TCREUR_Public/111121.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, November 21, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 230



CAIXA GERAL: Moody's Corrects Rating on Subordinated Note to Ba3


JJ SIETAS: Files Insolvency Petition in Hamburg Court
MANROLAND AG: Supervisory to Decide on Fate Tomorrow
SEB AG: Moody's Affirms D+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1(hyb)' Preferred Stock Rating
UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Says D+ BFSR Unaffected by Review

* GERMANY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 12 Public-Sector Banks


K+K BAU-PROFIL: Creditors File HUF4.5 Billion in Claims


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: To Start Repaying Priority Creditors
LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Iceland Foods Auction Stalls


IRISH LIFE: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on EUR200MM Notes on Watch Dev.


BANCASAI SPA: S&P Puts 'BB/B' Counterparty Ratings on Watch Neg.


ATF BANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Ratings for Possible Downgrade


MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Gets Final OK to Obtain US$5-Mil. RBS Loan
NXP BV: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to US$606MM Senior Secured Notes
STORM 2010-III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'


PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: Moody's Rates US$300-Mil. Notes at 'Ba2'


NOMOS BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Foreign Currency Deposit Rating
NOTA-BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Deposit Ratings to Pos.
SVIAZ-BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Long-term Deposit Ratings


IM BES: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating to EUR242.5MM Serie B Note

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARGUS CARE: Gets Assurances That Operations Will Continue
AVOCA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
BUSINESS DREAM: Sold Back to Former Director
DOUBLETAKE STUDIOS: Enters Administration on Cash Flow Problems

GOODWOOD GOLD: Moody's Reviews B2 Ratings on Three Note Classes
HELLAS TELECOM: Noteholders File US$104MM Suit Against PE Firms
SKYE IT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SKYJET UK: Files for Bankruptcy; Comtel Air Cancels Flights
WEDGWOOD MUSEUM: Faces Possible Forced Sale

* UK: Sadler Comments on Number of Care Homes in Administration


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 14 to November 18, 2011



CAIXA GERAL: Moody's Corrects Rating on Subordinated Note to Ba3
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the rating of these
Subordinate Note issued by Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A. (Paris)
to Ba3 from Ba2.

Due to an internal administrative error, Moody's previously
misclassified this instrument as senior unsecured. The note has
been reclassified as subordinate and the rating has been
corrected to Ba3.

This instrument is affected:

-- EUR21,000,000 floating rate subordinate note, maturing on
    June 26, 2016 (ISIN : XS0223711267).

The corrected rating history for this note is:

  August 12, 2005 -- A1 rating assigned;

  April 13, 2007 -- rating upgraded to Aa2;

  April 6, 2009 -- Aa2 rating put on review for downgrade;

  September 16, 2009 -- rating downgraded to Aa3;

  May 5, 2010 -- Aa3 rating put on review for downgrade;

  June 2, 2010 -- rating downgraded to A1 and put on review for
  further downgrade;

  July 14, 2010 -- rating downgraded to A2;

  December 9, 2010 -- A2 rating put on review for downgrade;

  April 6, 2011 - rating downgraded to Baa2 and put on review for
  further downgrade;

  July 15, 2011 - rating downgraded to Ba2 and put on review for
  further downgrade;

  October 7, 2011 - rating downgraded to Ba3.


JJ SIETAS: Files Insolvency Petition in Hamburg Court
The management of J.J. Sietas KG Schiffswerft GmbH u. Co. and
J.J. Sietas Verwaltungs GmbH have filed a petition for insolvency
at the Municipal Court Hamburg on November 17, 2011, due to over-
indebtedness.  Work on ships under construction will continue,
according to the company.  The court has appointed a provisional
creditors' committee of inspection and, following a hearing of
this provisional creditors' committee of inspection, has
appointed Lawyer Berthold Brinkmann of Hamburg as the provisional
insolvency administrator and also as consultant with regards to
the conditions of opening insolvency proceedings.  He will
conduct the company's future business dealings together with the
management, which remains in office.  The aim is to continue work
on the five ships currently under construction and to maintain
the Sietas Group as far as possible as a network.

The management and the provisional administrator was set to
inform the Works Council and the employees on Nov. 18 and conduct
first consultations with clients and suppliers in order to
maintain confidence in the work of the Sietas shipyard.  All
parties involved are working on the assumption that salaries will
be secured through insolvency wage pre-financing up to
January 31, 2012.  Opening of the insolvency proceedings by the
court is not expected before the end of January 2012.

According to the company's Web site, the J. J. Sietas shipyard
has been in existence in the west of Hamburg on the south bank of
the Elbe since 1635.

MANROLAND AG: Supervisory to Decide on Fate Tomorrow
Sheenagh Matthews at Bloomberg News reports that Manroland AG's
supervisory board will meet tomorrow to decide on a path to
salvage the unprofitable company.

According to Bloomberg, supervisory board member Juergen Baensch
-- -- said that a meeting last week
failed to produce results.  Mr. Baensch said that workers will be
told the board's decision the day after the next meeting,
Bloomberg notes.

Manroland last month reintroduced shorter working hours at its
factory in Offenbach, where it is based, in response to a drop in
orders as customers struggle to get financing, Bloomberg

Handelsblatt reported on Nov. 16 that the manufacturer, owned by
Allianz Capital Partners and MAN SE, may be acquired by a
European machinery company, Bloomberg relates.

Mr. Baensch, as cited by Bloomberg, on Friday said that an
investor willing to "accompany the company on its future path"
would be the best option.  He declined to say whether Manroland's
owners are in talks.

Manroland hasn't been able to offer full-time work at plants in
the German cities of Augsburg and Plauen since March 2009,
Bloomberg discloses.

Manroland needs a longer-term plan because a time limit on
government-subsidized shorter hours will be reached in March,
Bloomberg states.  According to Bloomberg, company spokesman
Thomas Hauser said last week that as many as 1,800 workers are
affected at the three sites, about a third of the company's
workforce in Germany.

Manroland AG is a German printing-machine maker.

SEB AG: Moody's Affirms 'D+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed SEB AG's Baa1 long-term
debt and deposit ratings, D+ bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) -- mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale -- and Prime-2
short-term rating. The outlook on the BFSR remains negative,
whilst the outlook on the Baa1 rating is stable.

Ratings Rationale

The affirmation of SEB AG's D+ BFSR primarily reflects (i) SEB
AG's modest franchise focused on more-volatile corporate business
in the very competitive German banking market; (ii) its low
profitability and efficiency metrics; (iii) its credit portfolio
largely focused on corporate borrowers, of which a material share
is related to property management; and (iv) its deposit funding,
which is now focused on non-retail.

-- Rationale for the Negative BFSR Outlook

The negative outlook on the BFSR reflects Moody's expectation
that, while the sale of SEB AG's loss-making retail division
(effective from January 2011) will help its profitability in the
longer term, it will take time before the effect of the
restructuring significantly improves its results. Furthermore,
Moody's believes that SEB AG will need to continue to carefully
manage the operational effect of the separation, and in
particular to ensure the continued growth of its retained
corporate banking business.

The rating agency also notes that SEB AG's problem-loan ratio of
1.5% of gross loans at end-September 2011 remains higher than
that related to SEB's Nordic exposures. This reflects SEB AG's
somewhat riskier credit portfolio, which includes over 30% of
property-management sector loans -- although almost half of these
loans represent loans to residential dwellings and housing
companies. Nevertheless, Moody's positively notes that problem
loans have gradually declined over recent years. This is a
function of SEB AG's focus on managing asset quality through its
Special Asset Management department (which handles non-core
exposures), alongside other asset-quality management measures. A
mitigating factor to the relatively high problem loan ratio is
SEB AG's Tier 1 ratio of 11.1% at end-June 2011, which provides a
buffer to withstand potential future losses.

Another factor underpinning the negative outlook is the change in
the deposit mix, which post-transaction is non-retail oriented.
Moody's positively notes that the coverage of loans with deposits
has improved (above 100% at end-June 2011) and that SEB AG's
treasury function is well-integrated into that of the SEB Group.
SEB AG also has access to the German covered bond market; almost
30% of SEB AG's total funding comprised covered bonds at end-June

-- Rationale for the Stable Outlook on the Long-Term Ratings

The stable outlook on the long-term debt and deposit ratings
reflects Moody's view that SEB AG is a strategic part of the SEB
Group and that it will benefit from parental support if needed.
SEB AG's Baa1 long-term ratings incorporate a three-notch uplift
from its Ba1 standalone credit strength, mapped from its D+ BFSR.
The rating uplift reflects several factors:

(i) The rating agency's assessment of a very high probability of
     parental support, based on the close involvement of SEB's
     management, shared-brand association, joint treasury

(ii) The fact that SEB benefits from (i) a deposit guarantee
     issued by SEB to the Bundesverband deutscher Banken; and
     (ii) a control and profit & loss transfer agreement, under
     which SEB has to compensate for any loss (calculated under
     German GAAP) that cannot be covered by reserves.

In addition, Moody's continues to assume a low probability that
systemic support would be provided to SEB AG in the event of a
crisis, due to its limited importance to the German banking

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

A revision to a stable outlook for SEB AG's BFSR could stem from
a successful implementation of the restructuring, which would
materialise in a sustainable rise in profitability as well as
continued improvement in asset quality.

SEB AG's ratings could be negatively affected if (i) any
execution failure in the separation process damages SEB AG's
franchise value or (ii) there is any sign of decreased commitment
or support from its Swedish parent, SEB.

Moody's previous rating action on SEB AG was implemented in July
2010, when the bank's Baa1 debt and deposit ratings and D+ BFSR
were affirmed.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published February 2007, and
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

SEB AG is headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, and reported total
assets of EUR39.4 billion at the end of June 2011.

UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1(hyb)' Preferred Stock Rating
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Unicredit Bank AG's (UCB's) standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of C- (mapping to Baa1 on the long-term scale) and
its A2 long-term/Prime-1 short-term senior debt and deposit

The decision follows Moody's announcement to review for downgrade
the C- BFSR and A2 long-term ratings of UniCredit SpA, UCB's
parent institution (see press release "Moody's reviews for
downgrade UniCredit's A2/C- ratings (Italy)", published earlier).

The ratings for UCB's senior subordinated debt and its hybrid
securities issued by HVB Funding Trust I, II, III, VI and VIII,
were also placed on review for downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has placed on review for downgrade all the
ratings of Unicredit Luxembourg S.A. (UCL), which also follows
the rating action on UniCredit SpA. These include the C- BFSR
(mapping to Baa1 on the long-term scale) -- which is principally
aligned with the BFSR of its German parent UCB -- the Baa1 long-
term debt and deposit ratings and the Prime-2 short-term rating.

Moody's expects to conclude the review of UCB's ratings, once the
rating agency concludes the review of UniCredit SpA's ratings.

Ratings Rationale


Moody's says that the decision to review UCB's and UCL's
standalone ratings for downgrade follows the rating review of the
BFSR and long-term ratings of UniCredit SpA, which was prompted
by the group's weak third-quarter results announced on 14
November 2011.

At the C- level -- mapping to Baa1 on the long-term rating scale
-- UCB's standalone credit rating is at the same level as that of
UniCredit SpA. Although it is not directly affected by many of
the challenges that the Italian parent is facing, UCB's reliance
on group clientele in its corporate and investment banking (CIB)
business as well as the potential for sizeable group wide lending
exposures (if fully drawn), effectively constrains its BFSR at
the level of the group's standalone rating.

The standalone rating of the Luxembourg-based UCL was driven by
the review of UCB's ratings, because its BFSR is aligned with
that of UCB. This is due to UCL's high degree of integration with
UCB and limited strategic and financial autonomy, based on
Moody's approach to rating selected "highly integrated


Moody's says that the review for downgrade of UCB's A2/Prime-1
ratings and UCL's Baa1/Prime-2 debt and deposit ratings is driven
by the review for downgrade of the ratings of their ultimate
parent bank, UniCredit SpA.

Although both banks do not currently benefit from parental
support for their long-term ratings, they may be adversely
affected by a downgrade of UniCredit SpA's -- and subsequently
their own -- BFSRs.


Negative rating pressure could primarily stem from a downgrade of
UniCredit SpA's BFSR. This, in turn, might lead to a downgrade of
UCB's standalone credit profile, given the high interdependence
with the parent institution. Similarly, the long-term debt and
deposit ratings could be downgraded if Moody's considers that the
systemic support available to UCB has weakened further; however,
Moody's considers that this is unlikely to develop in the
foreseeable future.

Downward pressure on the Luxembourg-based UCL's long-term ratings
could stem from a downgrade of UCB's ratings, given the alignment
of UCL's standalone rating with that of UCB.

Currently there is no upward rating pressure on the ratings,
captured by the review for downgrade.


The following ratings of UCB were placed on review for downgrade:

- C- bank financial strength rating mapping to an Baa1 on the
   long-term rating scale;

- A2 long-term senior debt and deposit ratings;

- (P)A2 senior unsecured MTN rating;

- Baa2 senior subordinated debt rating;

- (P)Baa2 senior subordinated MTN rating;

- Baa3(hyb)/Ba1(hyb) preferred stock ratings;

- P-1 short-term debt and deposit ratings.

The following ratings of UCL were placed on review for downgrade:

- C- bank financial strength rating mapping to an Baa1 on the
   long-term rating scale;

- Baa1 long-term debt and deposit ratings;

- P-2 short-term debt and deposit ratings.


The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Says D+ BFSR Unaffected by Review
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
long-term and short-term deposit ratings of UniCredit Bank
Slovakia a.s. (UBS) of Baa1 and Prime-2. The standalone bank
financial strength rating BFSR of D+ (mapping to Ba1 on the long-
term scale) was unaffected.

Ratings Rationale

The review for possible downgrade of UBS's long-term and short-
term deposit ratings of Baa1/Prime-2 follows Moody's recent
announcement on November 16, that it placed on review for
downgrade the ratings of UBS's parent, UniCredit SpA (long-term
debt and deposit ratings of A2 and its standalone bank financial
strength rating of C- mapping to Baa1 on the long-term scale).
Moody's said that, following the review for downgrade on the
parent's ratings, there is a relatively high likelihood that the
assumptions on the parent's capacity and willingness to provide
support could change thus affecting UBS's deposit ratings.

UBS's Baa1 long-term deposit rating incorporates a high
probability of parental support from UniCredit SpA and a high
probability of systemic support in case of need, consequently
UBS's long-term deposit rating receives a three-notch uplift from
its Ba1 standalone credit strength. Moody's assessment of the
high probability of parental support from UniCredit SpA is based
on: (i) the management control of UBS by the parent; (ii) the
bank's strategic fit and association with its ultimate parent;
and (iii) the low likelihood of disposal of UBS by its parent.


An improvement in the bank's standalone BFSR could exert upward
pressure on the bank's deposit ratings. However, in the current
operating environment the opportunity for this appears very
limited. An upgrade of UniCredit SpA could also exert upward
pressure on the bank's deposit ratings; however, this too is
unlikely given the current review for downgrade on the ratings of
UniCredit SpA.


A downgrade of the bank's standalone BFSR could exert downward
pressure on the bank's deposit ratings. A downgrade of UniCredit
and/or of Slovakia could also exert downward pressure on the
bank's deposit ratings.


The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Bratislava, Slovakia, UBS reported total assets
of EUR3.7 billion at June 2011.

* GERMANY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 12 Public-Sector Banks
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the senior
debt and deposit ratings of 12 German public-sector banks
(primarily Landesbanken), closing the review that was initiated
on July 1, 2011. The rating actions reflect Moody's assumption
that there is now a lower likelihood that these banks would
receive external support, if required.

The key drivers behind Moody's reduced support assumptions are

(i) that future government (or systemic) support for German
     public-sector banks has become less certain, partly owing to
     the new bank resolution regime that enables the government
     to impose losses on creditors outside of liquidation; and

(ii) the restrictions on the provision of support, due to strict
     conditions set by the European Commission (EC).

Even after downgrades, the senior ratings of Landesbanken
continue to incorporate support assumptions that are very high
because Landesbanken are ultimately government-owned, either
directly or indirectly. Following the reassessment of support,
assumptions support uplift of two to five notches is now
incorporated in the banks' long-term ratings (from a total of
four to eight previously).

The rating actions do not reflect changes in the standalone
credit assessments of the 12 banks. Rating announcements
pertaining to the standalone credit assessments of the banks were
reported separately during the review period, as appropriate.
Neither are the rating actions linked to the evolving euro-area
sovereign debt crisis. Moody's standalone credit assessments for
German public-sector banks already reflect potential losses on
exposures to stressed euro-area sovereigns, although the rating
agency closely monitors the credit implications of the ongoing
euro-area crisis for these banks.

Moody's had previously commented on the issue of weakening
support in various publications, see "Assessing Post-Crisis
Support for German Banks", April 15, 2010, "German Bank
Restructuring Act Shapes Post-Crisis Regulation, But Is Negative
for Debtholders", December 6, 2010, "German Landesbanken: Moody's
to Reassess Support Assumptions", 10 May 2011, "Moody's reviews
ratings of German Landesbanken", July 1, 2011.

In summary, Moody's has:

-- Confirmed the ratings of one bank, Landesbank Berlin AG (LBB,
   at the A1 level);

-- Downgraded by one notch the rating for one bank, DekaBank
   Deutsche Girozentrale (DekaBank, to Aa3 from Aa2);

-- Downgraded by two notches the ratings for three banks,
   Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen GZ (Helaba, to A1 from Aa2),
   Landesbank Saar (SaarLB, to A3 from A1) and HSH Nordbank AG
   (HSH, to Baa2 from A3);

-- Downgraded by three notches the ratings for six banks,
   Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB, to Baa1 from A1), Deutsche
   Hypothekenbank AG (Deutsche Hypo, to Baa1 from A1), Landesbank
   Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW, to A2 from Aa2), Norddeutsche
   Landesbank GZ (NORD/LB, to A2 from Aa2), Norddeutsche
   Landesbank Luxembourg S.A. (NLBL, to A3 from Aa3) and Bremer
   Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg GZ (BremerLB, to A2 from

-- Extended the review, direction uncertain, of the ratings of
   one bank, WestLB AG (WestLB, at the A3 level).

Moody's has also downgraded to Prime-2 the ratings for six banks,
namely BayernLB, Deutsche Hypo, HSH, NLBL, SaarLB, and WestLB.
The Prime-1 short-term ratings of the other banks were
unaffected. The agency also downgraded selected subordinated debt
and hybrid instruments as listed in the separate attachment.

Ratings Rationale

-- Reduced political will to support future bank bailouts:

Government (or systemic) support for German public-sector banks
has become less certain, partly owing to the new bank resolution
regime that enables the government to impose losses on creditors
outside of liquidation. Support factored into the ratings of
German banks rose to exceptionally high levels during the
prolonged period of market disruption, consistent with the
extraordinary actions taken by authorities to support banks. With
authorities now taking steps that reduce the probability,
predictability and likely extent of future support, Moody's has
removed some of this extraordinary support, which it always
considered temporary.

-- Restrictions to support due to strict EC conditions:

The European Commission, whose approval for some forms of support
is required under EU state aid regulations, has set strict
conditions that constrain the ability of governments (including
regional and local governments) to support banks. This has become
an obstacle for some Landesbanken to obtain support, particularly
for those banks that required support more than once.


Moody's view that German public-sector banks continue to benefit
from a very high probability of external support is driven by two
important factors:

(i) Systemic importance of German public-sector banks: The
Landesbanken, their subsidiaries and DekaBank belong to the
broader public-sector banking group, which accounts for more than
one third of total lending and deposits in the German system; the
public-sector banks are thus a cornerstone of Germany's financial
system and its economy.

(ii) Direct and indirect government influence: Ownership and
control of German public-sector banks relates ultimately to
government entities. The government's influence underpins a high
probability of support.

The long-term debt ratings for 11 of the banks affected by the
actions are now positioned two to five notches above their
standalone credit assessments (except for WestLB's ratings, which
benefit from eight notches of support-driven uplift, but remain
under review, direction uncertain).


During the crisis, support providers did not act alone, but
rather "in concert". Support was generally coordinated among
savings banks, German federal states and, in some cases, the
central government. The actual burden sharing of individual
support packages was subject to internal, multilateral
negotiations. Previously it was assumed that support would be
offered largely independently by the multiple sources of support
available to Landesbanken, namely parental, cooperative, regional
and local government (RLG), and systemic support. To reflect this
change, going forward, Moody's analyses external support for
German Landesbanken in a unified way, rather than sequentially.

The revised approach to assessing external support for
Landesbanken is consistent with Moody's joint default analysis
(JDA) and has not affected the outcome of the ratings review.
Broadly speaking, the Landesbanken fall into two groups.

(i) Landesbanken likely to benefit directly from multiple support

Most Landesbanken groups will likely receive support directly
from multiple sources, if needed. The group includes Helaba
(long-term rating A1, standalone credit assessment C-/Baa2,
support-driven rating uplift four notches ), LBBW (A2, D+/Baa3,
support-driven rating uplift four notches), NORD/LB (A2, D+/Baa3,
support-driven rating uplift four notches), SaarLB (A3, D/Ba2,
support-driven rating uplift five notches), BayernLB (Baa1, D-
/Ba3, support-driven rating uplift five notches), HSH (Baa2,
E+/B1, support-driven rating uplift five notches) and WestLB (A3,
E+/B2, ratings under review -- direction uncertain, support-
driven rating uplift eight notches).

(ii) Landesbanken likely to benefit indirectly from multiple
support sources, through the owners:

This smaller group, which comprises the banks wholly-owned by
savings banks (LBB and DekaBank) and the rated NORD/LB
subsidiaries, also benefits from multiple support sources.
Moody's expects that cooperative, RLG and systemic support would
be provided primarily through their owners, indirectly benefiting
the entities in this group.

The group includes DekaBank (long-term rating Aa3, standalone
credit assessment C/A3, three notches of support uplift), LBB
(A1, D+/Baa3, support-driven rating uplift five notches),
BremerLB (A2, C-/Baa1, support-driven rating uplift two notches),
NLBL (A3, D+/Baa3, support-driven rating uplift three notches)
and Deutsche Hypo (Baa1, D/Ba2, support-driven rating uplift four


WestLB (A3, E+/B2, support-driven rating uplift eight notches) is
an exception, as its ratings remain on review, direction
uncertain. The bank's evolving break-up and planned unwinding may
entail the sale of divisions to third parties and / or transfer
into a yet to be established servicer bank (Verbundbank) for
savings banks before remaining assets and liabilities are
transferred to the bank's dedicated wind-down vehicle, EAA Erste
Abwicklungsanstalt (rated Aa1 stable). The extended review will
focus on (i) the outcome of the EC's pending state-aid ruling;
and (ii) further clarity on the breakup and distribution of
existing liabilities. The agency notes that the transition risk
for WestLB's ratings, in either direction, remains high.


The downgrades of the short-term ratings for six banks from
Prime-1 to Prime-2 follow Moody's approach of positioning the
short-term ratings for banks with long-term debt ratings of A3 or
lower outside of Prime-1, whenever these long-term ratings
strongly rely on support-driven uplift (rather than a banks'
standalone credit profile).

In line with Moody's hybrid bank rating methodology, the ratings
for subordinated instruments of Landesbanken are based on their
adjusted baseline credit assessments, which in most cases
incorporate two notches of support. The outlooks assigned to
subordinated debt and hybrid ratings that are notched off the
adjusted baseline credit assessment follow the outlooks on the
respective standalone credit assessments.


All of the ratings are subject to changes of these banks'
standalone financial strength ratings. Debt ratings that continue
to benefit from very high support remain sensitive to any further
changes in Moody's support assumptions.


The methodologies used in these rating actions were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities
and Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.


K+K BAU-PROFIL: Creditors File HUF4.5 Billion in Claims
MTI-Econews reports that Ferenc Somogyi of TM-Line Liquidation
and Economic Consultation Kft, liquidator of K+K Bau-Profil, said
creditors have lodged HUF4.5 billion in claims against the

K+K Bau-Profil underwent mandatory liquidation in September,
MTI-Econews recounts.

According to MTI, Mr. Somogyi said that the company submitted
records indicating it has HUF2 billion in assets, adding that
much of these are outstanding debt whose collection is

K+K Bau-Profil is a Zalaegerszeg-based construction company.


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: To Start Repaying Priority Creditors
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that the
Landsbanki Islands hf winding-up and resolution committees said
they are preparing to start interim payments of US$11 billion
owed to priority creditors of the failed Icelandic lender.

"Preparations for interim distributions are well underway,"
Bloomberg quotes the committees as saying in a statement on the
lender's Web site.  The statement said that the first payment
will be made in a basket of the main currencies held by the bank
such as euros, pounds, U.S. dollars and Icelandic kronur,
Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates that the committees said the bank had
recoveries estimated at ISK1.35 trillion (US$11.5 billion) as of
Sept. 30, exceeding the total ISK1.32 trillion book value of
priority claims, calculated at exchange rates as of April 22,
2009.  The bank had the equivalent of ISK510 billion in cash at
the end of last quarter, or about 37% of priority claims,
Bloomberg discloses.

                    About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Iceland Foods Auction Stalls
Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that the auction of
Iceland Foods, the frozen food retailer, is facing unexpected
delays, with second-round bids now not expected to be lodged
until the new year.

Work on second-round bids for Iceland Foods -- put on the block
in May by its majority Icelandic owners with a price tag of about
GBP1.5 billion (US$2.4 billion) with a sale anticipated before
Christmas -- is expected to begin shortly, the FT discloses.
According to the FT, several people familiar with the situation
said that second-round offers are not likely to be submitted
until mid-January.

"We are not in a hurry.  We are making good progress and will run
the process in a way that optimizes the most value.  We
anticipate that, with the oncoming busy Christmas period, bids
will likely be expected early next year," the FT quotes
Landsbanki, the failed Icelandic bank that owns 67% of Iceland
Foods, as saying.

It had been expected that second-round bids -- from trade and
private equity buyers -- would be lodged with UBS and Bank of
America Merrill Lynch about the middle of next month, the FT

The delay has been caused in part by discussions with Malcolm
Walker, founder and chief executive of Iceland, and a minority
shareholder in the supermarket chain, about the information to be
disclosed to potential bidders, the FT states.  This is now
believed to have been resolved, according to the FT.

It means the auction of the value supermarket will stretch into
next year, and will be ongoing over the crucial Christmas trading
period, the FT says.

                    About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


IRISH LIFE: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on EUR200MM Notes on Watch Dev.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services reviewed its 'BBB-' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Irish-based insurer Irish Life Assurance PLC (ILA) and chose to
keep them on CreditWatch with developing implications. "We also
kept the 'BB' rating on the EUR200 million junior subordinated
notes on CreditWatch developing," S&P said.

"We originally placed the ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications on Nov. 26, 2010. We lowered the ratings to 'BBB-'
from 'BBB' on Feb. 2, 2011, and kept them on CreditWatch
negative. The CreditWatch was revised to developing on April 5,
2011," S&P said.

"We are retaining the CreditWatch placement because, in our view,
there are significant uncertainties regarding how the separation
of the insurer from the bank will unfold, and about the future
ownership structure of Irish Life," S&P said.

"Earlier in the year, the Central Bank of Ireland ran stress
tests for the Irish banking sector, which indicated that ILA's
banking parent Irish Life & Permanent PLC (ILP; BB/Negative/B)
required EUR4 billion in additional capital. Therefore, on March
31, 2011, ILP announced that it would sell ILA. As a result, we
revised our CreditWatch placement for ILA," S&P said.

"ILP continues to pursue the planned disposal of ILA through
either a trade sale or an IPO, although we view an IPO as
difficult in the current market environment. The Memorandum of
Understanding between the Irish state, the International Monetary
Fund, and the EU required ILP to have commenced the sale of ILA
by October 2011. Although the timetable has been somewhat
delayed, we understand the company is making progress in its
planned separation," S&P said.

"In our opinion, a successful separation of ILA from ILP is
likely to significantly reduce ILA's risks and exposures relating
to its weaker banking parent. The 'BBB-' long-term rating on ILA
is two notches below its 'bbb+' stand-alone credit profile
(SACP), reflecting risks relating to its parent bank, whose
rating is 'BB'," S&P related.

On June 30, 2011, the reported embedded value of ILP's life and
fund management business was EUR1.6 billion.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the ongoing uncertainty about
how the separation of ILA from ILP will unfold.  The future
ownership structure of ILA is particularly unclear; if a trade
sale occurs, the creditworthiness of the purchaser would affect
the rating on ILA.

"We could consider raising the rating by up to two notches to
'BBB+' if ILA successfully separates from ILP through an IPO or
trade sale to a highly-rated group, and has limited exposure to
its former parent," S&P said.

Such an upgrade would also depend on ILA's financial profile
remaining consistent with its current SACP. Failure to complete
the planned separation, or a trade sale to a lower rated group,
could result in the ratings being lowered.

"We intend to update the CreditWatch placement before the end of
the year," S&P said.


BANCASAI SPA: S&P Puts 'BB/B' Counterparty Ratings on Watch Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based BancaSai
SpA on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the lowering to 'BB+' and
placing on CreditWatch Negative of the ratings on BancaSai's
parent, Italian composite insurer Fondiaria-SAI SpA (BB+/Watch
Neg/--; see 'Italian Insurer Fondiaria-SAI And Core Subsidiary
Downgraded To 'BB+' On Increased Losses; On CreditWatch
Negative,' published Nov. 15, 2011, on RatingsDirect on the
Global Credit Portal).

"According to our group rating methodology and following
Fondiaria-SAI's new strategy to refocus its group activities,
including BancaSai, we do not consider BancaSai to be
strategically important to its parent. That said, we incorporate
a one-notch uplift in our ratings on BancaSai for extraordinary
support from Fondiaria-SAI, because the majority of BancaSai's
funding derives from its parent's activity. We nevertheless cap
our ratings on BancaSai at one notch below those on its parent.
For this reason, a further change in the ratings on Fondiaria-SAI
would prompt a similar rating action on BancaSai," S&P said.

In addition, further deterioration in Fondiaria-SAI's financial
or business profiles could result in a deterioration of
BancaSai's creditworthiness, as its activities are mainly
centered on the parent.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch on BancaSai over the coming
weeks, based on the resolution of our CreditWatch on the parent.
A change in the ratings on Fondiaria-SAI would prompt a similar
rating action on BancaSai," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch status on Fondiaria-SAI reflects our view of the
group's increasingly constrained capital adequacy and solvency
position, owing to material losses and the current highly
volatile capital markets. It also reflects our view that the
current environment may impair management's ability to implement
actions to restore the group's solvency," S&P said.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placement following further
discussions with Fondiaria-SAI's management over the coming
weeks, in order to assess the likelihood of a recovery in the
group's capitalization and solvency position in light of the
current environment," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings on Fondiaria-SAI by up to three
notches if we think it unlikely that the group will be able to
improve its capital base, or if its capitalization were to
deteriorate further," S&P said.

"Conversely, we could affirm the ratings at their current level
if management were to successfully implement measures that result
in a sustained recovery of the group's capitalization," S&P said.


ATF BANK: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Ratings for Possible Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade ATF
Bank's Ba3 long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings,
Ba3 foreign-currency senior unsecured and B2 foreign-currency
junior subordinated debt ratings. The bank's E+ bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) -- which maps to B3 on the long-term
rating scale is unaffected by this and continues to have a stable

Ratings Rationale

The decision to review the bank's ratings for possible downgrade
is triggered by the review for possible downgrade of UniCredit's
ratings, initiated by Moody's on November 16, 2011. Unicredit is
ATF Bank's ultimate parent. Moody's currently incorporates
moderate parental support probability in ATF Bank's deposit and
debt ratings, which results in three-notches of rating uplift
from the bank's standalone credit strength of B3. In the process
of the review, the rating agency said that it will consider the
effect of a possible downgrade of UniCredit's ratings on ATF
Bank's ratings.


Currently there is no upward rating pressure as expressed by the
review for downgrade.

Negative rating pressure could primarily stem from a downgrade of
Unicredit SpA's BFSR, in turn leading to a downgrade of ATF
Bank's long-term debt and deposit ratings.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, ATF Bank reported total
assets of US$6.57 billion and total capital of US$239 million, in
accordance with its audited IFRS financial statements at year-end


MARCO POLO SEATRADE: Gets Final OK to Obtain US$5-Mil. RBS Loan
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
authorized, on a final basis, Marco Polo Seatrade B.V., et al.:

  a. to borrow up to US$4,800,000 in principal amount, on a
     final basis, of postpetition financing, guaranteed by
     Seaarland Shipping Management B.V., Magellano Marine C.V.
     and Cargoship Maritime B.V.;

  b. to execute and deliver any necessary documents, to perform
     other and further acts as may be necessary or appropriate in
     connection therewith, and to grant the liens and security
     interests to The Royal Bank of Scotland plc;

  c. to grant certain priming liens and superpriority claims to
     the DIP Lender to secure the Debtors' obligations under the
     DIP Agreement; and

  d. to require repayment of the DIP Facility in full upon an
     event triggering the Stated Maturity Date in accordance with
     the DIP Agreement.

The Debtors are also authorized to exceed the permitted variance
of 15% from the Budget with respect to Credit Agricole Budget

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Oct 3, 2011, RBS
is owed US$117.7 million secured by three of Seaarland's six
vessels.  The other three are collateral for Credit Agricole
Corporate & Investment Bank, owed US$89.7 million.

The TCR reported that the financing requires Seaarland to file a
Chapter 11 plan acceptable to RBS.  Before the financing
agreement and the company's commitment to devise a plan
acceptable to the bank, RBS had a motion on file seeking
dismissal of the Chapter 11 case on the theory Seaarland has
insufficient ties to the U.S.

The Court also ordered that no proceeds of the DIP Facility may
be used for the payment of the fees and expenses of any person
incurred in challenging, or in relation to the challenge of, any
of the DIP lender's, or RBS' liens or claims, or the initiation
or prosecution of any claim or action against the DIP Lender or

The Debtors will grant adequate protection liens as:

   a) The Credit Agricole Lenders are granted replacement
      security interests and liens in and upon the Credit
      Agricole Collateral; provided that with respect to cash
      collateral of the Credit Agricole Lenders; and

   b) The RBS Lenders are granted additional and replacement
      security interests and liens in and upon the RBS
      Collateral; provided that with respect to cash collateral
      of the RBS Lenders, RBS adequate protection liens will only
      be granted to the extent the RBS Lenders would have been
      entitled to a  security interest or right of setoff in such
      cash collateral under the RBS Loan Agreement or applicable
      law.  The RBS adequate protection liens will be subject and
      subordinate only to the senior adequate protection liens.

A full-text copy of the DIP Loan final order is available for
free at:

                       About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing
commercial and technical vessel management services to third
parties.  Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the
name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate
headquarters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets
consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in
international trade, and call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million
on July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the
two other vessels.

The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.  Evan D. Flaschen,
Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J. Schoulder, Esq., at
Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as the Debtors' bankruptcy
counsel.  Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC serves as notice and
claims agent.

The petition noted that the Debtors' assets and debt are both
more than US$100 million and less than US$500 million.

Tracy Hope Davis, United States Trustee for Region 2, appointed
three members to serve on the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors.  The Committee has retained Blank Rome LLP as its

Secured lender Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank is
represented by Alfred E. Yudes, Jr., Esq., and Jane Freeberg
Sarma, Esq., at Watson, Farley & Williams (New York) LLP.

NXP BV: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to US$606MM Senior Secured Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' issue rating
to the US$606 million senior secured floating-rate notes (FRNs)
due November 2016 and the proposed US$500 million incremental
senior secured term loan (Tranche A2) due April 2017, to be
issued by Dutch semiconductor manufacturer NXP B.V.
(B+/Stable/--) and its subsidiary NXP Funding LLC (together,

"The issue ratings are in line with the corporate credit rating
on NXP B.V. We have also assigned a recovery rating of '4' to the
aforementioned debt instruments, indicating our expectation of
average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P said.

"The ratings on the proposed term loan are subject to our
satisfactory review of the final documentation," S&P said.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B+' issue rating on NXP's
senior secured debt facilities, comprising the outstanding part
of the euro-denominated callable notes and the dollar-denominated
callable notes due October 2013 (about EUR71 million and US$133
million expected to be outstanding post-transaction), the 9.75%
notes due August 2018, and the US$500 million senior secured term
loan due April 2017. The recovery rating on these debt
instruments is unchanged at '4', indicating our expectation of
average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P said.

"We also affirmed our 'BB' issue rating on NXP's super senior
debt. The '1' recovery rating on this debt remains unchanged,
reflecting our expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for
debt holders in the event of a payment default. In addition, we
affirmed our 'B-' issue rating on NXP's senior unsecured debt.
The '5' recovery rating on this debt remains unchanged,
reflecting our expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery for
debtholders in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"We understand that NXP will use the proceeds of the proposed
notes issuance and incremental term loan to refinance a part of
its euro- and U.S. dollar-denominated FRNs maturing in October
2013," S&P said.

The FRNs due 2016 are senior secured obligations and will benefit
from the same terms and conditions as the existing FRNs.

                        Recovery Analysis

"Recovery prospects for the proposed notes and loan are supported
by our expectation that, in a default, NXP would be reorganized
rather than liquidated, as we believe that the company would
still retain intellectual property and customer relationships
sufficient for a sustainable business model. Nevertheless,
recovery prospects for the secured and unsecured debt instruments
are constrained by our view of the relatively weak security and
guarantee package, which excludes NXP subsidiary Systems on
Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC). Recovery prospects
are also constrained by the covenant-lite documentation, as well
as the potential for material volatility in profitability and
valuation," S&P said.

"In order to determine recoveries, we simulate a default. Under
our hypothetical default scenario, we envisage, among other
things, declining revenues as a result of a significant
macroeconomic slowdown in 2014 and 2015, a significant drop in
operating margins, and meaningful capital expenditure and
research and development commitments," S&P said.

"The scenario assumes that NXP is not able to refinance its
significant debt maturities in 2015 (previously 2013), with
EBITDA declining to about US$440 million. We changed the year of
default in our scenario to 2015 primarily because we believe that
the proposed transaction would significantly ease NXP's current
debt maturity profile and that the company would be able to repay
the remaining moderate debt maturities in 2013 (including, among
others, about US$260 million of super priority notes) with cash
on hand and free cash flow generation. We also assume that the
EUR458 million forward-start facility due 2015 would be
outstanding and fully drawn at our simulated point of default,"
S&P said.

"We estimate the stressed enterprise value at the point of
default (assuming proportionate consolidation of SSMC to be
approximately US$2.5 billion, based on a combination of market-
multiple and discounted cash flow approaches. We value the core
NXP business, other non-guarantors, and NXP's stake in SSMC
separately when determining the overall value of the group. We
assign a stressed enterprise value to SSMC at a higher multiple
than we do to the remaining NXP operations because of SSMC's
better profitability," S&P said.

"With secured claims limited by gaps in the security package, we
assume that a portion of the enterprise value would likely become
available for all creditors to share, including the unsecured
note holders," S&P said.

"After taking these factors into account and deducting the costs
of enforcement and other priority liabilities of about US$270
million, we arrive at a net enterprise value of about US$2.2
billion. We assume that NXP would have repaid its super senior
debt by our simulated point of default," S&P said.

"With about US$2.6 billion outstanding at default for senior
secured debtholders, we see recovery within the 30%-50% range,
translating into a recovery rating of '4' on the senior secured
debt instruments," S&P said.

On the assumption that the portion of the enterprise value not
captured by the security package (mainly consisting of the 61.2%
stake in SSMC) would be shared among all creditors in the event
of default, we expect recoveries for unsecured noteholders (about
US$820 million) to be in the 10%-30% range, translating to a
recovery rating of '5'.

Ratings List

New Ratings

NXP Funding LLC
Senior Secured
  US$606.2 mil fltg rate nts            B+
   due 11/15/2016
   Recovery Rating                      4
  US$500 mil bank ln due 03/04/2017     B+
   Recovery Rating                      4

Ratings Affirmed

NXP Funding LLC
Senior Secured
  US$1 bil 9.75% bnds due 08/01/2018    B+
   Recovery Rating                      4
  EUR500 mil sr secd revolving credit   BB
  fac due 09/2012 bank ln
   Recovery Rating                      1
  US $131.28 mil 10.% bnds               BB
  due 07/15/2013
   Recovery Rating                      1
  US $1.004 bil 7.875% callable nts      B+
  due 10/15/2014
   Recovery Rating                      4
  US $1.535 bil callable nts             B+
  due 10/15/2013
   Recovery Rating                      4
  EUR1 bil 7.326% callable nts          B+
  due 10/15/2013
   Recovery Rating                      4
  EUR458 mil fltg rate forward start    BB
  facility bank ln due 09/28/2015
   Recovery Rating                      1
  EUR28.641 mil 10.% nts                BB
  due 07/15/2013
   Recovery Rating                      1
  US$89.896 mil 10.% nts                BB
  due 07/15/2013
   Recovery Rating                      1
  US$500 mil fltg rate bank ln          B+
  due 03/04/2017
   Recovery Rating                      4
Senior Unsecured
  EUR458 mil 8.625% callable bnds       B
  due 10/15/2015
   Recovery Rating                      5
  US$1.25 bil 9.5% callable bnds        B
  due 10/15/2015
   Recovery Rating                      5

STORM 2010-III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Storm 2010-III B.V.'s class B and D notes. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on STORM 2010-III's class A1, A2, and C
notes and on STORM 2010-II B.V.'s class A, B, C, and D notes,"
S&P related.

"The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow analyses of
the most recent transaction information that we have received,"
S&P said.

"Our credit analyses incorporate our standard Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria (see 'Dutch RMBS
Market Overview and Criteria,' published on Dec. 16, 2005)," S&P

"We also incorporate credit stability as an important factor in
our rating opinions. We consider whether we believe that an
issuer or security has a high likelihood of experiencing
unusually large adverse changes in credit quality under
conditions of moderate stress (see 'Methodology: Credit Stability
Criteria,' published on May 3, 2010)," S&P related.

"For Dutch RMBS transactions, we adjust our weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) by applying a 5% decrease in house prices and
giving full credit to the reported Dutch house price index (HPI).
If there has been an upward trend in arrears, we adjust our
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) by projecting
arrears based on historical data," S&P related.

"We have not projected arrears for STORM 2010-II or STORM 2010-
III, as total arrears are low and falling," S&P said.

"A portion of the mortgage receivables in both pools are entitled
to receive further advances until 2015. As per the further
advance criteria set out in the transaction documentation,
further advances may only be purchased if the product of our WAFF
and WALS (credit coverage) following the purchase, does not
exceed the credit coverage we calculated at closing plus 0.25%,"
S&P said.

"Our WAFF and WALS for both transactions have decreased since
closing due to increased seasoning and a decrease in the
calculated weighted-average loan-to-foreclosure value (WALTFV).
As the resulting credit coverage is lower than the calculated
credit coverage at closing plus 0.25%, we have used the closing
WAFF and WALS estimates plus 0.25% in our cash flow analyses,
given the conditions for further advances," S&P said.

The credit enhancement for each rating level has increased since
closing for both transactions due to deleveraging and the reserve
fund being topped up to its target level via excess spread.

"For STORM 2010-II, all classes of notes pass our cash flow
stresses at their current rating levels. We have therefore
affirmed our ratings on the class A, B, C, and D notes," S&P

"For STORM 2010-III, the class B and D notes pass our cash flow
stresses at higher rating levels than currently assigned. We have
therefore raised our ratings on the class B and D notes. The
class A1, A2, and C notes can maintain their current ratings
under our cash flow stresses. We have therefore affirmed our
ratings on the class A1, A2, and C notes," S&P said.

STORM 2010-II and STORM 2010-III are backed by Dutch residential
mortgages originated by Obvion N.V.

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                  From

STORM 2010-II B.V.
EUR1.01 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A           AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)

EUR909 Million Mortgage-Backed Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AA+ (sf)            AA- (sf)
D           BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A1          AAA (sf)
A2          AAA (sf)
C           A (sf)


PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: Moody's Rates US$300-Mil. Notes at 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba2 rating to
the US$300 million senior notes due 2018 issued by Petroleum Geo-
Services ASA, following receipt of final documentation.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on November 7, 2011. Moody's
rating rationale was set out in a press release issued on that

The final terms of the notes are in line with the drafts reviewed
for the provisional (P)Ba2 instrument rating assignment.

The principal methodology used in rating Petroleum Geo-Services
ASA was the Global Oilfield Services Rating Methodology published
in December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Petroleum Geo-Services ASA is a technologically leading oilfield
services company specializing in reservoir and geophysical
services, including seismic data acquisition, processing and
interpretation, and field evaluation. PGS maintains an extensive
multi-client seismic data library. On a twelve-months basis
(ending on September 30, 2011), PGS reported revenues of
US$1.27 billion.


NOMOS BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Foreign Currency Deposit Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 long-term foreign
currency deposit and the Ba3 local and foreign currency senior
unsecured debt ratings of NOMOS Bank. The standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of D-, the Not Prime short-term
foreign currency bank deposit rating and B1 foreign currency
subordinated debt rating were also affirmed. Concurrently,
Moody's has assigned Ba3 long-term and Not Prime short-term local
currency deposit ratings to NOMOS Bank. All ratings carry a
stable outlook.

Moody's said the rating action is based on NOMOS Bank's audited
financial statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, and its H1
2011 unaudited results prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale

"The affirmation of NOMOS Bank's ratings reflects the bank's
currently sound financial fundamentals and strengthened franchise
following the acquisition (in December 2010) of the controlling
stake in Bank of Khanty-Mansiysk (BKhM, Ba3/E+, stable outlook),"
says Semyon Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President and lead
analyst for the bank. "At the same time, historically high
single-name concentration in the loan book together with, in
Moody's view, risky credit policy and an appetite for related-
party lending exerts downward pressure on the bank's ratings
which, together with an excessive reliance on the market sources
for funding, continue to constrain NOMOS Bank's standalone
ratings at Ba3/D-," adds Mr. Isakov.

Moody's also notes that NOMOS Bank's diversification into the SME
and retail segments may positively impact NOMOS Bank's standalone
financial strength if the contribution of these segments to the
bank's earnings were to meaningfully increase. However, is it not
yet clear whether the diversification strategy announced by the
bank will be successfully implemented.

In the first six months of 2011 (NOMOS Bank's H1 2011 IFRS
results consolidate BKhM), the bank restored sound financial
performance that had been eroded by inflated loan loss
provisioning charges in the period in 2008-2010. As of end-June
2011, the level of problem loans declined to 2.74% compared to
4.49% in 2010 and 8.03% in 2009 (partly due to problem loan
write-offs, acquisitions and organic growth), whereby Return on
Assets improved to 2.16% aided by the healthy net interest
margin, sound operating efficiency and a relatively low (for
Russia) level of loan loss charges that dropped to 82 basis
points (of the gross loan book, annualised) in the first six
months of 2011.

In addition, Moody's considers that the acquisition of the
controlling stake in BKhM positively affected NOMOS Bank's
franchise, enabling the latter to secure a solid position on the
local market of Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug (Region). The
acquisition, that was bolstered by a RUB5.5 billion capital
injection received from the IPO of NOMOS Bank's shares on the
London and Moscow stock exchanges in April 2011, also enabled
NOMOS Bank to diversify its funding base in terms of segment
(given a high share of retail deposits in BKhM's total funding),
both by geography and by single-name.

Given the above-mentioned considerations, Moody's notes the key
drivers constraining NOMOS Bank's ratings are (i) historically
high single-name credit risk concentrations whereby the 20
largest credit exposures exceed 200% of the Tier 1 capital; and
(ii) risky credit policy whereby the largest portion of loans are
originated in order to finance the following: acquisition of
equity securities; project finance deals, and real estate and
construction companies. In addition, Moody's considers that there
is the risk that the level of related-party loans, which puts
pressure on the bank's capital, may not be fully captured by the
IFRS accounts that -- as of end-June 2011 -- indicated exposure
to related-party loans of 34% if compared with the bank's Tier 1
capital (YE2010: 48%; YE2009: 12%). The bank's ratings are also
constrained by an excessive reliance on market sources for
funding. As at end-June 2011, the loan-to-deposits ratio was 122%
while over 25% of the bank's total funding was attracted from the
market ('due to banks', bond issuance and promissory notes).

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, NOMOS Bank reported total assets
of RUB572 billion (US$20.4 billion) under IFRS (unaudited) as of
end-June YE2011, up 7.9% compared to YE2010. The bank's net
profit totalled RUB6.2 million (US$220 million) in the first six
months of 2011, a 66% increase compared to the same period in

NOTA-BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Deposit Ratings to Pos.
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on B3 local and foreign currency deposit ratings and
senior unsecured local currency debt rating of NOTA-Bank. At the
same time, the rating agency affirmed NOTA-Bank's standalone E+
bank financial strength rating (BFSR) with stable outlook. The
bank's Not Prime short-term deposit ratings were also affirmed.

Moody's revision of the outlook on NOTA-Bank's deposit and debt
ratings is primarily based on the bank's audited financial
statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, as well as its unaudited
financial statements for 3Q 2011 prepared under Russian statutory
accounting standards (RAS).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the revision of its outlook on NOTA-Bank's
ratings reflects the bank's growing franchise, supported by
periodic capital injections from the bank's shareholders. In
2010, NOTA-Bank's total assets doubled to RUB30.6 billion (from
RUB15.6 billion), and its total equity increased to RUB2.7
billion compared to RUB1.6 billion a year earlier. In 2011, the
continuing expansion of NOTA-Bank's loan portfolio was
accompanied by further capital increase stemming both from strong
internal capital generation and shareholders' support. In 2H
2011, NOTA-Bank's owners contributed a total of RUB470 million to
the bank's subordinated loans, and have also proposed a Tier 1
capital injection amounting to RUB450 million, which is expected
to be completed by year-end 2011.

Another factor contributing to Moody's rating action is NOTA-
Bank's historically robust profitability: the bank reported net
IFRS income of RUB530 million for 2010 due to the healthy net
interest margin of 6.8% (which, in turn, was supported by low
cost of funding attracted from corporate depositors) and a solid
fee and commission component. For 2011, the rating agency expects
the bank to again report strong profitability metrics, despite
some increase in administrative expense associated with business
expansion and higher staff costs.

NOTA-Bank's asset quality trends also look favorable as compared
to the majority of peer banks. The bank's loan book is dominated
by construction companies serving large industrial corporations,
trading companies including those focused on international
business, manufacturing companies (including state-controlled)
and their suppliers, pharmaceutical companies. Moody's observes
that this borrower segment was able to maintain the business
scope and sustainable financial positions even during the most
challenging periods of the global financial crisis.

According to NOTA-Bank's 2010 IFRS, loans exhibiting indicators
of impairment accounted for 5.8% of the bank's gross loans, and
85% of these loans were not overdue as of the same reporting
date. Against this background, the loan loss reserve of 6.5% of
the total gross loan book as of the same reporting date appears
to be sufficient. To date, no notable asset quality deterioration
has been revealed in the 2011 operations. Although Moody's does
not rule out the prospect that further loan loss provisions will
be warranted as the rapidly augmented loan book starts to season,
an important mitigating factor is that the bank is primarily
expanding its activities within the already tested client segment
which demonstrates a proven ability to properly serve the
indebtedness. The rating agency derives additional comfort from
the fact that NOTA-Bank has historically shown no significant
credit exposure to related parties, as the shareholders' other
businesses are generally more sizeable and are being served by
larger financial institutions.

Moody's further explains that NOTA-Bank's E+ BFSR and B3 deposit
and debt ratings continue to be constrained by (i) the bank's
still modest market franchise, whereby the bank ranked just 96th
in Russia by total assets as of October 1, 2011, according to
Interfax, and (ii) the still relatively high concentrations in
its loan portfolio and customer funding base (as of year-end
2010, the bank's top 20 credit exposures accounted for 40% of its
total gross loans and 193% of Tier 1 capital, whereas its top 10
client accounts comprised 44% of total customer funds as of the
same reporting date).

According to Moody's, NOTA-Bank's B3 deposit and debt ratings may
be upgraded if the bank demonstrates the positive trends for
further business expansion and diversification on a more
prolonged period of time, while also maintaining sustainable
strong financial fundamentals, in particular profitability,
liquidity and asset quality.

NOTA-Bank's deposit and debt ratings are based solely on the
bank's B3 standalone credit strength and do not incorporate any
external support to the bank, in case of need.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, NOTA-Bank reported -- at year-end
2010 -- total consolidated assets of US$1.0 billion and total
equity of US$88.6 million under audited IFRS. In the same
reporting period, the bank posted net IFRS profits of US$17.4

SVIAZ-BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Long-term Deposit Ratings
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of Sviaz-
Bank: B1 long-term and Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings, and standalone E+ Bank Financial
Strength Rating (BFSR). Prior to this withdrawal, Sviaz-Bank's
BFSR mapped to B2 on the long-term scale and carried a stable
outlook, and the long-term deposit ratings carried a positive

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The rating withdrawal does not reflect a change in the bank's
creditworthiness. Sviaz-Bank had no outstanding debt rated by
Moody's at the time of the withdrawal.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Sviaz-Bank reported total assets
of US$5.9 billion at H1 2011, according to reviewed IFRS.


IM BES: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating to EUR242.5MM Serie B Note
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these definitive ratings
to the debt issued by IM BES EMPRESAS 1, Fondo de Titulización de

   -- EUR242.5M Serie A Note, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR242.5M Serie B Note, Assigned Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

IM BES EMPRESAS 1, FTA is a securitization of loans and leasing
contracts granted by Banco Espirito Santo's (BES, Ba2 Negative
Outlook/NP) branch in Spain to micro, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SME) and corporate entities. BES is acting as
Servicer of the loans while Intermoney Titulizacion S.G.F.T.,
S.A. (Intermoney) is the Management Company ("Gestora").
Additionally, Finsolutia - Consultoria e Gestao de Creditos, S.A.
(Finsolutia) will be appointed as back-up servicer (BUS).

As of October 2011, the provisional pool amount was EUR577.1M and
consisted of 1,281 contracts linked to 900 obligors (807 names if
considering corporate groups) located in Spain. While most of the
portfolio consisted of standard loans, 13.3% of the pool volume
are leasing contracts. The assets were originated between 1997
and 2011 (90.2% between 2006 and 2010), and have a weighted
average seasoning of 3.4 years and a weighted average remaining
term of 8.8 years. Around 57.7% of the portfolio volume is
secured by mortgage guarantees over different types of
properties. Geographically, obligors are located mostly in Madrid
(38.9% of the pool volume), Catalonia (17.2%) and Andalusia
(11.2%). The provisional portfolio, as of its poolcut date,
included loans in arrears between 31 and 90 days representing
4.1% of the portfolio volume and loans in arrears above 90 days
representing 4.4%. Loans in arrears exceeding 90 days will be
excluded from the final pool at closing.

According to Moody's, the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) a back-up servicer is appointed from day one; and
(ii) while most of the credit enhancement to Serie A notes is
provided by subordination of Serie B notes, a cash reserve of
EUR24.25M, representing 5% of the securitized volume, is
exclusively available to cover any shortfall occurring on
interest payments on the notes as well as senior fees (the
reserve can also be used to repay any principal outstanding by

Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit
weaknesses, including: (a) 44.9% of the pool volume is related to
obligors in the construction and building sector according to
Moody's, including 21.1% to real estate developers; (b) 19.2% of
the total portfolio volume consists of loans with bespoke
amortization schedules which include bullet and soft-bullet
profiles; (c) there is significant obligor concentration, as the
top 10 corporate groups represent 19.6% of the portfolio balance;
(d) the transaction does not have a hedging mechanism to
compensate for interest and payment frequency mismatches between
the assets and the notes; (e) the transaction is originated by a
financial institution with no securitization track-record in the
Spanish market.

Moody's analysis focused primarily on (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical performance
information and other statistical information; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided via excess-spread, the cash reserve and the
subordination of the notes.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 32.3%, with a coefficient of variation of 34.5% and a
stochastic mean recovery rate of 45.0%. Moody's also tested other
set of assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis.
The results show that the model indicated ratings for Serie A and
Serie B would be (P)A1(sf) and (P)Caa3(sf) respectively if the
mean default rate assumption was to increase to 39.1% and the
recovery rate of 45% was reduced to 35%. For more details, please
refer to the full Parameter Sensitivity analysis included in the
New Issue Report of this transaction.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line
with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector " published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Defaults
Assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular SME Portfolios in
EMEA", published in March 2009 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa",
published in June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used a combination of its
CDOROM model (to generate the default distribution) and ABSROM
cashflow model to determine the potential loss incurred by the
notes under each loss scenario. The cash flow model evaluates all
default scenarios that are then weighted considering the
probabilities of the lognormal distribution assumed for the
portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, the
corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated given
the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments
to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or
EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the probability of
occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived
from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each
tranche. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of
stressed scenarios.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARGUS CARE: Gets Assurances That Operations Will Continue
Katy Gordon at reports that
assurances have been made about a Blairgowrie care home after its
owner went into administration.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Nov. 14, 2011,
Galloway News said that there are fears for the future of
Stewartry care home, Fleet Valley, after its owners, Argus Care
Group, were plunged into administration.  Local councilors have
called for swift action to ensure continuity of care for the
residents, according to Galloway News.  The report related that
joint administrator Bryan Jackson said he is "pretty positive"
about finding a solution and stressed the home will continue to
run as normal for the moment.

The administrator can be reached at:

          Bryan Jackson
          PKF (UK) LLP
          78 Carlton Place
          GLASGOW, G5 9TH
          Tel: 0141 4295900
          Fax: 0141 429 1210 relates that Perthshire North MSP,
John Swinney, said: "I have received verbal confirmation from the
company, which guarantees that care will not be interrupted. . .
. I have also discussed the matter with the Cabinet Secretary for
Health Nicola Sturgeon MSP. I am reassured that both the Scottish
Government and the council are monitoring this developing
situation. . . . Care needs to be the priority just now and
ensuring staff and residents are kept fully informed of
developments is vital.  I will be writing to the company to seek
guarantees for residents, family and staff."

The report notes that MP Pete Wishart, whose Perth and North
Perthshire constituency includes the Blairgowrie home, added: "I
know this will be a very worrying time for residents, their
families and staff.  I very much hope that a buyer for all of the
Argus homes can be found soon so that both jobs and the welfare
of residents can be protected."

AVOCA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all notes in Avoca CLO VIII Ltd.

Avoca VIII is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms. The transaction closed in August 2007 and is
managed by Avoca Capital Holdings.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report,
dated Oct. 5, 2011, in addition to a cash flow analysis. We have
taken into account recent developments in the transaction and
reviewed the transaction under our 2010 counterparty criteria
(see 'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions,' published Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have observed from the October 2011
trustee report a general improvement in the credit quality of the
portfolio, such as a decrease in 'CCC' rated assets, to 4.57%
from 4.83%. Currently, there are no defaulted assets in the
portfolio. From the October 2011 trustee report, we have also
observed that the overcollateralization test results for all
classes of notes have improved and are currently passing. At the
same time, the weighted-average spread earned on the collateral
pool has also increased since our last rating review," S&P said.

"In addition, our analysis indicates that the weighted-average
maturity of the portfolio since our last transaction update has
decreased, which has led to a reduction in our scenario default
rates (SDRs) for all rating categories," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class, which
we then compare against its respective SDR to determine the
rating level for each class of notes. In our analysis, we used
the reported portfolio balance that we consider to be performing,
the weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery
rates that we considered appropriate. We incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using our standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for the
class A notes, in conjunction with different interest stress
scenarios," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have observed that the non-euro-
denominated assets currently make up approximately 11.37% of the
performing assets. These assets are hedged using asset-specific
swaps. In our cash flow analysis, we considered scenarios where
the hedging counterparty does not perform and where the
transaction is therefore exposed to changes in currency rates,"
S&P related.

"In our opinion, the reduction in our SDRs, together with our
cash flow analyses, indicates that the credit enhancement
available to the class A1 and A2 notes is consistent with higher
rating levels than previously assigned. These higher rating
levels are also consistent with the application of our 2010
counterparty criteria. We have therefore raised our rating on the
class A1 notes to 'AAA (sf)' and on the A2 notes to 'AA- (sf)',"
S&P said.

"In our opinion, the improvements we have seen in the
transaction's performance since our last transaction update have
benefited the class B to E notes, and we believe the credit
enhancement levels available to these classes are now
commensurate with higher rating levels. We have therefore raised
our ratings on these classes," S&P said.

"The rating on the class E notes was constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (see 'Update To
Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P said.

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                 From

Avoca CLO VIII Ltd.
EUR508 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A1          AAA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
A2          AA- (sf)           A+ (sf)
B           A (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB (sf)           BB+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)           B+ (sf)
E           CCC+ (sf)          CCC (sf)

BUSINESS DREAM: Sold Back to Former Director
Julie Hayes at The Press reports that furniture retailer John
Peters has been sold to a former director, who expects to keep at
least two of its stores trading.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 3,
2011, The Press said that Business Dream Ltd, which owns the John
Peters chain of furniture shops, was placed into liquidation.
The company, which had a 15,000 sq ft superstore at Clifton Moor,
appointed Christopher Brooksbank -- --
of O'Hara & Co insolvency practitioners as liquidator to the
company on October 28.  The Press related that Mr. Brooksbank
said that all staff have been dismissed.  In its last accounts
filed to Companies House for the year ended May 31, 2010, the
business employed 55 people across its sites in York, Hull,
Doncaster, Wakefield and Guiseley.

The Press says the 15,000 sq ft superstore York, will reopened on
November 11 for a three-day clearance sale before closing for
good on November 14.

But the assets of the business have now been sold back to a
former director of Business Dream, John Cussins, who has set up a
new company called Oak Contract Solutions Ltd, The Press relates.

According to the Press, the liquidators O'Hara & Co said they did
not know which stores Oak Contract Solutions may re-open or
whether they would recruit former staff.

But Mr. Brooksbank said the deal meant at least two of the
outlets could continue to trade and the business planned to honor
as many existing customer orders as possible, The Press notes.

The Press discloses that Mr. Brooksbank was advised by law firm
Clarion and Michael Steel & Co Chartered Surveyors in the
negotiations to sell the business's assets:

          Britannia Chambers
          4 Oxford Place
          LS1 3AX
          Tel: (0113) 246-0622

          Michael Steel & Co
          9 East Parade
          LS1 2AJ
          Tel: (0113) 234-8999
          Fax: (0113) 234 8899

Business Dream Ltd trading as John Peters is a Doncaster-based
furniture retailer.

DOUBLETAKE STUDIOS: Enters Administration on Cash Flow Problems
---------------------------------------------------------------- reports that Doubletake Studios Ltd went into
administration after suffering severe cash flow problems caused
by the deferred nature of its revenue streams and was unable to
discharge significant arrears of crown debt.

The administrators said in the event, the company was unable to
pay costs of vital service providers that would have enabled it
to continue trading, according to

"Despite exploring payment options with Her Majesty Revenue and
Custom (HMRC), the Company's historic debt and the Company's
short term cash flow proved unmanageable, and we are now
undergoing the process of closing the business down.  We will be
working with management to fulfil outstanding orders and
assisting the Redundancy Payments Office in processing redundancy
payments for staff. . . . The situation is regrettable, but
having explored options it was found that Doubletake Studios Ltd
was not viable for a sale as a going concern and we were forced
to begin the shutdown process,"  the report quoted Joint
administrator Phillip Armstrong, as saying.

The administrator can be reached at:

          Phil Armstrong
          FRP Advisory Business Recovery Services
          London, United Kingdom
          Tel: +44 (0)20 3005 4000
          Fax: +44 (0)20 3005 4400

Doubletake Studios Ltd is a photographic company.  The firm which
was headquartered in London also had operations in Manchester,
Birmingham and Southampton.  The company has 156 people employed
in the Manchester studio.

GOODWOOD GOLD: Moody's Reviews B2 Ratings on Three Note Classes
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade all
the tranches in Goodwood Gold Limited for performance reasons.

Ratings Rationale

The rating announcement is primarily driven by the worse-than-
expected collateral performance of Goodwood Gold, a UK-based
asset-back security (ABS) based on small and medium-sized
businesses (SMEs). Defaults since Moody's November 2009 rating
review have represented 4.34% of the pool balance of GBP3 billion
that was outstanding at that date, and in November 2009, in an
updated assessment, Moody's said it expects the outstanding pool
to record a further 10.3% defaults until the end of the
transaction (please refer to Moody's press release "Moody's
downgrades Goodwood Gold's UK SME ABS ratings", 11 November
2009). Overall, a total of 42.17% of Moody's expected defaults as
of its latest rating action have therefore occurred by now, while
the pool has only amortized 27.84%, which implies that the
defaults occurred faster than the rating agency expected.
However, the rating agency notes that defaults in Q4 2011 are
expected to be the lowest observed in this transaction so far,
and Moody's will endeavor to investigate whether this improvement
could be durable. Moody's also notes that, while the overall
recovery rate of 64.3% is still lower than its expectation of
70%, the recovery rates have recently improved significantly
(75.8% over the liquidations in Q4 2011).

The pool consists of 24,671 loans to 22,145 SMEs originated by
Lloyd's (rated A1/P-1, on review for downgrade), with the largest
exposure representing 0.08%. The effective number of borrowers is
very high at 15,228 borrowers. The largest industry sector is
Healthcare, Education and Childcare at 19.3% of the pool. Moody's
attributes the decline in performance of Goodwood Gold
(especially when compared to Ascot Black, another ABS SME
transaction originated by Lloyd's) to the vulnerability of SME
borrowers (as found in Goodwood Gold), which are much smaller
than the larger entities of the Ascot Black portfolio.

Goodwood Gold has not yet benefited from deleveraging due to pro
rata amortixation. Also, credit enhancement levels appear low in
comparison to its peers.

Moody's review will reassess expected defaults for the remainder
of the transaction in light of recent performance, and evaluate
the impact of any updated expectation on the rating of the notes,
taking into account the specifics of the structure, including the
available synthetic excess spread.

Key modelling assumptions, sensitivities, cash-flow analysis and
stress scenarios have not been updated as the rating action has
been primarily driven by the worse-than-expected performance,
which has been characterixed by higher defaults and lower
recoveries than Moody's had assumed on its last review. Moody's
will update its modelling assumptions as part of the review

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default
Assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular Small and Mid-
sized Enterprise Portfolios in EMEA", published in March 2009,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in
Europe, Middle East and Africa", published in June 2007.

List of Affected Securities

Issuer: Goodwood Gold Limited

   -- GBP76M A1 Notes, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

   -- EUR28M A2 Notes, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

   -- GBP25M B CDS Notes, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to A1 (sf)

   -- GBP55M B1 Notes, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- EUR16.1M B2 Notes, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- GBP25M C CDS Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

   -- GBP33M C1 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

   -- EUR42.7M C2 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

   -- GBP11M D CDS Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to Ba1 (sf)

   -- GBP14M D1 Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

   -- EUR19.6M D2 Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to Ba1 (sf)

   -- GBP15.5M E CDS Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded
      to B2 (sf)
   -- GBP19.5M E1 Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- EUR26.6M E2 Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Nov 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

HELLAS TELECOM: Noteholders File US$104MM Suit Against PE Firms
Samuel Howard at Bankruptcy Law360 reports that noteholders of
Hellas Telecommunications Sarl on Tuesday sued private equity
firms TPG Capital LP and Apax Partners LLP to recover more than
EUR77 million (US$104 million) they pocketed while allegedly
driving the telecom into insolvency.

TPG and Apax acquired the profitable cellphone company formerly
called Tim Hellas Communications SA in 2005 and pursued a
breakneck expansion, borrowing vast sums, including EUR1.5
billion (US$2.2 billion), from noteholders, which the buyout
firms used to reward themselves despite burying the company in
debt, according to the complaint obtained by Law360.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 30,
2009, Bloomberg News said the English High Court approved an
order to place Hellas II into administration.  Maggie Mills and
Alan Hudson were appointed by the court as joint administrators
to Hellas II, Bloomberg disclosed, citing a statement from Ernst
& Young.

SKYE IT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
Doug Woodburn at CRN reports that Skye IT's trade creditors look
set to recover little of their debts as the fallen reseller
commences liquidation proceedings.

CRN says the company folded last month with trade-creditor debts
of about GBP1.1 million.  At the time, the report recalls, the
insolvency practitioner overseeing Skye IT's wind-down, Taylor
Aitken, was hopeful that the firm's large debtor book could see
creditors recover up to 30 pence in the pound.

RSM Tenon was formally appointed as liquidator at a creditors'
meeting on November 15, according to CRN.

According to the report, a representative at the insolvency
practitioner said any book debts will be returned to RBS, with
whom Skye IT had an invoice discounting facility.  Skye IT's
assets, which include office furniture, are currently being
assessed but it is unlikely trade creditors will recover a
substantial portion of their debts, the report relays.

Some distributors are understood to be owed as much as
GBP150,000. Money owed to Skye IT directors is also included in
the GBP1.1 million sum, CRN discloses.

"The original assumption was that creditors would see around 30p
in the pound but it now appears they will see zero," CRN quotes
Eddie Pacey, managing director of EP Credit Management &
Consultancy, as saying.  "The company filed abbreviated accounts
and without detailed management accounts it's not easy to say why
this is but invariably realisable book debt values always fall
short.  With unsecured creditors of over GBP1.1 million, some
major suppliers may have lost anything up to GBP150,000."

Chelmsford-based Skye IT, part of the Skye Group, provides
management, consulting and supply services for IT and technical

SKYJET UK: Files for Bankruptcy; Comtel Air Cancels Flights
BBC News reports that flights are being arranged on BMI to help
passengers return home from India after the collapse of Skyjet

Austrian airline Comtel Air cancelled all its flights between
Amritsar and Birmingham on Thursday when Skyjet UK in Essex said
it had filed for bankruptcy, BBC relates.

The flight cancellations have left about 180 people stranded in
India, BBC discloses.

Passengers are being offered special rates on BMI, BBC says.  The
UK Civil Aviation Authority has agreed to refund them, BBC notes.

According to BBC, Comtel Air said it was owed money by Skyjet UK,
one of its travel agents, and had not been able to pay its
carrier for two weeks as a result.

BBC relates that the Spanish carrier Mint Lineas Aereas said on
Thursday it was stopping services for Comtel Air due to
"unresolved financial questions".

It emerged later on Thursday that Astonbury Ltd., trading as
Skyjet UK, announced it had ceased trading, BBC recounts.

Skyjet UK is an Essex-based travel agency.  It was registered
with the Air Travel Organisers' Licensing (Atol), which the CAA

WEDGWOOD MUSEUM: Faces Possible Forced Sale
Dalya Alberge at the guardian reports that the Wedgwood Museum in
Stoke-on-Trent is waiting for a legal judgment that could
threaten its future.

Government safeguards introduced to protect employee pensions
after the Robert Maxwell scandal in the early 90s may prove
disastrous to the museum, which has a multimillion-pound china
collection, and masterpieces by George Stubbs, George Romney and
Joshua Reynolds, and an archive linked to the nation's social and
industrial history, according to the guardian.

The report notes that the Wedgwood Museum has not been legally
connected to Waterford Wedgwood Potteries, which went into
administration due to financial difficulties two years ago, for
nearly half a century.

However, the report relates, because five of the Wedgwood Group's
7,000-member pension scheme became employees of the museum seven
years ago, administrators of the museum, which went into
administration last year but remains open, may be held liable for
a GBP134m hole in the pension fund.

The case pits the museum against employees because of their
pension rights, the guardian notes.  It may adversely affect
other museums or institutions arising from charity in a similar
situation, it is feared, and is seen as a test case, the report

The legal case was brought to Birmingham high court by the
administrators of the museum, Begbies Traynor.  The Wedgwood
Museum and the Potteries, along with the Pension Protection Fund
(PPF) set up by the government after the Maxwell scandal, now
await the judgment on whether the museum must sell its collection
to make up shortfalls in the Potteries' pension fund, the
guardian discloses.

The court, the guardian relates, is also considering national
interests, represented by the attorney general, because the PPF
supports the pension trustees' claim.

The report recalls that when the Potteries went into
administration and was sold, its new owner, an American private
equity firm, KPS Capital Partners, did not take on the pension
shortfall.  The museum was dragged into the case after the
Potteries administrator applied for PPF help, the guardian

* UK: Sadler Comments on Number of Care Homes in Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------- Managing Director Mark Sadler said that the
most notable of these smaller care home operators collapsing to
date are: Southern Care Group, Winnie Care Group, Grosvenor Care
and Argus Care Group in Scotland.  Through the boom times, many
care home groups were keen to keep borrowing against the values
of the properties on their portfolios, and to keep buying even
more properties to expand their business often by acquisition
with many companies taking on significant debt.

Before and after the economic downturn, many operators were
forced into a position where they have needed to reduce their
debt, with many loan values outstripping the values of assets on
their books. In an attempt to overcome this problem and escape
'negative equity,' they have sold their care homes to investment
companies and leased or rented them back.

Care home operators who have used this 'leaseback' model to keep
expanding are facing significant cash flow pressures, as their
rents increase at 'above market rates' meanwhile the local
authorities are reducing their funding due to their own funding
cuts caused by the recession.

So what can we expect to see in the future?

It is possible that we will see more care home operators who
expanded rapidly without being adequately funded either falling
into administration or divesting their assets just as quickly as
they acquired them.

Everyone should not forget however that many care home operators
have managed and expanded their businesses more responsibly, but
have not overcommitted themselves.  They too may have grown
rapidly, but they have done so with more caution and with a more
modest funding requirement. is a new web based resource for people looking
to find a care home for themselves or a loved one.

Mark Sadler
Your Care Home Limited
Tel: 01793 710944


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 14 to November 18, 2011

Issuer                 Coupon    Maturity  Currency   Price
------                 ------    --------  --------   -----

BA CREDITANSTALT         5.470   8/28/2013      EUR    57.00
BAWAG                    5.430   2/26/2024      EUR    62.28
BAWAG                    5.400   2/12/2023      EUR    65.17
BAWAG                    5.310   2/12/2023      EUR    64.65
HAA-BANK INTL AG         5.250  10/27/2015      EUR    60.25
HAA-BANK INTL AG         5.270    4/7/2028      EUR    57.39
IMMOFINANZ               4.250    3/8/2018      EUR     3.47
KOMMUNALKREDIT           5.430   2/13/2024      EUR    57.88
KOMMUNALKREDIT           4.900   6/23/2031      EUR    46.25
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.750   4/30/2021      EUR    66.07
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.160   5/20/2025      EUR    67.98
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.810   7/29/2025      EUR    61.38
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.170   7/29/2015      EUR    62.25
OESTER VOLKSBK           5.270    2/8/2027      EUR    53.68
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.470   2/28/2028      EUR    62.35
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.730  12/11/2023      EUR    69.22
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.500  12/29/2023      EUR    67.44
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          4.500   9/28/2035      EUR    49.62

BELGIUM KINGDOM          3.625  10/21/2052      EUR    73.38
COMM FRANC BELG          3.620   3/17/2058      EUR    72.34
ECONOCOM GROUP           4.000    6/1/2016      EUR    19.35
IDEAL STANDARD I        11.750    5/1/2018      EUR    64.60
IDEAL STANDARD I        11.750    5/1/2018      EUR    65.00

CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600   4/23/2018      EUR    68.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.100   1/29/2018      EUR    71.06
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    1/2/2016      EUR    72.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   9/28/2017      EUR    69.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.350    6/9/2020      EUR    69.37
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.750   9/30/2015      EUR    72.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         3.750   11/1/2015      EUR    70.92
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   3/30/2016      EUR    72.17
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.750   12/2/2015      EUR    72.18
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.000    6/9/2016      EUR    72.31
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   2/15/2017      EUR    70.02
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    6/2/2016      EUR    71.67
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.000    6/9/2021      EUR    71.85
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   10/9/2016      EUR    70.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500   7/11/2016      EUR    71.39
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.500   8/25/2021      EUR    73.56
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    4/2/2017      EUR    69.81
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.100   4/20/2020      EUR    73.36
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.625    2/3/2020      EUR    66.68
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600   2/26/2019      EUR    68.17
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600  10/23/2018      EUR    68.44
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500    1/4/2017      EUR    70.26
MARFIN POPULAR           4.350  11/20/2014      EUR    39.75
REP OF CYPRUS            4.750   2/25/2016      EUR    72.54
REP OF CYPRUS            4.375   7/15/2014      EUR    74.31

FIN-DANISH IND           4.910    7/6/2021      EUR    55.38
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR    46.45
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500    2/3/2016      TRY    73.01

MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  10/28/2015      TRY    74.92
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR    74.70
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR    73.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR    72.73
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  10/27/2016      TRY    67.27
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   12/6/2016      TRY    73.96
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  11/16/2017      TRY    64.71
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR    67.59
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.250   6/28/2040      CAD    24.60
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   3/17/2025      CAD    62.29
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  11/10/2021      NZD    64.68
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR    49.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  11/21/2018      ZAR    66.69
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR    60.86
TALVIVAARA               4.000  12/16/2015      EUR    71.46

AIR FRANCE-KLM           4.970    4/1/2015      EUR    10.80
ALCATEL-LUCENT           5.000    1/1/2015      EUR     2.59
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG         6.720    1/1/2015      EUR     4.64
ASSYSTEM                 4.000    1/1/2017      EUR    20.08
ATOS ORIGIN SA           2.500    1/1/2016      EUR    50.20
AXA SA                   5.250   4/16/2040      EUR    71.86
BNP PARIBAS              2.890   5/16/2036      JPY    65.99
CALYON                   6.000   6/18/2047      EUR    14.62
CALYON                   5.800  10/29/2029      USD    69.88
CAP GEMINI SOGET         1.000    1/1/2012      EUR    42.09
CAP GEMINI SOGET         3.500    1/1/2014      EUR    38.14
CGG VERITAS              1.750    1/1/2016      EUR    26.15
CLUB MEDITERRANE         6.110   11/1/2015      EUR    17.39
CLUB MEDITERRANE         5.000    6/8/2012      EUR    12.03
CMA CGM                  8.875   4/15/2019      EUR    38.25
CMA CGM                  8.875   4/15/2019      EUR    37.67
CMA CGM                  8.500   4/15/2017      USD    39.07
CMA CGM                  8.500   4/15/2017      USD    41.25
CNP ASSURANCES           6.875   9/30/2041      EUR    65.61
CNP ASSURANCES           6.000   9/14/2040      EUR    64.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.270    8/5/2030      USD    63.68
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.850   9/17/2030      USD    59.56
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300   10/7/2030      USD    63.65
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.250  10/18/2030      USD    63.32
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300  10/22/2030      USD    63.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.690  11/26/2030      USD    67.10
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.080  11/23/2030      USD    61.55
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.450   11/9/2030      USD    64.92
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.910   11/3/2030      USD    61.08
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.350  10/29/2030      USD    64.07
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300  10/12/2030      USD    61.54
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.850   6/30/2031      USD    67.71
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.830   6/30/2031      USD    67.53
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.610   6/15/2031      USD    65.53
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.650   6/10/2031      USD    65.93
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.850   5/27/2031      USD    67.81
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.880    4/8/2031      USD    69.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.220   3/17/2031      USD    71.40
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.150   2/11/2031      USD    70.67
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.950   1/19/2031      USD    69.26
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.050   1/14/2031      USD    70.11
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.000  12/23/2030      USD    67.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.400   12/9/2030      USD    64.36
CREDIT AGRICOLE          4.500  12/22/2019      EUR    68.12
CREDIT LOCAL FRA         3.750   5/26/2020      EUR    56.79
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         5.037    8/4/2020      EUR    62.61
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.110   9/18/2018      EUR    64.90
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.500   2/25/2020      EUR    61.13
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.550    4/2/2020      EUR    61.22
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.020   3/13/2017      EUR    74.13
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY         1.000  12/23/2024      EUR    60.74
EURAZEO                  6.250   6/10/2014      EUR    55.77
EUROPCAR GROUPE          9.375   4/15/2018      EUR    60.00
EUROPCAR GROUPE          9.375   4/15/2018      EUR    59.88
FAURECIA                 4.500    1/1/2015      EUR    20.90
FONCIERE REGIONS         3.340    1/1/2017      EUR    73.02
GIE PSA TRESORER         6.000   9/19/2033      EUR    69.64
GROUPAMA SA              7.875  10/27/2039      EUR    42.78
INGENICO                 2.750    1/1/2017      EUR    43.51
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125   7/31/2015      EUR    16.92
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125   7/31/2014      EUR    18.11
NEXANS SA                4.000    1/1/2016      EUR    57.61
NOVASEP HLDG             9.750  12/15/2016      USD    43.00
ORPEA                    3.875    1/1/2016      EUR    42.31
PAGESJAUNES FINA         8.875    6/1/2018      EUR    71.00
PAGESJAUNES FINA         8.875    6/1/2018      EUR    70.96
PEUGEOT SA               4.450    1/1/2016      EUR    24.24
PIERRE VACANCES          4.000   10/1/2015      EUR    67.90
PUBLICIS GROUPE          1.000   1/18/2018      EUR    48.19
PUBLICIS GROUPE          3.125   7/30/2014      EUR    35.65
SOC AIR FRANCE           2.750    4/1/2020      EUR    20.54
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.900   3/10/2031      USD    69.11
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.860   3/11/2031      USD    68.73
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.910   3/16/2031      USD    69.18
SOCIETE GENERALE         6.010   3/15/2031      USD    70.12
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.860   4/26/2031      USD    68.93
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.920   3/17/2031      USD    69.27
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.940   3/14/2031      USD    69.47
SOITEC                   6.250    9/9/2014      EUR     7.61
TEM                      4.250    1/1/2015      EUR    51.35
THEOLIA                  2.700    1/1/2041      EUR     8.64

BAYERISCHE LNDBK         4.500    2/7/2019      EUR    70.00
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.450   2/20/2023      EUR    63.37
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.600   4/14/2023      EUR    64.10
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.640   1/30/2024      EUR    61.86
COMMERZBANK AG           6.460   6/24/2022      EUR    61.74
COMMERZBANK AG           6.360   3/15/2022      EUR    62.12
COMMERZBANK AG           6.300   3/15/2022      EUR    61.96
COMMERZBANK AG           6.375   3/22/2019      EUR    71.08
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000   4/20/2018      EUR    33.39
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000   3/30/2018      EUR    33.33
COMMERZBANK AG           4.000  11/30/2017      EUR    33.89
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000  10/30/2017      EUR    69.87
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN         5.300  11/20/2023      EUR    57.50
DRESDNER BANK AG         7.160   8/14/2024      EUR    60.37
DRESDNER BANK AG         7.350   6/13/2028      EUR    58.06
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.635   6/18/2018      EUR    72.02
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.000   2/25/2020      EUR    65.73
DRESDNER BANK AG         5.290   5/31/2021      EUR    58.26
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.210   6/20/2022      EUR    60.50
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.180   2/28/2023      EUR    57.42
DRESDNER BANK AG         5.700   7/31/2023      EUR    54.99
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.550   4/14/2020      EUR    67.96
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.375    5/8/2018      EUR    71.08
EUROHYPO AG              5.560   8/18/2023      EUR    63.13
EUROHYPO AG              3.830   9/21/2020      EUR    59.25
EUROHYPO AG              5.110    8/6/2018      EUR    72.13
EUROHYPO AG              6.490   7/17/2017      EUR     4.00
GOTHAER ALLG VER         5.527   9/29/2026      EUR    69.09
HAPAG-LLOYD              9.750  10/15/2017      USD    65.00
HAPAG-LLOYD              9.750  10/15/2017      USD    78.00
HECKLER & KOCH           9.500   5/15/2018      EUR    61.13
HECKLER & KOCH           9.500   5/15/2018      EUR    62.23
HEIDELBERG DRUCK         9.250   4/15/2018      EUR    59.50
HEIDELBERG DRUCK         9.250   4/15/2018      EUR    60.01
HSH NORDBANK AG          4.375   2/14/2017      EUR    51.75
L-BANK FOERDERBK         0.500   5/10/2027      CAD    54.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          5.250  10/20/2015      EUR    27.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.800   2/23/2037      JPY    39.36
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN         5.875   2/10/2016      EUR    69.57
Q-CELLS                  6.750  10/21/2015      EUR     0.98
QIMONDA FINANCE          6.750   3/22/2013      USD     1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK         6.600   5/29/2022      EUR    71.75
SOLARWORLD AG            6.375   7/13/2016      EUR    53.98
SOLARWORLD AG            6.125   1/21/2017      EUR    53.58
SOLON AG SOLAR           1.375   12/6/2012      EUR    17.29
STYROLUTION GRP          7.625   5/15/2016      EUR    72.83
STYROLUTION GRP          7.625   5/15/2016      EUR    73.00
TAG IMMO AG              6.500  12/10/2015      EUR     7.68
TUI AG                   2.750   3/24/2016      EUR    36.84
TUI AG                   5.500  11/17/2014      EUR    51.90

ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.301   8/12/2014      EUR    25.23
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.057   3/26/2013      EUR    36.00
ATHENS URBAN TRN         5.008   7/18/2017      EUR    29.73
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.851   9/19/2016      EUR    26.83
FAGE DAIRY IND           7.500   1/15/2015      EUR    73.17
FAGE DAIRY IND           7.500   1/15/2015      EUR    73.88
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.300   7/25/2030      EUR    16.50
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.900   7/25/2025      EUR    19.50
HELLENIC REPUB           5.200   7/17/2034      EUR    18.25
HELLENIC REPUB           4.625   6/25/2013      USD    41.75
HELLENIC REPUB           4.590    4/8/2016      EUR    21.88
HELLENIC REPUB           5.000   3/11/2019      EUR    31.63
HELLENIC REPUB           6.140   4/14/2028      EUR    23.38
HELLENIC REPUB           2.125    7/5/2013      CHF    44.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.702   9/30/2015      EUR    28.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900  10/22/2022      EUR    26.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.700   3/20/2024      EUR    24.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700  11/10/2015      EUR    24.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.600   7/20/2016      EUR    24.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.020   9/13/2016      EUR    28.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.225    3/1/2017      EUR    29.08
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.427   7/31/2013      EUR    35.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.900    7/3/2013      EUR    33.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         7.500   5/20/2013      EUR    33.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   5/20/2013      EUR    28.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.506   3/31/2013      EUR    40.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.100   8/20/2012      EUR    33.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI         1.000   6/30/2012      EUR    59.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.250   6/20/2012      EUR    61.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.250   5/18/2012      EUR    37.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300   3/20/2012      EUR    40.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500   9/20/2037      EUR    24.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.300   3/20/2026      EUR    24.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900   4/20/2017      EUR    24.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.100   8/20/2015      EUR    26.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   9/20/2040      EUR    24.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600   7/20/2018      EUR    24.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.000   7/19/2019      EUR    25.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500  10/22/2019      EUR    26.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.250   6/19/2020      EUR    26.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300   7/20/2017      EUR    24.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.000   8/20/2013      EUR    28.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700   7/20/2015      EUR    26.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.113   9/30/2014      EUR    29.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.500   8/20/2014      EUR    26.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.985   7/25/2014      EUR    28.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500    7/1/2014      EUR    32.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500   5/20/2014      EUR    29.08
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500   1/11/2014      EUR    27.83
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.520   9/30/2013      EUR    29.00
NATL BK GREECE           3.875   10/7/2016      EUR    54.69

CALYON FIN GUER          6.000    9/4/2029      USD    70.68
CREDIT AGRICOLE          5.600   2/25/2030      USD    67.48

AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000   2/12/2030      EUR    47.93
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000    3/1/2030      EUR    47.90
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.580   4/28/2028      EUR    53.28
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         4.875   6/29/2017      EUR    74.19
ALLIED IRISH BKS         5.625  11/12/2014      EUR    73.04
ALLIED IRISH BKS         4.000   3/19/2015      EUR    73.87
ALLIED IRISH BKS        12.500   6/25/2035      GBP    32.13
ANGLO IRISH BANK         4.000   4/15/2015      EUR    72.37
BANESTO FINANC           5.000    6/1/2024      EUR    71.71
BANESTO FINANC           5.000   3/23/2030      EUR    63.81
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000   2/12/2020      GBP    37.25
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000   2/12/2020      EUR    50.25
BANK OF IRELAND          4.473  11/30/2016      EUR    59.13
BANK OF IRELAND          5.600   9/18/2023      EUR    41.00
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.400   11/6/2029      EUR    50.44
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.450    3/1/2030      EUR    50.51
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.360  10/12/2029      EUR    50.18
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.760    9/7/2029      EUR    53.08
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125   3/16/2037      USD    70.27
DEPFA ACS BANK           0.500    3/3/2025      CAD    40.98
DEPFA ACS BANK           4.900   8/24/2035      CAD    68.68
EBS BLDG SOCIETY         4.000   2/25/2015      EUR    74.06
IRISH LIFE PERM          4.000   3/10/2015      EUR    72.23
UT2 FUNDING PLC          5.321   6/30/2016      EUR    57.04

BANCA MARCHE             5.500   9/16/2030      EUR    47.75
BANCA MARCHE             5.125   5/14/2024      ITL    53.32
BANCA MARCHE             4.360    1/4/2022      ITL    54.65
BANCA MARCHE             4.000   5/26/2021      EUR    53.62
BANCA MARCHE             4.000   1/10/2021      EUR    54.89
BANCA MARCHE             3.600  11/12/2020      EUR    53.78
BANCA MARCHE             4.300    1/4/2020      EUR    60.24
BANCA MARCHE             3.700    9/1/2020      EUR    55.09
BANCA MARCHE             3.900   8/17/2020      EUR    56.18
BANCA MARCHE             4.000    7/9/2020      EUR    57.07
BANCA POP LODI           5.250    4/3/2029      EUR    58.36
BANCA POP LODI           3.750   2/28/2018      EUR    71.53
BANCA POP MILANO         3.500   6/30/2018      EUR    72.72
BANCA POP MILANO         4.000   4/23/2020      EUR    70.95
BANCA POP MILANO         4.100   3/31/2018      EUR    76.40
BANCA POP MILANO         3.875  10/15/2017      EUR    76.50
BANCA POP MILANO         3.625   7/16/2017      EUR    75.65
BANCA POP MILANO         3.100   9/30/2017      EUR    73.00
BANCA POP MILANO         3.250   6/30/2017      EUR    72.67
BANCA POP MILANO         4.500   4/18/2018      EUR    69.50
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000   5/30/2021      EUR    61.00
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000   6/30/2021      EUR    60.42
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000   3/31/2021      EUR    61.50
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000   3/25/2021      EUR    61.52
BANCA POP VICENT         4.970   4/20/2027      EUR    48.92
BANCA SELLA              3.600   11/5/2019      EUR    70.04
BANCO POPOLARE           6.000   11/5/2020      EUR    67.36
BANCO POPOLARE           6.375   5/31/2021      EUR    67.39
BP CIVIDALE              3.180   5/19/2020      EUR    66.65
BTPS                     5.000    8/1/2039      EUR    74.93
BTPS                     5.000    8/1/2034      EUR    74.76
BTPS                     4.500    3/1/2026      EUR    77.20
BTPS                     5.000    9/1/2040      EUR    74.98
BTPS                     4.000    2/1/2037      EUR    67.84
BTPS I/L                 2.350   9/15/2035      EUR    62.83
BTPS I/L                 2.600   9/15/2023      EUR    69.06
BTPS I/L                 2.550   9/15/2041      EUR    62.94
BTPS I/L                 3.100   9/15/2026      EUR    68.17
BTPS I/L                 2.100   9/15/2021      EUR    69.47
BTPS I/L                 2.350   9/15/2019      EUR    74.98
CASSA RISP CENTO         4.500   9/12/2015      EUR    73.25
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.000   1/18/2015      EUR    73.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000    8/5/2015      EUR    73.00
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.500    3/5/2016      EUR    68.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000   11/2/2016      EUR    66.50
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.575    2/2/2017      EUR    67.50
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.400   9/17/2017      EUR    61.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.500   11/2/2020      EUR    55.88
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000    9/2/2015      EUR    72.63
COMUNE DI MILANO         4.019   6/29/2035      EUR    73.10
FINMECCANICA SPA         4.875   3/24/2025      EUR    66.29
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.000    9/2/2022      EUR    71.56
INTESA SANPAOLO          2.882   4/20/2020      EUR    67.54
REP OF ITALY             2.500   1/30/2018      CHF    76.56
REP OF ITALY             2.750  11/11/2018      EUR    75.37
REP OF ITALY             2.850    9/1/2022      EUR    72.15
REP OF ITALY             4.490    4/5/2027      EUR    68.41
REP OF ITALY             5.200   7/31/2034      EUR    71.23
REP OF ITALY             2.870   5/19/2036      JPY    48.21
REP OF ITALY             2.200   9/15/2058      EUR    50.08
REP OF ITALY             4.850   6/11/2060      EUR    64.16
REP OF ITALY             2.000   9/15/2062      EUR    45.37
REP OF ITALY             1.850   9/15/2057      EUR    43.15
SEAT PAGINE             10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    59.12
SEAT PAGINE             10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    59.67
SEAT PAGINE             10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    59.25
SEAT PAGINE             10.500   1/31/2017      EUR    59.00
TELECOM ITALIA           5.250   3/17/2055      EUR    61.94
UGF ASSICURAZION         5.660   7/28/2023      EUR    62.94
UNICREDIT SPA            5.160   6/14/2020      EUR    66.51
UNICREDIT SPA            5.370   6/19/2019      EUR    70.96
UNICREDIT SPA            6.040    3/3/2023      EUR    64.71
UNICREDIT SPA            5.000   4/21/2021      EUR    63.14
UNICREDIT SPA            5.050   4/25/2022      EUR    60.63
UNICREDIT SPA            6.700    6/5/2018      EUR    65.98
UNICREDIT SPA            4.350   8/25/2022      EUR    68.42
UNICREDITO ITALI         5.000    2/1/2016      GBP    62.00
UNICREDITO ITALI         4.750   4/12/2027      EUR    62.93

ARCELORMITTAL            7.250    4/1/2014      EUR    23.02
CONTROLINVESTE           3.000   1/28/2015      EUR    66.07
ESFG INTERNATION         6.875  10/21/2019      EUR    52.53
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    13.50
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    13.84
TELECOM IT CAP           6.000   9/30/2034      USD    75.25
UBI BANCA INT            8.750  10/29/2012      EUR    69.21

APP INTL FINANCE        11.750   10/1/2005      USD     0.01
ASTANA FINANCE           9.000  11/16/2011      USD     9.83
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/17/2016      TRY    72.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   4/27/2016      TRY    71.42
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   6/22/2021      ZAR    44.10
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   5/12/2021      ZAR    44.48
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/29/2021      NZD    68.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500    3/3/2021      NZD    68.40
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   9/15/2016      TRY    69.43
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   6/22/2016      TRY    70.62
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   5/25/2016      TRY    71.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   2/24/2025      CAD    61.57
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500   5/15/2014      USD    40.50
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500   5/15/2014      USD    42.00
BRIT INSURANCE           6.625   12/9/2030      GBP    56.61
CEMEX FIN EUROPE         4.750    3/5/2014      EUR    70.75
DEXIA FUNDING            5.875    2/9/2017      GBP    63.33
EDP FINANCE BV           4.125   6/29/2020      EUR    74.57
ELEC DE CAR FIN          8.500   4/10/2018      USD    58.63
FINANCE & CREDIT        10.500   1/25/2014      USD    63.23
FRIESLAND BANK           4.210  12/29/2025      EUR    65.94
ING BANK NV              4.200  12/19/2035      EUR    67.98
KBC IFIMA NV             8.500    2/7/2025      USD    67.75
LEHMAN BROS TSY          4.870   10/8/2013      USD    33.00
MARFRIG HLDG EUR         8.375    5/9/2018      USD    73.24
MARFRIG HLDG EUR         8.375    5/9/2018      USD    72.85
NATL INVESTER BK        25.983    5/7/2029      EUR    14.32
NED WATERSCHAPBK         0.500   3/11/2025      CAD    60.32
NIB CAPITAL BANK         4.510  12/16/2035      EUR    56.25
POLYSINDO FIN            9.375   7/30/2007      USD     0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN         4.500   6/16/2025      EUR    64.69
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         5.750   5/26/2014      EUR    22.32
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         1.375   2/28/2012      EUR    42.81
RABOBANK                 0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR    72.98
RABOBANK                 0.500  11/26/2021      ZAR    50.12
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         2.910   6/21/2036      JPY    67.69
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         5.000   2/27/2037      EUR    70.41
SIDETUR FINANCE         10.000   4/20/2016      USD    68.00
SNS BANK                 6.625   5/14/2018      EUR    74.19
SNS BANK                 6.250  10/26/2020      EUR    66.43
SNS BANK                 4.580   3/20/2026      EUR    70.39
SRLEV NV                 9.000   4/15/2041      EUR    62.07
TJIWI KIMIA FIN         13.250    8/1/2001      USD     0.01

EKSPORTFINANS            0.500    5/9/2030      CAD    46.37
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/29/2016      ZAR    72.17
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR    74.79
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR    74.39
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   5/25/2016      ZAR    73.31
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/26/2016      ZAR    72.42
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   7/29/2016      TRY    69.66
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   5/25/2018      ZAR    61.06
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125  10/15/2033      USD    42.67
NORSKE SKOGIND           6.125  10/15/2015      USD    62.00
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125  10/15/2033      USD    45.13
NORSKE SKOGIND          11.750   6/15/2016      EUR    65.38
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.000   6/26/2017      EUR    54.57
NORSKE SKOGIND          11.750   6/15/2016      EUR    65.46
NORSKE SKOGIND           6.125  10/15/2015      USD    62.00
RENEWABLE CORP           6.500    6/4/2014      EUR    58.80

POLAND-PAR CPN           3.000  10/27/2024      USD    73.35

BANCO COM PORTUG         9.250  10/13/2014      EUR    73.98
BANCO COM PORTUG         5.625   4/23/2014      EUR    67.99
BANCO COM PORTUG         3.750   10/8/2016      EUR    65.78
BANCO COM PORTUG         4.750   6/22/2017      EUR    66.29
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.875   7/15/2016      EUR    68.71
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600   9/15/2016      EUR    68.32
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600   1/26/2017      EUR    66.38
BANCO ESPIRITO           3.875   1/21/2015      EUR    69.75
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.160   7/23/2015      EUR    71.75
BRISA                    4.500   12/5/2016      EUR    70.01
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.250   1/27/2020      EUR    64.42
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.980    3/3/2028      EUR    56.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.320    8/5/2021      EUR    56.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.380   10/1/2038      EUR    51.12
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.500  11/13/2017      EUR    72.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.400   10/8/2019      EUR    66.05
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.750   2/14/2016      EUR    80.91
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.750   3/14/2016      EUR    71.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.090    6/8/2016      EUR    70.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.165    7/8/2016      EUR    69.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.570   8/12/2016      EUR    67.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.900  10/13/2016      EUR    68.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         3.875   12/6/2016      EUR    67.89
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.455   8/20/2017      EUR    63.00
METRO DE LISBOA          4.061   12/4/2026      EUR    53.84
METRO DE LISBOA          7.300  12/23/2025      EUR    69.46
METRO DE LISBOA          5.750    2/4/2019      EUR    62.43
METRO DE LISBOA          4.799   12/7/2027      EUR    53.16
MONTEPIO GERAL           5.000    2/8/2017      EUR    60.75
PARPUBLICA               3.567   9/22/2020      EUR    48.25
PARPUBLICA               4.200  11/16/2026      EUR    46.13
PARPUBLICA               4.191  10/15/2014      EUR    66.00
PARPUBLICA               3.500    7/8/2013      EUR    74.75
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500   3/25/2015      USD    69.75
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500   3/25/2015      USD    69.85
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.200  10/15/2016      EUR    68.38
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.600  10/15/2014      EUR    74.87
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.350  10/15/2015      EUR    72.58
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.750   6/14/2019      EUR    61.35
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.350  10/16/2017      EUR    63.93
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.450   6/15/2018      EUR    62.14
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.950  10/25/2023      EUR    57.67
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.800   6/15/2020      EUR    59.90
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.850   4/15/2021      EUR    58.15
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.100   4/15/2037      EUR    50.30
REFER                    5.875   2/18/2019      EUR    56.38
REFER                    4.000   3/16/2015      EUR    44.13
REFER                    4.047  11/16/2026      EUR    52.04
REFER                    4.250  12/13/2021      EUR    36.63
REFER                    4.675  10/16/2024      EUR    46.50

ARIZK                    3.000  12/20/2030      RUB    50.47
DVTG-FINANS              7.750   7/18/2013      RUB    20.29
DVTG-FINANS             17.000   8/29/2013      RUB    55.55
IART                     8.500    8/4/2013      RUB     1.00
MIRAX                   17.000   9/17/2012      RUB    30.00
MOSMART FINANS           0.010   4/12/2012      RUB     1.81
NOK                     12.500   8/26/2014      RUB     5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA         1.000  12/17/2012      RUB     0.01
PROTON-FINANCE           9.000   6/12/2012      RUB    75.00
RBC OJSC                 7.000   4/23/2015      RUB    60.00
RBC OJSC                 3.270   4/19/2018      RUB    34.00
RBC OJSC                 7.000   4/23/2015      RUB    66.00
SAHO                    10.000   5/21/2012      RUB    42.50
SATURN                   8.500    6/6/2014      RUB     1.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.250  10/25/2023      EUR    63.91
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.000   3/24/2021      EUR    71.33
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750  12/14/2022      EUR    61.96
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750   6/30/2025      EUR    57.80
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.750   5/25/2027      EUR    64.81
BANCAJA                  1.500   5/22/2018      EUR    62.25
BANCAJA EMI SA           2.755   5/11/2037      JPY    72.36
BANCO BILBAO VIZ         6.025    3/3/2033      EUR    66.21
BANCO POP ESPAN          5.702  12/22/2019      EUR    71.62
BBVA SUB CAP UNI         2.750  10/22/2035      JPY    43.84
CAJA CASTIL-MAN          1.500   6/23/2021      EUR    53.02
CAJA MADRID              4.125   3/24/2036      EUR    65.56
CAJA MADRID              4.000    2/3/2025      EUR    73.19
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         4.250   4/10/2031      EUR    48.68
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         3.875   5/23/2025      EUR    57.77
CEDULAS TDA A-4          4.125   4/10/2021      EUR    73.07
CEDULAS TDA A-5          4.250   3/28/2027      EUR    55.87
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         9.250   5/12/2020      USD    75.00
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         9.250   5/12/2020      USD    71.75
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         8.875   5/12/2017      EUR    71.13
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         8.875   5/12/2017      EUR    70.67
COMUN AUTO CANAR         4.200  10/25/2036      EUR    67.55
COMUN AUTO CANAR         3.900  11/30/2035      EUR    64.38
COMUNIDAD BALEAR         4.063  11/23/2035      EUR    67.12
COMUNIDAD MADRID         4.300   9/15/2026      EUR    72.75
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.220   4/26/2035      EUR    64.19
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.965    9/8/2039      JPY    55.40
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.750   3/24/2016      CHF    61.75
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.125   10/1/2014      CHF    69.10
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.690  10/28/2034      EUR    69.56
GENERAL DE ALQUI         2.750   8/20/2012      EUR    71.26
IM CEDULAS 10            4.500   2/21/2022      EUR    74.84
IM CEDULAS 5             3.500   6/15/2020      EUR    69.88
IM CEDULAS 7             4.000   3/31/2021      EUR    72.88
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         2.570  10/22/2021      CHF    64.56
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         3.250   6/28/2024      CHF    62.35
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          3.065   7/29/2039      JPY    58.68
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          3.170   7/29/2039      JPY    60.05
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          4.250  10/31/2036      EUR    70.13
JUNTA LA MANCHA          2.810  10/14/2022      JPY    67.14
JUNTA LA MANCHA          3.875   1/31/2036      EUR    58.88
MAPFRE SA                5.921   7/24/2037      EUR    63.45
SACYR VALLEHERM          6.500    5/1/2016      EUR    74.82
SPANISH GOV'T            4.200   1/31/2037      EUR    67.36
SPANISH GOV'T            4.700   7/30/2041      EUR    71.42

SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   8/25/2021      ZAR    43.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   9/30/2016      ZAR    71.24
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   9/20/2016      ZAR    71.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   8/26/2016      ZAR    71.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   8/25/2016      ZAR    71.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   6/14/2016      ZAR    73.27
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   9/29/2015      TRY    73.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500   6/12/2012      USD     8.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   6/29/2016      TRY    68.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.750   3/23/2012      USD     7.34
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000    3/9/2012      USD    10.56
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000    3/9/2012      USD    10.15
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.250   4/27/2012      USD     7.12
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000   1/27/2012      USD     3.84
SWEDISH EXP CRED         6.500   1/27/2012      USD     7.73
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.130   1/10/2012      USD    10.02
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.000   12/7/2011      USD    10.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   1/25/2028      USD    57.42
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  12/17/2027      USD    57.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   8/26/2021      AUD    63.64
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500   2/28/2012      USD     8.55

CRED SUIS NY             9.000  10/12/2012      USD    22.48
CRED SUIS NY             8.000  11/16/2012      USD    56.80
CYTOS BIOTECH            2.875   2/20/2012      CHF    68.36
UBS AG                  13.300   5/23/2012      USD     3.12
UBS AG                  13.700   5/23/2012      USD    11.14
UBS AG                  14.000   5/23/2012      USD     7.00
UBS AG                  10.960   7/20/2012      USD    22.79
UBS AG                  12.040   7/31/2012      USD    29.50
UBS AG                  11.760   7/31/2012      USD    25.45
UBS AG                   9.500   8/10/2012      USD    28.41
UBS AG                  15.240   8/23/2012      USD    27.47
UBS AG                  10.910    9/7/2012      USD    41.08
UBS AG                  10.200   10/1/2012      USD    71.89
UBS AG                  10.500  10/15/2012      USD    67.33
UBS AG                  12.350   3/27/2012      USD    23.65
UBS AG                  10.530   1/23/2012      USD    37.92
UBS AG                   8.380   3/20/2012      USD    32.03
UBS AG                   8.720   3/20/2012      USD    26.79
UBS AG                   9.250   3/20/2012      USD    11.24
UBS AG                  10.070   3/23/2012      USD    27.66
UBS AG JERSEY            3.220   7/31/2012      EUR    36.71
UBS AG JERSEY           10.140  12/30/2011      USD    14.50

ABBEY NATL TREAS         5.000   8/26/2030      USD    60.13
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         5.500   6/20/2013      EUR    59.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.500   6/21/2013      EUR    54.25
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         6.000   6/20/2014      EUR    48.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         3.875   9/17/2012      EUR    73.04
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.000  11/16/2012      EUR    66.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.400   2/12/2013      EUR    62.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         3.250   2/25/2013      EUR    59.00
BAKKAVOR FIN 2           8.250   2/15/2018      GBP    68.47
BAKKAVOR FIN 2           8.250   2/15/2018      GBP    68.70
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.359   3/27/2029      JPY    70.82
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.408    2/9/2027      JPY    75.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.000    6/3/2041      USD    70.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000   10/1/2012      USD     9.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC         14.000   10/1/2012      USD     9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.500  10/16/2012      USD     9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000  10/16/2012      USD    10.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.550   1/23/2012      USD    10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.350   1/23/2012      USD    26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.250   1/31/2012      USD     9.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC         12.950   4/20/2012      USD    23.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC         13.050   4/27/2012      USD    25.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000   6/29/2012      USD     9.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.000   7/20/2012      USD     7.77
BARCLAYS BK PLC          7.000   7/27/2012      USD     8.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC         11.500   7/27/2012      USD     7.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.400   7/31/2012      USD     9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.800   7/31/2012      USD    23.91
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000   8/28/2012      USD    10.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.250   8/31/2012      USD    31.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.500   8/31/2012      USD    22.20
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000   9/11/2012      USD     9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000   9/11/2012      USD     9.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000   9/28/2012      USD     9.78
BRADFORD&BIN BLD         4.910    2/1/2047      EUR    66.76
CEVA GROUP PLC          10.000   6/30/2018      EUR    55.38
CEVA GROUP PLC           8.500   6/30/2018      EUR    52.63
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.875   3/28/2033      GBP    66.43
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.750   12/2/2024      GBP    70.59
EFG HELLAS PLC           4.375   2/11/2013      EUR    54.92
EFG HELLAS PLC           6.010    1/9/2036      EUR    33.13
EFG HELLAS PLC           5.400   11/2/2047      EUR     8.63
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.000   2/28/2013      EUR    53.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.100   12/9/2021      EUR    14.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.350   7/22/2014      EUR    32.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.000   12/2/2021      EUR    14.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.000   12/2/2021      EUR    14.13
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.375   9/26/2031      GBP    62.13
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.875   2/15/2021      GBP    63.28
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.500   12/6/2018      GBP    70.13
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.875    5/9/2025      GBP    62.72
ESSAR ENERGY             4.250    2/1/2016      USD    65.57
EX-IM BK OF UKRA         5.793    2/9/2016      USD    71.76
F&C ASSET MNGMT          6.750  12/20/2026      GBP    65.08
GALA ELECTRIC CA        11.500    6/1/2019      GBP    69.46
GALA ELECTRIC CA        11.500    6/1/2019      GBP    72.00
HBOS PLC                 4.375  10/30/2019      EUR    71.20
HBOS PLC                 4.500   3/18/2030      EUR    59.35
HBOS PLC                 5.374   6/30/2021      EUR    68.91
INEOS GRP HLDG           7.875   2/15/2016      EUR    71.42
INEOS GRP HLDG           7.875   2/15/2016      EUR    71.81
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.975   9/15/2024      GBP    70.09
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         6.439   5/23/2020      EUR    69.19
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         6.385   5/12/2020      EUR    69.01
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         9.000   7/15/2029      GBP    74.68
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         8.500    6/7/2032      GBP    71.01
LOUIS NO1 PLC            8.500   12/1/2014      EUR    68.50
LOUIS NO1 PLC           10.000   12/1/2016      EUR    59.63
LOUIS NO1 PLC           10.000   12/1/2016      EUR    60.00
MATALAN                  9.625   3/31/2017      GBP    52.29
MATALAN                  9.625   3/31/2017      GBP    52.38
MAX PETROLEUM            6.750    9/8/2013      USD    52.85
NEW HOSPITALS ST         1.777   2/26/2047      GBP    58.54
NOMURA BANK INTL         0.800  12/21/2020      EUR    70.87
NORTH HOUSING            8.750   5/11/2037      GBP   144.35
NORTHERN ROCK            5.750   2/28/2017      GBP    70.58
NORTHERN ROCK            4.574   1/13/2015      GBP    84.95
OTE PLC                  4.625   5/20/2016      EUR    58.24
OTE PLC                  7.250    4/8/2014      EUR    67.80
OTE PLC                  5.000    8/5/2013      EUR    71.16
PIRAEUS GRP FIN          4.000   9/17/2012      EUR    63.79
PRIVATBANK               5.799    2/9/2016      USD    61.50
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         2.300  11/26/2024      JPY    74.98
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.625   9/22/2021      EUR    62.55
SPIRIT ISSUER            5.472  12/28/2028      GBP    68.68
THOMAS COOK GR           7.750   6/22/2017      GBP    74.00
TXU EASTERN FNDG         6.450   5/15/2005      USD     0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN           6.542   3/30/2021      GBP    69.75
UNIQUE PUB FIN           7.395   3/28/2024      GBP    45.00
UNIQUE PUB FIN           5.659   6/30/2027      GBP    62.00


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *