TCREUR_Public/111102.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, November 2, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 217

                            Headlines



G E R M A N Y

YIOULA GLASSWORKS: Moody's Lowers PDR to Ca/LD, Affirms Caa2 CFR


G R E E C E

* GREECE: PM Calls for Referendum on New Bailout Package


H U N G A R Y

* HUNGARY: Firms Deliberately Slow-Paying 80% of Bills


I R E L A N D

QUINN GROUP: Creditors Agree to Write More Than EUR800-Mil. Debt


L U X E M B O U R G

INTERCONTINENTAL CDO: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
KOENIGINSTRASSE I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1


N E T H E R L A N D S

DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
ENDEMOL BV: Lenders Extend Debt Waiver to November
LAMBDA FINANCE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'B-'
MALIN CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'


P O L A N D

PBG SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


S P A I N

BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Downgrades Senior Debt Rating to 'Ba2'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Pang Da & Youngman to Invest EUR610 Million


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EPIC INDUSTRIOUS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Note Classes to 'D'
EUROSAIL-UK 2007: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on Two Note Classes
PREMIER FOODS: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B2'
TRAVELPORT LLC: Moody's Affirms CFR at 'Caa1'; Outlook Stable
* UK: Plan to Cut Solar Project Subsidies May Prompt Bankruptcies


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Oak Hill Advisors' Debt Fund Nears Halfway Mark
* S&P: One U.S.-Based Default Last Week; 2011 Total at 36


                            *********


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G E R M A N Y
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YIOULA GLASSWORKS: Moody's Lowers PDR to Ca/LD, Affirms Caa2 CFR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Yioula Glassworks S.A.'s
probability-of-default rating (PDR) to Ca/LD (Limited Default)
from Caa2. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the company's Caa2
corporate family rating (CFR) and the Caa3 rating on its senior
unsecured notes. The outlook on all ratings is negative. Moody's
expects to remove the LD designation and to upgrade to PDR after
three business days to Caa2, in line with the CFR.

Ratings Rationale

"The downgrade of Yioula's PDR to Ca/LD reflects the challenges
faced by the company to finalize the long-term refinancing of its
EUR15 million term loan with Piraeus Bank or alternatively
replace it with other long-term lending arrangements," says
Anke Rindermann, Moody's lead analyst for Yioula. The loan, which
was originally due to be repaid by the end of September 2011, was
extended in mid-October until the end of 2011. Moody's considers
that this short-term extension was implemented to avoid a payment
default. Therefore, the rating agency regards the extension as a
distressed exchange and an event of default under its definition.
According to Yioula's management, a term sheet, specifying
details for a long-term extension of the loan, has been approved
meanwhile. However, Moody's notes that no binding agreement has
yet been signed. Yioula expects to sign a contract for the long-
term extension of the loan before year-end 2011.

The affirmation of Yioula's CFR and instrument ratings at Caa2
and Caa3, respectively, reflects that Moody's expects no material
changes to the company's capital structure in the short term. The
rating agency expects Yioula to continue to rely on a substantial
amount of short-term credit lines, which come up for renewal in
Q1 2012. Considering the current state of in particular the
group's Greek relationship banks, which provide about 60% of
committed short term lines, liquidity risk remains the key rating
driver. More fundamentally, the Caa2 reflects also the challenges
on the group's operating performance due to tough trading
conditions in its domestic market. While volumes are up across
most markets, a weaker product mix and substitution of domestic
sales with lower margin export sales have negatively affected the
company's operating profit generation. In addition, higher energy
costs and inflated raw material prices have largely mitigated the
efforts of rising selling prices. At the same time, the company
carries a relatively high debt burden with about 5.5x Debt/EBITDA
as of September 2011 and has very limited financial resources to
repay upcoming maturities should any, and particularly its Greek
relationship banks, struggle to extend its financing to Yioula.

More positively, the CFR continues to reflect (i) Yioula's
dominant position in its core market of south-eastern Europe;
(ii) its long-standing relationships in that region; and the
company's ability to leverage its production in low-cost
countries. While Moody's believes that Yioula's business model
remains fundamentally intact, the rating agency considers that
there is a high risk that liquidity pressure could trigger a
financial restructuring.

The negative outlook mirrors Moody's view that, in light of
continued high input costs and uncertainty regarding the overall
economic environment in Greece, Yioula will be challenged to
improve its performance and leverage metrics over the next few
quarters. Furthermore, the negative outlook is driven by
uncertainty surrounding the company's ability to successfully
refinance its upcoming maturities.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Further negative rating pressure could arise if (i) Yioula were
unable to successfully refinance its upcoming debt maturities; or
(ii) if the company's leverage, as adjusted by Moody's, were to
increase above 7.0x.

Although currently unlikely, Moody's would consider upgrading the
CFR if Yioula were to demonstrate an adequate liquidity profile
by (i) refinancing its upcoming debt maturities on a long-term
basis; or (ii) instating other long-term liquidity sources, such
as revolving liquidity facilities to help it meet its refinancing
requirements.

Downgrades:

   Issuer: Yioula Glassworks S.A.

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ca/LD
      from Caa2

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Yioula Glassworks S.A.
was the Global Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic
Containers Industry Methodology published in June 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Yioula Glassworks S.A., based in Athens (Greece), produces a wide
variety of glass containers for the food and beverage industries
throughout south-eastern Europe as well as glass tableware for
the Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian and Ukrainian markets. Yioula
generated revenues of EUR221 million in the last twelve months
ending September 2011.


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G R E E C E
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* GREECE: PM Calls for Referendum on New Bailout Package
--------------------------------------------------------
Maria Petrakis, Natalie Weeks and Marcus Bensasson at Bloomberg
News report that Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou called a
referendum and a parliamentary confidence vote, raising the
prospect of derailing Europe's bailout effort and pushing Greece
into default.

Mr. Papandreou's gambit risks pushing the country into default if
rejected by voters, and raises the ante with dissidents in his
own party, Bloomberg states.

An opinion poll published Oct. 29 showed most Greeks believe the
accord on a new bailout package and a debt writedown is negative,
Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Papandreou said that the referendum
will likely be held after details of the EU accord are wound up.
The vote of confidence in Parliament will begin today and
conclude late on Nov. 4, Bloomberg says, citing statements by
House Speaker Filipos Petsalnikos on Monday.

EU leaders carved out a second aid package for Greece at a summit
in Brussels lasting into the early hours of Oct. 27, after Mr.
Papandreou scraped together parliamentary approval for the second
round of austerity measures in four months, Bloomberg relates.
Greece will receive EUR130 billion (US$180 billion) in public
funds plus a 50% writedown on Greek debt, following a fully
taxpayer-funded package of EUR110 billion extended in May 2010,
Bloomberg discloses.

Meanwhile, Bloomberg News' Angela Cullen reports that
Rainer Bruederle, parliamentary leader of Germany's Free
Democratic Party, in an interview with Deutschlandfunk radio on
Tuesday said Greece's decision to call a referendum on the latest
European Union accord on the nation's financing may be a sign
that it is "trying to wriggle out of" the agreement and countries
should prepare for a possible default.

"There's only one thing to do, and that is to prepare for the
possibility of a state insolvency in Greece," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Bruederle as saying.


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H U N G A R Y
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* HUNGARY: Firms Deliberately Slow-Paying 80% of Bills
------------------------------------------------------
All Hungary News reports that debt enforcement company Atradius
reveals that Hungarian companies deliberately pay the vast
majority of their invoices late.

Atradius said in a report that payment deadlines in Hungary
generally range between 30 to 90 days, yet 4/5 of bills are
settled after the deadline, as companies find it attractive to
finance their operations via their payables rather than through
bank loans or other forms of capital.

The report also suggests that liquidation procedures are rarely
successful; in 90% of cases, the remaining assets of the company
do not even cover the costs of the liquidation procedure,
according to All Hungary News.  The average length of such
procedures is two to four years and usually longer in Budapest.


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I R E L A N D
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QUINN GROUP: Creditors Agree to Write More Than EUR800-Mil. Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Finbarr Flynn at Bloomberg News reports that creditors of Quinn
Group agreed on Monday to write off more than EUR800 million of
debt at the Irish conglomerate's manufacturing business.

According to Bloomberg, the company said in a statement on its
Web site that the approval of the debt waiver by creditors in
London on Monday will facilitate the sale of the Quinn Insurance
business to a joint venture between Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Liberty Mutual.

Quinn said in April it reached an initial restructuring agreement
with creditors to write off more than EUR500 million in debt,
Bloomberg recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2011, Irish Examiner related that the Quinn family began legal
proceedings against Anglo earlier this year in which they
challenged the appointment of the receiver appointed over their
shares in some of the Quinn Group companies in Ireland, Irish
Examiner disclosed.  They are also taking action in Cyprus
challenging Anglo's appointment of a receiver over shares in a
number of Cypriot companies, Irish Examiner noted.

The Quinn Group -- http://www.quinn-group.com/-- is a business
group headquartered in Derrylin, County Fermanagh, Northern
Ireland.  The privately owned group has ventured into cement and
concrete products, container glass, general insurance, radiators,
plastics, hotels and real estate.


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L U X E M B O U R G
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INTERCONTINENTAL CDO: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has taken various credit
rating actions on all of Intercontinental CDO S.A.'s notes.

Specifically, S&P has:

    -- raised its ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, C, and
       D notes due to an increase in credit enhancement;

    -- affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative, and
       subsequently withdrawn, its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class
       A-1a notes after the issuer fully repaid the notes'
       principal on the latest payment date;

    -- affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its
       'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1b notes, and affirmed
       its ratings on the pfd secs, and combo I, II, and IV
       notes; and

    -- withdrawn its ratings on the combo III and V notes
       following their decoupling into their component parts.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance, and the application of relevant criteria for
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions (see 'Related
Criteria And Research')," S&P related.

Intercontinental CDO has been amortizing since the end of its
reinvestment period in May 2007, by repaying its notes' principal
sequentially. As of the August 2011 trustee report, the portfolio
size has reduced to EUR80.15 million.

"Since our last review, the issuer has fully repaid the EUR61.88
million class A-1a note balance that was outstanding.
Furthermore, only EUR8.25 million of the class A-1b notes (33.00%
of the original balance) remains outstanding," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have also observed an increase in the
weighted-average spread, a decrease in the weighted-average life
of the transaction, and a decrease in the assets that we consider
to be rated 'CCC+' and below. In our view, these developments
have helped increase the credit enhancements for all of the
outstanding notes," S&P related.

"Our analysis has also taken into account other factors, such as
the portfolio's concentration, rating distribution, and
proportion of long-dated assets (assets with a maturity date
after the transaction's legal final maturity date in May 2014),"
S&P said.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. In
our analysis, we have used: the reported portfolio balance that
we consider to be performing (rated 'CCC-' or above); the
principal cash balance; the current weighted-average spread; and
the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered
appropriate. We have incorporated various cash flow stress
scenarios using various default patterns, levels, and timing for
each liability rating category, in conjunction with different
interest stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses and our
2010 counterparty criteria, we consider that the credit
enhancement available to the class A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, C, and D
notes is commensurate with higher ratings than previously
assigned. We have therefore raised our ratings on these notes,"
S&P related.

"At the same time, our analysis indicates that the levels of
credit enhancement available for the class A-1b, pfd secs, and
combo I, II, and IV notes, remain commensurate with their current
ratings. We have therefore affirmed our ratings on these notes,"
S&P said.

"Furthermore, the portfolio manager has confirmed that the combo
III and V notes have been decoupled from combo notes into their
component parts. We have therefore withdrawn our ratings on these
notes," S&P related.

"None of the ratings was constrained by the application of our
largest obligor default test -- a supplemental stress test that
we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (see 'Update To Global
Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P related.

"We have applied our 2010 counterparty criteria and, in our view,
the participants to the transaction are appropriately rated to
support the ratings on the notes (see 'Counterparty and
Supporting Obligations Methodology and Assumptions,' published on
Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

Intercontinental CDO is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.

Ratings List

Intercontinental CDO S.A.
EUR405 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

Class                     Rating
                  To                  From

Ratings Raised

A-2               AAA (sf)            AA+ (sf)
A-3               AAA (sf)            AA+ (sf)
B-1               A- (sf)             BB+ (sf)
B-2               A- (sf)             BB+ (sf)
C                 BB+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
D                 B+ (sf)             B- (sf)

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative, and
Subsequently Withdrawn
                  To                  From

Class A-1a        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
                  NR                  AAA (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-1b              AAA (sf)
Pfd secs          CC (sf)
Combo I           CC (sf)
Combo II          CC (sf)
Combo IV          CC (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

Combo III         NR                  CC (sf)
Combo V           NR                  CC (sf)


KOENIGINSTRASSE I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Koeniginstrasse I S.A.R.L:

Issuer: Koeniginstrasse I S.A.R.L

   -- EUR49.32M Class B Schuldschein Loan due 2024, Upgraded to
      Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR41.1M Class C Schuldschein Loan due 2024, Upgraded to A2
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR32.88M Class D Schuldschein Loan due 2024, Upgraded to
      Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR16.44M Class E Schuldschein Loan due 2024, Upgraded to
      Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Koeniginstrasse I S.A.R.L, issued in May 2008, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European and US loans. The
portfolio is managed by PIMCO Europe Ltd. This transaction will
be in reinvestment period until 12 July 2013. It is composed of
senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. Moody's notes that this
action also reflects improvements of the transaction performance
since the last rating action.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios have been relatively stable. They
are reported at 158.9%, 142.7%, 131.5%, 123.7% and 120.2%,
respectively, versus November 2009 levels of 160.4%, 144.0%,
132.7%, 124.9%, and 121.3%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Moody's highlights, that the performance of this transaction has
improved since the last rating action in January 2010. This is
observed through a better average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by the weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a
decrease in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below. In particular, as of the latest trustee report dated
September 2011, the WARF is currently 2,402 compared to 2,487 in
the November 2009 report, and securities rated Caa or lower make
up approximately 3.9% of the underlying portfolio versus 4.8% in
November 2009. However, the reported WARF understates the actual
improvement in credit quality because of the technical transition
related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates,
as announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities are zero as of
September 2011 compared to EUR 6.4million of the underlying
portfolio in November 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR
688.5million, zero defaulted par, a weighted average default
probability of 21.79% (consistent with a WARF of 2,763), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 25 and a weighted
average spread of 3.07%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 95% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by (1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Moody's notes that around 32% of the collateral pool,
excluding cash, consists of debt obligations whose credit quality
has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject
to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report
titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

(2) Limited granularity: Moody's notes that the portfolio is
characterized by a relatively low granularity. The largest issuer
makes up 5.6% and the largest industry makes up 25.6%, in each
case as a portion of the collateral pool, excluding cash.

(3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis.

(4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
covenant levels. The transaction currently features a large cash
balance (reported at EUR 109.2million in September 2011). In its
base case Moody's models this cash to be fully reinvested.
Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for weighted average rating factor, weighted
average spread, and diversity score. However, as part of the base
case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant
levels due to the large difference between the reported and
covenant levels. The modelled diversity score reflects the
increase of diversification which would result from the
reinvestment of the current cash balance. In addition, to mirror
the potential for reinvestment into non-senior-secured assets,
Moody's has assumed a portion of non-senior-secured assets of 5%
in its base case.

(5) Overcollateralization Levels: Moody's notes that the
transaction is permitted to change the leverage, provided the
fulfilment of certain collateral quality and
overcollateralization criteria, and subject to approval of a
majority of noteholders per class of notes. An increase in
leverage would be associated with a relative increase of the
Class A1 notes compared to the other classes of notes and a
decrease in required overcollateralization levels for all of the
classes of notes. Moody's has tested the impact of increasing the
leverage of this transaction and found that a change of leverage
is unlikely to affect the ratings of the notes given the set of
more restrictive portfolio quality criteria associated with a
higher leverage.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


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DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Dalradian European CLO I B.V.:

   -- EUR52.5MM Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR27.85MM Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
      Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR19.25MM Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR24.5MM Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Dalradian European CLO I B.V., issued in May 2006, is a multi
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Elgin Capital LLP, a wholly owned subsidiary of N M
Rothschild & Sons Limited. This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until June 15, 2012. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in Nov 2009. The Class B, Class C and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 131.38%,
121.62% and 111.12%, respectively, versus September 2009 levels
of 127.22%, 117.75% and 107.55%, respectively. Reported WARF has
increased marginally from 2669.30 to 2726.57 between September
2009 and August 2011. However, this reported WARF overstates the
actual deterioration in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities total
about EUR13.8 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
EUR19.2 million in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR312.501
million, defaulted par of EUR13.198 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.74% (consistent with a WARF of 2979), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.80% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 33 and a weighted
average spread of 2.97%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 87% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability
to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the
limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's
analyzed the impact of assuming weighted average spread
consistent with the midpoint between reported and covenanted
values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Moody's notes that around 58% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to
obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress
applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

(3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

(4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ENDEMOL BV: Lenders Extend Debt Waiver to November
--------------------------------------------------
Chiara Remondini and Patricia Kuo at Bloomberg News report that
Endemol NV won approval from lenders to extend the waiver of loan
terms for a second time, as it seeks to restructure EUR2.8
billion (US$3.8 billion) of debt.

Bloomberg relates two people with knowledge of the matter said
the waiver, extended once from mid-September until Oct. 31, will
be further delayed to mid-November, giving Endemol more time to
negotiate with creditors.

Charlie Armitstead, a spokesman for Endemol in London, said talks
with lenders continue to make "good progress," declining to
comment on the new deadline, Bloomberg relates.

The company is exploring options to restructure debt because
widening losses may cause it to breach covenants on its loans,
Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, daily Il Sole 24 Ore reported Oct. 30
that Mediaset SpA and Clessidra SGR SpA are ready to invest as
much as EUR500 million in Endemol.  The newspaper said that
Mediaset is looking for a partner to avert a potential dilution
of its holdings, Bloomberg notes.

Endemol B.V. -- http://www.endemol.com/-- is one of the world's
leading producers of TV programs best known for its output of hit
reality-based programming and game shows such as Deal or No Deal,
Big Brother, and Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.  The production
company also creates scripted dramas and soap operas, and
develops digital content for online distribution.  It has more
than 2,000 programming formats in its library and exports shows
to more than 25 countries around the world.  Formed in 1994,
Endemol is owned by a consortium led by private equity firm
Goldman Sachs and Italian television company Mediaset.


LAMBDA FINANCE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Lambda Finance B.V. series 2005-1's (also known as Gracechurch
Corporate Loans 2005-1) class A, AB, B, and F notes and series
2007-1's (also known as Gracechurch Corporate Loans 2007-1)
class A, AB, B, E, and F notes. "At the same time, we affirmed
our ratings on the class C and D notes in both transactions," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow a review of the counterparty roles
involved in both transactions, as well as a review of the
performance of the portfolios underlying the two Lambda
transactions. Both deals are fully funded synthetic small and
midsize enterprise (SME) collateralized loan obligations (CLOs),
referencing portfolios of corporate loans granted to U.K.-based
SME clients of Barclays Bank PLC," S&P related.

Both transactions have invested the proceeds from the issuance of
credit-linked notes in cash deposits with Barclays Bank. Thus,
the entire principal portion of the rated notes is cash
collateralized. "We therefore classify the underlying cash
deposit agreements as direct substantial support according to our
2010 counterparty criteria (see 'Counterparty And Supporting
Obligations Methodology And Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6,
2010)," S&P said.

"Due to an error, we did not review and place on CreditWatch
negative our ratings on the senior classes in both transactions
in January this year, when we started reviewing transactions
under our revised counterparty criteria. Had we placed these
ratings on CreditWatch negative in January, all other things
being equal, we would have taken the downgrades on the senior
notes in July 2011 when we finalized the review of the
CreditWatch placements under the 2010 counterparty criteria," S&P
related.

Since closing, both transactions' portfolios have undergone a
three-year replenishment period, after which amortization
started. Series 2005-1 amortized strictly sequentially, whereas
series 2007-1 allowed for pro rata amortization, but failed to
meet the requirements on almost all payment dates and hence also
amortized sequentially.

The deleveraging in both transactions has led to substantial
increases in relative credit enhancement available to all classes
of rated notes. The effect is more pronounced in series 2005-1
where the pool factor currently stands at 18%, as opposed to 35%
in series 2007-1.

"In our view, the enhancement levels available to the senior and
mezzanine notes in both transactions are commensurate with the
current ratings on the notes. In our opinion, the credit risk
associated with the reference portfolios is adequately addressed
by the enhancement levels at the various class levels. The
downgrades on the senior notes to 'AA (sf)' are due to our
analysis of counterparty risk involved in both transactions. The
transaction documents do not fully reflect our updated criteria,
but do reflect our prior counterparty criteria. Therefore, as per
our updated criteria, we have lowered the rating to a ratings
floor that is one rating level above the issuer credit rating
(ICR) on the lowest-rated counterparty. The main factor was the
analysis of the cash deposit agreement in both transactions,
where we classified the account provider as direct substantial
support. This role is currently fulfilled by Barclays Bank (AA-
/Negative/A-1+). Under our 2010 counterparty criteria, we have
therefore capped the ratings on the senior notes in these two
transactions at 'AA (sf)'," S&P stated.

The actual performance of both transactions is reflective of the
macroeconomic conditions prevalent since 2008. Both deals have
accumulated a notable amount of defaults and some losses have
been allocated in both transactions. The excess spread mechanism
in both transactions has helped absorb losses allocated so far.
All principal deficiency ledgers for the rated classes of notes
are clear as of the latest reporting dates in September 2011.

As of the September reporting date, series 2005-1 referenced
GBP164 million of defaulted loans (17% of the entire pool), which
are currently undergoing work-out procedures. "We expect that
these loans will result in losses over the next two years, which
in turn will result in a decrease in the first-loss protection in
the deal (currently provided through the reserve fund holding
GBP38 million of cash and the unrated class G notes). The loss
rate on liquidations has been 46% and we expect similar loss
rates for the current defaults," S&P said.

The performing enhancement available to the class F notes in
series 2005-1 is currently negative. "This means that actual
enhancement is dependent on recoveries. Based on our loss
expectation, we have assumed a 5.2% enhancement level for the
class F notes (enhancement before excess spread). In our view,
this enhancement is insufficient to cover the expected losses
associated with the largest obligor concentration risk in the
portfolio. The two largest obligors in the pool comprise more
than 6%. We have therefore lowered the rating on the class F
notes to 'B- (sf)' from 'B (sf)'," S&P related.

As of the August reporting date, series 2007-1 referenced GBP64.7
million of defaulted loans (5.5% of the entire pool). "We expect
these loans will result in similar loss rates to the ones
observed in series 2005-1, i.e., roughly 50%. Similar to the
effect for series 2005-1, this will cause a decrease in the
first-loss protection in series 2007-1. Currently, the lowest-
rated notes in series 2007-1 are protected by the subordination
of the unrated class G notes, as well as a cash reserve that
currently totals about GBP4 million. Based on our loss
expectation, the pre-excess-spread enhancement currently
available to the class F notes is 3.3%. For the class E notes,
the enhancement is 6.5%," S&P related.

Both the class E and F notes in series 2007-1 are exposed to tail
risk (deterioration of the asset pool over the residual life), as
well as the immediate risk posed by potential large obligor
defaults. "As is the case in series 2005-1, we believe the high
level of concentration risk in the portfolio could affect the
creditworthiness of the junior tranches in the capital structure.
Our credit analysis indicates that the class E notes should
be able to withstand only the default of the largest three
obligors and the class F notes should be able to withstand the
default of only the single largest obligor. We have therefore
lowered the ratings on both classes by one notch," S&P said.

Series 2005-1 and series 2007-1 are fully funded synthetic SME
CLOs originated by Barclays Bank. They reference loans granted to
SMEs in the U.K. The transactions closed in December 2005 and
February 2007.

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                From

Lambda Finance B.V.
EUR2.074 Billion, GBP1.403 Billion, and US$3.758 Billion
Floating-Rate Notes
(Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2005-1)

Ratings Lowered

A1          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A2          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A3          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
AB1         AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
AB2         AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
AB3         AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
B1          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
B2          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
B3          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
F           B- (sf)           B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C1          A+ (sf)
C2          A+ (sf)
C3          A+ (sf)
D1          BBB+ (sf)
D2          BBB+ (sf)
E           BB (SF)

Lambda Finance B.V.
EUR1.406 Billion, GBP1.396 Billion, and US$2.323 Billion Secured
Floating-Rate Notes
(Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2007-1)

Ratings Lowered

A1          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A2          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A3          AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
AB1         AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
AB2         AA (sf)           AAA (sf)
B1          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
B2          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
B3          AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
E1          BB (sf)           BB+ (sf)
E1          BB (sf)           BB+ (sf)
F1          B- (sf)           B (sf)
F1          B- (sf)           B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C1          A+ (sf)
C2          A+ (sf)
C3          A+ (sf)
D1          BBB+ (sf)
D2          BBB+ (sf)


MALIN CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Malin CLO B.V.

Issuer: Malin CLO B.V.

   -- EUR47M Class A-1b First Priority Senior Secured Floating
      Rate Notes due 7th May 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR32.5M Class B Second Priority Deferrable Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due 7th May 2023, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR25M Class C Third Priority Deferrable Secured Floating
      Rate Notes due 7th May 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR35M Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured Floating
      Rate Notes due 7th May 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.75M Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due 7th May 2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Malin CLO B.V., issued in May 2007, is a multi currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly senior secured European leveraged loans. The portfolio
also contains approximately 13.69% non senior secured loans
including mezzanine loans, second lien loans and approximately
1.90% high yield bonds. The portfolio is managed by Babson
Capital Europe Limited ("Babson"). This transaction will be in
reinvestment period until May 2014.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios as well as deleveraging of the
senior notes since the rating action in October 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009 (which was based upon
information reported as of 28 August 2009). As of 31 August 2011,
the Senior, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 141.04%, 128.10%,
119.66%, 109.56% and 104.81%, respectively, versus August 2009
levels of 136.76%, 124.48%, 116.44%, 106.78% and 102.24%,
respectively.

Reported WARF has increased from 2643 to 2912 between August 2009
and August 31, 2011. The change in reported WARF understates the
actual credit quality improvement because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010. In addition, securities rated Caa or lower
make up approximately 7.87% of the underlying portfolio as of 31
August 2011 versus 10.18% in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 446.49
million, defaulted par of EUR6.36 million, a weighted average
default probability of 23.57% (consistent with a WARF of 2947), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.76% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 37 and a weighted
average spread of 3.00%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 88.07% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the non first-lien loan corporate
assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by (1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Moody's also notes that around 62.63%of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

(3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis.

(4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon,
and diversity score.

(5) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


PBG SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating to Polish construction company PBG S.A.
The outlook is stable.

"The rating reflects our assessment of PBG's business risk
profile as 'fair' and its financial risk profile as 'aggressive'.
The rating is limited by PBG's exposure to project-related
execution risk in the cyclical and competitive construction
industry. Furthermore, the rating is constrained by PBG's small
size, weak cash flow profile, and limited diversity, especially
its lack of geographic presence beyond its domestic market," S&P
said.

"The rating is supported by PBG's leading position in Poland's
construction market, which we believe will benefit from a high
level of planned investment in infrastructure projects and public
facilities over the next few years, solid and above-industry-
average operating margins, and sound capital structure for the
rating level," S&P related.

PBG is among the Polish construction industry's leading players;
it had annual revenues of about Polish zloty 2.7 billion (about
EUR690 million) in 2010. The company started as an oil and gas
construction company in 1994, offering gas system installations
mostly to domestic gas monopoly Polish Oil & Gas Company SA
(PGNiG) (BBB+/Negative/--).

PBG's customer base skews heavily toward the public sector, which
accounted for about 80% of total 2010 revenues. "We believe long-
term relationships with the public sector benefit PBG's business
profile because they provide recurring contracts and limit
counterparty risk. Nevertheless, long payment terms and low
prepayments translate into heavy working-capital requirements
and weigh on the company's operating cash flows," S&P said.

"We assess PBG's financial profile as 'aggressive' because of the
company's track record of volatile, and frequently negative, free
operating cash flows (FOCF)," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that PBG's moderate
financial policy and solid capital structure will continue to
support the company's current credit profile. It further reflects
PBG's historically good project execution, which has resulted in
stable profitability over the past few years and ought to, in
our opinion, enable the company to cope with any slowdown in
construction activity, although we note its healthy order backlog
and project pipeline," S&P related.

"We assume that PBG will maintain prudent risk management
policies, that it will have no major difficulties executing large
projects, and that it will manage its liquidity profile to cover
near-term cash needs and maturities. To maintain the current
rating level the company needs to keep a ratio of adjusted debt
to EBITDA at about 3x and avoid consistent negative FOCF in the
absence of further equity contributions," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating if currently favorable operating
conditions deteriorate unexpectedly, if the company fails to
control investments in working capital, or if it engages in
further significant debt-funded acquisitions. Downside pressure
could also stem from deterioration in the liquidity profile or
failure to amend the financial covenants to ensure adequate
headroom," S&P said.

"Ratings upside potential is constrained by the company's weak
cash flow profile, but we could consider an upgrade over the
medium term if the company shortens its cash flow conversion
cycle and demonstrates a consistent record of FOCF, while
maintaining the capital structure and profitability," S&P said.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Downgrades Senior Debt Rating to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banco de Valencia's
senior debt and deposit ratings to Ba2 from Ba1 and the dated
subordinated debt to Ba3 from Ba2. The downgrade follows the new
majority ownership of Banco de Valencia by Banco Financiero y de
Ahorro (BFA, Ba2/ negative outlook); and the review assesses the
degree of ongoing support from either BFA or Bankia (Baa2/D+
(mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale)/Prime-2, negative), BFA's
operating company.

The Not-Prime short-term ratings and standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of D- (Ba3) remain unchanged. All of Banco
de Valencia's ratings are now on review for downgrade.

Moody's initially placed Banco de Valencia's ratings on review
for downgrade on March 24, 2011 due to the review for downgrade
on the ratings of its former parent Caja de Ahorros de Valencia,
Castellon y Alicante (Bancaja, unrated). Bancaja, which at that
time had been involved in a consolidation process with Caja
Madrid (unrated) and five other Spanish savings banks, had held a
38.6% stake in Banco de Valencia. After this process had
completed earlier this year, Bancaja transferred all its assets
and liabilities to BFA, Banco de Valencia's current parent bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

DOWNGRADE OF BANCO DE VALENCIA'S DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS

As a result of the completion of the transfer of Bancaja's assets
and liabilities, BFA assumed control over the shares of Banco de
Valencia. BFA is now the majority shareholder, with 38.6% of the
bank's capital.

Moody's decision to downgrade Banco de Valencia's debt and
deposit ratings by one notch to Ba2 reflects the change in
ownership.

Banco de Valencia has been integrated into BFA at the level of
the holding company and not at the commercial bank level
(Bankia). However, given the weak credit profile of BFA and
limited capacity to raise funds, Moody's expects that support for
Banco de Valencia will be forthcoming from Bankia, which has
broader ability to provide capital or liquidity to the bank
Therefore at this stage, Moody's also still incorporates an
assumption of a moderate probability of support from Bankia into
Banco de Valencia's ratings. Overall, this provides a one-notch
uplift to Banco de Valencia's standalone ratings of D-/Ba3.

Banco de Valencia is currently working on a recapitalization plan
that will be implemented before year-end 2011. The plan will
include some measures that will require support from Bankia to
implement these successfully.

The D- BFSR reflects its high credit-risk concentration, as well
as its very modest financial fundamentals. Its capital adequacy
ratios are weak compared with the portfolio's expected losses,
whilst the liquidity position is significantly reliant on short-
term funding with sizable refinancing requirements in 2012.

FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

The review of Banco de Valencia's standalone ratings will focus
on these factors:

(i) The bank's liquidity position and Moody's expectations for
     Bankia to provide alternative funding. In Moody's view,
     Banco de Valencia will only be able to address its debt
     maturities in 2012 if Bankia provides sufficient support to
     the bank;

(ii) Performance of the bank's financial metrics if the
     recapitalization plan is not accomplished in the short term,
     given its very weak risk-absorption capacity and
     deteriorating asset quality, and;

(iii) A reassessment of the bank's franchise value if Bankia
     fails to provide expected support. This would raise
     questions regarding the strategic fit of the bank within the
     group and its future viability if its credit profile
     continues to deteriorate.

The senior debt and deposit ratings are on review for downgrade,
reflecting the review for downgrade of Banco de Valencia's
standalone BFSR. The review will also assess the degree of
support provided by Bankia. Any failure to provide expected
support to the bank to restore its capital and liquidity position
will lead to a decline of current support assumptions from Bankia
and could result in Banco de Valencia's debt and deposit ratings
being aligned to its standalone rating.

POTENTIAL TRIGGERS FOR A DOWNGRADE/UPGRADE

Downward pressure would be exerted on Banco de Valencia's
standalone credit strength because of (i) further weakening of
its liquidity position; (ii) greater-than-expected deterioration
in its risk-absorption capacity and a depletion of its capital
levels; and/or (iii) deterioration of the bank's franchise,
particularly if Bankia fails to provide sufficient support.

The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone
BFSR, and any change to the BFSR would likely also impact these
ratings.

An upgrade of Banco de Valencia's standalone rating is currently
very unlikely given the review for downgrade of the rating. An
improvement of the bank's BFSR could be driven by (i) the
benefits of the planned recapitalization and deleveraging
measures; (ii) improved liquidity position with normalized access
to wholesale funding and broader diversification of its funding
sources; (iii) reduction of its real-estate and related assets;
and (iv) better access to capital. An improvement in the economic
and overall operating environment could also positively affect
Banco de Valencia's BFSR and its senior debt and deposit ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Valencia (Spain), Banco de Valencia had
EUR24 billion assets at end-June 2011.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Pang Da & Youngman to Invest EUR610 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that Pang Da Automobile
Trade Co. and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile that plan to buy
Saab Automobile pledged to invest EUR610 million (US$844 million)
in the Swedish carmaker, prompting a court to extend the
manufacturer's protection against creditors.

According to Bloomberg, Guy Lofalk, the attorney overseeing the
program, said in Vaenersborg District Court on Sunday that the
two Chinese companies will also provide an immediate EUR50
million bridge loan to help Saab survive as it reorganizes.
Saab's owner, Swedish Automobile NA, said separately that about
500 jobs will be cut, Bloomberg notes.

"Saab will now have a real chance to thrive," Bloomberg quotes
Chairman Victor Muller as saying in an interview at the court in
southwestern Sweden.  "But we have a lot of work ahead to even
get the investment approved, and Saab has suffered tremendous
damage to its brand and supplier base that must be overcome."

The Swedish court decided on Sunday to continue to shield Saab
from creditors after a hearing at which the carmaker presented
its business plan and where suppliers that are owed money could
voice their opinion, Bloomberg relates.

Saab laid out a target on Sunday of selling 35,000 to 55,000 cars
next year and becoming profitable by 2014, when it plans to
deliver 130,000 to 150,000 vehicles, Bloomberg discloses.

The Swedish company's long-term sales target is to produce
185,000 to 205,000 vehicles a year, Martin Larsson, the
carmaker's business-development chief, said at the hearing,
Bloomberg recounts.

"I believe strongly that Saab's production capacity in Sweden
will be completely used up," Bloomberg quotes Pang Qinghua,
chairman of Pang Da, as saying in an interview at the court.

Mr. Pang, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the two buyers aim to
build a Saab factory in China with annual capacity of at least
100,000 cars "in the next year or two".

The court panel led by Judge Stefan Nilsson ruled that the
investors' agreement provided the carmaker with cash to pay for
immediate expenses, while the long-term business plan was viable,
Bloomberg relates.  All the suppliers who commented at the
hearing, including Autoliv Inc. (ALV) and Continental AG (CON),
supported a continuation of the reorganization, Bloomberg notes.

Parties that must approve Saab's sale include Chinese
authorities, the Swedish government and the European Investment
Bank, as well as former owner General Motors Co. (GM) and
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW), which last year agreed to
supply engines to Saab's future models, Bloomberg states.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 31,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Youngman and Pang Da reached a
tentative deal on Oct. 28 to purchase Saab for EUR100 million
(US$142 million).  Saab Chief Executive Officer Victor Muller
said on a conference call on Oct. 28 that Youngman will buy 60%
of Saab and Pang Da will purchase 40%.  The two had originally
agreed to take a majority stake in Swedish Automobile before that
agreement fell apart this month, Bloomberg noted.  Saab, which
has produced few cars since it first halted production in March
because of a lack of money, staved off bankruptcy after a Swedish
court on Sept. 21 granted the carmaker's request for protection
from creditors, Bloomberg disclosed.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


EPIC INDUSTRIOUS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' its credit ratings on all classes of Epic (Industrious)
PLC's notes.

Epic (Industrious) is a synthetic CMBS transaction that closed in
October 2006, in which any loss allocation to the noteholders is
synthetically linked to the performance of a commercial property
loan. The transaction was arranged by The Royal Bank of Scotland
PLC (RBS), which is the credit default swap (CDS) counterparty,
the servicer, and the special servicer. The notes reference the
credit risk of one loan secured on industrial properties in the
U.K.

The rating actions follow the issuer's announcement that the
calculation agent has notified it of the credit protection
payment amount. "As we anticipated in 2009 when we lowered the
ratings to 'CCC- (sf)', all classes of notes have suffered
principal losses (see 'Ratings Lowered On All Notes In Epic
(Industrious)'s U.K. CMBS Transaction,' published on Aug. 11,
2009)," S&P related.

In 2008, a property valuation (which resulted in a 90.7% loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio for the securitized portion, compared with the
LTV ratio covenant of 75.0%) triggered a loan default.
Thereafter, the borrower and its parent company entered
insolvency proceedings, thereby triggering a credit event under
the CDS.

Between July and October 2009, all real estate assets securing
the loan were sold, through a property auction or portfolio sale,
for sales proceeds of approximately GBP263 million. The interest
rate swap was closed out due to the insolvency event, and the
borrower paid breakage fees of GBP33.8 million. This resulted in
net recoveries that were lower than the class A note balance.

"Our ratings transitioned in parallel with these events and we
lowered them to 'CCC- (sf)' in August 2009 to reflect our
expectation of principal losses on all classes of notes," S&P
said.

This transaction was structured to provide the originator (RBS)
with protection against loan losses through protection payments
under the CDS and a corresponding allocation of the loan losses
to the notes. The transaction documents envisage that if a credit
event occurs, the calculation agent (RBS) will calculate the
losses and appoint a verification agent to verify them. The
issuer will then apply those losses to the notes in reverse
sequential order by reimbursing RBS for the verified losses from
the note collateral, and then applying the remaining note
collateral to repay the notes, starting with the class A notes.

A verification agent was appointed in early October 2011 and
since then (according to the issuer's Oct. 20 notice) the
calculation agent has informed the issuer that the credit
protection payment amount is GBP251,697,113.95. The issuer's
notice states that it has repaid principal amounting to
GBP211,019,472.05 to the class A notes, against an outstanding
balance of GBP309,560,000. Following that payment, the principal
amount outstanding of all classes was reduced to zero, which
resulted in a loss to all classes of notes.

"Therefore, as our ratings are based on timely payment of
interest and full payment of principal, we have lowered our
ratings on these notes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

Ratings List

Epic (Industrious) PLC
GBP490 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class            Ratings
           To               From

Ratings Lowered

A          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
B          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
C          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
D          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
E          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
F          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)


EUROSAIL-UK 2007: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on Two Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all outstanding classes of Eurosail-UK 2007-1NC PLC's notes.

"The affirmations are due to relatively stable collateral
performance, in addition to increasing credit enhancement levels
for all classes of notes," S&P related.

"Since our last credit and cash flow review, the issuer has used
available revenue funds on each successive interest payment date
(IPD) to clear the class D and class E note principal deficiency
ledgers (PDLs). The clearing of the PDLs in June 2011 resulted in
the reserve fund being topped up and the reserve fund at the
September 2011 IPD was topped up to GBP3.0 million (66% of
its required level)," S&P related.

Severe arrears (defined in this transaction as more than 90
days), while relatively high at 28.7%, have remained relatively
flat since mid-2009. "Cumulative losses have tailed off in recent
quarters as the stock of repossessed properties has reduced from
the mid-2009 peak of 4.67%, which is consistent with other
nonconforming U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions that we rate," S&P said.

Although the level of credit enhancement has increased for all
classes of notes, prepayment levels remain low and the
transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the near
term.

"We considered all of the factors in our credit and cash flow
analysis," S&P related.

"We expect severe arrears to remain at their current levels, as
there are a number of downside risks for nonconforming borrowers.
These include rising inflation, weak economic growth, high
unemployment, and fiscal tightening. On the positive side, we
expect interest rates to remain low for the foreseeable future,"
S&P said.

"Substantial losses in this transaction caused interest
shortfalls on the class E1c and ETc notes on the March 2010 IPD,
at which point we lowered our ratings on both classes of notes to
'D (sf)' (see 'Ratings Lowered To 'D' On Class E1c And ETc Notes
In Eurosail-UK 2007-1NC's RMBS Deal After Nonpayment Of
Interest,' published on March 18, 2010). The liquidity facility
was unavailable to cover the interest shortfall, as the class E
notes' PDL balance was greater than 50% of the outstanding class
E note balance at the time," S&P stated.

In March 2010 the class A3c detachable A3 coupon expired, which
resulted in an increase in excess cash in the transaction. The
issuer used the excess cash clear PDLs and, on the September 2010
IPD, to pay unpaid interest on the class E notes.

"Our rating on the class FTc notes addresses ultimate payment of
interest and principal. In our opinion, the likelihood of these
noteholders receiving all principal, interest, and deferred
interest is low, so we have affirmed our 'CCC (sf)' rating on
this class of notes," S&P related.

                     Counterparty Criteria

"We do not consider the currency swap agreements for Eurosail
2007-1NC to be in line with our 2010 counterparty criteria (see
'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions'). Rather, the currency swap agreements reflect
replacement language in line with our previous counterparty
criteria. Therefore, under our 2010 counterparty criteria, the
highest potential rating on the notes in this transaction is
equal to the issuer credit rating on the swap provider, Barclays
Bank PLC (AA-/Negative/A-1+), plus one notch. The bank account
counterparty agreements, with Barclays as counterparty, are in
line with our 2010 counterparty criteria," S&P stated.

"We conducted a cash flow analysis without the benefit of the
currency swap, which indicates that the current rating on the
class A2 notes can be maintained," S&P related.

Eurosail-UK 2007-1NC is a U.K. nonconforming RMBS transaction
that closed in February 2007. It securitizes mortgages originated
by Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd., Southern Pacific Personal
Loans Ltd., Preferred Mortgages Ltd., London Mortgage Company
Ltd., and London Personal Loans Ltd.

Ratings List

Class       Rating

Eurosail-UK 2007-1NC PLC
EUR552.15 Million and GBP357.3 Million
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes and
Excess-Spread-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A2a         AAA (sf)
A2c         AAA (sf)
A3a         AA (sf)
A3c         AA (sf)
B1a         BBB (sf)
B1c         BBB (sf)
C1a         BB (sf)
D1a         B (sf)
D1c         B (sf)
DTc         B (sf)
E1c         D (sf)
ETc         D (sf)
FTc         CCC (sf)


PREMIER FOODS: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has lowered to B2 from Ba3 the
corporate family rating (CFR) of Premier Foods plc. The rating
has been placed on review for further possible downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

"The downgrade of Premier Foods' corporate family rating to B2
reflects Moody's view that continued weak operating performance
is likely to put further pressure on the company delivering on
their business plan in line with Moody's previous expectations,
resulting in key credit metrics, particularly RCF to Net debt,
further deteriorating during FY2011 and making deleveraging
prospects even more challenging", says Douglas Crawford, Moody's
lead analyst for Premier Foods. The action also reflects Moody's
developing concerns about liquidity.

Ongoing group sales of GBP1.45 billion year-to-date as of
September 30, 2011 were down 1.8% year-on-year. While the first
half of the year was impacted by cost inflation and lack of
promotional spend compared to the market, in the third quarter
the company was not able to recover volumes following a customer
dispute and an ineffective promotional program. This resulted in
volume declines in 3Q 2011 of 8% year-on-year and a loss in
market share of 1.9% in value terms and 2.1% in volume terms.

As a result of the surprise profit warning following 3Q 2011
results, Moody's expects Premier Foods' adjusted leverage to be
over 4.5x at FY2011, exceeding Moody's previous expectations.
Similarly, its adjusted RCF to Net debt eroded to approximately
12% for the last-twelve months to June 2011 from around 14% in
FY2010 and is expected to decline to below 6% at FY2011. This
rapid deterioration in Premier Foods' credit metrics (with
limited prospects for improvement in the short-term) positions it
better in the B2 rating category relative to its peers.

Moody's recognizes the company's new strategy to focus on the
eight most important brands through concentrating on long term
brand building and product innovation, as well as by reducing the
cost base and the size of the portfolio through disposals.
Moody's also notes that the latter initiative would further allow
the company to reduce debt. However, the rapid deterioration in
the company's profit expectations and continued problems from a
previous customer dispute lead us to consider that Premier Foods'
business risk profile could be shifting closer to that of private
label peers.

The rating action incorporates Moody's expectation that the
company will continue to show deteriorating year-on-year
operating performance and credit metrics as a result of an
intensely competitive environment, weakening bargaining power in
relation to their key customers and tendencies in the market to
shift towards private label.

The action also further reflects Moody's developing concerns over
liquidity. The company had unrestricted cash of GBP58 million as
of September 2011 and GBP213 million in availability under its
GBP500 million revolving credit facility (RCF) that matures in
2013. This gives the company less headroom to deal with the
weaker cash flows expected in 1H 2012 exacerbated by seasonality
and the maturity of its GBP90 million securitization facility.
Moody's also expects that covenant headroom has significantly
weakened for the next couple of quarters. As a result, Moody's
notes that Premier Foods' current liquidity profile has rapidly
deteriorated.

Whilst Moody's understands that Premier Foods is in negotiations
with its banks no signed agreement is yet in place. Although
Moody's at this point expects that the liquidity concerns will be
satisfactorily addressed, the review for possible downgrade
reflects the possibility that the rating could see further
downward pressure in the near term (which could potentially
result in a multi-notch downgrade) if negotiations with lenders
regarding covenants and any new or renewed funding if needed are
unsuccessful. Although in view of the action upward pressure on
the rating is currently not expected in the short-term, the
rating could be affirmed if the group retains continued access to
funding and improves its financial flexibility, thereby also
allowing it to maintain adequate and sustainable headroom under
its covenants, together with supporting operating performance
trends.

The principal methodology used in rating Premier Foods Plc. was
the Global Packaged Goods Industry Methodology published in July
2009.

Headquartered in St Albans, Premier Foods is the largest
manufacturer and distributor of food in the UK, with a focus on
ambient grocery, bread and chilled products. The company has
around 14,000 employees producing foods from around 60 facilities
in the UK and Ireland.


TRAVELPORT LLC: Moody's Affirms CFR at 'Caa1'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa1 Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) of
Travelport LLC. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the B1 rating
of the senior secured term loans and the Caa2 and Caa3 ratings of
the unsecured senior and subordinated notes. Moody's has also
assigned a Caa2 rating to the new US$342.5 million second lien
term secured loans. The outlook on the ratings is revised to
stable from negative.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows the company's recent refinancing of the
outstanding PIK notes in the amount of US$715 million at its
holding company, Travelport Holdings Limited, through a
combination of upstreamed cash, the new second lien term loan
borrowed at Travelport LLC, as well as a partial extension of the
existing PIK notes. As expected, in Moody's view the transaction
has removed the near-term risk associated with refinancing the
PIK notes, as well as enhanced the covenants headroom on the term
loans. At the same time, this has been achieved by increasing the
debt burden at the rated operating company, Travelport LLC.
Moody's had previously indicated that the rating would likely be
affirmed if the transaction was completed successfully.

On a pro forma basis for the transaction, Moody's estimates that
gross adjusted leverage will be approximately 7x, although
Moody's believes that this metric may deteriorate if the recent
trend in earnings persists. This will in particular be impacted
by the pending cancellation of a hosting contract with United
Airlines as of March 2012. As Moody's had previously adjusted
Moody's leverage metric for the PIK notes, the transaction does
not materially impact Moody's adjusted gross leverage metric,
although Moody's recognizes that the refinancing risk of the
remaining PIK notes has been postponed to longer-term.

At this time, Moody's believes that the company's liquidity
remains satisfactory over at least a 12 month horizon, factoring
in the existing cash balance, the Revolving Credit Facilities
(RCF) and negligible near-term debt maturities. Nevertheless, the
company's RCF have a final maturity in August 2013, in addition
to US$166 million in first lien term loans that mature the same
month, which will need to be repaid or refinanced.

The Caa1 CFR reflects the company's continued high adjusted
leverage, as well as the recent negative trend in earnings which
may persist. The stable outlook nevertheless reflects Moody's
view that the recent refinancing has removed near-term liquidity
risks as well as provided a degree of flexibility within
covenants. Given the trend in earnings, positive pressure on the
rating or outlook is unlikely in the near-term. For the current
rating and stable outlook, Moody's expects gross adjusted
leverage to trend back towards 7x, although this is not expected
to occur in the current year. Negative pressure on the rating or
outlook would likely result if concerns were to re-emerge about
near-term liquidity, notably in terms of continued access to the
RCF or if the debt maturities in August 2013 are not refinanced
in a timely manner.

Following the issuance of the new US$342 million second lien
secured term loan at Travelport LLC, currently only US$208
million have been swapped for the PIK notes. Moody's is
maintaining the current notching and present ratings of both the
senior secured term loans, which are rated B1, and of the senior
and subordinated unsecured notes, which are rated Caa2 and Caa3
respectively. The Caa2 rating of the new term loan reflects its
ranking within the capital structure, but also factors in the
potential for a deficiency in security in a distressed scenario.

Ratings affected by the rating action include:

-- US$342.5 million new second lien secured term loans due
    December 2016 are assigned a Caa2 rating;

-- US$180 million RCF tranches due 2012 and 2013 affirmed at B1;

-- US$166 million non-extended first lien term loans due August
    2013 affirmed at B1;

-- US$1,515 million extended first lien term loans due August
    2015 affirmed at B1;

-- US$800 million senior unsecured notes due 2014 affirmed at
    Caa2;

-- US$250 million senior unsecured notes due 2016 affirmed at
    Caa2;

-- US$450 million subordinated unsecured note due 2016 affirmed
    at Caa3.

The principal methodology used in rating Travelport was the
Global Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology
published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Travelport is a leading
provider of transaction processing services to the travel
industry through its global distribution system ("GDS") business,
which includes the Group's airline information technology
solutions business. During fiscal year ending December 2010, the
company generated revenues and EBITDA of US$2 billion and US$545
million, respectively, on a pro forma basis for the divestment of
its GTA in May 2011.


* UK: Plan to Cut Solar Project Subsidies May Prompt Bankruptcies
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Randy Fabi at Reuters reports that Jeremy Leggett, founder and
chairman of London-based Solar Century, on Tuesday said Britain's
plan to slash state subsidies for solar projects could force many
renewable companies into bankruptcy.

Energy Minister Greg Barker on Monday proposed to halve support
for small-scale rooftop generation of solar power, saving an
estimated GBP700 million (US$1.13 billion) annually by 2014-15,
Reuters relates.

"If they enact it, it will reverse a fast growing domestic
industry in a time of job cuts and austerity measures," Reuters
quotes Mr. Leggett as saying on the sidelines of an industry
conference.  "It will cause many bankruptcies in the rest of the
industry."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Oak Hill Advisors' Debt Fund Nears Halfway Mark
---------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Oak Hill Advisors
LP has held a first closing on its European distressed-debt fund
at around $360 million, nearly halfway to a $750 million target
for the offering, said people familiar with the matter.


* S&P: One U.S.-Based Default Last Week; 2011 Total at 36
---------------------------------------------------------
One corporate issuer defaulted last week, raising the 2011 global
corporate default tally to 36, said an article published Friday
by Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research, titled "Global
Corporate Default Update (Oct. 20 - 27, 2011)."  The rating on
U.S.-based Trailer Bridge Inc. was revised to 'SD' from 'CCC'
after the company provided confidential information regarding its
debt obligations.

Of the total defaulters this year, 26 are based in the U.S.,
three are based in New Zealand, two are in Canada, and one each
is in the Czech Republic, Greece, France, Israel, and Russia.

Of the defaulters by this time in 2010, 49 were U.S.-based
issuers, nine were from the other developed region (Australia,
Canada, Japan, and New Zealand), eight were from the emerging
markets, and two were European issuers.

Fourteen of this year's defaults were due to missed interest or
principal payments and seven were due to distressed exchanges--
both of which were among the top reasons for defaults in 2010.
Bankruptcy filings followed with six defaults, and regulatory
actions accounted for three. Of the remaining defaults, one
issuer failed to finalize refinancing on its bank loan, one
issuer had its banking license revoked by its country's central
bank, another was appointed a receiver, and three were
confidential.

By comparison, in 2010, 28 defaults resulted from missed interest
or principal payments, 25 from Chapter 11 and foreign bankruptcy
filings, 23 from distressed exchanges, three from receiverships,
one from a regulatory directive, and one from administration.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *