TCREUR_Public/111110.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, November 10, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 223

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: Aims to Complete Asset Disposals by First Quarter 2012


G E R M A N Y

COMMERZBANK GROUP: Moody's Cuts Hybrid Instrument Rating to 'Ba1'
GENERAL MOTORS: European Unit's Boss to Step Down Next Year
HEIDELBERGCEMENT: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Corporate Credit Ratings


I R E L A N D

MURRAYS-RENT A CAR: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
STRAWINSKY I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca(sf)'
* IRELAND: 172 Firms Declared Insolvent in Oct, Vision-net Says


I T A L Y

PRELIOS CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Special Service Ratings


L U X E M B O U R G

MOSSI & GHISOLFI: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC DE 2006-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
HYDE PARK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'


N O R W A Y

PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: Moody's Rates Senior Notes at '(P)Ba2'


R U S S I A

SAINT-PETERSBURG OJSC: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to Domestic Bonds


S P A I N

BANCO DE VALENCIA: May Require Additional Capital


S W I T Z E R L A N D

AGUILA 3: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to CHF750MM Secured Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBURN REAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'B2'
ARGUS CARE: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business
BORDER DEMOLITION: Calls in Liquidation Specialists
MF GLOBAL: London Unit In Administration, KPMG on Board
PALMER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'

ROYAL BANK: Moody's Says Posting of Collateral Won't Hurt Rating
SUPERGLASS: Mulls GBP9.5-Mil. Fundraising Under Rescue Plan
ULTRA MOTOR: Goes Into Administration, Sells Subsidiary
* UK: Company Insolvencies Up 6.5% in Third Quarter 2011
* UK: No. of Construction Firms in Liquidation Up 24% in Q3

* UNITED KINGDOM: Euro Zone Woes Kill GPE London Office JV


X X X X X X X X

* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA SA: Aims to Complete Asset Disposals by First Quarter 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, Dexia SA
Chief Executive Officer Pierre Mariani said on a call with
journalists on Wednesday that Dexia SA aims to complete most of
its planned asset disposals by the first quarter of 2012.

Benedetti-Valentini didn't name any specific assets, Bloomberg
notes.

Dexia is based both in Paris and Brussels.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 21,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Dexia completed agreements to
sell its Belgian banking unit and French municipal-lending
division to state-owned companies, moving closer to a full
breakup as part of plans to rescue the lender.  Dexia said in an
e-mailed statement on Oct. 20 that Dexia Bank Belgium will be
sold for EUR4 billion (US$5.5 billion) to the Societe Federale de
Participations et d'Investissement, or SFPI, acting on behalf of
the Belgian state, according to Bloomberg.  The company will sell
the French municipal-lending unit to Caisse des Depots et
Consignations and La Poste, Bloomberg said. Belgium and France
are dismantling the firm, once the world's leading lender to
municipalities, after the company could no longer fund itself as
the sovereign-debt crisis dried up short-term financing,
Bloomberg noted.  The two countries, along with Luxembourg,
agreed to provide a EUR90 billion, 10-year guarantee to cover
Dexia's funding needs on Oct. 9, Bloomberg recounted.

Dexia SA -- http://www.dexia.com/-- is a Belgian-based bank and
insurance carrier that focuses on Public and Wholesale Banking,
providing local public finance actors with banking and financial
solutions, and on Retail and Commercial Banking in Europe, mainly
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Turkey.


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COMMERZBANK GROUP: Moody's Cuts Hybrid Instrument Rating to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade all
the Moody's-rated hybrid instruments issued by different
Commerzbank Group entities. Six hybrid capital instruments issued
by Commerzbank AG and Eurohypo AG -- or certain issuing vehicles
of these entities -- were placed on review for downgrade. One
instrument issued by Dresdner Funding Trust I was downgraded to
Ba1(hyb) from Baa3(hyb) and placed on review for further
downgrade.

The rating actions follow the Q3 results reported last Friday,
which in Moody's view indicate that Commerzbank's annual local
GAAP results in 2011 will likely be considerably weaker than
previously anticipated. Commerzbank's hybrid instruments rated by
Moody's include coupon-skip or deferral triggers that are
primarily linked to profits under local GAAP results. This
linkage has raised concerns about whether Commerzbank will be
able to service these instruments.

The hybrids ratings that are now on review range from Ba1 to
Caa1, reflecting Moody's instrument-by-instrument assessment of
the various underlying terms and triggers.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The initiation of the rating reviews for all of the rated hybrid
instruments of Commerzbank Group was triggered by last Friday's
report of the Q3 earnings of Commerzbank group. The results were
weighed down by further write-downs on its exposure to Greece, as
well as other factors. As a result of the quarterly loss, the
earnings expectations for the current financial year have
deteriorated; Commerzbank has also announced that its earlier
earnings expectations for 2012 have to be revised downward.

Most of the loss drivers will also affect Commerzbank's accounts
under local GAAP, whereas some positive effects that supported
the IFRS-based result will not be included (such as gains on the
valuation of the bank's own debt). Moreover, Moody's understands
that the 2011 income statement under local GAAP will be burdened
by a one-off compensation payment of EUR1 billion made to the
German government earlier in 2011. This one-off payment did not
affect the income statement under IFRS, but was charged directly
against equity. The agency therefore notes that earlier
expectations of a return towards servicing the group's hybrid
instruments may not be met. Commerzbank, Eurohypo and its hybrid-
issuing vehicles have -- with few exceptions -- not been
servicing hybrid instruments for up to three years between 2008-
10.

For 2011, the rating agency had previously assumed that (i)
coupon payments would be resumed for most, if not all, hybrid
instruments that had previously not serviced annual coupon
payments; and (ii) that the group would start to write-back
principal that was previously written down and belatedly pay
coupons on profit participation certificates (Genussscheine) that
were deferred. With the weakened earnings expectations, however,
this appears less likely and the probability of coupon
suspensions or further deferrals has increased.

The rating of the Dresdner Funding Trust I hybrid has been
lowered due to concerns about potential regulatory intervention.
This intervention has not yet occurred in the German banking
market; however, the rating agency assumes that regulatory
intervention cannot be entirely ruled out. This would be
particularly relevant if (i) Commerzbank is not servicing most of
the group's other hybrids; and, at the same time (ii) faces
challenges to achieve the 9% core Tier 1 ratio after assumed
(valuation) losses on exposures to certain countries. The
European Banking Authority requires banks to meet the 9% level by
mid-2012.

FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

The review will therefore focus on the group's ability to service
hybrid instruments under the current economic and financial
circumstances. Characteristics of local GAAP accounting will also
form part of the review.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP / DOWN

In order to establish the rating levels, Moody's will continue to
follow its approach of calculating the expected loss for each
non-performing instrument. This takes into account coupon-skip or
deferral triggers and other terms that may apply individually,
depending on their respective documentation. The key driver will
be Moody's expectations of the extent of future profits of
Commerzbank AG and Eurohypo AG, under German GAAP.

Any upward pressure on the current ratings is not expected over
the next six to eight quarters, as indicated by the review for
downgrade. Any eventual upward pressure could stem from a return
to profitability (under local GAAP) that will ultimately allow
Commerzbank AG and other group entities to (i) write-back
principal where this was written down previously; (ii) resume
payment of coupons; and (iii) in those cases where coupons were
deferred in the past, pay coupons retroactively (applicable to
profit participation certificates).

Downward pressure arises if Commerzbank AG and (or) Eurohypo AG
will post losses under German GAAP for an extended period as this
would prohibit servicing or delay the banks' ability to service
its hybrid instruments.

AFFECTED INSTRUMENTS

-- Tier 1 instruments ("Trust Preferred Securities") issued by
    Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust I, II and III
    (DE000A0GPYR7, XS0248611047, DE000CK45783), each rated
    B2(hyb) on review for downgrade

-- Tier 1 instruments ("Dated Silent Partnership Certificates")
    issued by Dresdner Funding Trust I (US26156FAB94 or
    XS0097772965), downgraded to Ba1(hyb) from Baa3(hyb); the
    instrument remains on review for further downgrade

-- Tier 1 instruments ("Tier 1 Capital Securities" DE000A0KAAA7)
    issued by HT1 Funding GmbH, which represent a "repacked
    silent participation" in Commerzbank (previously Dresdner
    Bank AG), rated Ba2(hyb) on review for downgrade

-- Dated Upper Tier 2 Capital Securities (DE000A0GVS76) issued
    by UT2 Funding plc, Ireland, which represent a "repackaged
    profit participation certificate" issued by the former
    Dresdner Bank AG, now Commerzbank AG, rated Ba2(hyb) on
    review for downgrade


-- Tier 1 instruments ("dated silent partnership certificates"),
    issued by Eurohypo Capital Funding Trust I and II
    (XS0169058012, DE000A0DZJZ7) rated Caa1 on review for
    downgrade

-- The upper Tier 2 instrument ("Genussschein") DE000EH091Z4,
    issued by Eurohypo AG, with a maturity date of December 31,
    2017, rated B2 on review for downgrade

-- The upper Tier 2 instruments ("Genussschein") DE0005568380,
    issued by the former Hypothekenbank in Essen (which was
    merged with Eurohypo in Q3 2008), with a maturity date of
    December 31, 2013, rated B3 on review for downgrade.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.


GENERAL MOTORS: European Unit's Boss to Step Down Next Year
-----------------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that Nick Reilly, the
British boss of General Motors Europe, will be stepping down from
his position after helping to prevent the collapse of the car
maker in 2009.

GM made the announcement on Monday as the US company also
confirmed it will block the emergency sale of Saab to two Chinese
companies because of fears about the use of its technology, the
Telegraph relates.

Mr. Reilly was parachuted in from GM's Asian business at the peak
of the recession to rescue GM Europe, the owner of Vauxhall and
Opel, the Telegraph recounts.  He will retire aged 62 next March,
after 37 years with GM, the Telegraph notes.

Mr. Reilly's departure will concern GM Europe's 5,000 staff in
the UK, who make Vauxhall cars at Ellesmere Port on Merseyside
and vans at Luton, the Telegraph says.

Under Mr. Reilly, who led Vauxhall in the UK before moving to
Asia, the British operations suffered minimal job losses despite
10,000 staff being cut in an emergency cost-saving cull across
Europe, according to the Telegraph.

Karl-Friedrich Stracke, the boss of Opel, will replace Mr. Reilly
as GM Europe president, the Telegraph says.  Mr. Reilly will step
down on January 1 but remain as an adviser until March, the
Telegraph discloses.

GM Europe sold Saab as part of its survival plan during the
recession, the Telegraph recounts.  However, GM still owns
preference shares in the company and supplies vital components,
meaning Saab needed its approval for a new sale, the Telegraph
notes.

                      About General Motors

With its global headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, General Motors
Company (NYSE:GM, TSX: GMM) -- http://www.gm.com/-- is one of
the world's largest automakers, traces its roots back to 1908.
GM employs 208,000 people in every major region of the world and
does business in more than 120 countries.  GM and its strategic
partners produce cars and trucks in 30 countries, and sell and
service these vehicles through the following brands: Baojun,
Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC, Daewoo, Holden, Isuzu, Jiefang,
Opel, Vauxhall, and Wuling.  GM's largest national market is
China, followed by the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Canada, and Italy.  GM's OnStar subsidiary is the
industry leader in vehicle safety, security and information
services.

General Motors Co. was formed to acquire the operations of
General Motors Corp. through a sale under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363
following Old GM's bankruptcy filing.  The U.S. government once
owned as much as 60.8% stake in New GM on account of the
financing it provided to the bankrupt entity.  The deal was
closed July 10, 2009, and Old GM changed its name to Motors
Liquidation Co.

On Nov. 1, 2011, Moody's Investors Service raised New GM's
Corporate Family Rating and Probability of Default Rating to Ba1
from Ba2, and its secured credit facility rating to Baa2 from
Baa3.  Moody's also raised the Corporate Family Rating of GM's
financial services subsidiary -- GM Financial -- to Ba3 from B1.

On Oct. 7, 2011, Fitch Ratings upgraded the Issuer Default
Ratings of New GM, General Motors Holdings LLC, and General
Motors Financial Company Inc., to 'BB' from 'BB-'.

On Oct. 3, 2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its
corporate credit rating on New GM to 'BB+' from 'BB-'; and
revised the rating outlook to stable from positive. "We also
raised our issue-level rating on GM's debt to 'BBB' from 'BB+';
the recovery rating remains at '1'," S&P said.

                     About Motors Liquidation

General Motors Corporation and three of its affiliates filed for
Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 09-50026) on
June 1, 2009.  The Honorable Robert E. Gerber presides over the
Chapter 11 cases.  Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Stephen Karotkin,
Esq., and Joseph H. Smolinsky, Esq., at Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP, assist the Debtors in their restructuring efforts.  Al Koch
at AP Services, LLC, an affiliate of AlixPartners, LLP, serves as
the Chief Executive Officer for Motors Liquidation Company.  GM
is also represented by Jenner & Block LLP and Honigman Miller
Schwartz and Cohn LLP as counsel.  Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP
is providing legal advice to the GM Board of Directors.  GM's
financial advisors are Morgan Stanley, Evercore Partners and the
Blackstone Group LLP.  Garden City Group is the claims and notice
agent of the Debtors.

The U.S. Trustee appointed an Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and a separate Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors Holding Asbestos-Related Claims.  Lawyers at Kramer
Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP served as bankruptcy counsel to the
Creditors Committee.  Attorneys at Butzel Long served as counsel
on supplier contract matters.  FTI Consulting Inc. served as
financial advisors to the Creditors Committee.  Elihu Inselbuch,
Esq., at Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, represented the Asbestos
Committee.  Legal Analysis Systems, Inc., served as asbestos
valuation analyst.

The Bankruptcy Court entered an order confirming the Debtors'
Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan on March 29, 2011.  The Plan
was declared effect on March 31.


HEIDELBERGCEMENT: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Corporate Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Germany-based heavy materials group HeidelbergCement AG to stable
from positive. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB' long-term
and 'B' short-term corporate credit ratings on HeidelbergCement,"
S&P related.

"The rating actions reflect our view that HeidelbergCement's
consistent allocation of cash flow to deleveraging will improve
its credit ratios over the next 12 months, but at a slower pace
than we anticipated," S&P said.

"We assess HeidelbergCement's business risk profile as
satisfactory. The group reported solid operating performance in
the first nine months of 2011, with growth in group turnover of
8.4% and moderate reported EBITDA growth of 2.5% to EUR1,682
million. In line with our forecasts, high input cost inflation
has translated into a one percentage point decline in the EBITDA
margin, to 17.5%, compared with the same period last year. This
is despite the group's successful cost-saving initiatives, with
EUR251 million of cash savings so far this year. However, debt
utilization rates on the group's bank lines have increased, in
part due to higher working capital requirements. This, together
with the only very moderate improvement in EBITDA generation,
means that credit metrics remain weak for the ratings, and below
our forecasts, for instance with funds from operations (FFO) to
debt of 13% on a rolling 12-month basis," S&P stated.

"In our view, HeidelbergCement's credit measures will strengthen
gradually over the next 12 months to levels commensurate with the
'BB' rating -- specifically, FFO to debt in the mid- to high
teens. In our view, this would be a consequence of the group's
focus on allocating free cash flow and funds from asset disposals
to further debt reduction. Nevertheless, we believe that
deleveraging will occur at a slower pace than we anticipated
earlier in the year. The main reasons for this are that our
revised outlook for the building materials sector does not
anticipate a recovery before 2013, and that the group has a low
credit-measure base," S&P said.

"Rating downside could stem from the adoption of a more
aggressive financial policy than we currently anticipate, such as
significant step-ups in capital expenditures and/or acquisition
spending. Rating downside could also arise as a result of credit
metrics not improving in line with our forecasts, which could be
due to a more severe slowdown in the group's end markets than we
anticipate, in combination with flat or negative margin
development in 2012, and/or risks around tightening financial
covenant headroom," S&P stated.

"We could raise the ratings if the improvements in
HeidelbergCement's credit metrics were to exceed our current
forecasts. Rating upside could be accelerated as a result of
higher debt reduction than we currently assume, following, for
instance, an increase in asset disposals or an earlier market
recovery than we anticipate. In our view, credit metrics
commensurate with a 'BB+' rating include FFO to debt of above
20%, with an unchanged business risk profile assessment of
satisfactory," S&P related.


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MURRAYS-RENT A CAR: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
--------------------------------------------------------------
Irish Examiner reports that the High Court has confirmed the
appointment of a provisional liquidator to Murray's-Rent A Car
Ltd.

The Court heard the company, which has more than 60 employees,
sought to be wound up after a proposed EUR34 million deal to sell
development property to supermarket chain Superquinn fell
through, Irish Examiner relates.  As a result, the company was
unable to meets its debts and is insolvent, Irish Examiner notes.
Its main creditors include Bank of Ireland, Permanent TSB, Dublin
Airport Authority and Revenue Commissioners, Irish Examiner
discloses.

On Nov. 3, the High Court Mr. Justice Roderick Murphy confirmed
the appointment of Ken Fennell as provisional liquidator to the
Murray's Rent-A-Car after being told the company had become
insolvent and unable to pay its debts, according to Irish
Examiner.

The judge, as cited by Irish Examiner, said that he was satisfied
to appoint Mr. Fennell, who was further granted powers allowing
him to run the firm's car hire business.  Mr. Fennell's
appointment was sought after a resolution to wind up the firm was
passed by the company's board of directors on Nov. 3, Irish
Examiner recounts.

According to Irish Examiner, Bernard Dunleavy Bl, appearing with
Anthony Thuillier Bl, for the company, said it is estimated that
as a result of the company's application it had liabilities over
assets of EUR7 million.  The counsel added that value of its
fleet is worth EUR5 million and it operated car hire desk at
Dublin, Cork and Shannon Airports, Irish Examiner notes.

Murray's-Rent A Car Ltd. is one of Ireland's oldest car rental
businesses.  The company was founded by Harold F. Murray in 1948.


STRAWINSKY I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Strawinsky I P.L.C.:

  -- EUR105.5MM Class A1-T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR58.63MM Class A1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR43MM Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2024, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR23MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
     Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR19MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2024, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on
     Jun 22, 2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Strawinsky I P.L.C., issued in August 2007, is a multi currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by IMC
Asset Management B.V. This transaction will be in reinvestment
period until August 20, 2013. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans (86.06%) with some exposure to mezzanine and
second lien loans (8.85%) and CLO securities (5.09%).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios due to deleveraging of the senior
notes reducing the risk of an Event of Default ("EoD") being
triggered since the rating action in March 2010.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain
credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward
looking indicators as well as time lags in receiving information
required for credit estimate update.

Moody's notes that the Class A1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 52.9%, or EUR73.8 million, since the rating action
in March 2010. As a result, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the rating action in March 2010. As of the latest
trustee report dated 10 October 2011, the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
117.57%, 102.15%, 94.04% and 87.71%, respectively, versus
February 2010 levels of 106.24%, 97.04%, 91.95% and 87.91%
respectively. Except for the Class A/B OC test, all OC tests are
currently failing.

The documentation of Strawinsky CLO allows for an Event of
Default to be triggered by the Class A1 note holders, should the
Class A/B OC test fall below 100%. The current class A/B OC ratio
is 117.57%, up from 106.24% at the time of last rating action.
Moody's took into account in its analysis the potential risk of
an EoD.

The Reported WARF has increased from 3562 to 3877 between
February 2010 and October 2011.

However, this reported WARF overstates the actual deterioration
in credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities total about
EUR11.4 million of the underlying portfolio compared to EUR28.9
million in February 2010, while securities rated Caa1 or lower
increased slightly to 32.06% from 30.49% in February 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR175.22
million, defaulted par of EUR17.4 million, a weighted average
default probability of 37.32% (consistent with a WARF of 4726), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.31% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 24 and a weighted
average spread of 2.75%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 86% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Because of the high exposure to securities rated Caa1 or below in
this transaction, in determining the final ratings, Moody's took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses. For
instance, in one scenario Moody's defaulted all Caa rated assets,
which currently amount to a little over 32% of the pool, with no
recoveries. This run generated results consistent with ratings
assigned.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as 16.6% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Greece, Spain and
Italy and 2) the large concentration of speculative-grade debt
maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation
of CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

(2) Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration in junior CLO tranches in the
underlying portfolio. Based on the latest trustee report, CLO
Securities currently held in the portfolio total about EUR 9.4
million, accounting for approximately 5.1% of the collateral
balance.

(3) Moody's also notes that around 65% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

(4) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

(5) The deal has exposure to non-EUR denominated assets.
Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact
on interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction,
which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

(6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis. Extending the weighted average life of the portfolio
may positively or negatively impact the ratings of the notes
depending on their seniority within the transaction's structure.

(7) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
rating factor, weighted average spread and diversity score.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


* IRELAND: 172 Firms Declared Insolvent in Oct, Vision-net Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
IrishCentral reports that figures from business information
company Vision-net.ie show that nine Irish companies were
declared insolvent every working day in the month of October.

According to the report, Vision-net.ie said 172 companies were
declared insolvent in the month, with business and professional
services companies (17%) now ranking alongside construction
companies (18%) as the worst sectors affected.

IrishCentral relates that Vision-net.ie also released the results
of its monthly company stress tests.

Of the 14,700 companies surveyed in the sample, 41% were seen as
high risk in terms of their risk of failure, 20% were classified
as medium risk and 39% were low risk, IrishCentral relays.

IrishCentral notes that Christine Cullen, managing director of
Vision-net.ie, said the level of business failures continued to
be stubbornly high.

"There are few real signs yet of recovery in the domestic sector,
with professional services firms starting to creep in the wrong
direction. What is apparent is that while the export sector is
growing, weak consumer confident continues to hamper growth in
home-grown companies," the report quotes Ms. Cullen as saying.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


PRELIOS CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Special Service Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Prelios Credit Servicing SpA's
(PRECS) Italian residential and commercial mortgage special
servicer ratings to 'RSS2' and 'CSS2', from 'RSS2+' and 'CSS2+',
respectively.

The downgrade reflects the company's negative financial condition
in recent years, the low level of training hours delivered in
2010, a declining servicing portfolio and below average recovery
rates on the secured portfolios when compared to peers in the
Italian market.

Although PRECS continues to benefit from the financial support of
its unrated parent companies, it is not profitable and has
reported losses since 2008.  Fitch therefore has concerns around
the financial performance of PRECS on a standalone basis.

Training hours delivered in 2010 totalled an average of five
hours per staff member, below the 28 hours delivered in 2009 and
well below the Fitch benchmark of 40 hours.  Fitch believes this
may be a symptom of the fact there is no dedicated training
manager or documented training plan in place as seen in other
rated peers in the Italian market.

PRECS has not boarded any new portfolios in the last 24 months,
and the overall servicing portfolio size has followed a declining
trend since 2008.  Recovery rates for the secured portfolio are
also below average when compared to peers.

The ratings also reflect the company's restructure in 2010,
allowing increased focus on recoveries and operational control
across the regional branches, a robust risk management program,
with a new risk management function in place and dedicated risk
manager appointed and, the enhanced IT infrastructure,
demonstrating an ongoing commitment to IT development.

As of 30 June 2011, PRECS managed a non-performing loan portfolio
of 30,429 loans with a gross book value (GBV) of EUR7.6 billion.
The portfolio consists of mostly commercial and residential
assets, while unsecured loans account for 44% by GBV.

Fitch employed its global and Italian servicer rating criteria in
analyzing the servicer's operations and financial condition, with
the former criteria including a comparison of similar Italian
servicers as part of the review process.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


MOSSI & GHISOLFI: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) with a stable outlook of Mossi & Ghisolfi
International S.A. ("M&G"). Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn
the provisional (P)B3 rating that it assigned on July 26, 2011 to
the proposed issuance of US$500 million of senior unsecured
guaranteed notes by M&G Finance Corporation, a US subsidiary of
M&G. This action is in response to the fact that M&G Finance
Corporation has so far elected not to issue the notes due to the
increased turbulence in the global debt capital markets since the
beginning of August 2010.

Ratings Rationale

The reaffirmation of the B2 CFR and stable outlook reflects
Moody's recognition of the Company's well established niche
market position in North and Latin America, and its improved
credit metrics as a result of the likelihood that the new bond
issuance, and the large capital expenditure (capex) plan it was
supposed to fund, are likely to be delayed.

Nevertheless, the rating remains constrained by (i) the
relatively modest size of M&G compared with most of its rated
chemical peers; (ii) its lack of vertical integration; (iii) its
medium to low historical profitability and (iv) the relatively
fragile debt capital structure, currently characterized by a
large exposure to short term bank facilities for which the
company is seeking rollover agreements on an annual basis. The
rating also takes into account the relatively weak financial
performance and credit metrics recorded by M&G in 2009, as a
result of the global financial crisis, as well as the recent
improvements achieved in 2010 and Q1 2011, and the still positive
revenue and profitability dynamics in Q2 2011, despite the
negative impact of a major power outage issue at the company's
Brazilian plant during the quarter. As such, the B2 CFR reflects
a mid-chemical-cycle positioning for a chemical player with an
adequate business profile, especially when compared to direct
competitors in the PET industry, but still vulnerable to major
risks related to the cyclicality and volatility of its reference
niche market.

Moody's considers M&G's financial profile to be vulnerable in a
downside scenario, due to (i) the company's relatively high
historical PET margin volatility, determined by the exogenous
volatility of PET and key feedstock prices correlated to oil-
price movements; and (ii) its relatively high level of debt, both
in absolute terms and with reference to EBITDA (as adjusted by
Moody's). However, the rating agency notes that a material delay
in the bond issuance, with the associated material reduction in
planned capex, could provide M&G with an opportunity to
deleverage further, whilst maintaining an adequate liquidity
profile.

Liquidity

M&G's liquidity profile in the next 12 months is supported by
EUR89 million in cash balances and EUR84 million availability
under its committed revolving credit facilities (as of 30
September 2011), as well as its operating cash flow.

Moody's notes, however, that this level of liquidity is
materially lower than M&G's plan presented in July 2011, and
mostly reflects a force majeure incident at the Brazilian plant,
that led to a suspension of production and a loss of c.EUR15
million in EBITDA (c.9%-10% of M&G's EBITDA for 2011). The
incident also caused a higher-than-planned working capital
related outflow, mostly funded by short term bank facilities,
that management expects will be reversed in 4Q 2011.

The liquidity management remains tight, as M&G retains a
substantial reliance on short-term funding. In 2012, it will need
to make c. EUR89 million in principal repayments and further EUR
85 million of repayments in 2013. Furthermore, M&G finances its
working capital by borrowing under c. EUR120 million short-term
bi-lateral facilities with several relationship banks in Mexico
and Brazil that it rolls over on an annual basis. In addition,
the company is negotiating to extend the maturity of a
EUR62 million bridge loan facility, due in December 2011. While
the company has sufficient cash resources to address the
repayment, a failure to extend the maturity may put pressure on
the stable outlook.

Overall, the stable outlook assumes the preservation of an
adequate liquidity profile and the ability of the company to
maintain its high level of pre-contracted revenues, enabling high
capacity utilization at its existing plants, and a level of
profitability and cash flow generation that is commensurate with
historical levels.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider a rating upgrade as a result of a
sustained improvement in underlying demand and selling prices,
which would (i) drive the EBITDA margin sustainably above 10%;
and (ii) allow substantial positive Free Cash Flow generation,
leading to a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio sustainably below 4x and
FCF/Debt sustainably in the mid to high single digits.
Furthermore, positive rating pressure could derive from a
material improvement in the debt capital structure, currently
characterized by a large exposure to short term bank facilities.

Moody's would consider downgrading the rating in the event of a
material deterioration in M&G's liquidity profile, possibly as a
consequence of M&G failing to reschedule the vast majority of its
short-term debt obligations, including the EUR62 million bridge
loan facility due in December 2011. Negative rating pressure
could also stem from a substantial deterioration in the company's
operating performance, resulting in (i) lower profitability over
a prolonged period, with the company's adjusted EBITDA margin
materially below 10%; (ii) negative FCF generation; (iii) a total
net debt/EBITDA ratio exceeding 5.0x; and/or (iv) a breach of the
financial covenants. Furthermore, negative pressure could be
exerted on the rating if M&G decides to progress with its capex
plan in the US without adequate committed long-term funding in
place to cover the whole project.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Mossi & Ghisolfi
International S.A. was the Global Chemical Industry Methodology
published in December 2009.

M&G is one of the leading international producers of PET, a
thermoplastic polymer resin of the polyester family used for
packaging applications, especially for the beverage, food and
personal care industries. As a result of an international
expansion strategy begun in 2001, M&G has become the world's
second largest producer of PET in terms of installed capacity,
and the largest producer in the combined North and South American
region. The company currently owns three production sites,
strategically located in the United States, Brazil and Mexico.
The sites have a total PET nominal capacity of 1,571 kilo metric
tons per year. In 2010, M&G generated consolidated revenues of
EUR1,672 million and EBITDA of EUR156 million.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC DE 2006-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.'s class D and E notes. "At the same time, we
have affirmed our ratings on the class A, B, and C notes," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction's
performance and available credit support, which is provided by
subordination, a reserve fund, and excess spread," S&P related.

"We last reviewed the transaction's performance on April 15, 2010
(see 'Ratings Lowered In Four EMAC DE RMBS Transactions After New
Stresses Applied'). In that analysis, we adjusted our approach
for calculating the foreclosure frequency of the mortgage loans
in all of the E-MAC DE transactions, to take account of our view
on their historically poor performance. Since then, the
cumulative losses on the loans have increased further to 2.79%
from 0.83% of the current pool balance," S&P said.

E-MAC DE 2006-I has a swap contract in place to ensure that the
excess spread, after senior expenses and payments to the class A
to E noteholders, is 35 basis points (bps) before the first put
date in May 2013, and 20 bps thereafter, as of the reset date.
The issuer can use available excess spread to cure losses and to
top-up the reserve fund to its required amount of EUR9.5 million
-- equaling 1.9% of the original class A to E note balance.
"Since our last review, the issuer has made further draws on the
reserve fund because excess spread was not sufficiently available
to cure all of the losses on each interest payment date. The
reserve fund currently amounts to EUR3.4 million -- equaling
0.68% of the original class A to E note balance," S&P said.

As of the most recent four interest payment dates, 150+ day
delinquencies have stabilized at higher levels of between 9.80%
and 10.10% of the pool. As per the August 2011 investor report,
total delinquencies amount to 16.4% of the current outstanding
pool balance. "The remaining delinquency levels suggest to
us that the transaction could suffer further losses," S&P said.

As a result of the delinquency performance, the notes have
continued to amortize sequentially. They have not switched to
pro-rata amortization because 60+ day delinquencies have been
above 1.5% since May 2010. (The transaction's pro-rata
amortization trigger could have kicked in at the time if there
was compliance with certain triggers -- including for
delinquencies -- outlined in the transaction documents [see
"Redemption of the notes" in "New Issue: E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.,"
published June 28, 2006].)

The class A notes have been amortizing and the class B to E notes
currently remain at the same size as at closing. However, since
the reserve fund has been diminishing since November 2009, credit
enhancement provided by subordination has decreased for the class
B to E notes since April 2010, with the lowest-rated tranche (the
class E notes) most affected.

"Considering realized losses and delinquencies to date, we have
assessed the likelihood of future losses for both the performing
and nonperforming parts of the collateral pool," S&P said.

"Following our review, we have lowered our ratings on E-MAC DE
2006-I's class D and E notes to reflect the relative increase in
credit risk for these notes. We have affirmed our ratings on the
class A to C notes because we consider the current credit
enhancement to be commensurate with the ratings on these notes,"
S&P related.

"E-MAC DE 2006-I's pool factor (i.e., the current balance as a
percentage of the original balance) has reduced to 87.6%. We will
continue to monitor the development of delinquencies and actual
losses in the transaction," S&P said.

E-MAC DE 2006-I is a true-sale German residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction.

Ratings List

Class             Rating
            To             From

E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.
EUR502.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered
D           B- (sf)        B (sf)
E           CCC (sf)       B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A           AA- (sf)
B           BBB (sf)
C           BB- (sf)


HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Halcyon Structured Asset Management European Long
Secured/Short Unsecured CLO 2008-I B.V.

   -- EUR278MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10MM Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20MM Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR17MM Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR11MM Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European Long Secured/Short
Unsecured CLO 2008-I B.V., issued in May 2008, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Halcyon Structured Asset Management L.P. This
transaction will be in reinvestment period until June 2013. It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in August
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the Class A notes have been paid down by
approximately 1.8% or EUR5.17 million since the rating action in
August 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in June 2009. The Class A, B, C, D and E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 137.5%, 132.7%,
123.9%, 117.3% and 112.5%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels
of 131.1%, 126.5%, 118.3%. 112.1% and 108.5%, respectively. All
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance
with the exception of the Class E overcollateralization test
which is still marginally failing.

Reported WARF has increased from 2604 to 2915 between June 2009
and September 2011. The change in reported WARF understates the
actual credit quality improvement because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010. In addition, securities rated Caa or lower
make up approximately 7.5% of the underlying portfolio versus
6.9% in June 2009. Additionally, defaulted securities total about
EUR9.16 million of the underlying portfolio compared to EUR33.49
million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR373.30
million, defaulted par of EUR9.16 million, a weighted average
default probability of 23.9% (consistent with a WARF of 2870), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.6% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted
average spread of 2.86%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 86.5% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Moody's also notes that around 67.5% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Further information
regarding specific risks and stresses associated with credit
estimates are available in the report titled "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

(3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis. Extending the weighted average life of the portfolio
may positively or negatively impact the ratings of the notes
depending on their seniority within the transaction structure.

(4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon,
and diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
considered spread level higher than the covenant level due to the
large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HYDE PARK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Hyde Park CDO B.V.'s class A to E notes.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance -- using data from the latest available trustee
report, dated Sept. 20, 2011 -- and a cash flow analysis. We have
taken into account recent transaction developments, and our 2010
counterparty criteria (see 'Counterparty and Supporting
Obligations Methodology and Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6,
2010)," S&P related.

"Our analysis indicates that the portfolio's credit quality has
improved since our previous review on Jan. 14, 2010 (see
'Transaction Update: Hyde Park CDO B.V.'). Specifically, the
assets that we rate 'CCC' have decreased to 5.23% from 8.36% of
the portfolio's aggregate principal balance," S&P said.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. In
our analysis, we have used: the reported portfolio balance that
we consider to be performing (rated 'CCC-' or above); the
principal cash balance; the current weighted-average spread; and
the weighted-average recovery rates that we consider appropriate.
We have incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using
various default patterns, levels, and timing for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios," S&P related.

"Our analysis indicates that non-euro-denominated assets
currently compose 15.6% of the performing asset balance. In our
cash flow analysis, we have considered scenarios in which the
transaction is exposed to changes in currency exchange rates if
the counterparty does not perform," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and analyses and our 2010
counterparty criteria, we consider that the credit enhancement
available to the class A notes is commensurate with a higher
rating than previously assigned. We have therefore raised our
rating on these notes," S&P related.

"In our opinion, the improvements we have seen in the
transaction's performance since our previous review have also
benefited the class B to E notes, and we believe that the credit
enhancement available to these classes is now commensurate with
higher ratings. We have therefore raised our ratings on these
classes," S&P said.

"None of these ratings was constrained by the application of our
largest obligor default test -- a supplemental stress test that
we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (see 'Update To Global
Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published on Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P related.

Hyde Park CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms. It closed in February 2006 and is managed by
Blackstone Debt Advisors L.P.

Ratings List

Class                    Rating
               To                    From

Hyde Park CDO B.V.
EUR500 Million Floating-Rate Notes

A-1            AA+ (sf)              AA (sf)
A-2            AA+ (sf)              AA (sf)
B-1            A+ (sf)               A (sf)
B-2            A+ (sf)               A (sf)
C              BBB+ (sf)             BB+ (sf)
D              BB+ (sf)              BB- (sf)
E              BB- (sf)              B- (sf)


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: Moody's Rates Senior Notes at '(P)Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba2
rating to the US$300 million senior Notes, due 2018, to be issued
by Petroleum Geo-Services ASA ("PGS").

Moody's has also affirmed the Ba2 Corporate Family Rating ("CFR")
and Probability of Default Rating ("PDR"). It has concurrently
downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the ratings on the US$471 million
senior secured bank facility and US$350 million RCF due 2015. The
rating outlook remains stable.

The proceeds of the senior Notes issuance are intended to fully
repay the US$293 million principal amount of the convertible
notes maturing in December 2012 on or before maturity as well as
for general corporate purposes.

Ratings Rationale

The (P)Ba2 rating on the new senior Notes, in line with the CFR,
reflects that they will effectively rank pari passu with the
existing senior bank facilities. The 2018 Notes will be
guaranteed on an unsecured basis by all the operating
subsidiaries that guarantee the secured bank facilities except
for PGS Egypt. These account in aggregate for 79% of the group's
revenue as of FY 2010, 82% of consolidated total assets and 99%
of the group's EBITDA.

PGS' CFR and PDR remain unchanged at Ba2. This reflects its size
and scale, its leading market position, its geographic
diversification, and its high quality fleet. PGS' high-end
specification fleet provides greater earnings stability since it
positions PGS within the strongest demand segment of the seismic
acquisition business sector. However, the rating also considers
that seismic acquisition is a highly cyclical business directly
related to capital spending by oil and gas producers, which is
highly volatile and dependent on oil and natural gas prices.
Also, as the ability to provide newer technologies becomes
increasingly important to customers, despite its strong
intellectual property position, PGS is under continuous
competitive pressure to enhance it product slate.

The downgrade of the US$471 million senior secured bank facility
and US$350 million RCF to Ba2 from Ba1 solely reflects the
expected change to a capital structure largely consisting of debt
that will all rank pari passu, following the expected repayment
of the US$293 million convertible notes on or before December
2012, which had previously provided some ratings uplift due to
their subordinated position in the capital structure.

PGS's liquidity profile is acceptable for its near-term
requirements. As of September 30, 2011, its cash balance is
approximately US$177 million and its US$350 million senior
secured revolving credit facility (RCF), maturing in 2015,
remains fully available. PGS is expected to generate negative
free cash flow over the next twelve months, due to high capital
expenditures (including new builds), and following the equity
issuance in 2010, the company now intends to fund all capital
expenditures for the next twelve months from cash flow. As of
September, 2011, PGS was in compliance with all maintenance
covenants and following the credit agreement amendment in May
2010, PGS is expected to remain in compliance with all covenants
for the next twelve months.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that (i) PGS will
continue to maintain solid operational performance and liquidity;
and (ii) management will continue with prudent financial policies
that attempt to minimize the cyclical nature of the business.

The CFR could face positive pressure if PGS reduces adjusted
debt/ (EBITDA - MC investments) to below 2.5x on a sustained
basis and there is a visible improvement in Contract volumes. Any
potential upgrade would also include an assessment of market
conditions. Conversely, PGS' rating could come under pressure if
earnings decline substantially resulting in a material increase
in its financial leverage, or any other significant leveraging
event such as an acquisition or shareholder friendly action.

Ratings assigned:

Issuer: Petroleum Geo-Services ASA

-- New senior Notes rating assigned to new USD300 million Notes
    at (P)Ba2.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the notes. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

Moody's has also withdrawn the SGL-2 speculative grade liquidity
rating. Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating
for its own business reasons.

The principal methodology used in rating Petroleum Geo-Services
ASA was the Global Oilfield Services Rating Methodology published
in December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Petroleum Geo-Services ASA is a technologically leading oilfield
services company specializing in reservoir and geophysical
services, including seismic data acquisition, processing and
interpretation, and field evaluation. PGS maintains an extensive
multi-client seismic data library. On a twelve months basis
(ending on September 30, 2011) PGS reported revenues of US$1.27
billion.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SAINT-PETERSBURG OJSC: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to Domestic Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned OJSC Saint-Petersburg Telecom's
domestic bonds a final 'BB+' Long-term senior unsecured rating
and a 'AA(rus)' National Long-term rating.  The final ratings
reflect final documentation received by Fitch.

OJSC Saint-Petersburg Telecom is a subsidiary of Tele2 Russia
Holding AB (Tele2R; 'BB+'/'AA(rus)'), The Series-07 RUB6 billion
bond will have a stated maturity of ten years and an attached
investors' put option in year three.  Apart from the maturity
date (November 2021) and coupon rate, the Series-07 RUB6 billion
bond will have the same terms as the Series-01, Series-02 and
Series-03 bonds, which were issued on 24 June 2011 for a total
RUB13 billion.

Bondholders benefit from an irrevocable undertaking by Tele2
Russia Holding AB and Tele2 Financial Services AB, a treasury
company for Tele2R, which makes this instrument effectively
recourse to the Tele2R group.  The mechanism of irrevocable
undertakings (essentially an offer to purchase the bonds if the
issuer is in default) exposes bondholders to the same probability
of default and expected recoveries as senior unsecured creditors
to Tele2R.

Tele2R is the fourth-largest Russian mobile company by subscriber
base. It is a successful niche mobile player with a strong
financial profile.  However, it does not have 3G licenses and is
disadvantaged compared with its peers in terms of 4G/LTE options.
In Fitch's view, this deficiency makes it less strategically
important for the Tele2 group.  Tele2R's ratings do not reflect
any notching up for parental support.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO DE VALENCIA: May Require Additional Capital
-------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Spanish Banco de
Valencia SA said it may need additional capital following what it
called a "routine" inspection by the country's central bank, an
indication that it may soon become the latest troubled lender to
request state aid.

Headquartered in Valencia (Spain), Banco de Valencia had EUR24
billion assets at end June 2011.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


AGUILA 3: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to CHF750MM Secured Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B2 rating
(LGD-4) to the CHF750 million worth of senior secured notes due
2018 issued by Aguila 3 S.A., ("Swissport"), the parent company
of Swissport borrowing group. The final terms of the notes are in
line with the drafts reviewed for the provisional (P)B2
instrument rating assignment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on January 17, 2011. Moody's
rating rationale was set out in a press release issued on that
date.

The principal methodology used in rating Aguila 3 S.A. was the
Global Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology
published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Zurich, Swissport is the largest independent
ground-handling services company in the world. The company
employs around 35,000 personnel in 180 airports in 36 countries
worldwide throughout Europe, Africa, Asia, North America and
South America.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBURN REAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A Notes issued
by Alburn Real Estate Capital Ltd (amounts reflecting initial
outstanding) as follows:

GBP125.05M Class A Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2016,
Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the B, C, D, and E Classes.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due to an increase in the expected loss for
the single loan in the pool as a result of (i) further capital
value declines and the expectation of continued downward pressure
on the portfolio's value that may ultimately result in a
principal loss on the Class A Notes (ii) a heightened concern
that the transaction may experience cash flow stresses due to a
material lease rollover exposure to weak secondary and tertiary
markets (53% of leases expire within the next 3 years, and 80%
expire by the Notes' legal final maturity in 2016) and (iii) the
slow progress on a potential work-out of the loan.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loan (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment of the portfolio
securing the loan. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss
expectation for the securitized pool.

Alburn Real Estate Capital Limited represents the true-sale
securitization of a GBP183.6 million senior loan secured by 45
properties located across the UK with a four year weighted
average unexpired lease term. The property portfolio is
predominantly offices (73% by value), with some industrial (17%)
and retail (10%). There is also a GBP11.8 million junior loan
that is not securitized but is secured by the same properties.

A Loan Event of Default has been in effect since May 2011 as a
result of (i) an un-remedied and continuing LTV covenant breach
triggered by the April 2011 valuation; and (ii) the non-payment
of the stage two fee due to lenders consenting to the 2009
restructuring. Brookland Partners and CBRE were appointed to
advise the Servicer on the most appropriate course of action to
take in fulfilling its duties under the servicing standard.

CBRE valued the 18% over-rented portfolio at GBP124.7 million in
September 2011, which is down 3.7% since the previous valuation
in April 2011 and 50% since closing in February 2007. As such,
the senior loan to value ratio (LTV) is now 147.4% and whole loan
LTV is 156.8%, excluding the GBP5.6 million of cash collateral
held as of October 2011. The Class A Note to Value is 97.5%.
Based on Moody's value assessment and excluding the cash
collateral, the Moody's LTV is 155% and 165% on the senior and
whole loan balances respectively. The Moody's Class A Note to
Value is 103%. The lower value reflects higher yield assumptions
applied to the portfolio.

The details of any potential work-out strategy are unknown at
this stage. However, the following factors will impact value
recoveries (i) the GBP17.3 million of potential swap liabilities
(as of September 2011) ranking ahead of the Class A Notes that
may constrain any meaningful property disposal plan until closer
to the hedge expiry in October 2013 (ii) the extent to which any
property manager (the properties are currently managed by the
borrower) is adequately incentivized and able to enhance the
value of the management-intensive portfolio with an adverse lease
rollover profile amidst challenging occupational and investment
markets for secondary properties (iii) the non-alignment of
interest between the Class A Noteholders and the junior lender,
who is deeply out-of-the-money based on the most recent CBRE
valuation and has not appointed a special servicer as the only
party entitled to do so (iv) the extent to which the servicer or
special servicer can take any necessary action to maximize
recoveries under the servicing standard without being hindered by
any transaction party and (v) potentially higher senior costs
associated with increased property management fees and other
advisory work-out fees.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.
Even so, deviation from the expected range will not necessarily
result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or offsetting
factors to an improvement or decline in collateral performance,
such as increased subordination levels due to amortization and
loan re- prepayments or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2012, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) values will
overall stabilize but with a strong differentiation between prime
and secondary properties, and (iii) occupational markets will
remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with the anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
'hooked-shaped' for 2011; Moody's expects sluggish recovery in
most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth
rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

The methodologies used in this rating were 'Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio)' published in April 2006, and 'Update on Moody's Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS Transaction in EMEA' published in June
2005.

Other factors used in this rating are described in 'EMEA CMBS:
2011 Central Scenarios' published in February 2011.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.


ARGUS CARE: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Argus Care Group has gone into
administration due to debts and cash flow problems which were
exacerbated by creditor pressures.  Accountants and business
advisers PKF have been appointed administrators.

Argus Care said buyers would be sought amid efforts to minimize
disruption, according to BBC News.

"We will continue to operate the homes as normal while they are
in administration. . . .  We will ensure that all residents,
their relatives, and staff are kept fully informed of any
developments as well as notifying the relevant local and
regulatory authorities. . . .  We appreciate that these are not
like any other businesses but are the homes of the residents and
ensuring there is continuity of care is our priority," BBC News
quoted Bryan Jackson, corporate recovery partner with PKF, as
saying.

BBC News notes that Mr. Jackson said the company will continue
trading while administrators seek buyers for the business, which
will be market as going concerns.

Aberdeen-based Argus Care Group operates 12 nursing and
residential homes across.  It has more than 780 employees and 500
residents.  There are three in Ayr, two in Aberdeen, and one in
each of Peterhead, Turriff, Oban, Bishopton, Dunoon, Castle
Douglas and Blairgowrie.


BORDER DEMOLITION: Calls in Liquidation Specialists
---------------------------------------------------
Grant Prior at Construction Enquirer reports that Border
Demolition Ltd has ceased trading after calling in the
liquidators.

The report, citing industry website Demolition News, says the
firm is now in the hands of liquidation specialists French
Duncan.

Border was based in Glasgow and had been trading since 1997 when
it was set up by founder Peter Beattie who has nearly 30 years
experience in the demolition business.  The firm was a National
Federation of Demolition Contractors member and had worked on a
series of high-profile projects including Gleneagles Hotel and
the Royal Bank of Scotland headquarters in Edinburgh.


MF GLOBAL: London Unit In Administration, KPMG on Board
-------------------------------------------------------
MF Global's unit in London was placed into administration after
the parent company filed for bankruptcy Monday.  KPMG was
appointed administrator of the U.K. arm, according to BBC.

BBC said at least 700 jobs are at risk in London after the arm
went into administration.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges and British firm Ashurst are advising on
the U.K. administration, The American Lawyer reported.

"Against the backdrop of challenging market conditions and the
euro-zone crisis, the financial position of MF Global UK has
significantly deteriorated in recent weeks," according to a
statement by Richard Fleming, a joint special administrator and
head of KPMG's U.K. restructuring unit, The American Lawyer
related.  "Following the filing for Chapter 11 by MF Global
Holdings USA Inc., it would not be viable to operate MF Global UK
Ltd on a stand-alone basis."

The American Lawyer related that two former Jones Day
restructuring partners lured away from the firm's London office
this year are leading a Weil team representing KPMG on the
administration of MF Global's U.K. units.  London-based
restructuring head Adam Plainer, who left Jones Day for Weil in
January, and restructuring partner Paul Bromfield, who made the
leap in September, are advising KPMG, The American Lawyer noted,
citing Legal Week.

Mr. Plainer said the case "is a truly groundbreaking case as it
is the first time the new special administration regime has been
used," The American Lawyer related, further citing Legal Week.
"The administrators will be working closely with the FSA who have
extensive powers under the new legislation."

Other Weil partners working on the matter include London office
managing partner Michael Francies, finance and restructuring
partner Dominic McCahill, and structured finance and derivatives
partner Steven Ong, the report noted.  Legal Week reported that
barristers Martin Pascoe, Daniel Bayfield, and Glen Davis from
London-based South Square are advising both KPMG and the FSA on
the U.K. administration of MF Global.

The FSA has turned to an Ashurst team for advice on managing the
MF Global administration.  The Ashurst team, according to The
American Lawyer, includes London-based litigation chief Edward
Sparrow, restructuring and insolvency partner Giles Boothman, and
regulatory partner Rob Moulton.  Legal Week reported that the new
special administration rules, which went into effect in February,
will determine whether MF Global's U.K. units can continue as a
going concern or will be liquidated in order to return assets to
clients and creditors, the American Lawyer said.

Weil Gotshal's London team can be reached at:

        Adam B. Plainer, Esq.
        Paul G. Bromfield, Esq.
        Michael Francies, Esq.
        Dominic MacCahill, Esq.
        Steven Ong, Esq.
        WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
        110 Fetter Lane
        London, EC4A 1AY
        Tel: +44 20 7903 1000
        Fax: +44 20 7903 0990
        E-mail: adam.plainer@weil.com
                paul.bromfield@weil.com
                michael.francies@weil.com
                dominic.mccahill@weil.com
                steven.ong@weil.com

Ashurst can be reached at:

        Edward Sparrow, Esq.
        Giles Boothman, Esq.
        Rob Moulton, Esq.
        ASHURST
        Broadwalk House
        5 Appold Street
        London EC2A 2HA UK
        Tel: +44 (0)20 7638 1111
        Fax: +44 (0)20 7638 1112
        E-mail: edward.sparrow@ashurst.com
                giles.boothman@ashurst.com
                rob.moulton@ashurst.com

South Square can be reached at:

        Martin Pascoe QC
        Daniel Bayfield, Esq.
        Glen Davis QC
        SOUTH SQUARE
        3-4 South Square
        Gray's Inn
        London WC1R 5HP, UK
        Tel: National: 020 7696 9900
             International: +44 20 7696 9900
        Fax: National: 020 7696 9911
             International: +44 20 7696 9911
        E-mail: martinpascoe@southsquare.com
                danielbayfield@southsquare.com
                glendavis@southsquare.com

                          About MF Global

New York-based MF Global (NYSE: MF) -- http://www.mfglobal.com/
-- is one of the world's leading brokers of commodities and
listed derivatives.  MF Global provides access to more than 70
exchanges around the world.  The firm is also one of 22 primary
dealers authorized to trade U.S. government securities with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  MF Global's roots go back
nearly 230 years to a sugar brokerage on the banks of the Thames
River in London.

MF Global Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Finance USA Inc. filed
voluntary Chapter 11 petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos.
11-15059 and 11-5058) on Oct. 31, 2011, after a planned sale to
Interactive Brokers Group collapsed.  As of Sept. 30, 2011, MF
Global had $41,046,594,000 in total assets and $39,683,915,000 in
total liabilities.  It is easily the largest bankruptcy filing so
far this year.

Judge Honorable Martin Glenn presides over the Chapter 11 case.
J. Gregory Milmoe, Esq., Kenneth S. Ziman, Esq., and J. Eric
Ivester, Esq., at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, serve
as bankruptcy counsel.  The Garden City Group, Inc., serves as
claims and noticing agent.  The petition was signed by Bradley I.
Abelow, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of
MF Global Finance USA Inc.

The Securities Investor Protection Corporation commenced
liquidation proceedings against MF Global Inc. to protect
customers.  James W. Giddens was appointed as trustee pursuant to
the Securities Investor Protection Act.  He is a partner at
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP in New York.

Jon Corzine, the former New Jersey governor and co-CEO of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., stepped down as chairman and chief
executive officer of MF Global just days after the bankruptcy
filing.

U.S. regulators are investigating about US$633 million missing
from MF Global customer accounts, a person briefed on the matter
said Nov. 3, according to Bloomberg News.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes MF GLOBAL
BANKRUPTCY NEWS.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by MF Global Inc. and other insolvency and bankruptcy
proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


PALMER SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings to
'CCC- (sf)' from 'A (sf)' on the class X-1 and X-2 notes in
Palmer Square 2 PLC.

The rating actions follow the publication of the trustee's notice
of acceleration, dated Oct. 26, 2011, whereby Palmer Square 2's
notes were made immediately due and payable, and the notice,
dated Nov. 2, 2011, of appointment of Alastair Beveridge and
Simon Appell of Zolfo Cooper Europe as receivers.

"While we expect that the class X noteholders will ultimately be
repaid in full, we anticipate that scheduled principal and
interest payments may not now be made on a timely basis. In
particular, we understand that timely distributions will not be
made on the Nov. 2, 2011 payment date. We have therefore lowered
our rating on the notes to 'CCC- (sf)', denoting that the notes
are currently vulnerable to payment default," S&P said.

"Our opinion on full ultimate repayment of the class X notes is
based on our review of the most recent available portfolio
information and on the terms and conditions of the notes. Our
analysis shows an outstanding balance of US$4.21 million on the
class X notes, and a balance of US$904.02 million of performing
assets in the portfolio. Under the terms and conditions of the
notes, the class X notes must be repaid in full upon enforcement
before payments are made to other noteholders. At present, we
believe it is highly likely that liquidation of the portfolio
will generate sufficient proceeds to fully repay the class X
notes when distributed in accordance with the post-enforcement
priorities of payment," S&P said.

"However, recent developments have confirmed our view on the
likelihood of principal losses for all classes other than class
X. We note, for example, that the proportion of portfolio assets
we treat as defaulted in our analysis -- those rated 'CC' or 'D'
-- has risen to 35.2% of the portfolio, up from 32.4% at the time
of our last review in August 2011. In addition, the outstanding
balance of the class A1 notes currently exceeds the par value of
portfolio assets, including defaulted assets, available to repay
them," S&P said.

"Our current 'CC (sf)' ratings on all rated classes other than
class X already reflect our view that noteholders in these
classes are highly likely to experience principal losses. Given
that we have not changed our view on these classes, we are taking
no rating action on them at this stage," S&P related.

"If we receive confirmation that the nondeferrable class X, A1,
A2, and A3 notes did not receive timely payments on the November
2011 payment date, we will likely lower our ratings on these
classes to 'D (sf)' in the coming weeks," S&P stated.

Palmer Square 2 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) with a
portfolio of primarily U.S. structured finance securities. The
transaction closed in October 2005.

Ratings List

Class                    Rating
                To                   From

Palmer Square 2 PLC
$2.012 Billion Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

X-1             CCC- (sf)            A (sf)
X-2             CCC- (sf)            A (sf)


ROYAL BANK: Moody's Says Posting of Collateral Won't Hurt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service stated that the posting of collateral
by The Royal Bank of Scotland, PLC, in accordance with a Credit
Support Annex relating to a swap agreement between Preferred Term
Securities XVI, LTD. and the Counterparty -- without taking any
other remedial action -- will not in and of itself and at this
time result in the qualification, downgrade, or withdrawal of its
current ratings of the notes issued by the Issuer.

On October 7, 2011, Moody's downgraded the ratings of The Royal
Bank of Scotland, PLC to A2 from Aa3 on review for possible
downgrade for long term senior debt, a "Ratings Event".

In response to the Ratings Event, the Counterparty may post
collateral in favor of the Issuer in accordance with the Annex
without taking any other remedial action.

In determining the impact of the Arrangement on the current
Moody's ratings of the Notes, Moody's assessed, among other
factors, the highest current rating on the Notes which is
Ba3(sf), the credit quality of The Royal Bank of Scotland and the
degree of compliance with Moody's criteria for posting collateral
under swaps.

The principal methodology used in Moody's rating analysis is
"Moody's Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.
Factors identified in the Rating Implementation Guideline,
"Framework for De-Linking Hedge Counterparty Risks from Global
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions" published in October
2010, and in the Special Comment, "Moody's Identifies Core
Principals of Guarantees for Credit Substitution", published in
November 2010, were also taken into account in the rating
analysis.


SUPERGLASS: Mulls GBP9.5-Mil. Fundraising Under Rescue Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Scotsman reports that Superglass on Nov. 6 announced plans to
raise approximately GBP9.5 million from investors as part of a
financial restructuring which will also significantly reduce its
debts.

Clydesdale Bank has agreed to convert GBP12.15 million of its
loans to the company into convertible shares as part of the
proposals which would cut its borrowings to around GBP5.1
million, the Scotsman relates.

The company also said a Regional Selective Assistance grant of up
to GBP2 million was expected to be approved by Scottish
Enterprise on Nov. 7.

Superglass is a Stirling-based insulation firm.


ULTRA MOTOR: Goes Into Administration, Sells Subsidiary
-------------------------------------------------------
Carlton Reid at Bike Biz reports that Ultra Motor in the United
Kingdom has gone into administration.  Ensors Chartered
Accountants are appointed as administrators.

Ensors Chartered is seeking to sell the company as a going
concern, according to Bike Biz.

The report notes that Brompton e-bike, which is powered by an
motor developed jointly by Brompton and Ultra Motor, is not
impacted by Ultra Motor's demise.  "The [UK] bike business has
gone into [administration] but this does not affect the R&D arm
of Ultra Motor, which is a separate business," Bike Biz quoted
Brompton Marketing Director Emerson Roberts as saying.

Meanwhile, Bike Biz notes that the company sold its subsidiary
Ultra Motor Taiwan to a group of European private equity
investors, according to Bike Biz.  The report relates that as
part of the acquisition, Ultra Motor Taiwan has received
additional funding to finance its growth and continued R&D
activities.

Ultra Motor of the United Kimgdom was founded in 2003.  It has 10
staff.  Ultra Motor produced e-bikes under the A2B brand and also
produced e-bike propulsion systems for other companies.  The
company also had offshoots in Berlin and sales and marketing
offices in North America and Europe.


* UK: Company Insolvencies Up 6.5% in Third Quarter 2011
--------------------------------------------------------
According to Accountancy Age's Rachael Singh, government
statistics show that company insolvencies in the UK have risen
6.5% in the third quarter compared to the same period a year ago.

The Insolvency Service has revealed that corporate insolvencies
increased to 4,242 for the third quarter of this year compared to
3,974 for Q3 last year, Accountancy Age relates.

The latest figures show a marginal 0.1% increase on company
insolvencies compared with the previous quarter, Accountancy Age
notes.

Company voluntary arrangements (CVA) hit a five-quarter high,
with 206 companies using this process in the third quarter of
2011 -- up from 187 in the previous quarter, Accountancy Age
discloses.  This is a 29% increase compared to the same period a
year ago, when 159 companies opted to use this method,
Accountancy Age states.

Voluntary liquidations rose 3.1% on the previous quarter and 6.8%
compared to Q3 2010, according to Accountancy Age.

However, administrations fell to 673 inQ3 2011 -- a rise of 31 on
the same period last year, but down 22 on the previous quarter,
Accountancy Age states.


* UK: No. of Construction Firms in Liquidation Up 24% in Q3
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Construction Index, citing the latest Insolvency Service
statistics, reports that the number of construction companies
forced into a compulsory liquidation has increased by 24% with
244 construction companies entering compulsory liquidation in the
last quarter.

In total, almost 1,000 construction companies went out of
business in the three months -- and this does not include the
number of trading related bankruptcies, likely to be in excess of
500, as the figures for Q3 have not yet been released, the report
relays.

According to the report, Insolvency Service figures show that the
number of construction companies entering administration was up
10.5% over the last three months from 85 to 94 companies, and up
a significant 38% year on year, while construction companies
taking out company voluntary arrangements were up 30% quarter on
quarter and were up 50% compared to the same quarter last year.

The Construction Index adds that other forms of construction
insolvency showed a slightly better picture: the number of
creditors voluntary liquidations was almost static with 541
construction companies choosing to go into voluntary liquidation
compared to 555 last quarter, a drop of 2.5% compared to Q2, but
up 0.5% from this time last year. 44 construction companies
entered receivership in Q3 a drop of 8% compared to both last
quarter and this time last year.


* UNITED KINGDOM: Euro Zone Woes Kill GPE London Office JV
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Bill at Reuters reports that two unnamed sources said a deal
between developer Great Portland Estates and HSH Nordbank to
revamp and then sell a London office block that is in
receivership has failed due to the euro zone turmoil.

Under the plan, the bank would have contributed the 200,000 sq.
ft. Triton Court block in the City financial district, while
Great Portland planned to inject more than 50 million pounds
(US$80 million) to refurbish the property and lift its value,
according to Reuters.

"It got close to being signed but Great Portland had some
increasingly nervous shareholders looking over its shoulder . . .
.  After the summer and the problems in the euro zone, sentiment
everywhere took a turn for the worse," one of the sources told
Reuters.  A second source also told Reuters that the deal had
collapsed.

Reuters says that HSH appointed Savills as the so-called Law of
Property Act receiver on the property in June last year,
following non-repayment of the loan, which was originally about
GBP100 million, used to buy the property.

The previous owners, Propinvest and Jack Petchey's Incorporated
Holdings, bought the building for about GBP120 million in 2007
and its value has since fallen to about GBP40 million pounds.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

Nov. 28, 2011
  BEARD GROUP, INC.
     18th Annual Distressed Investing Conference
        The Helmsley Park Lane Hotel, New York City
           Contact: 1-240-629-3300

Dec. 1-3, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference
        La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 3-5, 2012
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        Grand Hyatt Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Apr. 19-22, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 14-17, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 2-4, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

November 1-3, 2012
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 10-12, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

October 3-5, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *