TCREUR_Public/111117.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, November 17, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 228



VTB BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'


DEXIA SA: Arco Mulls Liquidation of Units


MARFIN POPULAR: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba3'


BALTIC PANEL: SEB Gets Favorable Ruling in Grove Invest Dispute


MOVENTAS GROUP: Bought Out of Bankruptcy by Clyde Bowers


HAWK BIKES: Commences Insolvency Proceedings
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Fitch Affirms Senior Secured Rating at 'BB+'
NEURNBERGER LEBEN: Fitch Affirms Rating on EUR100MM Debt at 'BB+'


KERESKEDELMI ES: Fitch Says 'D' Individual Rating Unaffected


DRYDEN X-EURO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D-1 Notes to 'Ba1'
FASTNET LINE: High Court Judge Approves Examinership
MERCATOR CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2 Notes at 'B-'
TBS INTERNATIONAL: Files Form 10-Q, Incurs US$22MM Q3 Net Loss


BTA BANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'


MAVROVOINZENERING: Faces Bankruptcy Threat Over EUR21.7-Mil Debt


ASMITA GARDENS: Declared Insolvent on Alpha Bank's Request


BYSTROBANK JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings


IM BES EMPRESAS: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa2 Rating to Serie B Note


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Pang Da, Youngman Deal Expires; Talks Continue


NYCOMED SCA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BODIDRIS HALL: Colliers Int'l Sells Hotel Out of Administration
HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL: Circle Healthcare to Take Over
PLUS MARKETS: Future as Stock Exchange Uncertain
RADAMANTIS PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to 'D (sf)'
RANGERS FC: HMRC's GBP49MM Tax Case Verdict Gets Delayed

SHETLAND WINDPOWER: Follows Proven Energy in Receivership
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Says Structure Key Challenge for CFR
YELL GROUP: Chairman Buys Bonds; Wants Lender to Accept Debt Deal


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars



VTB BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded VTB Capital plc.'s and VTB Bank
(Austria) AG's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BBB'
from 'BBB-'.  The Outlooks are Stable.

The upgrades equalize the banks' IDRs with that of their parent,
Bank VTB (JSC) (VTB; 'BBB'/Stable), the second largest bank in
Russia, to reflect their increasing integration in VTB's
consolidated group.  This includes unified risk management,
regular and more granular group reporting, integrated pricing, a
centralized wholesale funding policy and considerable overlap in
subsidiary and parent customer franchises.  Fitch also notes the
relatively small size of the subsidiaries' balance sheets,
relative to that of the parent, making it easier to provide
support, in case of need.

In addition, VTB continues to consider Europe as one of its core
markets, where it mainly focuses on structured trade finance,
structuring and syndication of loans for Russian/CIS clients
(through both VTBA and VTBC) and equity transactions (mostly
through VTBC).  As part of the larger investment banking division
within VTB, VTBC is also involved in client activity in commodity
derivatives, client and proprietary activity in cash equities and
equity derivatives, FX and interest rate derivatives businesses;
the latter mostly represent hedging of VTB's positions arising
from transactions with Russian/CIS clients.

Both subsidiaries' ratings continue to be based on support from
VTB and ultimately from the Russian state.  In Fitch's view, the
Russian authorities are very unlikely to interfere or preclude
VTB from providing support to VTBC and VTBA.  Any rating action
on the parent could trigger a similar rating action on VTBC and
VTBA. Given the strong integration of both VTBA and VTBC into
VTB, Fitch has not assigned them Viability Ratings.

At the operational level, Fitch notes VTBC's improved
profitability, albeit with a setback in Q311 due to fairly severe
market conditions, replacement of the risky legacy loans with
somewhat less risky credit exposures and repo lending, and solid
capital position (total capital adequacy ratio was 16.9% at end-
9M11).  Funding is concentrated, but liquidity risk is covered by
the parent, which has a large contingency line for VTBC.

VTB Capital plc

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB' from
     'BBB-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

VTB Bank (Austria) AG

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB' from
     'BBB-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  -- Individual Rating of 'D' unaffected


DEXIA SA: Arco Mulls Liquidation of Units
Ewa Krukowska at Bloomberg News, citing L'Echo, reports that
Arco, a shareholder of bailed-out lender Dexia SA, plans to
liquidate some of its units.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said that around 800,000
private partners have invested more than EUR1.4 billion
(US$1.9 billion) in Arco and in the case of bankruptcy, the
Belgian government has to pay out guarantees.

Bloomberg notes that L'Echo said the ultimate bill for the
government should be lower and may total around EUR1 billion
thanks to Arco asset sales.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 11,
2011, BBC News related that Dexia was hit by GBP5.41 billion
(US$8.7 billion; EUR6.32 billion) of costs relating to the sale
of its Belgian bank and losses on Greek debt.  The
nationalization of Dexia Bank Belgium cost it EUR4 billion, BBC
disclosed.  Dexia also took a loss of EUR2.3 billion on Greek
government bonds in the third quarter, BBC said.  The bank also
announced that the board had agreed a capital injection of
EUR4.2 billion to comply with French financial regulations on
minimum capital levels, according BBC.  Dexia said it would
convert EUR2.5 billion of loans into capital for this
requirement, BBC recounted.

Dexia SA -- is a Belgian-based bank and
insurance carrier that focuses on Public and Wholesale Banking,
providing local public finance actors with banking and financial
solutions, and on Retail and Commercial Banking in Europe, mainly
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Turkey.


MARFIN POPULAR: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on
several covered bonds issued under Cypriot law. The actions
follow Moody's downgrade of Cyprus' sovereign debt and associated
rating actions on Cypriot issuers:

- Covered bonds issued by Marfin Popular Bank (Marfin), backed
   by Cypriot residential mortgage loans (Marfin Cypriot Pool
   CB): downgraded to Ba3 on review for further downgrade;
   previously downgraded to Baa3 on August 4, 2011;

- Covered bonds issued by Marfin, backed by Greek residential
   mortgage loans (Marfin Greek Pool CB): downgraded to Ba3 on
   review for further downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 on
   August 4, 2011;

- Covered bonds issued by Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited
   (BoC), backed by Greek residential mortgage loans (BoC Greek
   Pool CB): Baa3 placed on review for downgrade; previously
   downgraded to Baa3 on 4 August 2011.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on the covered bonds is prompted by Moody's
downgrade of Cyprus' sovereign debt and associated rating actions
on Cypriot issuers of covered bonds.

On November 4, Moody's downgraded Cyprus's sovereign debt ratings
by two notches to Baa3 on review for further downgrade. For
further information on this rating action, please refer to the
press release "Moody's downgrades Cyprus's bond ratings to
Baa3/P-3 on review for further downgrade".

On November 8, Moody's downgraded Marfin's senior unsecured
rating by three notches to B2 on review for further downgrade and
BoC's by one notch to Ba2 on review for further downgrade. Please
refer to the press release "Moody's downgrades three Cypriot
banks following Cyprus sovereign downgrade; banks on review for
further downgrade".

A downgrade of an issuer's senior unsecured ratings negatively
affects the covered bonds through its impact on both the timely
payment indicator (TPI) framework and the expected loss method.

TPI Framework

Following the downgrades of the issuers, Moody's has assessed the
covered bond ratings in line with the TPI framework. The TPI of
all three covered bond programs is "Very Improbable".

The rating actions place the covered bonds at the maximum rating
level indicated by Moody's TPI table. For Marfin's programs, a
TPI of "Very Improbable" coupled with an issuer rating of B2 caps
the covered bond ratings at Ba3. For BoC, a TPI of "Very
Improbable" coupled with an issuer rating of Ba2 caps the covered
bond ratings at Baa3.

Expected Loss Method

As the issuer's credit strength is incorporated into Moody's
expected loss assessment, any downgrade of the issuer's rating
will increase the expected loss on the covered bonds. For the
covered bonds issued under the above programs, the 5% over-
collateralization on a net present value (NPV) basis stipulated
by Cypriot covered bond law is sufficient to achieve a Ba3 rating
in case of Marfin's covered bonds and a Baa3 rating in case of
BoC's covered bonds. In all cases, Moody's views this level of OC
as "committed".

Rating Review

The covered bond ratings are under review for downgrade to
reflect that the Cypriot sovereign rating and the issuer ratings
of Marfin and BoC are under review for downgrade. Further, during
the review Moody's will also consider the value attributed to the
Greek residential mortgage assets in the Marfin Greek Pool CB and
BoC Greek Pool CB as recent events in Greece have increased the
risk of a disorderly default. For further information, please
refer to the press release "Moody's reviews for downgrade Greek
structured finance transactions" published November 11. During
the review, Moody's will assess any proposals by the issuers to
strengthen the credit of the covered bonds.

The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed
to investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to

The rating assigned to the existing covered bonds is expected to
be assigned to all subsequent covered bonds issued by the issuers
under these programs and any future rating actions are expected
to affect all such covered bonds. If there are any exceptions to
this, Moody's will, in each case, publish details in a separate
press release.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: expected loss analysis and TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL), which determines expected loss as a function of
the issuer's probability of default, measured by the issuer's
rating and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets,
following issuer default.

The cover pool losses are based on Moody's most recent modelling
and are an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models if the
relevant issuer defaults. Cover pool losses can be split between
Market Risk and Collateral Risk. Market Risk measures losses as a
result of refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral Risk measures losses resulting directly from
the credit quality of the assets in the cover pool. Collateral
Risk is derived from the Collateral Score.

The Cover Pool Losses of Marfin Cypriot Pool CB are 42.3%, with
Market Risk of 25.7% and Collateral Risk of 16.7%. The Collateral
Score for this program is currently 24.9%.

The Cover Pool Losses of Marfin Greek Pool CB are 51.3%, with
Market Risk of 44.3% and Collateral Risk of 6.9%. The Collateral
Score for this program is currently 10.4%.

The Cover Pool Losses of BoC Greek Pool CB are 48.8%, with Market
Risk of 42.7% and Collateral Risk of 6.1%. The Collateral Score
for this program is currently 9.1%.

For further details on Cover Pool Losses, Collateral Risk, Market
Risk, Collateral Score and TPI Leeway across all covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's EMEA Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. These figures
are based on the latest data that has been published by Moody's
and are subject to change over time. Quarterly these numbers are
updated in Performance Overview published by Moody's.

TPI Framework: Moody's assigns a TPI that indicates the
likelihood that timely payment will be made to covered
bondholders following issuer default. The effect of the TPI
framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain number
of notches above the issuer's rating.

Sensitivity Analysis

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
issuer's credit strength.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI leeway.

Based on the current issuer ratings and the TPI of "Very
Improbable" for each of the above covered bond programs, the TPI
leeway is limited to 1 notch for each of the above covered bond
programs. This means the covered bonds might be downgraded as a
result of a TPI cap once the issuer rating is downgraded more
than 1 notch, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
these circumstances:

  (i) a sovereign downgrade negatively affecting the issuer's
      senior unsecured rating;

(ii) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or

(iii) a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Rating
Approach to Covered Bonds" published in March 2010.


BALTIC PANEL: SEB Gets Favorable Ruling in Grove Invest Dispute
Toomas Hobemag at Baltic Business News reports that Grove Invest
has lost another court dispute against the Swedish bank
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB or SEB over the fate of bankrupt
plywood factory Baltic Panel Group.

Piotr Sedin, a large investor in Grove Invest, is claiming that
the actions and inactivity of SEB which financed the project
caused the plywood plant to go out of business, BBN discloses.
He was claiming EEK1.5 billion or almost EUR100,000 from SEB for
causing the bankruptcy, BBN relates.

An arm of SEB purchased the plywood factory with equipment from
the bankruptcy estate for EEK25 million (about EUR1.5 million)
two years ago and sold it to a Latvian company this spring, BBN

Baltic Panel Group is based in Estonia.


MOVENTAS GROUP: Bought Out of Bankruptcy by Clyde Bowers
Belfast Telegraph reports that engineering group Clyde Blowers
has said it is buying Moventas Group for GBP85 million.

According to Belfast Telegraph, the East Kilbride-based company
has a "definitive agreement" to buy the firm in a deal which
saves Moventas from bankruptcy.

Moventas Group is a Finnish wind turbine parts manufacturer.  The
company has more than 1,000 employees in 10 countries.


HAWK BIKES: Commences Insolvency Proceedings
Jo Beckendorff at Bike Europe reports that Hawk Bikes Entwicklung
& Marketing GmbH and its sister company Clean Air Bike GmbH on
November 1 sought to begin insolvency proceedings.

Thomas Kuhn -- -- from Berlin-based
Brinkmann & Partner has been appointed as temporary receiver,
according to the report.

"Both company business operations will continue unchanged even
after opening of the insolvency proceedings," the report quotes
Mr. Kuhn as saying. "All possibilities for the continuation of
the companies will be granted."

Bike Europe notes that since April 2011, both Hawk and Clean Air
Bike belonged to the newly formed e-bike group called Clean Air
Mobility GmbH.  At the present time, Clean Air Mobility has not
asked for insolvency, the report says.

According to the report, the major reason for the insolvency is
said to be a recall for a large number of e-bikes.

"The battery packs being acquired from an outside expert producer
were defective. The current damage of more than EUR1 million was
unsustainable for the companies," stated the receiver's spokesman
Jorg Nolte, Bike Europe reports.

Mr. Kuhn is now looking for an overview of the current financial
and economic situation of both companies and plans to speak to
all parties involved, the report relays.

"Hawk and Clean Air Bike business operations will continue
unchanged even after opening of the insolvency proceedings,"
Mr. Kuhn said. "We will inform all suppliers, service providers
and customers as soon as possible about the course of current

Clean Air Mobility GmbH was founded as a holding of Hawk Bikes
Entwicklung & Marketing GmbH (brands Hawk, Hawk Classic, Nox
Cycles), Clean Air Bike GmbH and Velodrive GmbH.

KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Fitch Ups LongTerm Issuer Default Rating to BB
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb and Service
GmbH's (KDG) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB' from
'BB-' and assigned a Stable Outlook.  KDG is the successor
company of Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb and Service GmbH & Co. KG,
a previously rated entity.  KDG's senior secured rating was
affirmed at 'BB+'.

"KDG's upgrade is driven by its improving operating and financial
profile and its significant deleveraging.  Fitch expects further
short-term deleveraging," says Nikolai Lukashevich, Senior
Director in Fitch's TMT team.

The Outlook is Stable reflecting KDG's high lease-adjusted
leverage and still relatively low broadband market share.  The
rating may potentially benefit from a tighter leverage target at
below 3x net debt/EBITDA and a significant reduction in lease
payments which is not expected in the near term.  A rise in
leverage to above 5x funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage on a sustained basis is likely to trigger a negative
rating action.

KDG has solid growth prospects helped by its expansion into the
broadband segment.  A combination of super-fast broadband speeds,
not achievable by peers, and moderate pricing provides a window
of opportunity to make heavy inroads into competitors' market
shares.  Broadband has been a key contributor to revenue growth
and improving margins.

However, the German broadband market is already mature with 26.8
million broadband accounts at end Q311 implying 67% household
penetration.  KDG entered the broadband market at a relatively
late stage, and while its broadband growth has been impressive it
was from a low base, and is likely to begin declining quickly in
relative terms.

KDG's broadband expansion will be supported by its superior
network infrastructure.  As of early November 2011, approximately
66% of the company's network was upgraded to DOCSIS 3.0, which is
capable of providing super-fast speeds of up to 100 Mbit/sec. The
company expects this share to reach 100% by December 2012.

KDG benefits from a stable basic TV subscriber base which
generates almost utility-type revenues.  This is enhanced by the
company's expansion into the Premium-TV segment with a positive
impact on average revenue per user.  The cable industry's share
in TV distribution has been relatively stable at above 50% and is
unlikely to come under significant pressure.

The company is strongly profitable with an EBITDA margin at 43.6%
in FY 2010/11. Its margins are likely to continue improving, a
positive impact of its larger scale.  In spite of a relatively
high capex spend due to network upgrades and investment into new
customer equipment, KDG has already achieved robust free cash
flow (FCF) generation, with a pre-dividend FCF margin of 13.3% in
FY 2010/11 which is strong for its rating category.

KDG significantly delevered to a 3.8x net debt/Adjusted last-12-
months EBITDA (company definition) at end-June 2011.  The
management expect this metric to drop to below 3.5x, within a
targeted range of between 3.0x and 3.5x, by end-March 2012 which
Fitch estimates as highly probable. However, further deleveraging
is unlikely as Fitch expect KDG to remain shareholder-friendly,
diverting all FCF to equity holders.

KDG is paying high leases, mostly for the use of Deutsche Telekom
AG's ('BBB+'/Positive) infrastructure which inflates its lease-
adjusted metrics.  In the 2011/12 financial year the company will
start paying higher cash taxes with a negative impact on FFO
adjusted leverage.

All of KDG's debt is secured. At 'BB+' its senior secured rating
is notched up from the IDR reflecting the likely stronger senior
secured creditors' rights in a hypothetical liquidation/debt
acceleration scenario.

KDG does not publish its financials. Instead, it is covenanted to
ensure the publication of the consolidated and stand-alone
financials of Kabel Deutschland Holding AG (KDH), its listed
parent. In Fitch's view, the publication of this set of
financials conforms to a robust information disclosure for KDG as
long as there are no significant changes in KDH's stand-alone
obligations, assets or operating activities at the holdco level.

NEURNBERGER LEBEN: Fitch Affirms Rating on EUR100MM Debt at 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed German insurers Nuernberger
Lebensversicherung AG's (NLV), Nuernberger Allgemeine
Versicherung AG's (NAV), Nuernberger Krankenversicherung AG's
(NKV) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) ratings at 'A' and their
holding company Nuernberger Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft's
(NB) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook.
NB's EUR100 million subordinated debt has been affirmed at 'BB+'.

The affirmation reflects Nuernberger group's (NG) strong
capitalization, its leading position in the German unit-linked
life and disability market, and its relatively greater resilience
to a long-lasting low interest rate environment compared to many
of its competitors.  Offsetting these positive rating factors is
NG's relatively low interest coverage compared to its current
rating level.

NG's profitability increased modestly in 2010 with reported net
income of EUR39.4 million (2009: EUR36.7 million), but a strong
improvement in profitability was recorded in H111 with net income
of EUR66.3 million (H110: EUR34.9 million).  Fitch notes that the
key factors that supported the improvement in profitability in
H111 included changes in the application of group taxation and a
strong improvement in the group's non-life underwriting results.
Fitch is forecasting that NG will report net income of EUR75
million for 2011.

Fitch expects that NG will report a much improved net combined
ratio in 2011 of about 100% (2010: 104.7%).  The agency believes
that this trend in improving underwriting results will be
maintained in 2012 as NG continues to consolidate its motor book.

As a provider of unit linked products, demand for this business
at NG has suffered through the financial crisis and the company's
lapse ratio is below the market average.  NG's life APE decreased
by 1.6% to EUR248.2 million (2009: EUR252.2 million) in 2010.
However, a reversal of this trend is expected to occur in 2011
with NG's life new business increasing, and Fitch expects that
NG's APE will grow positively by about 5%.

At 3.4x, NG's interest coverage remained low for its rating level
in 2010. Fitch expects NG's interest coverage to improve slightly
to about 4.0x in 2011 and to remain at this level in 2012.
Positively, adjusted debt leverage decreased to 20% at year-end
2010 compared to 26% in the prior year.  The agency expects a
further improvement in adjusted debt leverage in 2011.

A key rating driver for an upgrade would be further improvements
in NG's non-life underwriting profitability and interest coverage
while declining interest coverage, weak profitability, or a
material erosion in capital could lead to a downgrade.

In 2010, NG reported IFRS gross written premiums (GWP) of EUR3.5
billion and had total assets of EUR23 billion.  NG provides
insurance cover primarily for individuals.  The life insurer NLV
reported GWP of EUR2.2 billion, the non-life insurer NAV GWP of
EUR645 million and the health insurer NKV GWP of EUR160 million.


KERESKEDELMI ES: Fitch Says 'D' Individual Rating Unaffected
Fitch Ratings has revised Hungarian Kereskedelmi es Hitelbank
Zrt's (K&H) rating Outlook to Negative from Stable, and affirmed
its Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A-'.

The rating actions follow the revision of the Outlook on
Hungary's Long-term IDRs to Negative from Stable.  The Viability
Rating is unaffected by the rating action.

K&H is fully owned by Belgium's KBC Bank ('A'/Stable) and the
bank's IDRs reflect the high probability that support would be
provided by the parent, if required.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

  -- Viability Rating: unaffected at 'bb-'

  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'


DRYDEN X-EURO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D-1 Notes to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Dryden X -- Euro CLO 2005 plc:

Issuer: Dryden X - Euro CLO 2005 plc

   -- EUR19,200,000 Class B-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- GBP3,262,000 Class B-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR22,400,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- GBP3,806,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR14,400,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- GBP2,447,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12,000,000 Class E-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4,000,000 Class E-1B Mezzanine Deferrable Interest Fixed
      Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR4,000,000 Class Q Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded
      to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR8,000,000 Class S Combination Notes due 2022-2, Upgraded
      to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
Q, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal
amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by a
Rated Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the
Rated Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate
of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. For Class S, the 'Rated
Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the
Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Dryden X -- Euro CLO 2005 plc , issued in January 2006, is a
multi currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Pramerica Investment Management Inc. This transaction
will be in reinvestment period until January 25, 2012. It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in December 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's also notes that this action also reflects improvements of
the transaction performance since the last rating action. The
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in December 2009. The Senior, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
132.0%, 120.9%, 114.7% and 109.4%, respectively, versus November
2009 levels of 128.4%, 117.6%, 111.6% and 106.4%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance. Reported WARF has increased from 2684 to 2828 between
November 2009 and October 2011. The change in reported WARF
understates the actual credit quality improvement because of the
technical transition related to rating factors of European
corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release
published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. In addition, defaulted
securities total about EUR48,000 of the underlying portfolio
compared to approximately EUR12 million in November 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR384.8
million, defaulted par of EUR0.048 million, a weighted average
default probability of 21.9% (consistent with a WARF of 2940), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.0% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 44 and a weighted
average spread of 3.26%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability
to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. The weighted average rating factor
was modelled at the covenant level of 2940 given the relevant
test was in compliance with an actual level reported at 2828 in
the last monthly report. Furthermore, given the limited time
remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analyzed the
impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent with the
midpoint between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and (2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by (1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and (2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

(2) Moody's also notes that around 63% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Further information
regarding specific risks and stresses associated with credit
estimates are available in the report titled "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

(3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Extending the weighted
average life of the portfolio may positively or negatively impact
the ratings of the notes depending on their seniority with the
transactions structure.

(4) The deal has significant exposure to GBP denominated assets.
Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact
on interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction,
which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

FASTNET LINE: High Court Judge Approves Examinership
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that Mr. Justice Peter
Kelly on Tuesday approved examinership for Fastnet Line Ship
Holdings Ltd. and related companies where no opposition to court
protection was voiced by creditors.

Michael McAteer -- -- of Grant Thornton
has been appointed examiner for the Fastnet Line companies.  He
has 100 days to finalize a survival scheme, the Irish Times

Ross Gorman, for the companies, had outlined that the Fastnet
companies are insolvent with a deficit of some EUR10.3 million on
a going concern basis, rising to about EUR13.2 million in a
winding-up scenario, the Irish Times discloses.  The companies
said their difficulties were due to problems including start-up
cost overruns and the decision to operate an all-year service in
2010 in line with recommendations of a firm of independent
consultants in a "flawed" report commissioned by the Port of
Cork, the Irish Times notes.  The companies said it became
apparent during that first year the ferry was running at a
significant loss outside the high season, according to the Irish

The companies believe they will make a profit next year having
abandoned loss-making sailings and implemented other cost-saving
measures, the Irish Times says.

Fastnet Line Ship Holdings Ltd., 100%-owned by the West Cork
Tourism Co-operative Society Ltd) and related companies, operate
the Cork-Swansea ferry service based at Ferry Terminal,
Ringaskiddy, Co Cork.

MERCATOR CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2 Notes at 'B-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Mercator CLO II PLC's class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes. "At the same
time, we affirmed our ratings on the class B-1 and B-2 notes,"
S&P said.

"These rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report, dated Aug. 31,
2011, and the application of all of our relevant criteria for
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P related.

"Our analysis indicates that the portfolio's credit quality has
improved since our previous full review of the transaction in
February 2010 (see 'Transaction Update: Mercator CLO II PLC,'
published on Feb. 5, 2010). Specifically, we have observed a
reduction in the balance of assets that we consider as defaulted
(i.e., rated 'CC', 'SD' [selected default], or 'D') from 2.32% to
1.94% in August 2011. We have also seen a reduction in the assets
that we rate in the 'CCC' category (i.e., 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-
') to 14.12% from 21.56%. Additionally, the trustee report
indicates that the assets are earning higher spreads than in
February 2010," S&P said.

In the same period, the class A notes have repaid, leaving the
total outstanding note balance at EUR256 million of the initial
EUR274 million. This has resulted in increased credit enhancement
for all rated tranches, such that levels are now higher than at

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate for each rated tranche.
In our analysis, we have used the reported portfolio balance,
weighted-average spread, and weighted-average recovery rates that
we consider to be appropriate. We have incorporated various cash
flow stress scenarios, using alternative default patterns,
levels, and timing for each liability rating category (i.e.,
'AAA', 'AA', and 'BBB' ratings), in conjunction with different
interest rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"We have applied our 2010 counterparty criteria and, in our view,
the swap agreements do not entirely reflect these criteria.
Considering this, we have assessed our ratings -- taking into
account the transaction's exposure to counterparties and the
potential impact if they did not perform. Based on our
assessment, we have capped our ratings on the class A-2  notes to
our long-term issuer credit rating on the foreign-currency swap
counterparty plus one notch," S&P said.

"Since we lowered our ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes on
July 19, 2011 for counterparty reasons (see 'Ratings List
Resolving European Structured Finance Counterparty CreditWatch
Placements -- July 19, 2011 Review'), Barclays Bank PLC (AA-
/Negative/A-1+) has replaced American International Group Inc.
(A-/Stable/A-2) in its role as foreign-currency swap
counterparty.  We have therefore lifted our cap on the class A-2
notes to 'AA (sf)' from 'A (sf)'. However, our credit and cash
flow analyses suggest that our rating on the class A-2 notes
should not be higher than 'AA- (sf)'," S&P said.

"Considering all of these factors, we have raised our ratings on
all of the class A notes because our analysis indicates that the
credit enhancement available to each tranche is commensurate with
higher ratings than previously assigned. We have affirmed our
ratings on both of the class B notes to reflect our view that
their credit enhancement remains commensurate with the current
ratings," S&P said.

"None of the ratings was constrained by the application of our
largest obligor default test -- a supplemental stress test that
we introduced as part of our criteria update (see 'Update To
Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published on Sept. 17, 2009) -- or by the
largest industry default test, which is another of our
supplemental stress
tests," S&P said.

Mercator CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To            From

Mercator CLO II PLC
EUR419 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1         AA (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-2         AA- (sf)      A (sf)
A-3 def     A- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B-1 def     BB+ (sf)
B-2 def     B- (sf)

TBS INTERNATIONAL: Files Form 10-Q, Incurs US$22MM Q3 Net Loss
TBS International PLC filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q reporting a net loss
of US$22.04 million on US$95.68 million of total revenue for the
three months ended Sept. 30, 2011, compared with a net loss of
US$10.88 million on US$99.75 million of total revenue for the
same period during the prior year.

The Company also reported a net loss of US$55.16 million on
US$282.64 million of total revenue for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2011, compared with a net loss of US$29.21 million on
US$311.06 million of total revenue for the same period a year

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2011, showed US$659.28
million in total assets, US$409.77 million in total liabilities,
and US$249.51 million in total shareholders' equity.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available for free at:


                    About TBS International plc

Dublin, Ireland-based TBS International plc (NASDAQ: TBSI)
-- provides worldwide shipping
solutions to a diverse client base of industrial shippers through
its Five Star Service: ocean transportation, projects,
operations, port services and strategic planning.  The TBS
shipping network operates liner, parcel and dry bulk services,
supported by a fleet of multipurpose tweendeckers and
handysize/handymax bulk carriers, including specialized heavy-
lift vessels and newbuild tonnage.  TBS has developed its
franchise around key trade routes between Latin America and
China, Japan and South Korea, as well as select ports in North
America, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

The Company reported a net loss of US$247.76 million on US$411.83
million of total revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010,
compared with a net loss of US$67.04 million on US$302.51 million
of total revenue during the prior year.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  PwC believes
that the Company will not be in compliance with the financial
covenants under its credit facilities during 2011, which under
the agreements would make the debt callable.  According to PwC,
this has created uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to
fulfill its financial commitments as they become due.

As reported in the TCR on Feb. 8, 2011, TBS International on
Jan. 31, 2011, announced that it had entered into amendments to
its credit facilities with all of its lenders, including AIG
Commercial Equipment, Commerzbank AG, Berenberg Bank and Credit
Suisse and syndicates led by Bank of America, N.A., The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc and DVB Group Merchant Bank (the "Credit
Facilities").  The amendments restructure the Company's debt
obligations by revising the principal repayment schedules under
the Credit Facilities, waiving any existing defaults, revising
the financial covenants, including covenants related to the
Company's consolidated leverage ratio, consolidated interest
coverage ratio and minimum cash balance, and modifying other
terms of the Credit Facilities.

The Company currently expects to be in compliance with all
financial covenants and other terms of the amended Credit
Facilities through maturity.

As a condition to the restructuring of the Company's credit
facilities, three significant shareholders who also are key
members of TBS' management agreed on Jan. 25, 2011, to provide up
to US$10 million of new equity in the form of Series B Preference
Shares and deposited funds in an escrow account to facilitate
satisfaction of this obligation.  In partial satisfaction of this
obligation, on Jan. 28, 2011, these significant shareholders
purchased an aggregate of 30,000 of the Company's Series B
Preference Shares at US$100 per share directly from TBS in a
private placement.


BTA BANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kazakhstan-based BTA Bank (BTA) and
its subsidiary CJSC BTA Bank (Belarus)'s (BTAB) Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'B-'.

The downgrades reflects Fitch's view of the increased probability
of BTA's default in the near to medium term.  This is driven by
the recent sharp deterioration in the bank's reported financial
position and the apparent readiness of the bank and the Kazakh
authorities to consider a range of options, including less
creditor-friendly ones, for restoring the bank's solvency.

At end H111, BTA reported negative equity of KZT217 billion
(US$1.5 billion), and management has indicated that end Q311
accounts are likely to show a further KZT126 billion (US$0.9
billion) decrease in capital.  The sharp deterioration in the
bank's reported capital position is being driven by negative pre-
impairment results, de-recognition of deferred tax assets and
further impairment charges on the bank's loan book.

In Fitch's view, BTA's financial position has now deteriorated to
such an extent that even quite favorable results of the bank's
loan recovery efforts (which is not the agency's base case at
present) would be insufficient by themselves to return the bank
to solvency.  Furthermore, the scale of BTA's pre-impairment
losses (KZT33 billion or US$225 million in H111) is such that
elimination of the negative carry on the bank's government-
related assets and liabilities would only approximately halve,
rather than fully eradicate these losses.

Fitch has previously stated that it "would be unlikely to
downgrade BTA's Long-term IDR solely on the basis of any
disclosures from the bank indicating a deterioration in its
financial position.  However, if any such disclosures are not
accompanied by a clear plan to restore the bank's financial
position, in particular through provision of external support
from the Kazakh authorities, the rating could come under

In Fitch's view, there is currently no clear plan to restore
BTA's financial position.  Instead, the agency understands that
representatives of the bank, its controlling shareholder, the
national welfare fund Samruk Kazyna (SK), and the Kazakh
authorities are currently considering different ways to address
BTA's financial problems.  Furthermore, the agency believes that
less creditor-friendly options, such as a 'liability management
exercise' involving a further restructuring of the bank's debt,
have not been excluded from these discussions.

Fitch expects that any final decision on BTA will be made at a
high political level, and is hence quite unpredictable. The
agency also notes that the Kazakhstan sovereign ('BBB-'/Positive)
has sufficient resources to provide necessary support to BTA if
it chooses, and that the potential reputational damage from a
repeated default of the bank provides some incentive for the
Kazakh authorities to finance a bail-out.  However, in the
agency's view, the risks of a default are considerable, and are
now commensurate with a 'CCC' rating, indicating that default is
a real possibility.

BTA could be downgraded further if the Kazakh authorities and/or
the bank give a clear indication that a restructuring of the
bank's liabilities, under terms which Fitch would classify as a
coercive debt exchange, will take place.  Conversely, BTA could
be upgraded if the bank is returned to solvency and viability
without a default on its liabilities.

The downgrade of BTA's Viability Rating (VR) to 'f' reflects
Fitch's view that the bank has failed and will almost certainly
default if it does not receive external support.

The downgrade of BTAB's Long-term IDR reflects the reduced
probability of support from BTA. BTAB's Long-term IDR is now
aligned with its VR of 'ccc'.

SK has held a 81.5% stake in BTA since the completion of the
bank's restructuring in 2010. BTA currently holds a 99.7% stake
in BTAB.

The rating actions are as follows:

BTA Bank

  -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDR downgraded to 'CCC'
     from 'B-'

  -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDR: downgraded to 'C'
     from 'B'

  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'f' from 'cc'

  -- Individual Rating downgraded to 'F' from 'E'

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'CCC' from 'B-'

  -- Senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-';
     Recovery Rating at 'RR4'

  -- Subordinated debt rating downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
     Recovery Rating at 'RR6'

CJSC BTA Bank (Belarus)

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-'

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'C' from 'B'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  -- Viability Rating 'ccc' unaffected

  -- Individual Rating 'E' unaffected


MAVROVOINZENERING: Faces Bankruptcy Threat Over EUR21.7-Mil Debt
SeeNews reports that Mavrovoinzenering may face bankruptcy over a
debt of EUR21.7 million (US$29.6 million).

According to SeeNews, business daily Kapital said on Monday that
Mavrovoinzenering's bank account has been blocked even though the
company continues work on projects, including state-financed

The daily said that in 2010, Mavrovoinzenering posted a loss of
EUR3.3 million, as its income fell 38%, SeeNews relates.

In 2008, Croatian civil engineering firm Ingra acquired
Macedonian construction company ADG Mavrovo and its subsidiary
Mavrovoinzenering, SeeNews discloses.  In 2009, ADG Mavrovo filed
for bankruptcy over its "permanent inability to cover long-
standing financial liabilities," SeeNews recounts.

Macedonia-based Mavrovoinzenering was set up in 2003 by ADG
Mavrovo to implement hydraulic projects and build roads and
multi-story buildings.


ASMITA GARDENS: Declared Insolvent on Alpha Bank's Request
Property Investor Europe reports that the EUR120 million Asmita
Gardens residential project in Bucharest, Romania, has been
declared insolvent on the request of its financier Alpha Bank.

Asmita Gardens is 50-50 owned by UK-based European Convergence
Development company and India's Asmati Group.


BYSTROBANK JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Bystrobank Long-term foreign
currency and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B-'
and a National Long-term rating of 'BB-(rus)'.  The Outlooks are

The ratings reflect Bystrobank's small franchise and modest
profitability, coupled with the bank's unseasoned corporate loan
book and underreserved retail book.  The rating is supported by
the bank's strong market position in the domestic region and by
its adequate liquidity profile.

Bystrobank is a small bank in the Udmurtia region with a market
share around 14% of retail lending and 11% of retail deposits.
It was mostly a retail bank when it was acquired by former
shareholders of OJSC Orgresbank after they sold Orgresbank to
Nordea AB ('AA-'/Stable) in 2007.  Fitch believes the acquisition
of Bystrobank was intended to be speculative, as apart from
Bystrobank the main shareholders have a significant interest in
the Russian IT industry.  However, replicating the successful
sale of Orgresbank with Bystrobank in the medium-term would be
difficult given the reduced interest in Russian banking assets
after the financial crisis.

As retail loans began to demonstrate weak performance following
the crisis, management decided to diversify the bank's business
model and actively started issuing corporate loans, mainly to the
shareholders' business partners from the IT industry.  The
corporate loan book (45% of gross loans) consequently has a high
concentration on IT and electronics, which raises some concerns.
Currently there are no corporate NPLs, but most loans were issued
in H210-H111 and are therefore unseasoned.  Fitch notes that
about 75% are unsecured.  However, most of these loans are
working capital facilities to trade and IT companies with a
stable background.

Bystrobank's retail loans book (55% of gross loans) is mostly
secured, but the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) was a high
15% at end-2010, as the bank performed limited write-offs in the
past. The loans' reserve coverage was a moderate 40%.

Bystrobank plans to increase SME lending and unsecured retail
lending, which is likely to put pressure on credit costs.

Bystrobank relies on retail deposits, which represented 60% of
total funding as of end-Q311 with another 21% coming from
corporates.  Retail deposits proved to be relatively stable
during the Q408 liquidity squeeze, with a maximum outflow of 5%,
followed by a quick recovery.  However, Fitch does not consider
Bystrobank to be immune to deposit outflow risk, which is
aggravated by regional concentration, with 87% of retail deposits
coming from the Udmurtia region.  Bystrobank had about RUB1bn of
liquid assets at end-Q311 which is sufficient to withstand a 10%
outflow of customer funding.

The agency considers Bystrobank's regulatory capital ratio of 15%
at end-Q311 to be moderate given the bank's relatively high
credit risks. Fitch estimates its additional loss absorption
capacity is 8% of gross loans.  The bank's equity-to-assets ratio
under IFRS is stronger -- at 21% at end-Q311.  Profitability is
moderate, so earnings would provide a limited extra cushion if
there were asset quality problems.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'B-'; Stable Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR: 'B'
  -- National Rating: 'BB-(rus)'; Stable Outlook
  -- Viability Rating: 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'No floor'


IM BES EMPRESAS: Moody's Assigns '(P)Caa2' Rating to Serie B Note
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional ratings
to the debt to be issued by IM BES EMPRESAS 1, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos:

   -- EUR242.5M Serie A Note, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR242.5M Serie B Note, Assigned (P)Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

IM BES EMPRESAS 1, FTA is a securitization of loans and leasing
contracts granted by Banco Espirito Santo's (BES, Ba2 Negative
Outlook/NP) branch in Spain to micro, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SME) and corporate entities. BES is acting as
Servicer of the loans while Intermoney Titulizacion S.G.F.T.,
S.A. is the Management Company ("Gestora"). Additionally,
Finsolutia - Consultoria e Gestao de Creditos, S.A. will be
appointed as back-up servicer (BUS).

As of October 2011, the provisional pool was composed of a
portfolio of 1,281 contracts (13.3% of the pool volume being
leasing contracts) granted to 900 obligors located in Spain. The
assets were originated between 1997 and 2011 (90.2% between 2006
and 2010), with a weighted average seasoning of 3.4 years and a
weighted average remaining term of 8.8 years. Around 57.7% of the
portfolio volume is secured by mortgage guarantees over different
types of properties. Geographically, obligors are located mostly
in Madrid (38.9% of the pool volume), Catalonia (17.2%) and
Andalusia (11.2%). The provisional portfolio, as of its poolcut
date, included loans in arrears between 31 and 90 days
representing 4.1% of the portfolio volume and loans in arrears
above 90 days representing 4.4%. Loans in arrears exceeding 90
days will be excluded from the final pool at closing.

According to Moody's, the deal has these credit strengths: (i) a
back-up servicer is appointed from day one; and (ii) while most
of the credit enhancement is provided by subordination of Serie B
notes, a cash reserve of EUR24.25 million, representing 5% of the
securitized volume, is exclusively available to cover any
shortfall occurring on interest payments on Serie A notes as well
as senior fees.

Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit
weaknesses, including: (a) 44.9% of the pool volume is related to
obligors in the construction and building sector according to
Moody's, including 21.1% to real estate developers; (b) 19.2% of
the total portfolio volume consists of loans with bespoke
amortization schedules which include bullet and soft-bullet
profiles; (c) there is significant obligor concentration, as the
top 10 corporate groups represent 19.6% of the portfolio balance;
(d) the transaction does not have a hedging mechanism to
compensate for interest and payment frequency mismatches between
the assets and the notes; (e) the transaction is originated by a
financial institution with no securitization track-record in the
Spanish market.

Moody's analysis focused primarily on (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical performance
information and other statistical information; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided via excess-spread, the cash reserve and the
subordination of the notes.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 32.3%, with a coefficient of variation of 34.5% and a
stochastic mean recovery rate of 45.0%. Moody's also tested other
set of assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis.
The results show that the model indicated ratings for Serie A and
Serie B would be (P)A1(sf) and (P)Caa3(sf) respectively if the
mean default rate assumption was to increase to 39.1% and the
recovery rate of 45% was reduced to 35%. For more details, please
refer to the full Parameter Sensitivity analysis included in the
New Issue Report of this transaction.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line
with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector " published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Defaults
Assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular SME Portfolios in
EMEA", published in March 2009 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa",
published in June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used a combination of its
CDOROM model (to generate the default distribution) and ABSROM
cashflow model to determine the potential loss incurred by the
notes under each loss scenario.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Pang Da, Youngman Deal Expires; Talks Continue
AFP reports that Chinese companies Pang Da and Youngman are
continuing discussions on purchasing Saab Automobile even though
the deadline for the deal expired Tuesday.

"Talks continue between Swedish automobile and our Chinese
partners Pang Da and Youngman," Saab spokeswoman Gunilla Gustavs
told AFP.  "Discussions continue with the goal of (finding) a
proposed structure for the future that everyone can agree upon,"
Ms. Gustavs said, stressing that it was especially "important
that General Motors is okay with the proposal."

"GM needs to approve the deal if we are going to continue to
build and sell the current Saab line-up (the 9-3 and 9-5
models)," Ms. Gustavs, as cited by AFP, said, insisting it was
"critical" to get the US auto giant onboard.

Saab's former owner GM has said it will block the transfer of
technology licenses to the two Chinese firms if they buy all of
Saab, putting what is considered the Swedish carmaker's last
chance of survival in jeopardy, AFP relates.

Saab's current Dutch owner Swedish Automobile (Swan) announced on
October 28 that Youngman and Pang Da had agreed to buy the
insolvent brand for EUR100 million (US$134 million) and
EUR610 million in long-term funding, AFP recounts.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the parties expired
Tuesday but since this date was "self-imposed" it did not require
them to halt discussions unless one of the parties wanted to do
so, AFP notes.

Another deadline would have more practical implications -- Saab's
court-appointed administrator, who has been tasked to lead it
through reorganization under bankruptcy protection, is scheduled
to present a plan to creditors on November 22, AFP states.

Ms. Gustavs acknowledged that if no concrete agreement had been
reached between Youngman, Pang Da, Swan and GM by then, the sale
of Saab could be in jeopardy, according to AFP.

"The proposal that will be given to the creditors will have to be
concrete enough so that the creditors can take a position on it,"
AFP quotes Ms. Gustavs as saying.

If the administrator or creditors decide the presented plan lacks
credibility, Saab could be pushed out of bankruptcy protection,
AFP notes.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 21, 2011.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


NYCOMED SCA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Switzerland-headquartered
pharmaceuticals group Nycomed S.C.A. SICAR. The rating was then
withdrawn at the issuer's request. At the time of the withdrawal,
the outlook was stable.

"At the time of the withdrawal, the rating on Nycomed reflected
our assessment of its business risk profile as weak, due to
Nycomed's sole focus on dermatologic therapeutics; its position
as a small player in the fragmented global dermatology market;
upcoming patent expiries; and anticipated competition for some of
its products over the medium term," S&P said.

"The rating also reflected our view of Nycomed's aggressive
financial risk profile, with a track record of using debt as the
primary means of financing acquisitions. However, on the date of
withdrawal, the company had no cash interest-bearing debt on its
balance sheet," S&P said.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BODIDRIS HALL: Colliers Int'l Sells Hotel Out of Administration
Place North West News reports that Bodidris Hall has been sold by
licensed property agents at Colliers International on behalf of

A private investor has acquired the nine-bedroom hotel and
intends to continue with the same use, according to Place North
West News.  The report relates that Colliers International was
instructed earlier this year by joint administrators David
Costley-Wood and Brian Green of KPMG.

Three hotels in the same ownership also went into administration
and are still on the market; the Wild Pheasant, Bryn Howel and
Chainbridge Hotel, the report discloses.

Bodidris Hall is a 15th Century historic house hotel in Llandegla
near Wrexham.  The property dates from 1465 and comes with seven
acres of gardens.

HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL: Circle Healthcare to Take Over
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that Hinchingbrooke
hospital in Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, is to be taken over by a
stock-market listed company for the first time, paving the way
for further deals and reigniting the debate over the use of
private companies in the health service.

According to the FT, Circle Healthcare, a John Lewis-style
partnership with a market cap of about GBP120 million
(US$191 million), will manage the debt-laden National Health
Service hospital from February after the government signed off on
the 10-year contract on Nov. 9.

The takeover stops short of full privatization, but
Hinchingbrooke is widely seen as a landmark deal that is likely
to lead to other cash-strapped NHS hospitals being taken over by
private companies, the FT says.

Both Hinchingbrooke's assets and staff will remain within the
NHs, but employees, who have a 49.9% stake in Circle, will also
be able to win free shares in the company according to
performance and seniority, the FT notes.

In a separate report, the FT's Sarah Neville and Gill Plimmer say
that Circle will have its liabilities capped at GBP7 million
under the terms of a ground-breaking deal that will for the first
time see an all-purpose NHS hospital run by the private sector.

Circle, as cited by the FT, said it hoped Hinchingbrooke would
become a model for other debt-laden hospitals which could be
revitalized by private ownership.

However, the government played down the significance of the move,
the FT notes.  According to the FT, an official at the Department
of Health described Hinchingbrooke, which has debts of more than
GBP38 million, as a "special case".

"We are not ideologically opposed to the private sector providing
services but running whole hospitals only happens under
exceptional circumstances," the FT quotes the spokesman as
saying.  The only alternative, he suggested, would have been the
closure of the hospital, the FT notes.

Although the expectation is that Circle will pay off
Hinchingbrooke's debt over the 10-year life of the contract, the
immediate priority is to turn a year-on-year profit, the FT says.
If achieved, the surplus would be split between debt repayment
and reinvestment in the business, the FT states.

Circle is liable for the first GBP5 million of any further
losses, and the government has the right to terminate the
contract at any point, without giving a reason, the FT discloses.
Circle would be required to pay an additional GBP2 million on
exit, capping the private company's liability at GBP7 million,
the FT says.  The FT relates that Whitehall insiders said Circle
would be taking "the downside risk of this . . . so the taxpayer
is protected".

With turnover at Hinchingbrooke currently totaling about GBP90
million a year, both analysts and government insiders believe
that Circle has a tough job on its hands to turn the hospital
around, according to the FT.

PLUS MARKETS: Future as Stock Exchange Uncertain
Alison Smith and Michael Stothard at The Financial Times report
that Plus Markets' core business has seen continuing losses and
dwindling listings, while there is little to show from recent

The result is a rift between the board and Amara Dhari
Investments, a Middle Eastern syndicate that is one of the
group's biggest shareholders, the FT states.

The FT says the company is urging investors to reject Amara's
proposals to remove Giles Vardey, chairman, from the board and
bring back as a director Simon Brickles, former Plus chief

Beyond the predictable acrimony that such conflicts generate,
there is a more serious question, whoever is in charge, regarding
the role of Plus as an exchange -- both for the companies quoted
on it and the group itself, the FT notes.

The 151 groups whose shares are traded on Plus are mostly very
small companies seeking to raise funds, together with a handful
of companies with limited liquidity that came to Plus as it
evolved from Ofex, the FT discloses.

The Aim-quoted stock exchange operator is developing new revenue
streams from a derivatives arm and an "exchange in a box"
business designed to help financial institutions meet forthcoming
regulatory changes, the FT discloses.

For Plus itself, the stock exchange business is necessary but not
sufficient, the FT says.  Costs have been cut and annual revenues
have been maintained around the GBP3 million mark, but the group
is still racking up losses -- GBP8.26 million in 2009 and GBP5.67
million in 2010, the FT relates.  The number of companies quoted
on the market is down by more than one-quarter from the high of
213 at the end of 2008, the FT discloses.  Mr. Vardey says that
without other initiatives, Plus would need about 200 new
companies to break even, the FT notes.  Present market conditions
make such a tally seem unlikely in the near future, the FT

Plus Markets is a stock exchange for small companies, formerly
known as Ofex.

RADAMANTIS PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to 'D (sf)'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'B
(sf)' its credit rating on Radamantis (European Loan Conduit No.
24) PLC's class G notes.

"The rating action follows our review of the Oct. 11, 2011 cash
manager report, which reflects a non-accruing interest (NAI)
amount of GBP394,604 allocated to the class G notes. This NAI
amount is associated with the payment of liquidation fees
following the sale of the asset backing the Hayes Park loan,
which had been in special servicing since January 2011," S&P

"According to the offering circular, interest on the NAI amount
will be deferred, and will become due and payable on the date on
which the class G notes are redeemed in full. We anticipate that,
on that date, a principal loss equivalent to the NAI amount will
be applied to the class G notes," S&P related.

"The class G notes have also incurred a total interest shortfall
amount of GBP60,426, which reflects three fiscal quarters of
special servicing fees associated with this loan that, as we
understand, are not recoverable from the borrower," S&P said.

"As we rate to the timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal by legal final maturity, we have lowered our
rating on the class G notes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

Radamantis (European Loan Conduit No. 24) closed in August 2006
with notes totaling GBP493.5 million. The notes have a legal
final maturity date of October 2015. The current principal
balance minus the NAI amount is GBP433.0 million. The underlying
collateral now comprises three loans secured on U.K. commercial

         Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken the rating action based on our criteria for rating
European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). However,
these criteria are under review (see 'Advance Notice of Proposed
Criteria Change: Methodology And Assumptions For Rating European
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities,' published on Nov. 8,
2011)," S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result in
changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria (see 'Related Criteria And
Research')," S&P said.

RANGERS FC: HMRC's GBP49MM Tax Case Verdict Gets Delayed
Mail Online reports that the tax tribunal dealing with Rangers
Football Club PLC's dispute with Her Majesty Revenue and Customs
over GBP35 million in tax, as well as GBP14 million of penalties
has been postponed until early next year.

The First Tier Tribunal was expected to conclude this month but
will now take place on January 16-18, according to Mail Online.

The report notes that the players do not expect to learn their
fate until the end of the season, with a final decision
potentially coming months after the conclusion of the tribunal.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 1,
2011, said that Rangers FC could be hammered
with a total deduction of 25 points if they are forced into
administration.  And should the Ibrox side have to start again
under a new name, it is possible all of those points would come
off before the end of this season, according to  MailOnline related that if 75% of the
shareholders and the same percentage of creditors accept a
fraction of what they're owed, the club can come out of
administration and carry on with no further penalty.  But, the
report noted, if HMRC managed to put a block on the deal, the
club, would cease to be and assets would be transferred to a new
company.  If Rangers lose the tax case into the Employee Benefits
scheme, they could be facing a tax bill of GBP40 million plus,
the report added.

                    About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC --
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station,  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.

SHETLAND WINDPOWER: Follows Proven Energy in Receivership
Shetland News reports that Shetland Windpower Ltd has gone into
receivership less than 12 months after being sold to investment
firm Nevis Capital in December 2010.

John Robertson at The Shetland Times relates that the other parts
of Shetland Wind Power, including its new turbine orders and
customer inquiry list, were bought by the Ayrshire-based
renewables firm VG Energy.  The rest of the company's assets and
affairs were then placed in administration with accountants KPMG,
according to The Shetland Times.

Shetland Windpower is the second victim of the collapse of Proven
Energy, the Scottish wind turbine manufacturer which went bust
two months ago, according to Shetland News.  Shetland News
relates that the company called in KPMG as receivers to wind up
the business.

Shetland News ort discloses that earlier this year, the company
signed an exclusivity agreement to supply only Proven Energy wind
turbines, having previously installed a variety of manufacturers'
products.  Shetland News relates that the deal with Proven Energy
turned out to be a fatal one, after the Ayshire-based firm was
forced into receivership in September as a result of a defect in
its GBP50,000 P35-2 model.

Meanwhile, The Shetland Times notes that Michael Anderson -- -- the founder of
Shetland Wind Power, is to start up a new operation.  Mr.
Anderson is stepping in to buy back some of the assets of his old
company which he sold to Glasgow private equity investors Nevis
Capital, according to The Shetland Times.

Shetland Windpower Ltd is a renewable energy company.

VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Says Structure Key Challenge for CFR
Moody's Investors Service says that Vedanta Resources PLC's key
credit issues arising from the Group's structure and its
strategic direction have remained undiminished over these past
few years, and are behind the negative outlook for its Ba1
corporate family rating ("CFR") and its Ba2 senior unsecured bond

"Various credit issues have been largely unaddressed or unchanged
through the last few years, and despite its larger organization
and broader footprint, some of Vedanta's issues are now more
pronounced, and weigh on the company's credit profile and
ratings, culminating in the current rating and outlook," says
Alan Greene, a Moody's Vice President and Senior Credit Officer.

"Vedanta's condition as reflected by its consolidated EBITDA is
impressive. However, its acquisition policy is based on control
and not full ownership, and on pro-rata basis its leverage is
higher. At the same time, further subordination pressure is
building on the parent company's debt which cannot be readily
eased, as its Indian subsidiaries face restrictions on
guaranteeing such debt," adds Mr. Greene, also Moody's lead
analyst for Vedanta.

Mr. Greene was speaking on the release of a Moody's analysis of
Vedanta, looking at the credit strengths which drive the CFR as
well as the challenging group structure which impacts the senior
unsecured debt rating at the parent level. The report was
authored by Mr. Greene and Nidhi Dhruv, a Moody's Associate

"The disparity in the Vedanta group -- between the cash-
generating operations in India with minimal third-party debt and
the heavily indebted parent, with low cash upstreaming from its
subsidiaries beyond servicing their intercompany loans with it --
is stark," says Mr. Greene.

"At the same time, Vedanta has seemed reluctant to upstream
dividends from operating companies through the myriad of holding
companies to the Parent plc. As a result, loans taken to fund
acquired equity stakes are not being covered by returns from the
investments, leading to the accumulation of debt and losses at
the Parent. This has led Vedanta to convert capital reserves at
various levels in the structure into distributable reserves in
order to stop the run of losses and allow Parent company
dividends to be paid", says Mr. Greene.

Moody's notes that interim dividends have been declared by two
Indian subsidiaries, Hindustan Zinc Limited and Sterlite
Industries India Limited, in October 2011. However, these initial
payments merit caution, and a regular pattern of distribution is
required in Moody's view.

The report further notes that doing business in India requires
perseverance and Vedanta faces challenges on many fronts, from
mining rights, land ownership, settlement compensation, pollution
to export bans.

Furthermore, given various uncertainties -- such as regulatory
issues in India -- and the multi-directional growth strategy that
the company tends to pursue, Moody's notes a high degree of event
risk associated with Vedanta's credit profile.

However, Moody's also derives comfort from the company's track
record in executing new projects, its low cost operations, and
the fact that the inorganic and organic growth initiatives
support its geographic and product diversification.

YELL GROUP: Chairman Buys Bonds; Wants Lender to Accept Debt Deal
Harry Wilson at The Telegraph reports that Yell Group chairman
Bob Wigley has bought the bonds of the company as it attempts to
convince lenders to accept changes to its debt's terms.

Mr. Wigley bought Yell senior debt on Tuesday with a face value
of US$1 million (GBP625,260) for about GBP200,000, as well as
increasing his stake in the struggling company with the purchase
of shares worth GBP100,485, the Telegraph relates.

According to the Telegraph, the former investment banker said he
was convinced Yell had "huge potential" and could "manage its
debt structure".

On Monday, Yell sent a memorandum to its lenders asking them to
accept a change in the terms on its GBP2.6 billion debt pile, the
Telegraph discloses.

As part of its plans, Yell is planning to buy back GBP108 million
of its loans at a discount to their face value in order to cancel
them, as well as asking lenders to agree to give it more
flexibility on its debt covenants, the Telegraph notes.

                        About Yell Group

Headquartered in Reading, England, Yell Group plc -- is an international directories
business operating in the classified advertising market through
printed, online, and phone media in the U.K. and the US.  Yell
also owns 100% of TPI (renamed "Yell Publicidad"), the largest
publisher of yellow and white pages in Spain, with operations in
certain countries in Latin America.  Yell's revenue for the
twelve months ended March 31, 2008, was GBP2,219 million and its
Adjusted EBITDA was GBP738.9 million.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug 26,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its corporate
credit rating on U.K.-based classified directories publisher Yell
Group PLC to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  The outlook remains negative.
"We believe Yell is likely to breach one specific covenant within
the next few quarters, absent any remedies," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Carlo Castelli.


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars

Nov. 28, 2011
     18th Annual Distressed Investing Conference
        The Helmsley Park Lane Hotel, New York City
           Contact: 1-240-629-3300

Dec. 1-3, 2011
     23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference
        La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

April 3-5, 2012
     TMA Spring Conference
        Grand Hyatt Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.

Apr. 19-22, 2012
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

July 14-17, 2012
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

Aug. 2-4, 2012
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

November 1-3, 2012
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

April 10-12, 2013
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

October 3-5, 2013
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *