TCREUR_Public/111128.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, November 28, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 235

                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

DEXIA BANK: S&P Lowers Ratings on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
DEXIA CREDIT: S&P Lowers Subordinated Debt Ratings to 'B-'


B U L G A R I A

BDZ: To Seek Debt Deferrals; Strike May Prompt Bankruptcy
BULGARIAN DEV'T: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'


C R O A T I A

CREDO BANKA: Central Bank Revokes Operating License


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

MOBILKOM A.S.: Files for Insolvency Proceedings


F R A N C E

LA TRIBUNE: To File for Receivership on Dec. 19, Owner Says


G E R M A N Y

KLEOPATRA LUX: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
MANROLAND AG: Decline in Orders Prompts Insolvency Filing


H U N G A R Y

AVIATION GROUP: FlyBalaton Airport Under Liquidation
* HUNGARY: Moody's Downgrades Government Bond Rating to 'Ba1'


I C E L A N D

* REPUBLIC OF ICELAND: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative


I R E L A N D

MARQUETTE CLO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Caa1
WILLOW NO.2: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 36 Notes to 'B-'


I T A L Y

BERICA 6: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB+sf'
BERICA 6: S&P Retains 'CC' Rating on Class D Notes
PARMALAT SPA: US Court Upholds Dismissal of Grant Thornton Cases
SEAT PAGINE: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Agreement


K A Z A K H S T A N

DEV'T BANK: Fitch Affirms Rating on Long-Term IDR at 'BB'
MANGISTAU ELECTRICITY: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB'


L I T H U A N I A

BANKAS SNORAS: To File for Court Protection From Creditors


L U X E M B O U R G

ARM ASSET: Insetco Purchase Deal Likely to Collapse
BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR78.3-Mil. Notes to 'CCC'
DEXIA BANQUE: S&P Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
MOSELLE CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Two Note Classes From Caa1


N E T H E R L A N D S

AMSTERDAM AIRLINES: Declared Bankrupt by Court
ENDEMOL BV: Mediaset Makes Joint Bid with Clessidra


N O R W A Y

EKSPORTFINANS ASA: Moody's Downgrades Firm to Junk Status


P O R T U G A L

POLO SECURITIES: S&P Corrects Rating on EUR375MM Notes to 'B'


R O M A N I A

ODYSSEY COMMUNICATIONS: Officially Enters Insolvency


R U S S I A

FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Affirms E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
NS BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E+' BFSR to Negative
* KOSTROMA REGION: Fitch Rates RUB4 Billion Bond at 'B+(exp)'
* MOSCOW OBLAST: Moody's Raises Currency Ratings to 'Ba3'


S P A I N

FONCAIXA CONSUMU: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes
SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Assigns 'Ca' Rating to Serie C Notes
SANTANDER EMPRESAS: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating on Series C Notes


T U R K E Y

TOPLU KONUT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Currency Ratings
* REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating
* METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY: Fitch Affirms BB+/B Currency Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRAY ENG'G: Closed Down After Insolvency Service Investigation
CLARIS IV LTD: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class I-C Swap to 'B'
CORSAIR NO.4: Moody's Cuts Rating on US$150MM CSO Notes to 'B3'
COSALT PLC: In Urgent Financing Talks as Cash Dwindles
FLANAGANS FURNITURE: Closes Doors; 42 Jobs at Risks

INSPIRED EDUCATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on GBP352.25MM Bonds
STREAMLINE COMPUTING: In Liquidation Proceedings; Ceases Trading
THOMAS COOK: Nears GBP100-Mil. Loan Deal with Banks
THOMAS COOK: Fitch Puts 'BB' Long-Term IDR on Watch Negative


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 21 to November 25, 2011


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA BANK: S&P Lowers Ratings on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the subordinated debt
ratings of Dexia Bank S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB+'. The 'A-/A-2'
long-term and short-term issuer credit ratings remain on
CreditWatch with developing implications, where they were
placed on Oct. 6, 2011.

"The downgrade of the subordinated debt reflects our view of a
possibility that the EC could impose a debt restructuring
detrimental to the holders of Dexia Bank's regulatory capital,
including subordinated debtholders. The EC announced on Oct. 17,
2011, that it had opened an in-depth investigation into the
government support that the Dexia group entities were receiving
and mentioned that it would assess whether the new restructuring
plan ensured adequate burden sharing of the restructuring costs.
The subordinated debt is now rated one notch below the stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) of Dexia Bank," S&P said.

The Dexia S.A. group (Dexia; not rated) is undergoing a deep
restructuring, selling most of its commercial franchises and
receiving significant government support. Belgium-based Dexia
Bank was acquired by the Belgian government on Oct. 20, 2011. The
governments of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg have passed
legislation for a government guarantee scheme covering up to
EUR90 billion of new debt issuance from France-based Dexia Credit
Local and Dexia.

"The 'A-/A-2' ratings on Dexia Bank reflect our view that its
creditworthiness remains closely linked with that of Dexia's
operating subsidiaries. Although Dexia Bank is now wholly owned
by the Belgian government, it still has significant exposure to
other Dexia group entities. We note that Dexia Bank provided net
financing of EUR40 billion to other Dexia group entities at
year-end 2010, the last date at which this information is
publicly available," S&P said.

"The ratings on Dexia Bank reflect our assessment of the strong
support it is receiving from the Belgian government and which we
believe it is likely to continue to receive if necessary. As per
our criteria, we therefore include three notches of uplift above
the SACP in determining the long-term issuer credit rating on
Dexia Bank," S&P related.

"The SACP for Dexia Bank reflects our assessment of the bank's
satisfactory business position with a 15% domestic market share
of deposits, low-risk loan book, and adequate capitalization at
year-end 2010. It also takes into account our view of the
constraints linked to Dexia Bank's role as liquidity provider for
the Dexia group entities," S&P said.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement on Dexia Bank
once we have greater visibility about how it will manage its
exposures to the Dexia group entities," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch with developing implications indicates the
possibility of an upgrade or downgrade. We could upgrade Dexia
Bank if we believe the bank will proceed with a rapid reduction
of its exposure to Dexia group entities and if the bank's
financial profile remains satisfactory. We could downgrade Dexia
Bank if we believe that the difficulty of managing its large
exposure to Dexia group entities, combined with its own risk
positions, could hurt its financial profile," S&P related.


DEXIA CREDIT: S&P Lowers Subordinated Debt Ratings to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the CreditWatch
implications on the 'A-/A-2' issuer credit ratings on Dexia
Credit Local (DCL) to negative from developing, where they were
placed on Oct. 6, 2011, and lowered the subordinated debt ratings
to 'B-' from 'BBB+'.

"We have revised our assessment of the stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) for DCL to 'b+' from 'bbb-'. The change reflects our
opinion that DCL's funding and liquidity have become weak,
according to our criteria. Under our criteria, we cap the SACP on
banks we classify as having weak liquidity at 'b+'. At the same
time, we observe that the French, Belgian, and Luxembourg
governments have confirmed their willingness to extend
extraordinary government support, notably approving a guarantee
that will allow DCL and Dexia S.A. (Dexia; not rated) to issue up
to EUR90 billion in government guaranteed funds," S&P said.

"The lowering of the subordinated debt rating reflects our view
of a possibility that the EC could impose a debt restructuring
potentially detrimental to all holders of DCL's regulatory
capital, including subordinated debtholders. The EC announced on
Oct. 17, 2011, that it had opened an in-depth investigation into
the government support that the Dexia group entities were
receiving and mentioned that it would assess whether the new
restructuring plan ensured adequate burden sharing of the
restructuring costs. The subordinated debt is now rated two
notches below the SACP of DCL," S&P said.

"The revision of the CreditWatch implications to negative
reflects our assessment of the uncertainty regarding DCL's future
business position and the negative pressure arising from the
uncertainties regarding the bank's capacity to materially improve
liquidity, its future funding costs and profitability, and its
future adequacy of capital to absorb asset sales," S&P said.

The Dexia group is undergoing a deep restructuring, selling most
of its commercial franchises and receiving significant government
support. Belgium-based Dexia Bank was acquired by the Belgian
government on Oct. 20. Dexia is holding negotiations for the sale
of Luxembourg-based Dexia Banque Internationale a Luxembourg
(DBIL; A-/Watch Dev/A-2).

"The SACP incorporates our view that DCL has lost access to the
wholesale funding markets and that its liquidity is weak, with
high recourse to repurchase agreements, mainly with the European
Central Bank. In addition, DCL will have to be recapitalized in
the amount of EUR4.2 billion due to an impairment of EUR2.3
billion on its Greek sovereign-related debt. If the bank isn't
recapitalized, the exposure could lower DCL's capital below
minimum regulatory capital requirements. We believe that the
likely rise in DCL's interest costs, due to the high costs on new
wholesale issuance, potentially including government guaranteed
bonds, is likely to weaken DCL's financial profile," S&P stated.

"The 'A-/A-2' ratings on DCL reflect our assessment of the
potential for strong short-term extraordinary support from the
Belgian, French, and Luxembourg governments in the form of
government-guaranteed issues, and our belief that the governments
are likely to provide further support if necessary. As per our
criteria, we therefore include seven notches of uplift above the
SACP in determining the long-term issuer credit rating on DCL.
The French and Belgian governments and local public authorities
control about 50% of Dexia's capital," S&P said.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement once we have
greater visibility about the future business position of DCL and
on the terms and the proceeds of the sale of the other Dexia
entities, and its effect on the financial profile of DCL," S&P
said.


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B U L G A R I A
===============


BDZ: To Seek Debt Deferrals; Strike May Prompt Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------------
FOCUS News Agency reports that Bulgarian Transport Minister
Ivaylo Moskovski is to negotiate deferrals with the creditors of
the Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) over the state of the company.

"The German fund is an engagement shifted to the German
government, since there is state insurance, which concerns the
German budget and the four banks with the debenture loan.  If no
variant for a deferral is found, the situation will become
critical.  There is no pressure on their part yet. There are
clear parameters of the talks.  I believe I will persuade them
that the measures, we are undertaking, are a guarantee enough
that next year the company will be either even out or with
minimum operational loss," FOCUS quotes the minister as saying.

Asked whether he was aware of the exact number of the protesters
among the railway workers, the minister, as cited by FOCUS, said
he was engaged with much more important issues such as the talks
with the creditors.

                             Strike

In a separate report, Novinite.com relates that Vladimir
Vladimirov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of BDZ Holding,
said the company can only last ten days on strike.

According to Novinite.com, in a Friday interview for the
Bulgarian National Television (BNT), Mr. Vladimirov warned that
if the protests lasted longer, the company will lose its
customers permanently and could go bankrupt.

Mr. Vladimirov also informed that BDZ's creditors had stepped up
pressure on the company's management over the strike,
Novinite.com notes.  He said that Bulgarian Transport Minister
Ivaylo Moskovski had been summoned to Germany over the walk-out
because part of the credit risk for the purchase of the Siemens
trains had been covered by Berlin, Novinite.com discloses.  He
also made it clear that the bondholders had sent a letter last
week, demanding an exhaustive list of BDZ's pledged assets with
documents certifying the current status, according to
Novinite.com.

November 25 marked the second day of the nationwide strike of
Bulgarian railway workers, Novinite.com discloses.

According to Novinite.com, BDZ employees have said they are set
to strike every day from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. until they
resolve their differences with the government and at least reach
a compromise.

BDZ's staff rose in revolt against the intention of the company's
management to lay off at least 2, 000 employees of the company,
and to reduce the number of trains in operation in Bulgaria by
about 150, as part of a wider reform package unveiled in October
2011, Novinite.com recounts.

Established in 1885, The Bulgarian State Railways, commonly known
as BDZ, is Bulgaria's state railway company and the largest
railway carrier in the country.  The company's headquarters are
located in the capital Sofia.


BULGARIAN DEV'T: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Bulgarian Development Bank's (BDB)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB-', Short-Term IDR
at 'F3', Individual Rating at 'D', Support Rating at '2' and a
Support Rating Floor at 'BBB-'.  The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR
is Positive.

BDB's IDRs and Outlook are aligned with the Bulgarian sovereign.
They reflect the high probability of support given the bank's
99.9%-ownership by the Bulgarian government, its core development
mandate and function as a governmental policy instrument as well
as the legal framework governing the bank.  They also reflect the
bank's relatively small size and track-record of operating with
low leverage, and hence the small size of any potential support,
if required, from the sovereign.  A change in the bank's Long-
term IDR could result from a change in Fitch's view of the
sovereign's ability or willingness to support the bank, or a
change in the bank's current role.

The bank reports solid profitability indicators compared to the
Bulgarian bank sector average (operating profit/average total
assets at end-Q311: 6.9%; sector: 0.9%).  These are driven by
wide net interest margins, themselves derived from low funding
costs and the higher-yielding SME loan book which accounts for a
third of the bank's earning assets.  Development Finance
Institutions remain a key source of long-term funding for the
bank.  The bank does not accept retail deposits.  The bank's high
reported regulatory capital ratios (Tier 1 ratio at end-June
2011: 63.1%) indicate the bank is positioned for growth.

Impaired loans (loans overdue by 90 days) increased to 8.9% of
the gross SME loan book at end-Q311 (end-2010: 7.9%).  This ratio
however remains better than the sector average of 14.5%, in part
due to BDB's less seasoned portfolio.  The agency does not expect
improvements in asset quality in 2012, due to a challenging
operating environment for SMEs, and the bank's planned shift to a
"smaller" and possibly riskier SME borrower.  This shift however,
will help ease the current obligor concentration levels, which
remain high (the top 20 loans accounted for 62% of the end-Q311
gross SME loan book).

BDB's mandate is to provide loan financing to domestic SMEs,
either directly, or through the provision of wholesale earmarked
funding for SMEs through local commercial banks.  The bank also
acts as the preferred agent for various government lending
programs, including the assimilation of EU funds.  The bank has
two wholly-owned subsidiaries, the National Guarantee Fund and
the JOBS Microfinance Institution.


SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Societe Generale Expressbank AD's
(SGE) and Allianz Bank Bulgaria AD's (ABB) Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+'.  At the same time, the Outlook
on ABB's Long-Term IDR has been revised to Stable from Positive.
SGE's Long-Term IDR Outlook remains Positive.

The two banks' IDRs and Support Ratings reflect the high
probability of support from their major shareholders, namely
Societe Generale ('A+'/Stable; 99.7% stake in SGE) and Allianz SE
('AA-'/Stable, 66% stake in Allianz Bulgaria Holding that
controls ABB). SGE's Long-term IDR is constrained by Bulgaria's
Country Ceiling of 'BBB+'.  The Positive Outlook on SGE's Long-
Term IDR reflects the Outlook on the sovereign (Long-term foreign
currency IDR 'BBB-'/Positive), and therefore the potential for
the Bulgarian sovereign ratings and Country Ceiling to be
upgraded.

The revision of ABB's Outlook to Stable reflects a reassessment
by Fitch of the long-term strategic importance of the bank to
Allianz SE, in particular taking into account the parent's sale
of its banking subsidiaries in Poland and Hungary in 2010, due to
poor performance.  This would make an upgrade of the Long-term
IDR, and hence a Positive Outlook on the 'BBB+' Long-term IDR,
inappropriate for ABB.  At present Allianz does not appear to
have the intention to dispose of ABB.  However, in the agency's
opinion, whether ABB remains a group entity in the long term will
depend to a significant degree on the bank's own performance and
ability to contribute to the profitability of Allianz's insurance
business in Bulgaria.

At the same time, the affirmation of ABB's 'BBB+' Long-term IDR
reflects the currently close cooperation with, and tight
oversight of ABB, by the broader group.  Fitch views Allianz as
having a high propensity to support ABB as long as the latter
remains a group entity.

SGE's 'bb' Viability Rating (VR) reflects the bank's stronger-
than-sector asset quality and performance and limited market
risk.  However, it also takes into account the limited franchise
and high borrower concentration in the loan book, only adequate
capitalization (Tier 1 ratio of 11.20% at end-H111) for the
Bulgarian market, and still high, albeit decreasing, dependence
on parent funding.

SGE's non-performing loans (NPLs; loans overdue 90 days)/gross
loans ratio stood at 4.6% at end-Q311, compared to the Bulgarian
banking sector's average of 14.5%.  In Fitch's view, this is a
result of SGE's limited exposure to crisis-hit sectors (in
particular real estate and construction) as well as stringent
credit underwriting policies.  Fitch expects asset quality to
stabilize at current levels, unless the eurozone crisis leads to
a sharper than currently expected slowdown in the Bulgarian
economy.  Impairment coverage of NPLs was a reasonable 87% at
end-Q311.  Performance ratios have improved, supported by a wider
net interest margin driven by the lower cost of deposits, and the
decreasing cost of risk.

Credit concentrations are a concern, with the top 20 on- and off-
balance sheet exposures reaching almost three times the bank's
equity.  While larger loans have performed well to date, any
future problems could have a significant impact on capital, given
that the bank targets maintaining capital ratios close to
regulatory recommended (Tier 1 of 10%) and minimum levels.  SGE's
loans/deposits ratio was a high 149% at end-Q311, although recent
deposit growth has reduced the reliance on parent funding.

ABB's 'bb-' VR reflects the bank's narrow franchise and
significant loan book concentrations, as well as the recent
deterioration in asset quality.  The top 20 borrowers accounted
for a large 177% of equity at end-H111, while NPLs rose to 8.7%
of the portfolio at end-Q311, from 6.4% at end-2010.
Restructured loans accounted for 8.4% of the portfolio at end-
Q311, the majority of which were performing.

However, funding and liquidity is a credit strength, with the
loans/deposits ratio standing at a low 81% at end-H111,
significantly better than for the Bulgarian banking sector as a
whole (109%) while customer deposits represented 89.4% of the
non-equity funding.  ABB's capitalization is adequate, with a
regulatory Tier 1 ratio of 14.5% at end-H111, although impairment
coverage of NPLs was a moderate 60.9%.

The rating actions are as follows:

SGE:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+' Outlook Positive
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

ABB:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+' Outlook changed to Stable
     from Positive
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'


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C R O A T I A
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CREDO BANKA: Central Bank Revokes Operating License
---------------------------------------------------
Tanjug, citing Zagreb-based daily Jutarnji List, reports that the
Croatian National Bank has revoked the operating license of Credo
Banka and launched the liquidation of the first bank in Croatia
to go bankrupt since the beginning of the economic crisis.

Credo Banka was established in 1993 and makes for 0.44% of the
Croatian banking sector's transactions, Tanjug discloses.  Given
the size, says Tanjug, the bank's bankruptcy should not have
significant effects on the domestic banking system.

The deposits in the bank amounted to HRK465 million.  The CNB
said in a release that the deposits were insured by the State
Agency for Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation and the
depositors would have the money at their disposal.

Based in Split, Croatia, Credo banka d.d. provides banking
services to individual and corporate customers in the Republic of
Croatia and internationally.


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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MOBILKOM A.S.: Files for Insolvency Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
Telegeography reports that MobilKom A.S., trading as U:fon, has
filed a petition to start insolvency proceedings, laying the
blame for its woes squarely at the door of the regulator, the
Czech Telecommunication Office (CTU), which it claims repeatedly
delayed its competitive entry into the GSM market.

Telegeography relates that the company has reportedly initiated
its own insolvency proceedings in the wake of its failure to
adequately redress its poor credit history.  During the course of
the financial restructuring though, the operator said that
services to existing and new customers will remain unaffected,
the report notes.

The group's owner, Divenno Cyprus Holdings Limited operating via
another Czech operator Dial Telecom, which took over from Penta
Investments in July 2011, is backing the recovery plan, according
to the report.

Telegeography, citing IHNED.cz, discloses that MobilKom owes an
unspecified amount of money to the China Development Bank and was
required to repay a sum thought to be in the hundreds of
thousands of euros.

The report states that the cellco currently offers CDMA-based
services that are incompatible with the GSM standard employed by
its three larger rivals -- Telefonica O2 CR, T-Mobile, and
Vodafone -- but has been frustrated in efforts to launch its own
GSM service or offer a MVNO service.  For two years, the operator
has been unsuccessful in petitioning the CTU for new frequencies
to support not only 2G voice but also LTE data services, the
report relays.

According to the Telegeography, MobilKom's sales and marketing
director David Spies -- David.Spies@ufon.cz -- said the
regulator's heel-dragging is one of the big reasons for the firm
becoming insolvent.

                           About MobilKom

Based in Czech Republic, MobilKom, a.s., is a mobile operator
offering mobile internet and voice services under its U:fon brand
launched in May 2007.  The company was founded in March 1993 as a
joint-venture of Motorola Inc., ConnecTel Inc. and KonekTel, for
the purpose of operation of public radio networks in the Czech
Republic.


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F R A N C E
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LA TRIBUNE: To File for Receivership on Dec. 19, Owner Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Rudy Ruitenberg, Valerie Decamp, La
Tribune's owner, told Le Figaro in an interview that the French
daily newspaper will file for receivership on Dec. 19.

Ms. Decamp said in the interview that she has two candidates to
buy the newspaper, Bloomberg relates.  The unnamed potential
purchasers have until Dec. 16 to make their bids, Bloomberg
discloses.  Ms. Decamp told Le Figaro that the Paris commerce
tribunal will examine offers at the start of January and
designate a bidder by the second half of the month, Bloomberg
notes.

Ms. Decamp wrote in La Tribune on Friday that the daily is
suffering from the effect of two major crises in 36 months,
according to Bloomberg.

La Tribune is a French financial newspaper.


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G E R M A N Y
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KLEOPATRA LUX: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based packaging manufacturer
Kleopatra Lux 1 S.a.r.l (known as Kloeckner Pentaplast) to 'CCC-'
from 'CCC+'. The outlook is negative.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Kloeckner Pentaplast's
operating performance has been weaker than expected in the
financial year to Sept. 30, 2011, while covenant test levels have
tightened and foreign currency volatility has added further
pressure. EBITDA headroom on the quarterly debt leverage covenant
test date of Sept. 30, 2011, was just 0.6%, and we anticipate a
potential covenant breach in the near term as test levels
continue to tighten each quarter. Furthermore, Kloeckner
Pentaplast's capital structure remains highly leveraged, a
position that we consider to be unsustainable over the near term.
Consequently, we believe the group faces a heightened risk of a
debt restructuring," S&P said.

"The rating on Kloeckner Pentaplast continues to reflect our view
of its highly leveraged capital structure and significant
exposure to volatile input prices. Kloeckner Pentaplast had total
adjusted debt of about EUR1.5 billion (including preferred equity
certificates) as of Sept. 30, 2011, and in our view adjusted
debt to EBITDA is likely to remain above 10x over the near term,"
S&P said.

"We consider these weaknesses to be partly offset by Kloeckner
Pentaplast's niche leading market positions in Europe and North
America for polyvinylchloride-based and PET-based rigid film. The
group also has broad geographic diversity and a diverse customer
base," S&P related.

"In our view, there is heightened risk of a covenant breach, and
of a debt restructuring, by Kloeckner Pentaplast in the near
term," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating upon an announcement of a debt
restructuring. Alternatively, we could consider taking a positive
rating action if Kloeckner Pentaplast were to restore an adequate
cushion of about 15%-30% headroom under its financial covenants.
Such an action could be further accelerated by improved free cash
flow generation," S&P said.


MANROLAND AG: Decline in Orders Prompts Insolvency Filing
---------------------------------------------------------
Sheenagh Matthews and Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News report
that Manroland AG filed for insolvency, in Germany's biggest
corporate failure since retailer Arcandor AG collapsed two years
ago.

Manroland filed to open insolvency proceedings with the district
court in Augsburg, Germany, Bloomberg says, citing court
spokesman Alfred Schwarz.

The company said Werner Schneider was appointed as insolvency
administrator, Bloomberg relates.

"The decision to file for insolvency was triggered by another
dramatic downturn in incoming orders which can be noticed since
mid-July and has recently accelerated," Bloomberg quotes
Manroland as saying in a statement.  "Customers are finding it
far more difficult to obtain financing in the aftermath of the
financial crisis."

Manroland's annual sales have fallen by more than half since 2006
to EUR942 million (US$1.25 billion) last year, pushing the
company to an operating loss, Bloomberg discloses.  The company
has responded by cutting its workforce by almost one-fifth and
putting one-third of its remaining employees on shorter hours,
Bloomberg states.

Allianz, based in Munich, holds 75% of Manroland's share capital,
while German heavy-truck maker MAN SE owns almost 23%, Bloomberg
discloses.  Allianz is also the biggest investor in Heidelberger
Druck, Bloomberg notes.  The insurer tried and failed two years
ago to combine the two companies, Bloomberg recounts.

"All solutions failed because of a lack of financial support,"
Juergen Kerner, deputy chairman of Manroland's supervisory board,
as cited by Bloomberg, said in a statement on Friday.  "A
potential investor surprisingly withdrew.  But especially the
owners MAN and Allianz were not prepared to provide more
support."

Manroland said that the company has filed a request for self-
administration to complete restructuring efforts, and
Frank Kebekus was appointed as general representative for the
revamp, Bloomberg relates.  The company said that management aims
to rescue key units, Bloomberg notes.

Manroland AG is a German printing-machine maker.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


AVIATION GROUP: FlyBalaton Airport Under Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------
According to Hungary Around the Clock, Nepszabadsag reports that
liquidation procedures have been launched against FB Airport Ltd,
operator of FlyBalaton airport in Sarmellek.  A similar procedure
is under way against Aviation Group, the owner of FB Airport, the
report says.

The news agency says the tax authority is investigating the
Aviation Group finances.  The airport at Lake Balaton has been
out of operation since October.  MFB Hungarian Development Bank
has lent over HUF1 billion to Fly Balaton, the report notes.


* HUNGARY: Moody's Downgrades Government Bond Rating to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Hungary's government
bond rating by one notch to Ba1 from Baa3, and is maintaining a
negative outlook.

The key drivers for the downgrade and negative outlook are:

1) The rising uncertainty surrounding the country's ability to
meet its medium-term targets for fiscal consolidation and public
sector debt reduction, particularly given Hungary's increasingly
constrained medium-term growth prospects.

2) The increased susceptibility to event risk stemming from the
government's high debt burden, heavy reliance on external
investors and large financing needs as the country enters a
period of heightened external market volatility.

Moody's believes that the combined impact of these factors will
adversely impact the government's financial strength and erode
its shock-absorption capacity. The rating agency's decision to
maintain a negative outlook on Hungary's ratings is driven by the
uncertainty surrounding the country's ability to withstand
potential event risks emanating from the European sovereign debt
crisis.

Moody's has also downgraded by one notch to Ba1 from Baa3 the
foreign-currency debt rating of the National Bank of Hungary
(NBH) given that the Republic of Hungary is legally responsible
for the payments on NBH's bonds.

Rationale for Downgrade

The first driver of the downgrade is the uncertainty surrounding
the Hungarian government's ability to meet its targets on fiscal
consolidation and public sector debt reduction over the medium
term, in view of higher funding costs and the low-growth
environment. Hungary's general government debt ratio at 81% of
GDP in 2010 is materially higher than the Baa3 median. Although
the government has committed to reduce general government debt to
50% of GDP by 2018, the government's medium- term strategy to
achieve this goal remains unclear and reliance on one-off
measures to date, such as the liquidation of pension funds
assets, will not improve debt sustainably in the long term. While
the budget for 2012 is targeting a headline deficit of 2.5% of
GDP through a combination of structural reforms and ad-hoc
revenue-generating measures, Moody's believes that the
government's ability to achieve these targets will be constrained
by the higher cost of funding and a low-growth environment.
Similarly, the Convergence Programme envisages a 2.2% GDP deficit
target in 2013, but there is limited visibility on how the
government plans to achieve these targets in a low-growth
environment.

Moody's expects the medium-term growth trajectory of the country
to be increasingly constrained by both domestic and external
factors, which, as noted above, add to the implementation risks
of the deficit and debt reduction plan. Having recorded subdued
growth levels for several years prior to the global crisis,
Hungary's economy contracted sharply in 2009 and has recovered
only partially since then. Moody's has revised its growth
forecast for 2011 and 2012 to 1.5% and 0.5% respectively, down
from 2.7% and 2.6%. Domestically, weak demand resulting from the
deleveraging process in the private sector, along with structural
constraints such as high unemployment and low labour
participation, will further constrain the country's medium-term
growth potential. Externally, Hungary is affected by weakened
growth prospects among its main trading partners, particularly
Germany, and also by the crisis-driven impact on exchange and
interest rates. Finally, Moody's believes that the banking
system's ability to assist growth by extending credit will be
constrained by rising non-performing loans (NPLs), recent
government measures affecting banks profitability, and the
reduced ability of foreign parent banks to provide liquidity
support to their Hungarian operations.

The second driver of the action is the country's vulnerability to
external shocks stemming from the government debt structure,
which could in turn expose the government to funding cost
pressures. Approximately, 64% of general government debt is held
by non-residents, of which two thirds is denominated in foreign
currency. Moreover, the government's gross borrowing needs will
be significant in the next three years. The country's general
debt dynamics are already strongly affected by the weakness in
the Hungarian forint (HUF), and uncertainty over the
effectiveness of economic policy could further erode market
confidence. This is already reflected in a substantial increase
in yields over the course of 2011, resulting in a higher cost of
debt on new issuance. Moody's also notes that the banking system
and private sector also carry substantial external debt, adding
to the country's vulnerability to adverse foreign exchange rate
movements. At an expected 131% of GDP in 2011, Hungary's external
debt is very high, relative to the Baa3 median.

Moody's notes that Hungary's recent requests for assistance from
the IMF and the EU illustrate the funding challenges facing the
country. Negotiations with the IMF and EU have yet to begin, but
the government has stated its desire to negotiate a funding
safety net without conditionality. If negotiated successfully,
such an arrangement could help to alleviate immediate funding
challenges. However, Moody's believes that, even with such an
arrangement, the government's debt structure will remain
vulnerable to shocks in the medium term, which are inconsistent
with a Baa3 rating.

As a result of the rating action, Moody's has also downgraded
Hungary's country ceiling for foreign-currency debt (to A3 from
A1) and for foreign-currency bank deposits (to Ba2 from Baa3), as
well as the country ceiling for local-currency debt and bank
deposits (to A2 from Aa3).

What Could Move the Rating Up/Down

Moody's would consider a further downgrade of Hungary's
government debt rating if there is a significant decline in
government financial strength due to a lack of progress on
structural reforms and implementation of the medium-term plan.
Such a decline could be accompanied by lasting exchange-rate
pressures or rising financing costs.

Conversely, Moody's would consider stabilizing the outlook on the
government's Ba1 bond ratings (potentially leading to an eventual
ratings upgrade over the longer term) if the country were to
embark on a sustainable consolidation path, involving a more
consistent implementation of the medium-term plan and the
Convergence Programme -- possibly supported by a resumption of
robust economic growth -- which would stabilize government
financial strength on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2008.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


* REPUBLIC OF ICELAND: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to stable from
negative its outlook on the Republic of Iceland. "At the same
time, we affirmed our long- and short-term sovereign credit
ratings at 'BBB-/A-3'. The transfer and convertibility assessment
is 'BBB-'," S&P said.

"The ratings on Iceland are constrained by high external and
public-sector debt that we believe could become heavier still, if
not for capital controls limiting residents' ability to invest
overseas and nonresidents' ability to exchange krona holdings for
foreign currencies," S&P said.

"The ratings are supported by what we view as Iceland's
relatively prosperous and flexible economy, and its institutional
capacity to address its financial sector problems and build an
environment more conducive to sustainable economic growth," S&P
related.

Both the merchandise trade and the cash current accounts are
operating surpluses, supported by 20% year-on-year nominal export
growth (including manufacturing exports). Within the context of
controls on capital convertibility, these surpluses and recent
external borrowings have enabled the central bank to accumulate
gross foreign-exchange reserves amounting to an estimated 50% of
GDP, and usable foreign-exchange reserves of just under 30% of
GDP. While Iceland's unemployment is up sharply compared with
pre-crisis levels, at 6.6% it is still below that of most other
advanced economies.

"In our view, exceptionally lax financial sector oversight
contributed to the boom-bust cycle in Iceland. That said, other
long-standing economic policies have served the economy well.
These include measures to ensure high labor-market participation;
at 85%, Iceland's is the highest in Europe and one of the highest
in the world," S&P said.

"We project Iceland's GDP will expand during 2011, after
contracting by more than 10% between 2009 and 2010. Over the
medium term, planned energy-intensive investment projects and
related exports will likely contribute to further GDP growth, in
our view. With this expected growth and continued fiscal
consolidation, we estimate that the government will reach a
primary surplus in 2011. This will likely result in the net
general government debt burden trending downward from 2012.
Including IMF loans and Norwegian lending to the central bank,
and assumed drawdown of all remaining available bilateral
financing by the end of 2011, we forecast gross general
government debt to peak at 130% of GDP, and net debt to peak at
about 76%, in 2011, when assets in the form of foreign-exchange
reserves are netted out. Our forecast includes a central
government additional capital injection into Ibudalanasjodur
(Housing Financing Fund) (HFF; BB/Negative/B) and local
government support of Reykjavik Energy (not rated)," S&P related.

"Iceland continues to follow its adjustment program after
successfully returning to international capital markets in June
2011. We expect Iceland will draw on its remaining bilateral
funding from the Nordic countries and Poland to boost its foreign
exchange reserves in anticipation of its gross reserves declining
as pay-outs associated with bankrupted banks commence in 2012. A
Supreme Court decision in November 2011 to uphold depositors'
priority claims on old banks' assets will also reduce the
potential liabilities to the government related to Icesave. We
expect assets from the former Landsbanki to cover almost all of
the claims the U.K. and the Netherlands have in relation to
Icesave deposit guarantees, and we expect payments will start in
2012," S&P said.

"In 2011, the three largest domestic banks and HFF have made
significant progress in restructuring their household and
corporate loans. We expect nearly all loans will be restructured
by mid-2012. We anticipate nonperforming loans would remain high,
however, until the Icelandic economy returns to sustained growth.
In our view, business investment will likely pick up, from a
very low base, when banks return to normal lending operations,"
S&P said.

"If global demand were to weaken in 2012, we would expect the
Icelandic economy to remain relatively resilient as its export
volume is capped by capacity constraints. This means it is less
subject to any volume contraction as a consequence of weakening
external demand. Nevertheless, a deterioration in Iceland's terms
of trade could depress wages in the export sector and thus
weaken overall domestic demand," S&P said.

"The stable outlook balances our view of Iceland's improved
economic fundamentals with downside risks associated with capital
controls being lifted in the next few years," S&P said.

"We could consider raising the ratings on Iceland if, in
attracting further foreign investment, its economic growth
potential is boosted and external vulnerabilities are reduced. In
this scenario, we would anticipate public and external debt
declining more rapidly than we currently assume, thereby helping
to create favorable conditions for a smooth lifting of Iceland's
capital controls. This would likely strengthen Iceland's credit
standing," S&P said.

"We could consider lowering our ratings on Iceland if net
government debt levels increase significantly on further fiscal
slippage resulting from political tensions, higher-than-expected
support of the banking sector, or substantial currency
depreciation as capital controls are lifted," S&P said.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


MARQUETTE CLO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Marquette US/European CLO, P.L.C.:

  US$103,905,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22,
  2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$11,545,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22,
  2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR86,151,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes
  Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$2,550,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22,
  2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR7,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes
  Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
  Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$10,000,000 Class C-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR7,937,000 Class C-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$9,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR7,540,000 Class D-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$3,000,000 Class E-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR2,381,000 Class E-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
  2020, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3
  (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance, including principal proceeds, of $309
million, no defaulted par, a weighted average default probability
of 18.5% (implying a WARF of 2831), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 49.3%, and a diversity score of 58. Moody's
generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by assuming
the worse of reported and covenanted values for all collateral
quality tests. However, in this case given the limited time
remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to certain covenant requirements, as
seen in the actual collateral quality measurements. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Marquette US/European CLO, P.L.C., issued in July 2006, is a
multicurrency collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans denominated in US Dollars and
Euros.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
factor, weighted average coupon, and diversity score. However,
Moody's considered weighted average life and weighted average
spread levels better than the covenant levels given the limited
time in the deal's reinvestment period.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the redit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

4) Currency Exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-
USD denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rates
may have an impact on interest and principal proceeds available
to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.


WILLOW NO.2: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 36 Notes to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
three European collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches.

Specifically, S&P:

   Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
   two tranches; and

   Raised its rating on one tranche.

"The rating actions follow our recent rating actions on the
collateral, underlying collateral, or guarantor. According to the
transaction documents, the ratings on these tranches are weak-
linked to the rating on the underlying collateral, reference
obligation, or guarantor. Under our criteria applicable to
transactions such as these, we would generally reflect changes to
the rating on the collateral, reference obligation, or guarantor
in our rating on the tranche (see 'Related Criteria And
Research')," S&P said.

Ratings List

Class              Rating
            To                From

Ratings Lowered and Removed from CreditWatch Negative

Signum Verde Ltd.
CLP5.3 Billion Fixed-Rate Secured Inflation-Linked
and Credit-Linked To Cemex Notes Series 2007-03

            B- (sf)           B (sf)/Watch Neg

Willow No.2 (Ireland) PLC
EUR6.85 Million Secured Limited Recourse Notes Series 36

            B (sf)            A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Raised

Signum Verde Ltd.
CLP4.95 Billion Fixed-Rate Secured Inflation-Linked and
Credit-Linked to Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. and Petrobras
International Finance Notes Series 2007-04

            BBB (sf)          BBB- (sf)


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BERICA 6: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB+sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Berica 6 Residential MBS Srl (Berica
6) and removed the Rating Watch Negative (RWN), as follows:

  -- Class A2 (ISIN IT0004013790): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; off RWN;
     Outlook Stable

  -- Class B (ISIN IT0004013808): affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWN;
     Outlook Stable

  -- Class C (ISIN IT0004013816): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; off RWN;
     Outlook Negative

The removal from RWN and affirmation follows the originator's
repurchase of defaulted loans, as well as the restructuring of
the waterfall, which has resulted in the issuer trapping excess
spread (ES).

Fitch placed Berica 6 on RWN on June 30, 2011 due to concerns
about the deteriorating pool performance which had led to
continuous cash reserve (CR) draws and a reduction in the credit
enhancement (CE) levels available to the rated notes.  The CE is
provided by subordination and CR.

In September 2011, the originators bought back EUR39 million of
defaulted mortgage loans and amended the interest priority of
payments to allow the issuer to trap net ES generated by the
transaction structure.  Any proceeds remaining upon the payment
of interest on the unrated and uncollateralized junior notes,
junior expenses and swap termination payments, will be allocated
to the CR.  As a result, at the October 2011 interest payment
date, proceeds remaining from the purchase of defaulted mortgages
were used to replenish the CR to its target amount (EUR16.7
million, 2.6% of the outstanding notes).  In addition, the excess
amounts following payments junior in the waterfall, where trapped
in the CR, causing it to reach 6.5% of the outstanding notes.

The agency notes that, in the absence of net ES, the additional
CE provided by the ES trapping mechanism, would only be
temporary, as it is expected to be gradually eroded by the junior
items in the waterfall, which it is also supposed to cover.  In
addition, such ES trapping ranks junior to any swap termination
payments, should they occur.

Following the replenishment of the CR to its target amount, all
pro-rata conditions were met in October 2011.  As long as the CR
is fully funded and there is no outstanding PDL, the notes will
continue to amortize on a pro rata basis.

Fitch views the replenishment of the CR to its target amount as
positive.  However, given the current level of 90 days+ arrears
(4.4% of the current portfolio balance), the historical roll-
through rate of defaults and the temporary nature of the
additional CE provided by the trapped ES, Fitch believes that the
credit profile of the notes has not significantly improved from
the point when they were placed on RWN.  For these reasons Fitch
has removed the RWN and affirmed the notes.


BERICA 6: S&P Retains 'CC' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l.'s class A2, B, and C notes,
following its review of the transaction. The rating on the
class D notes is unaffected.

Delinquencies in the underlying portfolios, from both an absolute
and relative standpoint, have been fairly high during the life of
the transaction. As of the end of the latest collection period in
October 2011, mortgage loans in arrears for more than 90 days
were 4.0% of the performing pool, slightly up from 3.7% in July
2011. Cumulative gross defaults began to show some signs of
flattening out throughout 2011 and currently represent 6.3% of
initial balance, up from 6.2% in July 2011.

Banca Popolare di Vicenza restructured Berica 6 Residential MBS
in September 2011, which involved:

    The repurchase of the whole amount of defaulted mortgages;
    and

    The amendment of the interest priority of payments, by adding
    an item that, as long as senior notes are outstanding,
    diverts the funds that were originally directed toward the
    payment of the class E additional return. Those funds are now
    credited to the cash reserve account (potentially above its
    target level).

As a consequence of this, as of Oct. 2011, the transaction
featured a EUR26.3 million cash reserve, up from EUR4.5 million
in July 2011.

"The review does not rely on the full reserve amount: We only
gave credit to EUR16.6 million -- i.e., its current target level
-- due to the item being junior in the interest priority of
payments to expenses we cannot size for (for instance, the
termination payments due to the swap counterparty)," S&P said.

"Credit enhancement for all rated classes shows a positive trend.
The credit analysis we carried out returned default figures in
line with those at closing (this being due to the fact that,
according to Italian criteria, we allow for higher penalties
being assumed on loans in arrears). Loss given default severities
were lower that those at closing," S&P said.

"The rating on the class D notes, which addresses ultimate
payment of both interest and principal, is unaffected following
our review. On the October 2011 interest payment date (IPD), due
to the extraordinary amount of funds coming in from the
originator's repurchase of defaulted loans and thus entering the
interest priority of payments, the accrued but unpaid interest
for the class D notes was eventually paid out. On forthcoming
IPDs, we will assess under which rating scenario the class D
notes will fulfill the obligation their rating addresses," S&P
said.

Berica 6 Residential MBS is an Italian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in February
2006.  Banca Popolare di Vicenza, a mid-size bank, originated the
underlying mortgage loans.

Ratings List

Class         Rating

Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l.
EUR1.441 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
(Plus An Overissuance Of EUR8.565 Million
Mortgage-Backed Deferrable-Interest Class D Notes)

Ratings Affirmed

A2            AAA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)
C             BBB+ (sf)

Rating Unaffected

D             CC (sf)


PARMALAT SPA: US Court Upholds Dismissal of Grant Thornton Cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York has reaffirmed his decision to take two
cases by Parmalat S.p.A. and Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd.
against Grant Thornton LLP in Illinois in 2004 and 2005,
Bloomberg News reported on August 31, 2011.

Judge Kaplan dismissed the two lawsuits in 2009.

Parmalat and PCFL appealed Judge Kaplan's judgment and asked the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to determine whether
the New York District Court (i) erred in exercising jurisdiction
over their claims, pursuant to Section 1334(b) of the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedures Code, and (2) properly declined to
abstain from exercising that jurisdiction, pursuant to Section
1334(c)(2).  The appeal also challenged the rulings made by the
New York District Court and by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.

The Second Circuit remanded the cases back to the District Court
to determine whether federal law required him to abstain from
taking them in favor of the Illinois courts.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that
can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about
40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter,
cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable
sauces, soups and juices.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on Dec. 24, 2003.  Dr.
Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in each of
the cases.  The Parma Court declared the units insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi, on behalf of the Italian entities,
sought protection from U.S. creditors by filing a petition under
Sec. 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
04-14268).

Parmalat's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
Feb. 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary Holtzer,
Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal & Manges
LLP, represented the U.S. Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed
for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million
in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Three special-purpose vehicles established by Parmalat S.p.A. --
Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd., and Food
Holdings Ltd. -- commenced separate winding up proceedings before
the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and
James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman) Ltd. were appointed liquidators
in the cases.  On Jan. 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed a Sec. 304
petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-10362).  Gregory M.
Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and Richard
I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon, Herlands Randolph,
represented the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304 case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases and Sec. 304 cases.  In 2007, Parmalat obtained a
permanent injunction in the Sec. 304 cases.


SEAT PAGINE: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Agreement
-----------------------------------------------------
Chiara Remondini and Elisa Martinuzzi at Bloomberg News reports
that Seat Pagine Gialle SpA reached an agreement in principle on
the restructuring of its debt.

Bondholders proposed Nov. 4 to write down some of their EUR1.3
billion (US$1.7 billion) of debt in exchange for a 90% stake in
Seat Pagine, Bloomberg relates.

"The agreement on the new debt structure is very positive news,"
Bloomberg quotes Marco Greco, an analyst at Mediobanca SpA, as
saying in a note on Friday.  "However, the most important point
-- allocation of equity in the company post-restructuring -- is
still pending and the time left is only one week.  If there is no
agreement, then the company is due to become insolvent and would
eventually put under bankruptcy procedures."

Last month, Seat Pagine said it would take advantage of a 30-day
grace period to skip a EUR52 million coupon payment due Oct. 31
on its Lighthouse junior bond, Bloomberg recounts.  According to
Bloomberg, under the agreement reached on Thursday, the coupon
will be paid by Nov. 30.  The company requested that all parties
enter into a "lock-up" agreement to hold their securities,
Bloomberg discloses.

"This is an extremely challenging timetable," Seat, as cited by
Bloomberg, said in a statement on Thursday.  "The company urges
all stakeholders to use every effort to ensure" they meet the
deadline.

                       About Seat Pagine

Seat Pagine Gialle SpA (PG IM) -- http://www.seat.it/-- is an
Italy-based company that operates multimedia platform for
assisting in the development of business contacts between users
and advertisers.  It is active in the sector of multimedia
profiled advertising, offering print-voice-online directories,
products for the Internet and for satellite and ortophotometric
navigation, and communication services such as one-to-one
marketing.  Its products include EuroPages, PgineBianche,
Tuttocitta and EuroCompass, among others.  Its activity is
divided into four divisions: Directories Italia, operating
through, Seat Pagine Gialle; Directories UK, through TDL
Infomedia Ltd. and its subsidiary Thomson Directories Ltd.;
Directory Assistance, through Telegate AG, Telegate Italia Srl,
11881 Nueva Informacion Telefonica SAU, Telegate 118 000 Sarl,
Telegate Media AG and Prontoseat Srl, and Other Activitites
division, through Consodata SpA, Cipi SpA, Europages SA, Wer
liefert was GmbH and Katalog Yayin ve Tanitim Hizmetleri AS.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 4,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Italy-based international publisher of
classified directories SEAT Pagine Gialle SpA to 'CC' from
'CCC+'.  S&P said that the outlook is negative.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


DEV'T BANK: Fitch Affirms Rating on Long-Term IDR at 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on Development Bank of
Kazakhstan (DBK) and KazAgroFinance's (KAF) Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to Positive from Stable.  At the same
time, the agency has affirmed DBK's Long-term foreign currency
IDR at 'BBB-' and Long-term local currency IDR at 'BBB', and
affirmed KAF's Long-term IDR at 'BB'.

The rating actions follow the agency's upgrade of Kazakhstan's
Long-term foreign and local-currency IDRs to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
and to 'BBB+' from 'BBB', respectively, on November 21, 2011.
The Outlooks on Kazakhstan's IDRs are Positive.

DBK's ratings reflect Fitch's view of the very strong propensity
of the Kazakh authorities to provide support in case of need.
This view is based on DBK's ultimate sovereign ownership, its
important policy role as a development institution, the close
association with the government and a solid track record of
capital support.

At the same time, Fitch believes that DBK's increasingly
leveraged balance sheet and the now more material volumes of the
bank's wholesale debt warrant a minimum one-notch difference
between the ratings of the sovereign and the bank, in particular
at higher rating levels, where successive notches on the rating
scale capture ever smaller differences in default probability.
DBK's wholesale debt had risen to US$4.3 billion at end-H111,
which is significant compared to gross government external debt
(end-2011 forecast:US$5.3 billion), but still less than 3% of
GDP.

KAF's ratings reflect Fitch's view of the strong propensity of
the Kazakh authorities to provide support in case of need.  This
takes into account the company's full (albeit indirect)
government ownership, its policy role in the agricultural sector,
its small size (and hence low cost of any support required), the
track record of government assistance to date and the low
leverage with which the company operates.

However, the lower level of KAF's ratings relative to DBK
reflects the somewhat greater uncertainty about the provision of
government support due to its less prominent policy role, lower
importance for the country's economy and financial system, less
close association with the Kazakh authorities, the indirect
nature of government ownership and the possibility for other
government-controlled entities to take over KAF's functions, in
case of need.

DBK was founded to foster the growth of non-extracting industries
in Kazakhstan.  Its owner, the National Welfare Fund Samruk-
Kazyna, is wholly owned by the state.  DBK's Basel I tier I
capital ratio fell to 17% at end-H111 as a result of losses and
business expansion, a level which is at best adequate given the
bank's unseasoned, concentrated and high-risk credit exposures,
and its plans for further growth.

KAF is a non-banking financial institution providing loans and
finance leases mainly to the domestic agricultural industry. KAF
is a subsidiary company of the state-owned JSC National Holding
Kazagro.  The company's equity/assets ratio stood at a high 55%
at end-2010.  Fitch expects credit growth to be moderate in the
near term, although currently high levels of non-performing and
restructured credit exposures could result in partial capital
erosion.

The rating actions are as follows:

DBK

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '2'

  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BBB-'

  -- Senior unsecured Long-term rating affirmed at 'BBB-'

KAF

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

  -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- National Long-term rating affirmed at 'A(kaz)'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'

  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB'


MANGISTAU ELECTRICITY: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Mangistau Electricity Distribution
Company JSC's (MEDNC) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BB', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B',
Long-term local currency IDR at 'BB+' and National Long-term
Rating at 'AA-(kaz)'.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs and on
the National Long-term rating has been revised to Positive from
Stable.  The agency also affirmed MEDNC's senior unsecured
foreign currency and local currency ratings at 'BB' and 'BB+',
respectively.

The rating action follows the periodic rating review of MEDNC and
also reflects the agency's upgrade of Kazakhstan's Long-term
foreign and local currency IDRs to 'BBB' from 'BBB-' and 'BBB+'
from 'BBB', respectively on November 21, 2011.  The agency has
maintained the Positive Outlooks on Kazakhstan's Long-term IDRs.

MEDNC's ratings are linked to those of Kazakhstan, but notched
down by three notches to reflect that little indication has been
given by MEDNC's parent, JSC Samruk-Energo (S-E), that it will
provide timely financial assistance to MEDNC in case of need.
Fitch views MEDNC's standalone business and financial profile as
commensurate with a weak 'BB-' rating.  The Positive Outlook on
MEDNC's National scale rating reflects the agency's recalibration
of Kazakhstan's National ratings scale following the sovereign
ratings upgrade.

The increased notching between the sovereign ratings and MEDNC's
ratings reflect the fact that S-E did not provide tangible
financial assistance to MEDNC in the past two years.
Additionally, MEDNC's dividend payout for 2010 increased to 100%
of net income from 50% in prior years, despite the company's
significant capex requirement.

S-E is not actively pursuing the reduction in its stake in MEDNC.
However, MEDNC is not viewed as strategic.  The ratings are based
on the assumption that S-E will retain at least majority
ownership of MEDNC over the rating horizon.

MEDNC's credit profile is supported by its near-monopoly position
in electricity transmission and distribution in the Region of
Mangistau ('BB+'/Stable), one of Kazakhstan's strategic oil & gas
regions.  It is also underpinned by prospects for economic
development and expansion in the region, in relation to both oil
& gas and transportation, the cost-plus-based tariff mechanism
under which it operates and its expected decrease of leverage as
its domestic bonds are due to mature by 2014.  MEDNC also
benefits from limited foreign exchange and interest rate risks.

The ratings are constrained by MEDNC's small scale of operations
limiting its cash flow generation capacity, high exposure to a
single industry (oil & gas) and, within that, high customer
concentration (the top three customers represented over 60% of
FY10 revenue).  The latter is mitigated by solid credit quality
and the customers' state ownership.

In 2010, MEDNC discontinued direct electricity sales.  The agency
views this as credit neutral because the contribution to revenues
was marginal.

MEDNC's liquidity is adequate for the next 18 months, comprising
solely cash (the company does not have any available credit
lines).  As of September 30, 2011, its cash balance stood at
KZT1,943 million.  Most of MEDNC's debt was represented by four
unsecured fixed-rate bonds (for a total of KZT2.8 billion).  The
bonds mature at the rate of one each year between 2011 and 2014.
The rest of the debt is represented by 25-year interest-free
loans provided by MEDNC's customers to co-finance new network
connections.  However, such customers' contributions were
cancelled starting from January 1, 2009. Fitch forecasts positive
free cash flow for 2011.


=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


BANKAS SNORAS: To File for Court Protection From Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------
Milda Seputyte at Bloomberg News reports that Lithuania's central
bank said Bankas Snoras AB, Lithuania's fifth biggest bank by
assets, is insolvent and will file for court protection from
creditors to avoid a costly bailout for taxpayers.

According to Bloomberg, the central bank said in a statement that
the bank's financial situation is "worse than previously
identified" and saving the bank "would cost significantly more
and would take longer than the available liquidity" at Snoras.

Governor Vitas Vasiliauskas said at a news conference on Thursday
that some LTL3.4 billion (US$1.3 billion) in assets are missing,
Bloomberg relates.

"There's no sense in putting money into a plane that's not going
to fly," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Vasiliauskas as saying.  "We don't
see any other healthy way on how to resolve the problem other
than by liquidating the bank.  We have stumbled into potentially
illegal activity."

Former shareholders Vladimir Antonov and Raimondas Baranauskas
were detained in London on Thursday after Lithuanian prosecutors
issued an arrest warrant on suspicion of fraud and embezzlement,
Bloomberg recounts.

                      No International Aid

According to Bloomberg, Finance Minister Ingrida Simonyte said at
a conference in Vilnius on Thursday that Lithuania won't require
international aid to deal with the situation at Snoras.

Snoras's Latvian subsidiary Latvijas Krajbanka AS, the country's
sixth biggest deposit bank, said LTL100 million (US$190.7
million) was also missing, Bloomberg notes.  Ms. Simonyte, as
cited by Bloomberg, said that Krajbanka is also likely to be
liquidated.

In a Nov. 24 report, Bloomberg News' Ms. Seputyte disclosed that
Ms. Simonyte said Snoras is insolvent as liabilities exceed the
lender's assets.  She told lawmakers in Vilnius on Thursday that
the government will not cover the bank's losses because the
problems were caused by the bank's management and not by economic
difficulties.

                       Shareholder Arrests

In a separate report, Bloomberg News' Erik Larson relates that
Messrs. Antonov and Raimondas told a U.K. judge they were
innocent of Lithuanian allegations of fraud and embezzlement that
pushed the bank into insolvency.

Mr. Antonov, 36, and Mr. Baranauskas, 53, were granted bail by
Judge Caroline Tubbs at a hearing in London on Friday, Bloomberg
recounts.

Mr. Antonov "strenuously denies dishonesty in any of his
dealings," Rachel Scott, his lawyer, told the court, according to
Bloomberg.  "He doesn't impose a serious flight risk."

Mr. Antonov, the owner of the Portsmouth football club in
southern England, will be released on bail of GBP75,000
(US$116,000) and must report to a police station near his home in
the Notting Hill region of London three times a week, Bloomberg
discloses.

The judge, as cited by Bloomberg, said Mr. Baranauskas's ties to
the community aren't as strong as Mr. Antonov's and he must post
bail of GBP200,000 and report to a London police station every
day.  Both men have to turn in their passports, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Antonov's law firm, Mishcon de Reya, will post a surety for
both men, Bloomberg states.  They will have to return to court
for another hearing on the Lithuanian extradition request next
month, Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, U.K. prosecutor Natalie Soule said that
the men are accused of stealing about LTL879 million (US$388
million) through forgery and misappropriation.  Ms. Soule said
that they allegedly forged documents to show false deposits in
unspecified Swiss banks, Bloomberg notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 22,
2011, Bloomberg News related that the government took over Snoras
on Nov. 16 after the central bank discovered that about EUR300
million (US$405 million) of assets may be missing and the lender
was at risk of insolvency.  The country's Prosecutor General
opened an investigation into possible fraud and embezzlement,
Bloomberg disclosed.  Lawmakers approved legislation on Nov. 17
allowing the government to split Snoras into two banks, with good
and bad assets, Bloomberg recounted.

Bankas Snoras AB is Lithuania's fifth biggest lender.  Snoras
held LTL6.05 billion in deposits and had assets of LTL8.14
billion at the end of September.  It competes with Scandinavian
lenders including SEB AB, Swedbank AB (SWEDA), and Nordea AB.  It
also controls investment bank Finasta and Latvian lender Latvijas
Krajbanka AS.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ARM ASSET: Insetco Purchase Deal Likely to Collapse
---------------------------------------------------
FTAdviser reports that Insetco, the company that has offered to
buy the assets of failed life settlement fund ARM Asset Backed
Securities, has said the deal is likely to collapse.

The report relates that the AIM-listed group said that in spite
of majority support from ARM's bondholders for the deal, the
terms of the deal are unlikely to be met by the deadline date of
November 30.

The announcement puts ARM on the verge of liquidation, FTAdviser
reports.

According to the report, the deal will lapse from December 1
unless the negotiations, which also include the Luxembourg
financial regulator the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur
Financier, can be extended.

"Negotiations are continuing between the parties, and with the
relevant regulatory bodies to seek an appropriate extension to
the agreement," Insetco said in a statement, according to
FTAdviser.

"It is anticipated that should the acquisition agreement lapse,
whilst further discussions will continue between the parties with
a view to eventual re-engagement, the suspension from trading in
[Insetco's] shares on AIM will be lifted and trading will be
restored."

Roughly 1,500 UK investors placed GBP36 million in ARM's
Luxembourg-domiciled life settlements portfolio, FTAdviser
discloses.  FTAdviser recalls that ARM was suspended from making
any income payments to investors by the CSSF on August 29, having
been hit by liquidity issues during the summer.

According to the report, the CSSF has also claimed that ARM
continued to collect money from investors in spite of not being
permitted to trade in Luxembourg, and has been issuing bonds
without permission for two years.

Earlier this month, the FSA, in cooperation with the CSSF, froze
a number of HSBC and NatWest bank accounts while a decision was
made as to the status of investor cash yet to be invested in ARM
assets, FTAdviser recalls.

FTAdviser discloses that the CSSF has appointed accountancy firm
Ernst & Young as supervisory commissioner to ARM Asset Backed
Securities.

E&Y will now take all decisions relating to the operation and
future of the ailing life settlements fund on behalf of the CSSF,
which may mean managing the fund into a controlled liquidation
now that the Insetco deal has fallen through, the report adds.

ARM Asset Backed Securities S.A. is a Luxembourg based special
purpose vehicle managed by Intertrust Management Ireland Limited.


BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR78.3-Mil. Notes to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Breeze Finance S.A.'s (Breeze 3)
class A and B bonds as follows:

  -- EUR244.6mm class A (XS0294895999) downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BB-'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR78.3mm class B (XS0294895726) downgraded to 'CCC' from
     'B-'; Outlook Negative

The downgrades reflect Fitch's downwards adjustment of its energy
production expectations for the Breeze's wind farm portfolio.
The transaction's stressed financial position is further hindered
by its unfavorable structural features, namely the uniform
principal repayment amount at the April and October payment dates
and the subordination of the class A debt service reserve account
(DSRA) replenishment to class B debt service.  The Negative
Outlooks on both classes of notes primarily reflect the current
lack of clarity on the possible consequences on Breeze 3 of the
German insolvency law provisions regarding the concept of "over-
indebtedness" (Ueberschuldung).

The energy yield in H111 appears to have recovered from the
historical low of 2010 and is in line with H109.  However, even
if 2009's energy yield was to be replicated, this would represent
a shortfall of 19% and 12% below the P50 and P90, respectively.
Fitch notes that wind energy production data across Germany
suggest that the current wind conditions are materially below
historical averages.  However, the transaction's consistent
underperformance for four consecutive years suggests that the
likelihood of a reversion towards materially stronger energy
yield levels is low.

Consequently, the agency adjusted its energy production
assumptions bringing the Fitch adjusted P50 projections in line
with the 2008 actual production (544GWh).  The resulting debt
service coverage is particularly weak for class B (0.98x in
Fitch's adjusted P50 scenario), which is expected to continue to
defer interest -- or a portion thereof -- and principal.  A total
of EUR7.6 million of principal has been deferred to date.

Class A has proven to be relatively resilient, with full debt
service payments also met at the particularly testing October
2010 payment date without the need to draw on the cash reserve.
Under Fitch's base case, the average debt service coverage ratio
for class A is 1.33x. However, this does not reflect the effect
of seasonality, in that the issuer is expected to have to draw on
the debt service reserve in order to meet the debt service in
full on the October payment dates from 2016 onwards.  The
downgrade reflects class A's exposure to the risk that
particularly weak wind conditions during summer months, coupled
with a decrease in availability due to the ageing of the wind
turbines, may result in increased debt service shortfalls.  As
the replenishment of class A's cash reserve is structurally
subordinated to debt service on class B, it is not expected that
amounts drawn would be paid back.

Additional uncertainty arises from the effect of the insolvency
law provisions referring to the concept of "over-indebtedness"
(Ueberschuldung) on the German Breeze 3 borrower.  These
provisions foresee that if a German legal entity is either unable
to pay its obligations when due, or if its liabilities exceed its
assets (as is currently the case of the German Breeze 3
borrower), then management must put in place solutions such as a
formal subordination of debt repayments in order to avoid the
legal obligation to file for insolvency.  The overindebtedness
provisions were relaxed by the German Parliament in 2008, when
the test for "over-indebtedness" was mitigated by adding an
exception in the case of an overall positive prognosis for
business continuation.

The relaxation of the insolvency law applies up to December 31,
2013 and ensures Breeze 3's compliance with legal requirements.
Fitch is aware that the market expectation is for the revised
provisions to remain in place or at least for the 2013 time limit
to be extended.  The current lack of clarity on the extent of the
remedies that the German Breeze 3 borrower may eventually need to
put in place to preserve its solvency position is the main driver
behind the Negative Outlook assigned to the notes.

Breeze 3 is a Luxembourg SPV that issued three classes of notes
on April 19, 2007 for an aggregate issuance amount of EUR455
million to finance the acquisition and completion of a portfolio
of wind farms located in Germany and France, as well as
establishing various reserve accounts.  The notes will be repaid
from the cash flow generated by the sale of the energy produced
by the wind farms, mainly under regulated tariffs.


DEXIA BANQUE: S&P Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the subordinated debt
ratings of Dexia Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (DBIL) to
'BB+' from 'BBB+'. The 'A-/A-2' ratings on DBIL remain on
CreditWatch with developing implications, where they were placed
on Oct. 6, 2011.

"The downgrade of the subordinated debt reflects our view of a
possibility that the EC could impose a debt restructuring
detrimental to the holders of DBIL's regulatory capital,
including subordinated debtholders. The EC announced on Oct. 17,
2011, that it had opened an in-depth investigation into the
government support that the Dexia group entities were receiving
and mentioned that it would assess whether the new restructuring
plan ensured adequate burden sharing of the restructuring costs.
The subordinated debt is now rated one notch below the stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) of DBIL," S&P said.

The Dexia S.A. group (Dexia; not rated) is undergoing a deep
restructuring, selling most of its commercial franchises and
receiving significant government support. Belgium-based Dexia
Bank was acquired by the Belgian government on Oct. 20, 2011. The
governments of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg have passed
legislation for a government guarantee scheme covering up to
EUR90 billion of new debt issuance from France-based Dexia Credit
Local and Dexia S.A. (Dexia; not rated).

"We base the 'A-/A-2' ratings on Luxembourg-based DBIL on our
view that its creditworthiness remains closely linked with that
of Dexia's operating subsidiaries. Although Dexia is holding
talks to sell DBIL, the outcome is unclear and the activities to
be sold are not yet known," S&P said.

"The ratings on DBIL reflect our opinion of its high systemic
importance for the domestic banking system and the strong support
it is likely to receive from the Luxembourg government if it
would be necessary. As per our criteria, we therefore include
three notches of uplift above the SACP in determining the long-
term issuer credit rating on DBIL," S&P said.

"The SACP of DBIL reflects our assessment of the bank's business
position with 15% domestic market share in deposits, low-risk
loan book, and adequate capitalization on June 30, 2011, the last
date at which information is publicly available. It also takes
into account our assessment of the constraints linked to the
small size of its banking market, the confidence-sensitivity of a
portion of its client base in offshore private banking, and a
large securities portfolio subject to market risks," S&P said.


MOSELLE CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Two Note Classes From Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Moselle CLO S.A.:

  EUR85,500,000 Class A-1E Floating Rate Notes due 2020 (current
  balance of EUR73,719,763), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
  June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Upgrade;

  US$85,500,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2020 (current
  balance of $73,719,763), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
  June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Upgrade;

  EUR35,500,000 Class A-1LE Variable Principal Notes due 2020
  (current balance of EUR30,608,790), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade;

  US$35,500,000 Class A-1LE Variable Principal Notes-2 due 2020
  (current balance of $30,608,790), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade;

  EUR13,750,000 Class A-2E Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$13,750,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR6,800,000 Class A-3E Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$6,800,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade;

  EUR16,000,000 Class B-1E Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
  Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  US$16,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded
  to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
  Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from Moody's revised CLO assumptions described
in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in June 2011. The primary changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as
(2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased recovery
rate assumptions.

Moody's also notes that the rating actions reflect the
deleveraging of the Class A-1E Notes, Class A-1L Notes, and Class
A-LE Variable Principal Notes, which have been paid down by
approximately 11% or EUR21.4 million in total (based on the
EUR/USD exchange rate in the October 20, 2011 trustee report)
since the last rating action in September 2009. The deleveraging
was a result of paydowns of the senior notes due to
overcollateralization ratio failures. As a result of the
deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the last rating action in September 2009. As of the latest
trustee report dated October 20, 2011, the Senior Class A, Class
A and Class B-1 overcollateralization ratios are reported at
121.52%, 114.90%, and 112.30%, respectively, versus July 2009
levels of 110.60%%, 105.06% and 103.23%, respectively, and all
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR284.8 million,
defaulted par of EUR0.9 million, weighted average default
probability of 19.19% (implying a WARF of 2773), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.66%, and a diversity
score of 69. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to certain covenant requirements, as seen in the actual
collateral quality measurements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function
of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Moselle CLO S.A., issued in October 2005, is a multicurrency
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans denominated in U.S. dollars and Euros.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

3. Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

4. Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
current market value.

5. Currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-
USD denominated assets and liabilities. A material mismatch
between the non-USD assets and the non-USD liabilities may affect
the expected loss of rated tranches.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AMSTERDAM AIRLINES: Declared Bankrupt by Court
----------------------------------------------
According to SeeNews, Laurens Pit, who represented most of
Amsterdam Airlines' staff as the claimant, as cited by news
agency ANP, said that the airline has been declared bankrupt by
the court in Amsterdam.

Amsterdam Airlines is a Dutch charter airline.


ENDEMOL BV: Mediaset Makes Joint Bid with Clessidra
---------------------------------------------------
Salamander Davoudi and Guy Dinmore at The Financial Times report
that Mediaset, Silvio Berlusconi's media empire, has put in a
joint bid for Endemol, together with Clessidra, the Italian
private equity group.

Mediaset, which confirmed the bid submission, already owns
approximately one-third of Endemol and has long planned to invest
more money in the company to establish a clear role in running
it, the FT notes.

However, a deal could be months away as Endemol is going through
a large restructuring of its EUR2.8 billion net debt following a
breach of banking covenants, the FT states.  The company is
considering a debt-for-equity swap and lenders are understood to
prefer selling the company after the restructuring of its debt,
the FT discloses.

Mediaset, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, and Cyrte, the
investment company of Endemol co-founder Jon de Mol, bought
Endemol for EUR3.4 billion in 2007, but were caught out by the
crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which had
handled the sale, the FT recounts.

Creditors have spent months haggling over the EUR2.8 billion net
debt, which is supported by earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortization estimated at between EUR135 million
and EUR150 million this year, the FT relates.

According to the FT, two people familiar with the situation have
said that the company and its lenders plan to write to
prospective bidders to say that the business was unlikely to be
sold at the moment.  Talks to secure agreement around a debt-for-
equity swap are ongoing and aim to cut its EUR2.8 billion debt to
about EUR500 million, the FT says.

Endemol's largest creditors include the private equity funds
Apollo Management, Centerbridge and Providence Equity Partners,
and banks including Barclays, Goldman Sachs, Royal Bank of
Scotland and the Lehman estate, the FT discloses.

The FT notes that one person familiar with the discussions has
said the funds have agreed a restructuring with Goldman Sachs and
Cyrte but are still in talks with Lehman and RBS.

Endemol B.V. -- http://www.endemol.com/-- is one of the world's
leading producers of TV programs best known for its output of hit
reality-based programming and game shows such as Deal or No Deal,
Big Brother, and Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.  The production
company also creates scripted dramas and soap operas, and
develops digital content for online distribution.  It has more
than 2,000 programming formats in its library and exports shows
to more than 25 countries around the world.  Formed in 1994,
Endemol is owned by a consortium led by private equity firm
Goldman Sachs and Italian television company Mediaset.


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


EKSPORTFINANS ASA: Moody's Downgrades Firm to Junk Status
--------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that credit ratings
agency Moody's Investor Services Inc. cut Norway's Eksportfinans
ASA to junk, noting that the Norwegian government's takeover of
its export finance scheme leaves the company without a viable
business model.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


POLO SECURITIES: S&P Corrects Rating on EUR375MM Notes to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected an error by raising
its issue ratings to 'B' from 'B-' on the EUR375 million senior
secured notes due June 2014 issued by Polo Securities II Ltd.
(Polo II), and on the EUR400 million senior secured notes (EUR100
million due 2013 and EUR300 million due 2015) issued by Polo III
- CP Finance Ltd. (Polo III). These notes are insured by MBIA
U.K. Insurance Ltd (B/Negative/--). Polo II and Polo III are
financing vehicles for Portuguese national railway operator
Comboios de Portugal E.P.E (CP; B-/Watch Dev/--). "According to
our criteria, the issue rating on a monoline-insured debt
obligation is the higher of the rating on the monoline and
Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR) on the notes. Our SPUR
on the notes is equalized with our senior unsecured debt rating
on CP," S&P said.

"On Aug. 8, 2011, we lowered the ratings on CP to 'B-' and placed
it on CreditWatch with developing implications. At that time, the
ratings on the notes were mistakenly lowered to 'B-/Watch Dev'
from 'B+/Watch Neg' to reflect the SPUR on the notes. As per our
criteria, the rating should have been lowered to 'B' to reflect
the higher rating on the monoline. The press release corrects
this error. The ratings on CP are unaffected by its action," S&P
said.

Ratings List

Upgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                        To                 From
Polo Securities II Ltd.
Senior Secured (1 issue)               B                  B-
/Watch Dev

Polo III - CP Finance Ltd.
Senior Secured (1 issue)               B                  B-
/Watch Dev


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


ODYSSEY COMMUNICATIONS: Officially Enters Insolvency
----------------------------------------------------
Business Review, citing data from the Trade Registry, reports
that Odyssey Communications S.R.L. has entered insolvency
officially.

Business Review says the advertising agency's creditors will meet
in January.

According to Business Review, paginademedia.ro reported that the
agency must pay several million of euro for advertising Adevarul
Holding products.  Among others, approximately EUR1.5 million to
EUR2 million it owes to Pro TV, EUR200,000 to Splendid Media (the
agency that sells advertising space for TVR 1), and EUR150,000 to
Clir Media (the agency that sells advertising for Radio Romania
Actualitati and Radio ZU).

Business Review states that Odyssey committed to pay in
installments the debts by the middle of November.  However, in
the meantime, it became insolvent, the report notes.

New Age Media Advertising Agency in Craiova last year requested
the insolvency of Odyssey for a debt of EUR18,000.  However, the
debt was paid and the file was closed, Business Review recalls.

Odyssey Communications S.R.L. is a Romania-based advertising
agency. Businessman Dinu Patriciu owns 60 percent stake in the
company while Diana Flutur, manager of the agency, holds the
remaining 40 percent.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Affirms E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed First Republic Bank's
(FRB) E+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) --
mapping to B3 on the long-term scale -- and B3 local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings. The outlook on FRB's ratings remains
negative.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the affirmation of FRB's ratings and the
negative outlook reflect the ongoing weakness in FRB's credit
profile within its current rating level, evidenced by (i)
deteriorating revenue generation and cost management, with a
return on assets of 0.16% and cost-to-income ratio exceeding 100%
at end-Q3 2011; (ii) declining capital adequacy, as the equity-to
assets ratio decreased to 7.5% at end-Q3 2011 from 8.4% at year-
end 2010; and (iii) high borrower concentrations, as its top 20
credit exposures account for over 300% of its equity.

According to Moody's, FRB's E+ BFSR is constrained by the bank's
small size and undeveloped franchise; however, the rating is
supported by its acceptable liquidity position to date.

FRB's B3 global local-currency deposit rating does not
incorporate any systemic support given its relatively small size
and limited importance to the Russian banking system.
Consequently, FRB'S local-currency deposit rating is in line with
its B3 standalone credit strength.

Moody's says that FRB's ratings currently have limited upside
potential. Positive rating pressure is possible if FRB
significantly improves its earnings generation and operational
efficiency, and demonstrates much stronger capitalization.

The ratings could be downgraded if FRB's capitalization and
profitability demonstrate further material weakening from current
levels. Also, any substantial weakening of its liquidity position
due to an outflow of customer funds may have negative rating
implications.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, FRB reported total assets of
US$791.3 million and total capital of US$59.6 million at end-Q3
2011, according to its regulatory reports. The bank reported net
income of US$0.96 million for the first nine months of 2011.


NS BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E+' BFSR to Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to negative
from stable on NS Bank's (formerly Independent Building Bank or
IBB) standalone E+ bank financial strength rating (BFSR) -- which
maps to B3 on the long-term scale -- and B3 local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the change of outlook on the bank's ratings
reflects the growing negative pressure on its credit profile,
driven by (i) increasing credit-risk concentration, as the 20
largest credit exposures account for over 550% of NS Bank's
equity; (ii) mediocre profitability and cost management, with a
return on assets (ROA) of 0.92% and a cost-to-income ratio
exceeding 70% at end-Q3 2011; and (iii) weak capital adequacy
with an equity-to-assets ratio of 6.6% at end-Q3 2011.

According to Moody's, the E+ BFSR is constrained by NS Bank's
small size and undeveloped franchise, modest financial
performance, weak capitalization and high borrower
concentrations. However, NS Bank's acceptable liquidity position
to date provides a degree of support to the BFSR.

The B3 global local-currency deposit rating does not incorporate
any systemic support, given NS Bank's relatively small size and
limited importance to the Russian banking system. Consequently,
its local-currency deposit rating is in line with the B3
standalone credit strength.

Moody's says that NS Bank's ratings currently have limited upside
potential. A positive rating pressure is possible if NS Bank
significantly improves its capitalization, earnings generation
and operational efficiency.

The ratings could be downgraded if its capitalization weakens
further from current levels. Also, any substantial weakening of
NS Bank's liquidity position due to an outflow of customer funds
may have negative rating implications.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, NS Bank reported total assets of
US$924.4 million and total capital of US$61 million at end-Q3
2011, according to its regulatory reports. NS Bank reported net
income of US$6.4 million for the first nine months of 2011.


* KOSTROMA REGION: Fitch Rates RUB4 Billion Bond at 'B+(exp)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Russian Kostroma region's upcoming
RUB4bn domestic bond issue, due November 17, 2016, an expected
Long-term local currency rating of 'B+(exp)' and an expected
National Long-term rating of 'A(rus)(exp)'.

The region has Long-term local and foreign currency ratings of
'B+' and a National Long-term rating of 'A(rus)'. The Long-term
ratings both have Stable Outlooks.  The region's Short-term
foreign currency rating is 'B'.

The bond issue has a 9.5% fixed-rate coupon.  The principal will
be amortized by 27.5% of the initial bond issue value on
November 21, 2013, by 37.5% of the initial bond issue value on
August 21, 2014, and by 27.5% of the initial bond issue value on
August 20, 2015.  The remaining 7.5% will be redeemed on
November 17, 2016.  The proceeds from the bond issue will be used
to refinance maturing debt and to fund capital expenditure.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.


* MOSCOW OBLAST: Moody's Raises Currency Ratings to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the global-scale foreign
and local-currency ratings of Moscow Oblast to Ba3 from B1. The
outlook on the ratings is positive.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade in Moscow Oblast's ratings is supported by its
improving operating balances, solid financing surplus anticipated
in 2011 and decreasing debt position, produced by continuing
economic growth in the region and growing tax receipts. "These
positive financial results reflect conservative fiscal management
capable to address the region's challenges of inherited budget
imbalances, high off-balance liabilities and overall high debt
burden," says Alexander Proklov, a Moody's Vice President -
Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Moscow Oblast.

"The austerity measures implemented by the regional government,
coupled with high tax receipts have brought debt to around 40-42%
of its operating revenue in 2011, down from 63% in 2010," says
Mr. Proklov. At the same time, tax revenue growth of around 20%
for 2011 should boost the operating surplus to around 15% of
operating revenues. "Additionally, federal support in the forms
of low-interest bearing loans, transfers and lending through
state-owned banks have facilitated the budget readjustments,"
adds Mr. Proklov.

The region has streamlined and balanced its debt structure
towards increasing the share of federal soft-lending with rather
smooth maturity profile. Despite this progress, the region still
has relatively short maturities, which incur refinancing risk.
"Going forward, the Moscow Oblast's capacity to meet refinancing
needs at affordable rates and the central government's
willingness to retain its support to the region beyond 2011
remain core factors in the stability and potential progress of
the rating," says Mr. Proklov.

The region's tax revenues remain potentially volatile and could
sharply drop in a global and national economic slowdown, whilst
operating expenditure is more rigid, dominated by salaries,
social obligations and other politically sensitive spending
items. "The relatively diversified economy, with its strong
tertiary sector, as well as its proximity to the City of Moscow,
mitigates some national volatility; but overall the potential
economic weakness remains a constraining factor for the region's
credit profile," concludes Mr. Proklov.

What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down

Moody's positive outlook reflects the agency's view on the
regional government's capacity to maintain stable and positive
operating margins, which may ensure a strengthening liquidity
position. A further decline in Moscow Oblast's debt burden and an
improving debt maturity profile will also be considered as
positive rating drivers during Moody's rating monitoring over
next 12-18 months.

However, repeated weakening of the Oblast's budget and debt
management, coupled with substantial debt growth and material
deterioration in borrowing conditions may lead to a change in the
outlook back to stable and may ultimately exert downward pressure
on the ratings.

The methodologies used in this rating were Regional and Local
Governments Outside the US published in May 2008, and The
Application of Joint-Default Analysis to Regional and Local
Governments published in December 2008.

Moscow Oblast is located in the area surrounding the City of
Moscow. With 6.8 million inhabitants, it accounts for 4.8% of the
total population of Russia, and contributions 5% to the total
national GDP.


=========
S P A I N
=========


FONCAIXA CONSUMU: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Foncaixa Consumo 1, FTA's asset-backed
floating-rate notes, due on March 2053, expected ratings, as
follows:

  -- EUR2,618.0mm class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR462.0mm class B: 'BB+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

This is the first consumer securitization originated in Spain by
CaixaBank, S.A. (CaixaBank, 'A'/Negative/'F1') and rated by
Fitch.

The expected ratings address timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal on the class A and B notes in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the documentation.
If cumulative defaults on the assets are above 10%, the interest
on the class B notes may be deferred, which would imply that the
interest on class B would rank below the principal due amount
under the notes in the transaction's priority of payments.

The notes will be collateralized by a static pool of real estate
secured consumer and unsecured consumer loan receivables, so the
transaction will start to amortize from closing. The provisional
portfolio consists of 310,750 loan contracts, with an outstanding
principal balance of EUR3,478.2 million.  It is highly granular
and has an average seasoning of 42 months.  The loans have been
granted by CaixaBank for consumer purposes such as family and
home (56%), vehicle acquisition (26%), and others purposes (18%).

CaixaBank provided loan-by-loan information on the collateral
(including internal one-year PD estimates), vintages for real
estate secured consumer and unsecured consumer loan receivables
on defaults and recoveries and dynamic delinquency data covering
six years of history.  Fitch has analyzed the portfolio's credit
risk and formed a base case default and recovery expectation for
unsecured consumer loan receivables of 5% and 20%, respectively.
The agency utilized its proprietary Spanish RMBS default model
for the real estate secured consumer loan receivables proportion
of the pool and formed a base case default and recovery
expectation of 6% and 59.6%, respectively.

When forming the base case default and recovery expectations for
these two types of products in the transaction, Fitch captured
the effect of the term of the loans on the default and expected
recoveries.  This considered that secured loans tend to have a
weighted-average life of six years and unsecured consumer loans
of two years.

Initial CE for the class A notes, equivalent to 20% of the
original collateral balance, is provided by the subordination of
classes B (15%), plus a reserve fund of 5%.  Similarly, initial
CE for the class B notes is provided by reserve fund. All the
notes also benefit from available excess spread.

The issuer is a special purpose vehicle regulated by Spanish
Securitisation Law 19/1992 and Royal Decree 926/1998.  The fund
will be legally represented and managed by GESTICAIXA, S.G.F.T,
S.A., a limited liability company incorporated under Spanish law,
whose activities are limited to the management of securitization
funds.


SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Assigns 'Ca' Rating to Serie C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these definitive ratings
to the debt issued by FTA SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10 (the Fondo):

   -- EUR3760MM Serie A notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR940MM Serie B notes, Assigned B3 (sf)

   -- EUR940MM Serie C notes, Assigned Ca (sf)

FTA SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10 is a securitization of standard loans
and credit lines mainly granted by Banco Santander (Aa3/P-1;
Negative Outlook) to corporate and small and medium-sized
enterprise (SME).

At closing, the Fondo -- a newly formed limited-liability entity
incorporated under the laws of Spain -- will issue three series
of rated notes. Santander will act as servicer of the loans and
credit lines for the Fondo, while Santander de Titulizacion
S.G.F.T., S.A. will be the management company (Gestora) of the
Fondo.

Ratings Rationale

As of September 2011, the provisional asset pool of underlying
assets was composed of a portfolio of almost 30,000 contracts
granted to companies in Spain. In terms of outstanding amounts,
around 53% corresponds to standard loans and 47% to credit lines.
The assets were originated mainly between 2009 and 2011. The
weighted-average seasoning is 0.85 year for the loans sub-pool
and 0.52 years for the credit-lines sub-pool, while the weighted-
average remaining terms for these pools are 5.2 years and 1.0
years, respectively. Around 7% of the portfolio is secured by
first-lien mortgage guarantees. Geographically, the pool is
concentrated mostly in Madrid (29%), Catalonia (20%) and
Andalusia (11%). At closing, there will be no loans more than 30
days in arrears.

In Moody's view, the strong credit positive features of this deal
include, among others: (i) a relatively short weighted average
life of 2.1 years; (ii) a swap agreement guaranteeing an excess
spread of 1.0%; and (iii) a geographically well-diversified pool.
However, the transaction has several challenging features: (i) a
low portfolio granularity (effective number of obligors below
400); (ii) a relatively high exposure to the construction and
building industry sector (31.5% according to Moody's industry
classification); (iii) a low percentage of assets secured by a
first-lien mortgage guarantee (6.9%); and (iv) a complex
mechanism that allows the Fondo to compensate (daily) the
increase on the disposed amount of certain credit lines with the
decrease of the disposed amount from other lines, and/or the
amortization of the standard loans. These characteristics were
reflected in Moody's analysis and ratings, where several
simulations tested the available credit enhancement and 20%
reserve fund to cover potential shortfalls in interest or
principal envisioned in the transaction structure.

The ratings are primarily based on the credit quality of the
portfolio, its diversity, the structural features of the
transaction and its legal integrity.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 10.7%, with a coefficient of variation of 45.0% and a
recovery rate of 35.0%. Moody's also tested other set of
assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis. For
instance, if the assumed default probability of 10.7% used in
determining the initial rating was changed to 13.7% and the
recovery rate of 35% was changed to 25%, the model-indicated
rating for Serie A, Serie B and Serie C of Aaa(sf), B3(sf) and
Ca(sf) would be Aa2(sf), Caa1(sf) and Ca(sf) respectively. For
more details, please refer to the full Parameter Sensitivity
analysis included in the New Issue Report of this transaction.

The global V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is
in line with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. The main
source of uncertainty in the analysis relate to the Transaction
Complexity. This element has been assigned a Medium/High V-Score,
as opposed to Medium assignment for the sector V-Score. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector " published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default
assumptions in the rating analysis of granular Small and Mid-
sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA", published in March 2009 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in Europe,
Middle East and Africa", published in June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the default distribution assumed
(generated using CDOROM) for the portfolio default rate. The
Moody's CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the
Moody's default probabilities as input. Each corporate reference
entity is modelled individually with a standard multi-factor
model incorporating intra and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. On the
recovery side Moody's assumes a stochastic recovery distribution
which is correlated to the default distribution. In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.


SANTANDER EMPRESAS: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating on Series C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings to the
Notes issued by F.T.A. SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10, as follows:

   -- EUR3,760 million Series A Notes: AAA (sf)
   -- EUR940 million Series B Notes: B (sf)
   -- EUR940 million Series C Notes: C (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco
Santander, S.A. to Spanish corporates and small-and medium-sized
enterprises ("SMEs").  As of October 18, 2011, the transaction's
provisional pool included 28,642 loans totaling EUR 4,927
million.  At closing, the Originator will select the final
portfolio of EUR4,700 million from the above mentioned
provisional pool.

The above ratings are provisional.  Final ratings will be issued
upon receipt of executed versions of the governing transaction
documents.  To the extent that the documents and information
provided by F.T.A SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10, Santander de
Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. and Banco Santander, S.A. to DBRS as
of this date differ from the executed versions of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS may assign lower final ratings to the
Notes, or may avoid assigning final ratings to the Notes
altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS' review of the following
analytical considerations:

   * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
     credit enhancement.

     -- Credit enhancement is in the form of subordination,
        through the reserve fund and excess spread. The current
        credit enhancement level of 40% is sufficient to support
        the AAA (sf) rating for the Series A Notes, and the
        current credit enhancement level of 20% is sufficient to
        support the B (sf) rating for the Series B Notes.

     -- The Series C Notes have been issued for the purpose of
        funding the Cash Reserve Fund. The Reserve Fund has been
        initially set at 20% of the aggregate balance of the
        Series A and Series B Notes, or EUR 940 million.  The
        Reserve Fund is available to cover shortfalls in the
        senior expenses, interest and principal throughout the
        life of the Notes.

     -- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced, except for required
        payments to cover interest and principal shortfalls,
        unless:

        -- The transaction is at least two years old;

        -- The Reserve Fund is at least 40% of the outstanding
           aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes;
           and,

        -- The Reserve Fund balance is greater than 10% of the
           initial aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B
           Notes (EUR470.00 million).

     -- In addition, the Reserve Fund will not be eligible for
        further pay downs, the above notwithstanding, if:

        -- The balance of the Reserve Fund was not at the minimum
           required level the at the previous period; or,

        -- The outstanding balance of the non-failed assets,
           which are more than 90 days in arrears, is greater
           than 1% of the outstanding balance of the total non-
           failed assets.

   * As of October 18, 2011, credit lines represented 47.98% of
     the provisional pool's outstanding balance.  This exposure
     in the provisional pool to the credit lines could increase
     further by EUR1.72 billion if the clients use the credit
     lines to their maximum limits.  This exposure would be
     funded by a liquidity line provided by Banco Santander,
     S.A. if no other principal proceeds are available in the
     transaction.  This risk is partly mitigated by the short
     weighted average life of the credit lines and was taken
     into consideration in the DBRS analysis.

   * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
     flow assumptions and repay investors according to the
     approved terms.  For this transaction, the provisional
     rating of the Series A Notes addresses the timely payments
     of interest, as defined in the transaction documents, and
     the timely payments of principal on each Payment Date during
     the transaction and, in any case, at their Legal Final
     Maturities on March 16, 2044.  The provisional rating of the
     Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest,
     as defined in the transaction documents, and the ultimate
     payment of principal on each Payment Date during the
     transaction and, in any case, at their Legal Final
     Maturities on March 16, 2044.  Interest and principal
     payments on the notes will be made quarterly, generally on
     the 16th day of February, May, August and November, with the
     first payment date on February 16, 2012.

   * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
     to perform their respective duties, and the quality of
     origination, underwriting and servicing practices.

   * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
     opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the
     trust and the non-consolidation of the special purpose
     vehicle, as well as the consistency with the DBRS Legal
     Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions.

   * The rating of the Series C Notes is based upon DBRS' review
     of the following considerations:

     -- The Series C Notes are in the first loss position.
     -- As such, the Series C Notes are highly likely to default.
     -- Because the rating of the Series C Notes addresses the
        ultimate payment of interest and principal, the default
        most likely would occur at the maturity of the
        transaction.

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' Web site
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in DBRS' analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS' analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com

The sources of information used for this rating include F.T.A.
SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10, Santander de Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A.
and Banco Santander, S.A. DBRS considers the information
available to it for the purposes of providing this rating was of
satisfactory quality.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLO(s), please
see European Disclosure Requirements, located at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/235269

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Lead Analyst: Mudasar Chaudhry
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen
Initial Rating Date: 21 November 2011


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TOPLU KONUT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Currency Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Turkey's Toplu Konut Idaresi
Baskanligi's (TOKI) Long-term foreign currency (LTFC) and local
currency (LTLC) ratings Outlooks to Stable from Positive.  At the
same time, the agency has affirmed TOKI's LTFC and LTLC at 'BB+'
and National Long-term rating at 'AA+(tur)' with a Stable
Outlook.

The Outlook revision follows a similar Outlook revision of
Turkey's LTFC and LTLC Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to Stable from
Positive.  TOKI's ratings are credit linked to the sovereign,
which reflects its strong links with the sovereign and a high
probability of government bail-out support in case of need.
Fitch used its public-sector entities rating criteria and applied
a top-down approach in its analysis of TOKI.

TOKI is a not-for-profit, quasi-governmental policy institution
arm with a duty to implement government policies and programs to
support the provision of low-cost housing and loan facilities for
the purchase of social housing.  In recent years, the entity has
been at the forefront of government led initiatives for urban
transformation and for the construction of purpose-built
facilities for state departments.

The provision of affordable housing is a high priority for the
national government in light of strong demand driven by the
demographics and lack of financial resources available.  Under
its new mandate given following the re-election of the government
in 2011, TOKI targets the construction of another 500,000 housing
units until 2023 in addition to the same number of units it
completed in 2003-2011.

The entity reports directly to Prime Minister's office. It has no
share capital and its reserves are primarily made of retained
earnings.  Although it is not consolidated to the state budget,
it receives earmarked income appropriations from the state
budget.  The entity requires authorization for borrowing and
other strategic decisions from the government.  As of 2011 its
accounts are audited by the Court of Accounts which is
accountable to the parliament.

Given its expertise and experience in housing and social
infrastructure, the entity is poised to be at the forefront of
the government's urban transformation program.  Other mandates
include construction in earthquake relief areas (especially in
the province of Van) and of other social infrastructure
facilities projects as needed by various ministries and central
government departments.


* REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on the Republic of
Turkey's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) to Stable from Positive and affirmed the ratings at
'BB+'.  The agency has also affirmed Turkey's Short-term foreign
currency IDR at 'B' and Country Ceiling at 'BBB-'.

"The revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects an increase in
near-term risks to macroeconomic stability as Turkey faces the
challenge of reducing its large current account deficit and
above-target inflation rate against the background of
deterioration in the global economic and financing environment,"
says Ed Parker, Managing Director in the EMEA Sovereign group at
Fitch.

"Nonetheless, the ratings are supported by favorable government
debt dynamics, a healthy potential growth rate and a strong
banking sector.  If Turkey attains a 'soft landing' and near-term
macro-financial risks recede, then upward rating dynamics could
resume," added Mr. Parker.

Turkey's macroeconomic performance has been very volatile as it
has a low savings rate and has been unable to grow robustly
without generating major imbalances.  In Fitch's view, the
economy 'over-heated' in H111, with bank credit surging by 36%
yoy, fuelling double-digit GDP growth, rising inflation and a
widening in the current account deficit (CAD) to US$78 billion in
the 12 months to September 2011 (which Fitch estimates would be
the second highest in the world after the US).

Economic activity and credit growth have started to slow in
recent months. Fitch's base case is that GDP growth will ease to
2.2% in 2012 from 7.5% in 2011, before recovering to 4.5% in
2013, inflation will decline and the CAD will narrow.  However,
Turkey's large external financing requirement leaves it
vulnerable to the deterioration in the global outlook and there
is a downside risk of a less benign macroeconomic adjustment.

Fitch forecasts the CAD to increase to 9.8% of GDP in 2011 from
6.5% of GDP in 2010, well above the ten-year 'BB' range median of
2%, before easing to 7.6% in 2012. Year-to-date CAD financing has
been dominated by short-term and portfolio debt inflows and
running down foreign assets, leaving the country vulnerable to
the worsening in global financial conditions.  In 2012, Fitch
estimates that Turkey's CAD, amortization on medium and long-term
external debt plus stock of short-term debt will be around US$194
billion, compared with foreign exchange reserves of US$93.6
billion at end-September 2011. In addition, US$17 billion of non-
residents' holding of local currency debt falls due.  Turkey's
net external debt ratios are above the 'BB' range median and on
an upward trend.

Inflation has been significantly higher and more volatile than
for 'BB' range peers. Fitch forecasts inflation at 9.2% at end-
2011, well above the central bank (CBRT) target of 5.5%, which
would be the fourth time the CBRT has missed its target in six
years.  Facing challenging and volatile global conditions, the
CBRT has deployed an activist and unorthodox policy mix,
including low real interest rates.  Yet the large lira
depreciation, strong credit growth, high inflation and the
widening in the CAD mean the extent to which it has helped to
support macroeconomic and financial stability is debatable.

Turkey's strong and improving public finances are a key support
for its ratings.  Fitch forecasts the general government budget
deficit will decline to just 1.3% of GDP in 2011, from 3.3% in
2010 and 5.8% in 2009, albeit buoyed by the booming economy.
Public debt dynamics are highly favorable due to the government
running primary budget (before interest payments) surpluses, and
trend GDP growth above the real effective interest rate.  The
agency forecasts general government debt to decline to 40% at
end-2011 from 42% of GDP at end-2010 and continue decreasing over
the medium term.  Lower interest costs and a lengthening in the
maturity of debt have cut Turkey's fiscal financing requirement,
while relatively deep local capital markets provide financing
flexibility.

Turkey's ratings are also underpinned by a sound banking sector,
which is well capitalized, profitable and moderate in size, and
has a low ratio of non-performing loans, a loan/deposit ratio
below 100% and minimal FX lending to households.  GDP per capita
is well above the 'BB' range median, while the business climate
and governance are stronger, according to World Bank indicators.
Conversely, political risk weighs on Turkey's ratings. It ranks
below the 'B' range median in the World Bank's governance
indicator for "political stability".

Evidence that Turkey can attain a 'soft landing', with GDP growth
returning towards trend, coupled with greater confidence that
inflation is on a path towards its target rate and the CAD is
narrowing to a more sustainable rate could lead to an upgrade.

However, severe macroeconomic or financial instability such as a
'balance-of-payments crisis' and recession or a failure to secure
disinflation, for example triggered by external shocks or
domestic policy mistakes could lead to negative rating action.


* METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY: Fitch Affirms BB+/B Currency Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Metropolitan Municipality of
Istanbul's (Istanbul) National Long-term rating to 'AA+(tur)'
from 'AA(tur)' with a Stable Outlook.  At the same time, the
agency has revised the Outlooks on Istanbul's Long-term foreign
currency and local currency ratings to Stable from Positive and
affirmed them at 'BB+'.  The Short-term foreign currency rating
has been affirmed at 'B'.

The upgrade of the National rating reflects Istanbul's improved
budgetary performance with exceptionally strong operating
margins, dynamic socio-economic profile, a fiscal position which
directly correlates with that of the sovereign and the increased
collaboration with the central government in the execution of
the investment agenda.

The revision of the Outlook follows of the revision of the
Outlook on Turkey's Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to Stable from
Positive.  The ratings of Istanbul are constrained by the ratings
of Turkey ('BB+'/Stable).

Istanbul's budgetary performance remains robust, contributing 23%
of national GDP and more than 40% of national tax collections.
Operating balance in 2010 was 43% higher yoy and is set to
achieve 20% yearly growth in 2011.  Based on the municipality's
medium-term budget, Fitch's forecasts indicate that the operating
margins for 2011-2013 will comfortably average over 50%,
reflecting the municipality's investment-oriented
responsibilities.

Given the reduced future investment burden and sustained self-
funding capacity, Istanbul has scaled down its borrowing plans.
Following years of fast growth, direct debt peaked during 2011
and is budgeted to decline into 2013.  Exposure to FX risk is
substantial, although this is mitigated by the longer maturity
profile of the foreign currency debt extending to 2028.

The administration has stepped up its bid to sell its valuable
assets, including real estate in prime locations and
privatization of commercially viable municipal companies.  This
was reflected in a 3.3x yoy increase of capital revenue in 2010,
resulting in a coverage ratio of capital expenditure of 23%, up
from 3% in 2008.  Capital revenue in 2011 is set to reach
TRY1.5bn, providing considerable liquidity comfort.

With a population of over 13 million, Istanbul is Turkey's main
hub. Due to the high population concentration, demand for
municipal services continues to rise.  The administration's
prioritized investment sectors are transport, environment, and
disaster (earthquake) risk management.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRAY ENG'G: Closed Down After Insolvency Service Investigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
NDS UK reports that Bray Engineering Limited and MPH Engineering
Limited were closed down following The Insolvency Service's
investigation.

NDS UK says the companies, which are jointly owned, operated
nationally using a number of trading styles and websites.

The investigation showed the companies vastly inflated the costs
of the work they undertook. They also misled and intimidated
their customers.

Both companies were originally based in Southall, Middlesex and
more recently operated from Robinsons Farnell Warehouse,
Isleworth, Middlesex.

The court heard that the companies effectively operated one
business; that of engine reconditioning and repairs, and
generated business via a number of websites, including these
sites:

   * www.reconditioned-engines.co.uk
   * www.remanufactured-engines.co.uk
   * www.secondhandengines.co.uk
   * www.jaguarengines.co.uk
   * www.rangeroverengines.co.uk

The Insolvency Service's investigation discovered 429 customer
complaints made against the companies within a three-year period,
where customers had paid around GBP1.2 million for parts and
services which had either not been provided or were subject to
dispute.

Commenting on the case, David Hill, a Case Supervisor with The
Insolvency Service said: "This is a very significant result and
sends a clear message to crooks everywhere that unscrupulous
trading methods will not go unpunished. The sheer scale of the
complaints against these crooks, compounded by a number where
violence was used against customers, showed that the companies
had traded unethically and with a reckless disregard for
commercial probity in their treatment of customers".

The investigation also showed the companies enticed customers by
offering cheap initial quotes for services. Once the quote was
accepted, the companies would arrange to collect the vehicle from
the customer's home, often at a competitive flat fee, typically
GBP50.

However, once they collected the vehicle, they would inflate
their quotes, and tell customers reluctant to pay the new
inflated quote that their vehicle engine had already been
dismantled for inspection purposes, which would cost hundreds of
pounds to re-assemble.

The companies employed strong-arm sales tactics, including
threats and intimidation by 'engineers' against customers. This
meant customers often reluctantly agreed to pay sums
significantly higher than initial quotes, despite being given
verbal assurances that initial quotes were 'fixed and all
inclusive.'

Many customers complained that the companies failed to return
their vehicles within a reasonable timescale after collection, if
at all. Where work was carried out on vehicles, customers claimed
it was sub-standard, or had rendered their vehicle a write-off.

On May 19, 2011, the Metropolitan Police raided the joint trading
premises of the companies, accompanied by officials from the UK
Border Agency, HMRC and the Department for Work and Pensions.

The winding-up petitions were presented under s124A of the
Insolvency Act 1986 on Nov. 10, 2011, and were heard on Nov. 17,
2011, at which time the companies were wound up.  Company
Investigations, part of the Insolvency Service, carries out
confidential enquiries on behalf of the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).


CLARIS IV LTD: DBRS Cuts Rating on Class I-C Swap to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has downgraded the ratings on the Class I-A Swap,
Class I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap issued by Claris IV Limited -
Series 36.  Claris IV Limited - Series 36 is collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS),
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and other asset-backed
securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the Class I-A Swap, Class
I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap address the probability of breaching
their respective attachment points as defined in the transaction
documents at or prior to their maturity dates.

The actions reflect the deterioration in credit quality of the
underlying collateral pool since the transaction was last
confirmed on October 15, 2010.

The principal methodology is Rating US & European Structured
Finance CDO Restructurings, which can be found on DBRS' website
under Methodologies.

This credit rating has been issued outside the European Union
(EU) and may be used for regulatory purposes by financial
institutions in the EU.

Claris IV Limited - Series 36 Class I-A Swap, Series 36
Downgraded BBB (sf) -- Nov 22, 2011; Claris IV Limited - Series
36 Class I-B Swap, Series 36 Downgraded BB (high) (sf) -- Nov 22,
2011; Claris IV Limited - Series 36 Class I-C Swap, Series 36
Downgraded B (high) (sf) -- Nov 22, 2011.


CORSAIR NO.4: Moody's Cuts Rating on US$150MM CSO Notes to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Corsair (Jersey) No. 4:

Issuer: Corsair (Jersey) No.4 Limited Series 4 (Electric Lights
Orchestra 2)

   -- US$150,000,000 Floating Rate Secured Portfolio Credit-
      Linked Notes due 2016, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      Jan 12, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

This transaction is a collateralized debt obligation (the
"Collateralized Synthetic Obligation" or "CSO") referencing a
managed portfolio of 102 synthetic credit corporate exposures.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the overall credit deterioration of the portfolio. The 10-year
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the current portfolio is
1,067, equivalent to Ba2. This compares to a 10-year WARF of 803
from the last rating action in January 2010. Since then, there
have been credit events on Bradford & Bingley plc, Takefuji
Corporation and Bank of Ireland. The Telecommunications, FIRE:
Insurance and Banking industry sectors are the most represented,
weighting 12.5%, 12.0% and 7.5%, respectively, of the portfolio
notional. The notes have a remaining life of 5.11 years and
credit enhancement of approximately 8.34%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate
Collateralized Synthetic Obligations", key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis may be different from the
manager/arranger's reported numbers. In particular, rating
assumptions for all publicly rated corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review for Possible
Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

The action also reflects the correction of an inaccurate value
related to the calculation of credit enhancement that was input
into the rating model at the last rating action in January 2010.
Had the actual level of credit enhancement been considered, the
model would have indicated a lower expected loss for the Notes,
which may have impacted on the decision to downgrade the Notes at
that time. This input has now been corrected in the rating
model."

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Use of Market Implied Ratings -- MIRs were used in place of
the corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
probability of each corporate name in the reference portfolio.
The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating
is an indicator of the extent of the divergence of credit view
between Moody's and the market. This run generated a result that
was lower by one notch than the one modeled under the base case.

(2) Overriding the Withdrawn Ratings -- Three reference entities,
previously investment grade rated, had their ratings withdrawn by
Moody's since the last rating action. Their ratings have been
overridden with the average reference pool rating of Ba2. The run
generated a result that was 3 notches higher than the one modeled
under the base case.

(3) Defaulted all Caa Referenced Entities - To test the deal
sensitivity to the lowest rated entities of the portfolio, all
Caa exposures amounting to a little over 3% of the reference
pool, were ran as defaulted. This run generated a result that was
lower by one notch than the one modeled under the base case.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. CSO notes' performance may
also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) variations
over time in default rates for instruments with a given rating,
2) variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics, 3) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the
reference pool and 4) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities. Given the tranched nature of Corporate CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the Corporate
CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations" published in September 2009.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's
CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's
default probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity
is modelled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COSALT PLC: In Urgent Financing Talks as Cash Dwindles
-------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' DBR Small Cap reports that financially-troubled marine
safety products manufacturer Cosalt PLC Wednesday warned that its
cash flow position has continued to deteriorate and it now has
just GBP900,000 (US$1.4 million) available, representing
sufficient working capital only until Nov. 30.


FLANAGANS FURNITURE: Closes Doors; 42 Jobs at Risks
---------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that 42 jobs at Flanagan's Furniture are under
threat after it unexpectedly closed its doors.

According to BBC, owner Brian Flanagan confirmed the shops are
all closed, and said the firm is now involved in negotiations.

The mayor of Buncrana, Nicholas Crossan, said it was a
devastating blow for the town, BBC says.

Flanagans Furniture is a family-run business established in 1946
in Buncrana, Co. Donegal. The company employed up to 40 workers
at their Buncrana Sligo and Dublin stores.


INSPIRED EDUCATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on GBP352.25MM Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to
positive from stable on the GBP352.25 million senior secured
bonds issued by U.K.-based special-purpose vehicle InspirED
Education (South Lanarkshire) PLC (ProjectCo). "At the same time,
we affirmed our long-term issue rating on the bonds at 'BB+',"
S&P related.

The bonds retain an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee
provided by Syncora Guarantee U.K. Ltd. (not rated) of payment of
scheduled interest and principal.

"Under our criteria, a rating on a monoline-insured debt issue
reflects the higher of the rating on the monoline and Standard &
Poor's underlying rating (SPUR). Therefore, the issue rating on
the bonds reflects the SPUR," S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects an improvement in the project's
operational performance over the past 12 months. ProjectCo is
using the bonds' proceeds to design, build, finance, and operate
a range of facilities to support South Lanarkshire's secondary
schools under a U.K. government private finance initiative ending
Aug. 31, 2039," S&P said.

The technical advisor reports that various building defects have
been resolved and maintenance procedures have improved over the
past 18 months. In addition, the construction program is now
largely complete, with only limited works remaining --
specifically, the completion of three grass sports pitches. The
project's hard facilities management (FM) services are effective,
as demonstrated by an absence of financial deductions for most of
2011.

"The reporting of the project's financial performance has also
improved over the past 12 months, following the correction of
several errors in the financial model. Following this correction,
over the past six months, the project has reported relatively
stable financial performance. Based on our definition of the debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), which excludes interest income,
the project anticipates a minimum DSCR of 1.12x, albeit in
September 2038, and an average of 1.24x. In our opinion,
management will manage the project proactively, particularly its
lifecycle obligations, to ensure that the project's financial
profile does not weaken materially," S&P said.

"We could raise the rating if operational performance continues
to strengthen during the ramp-up phase, and the project continues
to forecast stable financial performance," S&P said.

"We could take a negative rating action if the financial profile
or operating performance were to weaken below our current
forecasts -- for example, as a result of an increased number of
building defects or reactive maintenance costs above the agreed
cap," S&P said.


STREAMLINE COMPUTING: In Liquidation Proceedings; Ceases Trading
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Kunert at Channel Register reports that Warwick-based
Streamline Computing has ceased trading and entered liquidation
proceedings.

According to the report, Streamline confirmed on its company
voicemail that it has "gone into liquidation".

Advisory services firm Mazars LLP has called a creditors' meeting
for December 6 at its offices in Birmingham.

The liquidators can be reached at:

          MAZARS LLP
          Tower Bridge House
          St Katharine's Way
          London E1W 1DD
          United Kingdom
          Tel.: +44 (0) 20 7063 4000
          Fax : +44 (0) 20 7063 4001
          E-mail : contact@mazars.co.uk

Channel Register relates that in a letter leaked to El Reg,
Streamline Computing told customers that it has "now ceased
trading" and in the process of entering "voluntary liquidation".

"Unfortunately this means that the company is no longer servicing
any support contracts for hardware or software warranty," the
letter stated. "However, many of the clusters sold through
Streamline Computing had hardware warranties which were backed by
the OEM. In these cases, the OEM is still responsible for
providing the hardware warranty for the system," it added.

In abbreviated accounts for the year to July 31, 2010, Streamline
had net assets of GBP137,000 and creditors of GBP1.22 million,
down from GBP2.5 million a year earlier, Channel Register
discloses.

Warwick-based Streamline Computing is a high-performance
computing specialist.


THOMAS COOK: Nears GBP100-Mil. Loan Deal with Banks
---------------------------------------------------
Alistair Osborne and Helia Ebrahimi at The Telegraph report that
Thomas Cook's 17-strong banking syndicate is close to extending
the company a GBP100 million loan to save it from imminent
collapse.

Thomas Cook, which is valued at GBP143 million but has debts of
GBP900 million, needs another GBP100 million to get through next
month when holiday companies' cash-flows traditionally hit their
low point for the year, the Telegraph says.  It has already been
back to its lenders for an extra GBP100 million loan in October,
the Telegraph notes.

Its banks, led by HSBC, Barclays and Unicredit, are broadly
supportive, recognizing that they would have most to lose by
letting the business fail now -- when the company has spent cash
to secure hotel beds for next year but is yet to receive much
cash from customer bookings, the Telegraph discloses.  They are
also wary of the political fallout from pulling the plug on the
business, the Telegraph states.

However, some less exposed banks are reluctant to put in more
cash, complicating the talks and potentially forcing the
syndicate's leading lenders to pick up the slack, according to
the Telegraph.

A deal needs to be done quickly to avoid a vicious circle where
concern over Thomas Cook's finances causes customers to stop
booking holidays, the Telegraph says.

Only after the banks have stabilized the business will they
consider whether Thomas Cook deserves long-term support --
possibly alongside an equity raising or debt-for-equity swap, the
Telegraph notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 23,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Thomas Cook said it's in talks
with banks on financing a month after agreeing to relaxed loan
conditions.  Thomas Cook said in a statement that it will delay
its full-year results until after the talks and expects headline
operating profit for the year ended Sept. 30 to be "broadly in
line" with previous guidance, Bloomberg disclosed.  The London-
based company said it's in the "seasonal low period" of cash,
Bloomberg noted.  It's also suffered from political unrest in
North Africa and weak consumer demand in U.K., Bloomberg said.

Thomas Cook Group plc is a United Kingdom-based company.  The
Company, together with its subsidiaries, is engaged in the
provision of leisure travel services.  Its main brands include
Airtours, Aspro, Club 18-30, Cresta, Manos, Neilson, Sunset,
Sunworld Holidays, Swiss Travel Service, Thomas Cook, Thomas Cook
Style Collection, Thomas Cook Signature and Thomas Cook Tours.
It has six geographic operating divisions: United Kingdom,
Central Europe, West and East Europe, Northern Europe, North
America and Airlines Germany.


THOMAS COOK: Fitch Puts 'BB' Long-Term IDR on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Thomas Cook Group plc's (TCG) Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured
rating of 'BB-' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

This rating action follows TCG's announcement that it has re-
entered discussions with its banking group regarding its covenant
and liquidity headroom in anticipation of the seasonal low period
for cash in December and in response to a deterioration in
trading in Q1 of the company's 2012 trading year, particularly in
North Africa and the Middle East.

The RWN reflects the fact that TCG's performance for 2012 may
deteriorate faster and to a greater extent than envisaged for the
current 'BB-' rating.  It also factors in the execution risk
surrounding not only the discussions with the banks should the
company be required to raise new capital or step up its asset
disposal program but also the longer-term recovery phase as
consumer spending remains muted in western Europe while the
eurozone debt crisis remains unresolved.

The RWN also reflects potential subordination to unsecured
creditors if any security is given to bank lenders as part of the
current negotiations.  According to the documentation of the
bonds, TCG may grant "permitted security" of up to GBP450
million.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN following discussions with TCG's
management and further analysis of the prospects of TCG's
business.  At present, Fitch expects minimal improvement in the
company's credit profile over the next 12-18 months.  The ratings
are subject to a multi-notch downgrade subject to the outcome of
the current discussions with banks re-assuring TCG's near-term
liquidity position, and Fitch's perception of the execution risk
in bringing the financial profile to a stable footing in the
longer term.

In Fitch's view, TCG faces significant headwinds, with the
continued unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, the
weakening consumer environment and legacy cost price inflation.
As new covenant levels and additional liquidity were only signed
off last month, The announcement is an indication of how quickly
trading conditions can deteriorate in the travel industry.  This
could also be detrimental for TCG's image and lead to
cancellations or a fall in bookings.

Fitch stated on July 12, 2011 that, despite the company's profit
warning announced at the time, the agency remained comfortable
with the company's liquidity headroom, lack of refinancing needs
and its commitment to strengthen its balance sheet.  TCG
subsequently announced on September 29 that the interim dividend
of approximately GBP30 million on October 7 will be the company's
last until further notice, which coincides with the step up in
the asset disposal program, the proceeds of which must be used to
prepay debt.

Negative rating actions could occur if FFO-adjusted leverage
remains above 4.5x on a sustained basis, FFO interest coverage is
2x or the liquidity ratio (measured as FCF + available cash +
committed undrawn facilities/debt service) falls below 1x.  Fitch
acknowledges the relatively modest debt redemption schedule as
only GBP50 million of the company's GBP150 million term loan
matures in 2012 and 2013.  The final maturity falls in May 2014
alongside the GBP850 million RCF.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 21 to November 25, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer               Coupon     Maturity  Currency    Price
------               ------     --------  --------    -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT       5.470    8/28/2013      EUR     56.38
BAWAG                  5.310    2/12/2023      EUR     56.37
BAWAG                  5.430    2/26/2024      EUR     52.11
BAWAG                  5.400    2/12/2023      EUR     56.87
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.270     4/7/2028      EUR     48.14
HAA-BANK INTL AG       5.250   10/27/2015      EUR     57.38
IMMOFINANZ             4.250     3/8/2018      EUR      3.32
KOMMUNALKREDIT         5.430    2/13/2024      EUR     52.50
KOMMUNALKREDIT         4.900    6/23/2031      EUR     41.13
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.170    7/29/2015      EUR     62.25
OESTER VOLKSBK         5.270     2/8/2027      EUR     43.37
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.810    7/29/2025      EUR     61.13
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        4.500    9/28/2035      EUR     43.32
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.500   12/29/2023      EUR     60.08
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.470    2/28/2028      EUR     55.35
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        5.730   12/11/2023      EUR     61.80

BELGIUM
-------
BELGIUM KINGDOM        3.625   10/21/2052      EUR     66.58
COMM FRANC BELG        3.620    3/17/2058      EUR     65.53
ECONOCOM GROUP         4.000     6/1/2016      EUR     19.07
EURONAV SA             6.500    1/31/2015      USD     74.60
IDEAL STANDARD I      11.750     5/1/2018      EUR     59.27
IDEAL STANDARD I      11.750     5/1/2018      EUR     58.88
ONTEX IV               9.000    4/15/2019      EUR     73.00

BULGARIA
--------
PETROL AD-SOFIA        8.375    1/26/2012      EUR     70.13

CYPRUS
------
AVANGARDCO INVES      10.000   10/29/2015      USD     78.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.100    1/29/2018      EUR     70.99
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600    4/23/2018      EUR     68.82
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600   10/23/2018      EUR     68.60
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.600    2/26/2019      EUR     68.43
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.625     2/3/2020      EUR     65.82
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.100    4/20/2020      EUR     73.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.600    4/15/2017      EUR     73.60
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.350     6/9/2020      EUR     69.97
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.000     6/9/2021      EUR     72.41
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       6.500    8/25/2021      EUR     74.16
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     4/2/2017      EUR     69.58
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    9/28/2017      EUR     68.92
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    2/15/2017      EUR     69.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     1/4/2017      EUR     70.02
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    10/9/2016      EUR     70.51
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    7/11/2016      EUR     71.08
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     1/2/2016      EUR     72.56
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.000     6/9/2016      EUR     71.93
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.750    12/2/2015      EUR     71.82
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       5.250     6/9/2015      EUR     74.54
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.750    9/30/2015      EUR     72.27
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       3.750    11/1/2015      EUR     70.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500     6/2/2016      EUR     71.35
CYPRUS GOVT BOND       4.500    3/30/2016      EUR     71.85
MARFIN POPULAR         4.350   11/20/2014      EUR     38.00
MARFIN POPULAR         4.375    9/21/2012      EUR     73.22
REP OF CYPRUS          4.750    2/25/2016      EUR     67.31
REP OF CYPRUS          4.375    7/15/2014      EUR     74.74
FIN-DANISH IND         4.910     7/6/2021      EUR     57.75
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR     45.74
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500     2/3/2016      TRY     71.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    3/17/2025      CAD     63.75
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR     58.48
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/21/2018      ZAR     65.83
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR     48.57
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    12/6/2016      TRY     73.44
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   10/27/2016      ZAR     70.38
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/10/2021      NZD     64.77
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR     73.01
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.250    6/28/2040      CAD     24.80
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   10/27/2016      TRY     67.39
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR     71.57
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR     65.26
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   10/28/2015      TRY     74.13
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/16/2017      TRY     60.26
TALVIVAARA             4.000   12/16/2015      EUR     69.63

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM         4.970     4/1/2015      EUR     10.33
ALCATEL-LUCENT         5.000     1/1/2015      EUR      2.39
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG       6.720     1/1/2015      EUR      4.43
ASSYSTEM               4.000     1/1/2017      EUR     19.75
ATOS ORIGIN SA         2.500     1/1/2016      EUR     49.57
AXA SA                 5.250    4/16/2040      EUR     68.80
BNP PARIBAS            5.700    3/11/2041      USD     74.46
BNP PARIBAS            4.850   11/26/2030      USD     71.48
BNP PARIBAS            2.890    5/16/2036      JPY     64.97
CALYON                 6.000    6/18/2047      EUR     13.82
CALYON                 5.800   10/29/2029      USD     65.11
CAP GEMINI SOGET       1.000     1/1/2012      EUR     42.11
CAP GEMINI SOGET       3.500     1/1/2014      EUR     37.06
CEGEDIM SA             7.000    7/27/2015      EUR     69.75
CGG VERITAS            1.750     1/1/2016      EUR     25.25
CIE FIN FONCIER        3.250   12/30/2044      EUR     74.17
CLUB MEDITERRANE       6.110    11/1/2015      EUR     16.59
CLUB MEDITERRANE       5.000     6/8/2012      EUR     10.62
CMA CGM                8.500    4/15/2017      USD     36.81
CMA CGM                8.500    4/15/2017      USD     41.25
CMA CGM                8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     36.80
CMA CGM                8.875    4/15/2019      EUR     36.75
CNP ASSURANCES         6.000    9/14/2040      EUR     61.84
CNP ASSURANCES         6.875    9/30/2041      EUR     62.75
CRED AGRICOLE SA       3.900    4/19/2021      EUR     70.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850    6/30/2031      USD     62.79
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.610    6/15/2031      USD     60.71
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.680    3/22/2026      USD     71.87
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.270     8/5/2030      USD     59.02
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.850    9/17/2030      USD     55.08
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300    10/7/2030      USD     58.98
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300   10/12/2030      USD     56.89
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.250   10/18/2030      USD     58.62
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.300   10/22/2030      USD     59.08
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.880     4/8/2031      USD     64.72
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.850    5/27/2031      USD     62.86
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.650    6/10/2031      USD     61.09
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.350   10/29/2030      USD     59.36
CREDIT AGRI CIB        4.910    11/3/2030      USD     56.58
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.450    11/9/2030      USD     60.17
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.080   11/23/2030      USD     56.94
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.690   11/26/2030      USD     62.25
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.400    12/9/2030      USD     59.62
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.000   12/23/2030      USD     62.33
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.830    6/30/2031      USD     62.61
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.050    1/14/2031      USD     65.15
CREDIT AGRI CIB        5.950    1/19/2031      USD     64.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.150    2/11/2031      USD     65.70
CREDIT AGRI CIB        6.220    3/17/2031      USD     66.38
CREDIT AGRICOLE        4.050   12/22/2020      EUR     72.27
CREDIT AGRICOLE        3.750   10/20/2020      EUR     71.13
CREDIT AGRICOLE        4.500   12/22/2019      EUR     64.91
CREDIT LOCAL FRA       3.750    5/26/2020      EUR     54.87
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.550     4/2/2020      EUR     60.37
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.500    2/25/2020      EUR     59.23
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.110    9/18/2018      EUR     64.39
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       4.020    3/13/2017      EUR     73.35
DEXIA CRED LOCAL       5.037     8/4/2020      EUR     62.09
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       1.000   12/23/2024      EUR     60.38
EURAZEO                6.250    6/10/2014      EUR     53.75
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375    4/15/2018      EUR     54.59
EUROPCAR GROUPE        9.375    4/15/2018      EUR     54.25
FAURECIA               4.500     1/1/2015      EUR     20.15
FONCIERE REGIONS       3.340     1/1/2017      EUR     70.59
GIE PSA TRESORER       6.000    9/19/2033      EUR     65.09
GROUPAMA SA            7.875   10/27/2039      EUR     39.54
INGENICO               2.750     1/1/2017      EUR     41.78
ITALCEMENTI FIN        5.375    3/19/2020      EUR     71.23
IXIS CIB               5.400     1/9/2033      EUR     70.07
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2014      EUR     17.31
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2015      EUR     15.90
NEXANS SA              4.000     1/1/2016      EUR     56.31
NOVASEP HLDG           9.750   12/15/2016      USD     43.00
ORPEA                  3.875     1/1/2016      EUR     42.68
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875     6/1/2018      EUR     69.90
PAGESJAUNES FINA       8.875     6/1/2018      EUR     70.00
PEUGEOT SA             4.450     1/1/2016      EUR     23.27
PUBLICIS GROUPE        1.000    1/18/2018      EUR     47.76
PUBLICIS GROUPE        3.125    7/30/2014      EUR     34.84
SOC AIR FRANCE         2.750     4/1/2020      EUR     20.53
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.910    3/16/2031      USD     68.28
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.940    3/14/2031      USD     68.56
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.900    3/10/2031      USD     68.21
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860    3/11/2031      USD     67.84
SOCIETE GENERALE       6.010    3/15/2031      USD     69.20
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.920    3/17/2031      USD     68.37
SOCIETE GENERALE       5.860    4/26/2031      USD     68.02
SOITEC                 6.250     9/9/2014      EUR      7.37
TEM                    4.250     1/1/2015      EUR     50.34
THEOLIA                2.700     1/1/2041      EUR      8.02

GERMANY
-------
BAYERISCHE HYPO        5.000   12/21/2029      EUR     68.27
BAYERISCHE LNDBK       4.500     2/7/2019      EUR     64.62
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.600    4/14/2023      EUR     55.63
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.450    2/20/2023      EUR     55.12
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       5.640    1/30/2024      EUR     52.75
BHW BAUSPARKASSE       4.270    1/15/2019      EUR     71.90
COMMERZBANK AG         7.750    3/16/2021      EUR     65.09
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000   10/30/2017      EUR     64.36
COMMERZBANK AG         4.000   11/30/2017      EUR     25.49
COMMERZBANK AG         5.625   11/29/2017      EUR     70.41
COMMERZBANK AG         6.300    3/15/2022      EUR     54.91
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000    3/30/2018      EUR     24.59
COMMERZBANK AG         5.000    4/20/2018      EUR     24.63
COMMERZBANK AG         6.600    4/23/2018      EUR     68.25
COMMERZBANK AG         6.654     5/9/2018      EUR     68.46
COMMERZBANK AG         6.500    5/14/2018      EUR     67.47
COMMERZBANK AG         6.375    3/22/2019      EUR     64.42
COMMERZBANK AG         6.460    6/24/2022      EUR     54.94
COMMERZBANK AG         6.360    3/15/2022      EUR     55.07
DEUT GENOS-HYPBK       6.610    3/21/2022      EUR     70.12
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN       6.050    9/27/2022      EUR     58.25
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN       5.300   11/20/2023      EUR     52.13
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.700    7/31/2023      EUR     48.10
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.160    8/14/2024      EUR     52.34
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.375     5/8/2018      EUR     65.18
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.350    6/13/2028      EUR     50.89
DRESDNER BANK AG       5.290    5/31/2021      EUR     52.23
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.550    4/14/2020      EUR     61.71
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.000    2/25/2020      EUR     59.67
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.210    6/20/2022      EUR     53.79
DRESDNER BANK AG       7.250    6/24/2019      EUR     67.08
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.180    2/28/2023      EUR     50.57
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.635    6/18/2018      EUR     66.01
DRESDNER BANK AG       6.400    4/23/2018      EUR     72.74
EUROHYPO AG            5.110     8/6/2018      EUR     71.00
EUROHYPO AG            5.560    8/18/2023      EUR     59.38
EUROHYPO AG            3.830    9/21/2020      EUR     56.50
EUROHYPO AG            6.490    7/17/2017      EUR      3.88
GOTHAER ALLG VER       5.527    9/29/2026      EUR     69.27
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750   10/15/2017      USD     65.25
HAPAG-LLOYD            9.750   10/15/2017      USD     78.00
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500    5/15/2018      EUR     60.63
HECKLER & KOCH         9.500    5/15/2018      EUR     61.12
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250    4/15/2018      EUR     55.75
HEIDELBERG DRUCK       9.250    4/15/2018      EUR     55.59
HSH NORDBANK AG        4.375    2/14/2017      EUR     50.26
HVB REAL ESTATE        6.570    3/18/2022      EUR     69.96
L-BANK FOERDERBK       0.500    5/10/2027      CAD     54.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT        5.250   10/20/2015      EUR     27.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.800    2/23/2037      JPY     39.25
Q-CELLS                6.750   10/21/2015      EUR      0.95
QIMONDA FINANCE        6.750    3/22/2013      USD      1.50
RHEINISCHE HYPBK       6.600    5/29/2022      EUR     68.38
SOLARWORLD AG          6.125    1/21/2017      EUR     51.92
SOLARWORLD AG          6.375    7/13/2016      EUR     53.09
STYROLUTION GRP        7.625    5/15/2016      EUR     67.38
STYROLUTION GRP        7.625    5/15/2016      EUR     67.31
TAG IMMO AG            6.500   12/10/2015      EUR      7.49
TUI AG                 2.750    3/24/2016      EUR     32.54
TUI AG                 5.500   11/17/2014      EUR     46.10

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN       5.008    7/18/2017      EUR     27.36
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.851    9/19/2016      EUR     24.58
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.301    8/12/2014      EUR     23.61
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.057    3/26/2013      EUR     34.98
FAGE DAIRY IND         7.500    1/15/2015      EUR     74.25
FAGE DAIRY IND         7.500    1/15/2015      EUR     74.00
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.300    7/25/2030      EUR     16.13
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.900    7/25/2025      EUR     17.62
HELLENIC REPUB         4.590     4/8/2016      EUR     20.00
HELLENIC REPUB         2.125     7/5/2013      CHF     42.63
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000    3/11/2019      EUR     30.75
HELLENIC REPUB         6.140    4/14/2028      EUR     13.38
HELLENIC REPUB         5.200    7/17/2034      EUR     10.75
HELLENIC REPUB         4.625    6/25/2013      USD     38.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300    7/20/2017      EUR     22.97
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    7/20/2018      EUR     24.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.000    7/19/2019      EUR     24.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500   10/22/2019      EUR     25.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.250    6/19/2020      EUR     28.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900   10/22/2022      EUR     24.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.700    3/20/2024      EUR     24.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.300    3/20/2026      EUR     24.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    9/20/2037      EUR     22.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    9/20/2040      EUR     23.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500     7/1/2014      EUR     30.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    5/20/2014      EUR     27.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500    1/11/2014      EUR     27.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.520    9/30/2013      EUR     28.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.000    8/20/2013      EUR     27.53
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.427    7/31/2013      EUR     35.20
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.900     7/3/2013      EUR     35.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI       7.500    5/20/2013      EUR     31.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    5/20/2013      EUR     27.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300    3/20/2012      EUR     39.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.985    7/25/2014      EUR     27.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.500    8/20/2014      EUR     25.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.113    9/30/2014      EUR     28.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700    7/20/2015      EUR     26.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.100    8/20/2015      EUR     29.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.702    9/30/2015      EUR     28.05
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700   11/10/2015      EUR     24.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.600    7/20/2016      EUR     22.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.020    9/13/2016      EUR     28.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.225     3/1/2017      EUR     28.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900    4/20/2017      EUR     23.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.506    3/31/2013      EUR     40.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250    5/18/2012      EUR     36.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.100    8/20/2012      EUR     31.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI       1.000    6/30/2012      EUR     59.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.250    6/20/2012      EUR     61.25
NATL BK GREECE         3.875    10/7/2016      EUR     54.90
CALYON FIN GUER        6.000     9/4/2029      USD     65.89
CREDIT AGRICOLE        5.600    2/25/2030      USD     62.73
OTP BANK               5.270    9/19/2016      EUR     74.17

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       4.875    6/29/2017      EUR     74.30
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000     3/1/2030      EUR     46.87
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000    2/12/2030      EUR     46.91
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.580    4/28/2028      EUR     52.36
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625   11/12/2014      EUR     72.18
ALLIED IRISH BKS       4.000    3/19/2015      EUR     71.30
ALLIED IRISH BKS      12.500    6/25/2035      GBP     33.75
ANGLO IRISH BANK       4.000    4/15/2015      EUR     69.81
BANESTO FINANC         6.050     7/2/2025      EUR     71.48
BANESTO FINANC         5.000     6/1/2024      EUR     66.97
BANESTO FINANC         5.000    3/23/2030      EUR     58.15
BANK OF IRELAND        5.600    9/18/2023      EUR     39.38
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020      EUR     50.25
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020      GBP     37.38
BANK OF IRELAND        4.473   11/30/2016      EUR     57.75
BANK OF IRELAND        3.585    4/21/2015      EUR     75.13
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.450     3/1/2030      EUR     49.32
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.760     9/7/2029      EUR     51.99
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.360   10/12/2029      EUR     49.13
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.400    11/6/2029      EUR     49.37
DEPFA ACS BANK         4.900    8/24/2035      CAD     69.63
DEPFA ACS BANK         3.250    7/31/2031      CHF     72.29
DEPFA ACS BANK         0.500     3/3/2025      CAD     41.47
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125    3/16/2037      USD     71.31
EBS BLDG SOCIETY       4.000    2/25/2015      EUR     71.54
IRISH GOVT             5.000   10/18/2020      EUR     73.08
IRISH GOVT             5.400    3/13/2025      EUR     69.99
IRISH GOVT             4.500    4/18/2020      EUR     70.89
IRISH GOVT             4.400    6/18/2019      EUR     72.74
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.000    3/10/2015      EUR     69.77
UT2 FUNDING PLC        5.321    6/30/2016      EUR     50.00

ITALY
-----
BANCA 121 SPA          6.370   12/21/2026      EUR     73.89
BANCA IMI SPA          3.500    6/30/2016      EUR     73.26
BANCA IMI SPA          3.500    2/21/2017      EUR     70.17
BANCA MARCHE           4.000     7/9/2020      EUR     66.18
BANCA MARCHE           4.300     1/4/2020      EUR     68.72
BANCA MARCHE           4.500     3/4/2018      EUR     73.90
BANCA MARCHE           3.200    9/27/2017      EUR     69.43
BANCA MARCHE           3.200    6/21/2017      EUR     70.57
BANCA MARCHE           3.700     9/1/2020      EUR     64.35
BANCA MARCHE           3.750     3/1/2017      EUR     74.18
BANCA MARCHE           3.500    7/16/2016      EUR     75.27
BANCA MARCHE           4.360     1/4/2022      ITL     67.60
BANCA MARCHE           5.125    5/14/2024      ITL     70.78
BANCA MARCHE           5.500    9/16/2030      EUR     71.12
BANCA MARCHE           4.700    8/16/2021      EUR     68.96
BANCA MARCHE           4.000    5/26/2021      EUR     64.33
BANCA MARCHE           4.000    1/10/2021      EUR     64.93
BANCA MARCHE           3.600   11/12/2020      EUR     63.28
BANCA MARCHE           5.400    9/16/2020      EUR     73.20
BANCA MARCHE           3.900    8/17/2020      EUR     65.42
BANCA MARCHE           3.200    5/10/2017      EUR     71.19
BANCA NAZ LAVORO       4.652     2/3/2023      EUR     71.59
BANCA POP ALTO         1.000    7/14/2015      EUR     74.23
BANCA POP EMILIA       4.000    4/12/2020      EUR     66.94
BANCA POP ETRURI       5.000    5/16/2021      EUR     71.66
BANCA POP ETRURI       5.000     8/1/2021      EUR     71.33
BANCA POP ETRURI       5.000    3/31/2021      EUR     72.02
BANCA POP ETRURI       4.500    1/31/2021      EUR     68.99
BANCA POP ETRURI       4.000    3/31/2018      EUR     72.13
BANCA POP ETRURI       4.150    2/16/2018      EUR     73.35
BANCA POP ETRURI       4.000   12/31/2017      EUR     73.18
BANCA POP LODI         3.750    2/28/2018      EUR     69.62
BANCA POP LODI         3.625    3/31/2017      EUR     73.05
BANCA POP LODI         5.250     4/3/2029      EUR     55.13
BANCA POP MILANO       3.625    7/16/2017      EUR     62.69
BANCA POP MILANO       3.250    6/30/2017      EUR     60.05
BANCA POP MILANO       3.375    4/16/2017      EUR     62.96
BANCA POP MILANO       3.375    1/15/2017      EUR     64.24
BANCA POP MILANO       3.000    9/29/2016      EUR     64.50
BANCA POP MILANO       2.900    8/30/2016      EUR     64.86
BANCA POP MILANO       3.000    3/31/2016      EUR     67.39
BANCA POP MILANO       3.250     3/4/2016      EUR     69.42
BANCA POP MILANO       3.000    1/16/2016      EUR     68.62
BANCA POP MILANO       3.000   10/14/2015      EUR     70.20
BANCA POP MILANO       3.400    8/12/2015      EUR     72.52
BANCA POP MILANO       4.000    8/11/2015      EUR     73.97
BANCA POP MILANO       3.300    7/29/2015      EUR     72.16
BANCA POP MILANO       3.000    7/15/2015      EUR     71.79
BANCA POP MILANO       2.650    6/30/2015      EUR     71.40
BANCA POP MILANO       3.125    4/15/2015      EUR     73.68
BANCA POP MILANO       4.000    4/23/2020      EUR     53.03
BANCA POP MILANO       7.125     3/1/2021      EUR     71.76
BANCA POP MILANO       3.500    6/30/2018      EUR     58.06
BANCA POP MILANO       4.500    4/18/2018      EUR     67.00
BANCA POP MILANO       4.100    3/31/2018      EUR     61.76
BANCA POP MILANO       3.875   10/15/2017      EUR     62.94
BANCA POP MILANO       3.100    9/30/2017      EUR     59.73
BANCA SELLA            3.600    11/5/2019      EUR     66.26
BANCA SELLA            5.070    3/15/2021      EUR     72.66
BANCO POPOLARE         3.500    1/31/2016      EUR     73.39
BANCO POPOLARE         6.000    11/5/2020      EUR     64.21
BANCO POPOLARE         6.375    5/31/2021      EUR     64.23
BANCO POPOLARE         2.900   11/30/2016      EUR     72.06
BANCO POPOLARE         3.000   10/29/2016      EUR     72.85
BP CIVIDALE            3.180    5/19/2020      EUR     62.93
BTPS                   5.000     8/1/2039      EUR     73.83
BTPS                   5.000     9/1/2040      EUR     73.83
BTPS                   5.000     8/1/2034      EUR     73.26
BTPS                   4.000     2/1/2037      EUR     66.72
BTPS I/L               3.100    9/15/2026      EUR     66.02
BTPS I/L               2.350    9/15/2035      EUR     59.99
BTPS I/L               2.600    9/15/2023      EUR     65.82
BTPS I/L               2.550    9/15/2041      EUR     60.68
BTPS I/L               2.100    9/15/2021      EUR     66.77
BTPS I/L               2.350    9/15/2019      EUR     71.73
CASSA RISP CENTO       4.500    9/12/2015      EUR     72.88
CASSA RISP CESEN       3.400     9/7/2017      EUR     71.43
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.575     2/2/2017      EUR     68.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.400    9/17/2017      EUR     62.63
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.500    11/2/2020      EUR     58.00
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.000    1/18/2015      EUR     72.38
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000    4/15/2015      EUR     74.13
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000     8/5/2015      EUR     72.63
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000     9/2/2015      EUR     72.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       3.500     3/5/2016      EUR     68.25
CASSA RISP FERRA       4.000    11/2/2016      EUR     67.25
CIR SPA                5.750   12/16/2024      EUR     72.38
COMUNE DI MILANO       4.019    6/29/2035      EUR     73.55
FINMECCANICA SPA       4.875    3/24/2025      EUR     63.15
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.350    1/28/2020      EUR     73.48
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.000    11/8/2018      EUR     73.57
INTESA SANPAOLO        6.160    6/27/2018      EUR     74.38
INTESA SANPAOLO        3.000    12/3/2017      EUR     71.15
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.630    2/19/2023      EUR     71.90
INTESA SANPAOLO        2.882    4/20/2020      EUR     64.10
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.000     9/2/2022      EUR     68.26
INTESA SANPAOLO        5.150    7/16/2020      EUR     73.38
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.375    2/12/2020      EUR     73.37
INTESA SANPAOLO        4.125    4/14/2020      EUR     73.26
MEDIOBANCA             4.190    6/20/2020      EUR     70.05
MEDIOBANCA             2.200    12/7/2017      EUR     68.56
MONTE DEI PASCHI       3.750    8/30/2020      EUR     68.31
REP OF ITALY           2.850     9/1/2022      EUR     73.29
REP OF ITALY           2.750   11/11/2018      EUR     71.79
REP OF ITALY           2.500    1/30/2018      CHF     76.72
REP OF ITALY           4.490     4/5/2027      EUR     67.17
REP OF ITALY           5.200    7/31/2034      EUR     70.29
REP OF ITALY           2.870    5/19/2036      JPY     47.58
REP OF ITALY           1.850    9/15/2057      EUR     42.25
REP OF ITALY           2.200    9/15/2058      EUR     49.08
REP OF ITALY           4.850    6/11/2060      EUR     63.92
REP OF ITALY           2.000    9/15/2062      EUR     44.45
ROMULUS FINANCE        5.441    2/20/2023      GBP     67.82
SANPAOLO IMI           3.750     3/2/2020      EUR     72.43
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     57.88
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     58.00
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     57.77
SEAT PAGINE           10.500    1/31/2017      EUR     57.73
TELECOM ITALIA         5.250    3/17/2055      EUR     60.32
UBI BANCA SPCA         4.600    7/28/2018      EUR     70.03

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL          7.250     4/1/2014      EUR     22.10
CONTROLINVESTE         3.000    1/28/2015      EUR     66.04
ESFG INTERNATION       6.875   10/21/2019      EUR     53.79
FINMECCANICA FIN       5.250    1/21/2022      EUR     65.22
INTL INDUST BANK       9.000     7/6/2011      EUR      2.95
KION FINANCE           7.875    4/15/2018      EUR     73.38
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     13.50
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     13.00
TELECOM IT CAP         6.375   11/15/2033      USD     76.11
TELECOM IT CAP         6.000    9/30/2034      USD     70.29
UBI BANCA INT          8.750   10/29/2012      EUR     64.27

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE      11.750    10/1/2005      USD      0.01
ASTANA FINANCE         9.000   11/16/2011      USD      8.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    2/24/2025      CAD     62.51
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR     43.49
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR     43.89
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/29/2021      NZD     67.97
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500     3/3/2021      NZD     68.22
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2016      TRY     69.64
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    9/15/2016      TRY     68.55
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    4/27/2016      TRY     70.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/17/2016      TRY     70.92
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/25/2016      TRY     70.01
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500    5/15/2014      USD     37.63
BLT FINANCE BV         7.500    5/15/2014      USD     37.75
CEMEX FIN EUROPE       4.750     3/5/2014      EUR     69.20
DEXIA FUNDING          5.875     2/9/2017      GBP     63.02
EDP FINANCE BV         4.125    6/29/2020      EUR     73.25
ELEC DE CAR FIN        8.500    4/10/2018      USD     58.61
FINANCE & CREDIT      10.500    1/25/2014      USD     59.94
FRIESLAND BANK         4.210   12/29/2025      EUR     56.69
FRIESLAND BANK         5.320    2/26/2024      EUR     68.76
ING BANK NV            4.200   12/19/2035      EUR     70.51
KBC IFIMA NV           8.500     2/7/2025      USD     66.25
LEHMAN BROS TSY        4.870    10/8/2013      USD     33.00
MAGYAR TELECOM         9.500   12/15/2016      EUR     70.83
MAGYAR TELECOM         9.500   12/15/2016      EUR     73.50
MARFRIG HLDG EUR       8.375     5/9/2018      USD     72.52
NATL INVESTER BK      25.983     5/7/2029      EUR     16.86
NED WATERSCHAPBK       0.500    3/11/2025      CAD     60.72
NIB CAPITAL BANK       4.510   12/16/2035      EUR     59.39
POLYSINDO FIN          9.375    7/30/2007      USD      0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       5.000    11/4/2019      EUR     73.17
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       4.375    3/24/2017      EUR     74.16
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       4.500    6/16/2025      EUR     63.10
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       1.375    2/28/2012      EUR     46.33
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       5.750    5/26/2014      EUR     21.38
RABOBANK               0.500   10/27/2016      ZAR     71.53
RABOBANK               0.500   11/26/2021      ZAR     50.12
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       5.000    2/27/2037      EUR     69.38
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       2.910    6/21/2036      JPY     66.62
SIDETUR FINANCE       10.000    4/20/2016      USD     68.00
SNS BANK               4.580    3/20/2026      EUR     70.48
SNS BANK               6.625    5/14/2018      EUR     73.34
SNS BANK               5.215    12/3/2027      EUR     74.39
SNS BANK               6.250   10/26/2020      EUR     65.13
SRLEV NV               9.000    4/15/2041      EUR     60.87
TJIWI KIMIA FIN       13.250     8/1/2001      USD      0.01
NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS          0.500     5/9/2030      CAD     40.73
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/29/2016      TRY     68.71
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    1/27/2016      ZAR     74.31
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR     72.19
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR     71.25
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR     73.70
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR     59.81
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR     71.03
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR     73.29
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125   10/15/2015      USD     57.70
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033      USD     44.00
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.000    6/26/2017      EUR     52.71
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750    6/15/2016      EUR     63.88
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033      USD     44.00
NORSKE SKOGIND        11.750    6/15/2016      EUR     64.00
NORSKE SKOGIND         6.125   10/15/2015      USD     55.63
RENEWABLE CORP         6.500     6/4/2014      EUR     57.42

POLAND
------
POLAND-PAR CPN         3.000   10/27/2024      USD     72.14

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG       4.750    6/22/2017      EUR     65.14
BANCO COM PORTUG       5.625    4/23/2014      EUR     67.99
BANCO COM PORTUG       9.250   10/13/2014      EUR     72.99
BANCO COM PORTUG       3.750    10/8/2016      EUR     64.63
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.375    2/17/2015      EUR     74.82
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600    1/26/2017      EUR     66.42
BANCO ESPIRITO         3.875    1/21/2015      EUR     69.21
BANCO ESPIRITO         4.600    9/15/2016      EUR     68.25
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.875    7/15/2016      EUR     68.38
BANCO ESPIRITO         6.160    7/23/2015      EUR     71.38
BRISA                  4.500    12/5/2016      EUR     70.48
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       3.875    12/6/2016      EUR     67.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.570    8/12/2016      EUR     80.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.980     3/3/2028      EUR     50.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.320     8/5/2021      EUR     82.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.500   11/13/2017      EUR     69.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.380    10/1/2038      EUR     49.87
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.400    10/8/2019      EUR     67.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.455    8/20/2017      EUR     82.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.250    1/27/2020      EUR     64.54
CAIXA GERAL FR         3.384   12/15/2014      EUR     75.13
COMBOIOS DE PORT       4.170   10/16/2019      EUR     56.31
METRO DE LISBOA        4.061    12/4/2026      EUR     53.51
METRO DE LISBOA        7.300   12/23/2025      EUR     69.89
METRO DE LISBOA        5.750     2/4/2019      EUR     62.19
METRO DE LISBOA        4.799    12/7/2027      EUR     53.81
MONTEPIO GERAL         5.000     2/8/2017      EUR     61.63
PARPUBLICA             3.567    9/22/2020      EUR     47.75
PARPUBLICA             4.191   10/15/2014      EUR     66.25
PARPUBLICA             3.500     7/8/2013      EUR     68.75
PARPUBLICA             5.250    9/28/2017      EUR     69.53
PARPUBLICA             4.200   11/16/2026      EUR     46.50
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500    3/25/2015      USD     70.00
PORTUGAL (REP)         3.500    3/25/2015      USD     69.27
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.100    4/15/2037      EUR     49.53
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.950   10/25/2023      EUR     54.87
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.850    4/15/2021      EUR     54.72
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.800    6/15/2020      EUR     56.62
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.750    6/14/2019      EUR     57.20
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.350   10/16/2017      EUR     59.18
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.200   10/15/2016      EUR     62.76
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.350   10/15/2015      EUR     69.79
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.450    6/15/2018      EUR     58.51
REFER                  4.675   10/16/2024      EUR     47.25
REFER                  4.250   12/13/2021      EUR     36.50
REFER                  4.047   11/16/2026      EUR     51.65
REFER                  4.000    3/16/2015      EUR     46.75
REFER                  5.875    2/18/2019      EUR     56.25

RUSSIA
------
ARIZK                  3.000   12/20/2030      RUB     49.78
DVTG-FINANS           17.000    8/29/2013      RUB     55.55
DVTG-FINANS            7.750    7/18/2013      RUB     20.29
IART                   8.500     8/4/2013      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                 17.000    9/17/2012      RUB     30.01
MOSMART FINANS         0.010    4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
NOK                   12.500    8/26/2014      RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA       1.000   12/17/2012      RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE         9.000    6/12/2012      RUB     75.00
RBC OJSC               7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC               7.000    4/23/2015      RUB     63.40
RBC OJSC               3.270    4/19/2018      RUB     35.00
SAHO                  10.000    5/21/2012      RUB      3.44
SATURN                 8.500     6/6/2014      RUB      1.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.000    3/31/2020      EUR     74.23
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.000    3/24/2021      EUR     69.47
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750   12/14/2022      EUR     60.22
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.250   10/25/2023      EUR     62.00
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750    6/30/2025      EUR     53.30
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.750    5/25/2027      EUR     63.74
AYUNTAM DE MADRD       4.550    6/16/2036      EUR     73.39
BANCAJA                1.500    5/22/2018      EUR     59.63
BANCAJA EMI SA         2.755    5/11/2037      JPY     68.46
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       4.500    2/16/2022      EUR     71.16
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       4.375   10/20/2019      EUR     74.83
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       5.650    6/16/2023      EUR     72.40
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       6.200     7/4/2023      EUR     68.51
BANCO BILBAO VIZ       6.025     3/3/2033      EUR     63.80
BANCO POP ESPAN        5.702   12/22/2019      EUR     69.00
BBVA SUB CAP UNI       2.750   10/22/2035      JPY     43.75
CAJA CASTIL-MAN        1.500    6/23/2021      EUR     48.80
CAJA MADRID            4.125    3/24/2036      EUR     63.30
CAJA MADRID            5.020    2/26/2038      EUR     72.00
CAJA MADRID            4.000     2/3/2025      EUR     71.76
CEDULAS TDA 5          4.125   11/29/2019      EUR     74.06
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       3.875    5/23/2025      EUR     55.43
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       4.250    4/10/2031      EUR     47.65
CEDULAS TDA A-4        4.125    4/10/2021      EUR     71.51
CEDULAS TDA A-5        4.250    3/28/2027      EUR     54.57
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250    5/12/2020      USD     67.50
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       9.250    5/12/2020      USD     67.75
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       8.875    5/12/2017      EUR     70.75
CEMEX ESPANA LUX       8.875    5/12/2017      EUR     70.75
COMUN AUTO CANAR       4.200   10/25/2036      EUR     67.80
COMUN AUTO CANAR       3.900   11/30/2035      EUR     64.60
COMUNIDAD BALEAR       4.063   11/23/2035      EUR     70.16
COMUNIDAD MADRID       4.300    9/15/2026      EUR     73.34
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.690   10/28/2034      EUR     69.45
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.220    4/26/2035      EUR     64.17
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.750    3/24/2016      CHF     62.07
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.965     9/8/2039      JPY     50.26
GEN DE CATALUNYA       2.125    10/1/2014      CHF     67.70
GENERAL DE ALQUI       2.750    8/20/2012      EUR     70.65
IM CEDULAS 10          4.500    2/21/2022      EUR     73.12
IM CEDULAS 5           3.500    6/15/2020      EUR     70.71
IM CEDULAS 7           4.000    3/31/2021      EUR     71.86
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       2.100    2/23/2021      JPY     71.85
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       3.250    6/28/2024      CHF     62.41
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       2.570   10/22/2021      CHF     63.35
INSTIT CRDT OFCL       2.799    11/5/2018      CHF     74.43
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.170    7/29/2039      JPY     54.68
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        4.250   10/31/2036      EUR     73.91
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        3.065    7/29/2039      JPY     53.39
JUNTA LA MANCHA        2.810   10/14/2022      JPY     62.66
JUNTA LA MANCHA        3.875    1/31/2036      EUR     62.25
MAPFRE SA              5.921    7/24/2037      EUR     62.98
SPANISH GOV'T          4.900    7/30/2040      EUR     73.19
SPANISH GOV'T          4.700    7/30/2041      EUR     70.90
SPANISH GOV'T          4.200    1/31/2037      EUR     67.10
XUNTA DE GALICIA       6.720   11/24/2013      EUR    101.57
XUNTA DE GALICIA       4.025   11/28/2035      EUR     73.63

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012      USD     10.15
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012      USD     10.56
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.750    3/23/2012      USD      7.47
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.250    4/27/2012      USD      6.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000    1/27/2012      USD      3.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED       6.500    1/27/2012      USD      7.13
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.130    1/10/2012      USD     10.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.000    12/7/2011      USD     10.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500    6/12/2012      USD      7.56
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    9/29/2015      TRY     72.71
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR     74.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR     72.92
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR     71.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/29/2016      TRY     68.70
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/25/2016      ZAR     69.66
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/26/2016      ZAR     69.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    9/20/2016      ZAR     69.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    9/30/2016      ZAR     69.03
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/25/2021      ZAR     42.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    8/26/2021      AUD     63.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    1/25/2028      USD     58.29
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500    2/28/2012      USD      8.55
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/17/2027      USD     58.69

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CRED SUIS NY           8.000   11/16/2012      USD     56.80
CRED SUIS NY           9.000   10/12/2012      USD     22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH          2.875    2/20/2012      CHF     70.03

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS       3.770    9/13/2020      EUR     72.91
ABBEY NATL TREAS       5.000    8/26/2030      USD     58.02
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       5.500    6/20/2013      EUR     58.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       3.250    2/25/2013      EUR     58.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.400    2/12/2013      EUR     62.00
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       3.875    9/17/2012      EUR     73.21
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       6.000    6/20/2014      EUR     47.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.500    6/21/2013      EUR     53.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP       4.000   11/16/2012      EUR     66.25
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250    2/15/2018      GBP     66.00
BAKKAVOR FIN 2         8.250    2/15/2018      GBP     66.88
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.408     2/9/2027      JPY     66.20
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.359    3/27/2029      JPY     62.09
BANK OF SCOTLAND       2.860   12/13/2021      CHF     70.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.350    1/23/2012      USD     26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.550    1/23/2012      USD     10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000   10/16/2012      USD     10.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.500   10/16/2012      USD      9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC       14.000    10/1/2012      USD      9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000    10/1/2012      USD      9.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/28/2012      USD      9.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/11/2012      USD      9.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    9/11/2012      USD      9.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.500    8/31/2012      USD     22.20
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000    8/28/2012      USD     10.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.800    7/31/2012      USD     23.91
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.400    7/31/2012      USD      9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC       11.500    7/27/2012      USD      7.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC        7.000    7/27/2012      USD      8.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.000    7/20/2012      USD      7.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.000    6/29/2012      USD      8.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.420     5/5/2031      USD     73.40
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.100    5/26/2031      USD     72.63
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.390     8/4/2031      USD     73.98
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200    8/25/2031      USD     71.74
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.230    8/26/2031      USD     71.80
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.200    8/29/2031      USD     71.43
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.250    8/29/2031      USD     70.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC        5.000     6/3/2041      USD     68.25
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       4.910     2/1/2047      EUR     70.36
CEVA GROUP PLC         8.500    6/30/2018      EUR     49.63
CEVA GROUP PLC        10.000    6/30/2018      EUR     55.63
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.875    3/28/2033      GBP     65.77
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.750    12/2/2024      GBP     70.52
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.625   11/16/2021      GBP     76.62
CONSORT HLTH M Y       2.055    6/27/2041      GBP     75.01
EC FINANCE             9.750     8/1/2017      EUR     74.38
EFG HELLAS PLC         4.375    2/11/2013      EUR     55.50
EFG HELLAS PLC         5.400    11/2/2047      EUR      8.50
EFG HELLAS PLC         6.010     1/9/2036      EUR     33.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.100    12/9/2021      EUR     13.25
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.000    12/2/2021      EUR     13.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       5.000    12/2/2021      EUR     13.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.000    2/28/2013      EUR     53.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN       4.350    7/22/2014      EUR     32.00
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875    2/15/2021      GBP     62.71
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.875     5/9/2025      GBP     63.00
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.500    12/6/2018      GBP     67.50
ENTERPRISE INNS        6.375    9/26/2031      GBP     61.50
ESSAR ENERGY           4.250     2/1/2016      USD     62.24
EX-IM BK OF UKRA       5.793     2/9/2016      USD     70.00
F&C ASSET MNGMT        6.750   12/20/2026      GBP     65.09
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500     6/1/2019      GBP     65.64
GALA ELECTRIC CA      11.500     6/1/2019      GBP     69.67
GRAINGER PLC           3.625    5/17/2014      GBP     74.61
HBOS PLC               6.000    11/1/2033      USD     73.21
HBOS PLC               4.500    3/18/2030      EUR     58.68
HBOS PLC               6.000    11/1/2033      USD     73.21
HBOS PLC               7.070     4/8/2023      EUR     73.08
HBOS PLC               5.374    6/30/2021      EUR     66.99
HBOS PLC               4.375   10/30/2019      EUR     70.66
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875    2/15/2016      EUR     68.08
INEOS GRP HLDG         7.875    2/15/2016      EUR     68.13
INEOS GRP HLDG         8.500    2/15/2016      USD     74.75
INEOS GRP HLDG         8.500    2/15/2016      USD     74.75
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.867   12/17/2019      GBP     69.84
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       6.439    5/23/2020      EUR     63.54
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.588    5/12/2020      GBP     68.81
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.869    8/25/2020      GBP     69.18
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.375    3/12/2020      EUR     67.83
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.875    11/1/2020      USD     78.50
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.625   10/14/2020      EUR     67.85
LBG CAPITAL NO.1       7.975    9/15/2024      GBP     64.32
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       9.000   12/15/2019      GBP     74.51
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       7.875    3/19/2020      USD     73.63
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       6.385    5/12/2020      EUR     63.54
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       9.125    7/15/2020      GBP     74.56
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       9.875    2/10/2023      GBP     74.26
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       9.000    7/15/2029      GBP     65.32
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       8.500     6/7/2032      GBP     62.05
LBG CAPITAL NO.2       7.625    12/9/2019      GBP     69.55
LLOYDS TSB BANK        6.500    3/24/2020      EUR     71.59
LLOYDS TSB BANK        4.500   12/13/2024      EUR     72.68
LLOYDS TSB BANK        5.750     7/9/2025      GBP     73.72
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000    12/1/2016      EUR     60.13
LOUIS NO1 PLC         10.000    12/1/2016      EUR     60.13
LOUIS NO1 PLC          8.500    12/1/2014      EUR     66.25
MATALAN                9.625    3/31/2017      GBP     48.70
MATALAN                8.875    4/29/2016      GBP     70.90
MATALAN                9.625    3/31/2017      GBP     48.75
MAX PETROLEUM          6.750     9/8/2013      USD     53.05
NATIONWIDE BLDG        5.600    8/19/2030      USD     74.24
NEW HOSPITALS ST       1.777    2/26/2047      GBP     58.82
NOMURA BANK INTL       0.800   12/21/2020      EUR     71.20
NORTHERN ROCK          5.750    2/28/2017      GBP     70.50
OTE PLC                7.250     4/8/2014      EUR     66.90
OTE PLC                5.000     8/5/2013      EUR     70.64
OTE PLC                4.625    5/20/2016      EUR     57.61
PIRAEUS GRP FIN        4.000    9/17/2012      EUR     63.80
PRIVATBANK             5.799     2/9/2016      USD     62.03
PUNCH TAVERNS          5.883   10/15/2026      GBP     65.67
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       2.300   11/26/2024      JPY     74.50
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       5.250   11/14/2033      EUR     66.32
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       2.375    11/2/2015      CHF     74.68
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.350    1/23/2017      EUR     67.73
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       6.934     4/9/2018      EUR     73.25
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.625    9/22/2021      EUR     61.28
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.700     7/3/2018      USD     77.84
SPIRIT ISSUER          5.472   12/28/2028      GBP     68.24
THOMAS COOK GR         6.750    6/22/2015      EUR     29.94
THOMAS COOK GR         7.750    6/22/2017      GBP     29.71
TUI TRAVEL PLC         4.900    4/27/2017      GBP     72.24
TXU EASTERN FNDG       6.450    5/15/2005      USD      0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN         6.542    3/30/2021      GBP     69.33
UNIQUE PUB FIN         5.659    6/30/2027      GBP     61.38


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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