TCREUR_Public/111031.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, October 31, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 215

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

PETROL AD: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'RD'


F R A N C E

TECHNICOLOR: Senior Creditors Approve Senior Debt Amendments
TEREOS UNION: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating


G E O R G I A

BANK OF GEORGIA: Moody's Says Listing Supportive of 'D-' BFSR


I C E L A N D

* ICELAND: Supreme Court Supports Bank Emergency Legislation
* ICELAND: Households, Firms Need Debt Restructuring


I R E L A N D

MCSWEENEY PHARMACY: High Court Appoints Interim Examiner


M A C E D O N I A

* MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

INVISTA BV: S&P Upgrades Corporate Credit Rating From 'BB+'
LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Rating on Class V Notes
REGENT'S PARK: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'


R U S S I A

MOSCOW BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' Debt Ratings to Neg.


S P A I N

EMPRESAS BANESTO: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating to Series C Notes
GC FTPYME: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on EUR200-Mil. Class B Notes
IM BANCO: Moody's Assigns '(P)Caa1' Rating to Series B Note
IM BANCO POPULAR: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating to Series B Notes
IM FTPYME: DBRS Assigns Provisional 'B' Rating to Series B Notes

SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO: Fitch Withdraws D Ratings on Four Tranches


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Youngman, Pang Da to Buy Business for EUR100MM
SAAB: Misses Deadline to Contest Bid to End Reorganization


U K R A I N E

SUBSIDIARY BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Ba2' Debt Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABERDEEN IMMOBILIEN: Liquidates EUR1.5-Bil. DEGI Int'l Fund
BROOKLANDS 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Three Tranches
BRYN AWEL: Goes Into Liquidation; 12 Staff Lose Jobs
CLARIS IV SERIES 25: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap
CLARIS IV SERIES 28: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap

CLARIS IV SERIES 29: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap
MISSOURI TOPCO: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B2'; Outlook Remains Neg.
* UK: IVAs Outnumber Bankruptcies in Q2, IS Figures Show
* UK: High Court Winds Up Three Wills and Trusts Companies
* UK: Need to Strengthen Laws on Pre-Pack Administrations


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 24 to October 28, 2011




                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


PETROL AD: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'RD'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Bulgaria-based Petrol AD's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from 'C'.  The senior
unsecured rating of Petrol AD's EUR87 million notes was affirmed
at 'C'.  The Recovery Rating on the notes is 'RR4'.

The downgrade reflects the agency's view that the recently
implemented maturity extension of Petrol AD's EUR87 million
outstanding bonds by three months from the original maturity date
of October 26, 2011 is a distressed debt exchange under Fitch's
criteria.  Fitch anticipates that Petrol AD's IDR will stay at
'RD' for 14 days and be raised to the appropriate IDR to reflect
the company's future prospects after this period.

Petrol AD's proposal to extend the outstanding notes' maturity
date and to delay the annual interest payment by three months to
January 26, 2012 was passed at the bondholders' meeting held on
October 5, 2011.  When implemented, Fitch considers this as a
distressed debt exchange given that the bonds' extended maturity
is a material reduction in terms vis-a-vis its original
contractual terms and the maturity extension was conducted in
order to avoid a traditional payment default.

The agency downgraded Petrol AD's IDR and the notes' senior
unsecured rating to 'C' from 'CC' on September 16, 2011 following
the company's announcement of a proposal for bondholders to extend
the notes maturity date and delay the interest payment.

Together with the proposal to extend the bond maturity, the
company also invited bondholders to offer to sell up to EUR10
million of bonds for cash to Petrol AD at 85% of the nominal
value.  Petrol AD has recently announced it purchased notes with a
nominal value of EUR11.8 million as a result of this invitation.
All these notes have been cancelled, which reduced Petrol AD's
amount outstanding under the notes to EUR87 million.

At end-June 2011, the Petrol AD group had weak liquidity. It had
cash of BGN65.7 million (of which BGN59.7 million was restricted
as collateral for trade loans) against short-term debt of BGN284.7
million, including the bonds.

Petrol AD is a leading fuel distributor in Bulgaria. It operates a
wholesale and retail distribution business.


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F R A N C E
===========


TECHNICOLOR: Senior Creditors Approve Senior Debt Amendments
------------------------------------------------------------
Technicolor on Thursday disclosed that its lenders and noteholders
approved certain changes to the Company's senior debt agreements
by more than the respective required majorities and, accordingly,
the proposed amendments to its senior debt agreements will become
effective soon.

The consent was approved by a large majority of around 90% in
accordance with the voting rules of the senior debt agreements.

On October 4, 2011, the Company requested that its senior
creditors provide their consent to certain amendments to its
senior debt agreements, principally related to joint ventures,
disposals and acquisitions, in order to increase its strategic
flexibility.

Once the amendments become effective, the Company will have
greater flexibility to participate in the industry's accelerating
consolidation trends and to take advantage of potential strategic
opportunities to optimize its portfolio of activities and
strengthen its business.

                       About Technicolor

Technicolor is a supplier of digital content delivery services and
home access devices, including set-top boxes and gateways.


TEREOS UNION: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on French
sugar and sugar derivatives producer Tereos Union de Cooperatives
Agricoles a Capital Variable (Tereos) to positive from stable. "At
the same time, we affirmed our 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating," S&P said.

"We also affirmed the 'BB' issue rating on the EUR500 million
senior secured bonds issued by subsidiary Tereos Europe S.A. The
'3' recovery rating on the bonds remains unchanged, indicating our
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default," S&P related.

"The outlook revision primarily reflects our view of the
improvement in the group's financial metrics. We believe that this
improvement will likely be sustainable, thanks to positive sugar
market dynamics and the group's firm commitment to reduce and
maintain net reported leverage below 2.5x," S&P related.

"We believe that the current favorable momentum in the European
sugar market will likely persist over the next 12 months. We
understand that sustained demand and stable supply in the global
sugar market should support high sugar prices. Sugarcane has also
benefited from high global sugar prices, while ethanol continues
to enjoy good growth prospects, particularly in Brazil, where
Tereos has a partnership with leading local fuel distributor
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras (BBB-/Positive/--)," S&P
said.

"We anticipate that Tereos' financial performance will continue to
improve, despite material future capital expenditures (capex). As
a result, we believe that adjusted debt leverage will likely
remain at about 3x and that adjusted FFO to debt will remain
comfortably above 20%. This is further supported by the group's
firm commitment to a more disciplined financial policy, despite
its appetite for expansion. The positive outlook reflects our view
that Tereos should be able to maintain adjusted leverage of about
3x and FFO to debt of more than 20% in 2012, supported by
sustained high prices and demand in the sugar market over the
next 12 months. Due to the business' inherent volatility and the
potentially gloomy macroeconomic environment in 2013, we will only
be in a position to view upside potential for the rating once we
have more visibility on next year's sugar harvest and pricing
environment. In our view, this could occur within the next six to
12 months," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if adjusted FFO to debt and
adjusted net debt to EBITDA deteriorate to below 20% and to about
3.5x or above within the next 12-18 months. In our view, this
would most likely result from an unexpected sharp and long-lasting
decline in sugar and/or ethanol prices, or from investment
projects that are larger than we anticipated," S&P added.


=============
G E O R G I A
=============


BANK OF GEORGIA: Moody's Says Listing Supportive of 'D-' BFSR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Bank of Georgia's ratings will
not be affected by its plans to seek a listing on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE). As part of this planned listing, the bank intends
to establish a UK-based non-operating holding company, which,
subsequent to a share exchange offer, is expected to hold the
majority of the bank's shares.

Moody's believes that the listing will be supportive of Bank of
Georgia's current ratings, which comprise a Ba3 deposit rating as
well as a D- standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR,
which maps to a Ba3 rating on the long-term scale). All ratings
have a stable outlook.

Moody's believes that the filing would improve market access for
funding- and capital-raising purposes, enhance compliance with
improved corporate governance practices and potentially improve
business generation:

   -- Capital and Funding. The LSE listing and potential inclusion
in the FTSE Index could enhance investors' awareness of Bank of
Georgia, increase stock liquidity and allow it to expand its
investor base, thereby increasing the potential for future
capital-raising exercises.

   -- Governance. The LSE listing would require compliance (or
justification of non-compliance) with the UK Corporate Governance
Code. Bank of Georgia already abides by many of the code's
requirements, but the external requirement would reinforce the
need for compliance. A full listing on the LSE would also improve
transparency of Bank of Georgia's ownership structure. More than
90% of the bank's shares are currently quoted on the LSE via
global depositary receipts (GDRs), but GDR holders are not subject
to high disclosure requirements. A full listing will require
shareholders owning more than a 3% stake to disclose their
interest.

   -- Business generation. Given the low levels of banking
intermediation in Georgia, the bank's prospects for growth are
significant. Moody's believes that the combination of increased
investor awareness, improved transparency, stronger governance,
and expanded capital and funding options could increase Bank of
Georgia's business generation prospects.

Bank of Georgia is the largest bank in Georgia, with a 36% market
share and total assets of US$2.5 billion as of June 2011.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


* ICELAND: Supreme Court Supports Bank Emergency Legislation
------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
Supreme Court ruled in favor of an emergency legislation passed in
2008 that gave depositors priority status over other creditors and
protected banks from bondholder claims.

According to Bloomberg, the Reykjavik-based body said the court's
decision was based on 11 cases brought by claimants.

Iceland's banks defaulted on US$85 billion in debt when they
failed at the end of 2008, as the government ring-fenced its
financial industry in an effort to avert an economic collapse,
Bloomberg recounts.  The domestic assets of Landsbanki Islands hf,
Kaupthing Bank hf and Glitnir Bank hf were taken over by the
state, which has since created local banks from the lenders,
Bloomberg discloses.  Bondholders are still trying to recoup their
funds, Bloomberg notes.

Bondholders who lose out after the decision include Royal Bank of
Scotland Plc, BNP Paribas SA and Deutsche Bank AG, Bloomberg
discloses.

The decision means Iceland won't be forced to renegotiate a
depositor claims accord with the U.K. and Netherlands, Bloomberg
states.  The island in September said proceeds from the assets of
Landsbanki will allow it to pay as much as US$11.4 billion to
cover all depositor claims stemming from the bank's failure,
Bloomberg notes.

Herdis Hallmarsdottir, an attorney at the Landsbanki's Winding Up
Committee, said at a press conference that calculations will be
made before a decision on repayments is made and that it has
ISK500 billion (US$4.4 billion) in available cash, Bloomberg
relates.  According to Bloomberg, she said that there will be a
tentative plan on repayments at a Nov. 17 creditors meeting.


* ICELAND: Households, Firms Need Debt Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Omar R. Valdimarsson, Willem H.
Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup Inc., said at a conference in
Reykjavik on Thursday that Iceland's banks need to agree to "at
least one more debt restructuring" with households and companies
struggling to service their loans before the Atlantic island's
economy can return to "normality."


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


MCSWEENEY PHARMACY: High Court Appoints Interim Examiner
--------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that the High Court has
appointed an interim examiner to 11 companies in the McSweeney
pharmacy group employing 95 people.

The group's companies in Northern Ireland are not affected by the
examinership and are trading profitably, the report says.

According to The Irish Times, the court heard the group, as part
of a proposed restructuring, is planning to place some of its
unprofitable companies in liquidation or to sell them.  The Irish
Times relates that an independent accountant had expressed the
view the 11 petitioning companies had a reasonable prospect of
survival provided certain conditions were met, including securing
investment and implementation of an existing cost reduction plan.

Once restructured, the group anticipates it will consist of 11
companies with four companies being liquidated, The Irish Times
notes.

According to the report, the company said most of the group's
losses are being incurred in pharmacies at Arthur's Quay,
Limerick; Middleton and Clonakilty, Co Cork, and Killarney, Co
Kerry.

The companies have debts of more than EUR17 million, with more
than EUR13 million owed to Allied Irish banks, but say a deficit
of more than EUR50 million would arise if they were liquidated,
The Irish Times discloses.

The report further says Rossa Fanning, for the companies, also
secured an injunction restraining United Drug Ltd, the largest
creditor, from attending at their premises and seizing stock.

Declan McDonald of PWC has been appointed on an interim basis, RTE
News reports.

Established in 1987, McSweeney Pharmacy Group operates 31
pharmacies in Ireland.  The group includes pharmacies in Dublin,
Sligo, Limerick, Cork, Ennis and Leitrim, as well as a central
warehouse in Clondalkin in Dublin and a cafe in Sligo.


=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


* MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Macedonia's Long-term foreign currency
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+', and has
maintained the rating Outlook at Stable.  Fitch has simultaneously
affirmed Macedonia's Short-term rating of 'B' and Country Ceiling
of 'BBB-'.

"The rating is supported by a strong macroeconomic policy
framework, low government debt and deficits, and a stable banking
sector.  However, fiscal financing vulnerabilities and political
risks persist, constraining Macedonia's rating," says
Matteo Napolitano, Director in Fitch's Sovereign Group.

In 2011, the agency expects the government to meet, or only
slightly exceed, its target of keeping the deficit to 2.5% of GDP.
Given the government's strong track record in this regard, Fitch
expects it to broadly meet its targets of reducing the deficit to
around 2% of GDP by 2013 and of keeping public debt under 30% of
GDP, compared with the 'BB' range median of 40%.  The authorities'
strong commitment to the Macedonian denar's informal peg to the
euro reinforces the importance of strong public finances.

However, in Fitch's view, the government's decision in March 2011
to draw down nearly half of the SDR413 million precautionary
credit line (PCL) with the IMF, at a time of favorable global
capital market conditions, highlights the shallowness of the
domestic capital markets and the government's limited financing
options.

Fitch expects growth to slow slightly in 2012 to 3.5% from 3.8% in
2011, as economic activity recedes in Macedonia's main trade
partners.  New export capacity in 2013 should help GDP growth
increase to around 4% in 2013, assuming there is an upturn in the
euro area.  However, structural impediments to higher growth are
likely to persist for some time.

The agency expects the current-account deficit to increase from an
estimated 4.9% in 2011 to 5.5%-6% in 2012-13, over half of which
should be financed by foreign direct investment.  This would be
well below the 2008 level, when it was nearly 13% of GDP.

Overall, the banking system has retained a low risk profile,
particularly in comparison with regional peers.  It is small, with
private credit just 46% of GDP, with a healthy capital adequacy
ratio of around 17% and comfortable liquidity position.  The
funding structure of banks is balanced, with a loan/deposit ratio
of 89% at the end of Q211.  However, subsidiaries of Greek parent
banks account for one-quarter of system assets, therefore despite
little material asset or funding exposures to Greece, the
Macedonian authorities will need to remain vigilant to prevent any
loss of confidence in the event of an escalation in the Greek
crisis.

Political risks remain a material constraint on the rating.
Progress towards EU and NATO accession is still blocked by the
dispute with Greece over Macedonia's constitutional name.  Given
the intransigence of both sides, Fitch deems it unlikely that a
mutually acceptable settlement will be found in the near term.
The 'name issue' will therefore continue to block Macedonia's path
towards joining Western institutions.

In terms of potential drivers of future rating actions, further
intensification of the euro area debt crisis would weaken
Macedonia's external position, possibly putting downward pressure
on Macedonia's ratings.  Also, the government's commitment towards
EU and NATO integration could weaken if the 'name dispute' drags
on, heightening political risk.

Conversely, resolution of the dispute would facilitate the path
towards membership and could support a positive rating action, if
other economic trends were suitably favorable.  Over the medium-
term, rising living standards and continuing macroeconomic
stability, supported by a continuing commitment to sound economic
policies and the implementation of business environment reform
could lead to an upgrade.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


INVISTA BV: S&P Upgrades Corporate Credit Rating From 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on INVISTA B.V. to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The outlook is
stable. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BBB' rating on the
company's first-lien secured debt consisting of a proposed US$300
million five-year senior secured revolving credit facility issued
by subsidiary INVISTA S.a.r.l. We are withdrawing the recovery
rating of '1' on this debt. Along with the new rated credit
facility, INVISTA is also entering into an unrated US$200 million
5.5-year second-lien revolving credit facility provided by KII or
one of its subsidiaries. The two new facilities will replace an
existing US$600 million asset-based revolving credit facility,"
S&P related.

"The ratings upgrade reflects a two-notch lift in our 'bb'
standalone credit profile on INVISTA for perceived support from
its parent, privately held KII," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Cynthia Werneth. "INVISTA represents a sizable investment
for KII, and the owner has facilitated INVISTA's deleveraging by
infusing equity capital in the company. Importantly, between
third-quarter 2008 and first-quarter 2011, INVISTA received
approximately US$2.6 billion from KII."

"The ratings reflect INVISTA's weak standalone business risk
profile and its intermediate financial risk profile, as well as
the two-notch uplift for our assessment of parental support. We
factored in the strength of the underlying collateral protecting
creditors into the 'BBB' rating, which is one notch above the
corporate credit rating, on the company's first-lien secured
debt," S&P related.

"Our business risk assessment reflects INVISTA's participation in
a capital-intensive and highly cyclical industry. One key end
market, carpet fibers, has suffered from poor operating conditions
in U.S. housing and commercial construction markets over the past
few years. This market has experienced further volume declines
this year, and it has no prospects for a speedy recovery. Many
carpet manufacturers now produce fibers in house even as the sales
and pricing premiums of branded products have fallen, compounding
the market weakness. In spandex fibers, another important end
market, raw material prices have increased and demand has
softened; pricing for value-branded spandex fibers has become
increasingly competitive as a result of increased production in
China," S&P noted.

INVISTA's raw material and energy costs are volatile, and its cost
advantage in its key butadiene-based nylon technology has eroded.
"Although butadiene prices have declined somewhat recently, we
expect them to remain high relative to historic levels, because
refineries are cracking lighter feedstocks, resulting in lower
butadiene production. Most of INVISTA's intermediates production
is located along the U.S. Gulf Coast, and some facilities have
sustained hurricane damage in recent years," S&P said.

"Offsetting considerations include emerging market growth for
INVISTA's products, increasing nylon content in autos (both under
the hood and airbags), and greater demand for high-performance
apparel fibers -- positive factors in our business risk
assessment," S&P related.

The outlook is stable. "We expect the company to benefit from the
strength of its competitive positions and recent cost
restructuring actions, which we believe will at least partly
offset some of the potential negative impact of a slowdown in its
markets resulting from slower economic growth," Ms. Werneth
continued. "We anticipate that EBITDA margins will remain steady
at around 10% over the next two years, though we recognize the
potential for some weakening in revenues and absolute EBITDA
levels if economic conditions deteriorate."

"We could lower the ratings if economic or industry conditions
turn out worse than we expect, causing credit metrics to weaken so
that FFO to total adjusted debt drops to less than 30% with no
near-term recovery prospects. Based on our scenario forecasting,
we think that this could occur if revenues contracted more than
10% from current levels and EBITDA margins dropped to less than
8%. While not unlikely given our current assessment of INVISTA's
relationship to its parent, we could also lower the ratings if we
no longer viewed INVISTA as having any strategic importance to
KII," S&P said.


LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Rating on Class V Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded and confirmed the ratings
of the following notes issued by Leveraged Finance Europe Capital
IV B.V.:

   -- EUR30M Revolving Facility Notes, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR26M Class I-D Senior Floating Rate Delayed Funding Notes
      due 2022, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR158.3M Class I-N Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR26.3M Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR11.7M Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19.9M Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7.4M Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022 (currently outstanding balance EUR4,862,673.20),
      Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital IV B.V, issued in October 2006,
is a single currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed
by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio
is managed by BNP Paribas. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until 11 October 2012 It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in December
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's notes that the Class V notes have been paid down by
approximately 19.5% or EUR1.18 million since the rating action in
December 2009.

The reported WARF has increased from 2679 to 2827 between October
2009 and September 2011. However, the change in reported WARF
understates the actual credit quality improvement because of the
technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR283 million,
defaulted par of EUR18.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 22.16% (consistent with a WARF of 3087), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 45.88% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average
spread of 3.085%. The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 89.71% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default. In each case, historical and market performance
trends are also relevant factors. These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for weighted average rating factor and diversity
score, and assuming the weighted average spread consistent with
the midpoint between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 72% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009. These large single
exposures represent 9% of the performing par.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


REGENT'S PARK: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Regent's Park CDO B.V.:

   -- EUR393M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR40.2M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2023,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR51M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR24M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR13.8M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class P Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to A3
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6M Class R Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR8M Class W Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba2
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class R,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by a Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. For Class P and Class W, the
'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of
the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported
by the trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Regent's Park CDO B.V., issued in October 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Blackstone Debt Advisors L.P. This transaction will be
in reinvestment period until January 2013. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009. The Senior, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
128.4%, 115.1%, 109.8% and 107.0%, respectively, versus August
2009 levels of 127.0%, 113.9%, 108.7% and 105.9%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.

Reported WARF has increased from 2702 to 2874 between August 2009
and September 2011.

The change in reported WARF understates the actual credit quality
improvement because of the technical transition related to rating
factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in
the press release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. In
addition, securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 8.6%
of the underlying portfolio versus 9.9% in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 564.63
million, defaulted par of EUR6.47 million, a weighted average
default probability of 23.3% (consistent with a WARF of 2914), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.0% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 36 and a weighted
average spread of 3.05%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 92.5% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's notes that around 52% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates. Risks and stresses associated to the
usage of credit estimates as described in the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, and diversity score. However, as part of
the base case, Moody's considered spread and diversity score
levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large difference
between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MOSCOW BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' Debt Ratings to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the following ratings of Moscow Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (MBRD): B1 long-term global-scale local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings, B1 local currency senior
unsecured debt rating and B2 foreign-currency subordinated debt
rating. At the same time, the rating agency affirmed MBRD's
standalone E+ bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of MBRD, which
maps to B2 on the long-term scale. The outlook on the BFSR is
stable. The bank's Not Prime short-term deposit ratings were also
affirmed.

Moody's revision of the outlook on MBRD's deposit and debt ratings
is primarily based on MBRD's audited financial statements for 2010
and its unaudited financial statements for H1 2011, prepared under
IFRS. The assessment also reflects the strategic and operational
support that MBRD continues to receive from its parent JSFC
Sistema.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the revision of the outlook on MBRD's
deposit and debt ratings primarily reflects the bank's weak
financial performance with the Return on Average Assets (ROAA) and
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) ratios reported at 0.3% and 5.0%,
respectively, in 2010. In the same reporting period, its net
interest margin (NIM) yielded just 2%, which is considerably lower
than most Russian banks' NIMs. Moreover, in 2011, the rating
agency has not observed any significant improvement in the bank's
financial performance and expects that poor recurring earnings
combined with high administrative costs will likely cause negative
bottom-line IFRS result for the current reporting period.

MBRD's E+ BFSR is constrained by considerable concentrations in
the bank's loan portfolio and liabilities. At year-end 2010, its
top 10 exposures accounted for 236% of the bank's Tier 1 capital,
whilst the eight largest deposits on aggregate comprised 34% of
MBRD's total customer funding base at the same reporting date.
Furthermore, approximately one third of MBRD's total consolidated
loan book stands for loans issued by its 66%-owned subsidiary East
West United Bank S.A. (EWUB, based in Luxembourg), which extends
loans to wealthy individuals and their businesses. These borrowers
are predominantly reported under financial services industry, and
the majority of such loans are collateralized by pledges of cash
(as reported in MBRD's 2010 IFRS statements), but since the
purpose of the named lending operations have not been disclosed to
Moody's in all the necessary details, the ultimate quality of this
portion of the group's loan book is difficult to assess and this
raises concerns.

Moody's says that the factor underpinning MBRD's E+ BFSR and B2
long-term scale at their current levels is the strategic and
operational support provided to the bank by its parent JSFC
Sistema (rated Ba3 on long-term corporate family rating with
stable outlook). As of year-end 2010, JSFC Sistema controlled --
directly or indirectly -- a 99.25% stake in MBRD. The parental
support is being demonstrated by regular capital injections to the
bank and provision of subordinated loans, in case of need.

MBRD's deposit ratings derive from the bank's B2 standalone credit
strength and incorporate a one-notch uplift to B1, reflecting
Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of parental support
from JSFC Sistema. The rating agency also recognizes the high
degree of interdependence between the parent and the subsidiary,
as evidenced by MBRD's involvement in providing financial services
to the Sistema group of companies.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

According to Moody's, the upward potential of MBRD's standalone
ratings is limited, given the bank's weak financial fundamentals
and low transparency of a significant portion of its loan
portfolio (as represented by loans booked on EWUB).

On the other hand, the volatile economic and operating environment
-- coupled with MBRD's lack of clear competitive advantages in the
Russian banking market -- continues to exert negative pressure on
its standalone credit strength, resulting in poor profitability
and cost-efficiency metrics. MBRD's position within its current
BFSR category could weaken if (i) these negative trends are not
offset by timely capital injections from shareholders; or (ii) the
bank's liquidity position comes under pressure as a result of the
high concentration of its customer funding base. If this occurs --
leading to a re-mapping of MBRD's E+ BFSR to B3 on the long-term
scale, as opposed to B2 currently -- MBRD's supported B1 debt and
deposit ratings, as well as the bank's B2 foreign-currency
subordinated debt rating, might be downgraded. Furthermore, if
Moody's considers that the parental support to MBRD from JSFC
Sistema has weakened, this might cause a removal of the support
uplift from the bank's deposit ratings and their realignment with
its standalone credit strength.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, MBRD reported -- at year-end 2010 --
total consolidated assets of US$7.76 billion and total equity of
US$538 million under audited IFRS. In the same reporting period,
the bank posted net IFRS profits of US$22 million.


=========
S P A I N
=========


EMPRESAS BANESTO: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating to Series C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned final ratings to the Notes
issued by Empresas Banesto 6, F.T.A., as follows:

   -- EUR935 million Series A Notes: AAA (sf)
   -- EUR165 million Series B Notes: BBB(low) (sf)
   -- EUR264 million Series C Notes: C (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco Espanol
de Credito, S.A. ("Banesto") to large corporations and small and
medium enterprises ("SMEs") domiciled in Spain.  As of October 24,
2011, the final portfolio included 4,970 loans with a weighted
average maturity of 3.2 years and a notional amount of EUR1,100
million.

The portfolio is well diversified in terms of region and industry
concentration.  The top three regions are Catalonia, Madrid and
Valencia, representing 26.2%, 23.1% and 9.3% of the portfolio
balance, respectively.  The top three industries by NACE code are
Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Transportation
representing 31.7%, 18.5% and 7.8% of the portfolio balance,
respectively.

The portfolio exhibits high obligor concentration with the largest
obligor representing 5.3% of the portfolio notional.  The top ten
and top twenty obligors represent 29.5% and 41% of the portfolio
balance, respectively.  DBRS has stressed the probability of
default of the largest obligors in its analysis to address the
obligor concentration risk.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

    * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
credit enhancement.

   -- Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination,
through the Reserve Fund and excess spread. The current credit
enhancement of 39% and 24% is sufficient to support the AAA (sf)
and BBB (low) (sf) ratings on the Series A Notes and the Series B
Notes, respectively.

   -- The Series C Notes has been issued for the purpose of
funding the cash Reserve Fund.  The Reserve Fund has been
initially set at 24% of the aggregate balance of the Series A and
Series B Notes, or EUR 264 million.  The Reserve Fund is available
to cover shortfalls in the senior expenses, interest and principal
throughout the life of the Notes.

   -- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced, except for required
payments to cover interest and principal shortfalls, unless:

         -- the transaction is at least two years old;

         -- the Reserve Fund is at least 48% of the outstanding
aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes and in any
case not less than EUR132 million.

   -- In addition, the Reserve Fund will not be allowed to
amortize if:

         -- the balance of the Reserve Fund is not at the minimum
required level as of the previous period; or,

         -- the outstanding balance of assets in arrears for more
than 90 days is less than 1% of the total outstanding balance of
the performing assets.

    * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the approved
terms.  For this transaction, the final rating of the Series A
Notes addresses the timely payment of interest and the payment of
principal on or before the Legal Final Maturity Date on  September
17, 2033, as defined in the transaction documents.  The final
ratings of the Series B and Series C Notes address the ultimate
payment of interest and the payment of principal on or before the
Legal Final Maturity Date on September 17, 2033, as defined in the
transaction documents.  The payments of interest and principal on
the Notes will be made quarterly, generally on the 17th day of
March, June, September and December.  The first payment date is
scheduled for December 19, 2011.

    * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
to perform their respective duties and the quality of origination,
underwriting and servicing practices.

    * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the trust
and the non-consolidation of the special purpose vehicle, as well
as the consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer, as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS's analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com

The sources of information used for these ratings include parties
involved in the rating, including but not limited to Empresas
Banesto 6, F.T.A., Santander de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. and
Banesto.  DBRS considers the information available to it for the
purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory quality.

This is the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLOs, please see
European Disclosure Requirements, located at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/235269


GC FTPYME: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on EUR200-Mil. Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has confirmed the following ratings to the
Notes issued by GC FTPYME SABADELL 8, F.T.A.:

    -- EUR250 million Series A1(G): AAA (sf)
    -- EUR390 million Series A2(G): AAA (sf)
    -- EUR160 million Series A3: AAA (sf)
    -- EUR200 million Class B Notes: BB (high) (sf)

The ratings of the Series A1(G), the Series A2(G) and the Series
A3 address the timely payment of interest and principal payable on
each payment date during the transaction.  The rating of the Class
B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal at the legal final maturity.

The confirmation follows the review of the ability of the
transaction to withstand stressed cash flow assumptions, the
transaction parties' financial strength, including the ability to
perform respective duties and the overall deal performance.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

The sources of information used for this rating include the
parties involved in the rating, including but not limited to Banco
de Sabadell, S.A., GC FTPYME SABADELL 8, F.T.A., and GestiCaixa
S.G.F.T., S.A.  DBRS considers the information available to it for
the purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory quality.

For additional information on DBRS European CLO and Tranched
Credit Derivatives, please see European Disclosure Requirements,
located at http://www.dbrs.com/research/237794


IM BANCO: Moody's Assigns '(P)Caa1' Rating to Series B Note
-----------------------------------------------------------Moody's
Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to three series
of Notes to be issued by IM BANCO POPULAR FTPYME 3, FTA:

   -- EUR475M Series A1 Note, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

   -- EUR500M Series A2(G) Note, Assigned (P)Aaa(sf)

   -- EUR325M Series B Note, Assigned (P)Caa1(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

IM BANCO POPULAR FTPYME 3, FTA is a securitization of loans mainly
granted to micro and small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) by
Banco Popular (A2/P-1; Possible Downgrade). The securitization is
done under the FTPYME program following the Spanish Ministry of
Economy's allocation of a new guarantee budget for such
transactions for the current year.

At closing, the Fondo -- a newly formed limited-liability entity
incorporated under the laws of Spain -- will issue three series of
rated notes. Banco Popular will act as servicer of the loans,
while Intermoney Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. will be the
management company (Gestora) of the Fondo.

As of September 2011, the provisional asset pool of underlying
assets was composed of a portfolio of 7,322 contracts granted to
companies located in Spain. The assets were originated mainly
between 2007 and 2011. The weighted-average seasoning of the
portfolio is 1.5 years and the weighted-average remaining terms is
6 years. Around 31% of the outstanding of the portfolio is secured
by first-lien mortgage guarantees over different types of
properties. Geographically, the pool is concentrated mostly in
Madrid (24%), Catalonia (18%) and Andalusia (14%). At closing,
there will be no loans more than 30 days in arrears (arrears 0-30
will represent less than 5%).

In Moody's view, the strong credit positive features of this deal
include, among others: (i) a relatively high percentage of
corporate with annual turnover above EUR50 million (16%); (ii) a
geographically well-diversified pool; and (iii) an up-front funded
reserve fund, representing 15.75% of the total notes balance,
which will be available to make interest payments on Series A1 and
A2(G) during the life of the transaction and can be used to cover
for principal redemption only at the last payment date or legal
final maturity. However, the transaction has several challenging
features: (i) a relatively high exposure to the construction and
building industry sector (33.7% according to Moody's industry
classification); (ii) a high percentage of bullet loans (18.8%);
(iii) high percentage of loans with principal grace period (25%);
and (iv) a low portfolio granularity (effective number of obligors
below 300). These characteristics were reflected in Moody's
analysis and ratings, where several simulations tested the
available 40.75% total credit enhancement (i.e. notes
subordination and reserve fund) for Series A1 and A2(G) notes to
cover potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in
the transaction structure.

Series A2(G) benefits from the guarantee of the Kingdom of Spain
for interest and principal payments. Nevertheless, the expected
loss associated with Series A2(G) notes is consistent with a
Aaa(sf) rating regardless of the Spanish Treasury guarantees
A2(G).

The resulting key assumptions of Moody's analysis for this
transaction are a mean default rate of 16.4%, with a coefficient
of variation of 43.9% and a stochastic mean recovery rate of
42.5%.

As mentioned in the methodology papers, Moody's used a combination
of its CDOROM model (to generate the default distribution) and
ABSROM cash-flow model to determine the potential loss incurred by
the notes under each loss scenario. In parallel, Moody's also
considered non-modeled risks (such as counterparty risk).

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes (November 2047). In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal on Series A1, A2(G) and B at par on
or before the rated final legal maturity date. Moody's ratings
address only the credit risks associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line
with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-to-
Medium Enterprise ABS Sector," published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007,
Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default
assumptions in the rating analysis of granular Small and Mid-sized
Enterprise portfolios in EMEA, published in March 2009 and Moody's
Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle
East and Africa, published in June 2007.

Moody's also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the rated
notes. For instance, if the assumed default probability of 16.4%
used in determining the initial rating was changed to 21.3% and
the recovery rate of 42.5% was changed to 32.5%, the model-
indicated rating for Series A1, Series A2(G) and Series B of
(P)Aaa(sf), (P) Aaa(sf) and (P)Caa1(sf), respectively, would have
changed to (P)Aa2(sf), (P) Aa3(sf) and (P)Caa1(sf) respectively.


IM BANCO POPULAR: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating to Series B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings to the Notes
issued by IM Banco Popular FTPYME 3, F.T.A., as follows:

    -- EUR475 million Series A1 Notes: AAA (sf)
    -- EUR500 million Series A2 (G) Notes: AAA (sf)
    -- EUR325 million Series B Notes: B (high) (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco Popular
Espanol, S.A. to large corporations and small and medium
enterprises ("SMEs") domiciled in Spain.  As of September 26,
2011, the transaction's provisional pool included 7,322 loans with
a weighted average life of 3.8 years, a weighted average maturity
of 6.0 years and a notional amount of EUR 1,479.2 million.  At
closing, the Originator will select the final portfolio of
EUR1,300.0 million from above mentioned provisional pool.

The above ratings are provisional.  The final rating will be
issued upon receipt of executed versions of the governing
transaction documents.  To the extent that the documents and
information provided by IM Banco Popular FTPYME 3, F.T.A.,
Intermoney Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. and Banco Popular and/or
their agents to DBRS as of this date differ from the executed
versions of the governing transaction documents, DBRS may assign a
lower final rating to the Notes, or may avoid assigning a final
rating to the Notes altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

    * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
credit enhancement.

   -- Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination,
through the Reserve Fund and excess spread.  The current credit
enhancement of 40.75% is sufficient to support the AAA (sf) rating
on both the Series A1 and Series A2 (G) Notes.  The 15.75% credit
enhancement provided by the Reserve Fund is sufficient to support
the B (high) (sf) rating on the Series B Notes.

   -- The Reserve Fund has been initially set at 15.75% of the
aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes, or
EUR204.75 million.  The Reserve Fund is available to cover
shortfalls in the senior expenses and interest on the Series A1
and A2 (G) Notes, throughout the life of the Notes.  On the last
payment date or the early liquidation payment date (if it occurs),
the Reserve Fund can be used to pay interest and principal on the
Series A1, the Series A2 (G) and the Series B Notes.

   -- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced during the life of the
transaction, except for required payments to cover interest
shortfalls.

   -- The Reserve Fund will be funded at inception through the
issuance of a subordinated loan granted by Banco Popular.

    * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the approved
terms.  For this transaction, the provisional ratings of the
Series A1 and A2 (G) Notes address the timely payment of interest
and the payment of principal on or before the Final Maturity Date
on November 22, 2047, as defined in the transaction documents.
The provisional rating of the Series B Notes addresses the
ultimate payment of interest and the payment of principal on or
before the Final Maturity Date, as defined in the transaction
documents.  The payments of interest and principal on the Notes
will be made monthly, generally on the 22nd day of each month.
The first payment date is scheduled for December 22, 2011.

    * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
to perform their respective duties and the quality of origination,
underwriting and servicing practices.

    * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the trust
and the non-consolidation of the special purpose vehicle, as well
as the consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer, as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS's analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com

The sources of information used for these ratings include parties
involved in the rating, including but not limited to IM Banco
Popular FTPYME 3, F.T.A., Intermoney Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A.
and Banco Popular.  DBRS considers the information available to it
for the purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory
quality.

This is the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLOs, please see
European Disclosure Requirements, located at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/235269


IM FTPYME: DBRS Assigns Provisional 'B' Rating to Series B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings to the Notes
issued by IM FTPYME Sabadell 9, F.T.A., as follows:

    -- EUR295 million Series A1 Notes: AAA (sf)
    -- EUR650 million Series A2 (G) Notes: AAA (sf)
    -- EUR555 million Series B Notes: B (high) (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco de
Sabadell, S.A. to large corporations and small and medium
enterprises ("SMEs") domiciled in Spain.  As of September 16,
2011, the transaction's provisional pool included 7,433 loans with
a weighted average life of 4.6 years, a weighted average maturity
of 8.1 years and a notional amount of EUR1,760.5 million.  At
closing, the Originator will select the final portfolio of
EUR1,500.0 million from above mentioned provisional pool.

The above ratings are provisional.  The final rating will be
issued upon receipt of executed versions of the governing
transaction documents.  To the extent that the documents and
information provided by IM FTPYME Sabadell 9, F.T.A., Intermoney
Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. and Banco Sabadell and/or their
agents to DBRS as of this date differ from the executed versions
of the governing transaction documents, DBRS may assign a lower
final rating to the Notes, or may avoid assigning a final rating
to the Notes altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

    * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination,
through the Reserve Fund and excess spread.  The current credit
enhancement of 47% is sufficient to support the AAA (sf) rating on
both the Series A1 and Series A2 (G) Notes.  The 10% credit
enhancement provided by the Reserve Fund is sufficient to support
the B (high) (sf) rating on the Series B Notes.

-- The Reserve Fund has been initially set at 10% of the aggregate
balance of the Series A and Series B Notes, or EUR150 million.
The Reserve Fund is available to cover shortfalls in the senior
expenses and interest on the Series A1 and A2 (G) Notes,
throughout the life of the Notes.  On the last payment date or the
early liquidation payment date (if it occurs), the Reserve Fund
can be used to pay interest and principal on the Series A1, the
Series A2 (G) and the Series B Notes.

-- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced during the life of the
transaction, except for required payments to cover interest
shortfalls.

-- The Reserve Fund will be funded at inception through the
issuance of a subordinated loan granted by Banco Sabadell.

    * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the approved
terms.  For this transaction, the provisional ratings of the
Series A1 and A2 (G) Notes address the timely payment of interest
and the payment of principal on or before the Legal Final Maturity
Date on January 17, 2046, as defined in the transaction documents.
The provisional rating of the Series B Notes addresses the
ultimate payment of interest and the payment of principal on or
before the Legal Final Maturity Date on
January 17, 2046, as defined in the transaction documents.  The
payments of interest and principal on the Notes will be made
quarterly, generally on the 17th day of January, April, July and
October.  The first payment date is scheduled for January 17,
2012.

    * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
to perform their respective duties and the quality of origination,
underwriting and servicing practices.

    * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the trust
and the non-consolidation of the special purpose vehicle, as well
as the consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer, as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS's analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com.

The sources of information used for these ratings include parties
involved in the rating, including but not limited to IM FTPYME
Sabadell 9, F.T.A., Intermoney Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. and
Banco Sabadell.  DBRS considers the information available to it
for the purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory
quality.

This is the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLOs, please see
European Disclosure Requirements, located at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/235269


SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO: Fitch Withdraws D Ratings on Four Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four tranches of Santander
Hipotecario 4, FTA to 'Dsf' following the 100% loss allocation on
classes D, E and F, and 29.2% loss allocation to class C.  The
remaining tranches A1, A2, A3 and B have been paid in full.  The
'Dsf' ratings have also been withdrawn as a result of the
termination of the transaction.  The rating actions are as
follows:

  -- Class C (ISIN ES0337711040) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'CCCsf'; rating withdrawn

  -- Class D (ISIN ES0337711057) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- Class E (ISIN ES0337711065) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- Class F (ISIN ES0337711073) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

On October 17, 2011, Santander Titulizacion SGFT announced that an
early liquidation of the fund was being exercised as of the
October 2011 interest payment date.  Fitch understands that the
gestora's decision to terminate the transaction was backed by the
sole noteholder, Banco Santander.

At the time of the last review in May 2011, the agency indicated
that the classes C, D, E and F were likely to default, which was
reflected in the ratings of those notes at the time.  The agency
was particularly concerned by the high volume of defaults seen
since transaction close, which, according to Fitch's estimates,
had reached 17.1% of the original portfolio balance by April 2011.
The gestora has recently provided Fitch with more information on
the performance of loans in Santander Hipotecario 3 and 4's
portfolios, including details about the property repossessions and
sales.  This information suggests that the average loss severity
on terminated loans has been approximately 47%.

Fitch has approached the gestora to fully understand the approach
used to quantify the losses that have been allocated to the notes.
In particular, Fitch is seeking more clarity on the assessment of
defaulted assets and recovery expectations.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Youngman, Pang Da to Buy Business for EUR100MM
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that Saab Automobile will likely change
owners for the second time in as many years as the Swedish
automaker seeks to restart production and stave off bankruptcy.

According to Bloomberg, Saab parent Swedish Automobile NV said in
a statement that Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile Co. and Pang
Da Automobile Trade Co. reached a tentative deal on Friday to
purchase Saab for EUR100 million (US$142 million).

Bloomberg relates Saab Chief Executive Officer Victor Muller said
on a conference call on Friday that Youngman will buy 60% of Saab
and Pang Da will purchase 40%.  The two had originally agreed to
take a majority stake in Swedish Automobile before that agreement
fell apart this month, Bloomberg notes.

"This is fantastic news," Bloomberg quotes Saab spokesman Eric
Geers as saying.  "Now we're hoping for a stable period where we
can start thinking about making cars again."

Mr. Geers, as cited by Bloomberg, said Saab will discuss payment
and delivery terms with suppliers with the aim of restarting
production "as soon as possible."

The agreement still faces hurdles and must be approved by Chinese
regulators, the Swedish government, the European Investment Bank
and General Motors, Bloomberg states.  Mr. Muller said Bayerische
Motoren Werke AG, which last year agreed to supply engines to
future Saab models, must also sign off on the new owners for that
engine agreement to stay valid, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Muller said Saab owes GM $326 million
in preferred shares, debt that Pang Da and Youngman would assume
if the deal is approved.

GM is "waiting for more information," said James Cain, a company
spokesman in Detroit.  "We simply don't know what's in the
agreement on principle.  Events are moving very quickly for Saab
and we're watching with interest."

Mr. Muller said that Pang Da and Youngman have a "tremendous
desire" to start Saab production in China, while they have agreed
to keep the factory in Sweden, Bloomberg relates.  He said that
the Chinese companies will invest "way more" than EUR245 million,
the amount they had originally pledged, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Muller said Saab, which employs 3,700 people, will probably
need to cut jobs, according to Bloomberg.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Bloomberg
News related that Saab, which has produced few cars since it first
halted production in March because of a lack of money, staved off
bankruptcy after a Swedish court on Sept. 21 granted the
carmaker's request for protection from creditors.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


SAAB: Misses Deadline to Contest Bid to End Reorganization
----------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that Saab Automobile
missed a deadline on Thursday to contest a request that it must
exit protection against creditors.

Saab asked the Vaenersborg District Court on Thursday for more
time to argue why the reorganization should continue, saying it
has nearly completed talks with potential investors Pang Da
Automobile Trade Co. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile Co.,
Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, Saab spokeswoman Gunilla Gustavs said the
Trollhaettan, Sweden-based company told the court in its filing
"We're in the intense final phase of negotiations with relevant
investors."  She said the company told the court that "The result
of the negotiations will be key" to whether the reorganization
should be allowed to continue, Bloomberg notes.

Separately, Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that the
court denied Saab's request for an extension to respond to request
from the administrator of the car maker's reorganization to end
the restructuring process.

Saab said it cannot formally respond to the administrator of its
reorganization's request to end the company's restructuring
process, as it is in "intense negotiations" with investors to
secure financing, Daily Bankruptcy Review relates.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 24,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Saab, which has produced few
cars since it first halted production in March because of a lack
of money, staved off bankruptcy after a Swedish court on Sept. 21
granted the carmaker's request for protection from creditors.  The
court had been scheduled to meet today, Oct. 31, to decide whether
the reorganization can carry on.  For the reorganization to
continue, the court must see that Saab has cash to pay for
immediate expenses, Bloomberg noted.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


SUBSIDIARY BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Ba2' Debt Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from negative the
outlook on Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia's (SBSR) Ba2 local-
currency deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings.

SBSR's E+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) mapping
to B2 on the long-term rating scale and its B3 foreign-currency
deposit rating -- which is constrained by the country ceiling for
Ukraine -- are unaffected by this and continue to carry a stable
outlook. SBSR's Aa1.ua National Scale Rating (NSR) is also
unaffected by this announcement.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change of the outlook on SBSR's ratings demonstrates the
stabilization of its credit profile, reflected by (i) improved
profitability, with a return on assets of 3.1% at end-H1 2011,
following large losses in 2008 and 2009; (ii) adequate
capitalization, with a Tier 1 ratio of 15.9% at end-H1 2011; (iii)
strengthening position in Ukraine's lending and deposit-taking
markets; and (iv) stabilization of asset quality in 2010.

However, the rating agency notes that the rapid growth in SBSR's
loan portfolio -- which rose more than two-fold between year-end
2009 and H1 2011 -- implies a greater degree of credit risk. As a
result, SBSR may incur significant credit losses if economic
conditions weaken materially.

The Ba2 local-currency deposit and debt ratings incorporate
Moody's assessment of a high probability of parental support from
Sberbank (Baa1/P-2/D+). Consequently, these ratings receive a
three-notch uplift from SBSR's B2 standalone credit rating.

SBSR's BFSR has a limited upside potential in the near term.
However, SBSR's local-currency deposit and debt ratings may be
upgraded in the medium term if its loan book seasons without
significant losses and without exerting pressure on its
profitability and capitalization. The B3 foreign-currency deposit
rating is constrained by the country ceiling for Ukraine, and can
be upgraded only if Moody's upgrades this country ceiling.

SBSR's local-currency deposit and debt ratings could come under
negative pressure if SBSR's asset quality suffered material
deterioration with a notable negative effect on profitability and
capitalization. A reduction of the parental support from Sberbank,
although not currently anticipated, would likely result in a
ratings downgrade. A downgrade of Ukraine's country ceilings for
foreign-currency deposit ratings would also result in a downgrade
of SBSR's foreign-currency deposit rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial Strength
Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings:
A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, SBSR reported total assets,
capital and net income of US$1.52 billion, US$245.7 million and
US$23.8 million, respectively, at end-H1 2011, according to its
IFRS report.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABERDEEN IMMOBILIEN: Liquidates EUR1.5-Bil. DEGI Int'l Fund
-----------------------------------------------------------
Atholl Simpson at Citywire.co.uk reports that Aberdeen Immobilien
has announced the liquidation of its third real estate fund in the
space of seven months.

Citywire.co.uk says the EUR1.5 billion DEGI International has
suffered the same fate as two of the group's other real estate
funds, DEGI Global Business and DEGI Europa, which began
liquidating in August and March of this year, respectively, after
two years of closure.

Citywire.co.uk states that this latest news will do little to
dispel investor concern over the firm's last remaining fund within
its DEGI range, the DEGI German Business.

According to the report, the EUR250 million domestic property fund
has also been closed for redemptions for the past two years, the
maximum permitted under current regulation, and is expected to
officially reopen on November 29 of this year.

It comes less than a week after fellow property investors AXA
announced the liquidation of one of the sector's giant property
funds, the EUR2.5 billion AXA Immoselect, the report notes.

Citywire.co.uk discloses that in the past year over half a dozen
property funds have been liquidated, including the Morgan Stanley
P2 Value and the KanAm US-Grundinvest.

"Investor protection is our highest priority. After intensive
discussions with our partners and regular contact with our
investors, we found we could not guarantee our fund would have the
liquidity in mid-November to meet all the investors wishing to
redem their shares in DEGI International," the report quotes
chairman Hartmut Lesser as saying.

"Aberdeen has chosen as part of the resolution to make half yearly
repayments to our investors in order to guarantee equal treatment
of all categories of investors."

Aberdeen Immobilien is the property arm of Aberdeen Asset
Management.


BROOKLANDS 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Three Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one junior tranche of Brooklands Euro
Reference-Linked Notes 2004-1 Limited (Brooklands 2004-1),
affirmed all other tranches of the same deal and all tranches of
Brooklands Euro Reference-Linked Notes 2001-1 Ltd (Brooklands
2001-1) and Brooklands Euro Reference-Linked Notes 2005-1 Ltd
(Brooklands 2005-1).

The three transactions represent synthetic securitizations of
structured finance assets and corporate debt.  The issuers have
entered into credit swaps with UBS AG, London Branch (UBS;
'A'/Stable/'F1') and issued notes collateralized by 'AAA'-rated
securities which have been purchased pursuant to a repurchase
agreement with UBS.

The affirmations of class A and B of Brooklands 2001-1 reflect the
likelihood of credit events being called in the short time
remaining before the scheduled maturity of the notes in December
2011.

Currently 3.6% of Brooklands 2001-1 reference portfolio is rated
'CCCsf' and below and Fitch views the 7.8% credit enhancement
provided by subordination for the class A as robust enough to
allow repayment of principal at maturity.  However, the risk
arising from a 43.6% sub investment grade bucket coupled with the
considerations that the reference entities are mostly subordinated
exposures to structured finance assets and the portfolio consists
of a large number of lowly-rated corporates, are the rationale
behind the affirmation at 'CCCsf'.  The 'CCsf' rating for class B
is driven by the limited amount of protection available in the
form of 1.3% of credit enhancement.

For the purpose of the credit enhancement calculation, the three
outstanding credit events which still need to settle were assumed
to have 0% recoveries.

The downgrade of class E of Brooklands 2004-1 is due to the class
notional being partially written down due to losses.

The affirmation of the mezzanine tranches reflects Fitch's view
that the likelihood of principal being repaid at maturity is low,
considering that the reference portfolio consists of 44% sub
investment grade assets, of which 8% are rated 'CCCsf' and below
as well as lowly rated corporates and this could lead to potential
defaults before the scheduled maturity in 2014, eroding the credit
enhancement that the tranches benefit from.  Of note is the fact
that all rated notes except class E are still current on interest
payments given they have not been even partially written down.

The affirmation of the senior tranches mainly reflects their
position in the structure making them less exposed to losses in
the portfolio The Negative Outlook on the class A1a is due to the
23% concentration of the portfolio in structured finance assets
rated 'Bsf' and below which have shown a poor performance over the
past years and could filter through as defaults in the coming
years.

The affirmation of classes D1 and D2 in Brooklands 2005-1 reflects
the low amount of protection in the form of subordination, as
little as 1%, compared with a nearly 10% 'CCC' and below rated
bucket, making the repayment of principal at scheduled final
maturity in 2015 unlikely.

Fitch has assigned an Issuer Report Grade (IRG) of two stars
("Basic") to the reporting of all three deals due to the standard
level of information received by the agency.  The lack of basic
counterparty and agent information listed and the fact that
portfolio changes (trading activity) are not clearly identified is
what prevented the reporting from getting a three stars IRG.

The rating actions are as follows:

Brooklands 2001-1

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0132520098) affirmed at 'CCCsf'
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0132520841) affirmed at 'CCsf'
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0132521575) affirmed at 'Dsf'
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0132521906) affirmed at 'Dsf'
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0132525725) affirmed at 'Dsf'

Brooklands 2004-1

  -- Class A1-a (ISIN XS0193140901) affirmed at 'Bsf', Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class A1-b (ISIN XS0193141388) affirmed at 'CCCsf'
  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0193141891) affirmed at 'CCsf'
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0193142436) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class C-E (ISIN XS0193142782) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class C-Y (ISIN XS0193142865) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0193143590) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0193143913) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'

Brooklands 2005-1

  -- Class D1 (ISIN XS0226777133) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class D2 (ISIN XS0226777216) affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0226777729) affirmed at 'Dsf'


BRYN AWEL: Goes Into Liquidation; 12 Staff Lose Jobs
----------------------------------------------------
The Flintshire Chronicle reports that The Bryn Awel Hotel has
closed down with 12 members of staff losing their jobs.

Owners Graham and Liz Fender have since confirmed to the Chronicle
the Bryn Awel has gone into liquidation.  The 18-bedroom venue
closed on Friday and will not reopen, the report discloses.

The Chronicle notes that although there are hotels on the
outskirts of Mold, the Bryn Awel was the only one in the town
centre and had been operating for 50 years.

"It's a blow to the town and I'm very disappointed," the report
quotes Mold councillor Chris Bithell as saying.  "We are trying to
encourage people to visit Mold to see what it has to offer and
they need places to stay."

In February 2010, the Chronicle recalls, former Bryn Awel owner
Greg Shankar was jailed for 15 months after admitted defrauding
Mold Food Festival out of more than GBP66,000 to help prop up his
failing business.


CLARIS IV SERIES 25: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has confirmed the following ratings on the Class I
Swaps issued by Claris IV Limited - Series 25.

   -- Class I-A Swap, Series 25 at AA (low) (sf)
   -- Class I-B Swap, Series 25 at BBB (low) (sf)
   -- Class I-C Swap, Series 25 at BB (low) (sf)

Claris IV Limited - Series 25 is collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
and other asset-backed securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the
Class I-A Swap, Class I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap address the
probability of breaching their respective attachment points as
defined in the transaction documents at or prior to their maturity
dates.

The principal methodology is Rating US & European Structured
Finance CDO Restructurings, which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.


CLARIS IV SERIES 28: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has downgraded the Class I-B Swap, Series 28 issued by
Claris IV Limited - Series 28 from a BBB (low) (sf) rating to a BB
(sf).

DBRS has confirmed the Class I-C Swap, Series 28 issued by Claris
IV Limited - Series 28 at BB (low) (sf).

Claris IV Limited Series 28 is collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS),
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and other asset-
backed securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the Class I-B Swap
and the Class I-C Swap address the probability of breaching their
respective attachment points as defined in the transaction
documents at or prior to their maturity dates.

The actions reflect the deterioration in credit quality of the
underlying collateral pool since the transaction was last assigned
a DBRS rating on August 11, 2010.

The principal methodology is Rating US & European Structured
Finance CDO Restructurings, which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.


CLARIS IV SERIES 29: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class I-C Swap
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has confirmed the following ratings on the Class I
Swaps issued by Claris IV Limited - Series 29.

   -- Class I-A Swap, Series 29 at AA (low) (sf)
   -- Class I-B Swap, Series 29 at BBB (low) (sf)
   -- Class I-C Swap, Series 29 at BB (low) (sf)

Claris IV Limited - Series 29 is collateralized primarily by a
portfolio of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
and other asset-backed securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the
Class I-A Swap, Class I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap address the
probability of breaching their respective attachment points as
defined in the transaction documents at or prior to their maturity
dates.

The principal methodology is Rating US & European Structured
Finance CDO Restructurings, which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.


MISSOURI TOPCO: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B2'; Outlook Remains Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has lowered to B2 from B1 the corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating of Missouri
TopCo Limited (Matalan). The outlook remains negative. The rating
action follows the further downward revision to the company's
EBITDA guidance in its second quarter results announcement for
FY2012 (to February). Concurrently, Moody's has lowered Matalan
Finance Plc's senior secured rating to Ba3 (LGD2) from Ba2, and
its senior unsecured rating to Caa1 (LGD5) from B3.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's view that in light of the
company's revised guidance for earnings in FY2012, the company's
key metrics, as adjusted by Moody's, will no longer be
commensurate with the previous B1 rating (with a negative
outlook), notably for gross leverage not to exceed 6x. More
specifically, the company has revised guidance for EBITDA to the
GBP100-110 million range, compared with the GBP130-135 million
range that had been factored into Moody's previous rating. In the
year to August, Moody's estimates gross adjusted leverage to be
c.6.3x, which Moody's expects will increase further towards the
end of the current fiscal year based on current guidance. Moody's
also expects that the earnings trend will further reduce headroom
under financial covenants for the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF)
which Moody's had indicated could result in downward pressure on
the rating.

Although second quarter sales were fairly stable, the company
attributed the sharp fall in earnings in the last two quarters to
a number of factors, including higher cost of sales; higher
promotional activity in July and August, including advertising;
the VAT increase in January 2011; and an adverse currency effect
from the GBP/US$ exchange rate. The reported EBITDA from
continuing operations (before exceptional items) fell from GBP36.7
million in Q2 FY2011 to GBP13.6 million in Q2 FY2012. Moody's
further notes that working capital turned negative in the quarter
which the company attributed to the intake of the autumn and
winter season stock being brought forward compared with last year
to ensure core stock availability, as well as higher unit prices.

Moody's believes that the more recent stability in some commodity
prices should, if sustained, ease cost pressure on Matalan.
Moody's also views favorably the company's statements that it will
reduce capital spending (now targeted at c.GBP21 million in FY2012
and GBP10 million in FY2013), and that it expects to end the
financial year with c.GBP80 million in cash. The company also
retained access to the GBP37 million unused amount under its RCF
as of August 2011. On this basis, in order to retain a
satisfactory liquidity profile Moody's would expect the company to
maintain adequate headroom under its financial covenants and
continued access to its RCF.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that at least over the
short-to-medium term earnings will remain under pressure. In light
of the negative outlook, positive pressure on the rating or
outlook is unlikely at this time. Nevertheless, Moody's would
consider positive rating pressure if earnings improved and
adjusted leverage were to fall back towards 5x with a strong
liquidity profile. Negative pressure on the ratings could develop
if the company reports a further deterioration in its operational
performance, such that its debt/EBITDA ratio were to remain above
6.5x on a continued basis, or if liquidity were to weaken, as
reflected mainly in the company's ability to retain adequate
covenants headroom and continued access to its RCF.

LAST RATING ACTION & PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

Moody's last announcement on Matalan was implemented on July 26,
2011 when the CFR was lowered to B1 from Ba3.

The principal methodology used in rating Missouri Topco Ltd. was
the Global Retail Industry Methodology published in June 2011.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Skelmersdale, UK, Missouri TopCo Limited is the
ultimate holding company that owns Matalan Retail Limited -- the
principal operating subsidiary of the group -- a leading out-of-
town value clothing retailer with total revenue of GBP1.1 billion
in the financial year ending February 26, 2011.


* UK: IVAs Outnumber Bankruptcies in Q2, IS Figures Show
---------------------------------------------------------
Figures released by the Insolvency Service show that, of the
30,513 individual insolvencies in England and Wales during Q2
2011, more than 39% of them took the form of an IVA and IVAs
outnumbered bankruptcy in the second quarter.

Debt experts at Moneysolve consider this positive news, commenting
that:

"This is such a good indication that consumers are more aware of
all the options available to them if they become insolvent.
Bankruptcy is not the only option for insolvent individuals for
many years and it seems that awareness of the IVA and debt relief
order is on the increase."

Moneysolve, who offers a range of debt solutions including IVAs
and debt management plans, believes that an awareness of all the
options is critical, adding:

"Every case is different. People's circumstances and the degree of
their financial problems differs widely and in order to really
resolve debt problems, the solution simply has to be tailored to
the individual."


* UK: High Court Winds Up Three Wills and Trusts Companies
----------------------------------------------------------
Three companies involved in the provision of will and trusts were
wound up in the High Court last week, following an investigation
by Company Investigations, part of The Insolvency Service.

Minster Legal Services (UK) Limited and Legal Assistance Limited -
- both based in Gainsborough, Lincolnshire -- and Legal Assistance
4 U Limited trading from Newark, Nottinghamshire, operated
nationwide using telesales staff to cold-call consumers to
persuade them to accept a home visit from a self employed `legal
consultant? who would then promote the companies? products.

The investigation found that Minster Legal Services (UK) Limited
operated using a deliberate lack of transparency in order to
disguise the controllers of the business, that a disqualified
director acted in the management of the company as though he were
a director; that company funds were diverted into a bank account
over which the company had no control, that the company failed to
maintain adequate financial and accounting records and that it
traded in a manner which was misleading and contrary to the public
interest.

The investigation also found that clients of the company were
charged significantly different prices for substantially the same
product without any adequate reason for doing so, that there were
significant delays in the administration of clients? affairs, that
some clients were sold products which were inappropriate for their
circumstances and the Official Order used by the company failed to
provide the necessary detail regarding a client?s right to cancel
their agreement. The company was also found to be insolvent.

In relation to Legal Assistance Limited, the investigation found
that the company had been used to continue the business of Minster
Legal Services (UK) Limited and continue the mischief described
above. The company also failed to make refunds to clients in a
timely manner and provided unfounded explanations to clients for
not having done so. The investigators also found evidence of the
disqualified director removing company documents from the
company?s trading premises.

The investigation found that Legal Assistance 4U Limited was
principally a telesales operation being run on behalf of Legal
Assistance Limited, and thus linked to the objectionable trading
activities of that company.

Together the three companies acquired sales income of over
GBP1.1 million.


* UK: Need to Strengthen Laws on Pre-Pack Administrations
---------------------------------------------------------
Maximilian Clarke at Fresh Business Thinking reports that UK law
on pre-pack administrations is considered a soft touch by European
companies, who are increasingly taking advantage of this to
register their businesses bankrupt in the UK.

Carole Hughes, managing director of credit management and debt
collection agency Daniels Silverman, is highlighting the issue,
encouraging business owners to sigh an online petition calling for
existing laws to be strengthened, Fresh Business Thinking
discloses.

"We note recent press reports on the increase in failing companies
transferring from European countries to Britain and then using
British bankruptcy laws to go bust," Fresh Business Thinking
quotes Ms. Hughes as saying.  "It is clear that the UK law is
considered a soft touch in other European countries and companies
are jumping on the band wagon to take advantage of this."

The technique of "bankruptcy tourism" allows European companies to
use the UK's more lenient insolvency laws to get rid of their
creditors and then re-launch the company without any debt,
Fresh Business Thinking discloses.

"While the Insolvency Service is technically able to do something
about it, usually the damage has already been done and the company
has been able to take advantage of Britain?s easy going bankruptcy
rules," Ms. Hughes, as cited by Fresh Business Thinking, said.

"We believe that the loophole whereby companies are using pre-
packs to avoid their creditors and set up again should be closed."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 24 to October 28, 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon     Maturity   Currency   Price
------                ------     --------   --------   -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT        5.470    8/28/2013       EUR    60.25
BAWAG                   5.430    2/26/2024       EUR    67.52
BAWAG                   5.400    2/12/2023       EUR    71.01
BAWAG                   5.310    2/12/2023       EUR    70.46
HAA-BANK INTL AG        5.270     4/7/2028       EUR    60.83
IMMOFINANZ              4.250     3/8/2018       EUR     3.65
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.750    4/30/2021       EUR    69.16
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.170    7/29/2015       EUR    66.38
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.160    5/20/2025       EUR    72.01
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810    7/29/2025       EUR    60.63
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.270     2/8/2027       EUR    56.80
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         5.470    2/28/2028       EUR    66.68
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500    9/28/2035       EUR    53.09


BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP          4.000     6/1/2016       EUR    19.29
IDEAL STANDARD I       11.750     5/1/2018       EUR    71.84
IDEAL STANDARD I       11.750     5/1/2018       EUR    72.38

CROATIA
-------
ZAGREBACKI HOLD         5.500    7/10/2017       EUR    73.04

CYPRUS
------
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500     1/4/2017       EUR    72.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    10/9/2016       EUR    72.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        3.750    11/1/2015       EUR    72.78
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600    2/26/2019       EUR    69.99
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600    4/23/2018       EUR    70.71
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    9/28/2017       EUR    70.93
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500     4/2/2017       EUR    71.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    2/15/2017       EUR    71.96
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.625     2/3/2020       EUR    68.44

DENMARK
-------
FIN-DANISH IND          4.910     7/6/2021       EUR    53.63
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500     2/3/2016       TRY    72.37

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500     2/9/2016       ZAR    74.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    4/26/2016       ZAR    73.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000    6/30/2017       ZAR    67.97
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    4/27/2018       ZAR    61.15
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    3/17/2025       CAD    59.30
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250    6/28/2040       CAD    23.82

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970     4/1/2015       EUR    11.54
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000     1/1/2015       EUR     3.19
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720     1/1/2015       EUR     5.02
ASSYSTEM                4.000     1/1/2017       EUR    20.35
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500     1/1/2016       EUR    51.85
BNP PARIBAS             2.890    5/16/2036       JPY    63.05
CALYON                  6.000    6/18/2047       EUR    16.92
CALYON                  5.800   10/29/2029       USD    74.38
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000     1/1/2012       EUR    42.03
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500     1/1/2014       EUR    39.27
CGG VERITAS             1.750     1/1/2016       EUR    26.32
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000     6/8/2012       EUR    13.76
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110    11/1/2015       EUR    18.09
CMA CGM                 8.875    4/15/2019       EUR    43.94
CMA CGM                 8.875    4/15/2019       EUR    43.63
CMA CGM                 8.500    4/15/2017       USD    44.31
CMA CGM                 8.500    4/15/2017       USD    49.00
CNP ASSURANCES          6.000    9/14/2040       EUR    72.69
CNP ASSURANCES          6.875    9/30/2041       EUR    75.56
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850    6/30/2031       USD    71.96
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.830    6/30/2031       USD    71.77
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.610    6/15/2031       USD    69.65
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.650    6/10/2031       USD    70.06
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850    5/27/2031       USD    72.02
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.880     4/8/2031       USD    73.86
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.220    3/17/2031       USD    75.86
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.150    2/11/2031       USD    75.05
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.950    1/19/2031       USD    73.52
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.050    1/14/2031       USD    74.46
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.000   12/23/2030       USD    71.37
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.400    12/9/2030       USD    68.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.690   11/26/2030       USD    71.21
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.080   11/23/2030       USD    65.34
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.450    11/9/2030       USD    68.91
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.910    11/3/2030       USD    64.78
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.350   10/29/2030       USD    68.00
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.250   10/18/2030       USD    67.18
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300   10/12/2030       USD    65.34
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300    10/7/2030       USD    67.59
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.850    9/17/2030       USD    63.26
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.270     8/5/2030       USD    67.64
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300   10/22/2030       USD    67.71
CREDIT AGRICOLE         4.500   12/22/2019       EUR    73.34
CREDIT LOCAL FRA        3.750    5/26/2020       EUR    62.70
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.110    9/18/2018       EUR    70.40
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        5.037     8/4/2020       EUR    69.25
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.550     4/2/2020       EUR    67.46
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.500    2/25/2020       EUR    67.12
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        2.875    4/23/2030       CHF    71.46
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000   12/23/2024       EUR    60.46
EURAZEO                 6.250    6/10/2014       EUR    58.88
EUROPCAR GROUPE         9.375    4/15/2018       EUR    67.40
EUROPCAR GROUPE         9.375    4/15/2018       EUR    66.50
FAURECIA                4.500     1/1/2015       EUR    24.09
FONCIERE REGIONS        3.340     1/1/2017       EUR    75.21
GROUPAMA SA             7.875   10/27/2039       EUR    53.25
INGENICO                2.750     1/1/2017       EUR    43.10
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2014       EUR    18.47
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2015       EUR    17.46
NEXANS SA               4.000     1/1/2016       EUR    60.50
NOVASEP HLDG            9.750   12/15/2016       USD    43.00
ORPEA                   3.875     1/1/2016       EUR    44.79
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875     6/1/2018       EUR    73.00
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875     6/1/2018       EUR    75.91
PEUGEOT SA              4.450     1/1/2016       EUR    25.92
PIERRE VACANCES         4.000    10/1/2015       EUR    70.11
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125    7/30/2014       EUR    37.87
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000    1/18/2018       EUR    48.93
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750     4/1/2020       EUR    20.53
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.920    3/17/2031       USD    70.22
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.900    3/10/2031       USD    70.06
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860    3/11/2031       USD    69.62
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.940    3/14/2031       USD    70.43
SOCIETE GENERALE        6.010    3/15/2031       USD    71.11
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860    4/26/2031       USD    69.93
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.910    3/16/2031       USD    70.13
SOITEC                  6.250     9/9/2014       EUR     7.59
TEM                     4.250     1/1/2015       EUR    52.87
THEOLIA                 2.700     1/1/2041       EUR     9.16
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500     2/1/2014       EUR    75.50
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500     2/1/2014       EUR    75.50

GERMANY
-------
BAYERISCHE HYPO         5.000   12/21/2029       EUR    71.57
BAYERISCHE LNDBK        4.500     2/7/2019       EUR    74.06
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.450    2/20/2023       EUR    69.11
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.640    1/30/2024       EUR    67.05
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.600    4/14/2023       EUR    69.83
COMMERZBANK AG          4.000   11/30/2017       EUR    41.99
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000    3/30/2018       EUR    41.96
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000    4/20/2018       EUR    42.04
COMMERZBANK AG          6.460    6/24/2022       EUR    74.20
COMMERZBANK AG          6.360    3/15/2022       EUR    73.88
COMMERZBANK AG          6.300    3/15/2022       EUR    73.73
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN        5.300   11/20/2023       EUR    69.05
DG BANK                 7.030    7/31/2020       EUR   110.62
DG BANK                 7.150    11/9/2020       EUR   111.65
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.000    2/25/2020       EUR    76.41
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.290    5/31/2021       EUR    69.28
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.210    6/20/2022       EUR    72.83
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.180    2/28/2023       EUR    70.03
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.160    8/14/2024       EUR    74.17
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.350    6/13/2028       EUR    72.51
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.700    7/31/2023       EUR    67.44
DZ BANK AG              4.500   10/28/2020       EUR    93.56
DZ BANK AG              6.350     4/9/2018       EUR   107.26
DZ BANK AG              5.750    1/22/2015       EUR   104.95
EUROHYPO AG             3.830    9/21/2020       EUR    57.38
EUROHYPO AG             5.110     8/6/2018       EUR    69.13
EUROHYPO AG             5.560    8/18/2023       EUR    61.50
EUROHYPO AG             6.490    7/17/2017       EUR     4.13
GOTHAER ALLG VER        5.527    9/29/2026       EUR    71.01
HECKLER & KOCH          9.500    5/15/2018       EUR    78.38
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250    4/15/2018       EUR    66.75
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250    4/15/2018       EUR    67.25
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375    2/14/2017       EUR    56.64
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        4.500     7/9/2013       EUR    62.01
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500    5/10/2027       CAD    48.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250   10/20/2015       EUR    27.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.800    2/23/2037       JPY    38.90
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN        5.875    2/10/2016       EUR    69.77
Q-CELLS                 6.750   10/21/2015       EUR     0.89
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750    3/22/2013       USD     1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK        6.600    5/29/2022       EUR    68.88
SOLARWORLD AG           6.125    1/21/2017       EUR    63.52
SOLARWORLD AG           6.375    7/13/2016       EUR    67.69
TAG IMMO AG             6.500   12/10/2015       EUR     7.74
TUI AG                  2.750    3/24/2016       EUR    39.40
TUI AG                  5.500   11/17/2014       EUR    60.58
VOLKSWAGEN BANK         5.400    9/26/2023       EUR    70.13
VOLKSWAGEN BANK         5.500     6/7/2024       EUR    68.23

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008    7/18/2017       EUR    35.15
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301    8/12/2014       EUR    35.69
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.057    3/26/2013       EUR    45.89
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851    9/19/2016       EUR    34.87
FAGE DAIRY IND          7.500    1/15/2015       EUR    78.00
FAGE DAIRY IND          7.500    1/15/2015       EUR    78.00
HELLENIC RAILWAY        4.500    12/6/2016       JPY    34.98
HELLENIC RAILWAY        7.350     3/3/2015       JPY    34.98
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900    7/25/2025       EUR    25.44
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300    7/25/2030       EUR    25.00
HELLENIC REPUB          4.625    6/25/2013       USD    73.75
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000    3/11/2019       EUR    37.38
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200    7/17/2034       EUR    33.00
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590     4/8/2016       EUR    34.00
HELLENIC REPUB          2.125     7/5/2013       CHF    49.38
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140    4/14/2028       EUR    34.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300    3/20/2012       EUR    55.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250    5/18/2012       EUR    49.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250    6/20/2012       EUR    68.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI        1.000    6/30/2012       EUR    66.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.100    8/20/2012       EUR    46.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.506    3/31/2013       EUR    44.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    5/20/2013       EUR    39.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        7.500    5/20/2013       EUR    41.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.900     7/3/2013       EUR    45.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.427    7/31/2013       EUR    40.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.000    8/20/2013       EUR    38.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.520    9/30/2013       EUR    40.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500    1/11/2014       EUR    38.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    5/20/2014       EUR    38.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500     7/1/2014       EUR    36.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985    7/25/2014       EUR    35.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500    8/20/2014       EUR    38.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113    9/30/2014       EUR    36.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700    7/20/2015       EUR    38.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100    8/20/2015       EUR    39.83
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702    9/30/2015       EUR    36.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   11/10/2015       EUR    36.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600    7/20/2016       EUR    39.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020    9/13/2016       EUR    37.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225     3/1/2017       EUR    37.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900    4/20/2017       EUR    37.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300    7/20/2017       EUR    37.48
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675    10/9/2017       EUR    38.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000    7/19/2019       EUR    36.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500   10/22/2019       EUR    37.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250    6/19/2020       EUR    38.46
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   10/22/2022       EUR    32.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700    3/20/2024       EUR    32.11
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300    3/20/2026       EUR    32.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    9/20/2037       EUR    30.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    9/20/2040       EUR    30.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    7/20/2018       EUR    37.60
NATL BK GREECE          3.875    10/7/2016       EUR    56.14
YIOULA GLASSWORK        9.000    12/1/2015       EUR    54.70
YIOULA GLASSWORK        9.000    12/1/2015       EUR    52.00

GUERNSEY
--------
CALYON FIN GUER         6.000     9/4/2029       USD    75.28
CREDIT AGRICOLE         5.600    2/25/2030       USD    71.76

HUNGARY
-------
OTP BANK                5.270    9/19/2016       EUR    75.29

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000     3/1/2030       EUR    49.14
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580    4/28/2028       EUR    54.81
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        4.875    6/29/2017       EUR    73.96
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    2/12/2030       EUR    49.18
ALLIED IRISH BKS        4.000    3/19/2015       EUR    74.00
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625   11/12/2014       EUR    75.73
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500    6/25/2035       GBP    28.63
ANGLO IRISH BANK        4.000    4/15/2015       EUR    73.67
BANESTO FINANC          5.000    3/23/2030       EUR    67.55
BANK OF IRELAND         5.600    9/18/2023       EUR    47.38
BANK OF IRELAND         4.473   11/30/2016       EUR    65.00
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000    2/12/2020       EUR    64.00
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000    2/12/2020       GBP    37.13
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760     9/7/2029       EUR    51.20
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.360   10/12/2029       EUR    48.39
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400    11/6/2029       EUR    48.62
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450     3/1/2030       EUR    48.45
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500     3/3/2025       CAD    39.17
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900    8/24/2035       CAD    65.79
DEPFA ACS BANK          3.250    7/31/2031       CHF    73.01
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125    3/16/2037       USD    68.30
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.000    2/25/2015       EUR    74.67
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.000    3/10/2015       EUR    72.95
UT2 FUNDING PLC         5.321    6/30/2016       EUR    71.01
BANCA MARCHE            3.900    8/17/2020       EUR    73.39
BANCA MARCHE            4.000    1/10/2021       EUR    72.78
BANCA MARCHE            4.000    5/26/2021       EUR    71.92
BANCA MARCHE            4.360     1/4/2022       ITL    73.94
BANCA MARCHE            5.125    5/14/2024       ITL    75.54
BANCA MARCHE            4.000     7/9/2020       EUR    74.26
BANCA MARCHE            3.600   11/12/2020       EUR    70.91
BANCA MARCHE            3.700     9/1/2020       EUR    72.21
BANCA MARCHE            5.500    9/16/2030       EUR    71.00
BANCA POP MILANO        4.000    4/23/2020       EUR    72.77
BANCA POP MILANO        3.500    6/30/2018       EUR    75.65
BANCA POP VICENT        4.970    4/20/2027       EUR    70.75
BANCO POPOLARE          6.375    5/31/2021       EUR    74.29
BTPS                    4.000     2/1/2037       EUR    71.60
BTPS I/L                2.550    9/15/2041       EUR    65.81
BTPS I/L                2.350    9/15/2035       EUR    66.91
CASSA RISP CENTO        4.500    9/12/2015       EUR    74.25
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.000    1/18/2015       EUR    74.88
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000     8/5/2015       EUR    74.25
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.500     3/5/2016       EUR    68.50
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000    11/2/2016       EUR    66.13
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.575     2/2/2017       EUR    67.13
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.400    9/17/2017       EUR    60.00
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.500    11/2/2020       EUR    54.13
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000     9/2/2015       EUR    73.75
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019    6/29/2035       EUR    71.12
DEXIA CREDIOP           4.790   12/17/2043       EUR    69.05
MONTE DEI PASCHI        5.750    9/30/2016       GBP    73.03
REP OF ITALY            2.200    9/15/2058       EUR    54.83
REP OF ITALY            1.850    9/15/2057       EUR    47.44
REP OF ITALY            4.850    6/11/2060       EUR    69.90
REP OF ITALY            2.870    5/19/2036       JPY    61.19
REP OF ITALY            2.000    9/15/2062       EUR    49.84
SEAT PAGINE            10.500    1/31/2017       EUR    62.78
SEAT PAGINE            10.500    1/31/2017       EUR    63.67
SEAT PAGINE            10.500    1/31/2017       EUR    63.00
SEAT PAGINE            10.500    1/31/2017       EUR    62.90
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250    3/17/2055       EUR    66.46
UGF ASSICURAZION        5.660    7/28/2023       EUR    64.33
UNICREDITO ITALI        5.000     2/1/2016       GBP    70.00

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250     4/1/2014       EUR    24.38
CONTROLINVESTE          3.000    1/28/2015       EUR    69.48
ESPIRITO SANTO F        6.875   10/21/2019       EUR    52.42
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014       EUR    16.10
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014       EUR    16.00

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750    10/1/2005       USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/17/2016       TRY    71.79
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    4/27/2016       TRY    71.21
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    5/25/2016       TRY    70.84
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    6/22/2016       TRY    70.43
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    9/15/2016       TRY    69.27
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/29/2021       NZD    64.26
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    5/12/2021       ZAR    43.84
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    6/22/2021       ZAR    43.40
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500     3/3/2021       NZD    64.52
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    2/24/2025       CAD    59.14
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500    5/15/2014       USD    41.38
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500    5/15/2014       USD    42.00
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625    12/9/2030       GBP    54.92
DEXIA FUNDING           5.875     2/9/2017       GBP    58.50
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500    4/10/2018       USD    56.97
FINANCE & CREDIT       10.500    1/25/2014       USD    50.00
FRIESLAND BANK          4.210   12/29/2025       EUR    67.77
INDAH KIAT INTL        12.500    6/15/2006       USD     0.01
ING BANK NV             4.200   12/19/2035       EUR    67.38
IVG FINANCE BV          1.750    3/29/2017       EUR    71.70
KBC IFIMA NV            4.200    8/16/2020       EUR    74.94
KBC IFIMA NV            4.250    7/15/2020       EUR    75.45
KBC IFIMA NV            8.500     2/7/2025       USD    69.00
LEHMAN BROS TSY         4.870    10/8/2013       USD    33.00
MARFRIG HLDG EUR        8.375     5/9/2018       USD    75.00
MARFRIG HLDG EUR        8.375     5/9/2018       USD    74.99
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983     5/7/2029       EUR    18.77
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500    3/11/2025       CAD    58.58
NIB CAPITAL BANK        4.510   12/16/2035       EUR    61.96
POLYSINDO FIN           9.375    7/30/2007       USD     0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN        4.500    6/16/2025       EUR    68.12
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750    5/26/2014       EUR    18.39
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        1.375    2/28/2012       EUR    35.50
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        5.000    2/27/2037       EUR    67.97
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        2.910    6/21/2036       JPY    70.01
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000    4/20/2016       USD    68.00
SNS BANK                6.250   10/26/2020       EUR    58.73
SNS BANK                6.625    5/14/2018       EUR    73.94
SNS BANK                4.580    3/20/2026       EUR    74.04
SRLEV NV                9.000    4/15/2041       EUR    67.40
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250     8/1/2001       USD     0.00

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500     5/9/2030       CAD    45.02
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    7/26/2016       ZAR    72.93
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    7/29/2016       TRY    69.10
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    7/29/2016       ZAR    72.41
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    5/25/2018       ZAR    61.35
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    5/25/2016       ZAR    73.98
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    3/24/2016       ZAR    75.02
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125   10/15/2015       USD    49.63
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125   10/15/2015       USD    49.63
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750    6/15/2016       EUR    46.63
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750    6/15/2016       EUR    46.75
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.000    6/26/2017       EUR    39.97
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125   10/15/2033       USD    41.00
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125   10/15/2033       USD    40.33
RENEWABLE CORP          6.500     6/4/2014       EUR    59.07

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG        9.250   10/13/2014       EUR    70.95
BANCO COM PORTUG        4.750    6/22/2017       EUR    66.40
BANCO COM PORTUG        5.625    4/23/2014       EUR    68.46
BANCO COM PORTUG        3.750    10/8/2016       EUR    65.54
BANCO ESPIRITO          3.875    1/21/2015       EUR    70.98
BANCO ESPIRITO          3.375    2/17/2015       EUR    73.99
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.875    7/15/2016       EUR    69.66
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600    9/15/2016       EUR    67.73
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600    1/26/2017       EUR    65.72
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.160    7/23/2015       EUR    73.38
BRISA                   4.500    12/5/2016       EUR    74.11
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.455    8/20/2017       EUR    62.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.500   11/13/2017       EUR    71.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380    10/1/2038       EUR    50.35
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.980     3/3/2028       EUR    57.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.320     8/5/2021       EUR    55.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250    1/27/2020       EUR    63.92
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400    10/8/2019       EUR    65.70
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750    2/14/2016       EUR    71.55
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750    3/14/2016       EUR    71.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.090     6/8/2016       EUR    69.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.165     7/8/2016       EUR    69.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.570    8/12/2016       EUR    67.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        3.875    12/6/2016       EUR    66.98
COMBOIOS DE PORT        4.170   10/16/2019       EUR    53.05
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799    12/7/2027       EUR    55.66
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061    12/4/2026       EUR    54.41
METRO DE LISBOA         7.300   12/23/2025       EUR    70.58
MONTEPIO GERAL          5.000     2/8/2017       EUR    61.00
PARPUBLICA              4.191   10/15/2014       EUR    70.13
PARPUBLICA              4.200   11/16/2026       EUR    41.75
PARPUBLICA              3.500     7/8/2013       EUR    76.50
PARPUBLICA              3.567    9/22/2020       EUR    45.13
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500    3/25/2015       USD    70.38
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500    3/25/2015       USD    70.19
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100    4/15/2037       EUR    48.94
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.950   10/25/2023       EUR    54.84
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850    4/15/2021       EUR    55.21
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.800    6/15/2020       EUR    57.05
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.750    6/14/2019       EUR    58.13
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.450    6/15/2018       EUR    58.85
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.350   10/16/2017       EUR    59.51
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.200   10/15/2016       EUR    64.43
PORTUGUESE OT'S         6.400    2/15/2016       EUR    72.20
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.600   10/15/2014       EUR    70.90
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.375    6/16/2014       EUR    73.53
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.350   10/15/2015       EUR    68.75
REFER                   5.875    2/18/2019       EUR    58.00
REFER                   4.675   10/16/2024       EUR    45.63
REFER                   4.000    3/16/2015       EUR    48.13
REFER                   4.047   11/16/2026       EUR    48.52
REFER                   4.250   12/13/2021       EUR    46.63

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA             17.500    5/23/2012       RUB     0.38
ARIZK                   3.000   12/20/2030       RUB    51.93
DVTG-FINANS            17.000    8/29/2013       RUB    55.55
DVTG-FINANS             7.750    7/18/2013       RUB    20.29
IART                    8.500     8/4/2013       RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  17.000    9/17/2012       RUB    12.02
MOSMART FINANS          0.010    4/12/2012       RUB     1.81
NOK                    12.500    8/26/2014       RUB     5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA        1.000   12/17/2012       RUB     0.01
PROTON-FINANCE          9.000    6/12/2012       RUB    65.00
RBC OJSC                7.000    4/23/2015       RUB    65.00
RBC OJSC                3.270    4/19/2018       RUB    40.01
RBC OJSC                7.000    4/23/2015       RUB    65.00
SAHO                   10.000    5/21/2012       RUB     3.00
SATURN                  8.500     6/6/2014       RUB     1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500    3/27/2012       RUB     3.40
TERNA-FINANS            1.000    11/4/2011       RUB    15.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750    5/25/2027       EUR    67.71
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750    6/30/2025       EUR    60.52
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.250   10/25/2023       EUR    70.13
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   12/14/2022       EUR    66.95
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.000    3/24/2021       EUR    74.32
BANCAJA                 1.500    5/22/2018       EUR    63.35
BANCO BILBAO VIZ        6.025     3/3/2033       EUR    59.95
BANCO BILBAO VIZ        4.500    2/16/2022       EUR    72.74
BANCO PASTOR            4.550    7/31/2020       EUR    75.13
BBVA SUB CAP UNI        2.750   10/22/2035       JPY    43.44
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500    6/23/2021       EUR    59.27
CAJA MADRID             4.125    3/24/2036       EUR    67.71
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        3.875    5/23/2025       EUR    61.46
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        4.250    4/10/2031       EUR    56.69
CEDULAS TDA A-4         4.125    4/10/2021       EUR    74.37
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250    3/28/2027       EUR    61.86
CEMEX ESPANA LUX        8.875    5/12/2017       EUR    76.84
CEMEX ESPANA LUX        9.250    5/12/2020       USD    80.50
CEMEX ESPANA LUX        8.875    5/12/2017       EUR    69.13
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900   11/30/2035       EUR    62.15
COMUN AUTO CANAR        4.200   10/25/2036       EUR    65.24
COMUNIDAD BALEAR        4.063   11/23/2035       EUR    63.71
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300    9/15/2026       EUR    73.81
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.965     9/8/2039       JPY    58.53
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.690   10/28/2034       EUR    70.02
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.750    3/24/2016       CHF    68.49
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.315    9/10/2015       CHF    70.72
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220    4/26/2035       EUR    64.69
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.355   11/10/2015       CHF    69.71
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.125    10/1/2014       CHF    77.31
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750    8/20/2012       EUR    70.79
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500    6/15/2020       EUR    72.46
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        3.250    6/28/2024       CHF    68.41
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        2.570   10/22/2021       CHF    69.00
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         4.250   10/31/2036       EUR    64.70
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         3.170    7/29/2039       JPY    63.57
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         3.065    7/29/2039       JPY    62.09
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875    1/31/2036       EUR    54.25
JUNTA LA MANCHA         2.810   10/14/2022       JPY    73.40
MAPFRE SA               5.921    7/24/2037       EUR    70.08
XUNTA DE GALICIA        4.025   11/28/2035       EUR    72.61

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    9/29/2015       TRY    72.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000    11/4/2011       USD     7.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000    12/7/2011       USD    10.33
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130    1/10/2012       USD     9.59
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500    1/27/2012       USD    10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000    1/27/2012       USD     4.31
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500    2/28/2012       USD     8.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500     3/3/2016       ZAR    74.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    6/14/2016       ZAR    72.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    6/29/2016       TRY    68.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    8/25/2016       ZAR    71.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    8/26/2016       ZAR    71.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    9/20/2016       ZAR    71.06
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    9/30/2016       ZAR    70.47
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500     3/5/2018       AUD    74.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    8/25/2021       ZAR    44.26
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    8/26/2021       AUD    61.83
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   12/17/2027       USD    55.02
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    1/25/2028       USD    54.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000     3/9/2012       USD    10.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750    3/23/2012       USD     8.47
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.250    4/27/2012       USD     8.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500    6/12/2012       USD     8.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000     3/9/2012       USD     9.90

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CRED SUIS NY            9.000   10/12/2012       USD    22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH           2.875    2/20/2012       CHF    62.81
UBS AG                 10.960    7/20/2012       USD    22.93
UBS AG                 11.760    7/31/2012       USD    25.45
UBS AG                 12.040    7/31/2012       USD    34.60
UBS AG                 11.960    8/14/2012       USD    35.49
UBS AG                 15.240    8/23/2012       USD    27.47
UBS AG                 10.910     9/7/2012       USD    41.08
UBS AG                  9.500    8/10/2012       USD    27.82
UBS AG                 10.500   10/15/2012       USD    67.33
UBS AG                 10.200    10/1/2012       USD    71.89
UBS AG                 14.000    5/23/2012       USD     7.00
UBS AG                 13.700    5/23/2012       USD    11.14
UBS AG                 13.300    5/23/2012       USD     3.57
UBS AG                 12.350    3/27/2012       USD    23.65
UBS AG                 10.000    8/23/2013       USD    14.14
UBS AG                  9.640   11/14/2011       USD    10.55
UBS AG                 10.070    3/23/2012       USD    27.66
UBS AG                  9.250    3/20/2012       USD    11.34
UBS AG                  8.720    3/20/2012       USD    26.79
UBS AG                  8.380    3/20/2012       USD    32.03
UBS AG                 10.530    1/23/2012       USD    35.91
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220    7/31/2012       EUR    42.57
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140   12/30/2011       USD    14.50

UKRAINE
-------
LVIV CITY               9.950   12/19/2012       UAH    91.19

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS        5.000    8/26/2030       USD    64.32
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        5.500    6/20/2013       EUR    62.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        3.250    2/25/2013       EUR    61.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.400    2/12/2013       EUR    64.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.000   11/16/2012       EUR    68.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.500    6/21/2013       EUR    57.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        6.000    6/20/2014       EUR    53.00
BAKKAVOR FIN 2          8.250    2/15/2018       GBP    76.25
BAKKAVOR FIN 2          8.250    2/15/2018       GBP    77.50
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.189    3/12/2022       JPY    69.85
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.000    2/22/2021       JPY    73.17
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.359    3/27/2029       JPY    53.53
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.340   12/28/2026       JPY    59.41
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.408     2/9/2027       JPY    58.22
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.000     6/3/2041       USD    71.31
BARCLAYS BK PLC         6.330    9/23/2032       GBP    74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   10/16/2012       USD    10.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.500   10/16/2012       USD     9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC        14.000    10/1/2012       USD     9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000    10/1/2012       USD     9.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000    9/28/2012       USD     9.76
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000    9/11/2012       USD     9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000    9/11/2012       USD     9.72
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500    8/31/2012       USD    22.20
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250    8/31/2012       USD    31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000    8/28/2012       USD     9.27
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800    7/31/2012       USD    25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400    7/31/2012       USD     9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC        11.000    7/27/2012       USD     7.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.000    7/27/2012       USD     8.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.000    7/20/2012       USD     8.59
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000    6/29/2012       USD     9.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.050    4/27/2012       USD    25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950    4/20/2012       USD    23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.950    4/20/2012       USD    16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650    1/31/2012       USD    34.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250    1/31/2012       USD     9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350    1/23/2012       USD    26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550    1/23/2012       USD    10.60
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910     2/1/2047       EUR    73.19
CEVA GROUP PLC         10.000    6/30/2018       EUR    57.75
CEVA GROUP PLC          8.500    6/30/2018       EUR    57.88
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.750    12/2/2024       GBP    70.54
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875    3/28/2033       GBP    66.92
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948    3/31/2037       GBP    71.74
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400    11/2/2047       EUR     9.63
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010     1/9/2036       EUR    32.75
EFG HELLAS PLC          4.375    2/11/2013       EUR    62.72
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.000    12/2/2021       EUR    19.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000    2/28/2013       EUR    55.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.100    12/9/2021       EUR    19.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.000    12/2/2021       EUR    19.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.350    7/22/2014       EUR    35.38
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375    9/26/2031       GBP    61.84
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875     5/9/2025       GBP    62.75
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875    2/15/2021       GBP    66.15
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.500    12/6/2018       GBP    70.57
ESSAR ENERGY            4.250     2/1/2016       USD    72.02
EX-IM BK OF UKRA        5.793     2/9/2016       USD    76.10
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750   12/20/2026       GBP    64.00
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500     6/1/2019       GBP    76.83
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500     6/1/2019       GBP    76.44
HBOS PLC                4.500    3/18/2030       EUR    62.82
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033       USD    56.01
HBOS PLC                4.375   10/30/2019       EUR    74.29
HBOS PLC                5.374    6/30/2021       EUR    68.79
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033       USD    56.01
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067    2/19/2043       GBP    74.13
INEOS GRP HLDG          7.875    2/15/2016       EUR    80.92
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        7.975    9/15/2024       GBP    74.14
LBG CAPITAL NO.2        8.500     6/7/2032       GBP    72.50
LOUIS NO1 PLC          10.000    12/1/2016       EUR    62.00
LOUIS NO1 PLC           8.500    12/1/2014       EUR    70.50
LOUIS NO1 PLC          10.000    12/1/2016       EUR    62.00
MATALAN                 9.625    3/31/2017       GBP    57.33
MATALAN                 9.625    3/31/2017       GBP    56.40
MAX PETROLEUM           6.750     9/8/2013       USD    57.53
NATIONWIDE BLDG         5.600    8/19/2030       USD    71.80
NEW HOSPITALS ST        1.777    2/26/2047       GBP    56.49
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800   12/21/2020       EUR    64.97
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574    1/13/2015       GBP    72.97
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750    2/28/2017       GBP    57.54
OTE PLC                 4.625    5/20/2016       EUR    68.82
PIRAEUS GRP FIN         4.000    9/17/2012       EUR    63.62
PRIVATBANK              5.799     2/9/2016       USD    65.98
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        5.168    6/29/2030       EUR    62.25
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.692     6/9/2025       EUR    66.14
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        2.300   11/26/2024       JPY    64.85
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.625    9/22/2021       EUR    66.37
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.450    5/15/2005       USD     0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.542    3/30/2021       GBP    68.40
UNIQUE PUB FIN          5.659    6/30/2027       GBP    61.67
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369    7/31/2057       GBP    32.31


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *