TCREUR_Public/111107.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, November 7, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 220

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Fitch Downgrades Viability Rating to 'B+'


B U L G A R I A

BDZ: Must Lay Off 2,000 People or Face Bankruptcy


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

HARVARDSKY PRUMYSLOVY: 2010 Financial Statement Not Approved
SAZKA AS: Ceska Sporitelna Files Suit v. New Owner Over Sale


D E N M A R K

ISS A/S: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

PHOTOWATT: To File for Bankruptcy After Buyer Not Found


G E R M A N Y

XENATEC GROUP: Sale Draws Little Interest, Liquidator Says


I R E L A N D

KILKENNY LIMESTONE: Brachot to Buy Firm Out of Receivership
MURRAY'S-RENT A CAR: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
STGN LIMITED: In Receivership After Defaulting on Bank Covenant


N E T H E R L A N D S

DUCHESS V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
TARA HILL: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR17MM Class IV Notes to B1


R U S S I A

BANK STROYKREDIT: Moody's Cuts LT National Scale Rating to 'Ba2'
BANK STROYKREDIT: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'Caa1'
* VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT Local Currency Rating


S W E D E N

NORCELL SWEDEN: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Rating to EUR287MM Sr. Notes
RG LINE: On Verge of Bankruptcy
SBAB BANK: Moody's Lowers Tier 1 Hybrid Rating to 'Ba1'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BICKLAND LIMITED: Moshi Moshi Goes Into Administration
DISCOVER LEISURE: Customers Set to Lose Deposits
FUTURE RESIDENTIAL: Goes Into Administration
LUMINAR GROUP: Liquid and Envy Cuts 30 Jobs Following Closure
NEWCASTLE BUILDING: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'

PARRY BOWEN: Alumet Rescues Firms; Takes on Six Staff
REGENCY LAND: High Court Winds Up Two Landbanking Companies
SOUTHGATE: Twitters Posts that Firm is in Administration
TIMBERLINE: In Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business
VON ESSEN: Llangoed Hall in Administration on Economic Climate

WEST BROMWICH: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'
* UNITED KINGDOM: Number of Bars Into Administration Doubles


X X X X X X X X

* David von Saucken Joins Kaye Scholer's European Practice
* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 31 to November 4, 2011


                            *********


=============
A U S T R I A
=============


KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Fitch Downgrades Viability Rating to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kommunalkredit Austria AG's (KA)
Viability Rating (VR) to 'b+' from 'bb-'.  At the same time, the
agency has affirmed KA's Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
and Short-term IDR at 'A' and 'F1' respectively.  The Outlook on
the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The downgrade of KA's Viability Rating largely reflects its
sizeable exposure to Greek sovereign bonds, which accounted for
around half of Tier 1 capital at end-H111.  While a write-down of
this exposure will not, in Fitch's view, lead to a breach of
regulatory capital ratios, it limits KA's financial flexibility
and represents a setback in its attempt to improve internal
capital generation.

The affirmation of the IDRs is based on Fitch's view that the
Republic of Austria ('AAA'/Stable) would support KA if required,
given its 99.78% ownership.  KA's ratings are further supported
by its domestic importance as a provider of public-sector
services in Austria, and the close affiliation with the state on
the back of the bank's business relationships with over two-
thirds of Austria's municipalities and its role as a trustee for
government development funds.

KA's restructuring plan foresees a privatization of the bank in
the medium term.  Fitch does not expect the privatization of KA
before 2013 and expects the Republic of Austria to provide the
bank with the necessary financial resources until its
privatization.  The European Commission approved the state aid
procedure, together with the restructuring plan, on 31 March
2011.

Fitch acknowledges that KA has made progress in focusing on
higher-margin and fee-generating businesses, diversifying its
funding base and controlling costs. However, the agency believes
that the increasingly challenging conditions on wholesale funding
markets will make successfully implementing KA's revised business
model more difficult.  Moreover, while KA's longer-dated and low-
margin credit exposure is gradually reducing through annual run-
offs, an accelerated reduction through opportunistic sales may,
in Fitch's opinion, become increasingly difficult given the
funding constraints of potential buyers.

KA's earnings base continues to be relatively concentrated and
its underlying operating profitability remains vulnerable to
single credit events despite the absence of credit losses in the
past three years.  Further, the tightening of public budgets in
Europe may translate into spending cuts by municipalities, and
hence lower demand for KA's services. In Fitch's view, higher net
fee income and increasing revenue from infrastructure financing
and corresponding advisory services may only partially mitigate
this adverse trend.

KA is the result of a demerger of KA Old in November 2009. KA
Old, a wholesale-funded public sector lender, was acquired by the
Republic of Austria in November 2008 following severe funding and
liquidity difficulties.  KA holds KA Old's core operating assets,
and focuses on advisory-intensive and fee-generating municipal
and infrastructure financing.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Kommunalkredit Austria AG (KA)
  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb-'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'
  -- Long-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A'
  -- Short-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
  -- Government guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AAA'


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


BDZ: Must Lay Off 2,000 People or Face Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------------
According to FOCUS News Agency reports, Bulgarian Prime Minister
Boyko Borisov said in an interview with Bulgarian National
Television that if Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) does not reduce
those 150 trains and does not lay off 2,000 people, the company
will go bankrupt.

FOCUS News relates that Mr. Borisov said BDZ has debts of nearly
BGN1 billion and keeps on generating losses.  He added that 500
to 600 people who would be laid off in BDZ would be hired in
Sofia's subway, FOCUS News notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 28,
2011, Novinite.com related that BDZ made a meager BGN3.5 million
by selling a total of 515 freight railway cars.  Vladimir
Vladimirov, head of BDZ's board, said that the management
completed the deal for the sale of the cars on Oct. 24,
Novinite.com disclosed.  Mr. Vladimirov stressed that the
management developed a package of measures to save the
technically bankrupt company, Novinite.com noted.

Meanwhile, Novinite.com reports that Bulgaria's railway workers
are most likely going to stage a mass strike following BDZ's
announcement for massive layoffs.

According to Novinite.com, Chair of the Bulgarian Railway
Workers' Union at the KNSB (Confederation of Independent
Bulgarian Syndicates), Petar Bunev said that the trade unions
were to talk to their members over the weekend and come up with
an action plan expected today.

Mr. Bunev did say he expected some of the people slated to be
laid off will agree to quit because of the carrot and stick
methods employed by the government company i.e. they will be
offered 6 monthly wages if they agree, and will be fired without
any compensation after 45 days if they refuse, Novinite.com
notes.


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


HARVARDSKY PRUMYSLOVY: 2010 Financial Statement Not Approved
------------------------------------------------------------
CTK reports that Harvardsky prumyslovy holding v likvidaci (HPH)
chairman Karel Stanek said shareholders did not approve the HPH's
financial statement for 2010 at a substitute general meeting on
Friday since the company's liquidator did not enable the
supervisory board to check the accounting.

HPH, a company in liquidation, still has around 240,000
shareholders, CTK notes.  According to the financial statement,
HPH's assets amounted to CZK20.9 billion in 2010, CTK discloses.

Harvardsky prumyslovy holding v likvidaci is based in the Czech
Republic.


SAZKA AS: Ceska Sporitelna Files Suit v. New Owner Over Sale
------------------------------------------------------------
CTK, citing information published in the insolvency register,
reports that the Ceska sporitelna (CS) bank has filed a suit
against Sazkova kancelar, the new owner of Sazka AS, as well as
against Sazka insolvency administrator Josef Cupka due to the
contract on Sazka's sale.

According to CTK, CS, to which Sazka owes about CZK216 million,
has also expressed doubts about impartiality of judge Jaromir
Harmach who was in  charge of Sazka's insolvency proceedings.  At
the end of September, CS proposed that the court abolish the
tender for Sazka's sale and declare a new one, CTK relates.  The
Municipal Court in Prague, however, turned down the request and
approved the sale of Sazka to Sazkova kancelar, a company owned
jointly by the PPF and KKCG groups, CTK notes.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in
the Czech Republic.


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


ISS A/S: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit ratings on Denmark-based facilities services
provider ISS A/S (ISS) and related entities ISS World Services
A/S and ISS Financing PLC, and removed them from CreditWatch,
where they were placed with positive implications on Oct. 19,
2011. The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we removed from CreditWatch positive our 'B'
issue ratings on ISS' EUR581.5 million subordinated facility
(including the add-on notes) due 2016; on ISS Global A/S'
EUR110.4 million issuance under the EUR2 billion unsecured euro
medium-term note program due 2014; and on ISS Financing's EUR525
million secured notes due 2014," S&P related.

The affirmation and removal from CreditWatch reflect the
termination of G4S' proposed acquisition of ISS for GBP5.2
billion. Under the acquisition, G4S would have repaid about
GBP1.1 billion of ISS' debt with proceeds of a share rights
issuance, and the majority of the remaining debt by way of an
acquisition facility. This would have reduced debt levels at ISS.

"In our view, ISS' operating performance will remain steady in
the near term thanks to the flexibility of its cost base. While
an environment of slower growth may occur worldwide in 2012, we
anticipate that credit metrics will remain broadly stable. Based
on current information, we anticipate that credit metrics will
improve gradually in the medium term, supported by continued
organic growth in the mid-single digits, as well as by a
reduction in debt-funded acquisitions. This should allow Standard
& Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA to decline toward 5x-6x, and
EBITDA interest coverage to increase to more than 2x over the
medium term," S&P related.

"Downside risk is most likely to arise from a change in
acquisition strategy toward larger debt-financed acquisitions or
a significant decline in organic growth rates toward zero or
negative growth. Both factors could lead to a reduction in credit
metrics over a longer period than we would consider commensurate
with the rating. Potential downside could also arise should the
group face difficulties in refinancing its maturing notes well
before their due dates. Upside rating potential is constrained by
the group's highly leveraged financial risk profile," S&P said.


===========
F R A N C E
===========


PHOTOWATT: To File for Bankruptcy After Buyer Not Found
-------------------------------------------------------
Catherine Lagrange at Reuters reports that Photowatt faced
collapse on Friday after its parent ATS Automation Tooling
Systems Inc. said the unit had begun proceedings to file for
bankruptcy, blaming a drop in demand and tough competition.

According to Reuters, Canada's ATS failed to find a buyer for its
struggling subsidiary last month against a backdrop of falling
prices, squeezed profits and lower subsidies for solar power in
Europe.

"We plan to separate the (Photowatt) solar assets within the next
six months," Reuters quotes ATS Chief Executive Officer Anthony
Caputo as saying in a statement.

Stiff competition from Asia has also hit the industry, leading to
the high-profile collapse of U.S. Solyndra and a recent profit
warning from First Solar Inc., Reuters notes.

Photowatt is a French solar panel maker.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


XENATEC GROUP: Sale Draws Little Interest, Liquidator Says
----------------------------------------------------------
GTspirit reports that Holger Blumle of Schultze & Braun, the
liquidator appointed to Xenatec Group, said that there has been
little interest in the company.

Xenatec, the company behind the Xenatec Maybach 57S Coupe, was
placed into liquidation in October.

According to GTspirit, the company's remaining 21 employees have
recently had their contracts terminated, another 47 employees
left the company after the initial liquidation announcement.

GTspirit relates that Xenatec came into being in 2009 as an off-
shoot from the Heilbronn-based company Thyssen-Krupp Drauz
Nothelfer.  The company rose to fame with the Xenatec Maybach 57S
Coupe, a planned limited edition coupe based on the ailing
Maybach platform.  A number of cars were produced and delivered
to customers.  However, the company hit problems this year and in
October, had to enter liquidation. It is alleged that bad
management decisions, supply problems and high production costs
were the cause of this, the report discloses.

A deadline has been set for the end of November, GTspirit
reports. If a serious buyer is not found by then, the company
will enter bankruptcy and cease to exist, the report adds.

Based in Germany, Xenatec Group GmbH & Co KG, is a maker of
special purpose vehicles.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


KILKENNY LIMESTONE: Brachot to Buy Firm Out of Receivership
-----------------------------------------------------------
Irish Independent reports that Brachot will acquire Kilkenny
Limestone out of receivership easing the fears of its 60 workers.

Kilkenny Limestone was placed in receivership after months of
negotiations to try to save the business, according to Irish
Independent.

The report notes that the deal is expected to be finalized in the
next two weeks.  Irish Independent relates that Brachot will be
investing up to EUR3 million in the company.

Irish Independent says that new owners will continue to employ
the current workforce.

Kilkenny Limestone is a 30-year-old firm specializing in
producing blue limestone.


MURRAY'S-RENT A CAR: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Examiner reports that the High Court has confirmed the
appointment of a provisional liquidator to one of Ireland's
oldest car rental businesses, Murray's-Rent A Car.

The report relates that the Court heard the company, which has
more than 60 employees, sought to be wound up after a proposed
EUR34 million deal to sell development property to supermarket
chain Superquinn fell through.  As a result, the company was
unable to meets its debts and is insolvent, The Irish Examiner
says.  Its main creditors include Bank of Ireland, Permanent TSB,
Dublin Airport Authority and Revenue Commissioners.

According to the report, Mr. Justice Roderick Murphy confirmed
the appointment of Mr. Ken Fennell as provisional liquidator to
the Murray's Rent-A-Car Ltd after being told the company had
become insolvent and unable to pay its debts.

The judge, as cited by The Irish Examiner, said he was satisfied
to appoint Mr. Fennell, who was further granted powers allowing
him to run the firm's car hire business.  Mr. Fennell's
appointment was sought after a resolution to wind up the firm was
passed by the company's board of directors on Thursday, according
to the report.

The Irish Examiner notes that Bernard Dunleavy Bl, appearing with
Anthony Thuillier Bl, for the company said Murray's successfully
exited examinership after seeking the protection of the courts in
2009 after a scheme of arrangement with the firm's creditors was
approved by the High Court.

While Murray's suffered losses due to factors including the drop
in tourist numbers and the costs involved the upkeep of its car
fleet, it had until the end of September been meeting all its
repayments under the scheme, the report discloses.

Murray's-Rent A Car and its predecessor was founded by Harold F
Murray in 1948.  In recent time, the firm was the Irish franchise
holder for the German car hire giant Sixt, which is one of the
biggest car hire firms in the world.


STGN LIMITED: In Receivership After Defaulting on Bank Covenant
---------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Slattery at Irish Times reports that STGN Limited has gone
into receivership after it was unable to pay a bank covenant.

Bank of Scotland appointed has appointed Liam Dowdall of
accountancy firm Smith and Williamson Freaney as receivers to
STGN Limited with the intention of finding a buyer for the firm,
according to Irish Times.

The report notes that Mr. Dowdall told staff he intended to sell
the business as a going concern.  It will continue to operate at
full capacity, with all jobs remaining in place, Irish Times
relates.

An unnamed spokesman for Mr. Dowdall said the company had "a good
customer base", but that it had become overburdened by debt, the
report relays.

Last month, the report recalls that Sealed Air Ltd, a creditor of
Ribworld, called issued a petition for a winding up of the
company.  However, it is the firm's inability to meet its bank
debt that has pushed it into receivership, Irish Times says.

The report discloses that abridged accounts for STGN Limited
filed at the companies office show that it swung from a pretax
profit of about EUR133,000 in 2009 to a loss of almost EUR534,000
last year. The accounts show that as of the end of 2010, it had
an overdraft of almost EUR2.5 million with cash of EUR86,000,
Irish Times relates.  Additional debts of EUR3.4 million took the
deficit in net funds to almost EUR5.8 million, the report notes.

Mr. Dowdall's spokesman said there were no issues of outstanding
payments to suppliers, Irish Times adds.

STGN Limited, which trades as Ribworld, is a producer of pre-
cooked pork ribs, which it sells in Ireland and overseas,
principally in Scandinavia.  It has a plant in Clonmel, where it
employs 65.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DUCHESS V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Duchess V CLO B.V.:

Issuer: Duchess V CLO B.V.

   -- EUR35.25MM Class B Second Priority Deferrable Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR29.5MM Class C Third Priority Deferrable Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR31.5MM Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7MM Class O Combination Notes due 2021 (current Rated
      Balance EUR 5,407,495.66), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR4.5MM Class P Combination Notes due 2021 (current Rated
      Balance EUR 2,531,668.88), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR4MM Class W Combination Notes due 2021 (current Rated
      Balance EUR 2,659,243.30), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
      on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

Moody's also withdrew the following rating due to redemption:

   -- EUR50MM Revolving Facility, Withdrawn (sf); previously on
      Dec 13, 2005 Assigned Aaa (sf)

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
O and W, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date
increased by a Rated Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively,
accrued on the Rated Balance on the preceding payment date minus
the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such
date, either through interest or principal payments. For Class P,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Duchess V CLO B.V., issued in December 2005, is a multi-currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by
Babson Capital Europe Limited. This transaction has past the
reinvestment period in February 2011. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates and (2) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's notes that some inputs related to the cross currency
swaps were incorrectly entered into the rating model at the last
rating action in December 2009. It is also noted that a
conservative base case scenario was mistakenly omitted from the
rating analysis. Had the correct inputs been used in combination
with the above mentioned base case scenario, the model would have
indicated a higher expected loss for each of the classes of
notes, which could have had a negative impact on the ratings of
certain classes of notes. These inputs are now corrected in the
rating model and the base case scenario is included in the rating
analysis.

The Revolving Facility has been completely repaid and the Class
A1 notes have been paid down by approximately 6% or
EUR17.52 million since the rating action in December 2009. As a
result of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the rating action in December 2009. As of the
latest trustee report dated September 30, 2011, the senior, Class
B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 149.54%, 132.03%, 120.25% and 109.79%, respectively, versus
October 2009 levels (on which the last rating action was based)
of 136.27%, 123.20%, 114.05% and 105.66%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR402.47 million, defaulted par of EUR5.97 million, a weighted
average default probability of 31.14% (consistent with a WARF of
3114), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.44%
for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 33 and a
weighted average spread of 3.344%. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and
Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that
83.32% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate
assets would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non
first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and (2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

(2) Moody's also notes that around 69% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

(3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

(4) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


TARA HILL: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR17MM Class IV Notes to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Tara Hill B.V.

Issuer: Tara Hill B.V.

   -- EUR71MM Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to
      Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR35MM Class III Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to
      Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR17MM Class IV Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to B1
      (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20MM Class S Combination Notes, Withdrawn; previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

The Class S Combination Notes are being withdrawn because the
rated balance has been reduced to zero.

Ratings Rationale

Tara Hill B.V., issued in January 2001, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European leveraged loans. The portfolio is
managed by GSO Capital Partners International. This transaction's
reinvestment period ended in January 2009. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class I notes have been paid down by
approximately 43.7% or EUR86.0 million since the rating action in
December 2009. As a result of the deleveraging, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in December 2009. As of the latest trustee report dated
September 30, 2011, the Class I/II and Class III
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 135.7% and 113.8%,
respectively, versus November 2009 levels of 122.4% and 108.3%,
respectively.

In addition, the Class IV overcollateralization ratio has
increased due to the diversion of excess interest to deleverage
the Class IV notes in the event of a Class IV
overcollateralization test failure, including on the January 2011
payment date, when EUR1.8 million of proceeds reduced the
outstanding balance of the Class IV Notes by 16.5%.

Reported WARF has increased from 2548 to 3042 between November
2009 and September 2011. However, this reported WARF overstates
the actual deterioration in credit quality because of the
technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. Additionally,
defaulted securities total about EUR12.1 million of the
underlying portfolio compared to EUR3.7 million in September
2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR247.4
million, defaulted par of EUR8.4 million, a weighted average
default probability of 24.3% (consistent with a WARF of 3404), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.39% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 27 and a weighted
average spread of 2.66%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 95.97% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. The pace of amortization could vary significantly
subject to market conditions and this may have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could
accelerate as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the
loan market or collateral sales by the CLO Manager or be delayed
by rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

(2) Moody's also notes that around 66.0% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK STROYKREDIT: Moody's Cuts LT National Scale Rating to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded long-term national
scale credit rating (NSR) of Bank Stroykredit (BSK) to Ba2.ru
from Baa2.ru. Moscow-based Moody's Interfax is majority owned by
Moody's, a leading global rating agency. The NSR carries no
specific outlook.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on BSK's audited financial
statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, the bank's unaudited
(management) accounts for 2011, as well as its 2011 monthly
accounting statements prepared under local statutory accounting
rules (local GAAP).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects Moody's concerns over (i) BSK's risky
approach towards accumulating significant levels of real estate
linked mutual funds, (ii) weak recurring profitability, (iii) low
capital adequacy and (iv) limited reporting transparency.

Moody's notes that BSK has increased its exposure to non-core
banking assets. As of 1 October 2011, investments to real estate
linked mutual funds accounted for over 180% of the bank's
regulatory capital (c.a.142% as of YE2010), reflecting BSK's high
risk appetite. Moreover, the quality and liquidity of BSK's
investments are difficult to assess because the bank does not
disclose underlying assets of the mutual funds under IFRS.

Moody's also observes that the bank's low net income in 3Q 2011
was mainly attributable to positive revaluation of mutual funds,
while recurring revenues barely covered operating expenses.
Whilst BSK complies with Central Bank of Russia (CBR) regulatory
requirements on capitalization -- against the background of low
profitability in 2010 and 3Q 2011, and 36% loan growth in 3Q 2011
-- the bank's regulatory capital adequacy decreased to 14.2% as
of 1 October 2011 from 22% at YE2010, thus rendering the bank
more vulnerable to seasoning of the loan book and to potential
deterioration of its non-core assets. Given the adverse credit
conditions in which BSK operates, the rating agency does not
expect material improvements in the bank's capitalization in
2011-2012.

According to Moody's, BSK's ratings are underpinned by the bank's
growing deposit taking and lending franchise as well as a
sizeable liquidity portfolio, with liquid assets accounting for
over 25% of the bank's total assets as of 1 October 2011.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology, published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology, published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, BSK reported total assets of
RUB18 billion (US$593 million) under audited IFRS at YE2010.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance
published in August 2010 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".

                About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


BANK STROYKREDIT: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'Caa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of Bank Stroykredit (BSK) to E
from E+, and the long-term global local and foreign currency
deposit ratings to Caa1 from B3. The bank's Not-Prime short-term
local and foreign currency deposit ratings were affirmed.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on BSK's audited financial
statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, the bank's unaudited
(management) accounts for 2011, as well as its 2011 monthly
accounting statements prepared under local statutory accounting
rules (local GAAP).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects Moody's concerns over (i) BSK's risky
approach towards accumulating significant levels of real estate
linked mutual funds, (ii) weak recurring profitability, (iii) low
capital adequacy and (iv) limited reporting transparency.

Moody's notes that BSK has increased its exposure to non-core
banking assets. As of 1 October 2011, investments to real estate
linked mutual funds accounted for over 180% of the bank's
regulatory capital (c.a.142% as of YE2010), reflecting BSK's high
risk appetite. Moreover, the quality and liquidity of BSK's
investments are difficult to assess because the bank does not
disclose underlying assets of the mutual funds under IFRS.

Moody's also observes that the bank's low net income in 3Q 2011
was mainly attributable to positive revaluation of mutual funds,
while recurring revenues barely covered operating expenses.
Whilst BSK complies with Central Bank of Russia (CBR) regulatory
requirements on capitalization -- against the background of low
profitability in 2010 and 3Q 2011, and 36% loan growth in 3Q 2011
-- the bank's regulatory capital adequacy decreased to 14.2% as
of 1 October 2011 from 22% at YE2010, thus rendering the bank
more vulnerable to seasoning of the loan book and to potential
deterioration of its non-core assets. Given the adverse credit
conditions in which BSK operates, the rating agency does not
expect material improvements in the bank's capitalization in
2011-2012.

According to Moody's, BSK's ratings are underpinned by the bank's
growing deposit taking and lending franchise as well as a
sizeable liquidity portfolio, with liquid assets accounting for
over 25% of the bank's total assets as of October 1, 2011.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology, published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology, published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, BSK reported total assets of
RUB18 billion (US$593 million) under audited IFRS at YE2010.


* VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT Local Currency Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia's Voronezh Region a Long-term
foreign and local currency rating of 'BB', a Short-term foreign
currency rating of 'B' and a National Long-term rating of 'AA-
(rus)'.  The Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.  The
agency has also assigned the region's RUB900 million outstanding
domestic bond issues due June 25, 2012 a Long-term local currency
rating of 'BB' and National Long-term rating of 'AA-(rus)'.

The ratings reflect the region's satisfactory budgetary
performance, low debt burden and well-diversified economy.
However, the ratings also factor its operating expenditure's high
rigidity and reduced self-financing capacity on capex.

An improvement in the region's operating performance in line with
the maintenance of sound direct risk ratios would be positive for
the ratings.  Conversely, the deterioration of its budgetary
performance, triggered by operating expenditure growth coupled
with refinancing risk due to short-term borrowing would be
negative for the ratings.

Fitch expects Voronezh's budget to continue to improve, with the
operating balance increasing to 9%-10% of operating revenue in
2011 and 10%-11% in 2012-2013 from 7.6% in 2010.  This will be
driven by tax revenue growth, which increased by 25.6% yoy in
2010.  Fitch also expects the region's deficit before debt
variation to further narrow below 3% of total revenue in 2011-
2013 (2010: 3.6%).

Voronezh's budget remains extremely rigid as inflexible spending
items are expected to remain high at about 70% of total
expenditure in 2011.  Fitch also expects the region's self-
financing capacity on capital outlays to remain moderate with
2011 current balance covering about 52% of capex.  This will
limit the region's flexibility for expenditure adjustment if
there is a negative revenue shock.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to remain at a moderate
level of about 17%-18% of current revenue in 2011-2013.  Despite
an increase of direct risk to RUB7.2 billion in 2010 (2009:
RUB5.1 billion) payback and coverage ratios remained moderate at
about two years and 14.9% respectively. 76.3% of Voronezh's
direct risk is composed of subsidized federal budget loans with
maturities in 2012-2015.  The region's contingent risk is low,
comprised of few outstanding guarantees and public companies'
debt.

The Voronezh region is a part of the Central Federal District,
which lies in the southern part of European Russia.  Its economy
is well diversified with trade, processing industries and
agriculture being prime sectors. The region contributed 0.9% of
the Russian Federation's GDP in 2009 and accounted for 1.6% of
the country's population.  The local economy recovered relatively
fast in 2010 after the economic downturn negatively affected the
region in 2009.  Gross regional product increased by 3.5% yoy in
2010.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORCELL SWEDEN: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Rating to EUR287MM Sr. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'CCC+' issue
rating to the proposed EUR287 million senior notes to be issued
by Swedish cable operator NorCell Sweden Holding 2 AB(publ) (Com
Hem). "We have assigned a '6' recovery rating to the proposed
notes, indicating our expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
in the event of a payment default," S&P related.

"We understand that the proceeds of the notes will be used to
fully repay Com Hem's senior bridge facility, which was part of
the financing package supporting Com Hem's acquisition by the
private equity firm BC Partners (not rated)," S&P related.

"The issuance of the proposed notes does not change our existing
recovery analysis on Com Hem," S&P said.

The recovery prospects on the proposed EUR287 million senior
notes due 2019 are limited by the subordination of the notes to a
high proportion of prior-ranking debt, including the bank term
loans issued by the holding company NorCell Sweden Holding 3
AB(publ) and the operating entity Com Hem AB and the senior
secured notes issued by NorCell Sweden Holding 3 AB(publ). "The
recovery and issue ratings on the notes are supported by our
valuation of the company as a going concern in the event of a
payment default and by Com Hem's incorporation in Sweden, a
jurisdiction that we view as relatively favorable to secured
creditors," S&P related.

The proposed senior notes will be guaranteed on a senior
subordinated basis by NorCell Sweden Holding 3 AB(publ) at
closing, and by most of Com Hem's subsidiaries between 45 and 60
days following the closing of Com Hem's acquisition, because of
Swedish legal restrictions. "In addition, we view the notes'
security package as weak, given that it is limited to a second-
ranking share pledge over all the shares of NorCell Sweden
Holding 3 AB(publ) and to the intercompany loans from the issuer
to NorCell Sweden Holding 3 AB(publ)," S&P said.

The documentation on the senior notes contains incurrence
covenants in line with the documentation on the senior secured
notes. In particular, the company is allowed to incur additional
debt if the leverage ratio is below 5.5x during the first 12
months after closing, and below 5.25x thereafter.

For more details on the recovery analysis, please refer to "Com
Hem Recovery Rating Profile", published Oct. 27, 2011, on
RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal, and to "Swedish Cable
Operator Norcell Sweden Holding 2 AB (Com Hem) Rated 'B'; Outlook
Stable", published on Oct. 14, 2011.


RG LINE: On Verge of Bankruptcy
-------------------------------
Radio Sweden, citing Swedish Radio Vasterbotten, reports that
RG Line is close to bankruptcy.

According to Radio Sweden, the CEO of RG Line says to Finnish
local paper Vasabladet that the company is hoping to survive by
getting economic support from the two cities it connects.  On
Friday RG Line started discussions with the Vaasa city authority,
and on Wednesday it will enter talks with Umea, Radio Sweden
discloses.

RG Line has not made a profit since 2008, Radio Sweden notes.

RG Line is the ferry line that connects two northern Swedish and
Finnish cities.


SBAB BANK: Moody's Lowers Tier 1 Hybrid Rating to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded SBAB Bank AB's issuer
rating to A2 from A1, which reflects Moody's view that SBAB's
standalone creditworthiness is exposed to increasing challenges,
in particular due to its low profitability, concentrated and
unseasoned loan book and almost whole reliance on market funding.

At the same time, the subordinated debt rating was downgraded to
A3 from A2 and the junior subordinated MTN and Tier 1 hybrid
ratings were downgraded to (P)Baa2 from (P)Baa1 and to Ba1(hyb)
from Baa3(hyb), respectively. All ratings carry a stable outlook.
The Prime-1 short-term ratings were unaffected.

The ratings of the covered bonds issued by SBAB's wholly-owned
subsidiary, the Swedish Covered Bond Corporation (SCBC), are
unaffected by this action.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's regards the institution's current strategy of
diversifying its product offering -- particularly in terms of
retail savings products (SBAB started taking deposits in May
2007) -- as broadly credit positive. However, it also expects
that SBAB could find the implementation of this strategy
challenging, with limited upside potential for its profitability.
This is particularly relevant given the strong competition in the
Swedish banking market and SBAB's relatively limited expertise in
these business areas. As a result, the rating agency expects that
SBAB's profitability will continue to underperform that of the
other rated Swedish institutions, though it recognizes that
mortgage lending is generally a low-margin business in Sweden.
Moody's also notes that SBAB's income may be negatively affected
by increasing funding costs, similar to other European financial
institutions.

In addition, Moody's views the institution's funding profile,
which is almost fully reliant on capital market funding, as a
vulnerability in the current environment. Though the rating
agency considers deposits as a credit-positive addition to the
funding mix, it considers that any significant increase of SBAB's
deposit base will be challenging in the context of the fierce
competition between banks.

With regards to SBAB's asset quality, Moody's recognizes that
relatively low-risk residential mortgages constitute around 60%
of the loan book; the rest primarily represents mortgages to
tenant-owner associations, multi-family dwellings and a limited
amount of commercial properties. Whilst Moody's recognizes the
fact that the exposures are well-collateralized -- with very low
levels of problem loans historically -- it notes that loan growth
in the portfolio has been brisk in recent years, leading to a
less seasoned portfolio and that the sustained increase in house
prices in Sweden may have contributed to inflated collateral
values. In addition, any increase in interest rates -- although
unlikely to occur in the short-term -- may negatively affect
borrowers repayment abilities and weigh on asset-quality metrics.

SBAB was removed from the Swedish government's "for sale" list in
March 2011. Moody's regards this decision as removing some
downwards pressure on support for SBAB. However, the rating
agency considers that, notwithstanding the decision being voted
in Parliament, the willingness of providing support has not been
clearly expressed, because the decision was the result of the
opposition parties blocking a general government's privatization
initiative, as opposed to an SBAB-specific discussion. In
addition, Moody's continues to consider SBAB's public policy role
as a provider of mortgage loans as important, but not crucial to
government policies. Nevertheless, Moody's assessment of
governmental support is underpinned by (i) SBAB's 100% government
ownership; (ii) its state-conferred mission to ensure diversity
and competition in the Swedish residential mortgage market; (iii)
the SEK1 billion committed credit facility provided by the
Swedish National Debt Office on behalf of the Kingdom of Sweden
until the end of 2011; and (iv) the "ownership clause" that
grants SBAB's senior unsecured euro medium term note (EMTN)
bondholders a right of early redemption, if government ownership
falls below 51%. The right of early redemption does not extend to
the covered bonds issued by its wholly owned subsidiary, the
Swedish Covered Bond Corporation (SCBC).

The stable outlook on SBAB's ratings reflects Moody's view that
the ratings are well positioned at their current levels.

Whilst SBAB received a full banking license in March 2011,
Moody's continues to rate SBAB according to its methodology for
Government Related Institutions, as it views the entity's
business model as less diversified than that of a fully fledged
bank and expects it deposit base to grow only marginally over the
next years.

In line with Moody's methodology for GRIs, SBAB's A2 issuer and
senior debt ratings rating is derived from a Baseline Credit
Assessment in the range of 7-9 (on a scale of 1 to 21, where 1
represents the lowest credit risk) as well as Moody's assessment
of a high default dependence (correlation) between SBAB and its
support provider, the Swedish government and a high probability
of systemic support from the Swedish government.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Revised
Methodology for Government Related Non-Bank Financial
Institutions published in August 2006.

Headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, SBAB reported total assets of
SEK350 billion (EUR38.7 billion) at end-September 2011.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BICKLAND LIMITED: Moshi Moshi Goes Into Administration
------------------------------------------------------
Caterer and Hotelkeeper reports that Sushi group Moshi Moshi's
restaurant in London's Liverpool Street station has been put into
administration.

The restaurant continues to trade as normal as administrators
seek a potential buyer for the site, according to Caterer and
Hotelkeeper.

Administrators Kingston Smith & Partners have been called into
the restaurant's owner, Bickland Limited.  However, Caterer and
Hotelkeeper notes that Moshi Moshi's other site in Brighton as
well as the group's Japanese fine dining restaurant Soseki in the
City of London are unaffected.

Administrator Ian Defty said he was keen to keep the busy Moshi
Moshi Liverpool Street station branch trading and to conclude a
sale of the business, to achieve the best possible return for
creditors and save some 27 jobs, the report discloses.

"It is a sad fact that popular businesses and restaurants are
failing regularly in today's economic climate. . . . If the
insolvency industry can try to soften the blow to both creditors
and employees, then we'll be doing a good job in difficult
circumstances," the report quoted Mr. Defty as saying.

Moshi Moshi founder and managing director Caroline Bennett was
unavailable for comment.

Moshi Moshi restaurant was the UK's first conveyor belt
restaurant when it launched in 1994.


DISCOVER LEISURE: Customers Set to Lose Deposits
------------------------------------------------
Chloe Hukin at Out&AboutLive reports that customers who paid
deposits to Discover Leisure, which is in administration, using
anything other than a credit card are unlikely to get their money
back.

Administrator KPMG, has told MMM that: "Those who paid by credit
card should contact their credit card company about a refund.
Customers who have paid on debit card or cash will be unsecured
creditors of Discover Leisure. Unfortunately it is unlikely there
will be a dividend for unsecured creditors. . . . "Equally the
administrators will be making contact with such customers
(including storage customers) once they have finished assessing
each individual case to ensure assets are returned to the correct
owner," according to Out&AboutLive.

Out&AboutLive relates that the company's unsold stock is likely
to be sold off to other dealers.

However, the report says that this could create problems for
dealers reluctant to take surplus stock or to upset an already
fragile motorhome market by selling it off at discount prices.

"It is reported that appreciable numbers of touring   caravans
and motorhomes will need to be disposed of.  However,
manufacturers and stock-funders were well aware of the risks of
destabilizing what is already a weak market.  All were at pains
to stress that they had no desire to precipitate further market
stress through inappropriate disposal policies," Out&AboutLive
quoted Randal Thomas, editor of Glass as saying.

So while there may be bargains to be had as Discover's stock is
sold off, it is likely the stock will be gradually pushed out
through dealers rather than a major 'dumping' of stock onto the
market, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Oct. 17, 2011,
Yorkshire Post said that Discover Leisure has gone into
administration putting 250 jobs at risk in the process.  Mark
Firmin and Paul Flint of KPMG were appointed joint administrators
of Discover Leisure, and its trading subsidiary Signlease,
according to Yorkshire Post.  "Discover has faced a difficult
market over an extended period of time, with persistently
depressed consumer demand for high value discretionary items in
particular," the report quoted Mr. Firmin, KPMG's Northern head
of Restructuring, as saying.  Discover Leisure's shares were
suspended after the caravan retailer admitted it was unlikely to
secure vital funds needed to keep it trading, the report relayed.

Yorkshire-based caravan and motorhome retailer Discover Leisure
trades from sites in York, Newbald, Delamere, Chorley, Darlington
and Birtley.


FUTURE RESIDENTIAL: Goes Into Administration
--------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Future Residential Developments has been
placed into administration.

The company last filed accounts for the year ending October 2007,
and at that time it had borrowings of almost GBP6 million,
according to BBC News.  The report relates that the company's
auditor said the value of its property assets was uncertain.

Documents filed at Companies House suggest the firm had been
loaned money by Northern Bank and Bank of Ireland, BBC News
discloses.

The report notes that company owner County Armagh property
developer Derek Harrison's three financial institutions have
moved against some of his firms in the last two years.

Northern Bank, which is believed to have been one of the main
funders of Mr. Harrison's firms, has appointed receivers to
several sites in Armagh and Tyrone, BBC News says.

BBC News discloses that last year the Derbyshire Building Society
appointed receivers to properties in Cookstown, Lurgan and
Portadown.

Earlier this year, the report notes that Bank of Scotland
appointed receivers to development sites in counties Armagh,
Tyrone and Antrim which were held by various companies.  BBC News
relates that the assets were placed into receivership in April
and include fields at Tarry Lane in Lurgan with planning
permission for 100 houses.

The other sites are the old Woodside Training Centre in Omagh
which has planning permission for 40 houses, a site in
Fivemiletown with planning permission for 50 houses and a site on
the Belfast Road in Carrickfergus, BBC News adds.

Future Residential Developments is owned by County Armagh
property developer Derek Harrison.


LUMINAR GROUP: Liquid and Envy Cuts 30 Jobs Following Closure
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wigan Today reports that Liquid Envy has closed its operation
after its parent company Luminar Group Holding PLC went into
administration.

With Liquid Envy's closure, a total of 30 full and part-time jobs
have also been lost, according to Wigan Today.

The report notes that Ernst & Young, which has been appointed as
administrators, said the closures represented an acceleration of
a turnaround plan for the business and the clubs being closed had
already been identified as "non-core."

Wigan Today relates that a total of 11 venues will close across
the country but 65 will remain open as usual.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Oct. 28, 2011, MK
News said that Luminar Group has gone into administration, saying
it cannot meet its banking obligations.  Luminar Group said it
could not pay back debts to Lloyds TSB Bank, Barclays Bank and
the Royal Bank of Scotland which due to be repaid on Oct. 26,
according to MK News.  The report related that the company's
shares were temporarily suspended from trading when the news was
announced.

Meanwhile, xmedia online reports that another unit of Luminar
Group, Arena, has been quick to dismiss concerns it may be
shutting down on its Facebook page, although managerial staff
were unable to comment on how it will survive.

Liquid Envy, which opened in July 2006 in Station Way, employs
approximately 45 people and has a capacity of 2,000

Luminar Group Holding PLC owns the Oceana chain as well as Liquid
and the Lava and Ignite brand.  It is Britain's biggest nightclub
owner with 76 outlets in United Kingdom.


NEWCASTLE BUILDING: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Newcastle Building Society's
(Newcastle) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior
unsecured notes to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', and its Short-term IDR and
unsecured short-term notes to 'B' from 'F3'.  The Outlook for the
Long-term IDR is Stable.  The agency has also downgraded
Newcastle's lower Tier 2 subordinated debt securities to 'BB-'
from 'BB' and the society's Viability Rating to 'bb+' from
'bbb-'.

Newcastle's Individual and Support Ratings and its Support Rating
Floor have been affirmed at 'C/D', '5' and 'No Floor',
respectively.

The downgrade of Newcastle's IDRs and Viability Rating is the
result of the concentration in the society's commercial loan
book, combined with the mutual's limited access to external
sources of core capital.  Although the society's commercial loan
book is being wound down, in Fitch's view, the concentration has
not yet been sufficiently reduced in light of the deteriorating
economic environment in the UK.  A number of loans within it,
although still performing, are not profitable.

Overall, profitability remains low. Pressure on profitability has
been caused by narrowing net interest spreads in the low base
rate/high funding cost environment, which is expected to persist
in the short-to medium-term.  Revenue streams will benefit from
the potential business volume growth of Newcastle Strategic
Solutions (NSS), a product and services provider.  However, the
contribution of this business has been volatile in the past and
remains small in absolute terms.

However, Fitch recognizes the society's conservative risk
management policies in its residential mortgage book, which
accounts for 58% of total loans and the continued low risk
residing in this portfolio.

Fitch recognizes that the society's funding and liquidity are
adequate, reflecting NBS's strong regional franchise, as a result
of which loans are fully funded by deposits.  The society has
also built up a liquidity buffer.  These have provided some
cushion against difficult wholesale market conditions, which have
severely limited the society's ability to access longer-term
capital markets.

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor take into account the
weakened probability of whole bank support following the
introduction of the UK Banking Act in 2009.  Newcastle is the
eighth largest building society in the UK, regionally focused
with just over 350,000 members.  NBS now operates from 30
branches in mainly north-east England and its core product is
prime residential mortgages.


PARRY BOWEN: Alumet Rescues Firms; Takes on Six Staff
-----------------------------------------------------
TheManufacturer.com reports that windows and fa‡ade specialist
Alumet has leaped to the rescue of Parry Bowen Limited after it
was forced to close.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 1,
2011, Birmingham Post said more than 100 jobs have been lost
and more are under threat as Parry Bowen went into
administration after the company ran into cash flow difficulties.
Matthew Hammond, Mark Hopkins and Eddie Williams of
PricewaterhouseCoopers were appointed as joint administrators.

"Parry Bowen is a Staffordshire building cladding specialist that
has been established for over 20 years and which has
unfortunately been severely affected by the ongoing difficulties
that continue to affect the construction sector. . . .  We are
currently exploring strategic options in respect of the
companies' assets and are working to secure interest in the
assets of the business," Birmingham Post quoted Mr. Hammond as
saying.

According to TheManufacturer.com, six members of Parry Bowen have
been taken on by Alumet.

TheManufacturer.com quotes Alumet Group's CEO Gary Summers as
saying that, "Parry Bowen was a well run company with a great
reputation and a reasonable order book, but still succumbed to
the commercial pressures which lower margins exert upon a
business.

"Out of bad news we have created good news. The appointment of
these key members of staff will help us towards a secure future
and their knowledge and experience will provide our contractors
with the best possible service."

Parry Bowen is the Staffordshire building cladding specialist
that has a major contract for work at London's Olympic Village.
The company employed 150 people from its base on the Burntwood
Business Park in Chasetown, and was set up more than 20 years
ago.


REGENCY LAND: High Court Winds Up Two Landbanking Companies
-----------------------------------------------------------
NDS UK reports that Regency Land Sales Ltd and Regency Land Group
Limited IBC, based in London, Spain and Belize were both wound up
in the High Court following an investigation by the Government's
Companies Investigations, part of The Insolvency Service.

The investigation found Regency Land Group Limited, formed in
Belize and operated from offices in Spain, used telesales methods
to sell small plots of agricultural land in Grantham to members
of the public. The company misleadingly suggested the land would
'accrue further value when it was rezoned for planning purposes'.
In reality, enquiries made of the local authority by
Investigators have confirmed there is no real prospect of such
rezoning taking place. Regency Land Sales Ltd, an England & Wales
registered company, acted as UK sales agent for its offshore
relation.

The investigation followed on from an earlier enquiry into
Britannia Land Management Limited, which also sold land in
Grantham and which identified similar concerns over the
activities of that company, resulting in it being wound up by the
High Court in the public interest on 18 October 2010.
Both Britannia and the Regency companies have been managed by
Llewellyn Adam Hannah-Shelton, a UK citizen resident in Spain.

During the investigation, Mr. Hannah-Shelton and others said to
be in control of the two companies failed to co-operate with
Investigators and did not provide full information regarding
their affairs. Nevertheless, the investigators were able to
establish that the land sold to the public was never legally
transferred into their names and that whilst purchasers were
given a "guarantee" of 8% growth on their investment in the first
12 months, this was entirely illusory.

Investigators also found that there was also a lack of
transparency about the management and status of Regency Land
Group Limited as a Belize registered company with only very
limited disclosure of its details. In addition, those in control
of the companies admitted to the use of aliases when talking to
the clients, and to using virtual offices and internet based mail
scanning services.

On Sept. 7, 2011, the Secretary of State for Business Innovation
and Skills successfully applied to the High Court to have the
Official Receiver appointed as Provisional Liquidator of both
companies. The role of the provisional liquidator was to protect
assets in the possession or under the control of the company
pending the determination of the petition.

The petitions were presented under s124A of the Insolvency Act
1986 on Sept. 1, 2011, and the Winding-up Orders were made on
Nov. 1, 2011.

                         About Regency Land

Regency Land Sales Ltd was incorporated on Oct. 7, 2010. Its
registered office is at Suite 11, Penhurst House, 352-356
Battersea Park Road, London SW11 3BY.  Regency Land Group Limited
is an International Business Company registered in Belize under
license number 97616 and its given address in Belize is 60 Market
Square, Belize City with a registration date of Sept. 20, 2010.


SOUTHGATE: Twitters Posts that Firm is in Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
Car Dealer Magazine reports that rumors are circulating that
Southgate has gone into administration.

Despite Car Dealer Magazine trying to contact the dealer group,
no-one is confirming the news.

The report discloses that its tip-off followed rumors on Twitter
speculating the dealer group's fortunes, and the news agency's
attempts at logging onto the group's Peugeot dealership websites
have returned with 'this page does not exist'.

Southgate is a family-owned dealer group.  The group represents
Peugeot in Southampton, Winchester, Andover and Blandford,
Mitsubishi in Andover, Bridport, Poole and Romsey, and has a
Subaru site in Blandford.


TIMBERLINE: In Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business
-------------------------------------------------------
The Chesterfield Field Post reports that Timberline has gone into
administration putting 79 jobs at risk in the process.

Administrators from Hart Shaw in Sheffield said they are hopeful
a buyer can be found for company, according to The Chesterfield
Field Post.

The report notes that the decision to place it in administration
was taken after the economic downturn forced a sharp decline in
profits for the company.

"The directors reacted quickly to the changing circumstances of
the company and sought expert professional advice.  The
administrators are continuing to trade the business while it is
marketed for sale as a going concern," joint administrator
Christopher Brown from Sheffield's Hart Shaw issued this
statement to The Chesterfield Post.

Headquartered in Chesterfield, family run Timberline has been
trading for 20 years and produces outdoor play equipment, with
its main customer base being educational sites.


VON ESSEN: Llangoed Hall in Administration on Economic Climate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Janet Harmer at Caterer and Hotelkeeper reports that Karen Dukes
and Rob Lewis of PricewaterhouseCoopers have been appointed joint
administrators Llangoed Hall hotel in Brecon, Powys.

Originally created by the late Sir Bernard Ashley, the hotel was
bought a year ago by Von Essen Hotels, according to Caterer and
Hotelkeeper.

The report says that Ms. Dukes said that as a result of the
current economic climate facing the hotel industry, Llangoed Hall
is facing significant challenges and the hotel has found trading
conditions to be difficult over the past two years.

"Our immediate priority now is to review all options for the
company. . . .  While a buyer for the business is sought, we
expect to continue trading and we will look to work with the
company's existing management team, suppliers, employees and
customers to try and ensure that a solution is found to take the
business forward," Caterer and Hotelkeeper quoted Ms. Duke as
saying.

The report says that the hotel will continue to trade and the
administrators aim to honor deposits paid for wedding bookings.
However, where bookings are cancelled the administrators will not
refund deposits, the report relays.

Llangoed Hall was one of four properties that did not form part
of the administration of Von Essen Hotels, Caterer and
Hotelkeeper notes.  Alongside the Forbury in Reading; Hunstrete
House, near Bath; and Hotel Verta in London; it continued to be
owned by Von Essen's founder Andrew Davis.

Llangoed Hall hotel is 3-bedroom establishment in Brecon, Powys.
It is one of only two remaining hotels owned by Andrew Davis, the
founder of the beleaguered Von Essen group.

von Essen hotel chain owns 28 luxury hotels in the UK and France.

                           *     *     *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 25,
2011, BBC News said the holding company of the von Essen hotel
chain has appointed accountants Ernst & Young as administrators.
SoGlos.com related that von Essen is reported to have debts of
more than GBP25 million.  SoGlos.com noted that while
administrators have been appointed and the portfolio of hotels
are expected to be sold off either as a group or as individual
properties, the hotels are all expected to continue to trade as
usual.


WEST BROMWICH: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded West Bromwich Building Society's
(WBBS) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured
notes to 'B+' from 'BBB-' and its Short-term IDR and unsecured
short-term notes to 'B' from 'F3'.  The society's Viability
Rating has been downgraded to 'b+' from 'bbb-'.  The Outlook for
the Long-term IDR is Negative.

The downgrades reflect Fitch's concern over the risk deriving
from the high concentration in the society's large commercial
loan book, a large portion of which is not performing adequately.
The risk is heightened by Fitch's view on the limitations on the
society in raising core capital externally because of its
mutuality.

The society's operating profitability (pre and post loan
impairment charges), remains under pressure because of an
inability to effectively manage the low interest rate/high
funding costs environment.  The impact has been exacerbated by
reducing business volumes and an undiversified income stream.
Furthermore, loan impairment charges continue to absorb a high
proportion of recurring pre-impairment operating profitability.
Fitch has recently revised downwards its outlook for the macro
economic environment in the UK and hence, the agency's view is
that loan impairment charges are likely to remain high in the
short- to medium-term and for profitability to remain under
pressure.

Loan growth has been curtailed by the management team appointed
in 2008/2009 while the commercial and non-prime, residential
mortgage loans are being managed down.  However, these still
accounted for a high proportion of total loans at end-March 2011
as well as for the majority of impaired loans.  Residential
mortgages and the buy-to-let book continue to perform well, on
the other hand.

Fitch recognizes that the society's funding and liquidity are
adequate, reflecting WBBS's strong regional franchise (the West
Midlands, around Birmingham) and the build-up of a liquidity
buffer.  These have provided some cushion against difficult
wholesale market conditions, which have severely limited the
society's ability to access longer-term capital markets.
Nonetheless, its funding sources, while stable, are expensive
relative to the returns available on their assets.

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor take into account the
weakened probability of whole bank support following the
introduction of the UK Banking Act in 2009.  WBBS is the sixth-
largest building society in the UK

The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'

  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'b+' from 'bbb-'

  -- Individual Rating downgraded to 'D/E' from 'C/D'

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF'

  -- Senior long-term and short-term unsecured EMTN program and
     notes downgraded to 'B+'/'B' from 'BBB-'/'F3'

  -- Government Guaranteed Debt: affirmed at 'AAA'

  -- Commercial Paper Programme: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'

  -- PIBS: affirmed at 'C'


* UNITED KINGDOM: Number of Bars Into Administration Doubles
------------------------------------------------------------
Luke Nicholls at Big Hospitality reports that the number of
United Kingdom bars appointing administrators has more than
doubled between quarters two and three, reflecting the deep-set,
challenging trading conditions.

The latest official insolvency statistics revealed that the
overall number of businesses going into administration in the
hotel and licensed trade has increased by 33%, with a year-on-
year increase of 26%, according to Big Hospitality.

"The latest insolvency statistics for the hotel and licensed
sectors support our previous predictions. . . . Challenging
trading conditions have translated into a significant number of
bar, nightclub, restaurant and hotel insolvencies in quarter
three, with wet led pubs and bars being particularly badly hit. .
. .  As expected, there is some regional variation with the
London markets holding up better than the provinces," the report
quoted Peter Cooper, partner at Baker Tilly Restructuring and
Recover, as saying.

BigHospitality notes that administrators at Ernst Young,
appointed to take over the running of nightclub operator Luminar
decided to close 11 loss-making sites, leading to the loss of 300
jobs.

With a busy festive period approaching, Mr. Cooper believes that
even more businesses may struggle to cope with the perfect storm
of a weak economy and low consumer confidence over the coming
months, the report discloses.

"As Christmas approaches and the prospects for a full scale
economic recovery become less certain, the key issues for the
sector will continue to center around consumer confidence and
spending power, restricted working capital availability and, as a
consequence, the threat that businesses will not be able to
absorb the impact of unforeseen events such as adverse weather. .
. .  This may well lead to a greater number of insolvencies in Q4
2011 and Q1 2012," Mr. Cooper added, Big Hospitality relays.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* David von Saucken Joins Kaye Scholer's European Practice
----------------------------------------------------------
David von Saucken, a noted Restructuring & Insolvency lawyer,
dually qualified to practice in Germany and England and Wales,
has joined Kaye Scholer as a Partner in the firm's London and
Frankfurt offices.

Previously a partner with Ashurst LLP, von Saucken focuses on
advising funds and investment banks in special situations, with a
particular emphasis on CMBS and other complex real estate-related
restructurings.  He also counsels on debt, hedge funds and
private equity investments in performing German situations.

"We are delighted to have David join us as a partner as part of
our strategy to grow our bankruptcy and restructuring
capabilities internationally," said Michael Solow, Co-Managing
Partner of Kaye Scholer and himself a bankruptcy attorney.  "The
European markets currently face great uncertainty at a time when
leverage is still high in most areas as a consequence of the
lending boom prior to the ongoing financial crisis.  This has led
to ongoing high client demand for restructuring assistance in
Europe.  There couldn't be a better time to bring on someone with
David's unique strengths and talents."

Among von Saucken's recent work is the representation of
mezzanine lenders to Highstreet, a vehicle owning some of
Germany's largest department stores, the representation of a
group of banks and a securitized lender in the work-out of a
residential mortgage portfolio in excess of EUR1 billion through
an offshore receivership, and the representation of various
bondholders groups in European and Middle Eastern restructurings.

According to 2011 Chambers UK, which ranks him as a leading
bankruptcy attorney, "international clients describe David von
Saucken as 'a great lawyer -- responsive, capable and a good
tactician.'  He offers strong technical know-how in German
insolvency matters and has advised a number of Anglo-American
funds on their transactions in the region.  Distressed M&A deals,
restructurings and non-performing loans all form significant
components of his caseload."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 31 to November 4, 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon    Maturity  Currency   Price
------                ------    --------  --------   -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT        5.470   8/28/2013      EUR    59.50
BAWAG                   5.430   2/26/2024      EUR    66.14
BAWAG                   5.310   2/12/2023      EUR    69.19
BAWAG                   5.400   2/12/2023      EUR    69.74
HAA-BANK INTL AG        5.270    4/7/2028      EUR    59.84
IMMOFINANZ              4.250    3/8/2018      EUR     3.60
KOMMUNALKREDIT          5.430   2/13/2024      EUR    54.88
KOMMUNALKREDIT          4.900   6/23/2031      EUR    43.50
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.170   7/29/2015      EUR    65.13
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.160   5/20/2025      EUR    72.86
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.750   4/30/2021      EUR    70.40
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810   7/29/2025      EUR    61.38
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.270    2/8/2027      EUR    55.71
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         5.470   2/28/2028      EUR    65.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500   9/28/2035      EUR    52.18

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP          4.000    6/1/2016      EUR    19.49
IDEAL STANDARD I       11.750    5/1/2018      EUR    69.88
IDEAL STANDARD I       11.750    5/1/2018      EUR    69.25

CYPRUS
------
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    1/2/2016      EUR    74.78
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   3/30/2016      EUR    74.11
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    6/2/2016      EUR    73.64
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   7/11/2016      EUR    73.35
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        3.750   11/1/2015      EUR    72.59
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600   2/26/2019      EUR    70.60
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   10/9/2016      EUR    72.82
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    1/4/2017      EUR    72.31
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   2/15/2017      EUR    72.11
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500    4/2/2017      EUR    71.90
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.500   9/28/2017      EUR    71.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.100   1/29/2018      EUR    73.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.600   4/23/2018      EUR    71.07
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        5.350    6/9/2020      EUR    73.65
CYPRUS GOVT BOND        4.625    2/3/2020      EUR    69.39
MARFIN POPULAR          4.350  11/20/2014      EUR    49.13
REP OF CYPRUS           4.750   2/25/2016      EUR    74.58

DENMARK
-------
FIN-DANISH IND          4.910    7/6/2021      EUR    54.25
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR    47.17
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500    2/3/2016      TRY    73.50

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR    50.04
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  11/21/2018      ZAR    66.89
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR    61.45
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  11/16/2017      TRY    72.13
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR    68.37
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  10/27/2016      TRY    67.42
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR    75.37
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250   6/28/2040      CAD    24.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   3/17/2025      CAD    61.66
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  11/10/2021      NZD    62.06
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR    74.38
TALVIVAARA              4.000  12/16/2015      EUR    74.52

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970    4/1/2015      EUR    11.43
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000    1/1/2015      EUR     3.04
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720    1/1/2015      EUR     4.76
ASSYSTEM                4.000    1/1/2017      EUR    20.32
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500    1/1/2016      EUR    51.39
BNP PARIBAS             2.890   5/16/2036      JPY    64.15
CALYON                  6.000   6/18/2047      EUR    15.10
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000    1/1/2012      EUR    42.11
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500    1/1/2014      EUR    38.96
CGG VERITAS             1.750    1/1/2016      EUR    26.13
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110   11/1/2015      EUR    17.54
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000    6/8/2012      EUR    13.21
CMA CGM                 8.500   4/15/2017      USD    40.31
CMA CGM                 8.875   4/15/2019      EUR    41.13
CMA CGM                 8.875   4/15/2019      EUR    40.33
CMA CGM                 8.500   4/15/2017      USD    41.00
CNP ASSURANCES          6.875   9/30/2041      EUR    73.20
CNP ASSURANCES          6.000   9/14/2040      EUR    71.06
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300  10/12/2030      USD    65.95
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.250  10/18/2030      USD    67.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300  10/22/2030      USD    68.29
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.350  10/29/2030      USD    68.59
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.910   11/3/2030      USD    65.35
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.450   11/9/2030      USD    69.49
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.080  11/23/2030      USD    65.92
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.690  11/26/2030      USD    71.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.400   12/9/2030      USD    68.90
CREDIT AGRI CIB         6.000  12/23/2030      USD    71.93
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850   5/27/2031      USD    72.62
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.650   6/10/2031      USD    70.65
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.610   6/15/2031      USD    70.23
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.270    8/5/2030      USD    68.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.830   6/30/2031      USD    72.34
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.850   6/30/2031      USD    72.54
CREDIT AGRI CIB         5.300   10/7/2030      USD    68.14
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.850   9/17/2030      USD    63.83
CREDIT AGRICOLE         4.500  12/22/2019      EUR    71.73
CREDIT LOCAL FRA        3.750   5/26/2020      EUR    60.29
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        5.037    8/4/2020      EUR    66.54
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.550    4/2/2020      EUR    64.88
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.500   2/25/2020      EUR    64.67
DEXIA CRED LOCAL        4.110   9/18/2018      EUR    68.24
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000  12/23/2024      EUR    61.69
EURAZEO                 6.250   6/10/2014      EUR    57.48
EUROPCAR GROUPE         9.375   4/15/2018      EUR    63.88
EUROPCAR GROUPE         9.375   4/15/2018      EUR    63.78
FAURECIA                4.500    1/1/2015      EUR    23.24
FONCIERE REGIONS        3.340    1/1/2017      EUR    74.35
GROUPAMA SA             7.875  10/27/2039      EUR    49.45
INGENICO                2.750    1/1/2017      EUR    42.99
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2014      EUR    18.53
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2015      EUR    17.49
NEXANS SA               4.000    1/1/2016      EUR    59.01
NOVASEP HLDG            9.750  12/15/2016      USD    43.00
ORPEA                   3.875    1/1/2016      EUR    45.04
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875    6/1/2018      EUR    70.67
PAGESJAUNES FINA        8.875    6/1/2018      EUR    71.32
PEUGEOT SA              4.450    1/1/2016      EUR    25.34
PIERRE VACANCES         4.000   10/1/2015      EUR    70.47
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000   1/18/2018      EUR    49.02
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125   7/30/2014      EUR    37.82
RHODIA SA               0.500    1/1/2014      EUR    52.16
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750    4/1/2020      EUR    20.55
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.900   3/10/2031      USD    70.76
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860   3/11/2031      USD    70.29
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.940   3/14/2031      USD    71.13
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.910   3/16/2031      USD    70.83
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.920   3/17/2031      USD    70.92
SOCIETE GENERALE        5.860   4/26/2031      USD    70.61
SOCIETE GENERALE        6.010   3/15/2031      USD    71.80
SOITEC                  6.250    9/9/2014      EUR     7.57
TEM                     4.250    1/1/2015      EUR    52.78
THEOLIA                 2.700    1/1/2041      EUR     9.01

GERMANY
-------
BAYERISCHE HYPO         5.000  12/21/2029      EUR    72.84
BAYERISCHE LNDBK        4.500    2/7/2019      EUR    73.66
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.450   2/20/2023      EUR    67.85
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.600   4/14/2023      EUR    68.55
BHW BAUSPARKASSE        5.640   1/30/2024      EUR    65.75
COMMERZBANK AG          4.000  11/30/2017      EUR    42.05
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000   3/30/2018      EUR    42.01
COMMERZBANK AG          6.300   3/15/2022      EUR    69.52
COMMERZBANK AG          6.360   3/15/2022      EUR    69.67
COMMERZBANK AG          6.460   6/24/2022      EUR    69.79
COMMERZBANK AG          5.000   4/20/2018      EUR    42.09
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN        5.300  11/20/2023      EUR    67.76
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.180   2/28/2023      EUR    65.58
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.210   6/20/2022      EUR    68.45
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.700   7/31/2023      EUR    63.00
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.350   6/13/2028      EUR    67.27
DRESDNER BANK AG        6.000   2/25/2020      EUR    72.56
DRESDNER BANK AG        7.160   8/14/2024      EUR    69.20
DRESDNER BANK AG        5.290   5/31/2021      EUR    65.28
EUROHYPO AG             3.830   9/21/2020      EUR    54.63
EUROHYPO AG             5.110    8/6/2018      EUR    67.75
EUROHYPO AG             5.560   8/18/2023      EUR    57.75
EUROHYPO AG             6.490   7/17/2017      EUR     4.00
GOTHAER ALLG VER        5.527   9/29/2026      EUR    70.98
HECKLER & KOCH          9.500   5/15/2018      EUR    75.20
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250   4/15/2018      EUR    64.83
HEIDELBERG DRUCK        9.250   4/15/2018      EUR    64.75
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375   2/14/2017      EUR    54.96
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        4.500    7/9/2013      EUR    63.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500   5/10/2027      CAD    49.53
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.800   2/23/2037      JPY    38.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250  10/20/2015      EUR    27.53
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN        5.875   2/10/2016      EUR    69.99
Q-CELLS                 6.750  10/21/2015      EUR     1.10
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750   3/22/2013      USD     1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK        6.600   5/29/2022      EUR    65.88
SOLARWORLD AG           6.125   1/21/2017      EUR    64.09
SOLARWORLD AG           6.375   7/13/2016      EUR    68.14
STYROLUTION GRP         7.625   5/15/2016      EUR    76.73
TAG IMMO AG             6.500  12/10/2015      EUR     7.66
TUI AG                  5.500  11/17/2014      EUR    58.30
TUI AG                  2.750   3/24/2016      EUR    38.60

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851   9/19/2016      EUR    30.98
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.057   3/26/2013      EUR    40.02
ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008   7/18/2017      EUR    31.22
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301   8/12/2014      EUR    30.23
FAGE DAIRY IND          7.500   1/15/2015      EUR    73.00
HELLENIC RAILWAY        4.500   12/6/2016      JPY    34.98
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300   7/25/2030      EUR    26.54
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900   7/25/2025      EUR    21.76
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   3/11/2019      EUR    37.25
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140   4/14/2028      EUR    31.13
HELLENIC REPUB          4.625   6/25/2013      USD    74.00
HELLENIC REPUB          2.125    7/5/2013      CHF    47.13
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200   7/17/2034      EUR    30.75
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590    4/8/2016      EUR    29.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   3/20/2012      EUR    42.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250   5/18/2012      EUR    38.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.250   6/20/2012      EUR    62.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        1.000   6/30/2012      EUR    60.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.100   8/20/2012      EUR    36.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.506   3/31/2013      EUR    43.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   5/20/2013      EUR    32.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        7.500   5/20/2013      EUR    33.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.900    7/3/2013      EUR    35.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.427   7/31/2013      EUR    39.08
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.000   8/20/2013      EUR    31.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.520   9/30/2013      EUR    35.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500   1/11/2014      EUR    31.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   5/20/2014      EUR    31.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    7/1/2014      EUR    33.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985   7/25/2014      EUR    33.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500   8/20/2014      EUR    30.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113   9/30/2014      EUR    34.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   7/20/2015      EUR    31.29
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100   8/20/2015      EUR    32.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702   9/30/2015      EUR    34.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700  11/10/2015      EUR    34.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600   7/20/2016      EUR    30.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020   9/13/2016      EUR    34.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225    3/1/2017      EUR    35.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   4/20/2017      EUR    29.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   7/20/2017      EUR    29.11
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675   10/9/2017      EUR    35.53
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   7/20/2018      EUR    29.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000   7/19/2019      EUR    29.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.161   9/17/2019      EUR    27.97
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500  10/22/2019      EUR    29.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250   6/19/2020      EUR    30.44
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900  10/22/2022      EUR    28.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700   3/20/2024      EUR    27.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   9/20/2037      EUR    27.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   9/20/2040      EUR    27.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300   3/20/2026      EUR    27.37
NATL BK GREECE          3.875   10/7/2016      EUR    54.71
GUERNSEY
--------
CREDIT AGRICOLE         5.600   2/25/2030      USD    72.24

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580   4/28/2028      EUR    53.59
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        4.875   6/29/2017      EUR    74.21
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   2/12/2030      EUR    47.96
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    3/1/2030      EUR    47.92
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2035      GBP    31.75
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625  11/12/2014      EUR    73.21
ALLIED IRISH BKS        4.000   3/19/2015      EUR    73.96
ANGLO IRISH BANK        4.000   4/15/2015      EUR    72.48
BANESTO FINANC          5.000   3/23/2030      EUR    66.46
BANK OF IRELAND         5.600   9/18/2023      EUR    46.00
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      EUR    54.38
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      GBP    37.13
BANK OF IRELAND         4.473  11/30/2016      EUR    64.38
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400   11/6/2029      EUR    48.92
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760    9/7/2029      EUR    51.51
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.360  10/12/2029      EUR    48.68
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450    3/1/2030      EUR    48.67
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900   8/24/2035      CAD    67.73
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037      USD    69.44
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500    3/3/2025      CAD    40.71
DEPFA ACS BANK          3.250   7/31/2031      CHF    74.15
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.000   2/25/2015      EUR    74.14
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.000   3/10/2015      EUR    72.29
UT2 FUNDING PLC         5.321   6/30/2016      EUR    64.44

ITALY
-----
BANCA MARCHE            3.600  11/12/2020      EUR    71.45
BANCA MARCHE            3.900   8/17/2020      EUR    73.97
BANCA MARCHE            4.000   1/10/2021      EUR    73.27
BANCA MARCHE            3.700    9/1/2020      EUR    72.78
BANCA MARCHE            4.000   5/26/2021      EUR    72.25
BANCA MARCHE            5.500   9/16/2030      EUR    70.18
BANCA MARCHE            4.360    1/4/2022      ITL    74.03
BANCA POP MILANO        4.000   4/23/2020      EUR    72.98
BANCA POP VICENT        4.970   4/20/2027      EUR    70.80
BANCO POPOLARE          6.375   5/31/2021      EUR    73.02
BTPS                    4.000    2/1/2037      EUR    69.29
BTPS I/L                3.100   9/15/2026      EUR    74.94
BTPS I/L                2.550   9/15/2041      EUR    61.21
BTPS I/L                2.600   9/15/2023      EUR    75.44
BTPS I/L                2.100   9/15/2021      EUR    76.05
BTPS I/L                2.350   9/15/2035      EUR    62.13
CASSA RISP CENTO        4.500   9/12/2015      EUR    74.25
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.500    3/5/2016      EUR    68.63
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000    9/2/2015      EUR    73.75
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000    8/5/2015      EUR    74.25
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.000   11/2/2016      EUR    66.63
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.575    2/2/2017      EUR    67.50
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.000   1/18/2015      EUR    74.75
CASSA RISP FERRA        3.400   9/17/2017      EUR    60.50
CASSA RISP FERRA        4.500   11/2/2020      EUR    54.75
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019   6/29/2035      EUR    72.25
DEXIA CREDIOP           4.790  12/17/2043      EUR    68.26
MONTE DEI PASCHI        5.750   9/30/2016      GBP    69.97
REP OF ITALY            2.000   9/15/2062      EUR    44.97
REP OF ITALY            4.850   6/11/2060      EUR    67.83
REP OF ITALY            2.200   9/15/2058      EUR    49.64
REP OF ITALY            1.850   9/15/2057      EUR    42.76
REP OF ITALY            2.870   5/19/2036      JPY    56.68
REP OF ITALY            4.490    4/5/2027      EUR    73.08
REP OF ITALY            5.200   7/31/2034      EUR    75.57
ROMULUS FINANCE         5.441   2/20/2023      GBP    67.37
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    62.60
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    62.54
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    62.13
SEAT PAGINE            10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    62.13
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250   3/17/2055      EUR    64.71
UGF ASSICURAZION        5.660   7/28/2023      EUR    59.25
UNICREDIT SPA           5.050   4/25/2022      EUR    73.32
UNICREDITO ITALI        5.000    2/1/2016      GBP    69.00

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250    4/1/2014      EUR    23.88
CONTROLINVESTE          3.000   1/28/2015      EUR    69.06
ESPIRITO SANTO F        6.875  10/21/2019      EUR    51.88
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    15.83
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    16.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750   10/1/2005      USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   6/22/2021      ZAR    44.06
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   5/12/2021      ZAR    44.51
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021      NZD    65.39
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/3/2021      NZD    65.64
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   9/15/2016      TRY    69.72
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   2/24/2025      CAD    61.52
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   6/22/2016      TRY    70.91
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   4/27/2016      TRY    71.70
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/17/2016      TRY    72.29
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   5/25/2016      TRY    71.32
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500   5/15/2014      USD    40.63
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500   5/15/2014      USD    40.50
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625   12/9/2030      GBP    57.10
CEMEX FIN EUROPE        4.750    3/5/2014      EUR    75.04
DEXIA FUNDING           5.875    2/9/2017      GBP    59.09
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500   4/10/2018      USD    58.41
FRIESLAND BANK          4.210  12/29/2025      EUR    65.09
INDAH KIAT INTL        12.500   6/15/2006      USD     0.01
ING BANK NV             4.200  12/19/2035      EUR    69.81
IVG FINANCE BV          1.750   3/29/2017      EUR    71.38
KBC IFIMA NV            8.500    2/7/2025      USD    68.08
LEHMAN BROS TSY         4.870   10/8/2013      USD    33.00
MARFRIG HLDG EUR        8.375    5/9/2018      USD    70.50
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983    5/7/2029      EUR    17.78
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500   3/11/2025      CAD    60.80
NIB CAPITAL BANK        4.510  12/16/2035      EUR    60.41
POLYSINDO FIN           9.375   7/30/2007      USD     0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN        4.500   6/16/2025      EUR    66.17
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750   5/26/2014      EUR    18.28
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        1.375   2/28/2012      EUR    35.88
RABOBANK                0.500  11/26/2021      ZAR    50.12
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        5.000   2/27/2037      EUR    68.50
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        2.910   6/21/2036      JPY    65.99
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000   4/20/2016      USD    68.00
SNS BANK                6.250  10/26/2020      EUR    58.82
SNS BANK                6.625   5/14/2018      EUR    72.70
SRLEV NV                9.000   4/15/2041      EUR    67.37

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500    5/9/2030      CAD    45.80
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   7/26/2016      ZAR    73.25
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR    75.38
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   7/29/2016      ZAR    72.78
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   5/25/2018      ZAR    61.63
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   5/25/2016      ZAR    74.35
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   7/29/2016      TRY    69.64
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125  10/15/2033      USD    37.80
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125  10/15/2015      USD    49.50
NORSKE SKOGIND          6.125  10/15/2015      USD    52.67
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750   6/15/2016      EUR    54.75
NORSKE SKOGIND         11.750   6/15/2016      EUR    56.60
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.000   6/26/2017      EUR    48.12
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125  10/15/2033      USD    37.25
RENEWABLE CORP          6.500    6/4/2014      EUR    59.95

POLAND
------
POLAND-PAR CPN          3.000  10/27/2024      USD    75.87

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG        5.625   4/23/2014      EUR    68.50
BANCO COM PORTUG        3.750   10/8/2016      EUR    66.54
BANCO COM PORTUG        4.750   6/22/2017      EUR    66.44
BANCO COM PORTUG        9.250  10/13/2014      EUR    73.76
BANCO ESPIRITO          3.375   2/17/2015      EUR    74.84
BANCO ESPIRITO          3.875   1/21/2015      EUR    70.53
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.160   7/23/2015      EUR    72.13
BANCO ESPIRITO          6.875   7/15/2016      EUR    68.13
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600   9/15/2016      EUR    68.74
BANCO ESPIRITO          4.600   1/26/2017      EUR    66.81
BRISA                   4.500   12/5/2016      EUR    72.61
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250   1/27/2020      EUR    64.68
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400   10/8/2019      EUR    67.72
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.500  11/13/2017      EUR    70.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.455   8/20/2017      EUR    62.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        3.875   12/6/2016      EUR    68.01
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.900  10/13/2016      EUR    68.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.570   8/12/2016      EUR    67.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.165    7/8/2016      EUR    69.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.090    6/8/2016      EUR    70.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750   3/14/2016      EUR    71.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750   2/14/2016      EUR    73.03
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.320    8/5/2021      EUR    55.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.980    3/3/2028      EUR    53.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380   10/1/2038      EUR    51.12
COMBOIOS DE PORT        4.170  10/16/2019      EUR    53.37
METRO DE LISBOA         5.750    2/4/2019      EUR    62.98
METRO DE LISBOA         7.300  12/23/2025      EUR    74.47
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799   12/7/2027      EUR    57.93
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061   12/4/2026      EUR    55.73
MONTEPIO GERAL          5.000    2/8/2017      EUR    61.63
PARPUBLICA              4.191  10/15/2014      EUR    68.75
PARPUBLICA              3.500    7/8/2013      EUR    75.50
PARPUBLICA              4.200  11/16/2026      EUR    46.00
PARPUBLICA              3.567   9/22/2020      EUR    46.38
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500   3/25/2015      USD    69.83
PORTUGAL (REP)          3.500   3/25/2015      USD    69.57
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.350  10/15/2015      EUR    68.06
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850   4/15/2021      EUR    55.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.600  10/15/2014      EUR    69.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.375   6/16/2014      EUR    71.51
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.950  10/25/2023      EUR    55.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.800   6/15/2020      EUR    57.53
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100   4/15/2037      EUR    49.53
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.350  10/16/2017      EUR    59.67
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.750   6/14/2019      EUR    57.91
PORTUGUESE OT'S         6.400   2/15/2016      EUR    71.27
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.200  10/15/2016      EUR    64.20
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.450   6/15/2018      EUR    58.99
REFER                   4.250  12/13/2021      EUR    39.00
REFER                   4.000   3/16/2015      EUR    39.88
REFER                   5.875   2/18/2019      EUR    57.50
REFER                   4.675  10/16/2024      EUR    44.63
REFER                   4.047  11/16/2026      EUR    52.52

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA             17.500   5/23/2012      RUB     0.38
ARIZK                   3.000  12/20/2030      RUB    50.46
DVTG-FINANS            17.000   8/29/2013      RUB    55.55
DVTG-FINANS             7.750   7/18/2013      RUB    20.29
IART                    8.500    8/4/2013      RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  17.000   9/17/2012      RUB    35.00
MOSMART FINANS          0.010   4/12/2012      RUB    16.24
NOK                    12.500   8/26/2014      RUB     5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA        1.000  12/17/2012      RUB     0.01
PROTON-FINANCE          9.000   6/12/2012      RUB    65.00
RBC OJSC                7.000   4/23/2015      RUB    67.00
RBC OJSC                7.000   4/23/2015      RUB    65.01
RBC OJSC                3.270   4/19/2018      RUB    40.00
SAHO                   10.000   5/21/2012      RUB     5.01
SATURN                  8.500    6/6/2014      RUB     1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500   3/27/2012      RUB     3.40
TERNA-FINANS            1.000   11/4/2011      RUB    15.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750   5/25/2027      EUR    68.89
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750  12/14/2022      EUR    67.85
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   6/30/2025      EUR    61.90
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.250  10/25/2023      EUR    71.27
BANCAJA                 1.500   5/22/2018      EUR    64.20
BANCO BILBAO VIZ        6.025    3/3/2033      EUR    62.59
BANCO BILBAO VIZ        4.500   2/16/2022      EUR    73.79
BANCO POP ESPAN         5.702  12/22/2019      EUR    74.50
BBVA SUB CAP UNI        2.750  10/22/2035      JPY    43.55
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500   6/23/2021      EUR    58.90
CAJA MADRID             4.125   3/24/2036      EUR    68.71
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        4.250   4/10/2031      EUR    57.94
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        3.875   5/23/2025      EUR    62.49
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250   3/28/2027      EUR    62.89
CEMEX ESPANA LUX        8.875   5/12/2017      EUR    76.56
CEMEX ESPANA LUX        8.875   5/12/2017      EUR    75.13
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900  11/30/2035      EUR    63.54
COMUN AUTO CANAR        4.200  10/25/2036      EUR    66.66
COMUNIDAD BALEAR        4.063  11/23/2035      EUR    66.37
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300   9/15/2026      EUR    73.51
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.355  11/10/2015      CHF    67.51
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.750   3/24/2016      CHF    65.89
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.690  10/28/2034      EUR    71.33
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.125   10/1/2014      CHF    74.87
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.315   9/10/2015      CHF    68.55
GEN DE CATALUNYA        2.965    9/8/2039      JPY    58.18
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220   4/26/2035      EUR    65.45
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750   8/20/2012      EUR    71.08
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500   6/15/2020      EUR    72.81
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        3.250   6/28/2024      CHF    68.33
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        2.570  10/22/2021      CHF    69.31
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         3.065   7/29/2039      JPY    61.73
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         4.250  10/31/2036      EUR    65.87
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         3.170   7/29/2039      JPY    63.21
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875   1/31/2036      EUR    57.25
JUNTA LA MANCHA         2.810  10/14/2022      JPY    72.96
MAPFRE SA               5.921   7/24/2037      EUR    68.02
SACYR VALLEHERM         6.500    5/1/2016      EUR    75.25
SPANISH GOV'T           4.200   1/31/2037      EUR    74.49
XUNTA DE GALICIA        4.025  11/28/2035      EUR    73.48

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000   12/7/2011      USD    10.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   11/4/2011      USD     7.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500   1/27/2012      USD     7.65
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500  12/17/2027      USD    57.42
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130   1/10/2012      USD     9.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   1/27/2012      USD     3.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500   2/28/2012      USD     8.65
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD     9.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD    10.62
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750   3/23/2012      USD     8.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500   6/12/2012      USD     7.96
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.250   4/27/2012      USD     7.67
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   6/14/2016      ZAR    74.36
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   9/29/2015      TRY    73.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/25/2016      ZAR    72.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   6/29/2016      TRY    68.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   9/20/2016      ZAR    72.75
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/26/2016      ZAR    72.79
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/25/2021      ZAR    44.10
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   8/26/2021      AUD    63.33
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   9/30/2016      ZAR    72.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   1/25/2028      USD    57.01

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CRED SUIS NY            9.000  10/12/2012      USD    22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH           2.875   2/20/2012      CHF    64.61
UBS AG                 10.200   10/1/2012      USD    71.89
UBS AG                 10.500  10/15/2012      USD    67.33
UBS AG                 10.000   8/23/2013      USD    14.14
UBS AG                 10.530   1/23/2012      USD    35.91
UBS AG                  8.380   3/20/2012      USD    32.03
UBS AG                  8.720   3/20/2012      USD    26.79
UBS AG                  9.250   3/20/2012      USD    11.34
UBS AG                 10.070   3/23/2012      USD    27.66
UBS AG                 12.350   3/27/2012      USD    23.65
UBS AG                 13.300   5/23/2012      USD     3.57
UBS AG                 13.700   5/23/2012      USD    11.14
UBS AG                 14.000   5/23/2012      USD     7.00
UBS AG                 10.960   7/20/2012      USD    22.40
UBS AG                 11.760   7/31/2012      USD    25.45
UBS AG                 12.040   7/31/2012      USD    34.60
UBS AG                  9.500   8/10/2012      USD    27.82
UBS AG                 11.960   8/14/2012      USD    35.49
UBS AG                 15.240   8/23/2012      USD    27.47
UBS AG                 10.910    9/7/2012      USD    41.08
UBS AG                  9.640  11/14/2011      USD    10.55
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140  12/30/2011      USD    14.50
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220   7/31/2012      EUR    39.09

UKRAINE
-------
LVIV CITY               9.950  12/19/2012      UAH    91.31

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS        5.000   8/26/2030      USD    64.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.400   2/12/2013      EUR    64.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        5.500   6/20/2013      EUR    62.25
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.500   6/21/2013      EUR    57.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        6.000   6/20/2014      EUR    52.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.000  11/16/2012      EUR    68.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        3.250   2/25/2013      EUR    61.63
BAKKAVOR FIN 2          8.250   2/15/2018      GBP    73.24
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.340  12/28/2026      JPY    74.83
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.408    2/9/2027      JPY    74.26
BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772    2/7/2035      EUR    61.33
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.359   3/27/2029      JPY    69.89
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550   1/23/2012      USD    10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350   1/23/2012      USD    26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   1/31/2012      USD     9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650   1/31/2012      USD    34.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950   4/20/2012      USD    23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.050   4/27/2012      USD    25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.000    6/3/2041      USD    74.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000  10/16/2012      USD    10.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.500  10/16/2012      USD     9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC        14.000   10/1/2012      USD     9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   10/1/2012      USD     9.28
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   9/28/2012      USD     9.89
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   9/11/2012      USD    10.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   9/11/2012      USD     9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500   8/31/2012      USD    22.20
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   8/31/2012      USD    31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   8/28/2012      USD    10.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800   7/31/2012      USD    25.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400   7/31/2012      USD     9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC        11.000   7/27/2012      USD     8.15
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.000   7/27/2012      USD     8.87
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.000   7/20/2012      USD     8.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.000   6/29/2012      USD     9.09
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910    2/1/2047      EUR    71.18
CEVA GROUP PLC          8.500   6/30/2018      EUR    53.13
CEVA GROUP PLC         10.000   6/30/2018      EUR    55.63
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.750   12/2/2024      GBP    71.28
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875   3/28/2033      GBP    68.22
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948   3/31/2037      GBP    73.01
EFG HELLAS PLC          4.375   2/11/2013      EUR    62.92
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400   11/2/2047      EUR     9.50
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010    1/9/2036      EUR    33.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.100   12/9/2021      EUR    18.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000   2/28/2013      EUR    54.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.350   7/22/2014      EUR    34.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.000   12/2/2021      EUR    18.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        5.000   12/2/2021      EUR    18.38
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875    5/9/2025      GBP    63.63
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.500   12/6/2018      GBP    70.02
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.875   2/15/2021      GBP    63.03
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375   9/26/2031      GBP    62.00
ESSAR ENERGY            4.250    2/1/2016      USD    70.77
EX-IM BK OF UKRA        5.793    2/9/2016      USD    72.18
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750  12/20/2026      GBP    64.98
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500    6/1/2019      GBP    72.00
GALA ELECTRIC CA       11.500    6/1/2019      GBP    73.52
GRAINGER PLC            3.625   5/17/2014      GBP    74.94
HBOS PLC                4.500   3/18/2030      EUR    61.76
HBOS PLC                5.374   6/30/2021      EUR    69.96
INEOS GRP HLDG          7.875   2/15/2016      EUR    73.92
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        7.975   9/15/2024      GBP    73.45
LBG CAPITAL NO.1        6.439   5/23/2020      EUR    73.12
LBG CAPITAL NO.2        8.500    6/7/2032      GBP    72.22
LBG CAPITAL NO.2        6.385   5/12/2020      EUR    73.09
LOUIS NO1 PLC          10.000   12/1/2016      EUR    60.00
LOUIS NO1 PLC          10.000   12/1/2016      EUR    60.00
LOUIS NO1 PLC           8.500   12/1/2014      EUR    67.13
MATALAN                 9.625   3/31/2017      GBP    50.88
MATALAN                 9.625   3/31/2017      GBP    50.50
MAX PETROLEUM           6.750    9/8/2013      USD    56.72
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800  12/21/2020      EUR    68.21
NORTH HOUSING           8.750   5/11/2037      GBP   140.27
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574   1/13/2015      GBP    72.00
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750   2/28/2017      GBP    57.00
OTE PLC                 7.250    4/8/2014      EUR    65.56
OTE PLC                 5.000    8/5/2013      EUR    69.09
OTE PLC                 4.625   5/20/2016      EUR    56.88
PIRAEUS GRP FIN         4.000   9/17/2012      EUR    63.03
PRIVATBANK              5.799    2/9/2016      USD    65.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.625   9/22/2021      EUR    63.28
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        2.300  11/26/2024      JPY    74.19
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        5.168   6/29/2030      EUR    61.97
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.450   5/15/2005      USD     0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN          5.659   6/30/2027      GBP    62.00


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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