates that
the company's shares were temporarily suspended from trading when
the news was announced.

"The Directors of Luminar have no option but to take steps to
place the Company and certain of its subsidiaries into
administration and to request the UKLA to suspend trading in
Luminar's shares with immediate effect," the company said in a
statement obtained by the news agency.

Luminar Group Holding PLC owns the Oceana chain as well as Liquid
and the Lava and Ignite brand.  It is Britain's biggest nightclub
owner with 76 outlets in United Kingdom.


SEAFRANCE: Court Defers Decision Over Rescue Options
----------------------------------------------------
Kent Online reports that SeaFrance workers will have to wait until
November 16 to find out their fate after the court deferred
decision to fully explore all options for the company.

According to the report, crunch talks to decide the future of the
ferry firm in Paris on Monday lasted a gruelling five hours.  But
none of the options tabled to rescue the stricken company --
including a buy-out and liquidation -- was ruled out.

SeaFrance has been in administration since last year and now the
EU has decided a financial rescue package from French firm SNCF
can't go ahead, the report notes.

SeaFrance is a cross-Channel ferry operator.  The company went
into receivership in 2010.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Banks Need to Raise EUR106BB in Fresh Capital, EBA Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Moshinsky and Jim Brunsden at Bloomberg News report that the
European Banking Authority said Europe's banks will need to raise
EUR106 billion (US$147 billion) in fresh capital under tougher
rules being introduced in response to the euro area's sovereign
debt crisis.

The EBA said on Wednesday that seventy banks were tested, with
Spanish banks needing EUR26.2 billion and Italian banks EUR14.8
billion in core tier 1 capital, Bloomberg relates.  The lenders
have until Dec. 25 to submit their plans for raising the money to
national supervisors, Bloomberg notes.  The extra reserves are
needed to meet a temporary requirement for lenders to hold 9% in
core reserves, after sovereign debt writedowns, Bloomberg states.

"The building of these buffers will allow banks to withstand a
range of shocks while still being able to maintain an adequate
capital level," Bloomberg quotes the EBA as saying in a statement
on its Web site.

The EBA recommended banks withhold bonuses and dividends and go to
private markets before seeking government funds to cover any
shortfall, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, the agency said that lenders' reserves
will be measured using a definition of core tier 1 capital that is
"largely the same" as that applied by the EBA in this year's round
of stress tests on European Union banks.  The agency, as cited by
Bloomberg, said that the 70 lenders will be required to reach the
9% capital threshold by the end of June 2012.


* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds
----------------------------------------------------
Edited by Greg N. Gregoriou, Fabrice Rouah, and Komlan Sedzro
Publisher: Beard Books
Hardcover: 203 pages
Listprice: $59.95
Review by Henry Berry

Hedge funds can be traced back to 1949 when Alfred Winslow Jones
formed the first one to "hedge" his investments in the stock
market by betting that some stocks would go up and others down.
However, it has only been within the past decade that hedge funds
have exploded in growth.  The rise of global markets and the
uncertainties that have arisen from the valuation of different
currencies have given a boost to hedge funds.  In 1998, there were
approximately 3,500 hedge funds, managing capital of about $150
billion.  By mid-2006, 9,000 hedge funds were managing $1.2
trillion in assets.

Despite their growing prominence in the investment community,
hedge funds are only vaguely understood by most people.
Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds addresses this shortcoming.
The book describes the structure, workings, purpose, and goals of
hedge funds.  While hedge funds are loosely defined as "funds with
no rules," the editors define these funds more usefully as
"privately pooled investments, usually structured as a partnership
between the fund managers and the investors."  The authors then
expand upon this definition by explaining what sorts of
investments hedge funds are, the work of the managers, and the
reasons investors join a hedge fund and what they are looking for
in doing so.

For example, hedge funds are characterized as an "important avenue
for investors opting to diversify their traditional portfolios and
better control risk" -- an apt characterization considering their
tremendous growth over the last decade.  The qualifications to
join a hedge fund generally include a net worth in excess of $1
million; thus, funds are for high net-worth individuals and
institutional investors such as foundations, life insurance
companies, endowments, and investment banks.  However, there are
many individuals with net worths below $1 million that take part
in hedge funds by pooling funds in financial entities that are
then eligible for a hedge fund.

This book discusses why hedge funds have become "notorious as
speculating vehicles," in part because of highly publicized
incidents, both pro and con.  For example, George Soros made $1
billion in 1992 by betting against the British pound.  Conversely,
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCP) imploded in
1998, with losses totalling $4.6 billion.  Nonetheless, these are
the exceptions rather than the rule, and the editors offer
statistics, studies, and other research showing that the
"volatility of hedge funds is closer to that of bonds than mutual
funds or equities."

After clarifying what hedge funds are and are not, the book
explains how to analyze hedge fund performance and select a
successful hedge fund.  It is here that the book has its greatest
utility, and the text is supplemented with graphs, tables, and
formulas.

The analysis makes one thing clear: for some investors, hedge
funds are an investment worth considering.  Most have a
demonstrable record of investment performance and the risk is low,
contrary to common perception.  Investors who have the necessary
capital to invest in a hedge fund or readers who aspire to join
that select club will want to absorb the research, information,
analyses, commentary, and guidance of this unique book.

Greg N. Gregoriou teaches at U. S. and Canadian universities and
does research for large corporations.  Fabrice Rouah also teaches
at the university level and does financial research.  Komlan
Sedzro is a professor of finance at the University of Quebec and
an advisor to the Montreal Derivatives Exchange.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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