TCREUR_Public/111205.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, December 5, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 240



* DENMARK: Corporate Bankruptcies Down 9.3% in November


KABEL BW: Moody's Says Liberty Bid to Address Antitrust Concerns
MANROLAND AG: Obtains EUR55-Mil. Credit to Continue Operations


ALLIED IRISH: Files Interim Management Statement
ATLAS VI: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class A Series 2011-1 Notes
BANK OF IRELAND: Five Hedge Funds Seek Debt-for-Equity Swap


BANCA UBAE: Fitch Maintains 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating on RWN
CELL THERAPEUTICS: Has US$4 Million Net Profit in October
LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes


LATVIJAS KRAJBANKA: Banking Regulator Files Bankruptcy Papers


BANKAS SNORAS: Lithuania May Raise Debt Level to Repay Depositors


BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR78.3-Mil. Notes to 'CCC'
CRC BREEZE: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR36-Mil. Class B Notes to CCC
RMF EURO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCC-'


* Fitch Hopes to Resolve RWN on Dutch NHG Backed RMBS


EKSPORTFINANS ASA: Rescue Plan Thwarted by Government


POLKOMTEL SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'


MAGNITOGORSK IRON: Fitch Says Flinders Buyout Neutral to Ratings
* KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Rates RUB1-Bil. Bond Issue at 'BB-'
* PENZA REGION: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Currency Rating at 'BB'
* UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Rates RUB2-Bil. Bond Issue at 'BB+'


CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR35MM D Notes
CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Takes Action on 19 Spanish RMBS Deals
FONCAIXA CONSUMO: Fitch Rates EUR462-Mil. Class B Notes at 'BBsf'
PYMES BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Assigns (P)Ca Rating to Serie D Notes

SANTANDER EMPRESAS: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating to Series C Notes
TDA 24: Fitch Says Change in Servicer Will Note Affect Ratings


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Owner Swedish Auto Posts Substantial 3Q Loss


OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'


* TURKEY: Moody's Says 'Ba2' Positive Outlook Reflects Resilience


* REGION OF DONETSK: Fitch Affirms Currency Ratings at 'B'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASTON MARTIN: Moody's Downgrades CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Stable
BATTERSEA POWER STATION: Next Owner May Have to Commit GBP70MM
BRITISH AIRWAYS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating to Unsecured Notes
EUROMASTR SERIES: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
INVESTEC BANK: Fitch Cuts Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to 'BB'

MF GLOBAL: Int'l FCStone Unit to Buy UK Metals Division
MF GLOBAL: LME Completes Transfer of UK Client Contracts
OSPEY ACQUISITION: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'
* Lloyds Banking Final Bids for Distressed Property Loans Due


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 28 to December 2, 2011



* DENMARK: Corporate Bankruptcies Down 9.3% in November
Anne Cathrine Schjott at Borsen reports that the number of
bankruptcies in Denmark is slightly falling.

According to Borsen, data from the research agency Experian show
that over the year, the number has decreased by 15.2%.

In November, the number of bankruptcies in 645 businesses was the
lowest level in two years and 9.3% fewer than the previous year,
Borsen notes.

"Compared to a weak increase in the export and the propensity to
invest among the businesses it indicates that the long haul has
begun, and this is what is needed to restore the consumer
confidence," Borsen quotes Experian communication officer Kim
Bach as saying.


KABEL BW: Moody's Says Liberty Bid to Address Antitrust Concerns
In a Special Comment report, Moody's Investors Service says that
in its bid to acquire German cable operator Kabel BW Erste
Beteiligungs, Liberty Global has attempted to mitigate the
antitrust concerns of Germany's national competition regulator,
the Federal Cartel Office.

The German Federal Cartel Office is concerned that a KBW-
Unitymedia merger could potentially intensify Germany's existing
regional oligopoly of cable companies for delivering basic cable
TV services to apartment blocks, or multi-dwelling units (MDUs),
through housing associations.

Moody's recognizes that LGI has offered several concessions to
try and make the deal acceptable to the regulator. Indeed, on 29
November 2011, LGI has proposed an additional concession to the
regulator. This concession will grant an extraordinary
termination right for a specified number of housing associations
with longer-term MDU contracts in the footprints of Unitymedia
and KBW. The regulator will take these concessions into account
in its final decision, which it plans to deliver by December 15,

If LGI's bid for KBW succeeds, Kabel Deutschland Holding (rated
Ba2 stable) will still be Germany's single biggest cable
operator, with 8.7 million subscribers and annual revenues of
around EUR1.6 billion. Even so, the acquisition would give LGI
nearly 7 million subscribers and combined revenues of around
EUR1.5 billion in Germany. This would result in the company
holding a solid second ranking position in the German cable
market in terms of subscribers. However, if the deal is not
approved by the Federal Cartel Office in December, LGI has no
other immediate contingency plans except litigation, which may
not lead to a clear outcome in the near term.

Moody's considers that denial of the merger is not likely to
damage LGI from a credit standpoint (despite the indemnification
by LGI to the "backstop purchaser" for any losses that may arise
selling or transferring KBW), but it would make further
consolidation of Germany's cable industry less likely. A change
in ownership would not affect KBW group's ratings as long as its
business strategy and leverage remain broadly unchanged.

"In our view, a regulatory approval of the merger would benefit
LGI, encouraging its strategy of acquiring more cable assets in
Europe should they come up for sale," says Gunjan Dixit, an
analyst in Moody's Corporate Finance Group and author of the
report. "We would expect LGI to manage its leverage within its
current financial policy for any future acquisitions," adds Ms

Moody's notes that the EUR3.2 billion bid by Liberty Global (LGI,
Ba3 stable) to buy Kabel BW Erste Beteiligungs ("KBW", the parent
company of which, Musketeer GmbH, is rated B2 stable) would give
US-based LGI ownership of two of Germany's three biggest cable
operators. LGI already owns Unitymedia (B1 stable), Germany's
second-largest cable operator.

Moody's report, entitled "Liberty Global's KBW Bid Strives to
Mitigate Antitrust Concerns of the German Regulator", is
available on

MANROLAND AG: Obtains EUR55-Mil. Credit to Continue Operations
Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News reports that Manroland AG, which
filed for insolvency on Nov. 25, secured a so-called mass credit
for EUR55 million (US$74 million) to continue operations.

"The company can continue to do business with customers and
suppliers, and we are sending a very positive signal to the
market," Bloomberg quotes Werner Schneider, the manufacturer's
provisional insolvency administrator, as saying in a statement on

Thomas Hauser, a spokesman for Manroland, said that the move is
the second step to help Manroland stay in business following an
agreement for Germany's Federal Labor Agency to pay the company's
wages, Bloomberg notes.

Manroland said, as cited by Bloomberg, it employs 6,500 people,
including 5,000 in Germany, when it announced the insolvency

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 28,
2011, Bloomberg News related Manroland filed to open insolvency
proceedings with the district court in Augsburg, Germany.  "The
decision to file for insolvency was triggered by another dramatic
downturn in incoming orders which can be noticed since mid-July
and has recently accelerated," Bloomberg quotes Manroland as
saying in a statement.  "Customers are finding it far more
difficult to obtain financing in the aftermath of the financial

Manroland AG is a German printing-machine maker.


ALLIED IRISH: Files Interim Management Statement
Allied Irish Banks reported that in the second half of 2011 to
date, it has been working hard to continuously improve customer
service, structure, processes and practices in the now merged
AIB/EBS.  This work is being done in circumstances where
difficult trading conditions are continuing to affect the bank's
financial performance.


Progress is being made in a number of key areas:

   * New CEO and Transformation Director appointments announced.

   * Recapitalization required under the 2011 Prudential Capital
     Assessment Review now completed.  AIB's capital adequacy
     subsequently confirmed by the most recent European Banking
     Authority (EBA) stress tests announcement.

   * Customer deposits have stabilized.

   * Non core deleveraging of EUR10.7 billion, over 50% of end
     2013 deleveraging target has been achieved, strong pipeline
     for more disposals by year end.  Total overall reduction of
     c. EUR46 billion in loans, from  c. EUR147 billion to c.
     EUR101 billion, over 21 months period to the end of
     September 2011.

   * Improved customer access to products and services

   * Extensive and increasing support being provided to customers
     in difficulty.

   * EBS is being successfully aligned and integrated.


   * The Irish economy is showing encouraging signs of growth
     driven by increased competitiveness. There has been an
     improvement in market sentiment towards Ireland due to
     Government's impressive adherence to EU/IMF program
     conditions.  However, challenging environment remains in
     many domestic sectors, demand being affected by strict and
     continuing austerity measures.  The future economic
     performance in Ireland will be strongly influenced by events
     in Europe, where conditions are currently volatile and

   * Liability Management Exercises, higher levels of capital and
     no utilization of higher cost, non standard Central Bank
     facilities since April have helped stabilize the Company's
     net interest margin in the third quarter, compared to the
     half year figure. However, income pressures persist and may
     intensify in a lower interest rate environment.

   * Net income continues to be negatively affected by elevated
     costs of deposits and funding and Government Guarantee
     costs.  As deleveraging continues, reliance on ECB
     facilities should reduce which is welcome but will further
     emphasize the higher cost of customer deposits.

   * Lower earning loan volumes as impaired loans continue to
     increase and volume of new business continues to be affected
     by muted customer demand.

   * Costs are broadly stable in the 9 months to September vs
     same period in 2010, lower staff costs have been offset by
     higher restructuring and transformation costs and also
     higher cost of resources required to work with customers in
     difficulty.  Negotiations are ongoing to find agreement on a
     severance program that is acceptable to all stakeholders.


   * Impaired loans have continued to increase across business
     and personal sectors, levels of arrears in the mortgage book
     increased in the third quarter for both AIB and EBS.

   * Expected bad debt provisions for 2011 will reflect the
     continued asset quality deterioration. The provisions that
     AIB incurs in 2011 will also reflect the Central Bank of
     Ireland's guidance* that banks should adopt a more
     conservative and prudent approach to provisioning, to the
     extent possible within International Financial Reporting
     Standards (IFRS).

   * The bad debt provisions for 2011 should position AIB to
     reduce its bad debt charge in 2012.  The outlook for 2012
     and beyond will be influenced by the domestic and
     international economic environment.

   * NAMA transfers completed in October, EUR20.4bn in total
     transferred at an overall discount of c. 55%.


   * Improving customer access to products and services, taking
     steps to simplify the credit application and fulfilment
     process to better satisfy customer requirements. Recruiting,
     training and deploying staff to engage and deliver in
     locations and at times that suit our customers.

   * Committed to continue providing a range of highly
     competitive products and services to customers, including
     lowest priced variable rate mortgages.

   * In the year to date, AIB/EBS has supported over 12,000
     customers in difficulty with mortgage repayments on their
     homes.  Identifying and will speedily implement further
     solutions for the Company's customers under the Mortgage
     Arrears Resolution Strategy.

   * Over 800 dedicated staff (an increase of 200 in last 6
     months) are assigned to specialized lending units around the
     country, managing 29,000 SME customers in difficulty.

   * Deposits have been stable in recent months, particularly
     since recapitalization completed in July.  Some early signs
     of balances increasing, though competition is intense and
     pricing very high.

   * Value of EBS brand underlined by the strong resilience of
     its deposits.


    * To date, AIB has exceeded the 2011 objectives agreed with
      the Central Bank of Ireland as part of the Financial
      Measures Programme in terms of amount delevered, overall
      cumulative haircut achieved and total capital impact.

   * Achieved EUR10.7 billion of non core deleveraging by the end
     of October 2011 through execution of a controlled strategy,
     featuring asset disposals, repayments and redemptions and
     increased provisioning.

   * Asset disposals comprised principally property, project and
     leveraged finance assets located in the United States and

   * Disposals achieved at better discounts than those assumed in
     the base case of the Financial Measures Programme and the
     capital impact of disposals to date has been broadly

   * The pipeline for further asset disposals to year end remains
     strong, containing over EUR1 billion, subject to market

   * Repayments and redemptions to date principally in overseas
     locations.  Achieved through a deliberate strategy to
     accelerate run-off and amortization of non core assets
     located abroad, thereby minimizing losses and preserving

   * The non-core team continues to prepare the pipeline for
     further non-core asset disposals.


   * Following completion of the recapitalization program, AIB
     is adequately capitalized as underlined by the recent EBA
     tests of European banks. At end of September, AIB's core
     tier one capital ratio was c. 20%.

                     About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

As reported by the TCR on May 31, 2011, KPMG, in Dublin, Ireland,
noted that there are a number of material economic, political and
market risks and uncertainties that impact the Irish banking
system, including the Company's continued ability to access
funding from the Eurosystem and the Irish Central Bank to meet
its liquidity requirements, that raise substantial doubt about
the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company reported a net loss of EUR10.16 billion on
EUR1.84 billion of interest income for 2010, compared with a net
loss of EUR2.33 billion on US$2.87 billion of interest income for

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2011, showed
EUR126.87 billion in total assets, EUR120.01 billion in total
liabilities, and EUR6.86 billion in total shareholders' equity
including non-controlling interests.

ATLAS VI: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class A Series 2011-1 Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned preliminary
credit ratings to the series 2011-1 class A and B notes and the
series 2011-2 class A notes issued under the principal-at-risk
variable-rate note program Atlas VI Capital Ltd. (Atlas VI).
These will be the third and fourth series of notes issued under
this program, which is sponsored by SCOR Global P&C SE

The series 2011-1 class A and B notes will be exposed to U.S.
hurricane and U.S. earthquake risks between January 2012 and
December 2014. The 2011-2 class A notes will be exposed to
European windstorm risk (in selected countries and regions in
northern and western Europe), between December 2011 and March
2015. Atlas VI is an Irish special-purpose private limited
company. All of its issued and outstanding share capital is held
in trust for charitable purposes by Marsh Management Services

SCOR Global P&C SE will be the counterparty to the risk transfer
contracts. It is the principal property and casualty operating
company in a group of affiliated companies (SCOR SE). SCOR SE
transacts reinsurance business worldwide and is one of the
largest global reinsurers in terms of premiums written and

The proceeds from the sale of the notes will be invested in
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) floating-
rate notes.

Ratings List

Atlas VI Capital Ltd.
US$100 Million Class A and B Principal-At-Risk Variable-Rate
Notes, Series 2011-1; and EUR75 Million Class A Principal-At-Risk
Variable-Rate Notes, Series 2011-2

Class          Prelim.          Prelim.
               rating           amount (mil.)

Series 2011-1

A              B (sf)               $50
B              B+ (sf)              $50

Series 2011-2

A              B (sf)               EUR75

BANK OF IRELAND: Five Hedge Funds Seek Debt-for-Equity Swap
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that five hedge funds
holding about EUR300 million worth of Bank of Ireland
subordinated bonds have asked the Irish Government to consider a
debt-for-equity swap instead of proceeding with plans to inflict
up to 100% losses on them.

The North American and European bondholders have told the
department that they are also open to investing additional
capital into the bank at a discount to the share price in line
with other right issues by European banks, the Irish Times

The noteholders, including US fund Appaloosa Management, made the
proposals in a submission in response to Minister for Finance
Michael Noonan saying he was considering imposing losses on the
remaining EUR350 million of subordinated debt at Bank of Ireland,
the Irish Times notes.

The Minister said he was considering using emergency banking
legislation to secure a Subordinated Liabilities Order to raise
the final EUR350 million required to meet the bank's EUR4.2
billion capital target set by the Central Bank, the Irish Times

According to the Irish Times, Stephen Phillips, a partner with
London law firm White and Case, which represents the bondholders,
said they would take legal action in the Irish courts if the
Minister proceeded to seek the order.

He pointed to the Minister's statements that the Irish banks were
"over-capitalized" and argued that Bank of Ireland didn't require
further capital given the better-than-expected results from the
bank's sale of non-core assets, the Irish Times discloses.

Mr. Phillips represents the subordinated bondholders who chose
not to participate in the liability management exercise in June,
the Irish Times says.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland -- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor,
trustee, life assurance and pension and investment fund
management, fund administration and custodial services and
financial advisory services, including mergers and acquisitions
and underwriting.  The Company organizes its businesses into
Retail Republic of Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital
Markets, UK Financial Services and Group Centre.  It has
operations throughout Ireland, the United Kingdom, Europe and the
United States.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 14,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the bank deposit
ratings of Bank of Ireland (UK) Plc (BoI UK) to Ba1/Not-Prime,
from Baa3/Prime-3 following a reassessment of UK systemic support
and of Moody's parental support assumptions.  The Ba1 long-term
deposit rating now incorporates one notch of parental support
from Bank of Ireland (BoI) and no UK systemic support.  Moody's
said the outlook is negative.


BANCA UBAE: Fitch Maintains 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating on RWN
Fitch Ratings has maintained Banca UBAE's 'BB' Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and 'bb' Viability Rating on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN).

The RWN on Banca UBAE's ratings reflects Fitch's view that
despite significant improvements in the situation in Libya, where
Banca UBAE's main shareholder is domiciled, there is still
considerable uncertainty around the bank's future operations.
Fitch expects to resolve the RWN once more clarity over the
bank's future operations become available.

In the meantime, Banca UBAE's ratings are underpinned by its
currently sound liquidity and capitalization.  The instability in
a number of countries where Banca UBAE provides trade finance
services and the situation in Libya has resulted in a decline in
business volumes in 2011, but UBAE has remained profitable in
2011 to date.  Over 90% of Banca UBAE's deposits are from Libyan
institutions.  These funds are invested conservatively by the
bank and have contributed to 2011 earnings.

The bank's Support Rating is based on potential support from the
bank's major shareholder, the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB).
Although support from the LFB is possible, it is difficult for
Fitch to assess the likelihood of support given the current
circumstances in Libya, and therefore the lowest Support Rating
of '5' has been maintained.

Banca UBAE remains under special administration by the Bank of
Italy, which in March 2011 dissolved Banca UBAE's board of
directors and appointed two administrators.  This was to ensure
the bank's full compliance with the sanctions against Libya.
Banca UBAE continues to operate normally under this special

Rome-based Banca UBAE is a niche provider of trade finance,
payment and treasury services, predominantly to customers in the
Middle East and North African markets.  Banca UBAE is 67.55%
owned by the Libyan Foreign Bank.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BB'; RWN maintained
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb'; RWN maintained
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; RWN maintained
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5

CELL THERAPEUTICS: Has US$4 Million Net Profit in October
Cell Therapeutics, Inc., provided information pursuant to a
request from the Italian securities regulatory authority, CONSOB,
pursuant to Article 114, Section 5 of the Unified Financial Act,
that the Company issue at the end of each month a press release
providing a monthly update of certain information relating to the
Company's management and financial situation.

The Company estimated net profit attributable to common
shareholders of US$4.01 million on US$0 of net revenue for the
month ended Oct. 31, 2011, compared with a net loss attributable
to common shareholders of US$20.25 million on US$0 of net revenue
during the prior month.

A full-text copy of the press release is available for free at:


                     About Cell Therapeutics

Headquartered in Seattle, Washington, Cell Therapeutics, Inc.
(NASDAQ and MTA: CTIC) -- is
a bi4opharmaceutical company committed to developing an
integrated portfolio of oncology products aimed at making cancer
more treatable.

The Company reported a net loss of US$82.64 million on US$319,000
of revenue for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2010, compared with a
net loss of US$82.64 million on US$80,000 of total revenue during
the same period in 2009.

The Company also reported a net loss attributable to CTI of
US$53.39 million on US$0 of revenue for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2011, compared with a net loss attributable to CTI of
US$62.92 million on US$319,000 of total revenues for the same
period during the prior year.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2011, showed
US$62.85 million in total assets, US$33.89 million in total
liabilities, US$13.46 million in common stock purchase warrants,
and US$15.49 million total shareholders' equity.

Marcum LLP, in San Francisco, Calif., expressed substantial doubt
about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern in its
audit reports for the financial statements for 2009 and 2010.
The independent auditors noted that the Company has incurred
losses since its inception, and has a working capital deficiency
of approximately US$14.2 million at Dec. 31, 2010.

                         Bankruptcy Warning

The Company has incurred losses since inception and expect to
generate losses for the next few years primarily due to research
and development costs for Pixuvri, OPAXIO, tosedostat,
brostallicin and bisplatinates.

If the Company receives approval of Pixuvri by the European
Medicines Agency or the Food and Drug Administration, the Company
would anticipate additional commercial expenses associated with
Pixuvri operations.  Accordingly, the Company will need to raise
additional funds and is currently exploring alternative sources
of equity or debt financing.  The Company may seek to raise such
capital through public or private equity financings,
partnerships, joint ventures, disposition of assets, debt
financings or restructurings, bank borrowings or other sources of
financing.  However, additional funding may not be available on
favorable terms or at all.  If additional funds are raised by
issuing equity securities, substantial dilution to existing
shareholders may result.  If the Company fails to obtain
additional capital when needed, the Company may be required to
delay, scale back, or eliminate some or all of its research and
development programs and may be forced to cease operations,
liquidate its assets and possibly seek bankruptcy protection.

LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
DBRS, Inc. (DBRS) has confirmed the Class A and Class B notes
issued by LEO CONSUMO 1 S.R.L. at BBB (sf) and BB (sf),
respectively.  The rating action reflects the following
analytical considerations:

   * Incorporation of a sovereign related stress component in the
     rating analysis.  The additional stress was prompted by the
     recent downgrade by DBRS of the Republic of Italy's
     sovereign from AA (low) to A (high) with the Negative Trend

   * Upon incorporation of the sovereign related stress
     component, the transaction is performing within DBRS
     expectations and available credit enhancement for the notes
     is sufficient to cover DBRS stressed assumptions.

   * The transaction parties' continue to meet DBRS legal

On November 9, 2011, DBRS downgraded the Republic of Italy's Long
Term Foreign Currency and Long-Term Local Currency ratings from
AA (low) to A (high) with the Negative Trend maintained (see
press release "DBRS Downgrades Republic of Italy to A (high) on
Fiscal and Market Risks; Trend Remains Negative").

The principal methodologies applicable are Master European
Structured Finance Surveillance Methodology, Rating European
Consumer and Commercial Asset-Backed Securitisations and the DBRS
Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions,
which can be found on DBRS' Web site under Methodologies.  For a
more detailed discussion of sovereign risk impact on Structured
Finance ratings, please refer to DBRS commentary

"The Effect of Sovereign Risk on Securitisations in the Euro
Area", located at

For additional information on these ratings, please refer to the
linking document.

Lead Analyst: Mike Babick
Rating Committee Chair: Claire Mezzanotte
Initial Rating Date: 30 December 2010
DBRS's rating definitions and the terms of use of such ratings
are available at


LATVIJAS KRAJBANKA: Banking Regulator Files Bankruptcy Papers
Aleks Tapinsh at Reuters reports that Latvia's banking regulator
said on Thursday it had filed bankruptcy papers on midsize lender
Latvijas Krajbanka, adding that it is keeping a close eye on
several other banks.

"The Financial and Capital Market Commission [Thurs]day submitted
to the Riga district court an application about Latvijas
Krajbanka's insolvency," Reuters quotes the commission as saying
in a statement on its Web site.

FKTK head Irena Krumane and board member Janis Placis resigned
last week amid allegations of mishandling of the collapse of
Latvijas Krajbanka, an affiliate of Snoras Bank which Lithuania
nationalized earlier this month, Reuters recounts.

The FKTK suspended Latvijas Krajbanka, the sixth-largest bank by
deposits, on Nov. 21 after neighboring Lithuania nationalized
Snoras, Reuters discloses.

Latvijas Krajbanka is Latvia's oldest bank.


BANKAS SNORAS: Lithuania May Raise Debt Level to Repay Depositors
Milda Seputyte at Bloomberg News reports that Lithuania may have
to raise the level of public debt to repay depositors of Bankas
Snoras AB, exacerbating an increase in financing costs caused by
Europe's sovereign-debt crisis.

According to Bloomberg, DnB Bank AB economist Jekaterina Rojaka
said that the Baltic nation may need EUR1 billion (US$1.33
billion) next year to make up for funds used to clean up after
the collapse of Snoras.

Bloomberg notes that Ms. Rojaka said state debt may surge to 40%
of economic output from 33.3% at the end of October at an
"unfavorable time" as the crisis roils financial markets.

"The pressure in the near-term is very strong because the
government will be left with no reserves to refinance maturing
debt," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Rojaka as saying.  "The first half
isn't looking very cheerful for Lithuania."

Snoras filed for court protection from creditors to avoid a
costly bailout for taxpayers after the central bank discovered
some LTL3.4 billion in assets are missing, Bloomberg relates.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 2,
2011, The Baltic Times, citing LETA/ELTA, related that Vilnius
District Court has accepted the application regarding the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against Snoras bank.
Under the law, the court must take the decision on this issue no
later than within 15 days from the date of submission of the
application, the Baltic Times noted.  The Bank of Lithuania
delivered application on Snoras bankruptcy on Nov. 28, the Baltic
times disclosed.

Finance Minister Ingrida Simonyte said on the Lietuvos Rytas
television channel on Nov. 27 that the government may need to
raise its borrowing ceiling from LTL9.5 billion (US$3.66 billion)
for next year because the funds that were initially allocated to
refinance a maturing EUR1 billion bond in May will now be lent to
the country's insurance facility to compensate depositors,
Bloomberg recounts.

The government needs to plug the gap between the LTL1.7 billion
currently held by the deposit insurance facility and the LTL4.1
billion needed to compensate Snoras' clients, Bloomberg
discloses.  The central bank said on Nov. 25 that about 90% of
deposits at Snoras will be compensated, which will affect 387,000
clients, according to Bloomberg.

Bankas Snoras AB is Lithuania's fifth biggest lender.  Snoras
held LTL6.05 billion in deposits and had assets of LTL8.14
billion at the end of September.  It competes with Scandinavian
lenders including SEB AB, Swedbank AB (SWEDA), and Nordea AB.  It
also controls investment bank Finasta and Latvian lender Latvijas
Krajbanka AS.


BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR78.3-Mil. Notes to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Breeze Finance S.A.'s (Breeze 3)
class A and B bonds as follows:

  -- EUR244.6m class A (XS0294895999) downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BB-'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR78.3m class B (XS0294895726) downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-

The downgrades reflect Fitch's downwards adjustment of its energy
production expectations for the Breeze's wind farm portfolio.
The transaction's stressed financial position is further hindered
by its unfavorable structural features, namely the uniform
principal repayment amount at the April and October payment dates
and the subordination of the class A debt service reserve account
(DSRA) replenishment to class B debt service.  The Negative
Outlook on the class A primarily reflect the current lack of
clarity on the possible consequences on Breeze 3 of the German
insolvency law provisions regarding the concept of "over-
indebtedness" (Ueberschuldung).

The energy yield in H111 appears to have recovered from the
historical low of 2010 and is in line with H109.  However, even
if 2009's energy yield was to be replicated, this would represent
a shortfall of 19% and 12% below the P50 and P90, respectively.
Fitch notes that wind energy production data across Germany
suggest that the current wind conditions are materially below
historical averages.  However, the transaction's consistent
underperformance for four consecutive years suggests that the
likelihood of a reversion towards materially stronger energy
yield levels is low.

Consequently, the agency adjusted its energy production
assumptions bringing the Fitch adjusted P50 projections in line
with the 2008 actual production (544GWh).  The resulting debt
service coverage is particularly weak for class B (0.98x in
Fitch's adjusted P50 scenario), which is expected to continue to
defer interest -- or a portion thereof -- and principal.  A total
of EUR7.6m of principal has been deferred to date.

Class A has proven to be relatively resilient, with full debt
service payments also met at the particularly testing October
2010 payment date without the need to draw on the cash reserve.
Under Fitch's base case, the average debt service coverage ratio
for class A is 1.33x.  However, this does not reflect the effect
of seasonality, in that the issuer is expected to have to draw on
the debt service reserve in order to meet the debt service in
full on the October payment dates from 2016 onwards.  The
downgrade reflects class A's exposure to the risk that
particularly weak wind conditions during summer months, coupled
with a decrease in availability due to the ageing of the wind
turbines, may result in increased debt service shortfalls.  As
the replenishment of class A's cash reserve is structurally
subordinated to debt service on class B, it is not expected that
amounts drawn would be paid back.

Additional uncertainty arises from the effect of the insolvency
law provisions referring to the concept of "over-indebtedness"
(Ueberschuldung) on the German Breeze 3 borrower.  These
provisions foresee that if a German legal entity is either unable
to pay its obligations when due, or if its liabilities exceed its
assets (as is currently the case of the German Breeze 3
borrower), then management must put in place solutions such as a
formal subordination of debt repayments in order to avoid the
legal obligation to file for insolvency.  The overindebtedness
provisions were relaxed by the German Parliament in 2008, when
the test for "over-indebtedness" was mitigated by adding an
exception in the case of an overall positive prognosis for
business continuation.

The relaxation of the insolvency law applies up to December 31,
2013 and ensures Breeze 3's compliance with legal requirements.
Fitch is aware that the market expectation is for the revised
provisions to remain in place or at least for the 2013 time limit
to be extended.  The current lack of clarity on the extent of the
remedies that the German Breeze 3 borrower may eventually need to
put in place to preserve its solvency position is the main driver
behind the Negative Outlook assigned to the class A notes.

Breeze 3 is a Luxembourg SPV that issued three classes of notes
on April 19, 2007 for an aggregate issuance amount of EUR455
million to finance the acquisition and completion of a portfolio
of wind farms located in Germany and France, as well as
establishing various reserve accounts.  The notes will be repaid
from the cash flow generated by the sale of the energy produced
by the wind farms, mainly under regulated tariffs.

CRC BREEZE: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR36-Mil. Class B Notes to CCC
Fitch Ratings has downgraded CRC Breeze Finance S.A.'s (Breeze 2)
class A and B bonds as follows:

  -- EUR239m class A (XS0253493349) downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BB-'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR36m class B (XS0253496441) downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-';
     Outlook Negative

The downgrades reflect the significant underperformance in the
Breeze 2 portfolio's wind resource compared to original
expectations, coupled with weaknesses in the financial structure.
The Negative Outlooks on both classes of notes primarily reflect
the current lack of clarity on the possible consequences on
Breeze 2 of the German insolvency law provisions regarding the
concept of "over-indebtedness" (Ueberschuldung).

Following weak initial wind resource, Breeze 2 commissioned a
revised wind study in 2009 which estimated revised P50 energy
production 17% below the original forecast.  Actual performance
has been significantly below even that revised level (12% lower
in 2009 and 20% lower in 2010).  This places significant stress
on the transaction, particularly at the November payment date.
In Fitch's base case this is likely to result in debt service
shortfalls on the class A, to be covered by drawings on the class
A debt service reserve account (DSRA).  As the replenishment of
class A's cash reserve is structurally subordinated to debt
service on class B, it is not expected that amounts drawn would
be paid back.  The class A DSRA remains partially funded as a
result of the EUR2.2 million drawing made in November 2009.  This
leaves the class A notes exposed to default in the medium term.

The downgrade of the class B notes' rating reflects the view
that, despite the bonds' terms and conditions allowing for the
deferral of interest and principal payments, the probability of
the energy yield reaching a level which would allow the full
service of the debt (including the EUR10.2 million of currently
deferred principal) by the final maturity date of the class A
notes (2026) is low.

Fitch is aware that Breeze 2 is seeking noteholders' consent to
amend the payment waterfall by subordinating the class B debt
service to the replenishment of the class A DSRA.  Also, the
borrower intends to improve the cashflows available at November
payment dates by anticipating the payment of O&M costs from the
May-November period to the first quarter of the year.  A precise
assessment of the effect of such remedies will be possible once
approved, assuming approval is granted.

Additional uncertainty arises from the effect of the insolvency
law provisions referring to the concept of "over-indebtedness"
(Ueberschuldung) on the German Breeze 2 borrower.  These
provisions foresee that if a German legal entity is either unable
to pay its obligations when due, or if its liabilities exceed its
assets (as is currently the case of the German Breeze 2
borrower), then management must put in place solutions such as a
formal subordination of debt repayments in order to avoid the
legal obligation to file for insolvency.  The overindebtedness
provisions were relaxed by the German Parliament in 2008, when
the test for "over-indebtedness" was mitigated by adding an
exception in the case of an overall positive prognosis for
business continuation.

The relaxation of the insolvency law applies up to 31 December
2013 and ensures Breeze 2's compliance with legal requirements
for the time being.  Fitch is aware that the market expectation
is for the revised provisions to remain in place or at least for
the 2013 time limit to be extended.  The current lack of clarity
on the extent of the remedies that the German Breeze 2 borrower
may eventually need to put in place to preserve its solvency
position is the main driver behind the Negative Outlook assigned
to the notes.

Breeze 2 is a Luxembourg special purpose vehicle that issued
three classes of notes on May 8, 2006 for an aggregate issuance
amount of EUR470 million to finance the acquisition and
completion of a portfolio of wind farms located in Germany and
France, as well as establishing various reserve accounts.  The
notes are scheduled to be repaid from the cash flow generated by
the sale of the energy produced by the wind farms, mainly under
regulated tariffs.

RMF EURO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
RMF Euro CDO S.A.'s class A, B-1, and B-2 notes. "At the same
time, we affirmed our rating on the class C notes," S&P said.

RMF Euro CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.

"From our analysis, we have observed that the credit quality of
the portfolio has improved. There are no defaults in the
portfolio. The credit enhancement for all classes of notes has
been increasing since our last rating action in January 2010. We
have also observed from the latest trustee report that the
overcollateralization test results for all classes have improved,
and a reduction of the weighted-average life of the pool. These
factors, in our view, support higher ratings on the class A, B-1,
and B-2 notes," S&P said.

"In our analysis, the class C tranche rating was constrained by
the application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test we introduced as part of our criteria
update (see 'Update To Global Methodologies And Assumptions For
Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17,
2009). None of the ratings was affected by the largest industry
default test, another of our supplemental stress tests," S&P

Ratings List

Class       To            From

EUR300 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A           AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)
B-1         BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
B-2         BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

C           CCC- (sf)


* Fitch Hopes to Resolve RWN on Dutch NHG Backed RMBS
In its special report "Estimated Rating Implications of the NHG
Criteria Review" published in July 2011, Fitch Ratings indicated
that it expected to resolve the Ratings Watch Negative (RWN) on
Dutch NHG backed RMBS transaction by the end of November 2011.
Ratings on all tranches of 13 affected transactions have been
under review following the update of Fitch's ratings methodology
for NHG backed mortgage transactions.

Following the update to the criteria, all the affected issuers
confirmed to Fitch that they intended to restructure the deals.
The agency was provided with updated pool cuts, historical NHG
claims submitted to the stichting WEW, historical foreclosure
data of the NHG-backed loans and set-off risk assessments, as
requested in the special report, followed by proposals to
restructure the transactions.  All lenders have provided Fitch
with the data requested and the final capital structures for
restructuring have been received for most issuers.

Feedback has been provided to all issuers on the data and
structures provided. Over the next few weeks, most restructurings
are expected to be put in place.  The agency expects to resolve
the RWN's shortly afterwards, subject to finalization of the
documentation and approval of the amended structures by the
noteholders. Some lenders prefer to implement the changes on the
next interest payment date, the latest being in January.

For the two transactions where the issuers have confirmed that
they intend to restructure the deals but final capital structures
are pending -- the agency expects to receive the final capital
structure shortly.

Based on the proposals received so far, Fitch expects to affirm
almost all class A notes at 'AAAsf'.  The junior notes in many
transactions are however likely to see downgrades, broadly in
line with the indications provided in the special report."

Related transactions:

Darts Finance B.V. (Amstelhuys 2005 NHG Pool)

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0233338135): 'AAAsf'; RWN

Green Apple B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0322161026): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0322161299): 'BBB+sf'; RWN;
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0322161372): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

Green Apple 2008-I NHG B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0406581495): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0406581735):'BBB+sf'; RWN
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0406582030): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

Holland Homes Oranje MBS B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0238851827): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0238855141) 'Asf'; RWN

Stichting Holland Homes Oranje II

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0311660392): 'AAAsf'; RWN

PEARL Mortgage Backed Securities 1 B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0265250638): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0265252253): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

PEARL Mortgage Backed Securities 2 B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0304854598): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0304857690): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

PEARL Mortgage Backed Securities 3 B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0343673611): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0343676044): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

Saecure 6 NHG B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0266744761): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0266745735): 'Asf'; RWN
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0268063566): 'BBB-sf'; RWN

Securitized Guaranteed Mortgage Loans I B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0277021399): 'AAAsf'; RWN

Securitized Guaranteed Mortgage Loans II B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN NL0006477739 ): 'AAAsf'; RWN

Sound I B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0221342131): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0228909130): 'AAsf'; RWN
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0228909304): 'Asf'; RWN
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0228909643): 'BBBsf'; RWN
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0228910146): 'BBsf'; RWN

Sound II B.V.

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0322223586): 'AAAsf'; RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0322223826): 'AAsf'; RWN


EKSPORTFINANS ASA: Rescue Plan Thwarted by Government
Meera Bhatia at Bloomberg News reports that Eksportfinans ASA's
biggest owners had been working on a rescue plan before the
Norwegian government stunned them with its decision to wind down
the unit in an uncoordinated move that rattled markets as far as

DNB ASA, Nordea Bank AB (NDA) and Danske Bank A/S (DANSKE), which
together own about 70% of Eksportfinans, were working on a plan
to recapitalize the lender to allow it to meet stricter
regulatory standards, Bloomberg relates.  Those plans came to
nothing when the government, which owns a 15% stake, on Nov. 18
announced its decision to create a direct lending facility for
exporters and deny Eksportfinans permanent exemption from the
capital rules, Bloomberg notes.

Since then, bond owners holding US$35 billion have seen their
investments slump, Bloomberg recounts.

Eksportfinans is 40% owned by DNB, 23.21% by Nordea, the largest
Nordic lender, and 8.09% by Danske Bank in Copenhagen.  Other
owners include a number of smaller Norwegian banks as well as BNP
Paribas SA, which holds 0.03%.

DNB's spokesman Thomas Midteide and Danske Bank's Treasurer Steen
Blaafalk also said they weren't informed, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Blaafalk, as cited by Bloomberg, said the owners, including
the government, were in talks.  "The actual measure that the
government decided to take its full support out came as a
surprise in the middle of the process," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Blaafalk as saying.

The government's announcement came at an 8:30 a.m. press
conference on Nov. 18, hosted by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg
and Trade and Industry Minister Trond Giske, Bloomberg relates.
They announced the government would support Norway's export
industry with as much as NOK30 billion (US$5.2 billion) in direct
loans, administered by Eksportfinans until July, Bloomberg
recounts.  After that, a new state unit will be created to run
the facility, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, the government on Friday increased that
support to NOK40 billion.  The bill presenting the raised amount
said that "insider" issues prevented it from consulting
Eksportfinans before the decision on Nov. 18, Bloomberg notes.

                        Moody's Downgrade

Eksportfinans, created to help Norwegian companies expand abroad,
had its credit rating cut seven steps to junk on Nov. 22 by
Moody's Investors Service, Bloomberg relates.  The government's
decision, which also triggered a five-step downgrade by Standard
& Poor's to BBB+ on Nov. 25, sent tremors across credit markets
as far as Japan as investors tried to assess the risk of losses,
Bloomberg discloses.

S&P on Friday issued a correction of its Nov. 25 statement,
downgrading the company's junior subordinated debt to BB+ from
the BBB- it cut to earlier.

Mr. Giske, as cited by Bloomberg said in an interview on Nov. 30
that he "disagrees" with the Moody's downgrade, and that the
lender "has never been more supported by the state."  He told
newspaper Dagens Naeringsliv in an article published on Friday
that the government decided not to coordinate its plans with
other shareholders because the move was market sensitive,
Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Giske on Nov. 30 said that the government's facility will
probably be able to provide loans to exporters at similar terms,
Bloomberg recounts.

Eksportfinans, which had NOK205 billion (US$35 billion) in debt
as of Sept. 30, will reduce that to NOK41 billion by 2017, the
company, as cited by Bloomberg, said in a presentation on
Nov. 27.  The company predicted that its NOK120 billion book of
loans will dwindle to NOK21 billion by the end of 2017, Bloomberg

Headquartered in Oslo, Eksportfinans ASA operates as an export
lending institution that provides financing for a range of
exports and for the internationalization of Norwegian industry.


POLKOMTEL SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Polish wireless telecommunications
operator Polkomtel S.A. to 'B+' from 'BB+'. "At the same time,
the rating was removed from CreditWatch, where it was originally
placed with negative implications on July 6, 2011. The outlook is
stable," S&P said.

In addition, the short-term corporate credit rating on Polkomtel
was affirmed at 'B'. Also, the 'BBB+' issue rating on Polkomtel's
Euro Medium-Term Note (EMTN) program was removed from CreditWatch
and withdrawn following the acquisition of 100% of the notes by
Polkomtel's new owner. The issue rating was originally placed on
CreditWatch with negative implications on July 6, 2011.

"The downgrade primarily reflects our view of Polkomtel's
material debt burden and high leverage following its recent
acquisition by Spartan Capital Holdings Sp. z.o.o., and our
expectation of a relatively slow pace of deleveraging over the
medium term. As a consequence, we now assess Polkomtel's
financial risk profile as highly leveraged," S&P said.

The withdrawal of the issue rating on the EMTN program follows
the acquisition of 100% of the notes, above par, following a
tender offer made by Polkomtel's new owner Spartan Capital

"We continue to view Polkomtel's business risk profile as
satisfactory, supported by its market share in Polish mobile
telecoms services, with a relatively strong presence in the
contracted wireless market. Our assessment of Polkomtel's
financial risk profile as highly leveraged incorporates our
projection of its EBITDA interest coverage ratio at slightly more
than 2x on a Standard & Poor's-adjusted basis, and slow
deleveraging prospects," S&P said.

"In our view, Polkomtel's operating performance over the medium
term should remain relatively stable, with potential growth
prospects from 2013 driven by increasing data revenues and the
implementation of cost-cutting initiatives. We also assume that,
under our base-case scenario, there will be no material
deleveraging in 2012 owing to high long-term evolution (4G)
carriage costs, additional pressures on voice revenues, and
declining interconnection revenues. Even so, we anticipate that
adjusted debt to EBITDA should not exceed 5.5x in 2012," S&P

"Downward rating pressure could arise if operating pressures over
2012 are higher than we anticipate, leading to a significant
decline in covenant headroom or an increase in adjusted leverage
to more than 6x. This could potentially materialize, for example,
if voice revenues (excluding interconnection and roaming fees)
were to experience a low double-digit decline, although we
consider this to be unlikely," S&P said.

"Rating upside is limited over the next 12 months, in our
opinion, given our expectation of a relatively slow deleveraging
path. Rating upside remains possible, however, if Polkomtel
deleverages more rapidly than we currently anticipate on the back
of improving and sustainable profitability, with adjusted
leverage at less than 5x," S&P said.


MAGNITOGORSK IRON: Fitch Says Flinders Buyout Neutral to Ratings
Fitch Ratings says OJSC Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Works's (MMK)
decision to acquire 100% of Flinders Mines Limited is neutral to
its ratings.

On November 25, 2011, MMK has announced the execution of a scheme
implementation agreement to effect acquisition of Flinders Mines
Limited by MMK.  MMK has offered to acquire 100% of the issued
shares in Flinders at A$0.30 cash per share, implying a fully
diluted value for Flinders of approximately A$554 million
(US$540 million).

Flinders' board of directors recommended its shareholders vote in
favor of acquisition.

The transaction is subject to regulatory approvals in Australia
and is expected to close in March 2012.

Flinders owns a Pilbara iron ore deposit in Western Australia
with 917.3m tonnes of JORC-compliant resources.  MMK, being less
vertically integrated in iron ore than its Russian peers, has
been traditionally exposed to volatility of iron ore prices.
After launching of the project, which is expected by end-2014,
MMK will receive an economic hedge for iron ore price increases.

Fitch expects MMK will be able to keep positive free cash flow
margin during 2012-2013, which will contribute to a decrease of
the company's gross funds from operations leverage to 1.8x by
end-2013 compared with 2.7x at end-2010.  The company's
profitability, with expected average EBIT margin of 9%-11% during
2012-2013, is in line with Fitch's guidelines for 'BB' category
rated steel companies.

MMK's ratings are as follows:

  -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating: 'BB+', Stable Outlook

  -- Short-term Issuer Default Rating: 'B'

  -- Local Currency Long-term Issuer Default Rating: 'BB+',
     Stable Outlook

  -- National Long-term Rating: 'AA(rus)', Stable Outlook

* KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Rates RUB1-Bil. Bond Issue at 'BB-'
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Russian Republic of Karelia's
upcoming RUB1 billion domestic bond issue, due November 30, 2016,
an expected Long-term local currency rating of 'BB-(exp)' and an
expected National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)(exp)'.

The region has Long-term local and foreign currency ratings of
'BB-' and a National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'.  The Long-
term ratings both have Stable Outlooks.  The region's Short-term
foreign currency rating is 'B'.

The bond issue has a fixed-rate step-down coupon.  The initial
coupon rate will be set on December 2, 2011.  The principal will
be amortized by 25% of the initial bond issue value on May 31,
2013, by 40% of the initial bond issue value on May 30, 2014, and
by 20% of the initial bond issue value on May 31, 2015.  The
remaining 15% will be redeemed on November 30, 2016.  The
proceeds from the bond issue will be used to refinance maturing
debt and to fund capital expenditure.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

* PENZA REGION: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Currency Rating at 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Penza Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings at 'BB' with Stable Outlooks,
Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B' and National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

The agency has simultaneously withdrawn all of the region's
ratings as the issuer has chosen to stop participating in the
rating process.  Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for the Penza Region.

* UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Rates RUB2-Bil. Bond Issue at 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Russian Republic's of Udmurtia
upcoming RUB2 billion domestic bond issue, due November 24, 2016,
an expected Long-term local currency rating of 'BB+(exp)' and an
expected National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)(exp)'.

The republic has Long-term local and foreign currency ratings of
'BB+' and a National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)'.  The Long-
term ratings both have Stable Outlooks.  The republic's Short-
term foreign currency rating is 'B'.

The bond issue has a fixed-rate step-down coupon and amortization
structure.  The rate for the first coupon is set at 10.15%.  The
proceeds from the bond issue will be used to refinance maturing
debt and to fund the budget deficit.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.


CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR35MM D Notes
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12 senior
tranches across six Spanish asset-backed securities (ABS)
transactions serviced by Catalunya Banc (Ba1/NP/D). These rating
actions reflect the lack of a back-up servicer, which has not yet
been appointed in any of these deals since the downgrade of
Catalunya Banc to Ba1 in March 2011. The rating actions also
conclude the rating reviews of the relevant transactions.

As part of the review, Moody's also assessed the effect of the
increased commingling risk in these transactions (since the
downgrade of Catalunya Banc to Ba1) and the effect of the absence
of a replacement for Catalunya Banc as swap counterparty in two
of these six transactions (i.e. Catalunya Banc remains as swap

Moody's has confirmed the ratings of the subordinated notes of
Pymecat 2 FTPYME, a Spanish SME ABS, after BBVA replaced
Catalunya Banc as swap counterparty.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the lack of back-up servicer in the
transactions serviced by Catalunya Banc, in order to support
payments on the rated tranches in the event of servicer

Moody's has been informed that the transactions will be
restructured in order to address the payment disruption risk
related to Catalunya Banc. However, Moody's has not yet been
provided with all final documentation and information related to
the potential back-up servicing arrangement. Based on the
information provided to Moody's so far on the back-up servicing
arrangement, Moody's concludes that for these transactions, the
maximum achievable rating is Aa2(sf), if sufficient liquidity is
available in the structures.

However, Moody's downgraded the senior notes of GAT FTGENCAT 2008
to Aa3(sf) despite sufficient liquidity (provided via a 6.5%
reserve fund), because UNNIM (unrated) also acts as a servicer in
the transaction (together with Catalunya Banc). Moody's is not
aware of any back-up servicing arrangement being discussed for

Moody's downgraded the senior notes of Financat I to A1(sf)
because they do not benefit from any liquidity source; the
reserve fund in this deal is almost fully depleted.

In addition, Moody's concludes that the increased commingling
risk following the downgrade of Catalunya Banc on these six
transactions did not affect the ratings of the notes, given the
current credit enhancement levels.

For Financat I and GAT FTGENCAT 2008, Catalunya Banc remains as
swap counterparty, providing some excess spread to the
transaction structure. Moody's has taken into account the
potential reduction of support provided by the swap when
downgrading the notes by stressing the swap protection in its
cash flow model. However, this risk had a marginal effect
compared with the operational risks discussed above.

Apart from the stress runs mentioned above on the Financat and
GAT FTGENCAT 2008 transactions, key modelling assumptions,
sensitivities, cash-flow analysis and stress scenarios have not
been updated for any of the affected transactions, as the rating
actions have been primarily driven by increased operational risk.
Uncertainty mainly stems from the lack of a back-up servicer in
these transactions. If the rating of the servicer, Catalunya
Banc, is downgraded further while no back-up agreement is in
place, the ratings would be negatively affected.

The principal methodology used in rating SME ABS transactions was
"Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in
February 2007. The principal methodology used in rating consumer
loan ABS transactions was "Moody's Approach to Rating Consumer
Loan ABS Transactions", published in July 2011.


Releasing Office:

Moody's France SAS
96 Boulevard Haussmann
75008 Paris


   -- EUR927-Mil. A Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Mar 25, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

Releasing Office:

Moody's Investors Service Ltd.

One Canada Square

Canary Wharf

London E14 5FA

United Kingdom

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2008, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR349.7M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 30, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR314.5M A2(G) Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
      on Jun 30, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2009, FTA

   -- EUR284.8M Serie A1 (G) Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 30, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR71.2M Serie A2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
      on Jun 30, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

Issuer: GC FTGENCAT Caixa Tarragona 1, FTA

   -- EUR104.3M AS Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Nov 10, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR93.2M AG Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Nov 10, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

      Issuer: PYMECAT 2 FTPYME Fondo de Titulización de Activos

   -- EUR237.7M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      May 31, 2011 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remained On Review
      for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR189.8M A2(G) Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
      on May 31, 2011 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remained On
      Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR17.5M B Notes, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on May
      31, 2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for
      Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR20M C Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May
      31, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for
      Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR35M D Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 31,
      2011 Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for
      Possible Downgrade


   -- EUR240M A1(G) Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 30, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR50M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun
      30, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

   -- EUR109.7M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 30, 2011 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Takes Action on 19 Spanish RMBS Deals
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 26
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 6 tranches across 18
Spanish mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions serviced
by Catalunya Banc (Ba1/NP/D). The rating action follows the
downgrade of Catalunya Banc to Ba1 in March 2011. The rating
action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by Moody's on
March 2011 or June 2011 depending on the transaction.

Moody's has also placed on review for downgrade 3 tranches in 2
transactions in consideration of exposure to Catalunya Banc and
weaker-than-expected performance.

Moody's has maintained on review for downgrade the rating of two
tranches in consideration of sovereign risk exposure following
the downgrade of Kingdom of Spain in October 2011 (see "Moody's
reviews for downgrade 112 Spanish RMBS notes following the
downgrade of the Kingdom of Spain", November 4, 2011).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects: (i) lack of back-up servicer in the
transactions serviced by Catalunya Banc, in order to support
payments on the rated tranches in the event of servicer
disruption; (ii) the increased commingling risk in the
structures, (iii) the failure of Catalunya Banc to find a
replacement swap counterparty in five of the transactions and
(iV) the performance of the transactions to date.


Catalunya Banc (formerly Caixa Catalunya or Caixa Tarragona)
services 20 transactions, 19 as sole servicer and one (GAT ICO-
FTVPO 1, FTH) as part of a multi-servicer deal administered by
former Caixa Catalunya, Caixa Manresa (now Catalunya Banc), Caixa
Terrassa (now part of Unnim, NR) and Caixa Penedes (now part of
Mare Nostrum, NR).

Moody's has been informed that all 20 transactions will be
restructured in order to address the payment disruption risk
related to Catalunya Banc. However, Moody's has not yet been
provided with all final documentation and information related to
the potential back-up servicing arrangement. Based on the
information provided to Moody's, the rating agency concludes that
for these 20 transactions, the maximum achievable rating is
Aa2(sf), if sufficient liquidity is available in the structures.
Ratings have been downgraded to Aa3(sf) for deals with low
liquidity and to A1(sf) for tranches A2 and A3 of Hipocat 10,
FTA, which does not benefit from any liquidity source as its
reserve fund is fully depleted. Moody's did not downgraded
tranche A4 as the rating agency expects it to be repaid in the
short term.

Moody's downgraded the senior notes of GAT ICO FTVPO 1, FTH to
Aa3(sf) despite having sufficient liquidity because UNNIM
(unrated) and Mare Nostrum (NR) also act as a servicers in the
transaction (together with Catalunya Banc). Moody's is not aware
of any back-up servicing arrangement being discussed for UNNIM
and Mare Nostrum.

Uncertainty mainly stems from the lack of a back-up servicer in
these transactions. If the rating of the servicer, Catalunya
Banc, is downgraded further while no back-up agreement is in
place, the ratings would be negatively affected.


Collections are transferred daily or every 48 hours from
Catalunya Banc to the treasury account held by a P-1 entity in
all cases with the exception of GaT ICO-FTVPO for which Moody's
has been informed the account transfer is in progress. Some of
the transactions include triggers to fund a commingling reserve
at the loss of their investment grade rating. Moody's understands
that these reserves have not been funded and has therefore
assessed commingling risk in all the transactions. Commingling
was the main driver of the downgrade of tranche C of Hipocat 8
FTA and one of the drivers of the downgrade of mezzanine and
junior tranches of Hipocat 4, 5 and 6 FTA, together with swap
counterparty exposure.

Uncertainty mainly stems from the exposure to Catalunya Banc as
the collection account bank. If the rating of Catalunya Banc is
downgraded further, in absence of other mitigants to commingling
risk, the ratings of the transactions concerned would be
negatively affected


Moody's has assessed swap counterparty risk for the five
transactions for which Catalunya Banc continues to act as swap
counterparty. According to the transaction documents Catalunya
Banc should have been replaced as swap counterparty or its
obligations guaranteed by an eligible party at loss of its A3/P-2
ratings, on March 2011. These swaps are providing credit support
to the transactions as they guarantee an amount of excess spread.

Moody's has been informed that the swap counterparty for Hipocat
14 is in the process of being replaced. In this transaction,
Moody's has maintained on review for downgrade the ratings of
senior notes and has placed on review for downgrade the junior
and mezzanine ratings, pending the completion of swap transfer.

Swap exposure was one of the drivers of the downgrade of
mezzanine and junior tranches of Hipocat 4, 5 and 6 FTA, in
combination with commingling exposure.

Uncertainty mainly stems from the exposure to Catalunya Banc as
swap provider. If the rating of Catalunya Banc is downgraded
further, in absence of a replacement to take over the role of
swap provider, the ratings in the five transactions would be
negatively affected.


As part of its analysis, Moody's reviewed its current assumption
for these transactions, considering collateral performance to
date and the future outlook for the Spanish RMBS sector. Moody's
updated its expected loss assumption in 4 of the 20 deals
serviced by Catalunya Banc (details provided in the excel

Moody's decreased its original expected loss assumption for
Hipocat 4 and 5 FTA (from 0.7% OB to 0.5% OB in both cases) in
consideration of better-than-expected collateral performance.
This has no rating implication on itself given additional risks
in these transactions, discussed above. Moody's increased its
original expected loss assumption for Hipocat 7 (from 0.5% OB to
0.9% OB) and 15 FTA (from 0.8% OB to 1.3% OB) in light of
performance and current macroeconomic environment. This has no
rating implication for Hipocat 7 FTA given credit enhancement
built up since closing. Moody's has placed on review for
downgrade tranche C of Hipocat 15 FTA for which current credit
enhancement seems not sufficient to withstand performance

Expected loss assumptions remain subject to uncertainties such as
the future general economic activity, interest rates and house
prices. If realized recovery rates were to be lower or default
rates were to be higher than assumed, the ratings of some of the
transactions could be negatively affected.

Key modelling assumptions, sensitivities and stress scenarios
have not been updated for GaT ICO-FTVPO 1 FTH where the rating
action has been primarily driven by increased operational risk.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa,"
published in October 2009.

In rating these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche with the
exception of GaT ICO-FTVPO 1 FTH mentioned above. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and note holders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

FONCAIXA CONSUMO: Fitch Rates EUR462-Mil. Class B Notes at 'BBsf'
Fitch Ratings has assigned Foncaixa Consumo 1, FTA's asset-backed
floating-rate notes, due on March 2053, ratings, as follows:

  -- EUR2,618.0m class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR462.0m class B: 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

This is the first consumer securitization originated in Spain by
CaixaBank, S.A. (CaixaBank, 'A'/Negative/'F1') and rated by

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal on the class A and B notes in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the documentation.  If
cumulative defaults on the assets are above 10%, the interest on
the class B notes may be deferred, which would imply that the
interest on the class B would rank below the principal amount due
under the notes in the transaction's priority of payments.

The notes are collateralized by a static pool of real estate
secured consumer (69%) and unsecured consumer (31%) loan
receivables, so the transaction will start to amortize from
closing.  The portfolio consists of 285,281 loan contracts, with
an outstanding principal balance of EUR3,174.9 million.  It is
highly granular and has an average seasoning of 42 months.  The
loans have been granted by CaixaBank for consumer purposes such
as family and home (56%), vehicle acquisition (26%), and others
purposes (18%).

CaixaBank provided loan-by-loan information on the collateral
(including internal one-year probability of default estimates),
vintages for real estate secured consumer and unsecured consumer
loan receivables on defaults and recoveries and dynamic
delinquency data covering six years of history.  Fitch has
analyzed the portfolio's credit risk and formed a base case
default and recovery expectation for unsecured consumer loan
receivables of 5% and 20%, respectively.  The agency utilized its
proprietary Spanish RMBS default model for the real estate
secured consumer loan receivables proportion of the pool and
formed a base case default and recovery expectation of 6% and
59.6%, respectively.

When forming the base case default and recovery expectations for
these two types of products in the transaction, Fitch captured
the effect of the term of the loans on the default and expected
recoveries.  This considered that secured loans tend to have a
weighted-average life of six years and unsecured consumer loans
of two years.

Initial credit enhancement (CE) for the class A notes, equivalent
to 20% of the original collateral balance, is provided by the
subordination of classes B (15%), plus a reserve fund of 5%.
Similarly, initial CE for the class B notes is provided by
reserve fund.  All the notes also benefit from available excess

The issuer is a special purpose vehicle regulated by Spanish
Securitisation Law 19/1992 and Royal Decree 926/1998.  The fund
is legally represented and managed by GESTICAIXA, S.G.F.T, S.A.,
a limited liability company incorporated under Spanish law, whose
activities are limited to the management of securitization funds.

PYMES BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all three classes of PYMES Bancaja 5
and has assigned Outlooks and recovery estimates (RE) as follows:

  -- EUR66.72m class A3 (ISIN ES0372259020): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR62.7m class B (ISIN ES0372259038): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
     Outlook Negative

  -- EUR24.1m class C (ISIN ES0372259046): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned RE 50%

  -- EUR28.8m class D (ISIN ES0372259053): affirmed at 'Csf';
     assigned RE 10%

The affirmation of PYME Bancaja 5 is supported by a significant
increase in credit enhancement (CE) available to the class A3
notes due to structural deleveraging.  Loans over 90 days in
arrears have increased to 7.8% of the outstanding portfolio
balance as of October 31, 2011.  However, the CE available to
class A3 is higher than the agency's 'AAA' loss expectation.

The Negative Outlook on the Class B notes reflects the
sensitivity of this class to the increasing obligor concentration
in the portfolio and the exposure to the real estate industry
among the top obligors.  There are currently 75 obligors, each
representing more than 50bp of portfolio volume, constituting 62%
of the portfolio.  This excessive concentration risk is mitigated
to a certain extent by the high security coverage on the
portfolio (94%).

The affirmation of the class C notes at 'CCCsf' reflects their
vulnerability to the default of larger obligors and their
subordinated position in the capital structure.

PYME Bancaja 5 is a cash-flow securitizations of loans granted to
Spanish small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by Bankia ('A-

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Assigns (P)Ca Rating to Serie D Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional ratings
to the debt to be issued by FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

   -- EUR659.8M Serie A Note, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR71.6M Serie B Note, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR63.6M Serie C Note, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR117.3M Serie D Note, Assigned (P)Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

FTA SANTANDER CONSUMER SPAIN AUTO 2011-1 is a securitization of
loans granted by Santander Consumer, E.F.C., S.A. ("Santander
Consumer"; not rated) to Spanish individuals. Santander Consumer
is acting as Servicer of the loans while Santander de
Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. is the Management Company

As of November 2011, the provisional pool was composed of a
portfolio of 85,456 unsecured auto loans granted to 84,975
obligors located in Spain, 97.4% of whom are private individuals.
98% of the assets were originated between 2010 and 2011. The
weighted average seasoning of the portfolio is 1.0 year and its
weighted average remaining term is 3.7 years. Around 78.5% of the
portfolio are loans to purchase new vehicles, and the remaining
21.5% are loans to purchase used vehicles. Geographically, the
pool is concentrated mostly in Andalucia (24.2%) and Madrid
(13.5%). The provisional portfolio, as of its poolcut date, did
not include any loans in arrears.

The rating is primarily based on, (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) the historical performance
information; (iii) the swap agreement, under which the swap
counterparty will pay the weighted-average margin on the notes
plus an excess spread of 2.5% on a notional equal to the
portfolio net of loans in arrears for more than 90 days; (iv) the
credit enhancement provided by the excess spread and the reserve
fund (that however can also be used to cover portfolio defaults);
(v) the liquidity support available in the transaction, by way of
principal to pay interest, and the reserve fund; (vi) the
provisions for the appointment of a back-up servicer; and (vii)
the legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

This deal benefits from several credit strengths, such as the
granularity of the portfolio and its short portfolio weighted
average life of around 2.5 years, as well as the simplicity of
the structure, which does not include a revolving period and
where notes are repaid sequentially. Moody's, however, notes that
the transaction features a number of credit weaknesses, as there
is some exposure to commingling risk (although partially
mitigated by the undertaking of Santander Consumer Finance S.A.
(SCF, A3/P-2) to fund a commingling reserve if it is downgraded
below Baa3) as well as the presence of an unrated servicer, which
is mitigated by the appointment of SCF as the transaction back up
servicer at closing. Moody's also took into account the worse
than expected performance of some of the previous Santander
transactions in the same sector. These characteristics, amongst
others, were considered in Moody's analysis and ratings.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 10%, with a coefficient of variation of 40% and a
recovery rate of 30%. Moody's also tested other set of
assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis. The
results show that the model output for class A notes would be 2
notches lower if the mean default rate assumption was to increase
to 13%, all other parameters being kept unchanged. Similarly, the
model output would be 1 notch lower if the recovery rate
assumption was to decrease to 20%, all other parameters being
kept unchanged. For more details, please refer to the full
Parameter Sensitivity analysis included in the New Issue Report
of this transaction. The main source of uncertainty in the
analysis relates to the variability of the assets historical

The V Score for this transaction is Low/Medium, which is in line
with the score assigned for the German/French Auto sector. V-
Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of available
credit information and of the degree of dependence on various
assumptions used in determining the rating. For more information,
the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the report "V Scores
and Parameter Sensitivities in the Non-U.S. Vehicle ABS Sector"
published in January 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating European Auto ABS published in November 2002.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in The Lognormal
Method Applied to ABS Analysis published in July 2000.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses
the assessment of stressed scenarios.

SANTANDER EMPRESAS: DBRS Assigns 'C' Rating to Series C Notes
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned Final ratings to the Notes
issued by F.T.A.

SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10 ("the Issuer"), as follows:

    * EUR3,760 million Series A Notes: AAA (sf)
    * EUR940 million Series B Notes: B (sf)
    * EUR940 million Series C Notes: C (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized
primarily by a portfolio of bank loans originated by Banco
Santander, S.A. to Spanish corporates and small-and medium-sized
enterprises ("SMEs").  At closing, November 25, 2011, the
transaction's final pool included 25,153 loans totaling EUR 4,700

These ratings are based upon DBRS' review of the following
analytical considerations:

   * Transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of available
     credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of subordination, through
   the reserve fund and excess spread.  The current credit
   enhancement level of 40% is sufficient to support the
   AAA (sf) rating for the Series A Notes, and the current credit
   enhancement level of 20% is sufficient to support the B (sf)
   rating for the Series B Notes.

-- The Series C Notes have been issued for the purpose of funding
   the Cash Reserve Fund.

The Reserve Fund has been initially set at 20% of the aggregate
balance of the Series A and Series B Notes, or EUR940 million.
The Reserve Fund is available to cover shortfalls in the senior
expenses, interest and principal throughout the life of the

-- The Reserve Fund cannot be reduced, except for required
   payments to cover interest and principal shortfalls, unless:

   -- The transaction is at least two years old;
   -- The Reserve Fund is at least 40% of the outstanding
      aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes; and,
   -- The Reserve Fund balance is greater than 10% of the initial
      aggregate balance of the Series A and Series B Notes
      (EUR 470.00 million).

-- In addition, the Reserve Fund will not be eligible for further
   pay downs, the above notwithstanding, if:

   -- The balance of the Reserve Fund was not at the minimum
      required level the at the previous period; or,
   -- The outstanding balance of the non-failed assets, which are
      more than 90 days in arrears, is greater than 1% of the
      outstanding balance of the total non-failed assets.

   * At closing, credit lines represented 49% of the pool's
     outstanding balance.  This exposure in the pool to the
     credit lines could increase further by EUR665.52 million if
     the clients use the credit lines to their maximum limits.
     This exposure would be funded by a liquidity line provided
     by Banco Santander, S.A. if no other principal proceeds are
     available in the transaction.  This risk is partly mitigated
     by the short weighted average life of the credit lines and
     was taken into consideration in the DBRS analysis.

   * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
     flow assumptions and repay investors according to the
     approved terms.  For this transaction, the final rating of
     the Series A Notes addresses the timely payments of
     interest, as defined in the transaction documents, and the
     timely payments of principal on each Payment Date during the
     transaction and, in any case, at their Legal Final
     Maturities on March 16, 2044.  The final rating of the
     Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest,
     as defined in the transaction documents, and the ultimate
     payment of principal on each Payment Date during the
     transaction and, in any case, at their Legal Final
     Maturities on  March 16, 2044.  Interest and principal
     payments on the notes will be made quarterly, generally on
     the 16th day of February, May, August and November, with the
     first payment date on February 16, 2012.

   * The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
     to perform their respective duties, and the quality of
     origination, underwriting and servicing practices.

   * Soundness of the legal structure and presence of legal
     opinions which address the true sale of the assets to the
     trust and the non-consolidation of the special purpose
     vehicle, as well as the consistency with the DBRS Legal
     Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions.

   * The rating of the Series C Notes is based upon DBRS' review
     of the following considerations:

     -- The Series C Notes are in the first loss position.
     -- As such, the Series C Notes are highly likely to default.
     -- Because the rating of the Series C Notes addresses the
        ultimate payment of interest and principal, the default
        most likely would occur at the maturity of the

The principal methodology is Master European Granular Corporate
Securitisations (SME CLOs), which can be found on DBRS' Web site
under Methodologies.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the originator and
servicer as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
Further information on DBRS' analysis of this transaction will be
available in a rating report on http://www.dbrs.comor by
contacting us at

The sources of information used for this rating include F.T.A.
SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10, Santander de Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A.
and Banco Santander, S.A.  DBRS considers the information
available to it for the purposes of providing this rating was of
satisfactory quality.

For additional information on DBRS European SME CLO(s), please
see European Disclosure Requirements, located at

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Lead Analyst: Mudasar Chaudhry
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen
Initial Rating Date: 24 November 2011

TDA 24: Fitch Says Change in Servicer Will Note Affect Ratings
Fitch Ratings says that TDA 24's ratings will not be affected by
the change in servicer to CaixaBank ('A'/Negative/'F1') from
Bankpime (NR).

Since closing, TDA 24's portfolio has been serviced by the
respective originators of the underlying collateral.  The
portfolio comprises loans originated by Caja Castilla la

Mancha now Banco de Castilla-La Mancha ('BBB+'/Stable/'F2')
62.9%, Credifimo (NR) 27.4% and Bankpime (NR) 9.7%.  With
CaixaBank's acquisition of Bankpime's banking business
effective December 1, 2011, CaixaBank will become the servicer of
the Bankpime's portion of the TDA 24 pool.

The servicing department of CaixaBank will immediately be
responsible for the administration of the Bankpime portfolio from
the effective transfer date.  However, the loans will remain on
Bankpime's IT servicing platform under control of CaixaBank until
full migration of the portfolio takes place on February 4, 2012.
In comparison to CaixaBank's existing mortgage portfolio (over 1
million loans), this pool is relatively small (c.400 loans) and
Fitch believes CaixaBank has sufficient capacity to service these
loans appropriately.  A project plan is in place for the
migration of assets, and Fitch gains comfort from this process
due to the fact that CaixaBank has demonstrated experience in
servicing portfolios of other acquired entities such as Caixa

CaixaBank has a track record of servicing similar assets within
other Fitch rated transactions, and as such, the agency is
comfortable that CaixaBank has the appropriate staff experience
and IT systems to ensure servicing standards are met.

Fitch notes that the transaction has no dedicated liquidity
sources to cover an eventual disruption in servicing.  However,
given the limited portion of Bankpime loans in the pool, the
agency believes that income from the other servicers would be
sufficient to cover for timely payment on the interest of senior

Upon servicer replacement, CaixaBank will continue transferring
receipts from the collateral twice a month to the special purpose
vehicle's treasury account.  In Fitch's view, the commingling
exposure remains the same but is less of a concern given the
higher rating of the new servicer of this limited portion of the
securitized pool.

The notes' ratings are as follows:

  -- Class A1 (ISIN ES0377952009) 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0377952017) 'BBBsf' ; Outlook Stable
  -- Class B (ISIN ES0377952025) 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class C (ISIN ES0377952033) 'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RE 0%'
  -- Class D (ISIN ES0377952041) 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RE 0%'


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Owner Swedish Auto Posts Substantial 3Q Loss
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that swedish
Automobile NV, the Dutch owner of troubled Swedish automaker Saab
Automobile AB, posted a third-quarter net loss of EUR142.7
million (US$192.4 million) late Wednesday and said it foresees a
"substantial net loss" for the full year, following production
stoppages and a tight liquidity situation during the third

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB received approval for their proposal for voluntary
reorganization from the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg,
Sweden on Sept. 21, 2011.  The purpose of the voluntary
reorganization process is to secure short-term stability while
simultaneously attracting additional funding, pending the inflow
of the equity contributions by Pang Da and Youngman.


OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Switzerland-based plasma derivatives
manufacturer and distributor Octapharma Nordic AB to 'BB+' from
'BBB-'. The outlook is stable.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Octapharma's profitability
and cash position have deteriorated significantly following the
withdrawal of its intravenous immunoglobulin product Octagam in
the U.S. and some EU markets in August and September 2010,
respectively. We understand that Octapharma will re-launch
Octagam later this year. However, we believe that the company
will have to re-launch Octagam at markedly lower prices in order
to regain its share of the immunoglobulin market. There is
already a competitive pricing environment for intravenous
immunoglobulin products in the U.S. and EU. As such, we expect
that the company will be able to increase its sales only
gradually, while our baseline rating scenario assumes an
improvement in the EBITDA margin to the mid-twenties, well below
the pre-2010 level of the low thirties," S&P said.

"In 2011, Octapharma was able to absorb Octagam revenue losses
and the associated significant working capital requirements using
a large amount of net cash that it had built up previously. This
ability is a reflection of Octapharma's conservative financial
policy. However, Octapharma used this cash to cover rising
inventory in 2011. Should a similar adverse event occur over
the next 18-24 months, which we see as very unlikely, we believe
that it would be difficult for the company to absorb the impact,"
S&P related.

"The rating on Octapharma continues to reflect our view of the
company's fair business risk profile, mainly due to its
relatively small size and low product diversification as a
consequence of its sole focus on plasma fractionation," S&P said.

"We believe that Octapharma's debt protection metrics will remain
commensurate with what we classify as a modest financial risk
profile in the year ending Dec. 31, 2011, and will improve
gradually over the next three years. We forecast that Octapharma
will maintain Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from operations to
debt of about 45% and debt to EBITDA of less than 2x. We view
these ratios as commensurate with the 'BB+' rating," S&P said.

"The possibility of a downgrade is limited, in our view, but
could arise from a material deterioration of revenues and the
EBITDA margin. This could result from safety issues leading to a
prolonged product suspension, or from a change to Octapharma's
currently conservative financial policy leading to an increase
in leverage," S&P said.

"An upgrade would depend on the company's ability to restore its
profits at least to their 2009 level, while at the same time
building up a sizable net cash position of at least EUR200
million. We factor this amount of cash into our rating for the
company to be able to absorb any potential cash outflows due to
a temporary loss of revenues caused by product contamination. We
would take a positive view of the company improving its product
diversification so as to warrant uplift in our assessment of the
company's business risk profile," S&P said.


* TURKEY: Moody's Says 'Ba2' Positive Outlook Reflects Resilience
The positive outlook on Turkish government's sovereign debt
rating of Ba2 reflects the resilience of country's economy during
the global financial crisis, says Moody's Investors Service in
its new sovereign credit report on Turkey. The strengthening of
the government's balance sheet in recent years has also improved
the Turkish sovereign's ability to withstand shocks.

Turkey's most significant challenge is the current account
deficit and its financing, which renders it vulnerable to
balance-of-payment shocks and offsets some, though not all, of
the progress that the government has made in improving its own
financial strength. In its Medium-Term Plan, the government
announced a range of short- and medium-term measures to address
this imbalance.

"Over the short term, we expect the cyclical slowdown in the
economy to reduce some of the pressure on the current account,
whilst the tax increases announced in conjunction with the
Medium-Term Plan should also make a contribution to reducing the
current account deficit," says Moody's.

"We also acknowledge that the Plan has announced reforms that
have the potential to alter the structural nature of the current
account deficit, although we believe that it will take time for
the credit-positive aspects to emerge," adds the rating agency.

Moody's says that an upgrade of the rating would be possible if
Turkey were to pursue fiscal and monetary policies that reverse
the recent growth in internal and, more importantly, external
imbalances. Credit-positive pressure could also develop if the
government consolidates its buffers, such as foreign-exchange
reserves; these would improve the sovereign's resilience to
balance-of-payment shocks.

However, Moody's adds that the longer Turkey's internal and
external imbalances remain at a high level, the more downward
pressure will build on the positive outlook to the rating, and in
extremis on the Ba2 rating itself. The international economic
environment has become increasingly challenging, and the margin
for policy error has therefore become much smaller than it has
been in recent years.

The issuance of this credit report by Moody's Investors Service
is an annual update to the markets and is not a formal action to
the credit rating of the issuer.


* REGION OF DONETSK: Fitch Affirms Currency Ratings at 'B'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Ukrainian Region of Donetsk's
Long-term foreign and local currency ratings of 'B', Short-term
foreign currency rating of 'B' and National Long-term rating of
'AA(ukr)'.  The Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.

The ratings reflect Donetsk's strong economy, satisfactory
budgetary performance and its risk free status.  The ratings also
factor in the regional budget's strong reliance on central
government decisions and the overall evolving institutional
environment in Ukraine.  Donetsk's ratings are constrained by
Ukraine's sovereign ratings ('B'/Stable), reflecting the strong
integration of the region's budget to the national budgetary
system of the Ukraine.

Fitch notes that an upgrade of the sovereign ratings coupled with
the maintenance of a satisfactory budgetary performance would be
positive for the region's ratings.  Conversely downward rating
pressure would arise if unfavorable changes in the institutional
framework for Ukrainian subnationals negatively affected the
region's budgetary performance and led to a significant
deterioration of the region's debt position.

The region has a strong economy, primarily focused on metallurgy
and coal extraction.  With a population of 9.7% of Ukraine's it
produces 11.4% of national gross regional product (GRP).
Donetsk's GRP per capita was 17% above the national average in
2009, and its industrial sector is well developed and provides a
strong tax base.  Metallurgy represents around 42% of its
industrial output.  This, however, makes the region's economy
exposed to commodity price and demand fluctuations, both on
domestic and international market.

Fitch expects the region's operating balance to remain
satisfactory at 11%-13% of operating revenue and to achieve a
mostly balanced budget in 2011-2013.  The region recorded a
stable budgetary performance with operating margin averaging
12.3% in 2008-2010.  Performance was supported by a stable tax
base, as personal income tax is a major regional tax and has
little sensitivity to economic cycles.  The budget was usually
balanced as the region cannot contract any debt obligations to
finance its deficit.

The region is free of direct debt and contingent liabilities.
Ukrainian law prevents regional governments from borrowing or
issuing guarantees, limiting their financing ability. In turn,
regional public companies are able to contract debt obligations.
However, Donetsk's public-sector entities' debt was fully
redeemed in 2009. Fitch does not expect legislative changes
allowing the regions to borrow in the medium term.

The current institutional framework for Ukrainian regions leads
to the region's high dependence on central government decisions
and hinders long-term budget planning. The region has a one year
budget planning horizon, which coupled with borrowing restriction
put a limitation on the region's capital expenditure, which
accounted for a low of 11% of total expenditure in 2010.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASTON MARTIN: Moody's Downgrades CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) and the probability of default rating (PDR) of Aston
Martin Holdings (UK) Limited as well as the senior secured notes
rating to B3 from B2. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade was prompted by a significantly weaker performance
year to date 2011 compared to Moody's expectations. Furthermore,
Moody's deems it very unlikely that the company will be able to
catch up the missing performance in the last quarter 2011. "Aston
Martin's financial metrics are anticipated to be weaker for the
current fiscal year than in 2010 against Moody's initial
expectation of an improvement in credit metrics in the current
year the underlying assumption for the company's previous rating
category" says Falk Frey, Moody's analyst for European Automotive
manufacturer. "A successful implementation of the announced cost
savings program will be needed to improve performance in 2012 and
avoid further rating pressure," Mr. Frey added.

For the first nine months 2011, Aston Martin reported an increase
in revenues by 10% mainly driven by the additional unit sales of
the Cygnet city car (262 units) and the One-77, introduced in the
course of 2011. However, unit sales of the V8 and V12 engine cars
decreased by 3% to 2870 units over the same period. The negative
mix effect resulted in a decline in operating profit to GBP3.7
million compared with GBP13.1 million for Q1-Q3 2010. Moody's
estimates that the company's leverage ratio (debt/EBITDA) per end
of 2011 will be slightly above 10x, which positions the company
weakly in the rating category.


   Issuer: Aston Martin Capital Limited

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B3
      from B2

   Issuer: Aston Martin Holdings (UK) Limited

   --  Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B3 from B2

   --  Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B3 from B2

Aston Martin's B3 corporate family rating reflects: (i) Limited
size and financial strength compared to some direct peers, such
as Bentley, Ferrari or Lamborghini, that are part of a larger
group of European car manufacturers; (ii) high dependency on the
mature markets of Western Europe, and especially the UK, (iii)
its relatively narrow product line focusing on high end luxury
sports cars with the exception of the Cygnet model as well as
(iv) its sizable foreign exchange risk given its fixed cost base
in UK compared to a sizable share of revenues generated from
exports to Europe and the US and (v) the operational risks
related to the production of all models except for the Rapide
model in one single plant in UK.

However, Aston Martin's rating also reflects certain positives:
(i) the company's strong brand name and pricing position in the
luxury car segment; (ii) its lean organization with a high degree
of flexibility in its cost structure demonstrated by a solid
reported profitability through the recent economic crisis as well
as (iii) a solid product pipeline with continued model renewals
expected for the next couple of years as well as derivatives
given its highly flexible production through a common

The stable outlook takes into account the company's solid
liquidity with no short-term debt maturities and the assumption
that the company's off-balance sheet wholesale financing
arrangement can be rolled over upon maturity and at the same time
anticipates an improvement of Aston Martin's operating
performance and leverage on the back of the announced GBP25m cost
savings programme.

The rating could come under pressure in case of Aston Martin's
inability to improve operating performance and cash flow
generation in 2012 compared to 2011 evidenced by (i) leverage
ratio of adjusted debt/ EBITDA not falling below 7.0x; (ii) a
significantly negative free cash flow or (iii) a material
deterioration in Aston Martin's liquidity profile.

The rating could be upgraded if leverage felt below 6.0x adjusted
debt/ EBITDA on a sustainable basis and if Aston Martin showed
the ability to generate positive free cash flow through the
cycle. Moreover, Aston Martin would have to maintain a solid
liquidity with a sufficient cushion to cover cash needs over the
next 12 months on a rolling basis.

Aston Martin has a good liquidity profile over the next 12
months. Moody's expects the company to have sufficient cash
sources, comprising readily available cash (GBP41 million as of
Q3 2011), funds from operations and an undrawn revolving credit
facility of GBP30 million to cover all possible needs over the
next 12 months including capex, debt repayments, cash for day-to-
day operations and working capital needs. Moody's thereby
anticipates the renewal of Aston Martin's wholesale financing
facility prior to becoming due August 2012.

The principal methodology used in rating Aston Martin Holdings
(UK) Limited was the Global Automobile Manufacture Industry
Methodology published in June 2011. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Aston Martin, domiciled in Gaydon, UK is a car manufacturer
focused on the high luxury sports car segment. The company offers
a range of eight models and generated sales of GBP509 million for
the twelve months ended March 31, 2011 and an EBITDA of GBP98
million from the sale of 4,299 cars.

BATTERSEA POWER STATION: Next Owner May Have to Commit GBP70MM
Neil Callanan and Simon Packard at Bloomberg News report that
Battersea Power Station's next owner may have to commit GBP700
million (US$1.1 billion) to the derelict London development site
before any construction work can be started.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
that creditors led by Lloyds Banking Group Plc and Ireland's
National Asset Management Agency will try to recover the entire
GBP502 million (US$788 million) owed by the project's owner by
selling the site or the debt.  The existing plan also includes a
commitment to contribute more than GBP200 million toward
extending a London Underground subway line, Bloomberg notes.

The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the development is
effectively up for sale now because Lloyds and Ireland's National
Asset Management Agency want to avoid the cost of putting the
owner into administration.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 2,
2011, Bloomberg News related that creditors of Battersea Power
Station, led by Lloyds and NAMA, asked a court to put the
landmark property's owner into administration.  Lenders owed
GBP502 million (US$788 million) will ask an English court on
Dec. 12 to have administrators appointed for various units of
Battersea Power Station Shareholder Vehicle Ltd., Bloomberg
disclosed.  The lenders rejected a GBP262 million bid from SP
Setia Bhd., Malaysia's biggest public traded property developer
by sales, to purchase the senior debt related to the London
landmark, Bloomberg noted.

Battersea Power Station, with four 350-foot-high smokestacks, is
Europe's largest brick building.

BRITISH AIRWAYS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating to Unsecured Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its recovery rating to
'3' from '4' on the GBP250 million unsecured notes due 2016 and
GBP350 million convertible bond due 2014, issued by U.K.-based
airline British Airways PLC (BA; BB-/Stable/--). "The recovery
rating of '3' reflects our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery for creditors in the event of a payment default. At the
same time, we affirmed our 'BB-' issue rating on the unsecured
notes and convertible bond. The issue rating is in line with the
corporate credit rating on BA," S&P related.

"We have revised our recovery rating on the unsecured debt
instruments in light of the decrease in BA's accounting net
pensions deficit that we treat as a priority liability ranking
ahead of the notes and bond in our payment waterfall at default.
About one-half of the reduction in the net pensions deficit is a
result of a change in pension payment indexation from the Retail
Prices Index to the Consumer Prices Index after a decision by the
U.K. government on July 8, 2010. The net pensions deficit of BA's
two pension schemes amounted to about GBP826 million in December
2010, compared with GBP2.1 billion in March 2010," S&P said.

                      Recovery Analysis

"The issue and recovery ratings on the unsecured debt are
supported by our valuation of BA as a going concern, given our
assessment of BA's leading market position among European
airlines and our assessment that the business would retain more
value as an operating entity than in liquidation. On the other
hand, the ratings are limited by the unsecured nature of the
notes and convertible bond," S&P said.

"In our hypothetical scenario, a default would most likely result
from operational underperformance, as well as a weakening in both
liquidity reserves and operating cash flow generation. We believe
that adverse industry conditions -- due notably to a prolonged
and deep economic recession and outside shocks to the aviation
industry such as a major terrorist attack or a pandemic disease
outbreak -- combined with increased fuel prices and negative
operating cash flow generation would trigger a default in 2014,"
S&P said.

"We value BA at the point of default using a discrete-asset
valuation, since aircraft and other tangible assets represent the
majority of assets. Our valuation assumptions on BA include
conservative realization rates of receivables and inventory,
plant and equipment, intangibles (including landing rights), and
investments. With regard to the aircraft fleet, our stressed
valuation only includes the realizable value of the unencumbered
fleet (that is to say, owned aircraft and aircraft pledged for a
$616 million general-purpose facility), because we assume that
the value of encumbered aircraft will be fully realized by the
secured creditors (which are the providers of BA's fleet
financing). We use a conservative realizable value for landing
rights of about GBP210 million. Our estimate of the stressed
asset value (excluding the encumbered assets) is about GBP1.8
billion," S&P said.

"After deducting priority liabilities, including 50% of the
projected present value of the net pensions deficit at the point
of default and about GBP480 million of debt secured on the
unencumbered assets (including the general purpose facility that
we assume would be fully drawn), we expect recovery prospects for
the notes to be in the 50%-70% range. While the nominal
calculated recovery is higher than the indicated threshold, our
criteria for unsecured debt instruments cap the recovery rating
at '3'. For consistency, we do not include the fleet financing in
the payment waterfall as priority debt, as our projected stressed
valuation does not include the encumbered assets," S&P said.

"Although the recovery prospects on the unsecured debt have
improved following the significant reduction in the accounting
net pensions deficit, we believe that there is still some
downside risk related to the pensions. This is because we
understand that total pension claims amount to about GBP10
billion, and in our view the net pensions deficit could therefore
be volatile. Recovery prospects could also come under pressure
depending on the evolution of the value of the unencumbered
assets through asset rotation or aging. At the same, we believe
that there could be additional value in BA's landing rights above
the reported book value," S&P said.

"We do not consider the acquisition of British Midland
International (not rated) in our recovery analysis because the
acquisition remains subject to BA and Deutsche Lufthansa AG (BBB-
/Stable/--) agreeing the acquisition price and obtaining
regulatory clearance," S&P said.

"For a complete recovery analysis, please see our recovery report
'British Airways PLC Recovery Rating Profile,' published Jan. 6,
2011, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal," S&P said.

Ratings List

Ratings Affirmed; Ratings Revised
                                        To                 From
British Airways PLC
Corporate Credit Rating            BB-/Stable/--   BB-/Stable/--
  Senior Unsecured
  GBP250-mil. 8.75% bonds
  due 08/23/2016                    BB-             BB-
   Recovery Rating                  3               4
  GBP350-mil. 5.8% convertible
  due 08/13/2014                    BB-                BB-
   Recovery Rating                  3                  4

British Airways Finance (Jersey) L.P.
Preferred Stock                    B-                 B-

EUROMASTR SERIES: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all five tranches of EuroMASTR Series
2007-1V plc as follows:

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0305763061): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0305764036): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0305766080): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0305766320): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate 80%

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0305766676): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate 0%

The affirmation reflects the transaction's continued stable asset
performance over the past year as well as credit enhancement
levels that are commensurate with their respective ratings.

As of September 2011, the level of loans in arrears by three
months or more stood at 18.7% compared to 21.4% a year ago.  The
sale of repossessed properties has also continued to decrease
from peak levels seen in early 2009.  Over the past year, the
volume of sold repossessions accumulated to about one-third of
the sales volume seen in the prior year.  Subsequently,
associated losses have also declined.

However, while losses have remained low, the loss severity to
date is relatively high at 31.8%.  At present, with the current
stock of unsold repossessions remaining largely unchanged at
levels below 1% of the outstanding collateral balance since
December 2009, the agency expects that losses will continue to be
cleared, at least in the near future, and for available revenue
funds to contribute towards the continued replenishment of the
reserve fund.  Currently, the cash reserve is under 50% of its
required amount and given the modest rate of replenishment seen
thus far, Fitch does not necessarily expect the reserve fund to
be fully replenished in the next year.

Amortization of notes is currently sequential, and a switch to
pro-rata amortization is not expected over the next year as long
as the pro-rata trigger ratio is not met and the reserve fund
remains below its target amount.  Additionally, reserve fund
amortization is no longer permitted due to the irreversible
breach of the cumulative losses and cumulative foreclosures
trigger.  This will help provide credit support for the notes.

INVESTEC BANK: Fitch Cuts Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Investec Bank's (IBP) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and Viability
Rating (VR) to 'bbb-' from 'bbb'.  The Outlook on the Long-term
IDR is Negative.

The downgrade mainly reflects IBP's high level of property-
related loans (equal to GBP4.2 billion at end-March 2011, or over
half of the bank's core loans).  IBP has experienced asset
quality problems, largely in its property development and
planning books to date and primarily in Australia and Ireland.
The bank's income-producing and other property loans, mainly in
South East England but also elsewhere in Europe, have performed
reasonably to date.  However, Fitch considers that these books
are exposed to the deteriorating economic outlook in the UK and
Europe.  The bank's high reliance on collateral in an
increasingly difficult market is an additional driving factor for
the rating decision.  IBP's ratings also reflect its modest

The Negative Outlook on IBP's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's view
that the deteriorating global macro-economic environment could
well have a further negative impact on IBP's asset quality and
performance, given its business mix and risk profile.  Fitch's
concern is that an unfavorable economic environment will make it
difficult to turn the legacy portfolio around as quickly as
management would like.  The ratings remain investment grade
thanks to IBP's reasonable liquidity, strengthened funding
profile -- reflecting customer deposit growth - and adequate

IBP is making progress in refocusing its operations to achieve a
more balanced earnings profile.  It has a niche mid-market
corporate/private bank franchise, which should benefit further
from the expansion of the asset management business and potential
new cross-selling opportunities.  The level of diversification in
IBP's business and earnings has also increased on the back of the
consolidation of Rensburg Sheppards (RS), the wealth management

The property development and planning portfolios in Ireland and
Australia have contributed disproportionately to gross defaults
to date and have acted as a significant drag on earnings.  Fitch
recognizes that IBP is running down its property planning and
development books and should have already identified asset
quality problems in these books.  Consequently, the pace of
growth in defaults should decline.  However, the level of
provisions will remain high at least in the short-term as IBP
increases reserves coverage notably of its Irish and Australian
property planning and development loan portfolios.

The high level of loan impairment charges puts pressure on IBP's
profitability.  To some extent this has been offset by solid
performance in the capital markets unit (primarily asset
financing) and increased fee income from the RS consolidation.
Similarly, the planned acquisition of the Evolution asset
management business would be a positive for IBP's performance.
In addition, reduced exposure to the bank's loss-making private
equity investments means these investments will no longer act as
an ongoing drag on performance.

However, Fitch notes the negative headwinds in the global economy
which could result in lower business volumes in the short- to
medium-term.  IBP's cost base also remains fairly high, although
Fitch notes that around a fifth of costs in the year ending March
2011 were variable, which provides some flexibility to the profit

Fitch views positively the strong customer deposit growth in 2010
and in the nine months to end-September 2011, notably through
medium-term structured deposit products.  This has extended IBP's
tenor of funding and reduced its exposure to wholesale funding.
Fitch notes that the 'stickiness' of more recent deposit inflows
remains to be tested given the increasingly challenging operating
environment, although IBP has reduced its level of interbank
funding.  In the short term at least, refinancing risk is low.

IBP's liquidity is solid and is supported by a buffer of around
GBP4.3bn (around 22% of total assets), consisting of cash, short-
term interbank placements (including with central banks) and, to
a lesser extent, highly-rated securities. IBP is comfortably in
excess of its regulatory liquidity requirements.

In addition, IBP's capital is currently adequate for its risk
profile, even adjusting for the high level of unreserved
property-related NPLs in Ireland and Australia (equal to 17% of
equity at end-September 2011) and for sub-investment grade
structured credit investments.

IBP is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Investec Plc, listed in the
UK, which is part of the South African-based Investec group of
companies.  IBP's main business units are private banking, wealth
and investment management, capital markets (consisting largely of
asset financing), investment banking and property activities.
IBP's subsidiaries include Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd
('BBB'/Rating Watch Negative).

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook

  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'bbb-' from 'bbb'

  -- Individual Rating affirmed at 'C'

  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' is affirmed

  -- Guaranteed EMTN Programme affirmed at Long-term 'AAA' and
     Short-term 'F1+'

  -- Junior subordinated debt downgraded to 'BB'

  -- Senior unsecured certificates of deposit downgraded to Long-
     term 'BBB-;' Short-term affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Senior unsecured EMTN Programme downgraded to Long-term
     'BBB-'; Short-term Notes affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Subordinated debt downgraded to 'BB+'.

MF GLOBAL: Int'l FCStone Unit to Buy UK Metals Division
INTL FCStone Inc. (Nasdaq:INTL), announced that INTL FCStone
(Europe) Limited, its wholly owned subsidiary in the United
Kingdom, has agreed to acquire the Metals Division of MF Global
UK Limited (in special administration).  As part of this
transaction, INTL FCStone (Europe) has received approval from the
London Metal Exchange ("LME") to upgrade its LME Category Two
membership to LME Category One ring dealing membership.

The Metals Division, headed by Fred Demler, has more than 50
professional staff based in London, New York, Hong Kong and
Sydney, and has long-standing client relationships throughout the
world.  The Metals Division is a leading LME ring dealing member
providing execution and clearing of LME products and OTC products
to assist commercial customers in hedging their price risk in
metals markets.

The Metals Division also serves institutional investors and
financial services firms in the Americas, Europe, and the Asia-
Pacific region.  Mr. Demler will assume leadership of INTL
FCStone's global metals LME futures and derivatives business.

Sean O'Connor, CEO of INTL FCStone, commented, "Fred and his
metals team add a well-recognized and leading LME franchise with
deep and diverse global relationships to our growing and
profitable company.  Our existing significant physical metals,
structured OTC products and corporate finance advisory services
combined with the LME capabilities and relationships should
create a unique metals franchise.  With our unwavering focus on
customers, our broad capabilities and our expertise in all
commodity verticals, we will now be in a better position than
ever before to offer significant value to our global customer

"We are all very excited about the acquisition of our global
metals team and see INTL FCStone as having a clear focus on
serving customers, especially mid-market commercial entities
where we have a great footprint globally," added Mr. Demler.
"INTL FCStone has a strong presence across all the other
commodity markets and we believe we can become a leading
franchise for them in the broader metals markets.  We anticipate
a quick transition, which will allow us to continue serving our
clients' needs with minimal disruption."

                   About INTL FCStone Inc.

INTL FCStone Inc. provides execution and advisory services in
commodities, currencies and international securities.  INTL
FCStone's businesses, which include the commodities advisory and
transaction execution firm FCStone Group, serve more than 10,000
commercial customers through a network of offices around the
world.  Further information on INTL FCStone Inc. is available at

                        About MF Global

New York-based MF Global (NYSE: MF) --
-- is one of the world's leading brokers of commodities and
listed derivatives.  MF Global provides access to more than 70
exchanges around the world.  The firm is also one of 22 primary
dealers authorized to trade U.S. government securities with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  MF Global's roots go back
nearly 230 years to a sugar brokerage on the banks of the Thames
River in London.

MF Global Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Finance USA Inc. filed
voluntary Chapter 11 petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 11-
15059 and 11-5058) on Oct. 31, 2011, after a planned sale to
Interactive Brokers Group collapsed.  As of Sept. 30, 2011, MF
Global had $41,046,594,000 in total assets and $39,683,915,000 in
total liabilities.  It is easily the largest bankruptcy filing so
far this year.

Judge Honorable Martin Glenn presides over the Chapter 11 case.
J. Gregory Milmoe, Esq., Kenneth S. Ziman, Esq., and J. Eric
Ivester, Esq., at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, serve
as bankruptcy counsel.  The Garden City Group, Inc., serves as
claims and noticing agent.  The petition was signed by Bradley I.
Abelow, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of
MF Global Finance USA Inc.

The Securities Investor Protection Corporation commenced
liquidation proceedings against MF Global Inc. to protect
customers.  James W. Giddens was appointed as trustee pursuant to
the Securities Investor Protection Act.  He is a partner at
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP in New York.

Jon Corzine, the former New Jersey governor and co-CEO of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., stepped down as chairman and chief
executive officer of MF Global just days after the bankruptcy

U.S. regulators are investigating about $633 million missing from
MF Global customer accounts, a person briefed on the matter said
Nov. 3, according to Bloomberg News.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes MF GLOBAL
BANKRUPTCY NEWS.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by MF Global Holdings and other insolvency and
bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
( 215/945-7000)

MF GLOBAL: LME Completes Transfer of UK Client Contracts
The London Metal Exchange (LME) said the process of transferring
client contracts with the U.K. unit of MF Global (MFGLQ.PK) to
other LME members had been completed, Reuters related in a
Nov. 24 report.

"The process of transferring client contracts that satisfied
LCH.Clearnet's eligible criteria has been completed," the LME
said in a statement, according to Reuters.  "LCH.Clearnet will be
contacting all those who requested transfers."

Reuters noted that metals clients of MF Global UK had faced
delays in their positions being transferred to new brokers,
partly because of a problem with LME data, which slowed the
migration process.

J.P. Morgan (JPM.N) has agreed to buy all off MF Global's
shareholding in the LME after a competitive bidding process,
Reuters said in a Nov. 23 report, citing a statement by KPMG, the
administrators for the failed brokerage's UK unit.

KPMG did not give a price for the sale, Reuters noted, but
sources, according to the same report said J.P. Morgan would pay
GBP25 million (US$39 million) for the 4.7% stake in the LME,
implying a total value of around GBP530 million.

"It's a good price that they've paid," a source at a shareholder
company said, according to Reuters.  "The question is are they
looking at trying to make a quick profit or is it a much longer-
term investment?"

The report related that J.P. Morgan already has a 6.2% stake in
the LME, the world's largest metals market place, which has
opened its doors to potential suitors.  Increasing its stake
alters the landscape, as LME shareholders seek to protect their
interests, or make a profit, in any eventual takeover, the report

"We received a great deal of interest in the LME shares and are
pleased to be in the final stages of concluding a sale," Richard
Heis, joint special administrator of MF Global UK, told Reuters.

The LME had been due to open its books to potential bidders by
December 8, a spokesperson for the exchange said earlier,
according to Reuters, but a source close to the LME later said
this now seemed ambitious, and that the date could be pushed

The report noted that Goldman Sachs (GS.N) is also a large
shareholder in the LME.  Contenders for the 134-year old group
are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME.O and the
IntercontinentalExchange ICE.N energy market, both U.S. groups.


According to KPMG, J.P. Morgan will also buy the B-shares held by
MF Global.  Those would be bought for GBP2 million, Reuters said,
citing one of its sources.

B-shares, Reuters related, give holders the right to trade on the
LME and can be sold separately to other members of the exchange.
J.P. Morgan already holds B-shares, and it was unclear what would
happen to the new shares it would now acquire, the report said.

The report, however, said the LME stake sale could leave more
money for MF Global creditors.

Mr. Heis told Reuters that the process to sell other parts of MF
Global's UK business "continues apace and we are in negotiations
with several parties to this end."

Industry sources told Reuters that MF Global's ring dealing seat
on the LME will be bought by U.S.-based broker INTL FCStone
(INTL.O), although no price was given.

An industry source also told Reuters that MF Global's shares and
the ring dealing seat had been treated as separate assets.  J.P.
Morgan already has a ring dealing seat on the LME, Reuters noted.

Mr. Heis also said KPMG had prepared a timeline for the return of
client assets and funds.

According to a separate Financial Times report, customers of MF
Global's UK arm will be able to apply for a partial return of
their funds in two weeks' time.

KPMG will be announcing on Monday that clients would be able to
submit claims from December 8, FT disclosed.  This will likely
lead to an early return of some funds to some market participants
like spread betting companies, the report added.

FT noted that confirmation that KPMG plans an early interim
distribution comes after the trustee overseeing MF Global Inc.'s
liquidation won court permission to access funds.

The MF Global UK administrator may be reached at:

        Richard Heis
        KPMG LLP (UK)
        8 Salisbury Square
        London EC4Y8BB
        Tel: (020) 7694-3429

                        About MF Global

New York-based MF Global (NYSE: MF) --
-- is one of the world's leading brokers of commodities and
listed derivatives.  MF Global provides access to more than 70
exchanges around the world.  The firm is also one of 22 primary
dealers authorized to trade U.S. government securities with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  MF Global's roots go back
nearly 230 years to a sugar brokerage on the banks of the Thames
River in London.

MF Global Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Finance USA Inc. filed
voluntary Chapter 11 petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 11-
15059 and 11-5058) on Oct. 31, 2011, after a planned sale to
Interactive Brokers Group collapsed.  As of Sept. 30, 2011, MF
Global had $41,046,594,000 in total assets and $39,683,915,000 in
total liabilities.  It is easily the largest bankruptcy filing so
far this year.

Judge Honorable Martin Glenn presides over the Chapter 11 case.
J. Gregory Milmoe, Esq., Kenneth S. Ziman, Esq., and J. Eric
Ivester, Esq., at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, serve
as bankruptcy counsel.  The Garden City Group, Inc., serves as
claims and noticing agent.  The petition was signed by Bradley I.
Abelow, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of
MF Global Finance USA Inc.

The Securities Investor Protection Corporation commenced
liquidation proceedings against MF Global Inc. to protect
customers.  James W. Giddens was appointed as trustee pursuant to
the Securities Investor Protection Act.  He is a partner at
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP in New York.

Jon Corzine, the former New Jersey governor and co-CEO of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., stepped down as chairman and chief
executive officer of MF Global just days after the bankruptcy

U.S. regulators are investigating about $633 million missing from
MF Global customer accounts, a person briefed on the matter said
Nov. 3, according to Bloomberg News.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes MF GLOBAL
BANKRUPTCY NEWS.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by MF Global Holdings and other insolvency and
bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
( 215/945-7000)

OSPEY ACQUISITION: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Osprey Acquisitions Limited's Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' and senior secured
rating at 'BB+'.  The Outlook for the Long-term IDR is Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed the bond issued by Anglian Water (Osprey)
Financing Plc (AWOF) at 'BB+'.  The bond is guaranteed by Osprey,
and is thus rated in line with Osprey's senior secured rating of

AWOF is the financing vehicle for Osprey, which is a holding
company for businesses focused on the water sector, including
ownership of Anglian Water Services Limited (Anglian Water,
senior secured debt of its financing vehicle, Anglian Water
Services Financing Plc, rated 'A'/'BBB+'/Stable) -- a regulated
UK water and wastewater company.

The rating affirmation reflects strong cash flow characteristics
and adequate financial flexibility of Anglian Water, the main
operating subsidiary of the group, as well as the structurally
and contractually subordinated nature of the holding company
financing at Osprey level.

Fitch calculates Osprey's FYE11 pension adjusted net
debt/regulatory asset value at 87.5%, dividend cover at 9.8x and
post-maintenance and post-tax interest cover at around 1.22x.
Fitch forecasts for the remainder of the price control period
gearing at around 88-89%, dividend cover at around 3.9x and post-
maintenance and post-tax interest cover at around 1.15-1.20x.
These are slightly stronger than metrics forecasted in January
2011 when the initial rating was published and comfortably within
ratio guidelines of less than 90% for gearing, 2.5-3.0x for
dividend cover and above 1.1x for post-maintenance and post-tax
interest cover.

The gearing ratio differs from the corresponding covenant
applicable to Osprey and AWOF.  Fitch adjusts the regulatory
asset value for variation in timing of capital investment and
anticipated prospective changes to be made by the regulator, such
as logging for the construction output price index.

As of March 2011, Osprey held GBP21.2 million in cash and AWOF
had available GBP25 million of undrawn, committed bank facilities
with a maturity in November 2015.  This is sufficient to bridge
short-term liquidity needs.  For debt service, Osprey and AWOF
effectively rely on upstream cash flows from their operating
subsidiaries, primarily Anglian Water.

* Lloyds Banking Final Bids for Distressed Property Loans Due
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that final bids for a
GBP1 billion (US$1.6 billion) portfolio of distressed commercial
property loans being sold by Lloyds Banking Group PLC were due on
Nov. 30, people familiar with the situation told Dow Jones.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 28 to December 2, 2011

Issuer                 Coupon      Maturity  Currency    Price
------                 ------      --------  --------    -----

BA CREDITANSTALT         5.470     8/28/2013      EUR     54.13
BAWAG                    5.400     2/12/2023      EUR     53.91
BAWAG                    5.430     2/26/2024      EUR     49.03
BAWAG                    5.310     2/12/2023      EUR     53.40
HAA-BANK INTL AG         5.250    10/27/2015      EUR     57.63
HAA-BANK INTL AG         5.270      4/7/2028      EUR     42.81
IMMOFINANZ               4.250      3/8/2018      EUR      3.48
KOMMUNALKREDIT           4.900     6/23/2031      EUR     40.75
KOMMUNALKREDIT           5.430     2/13/2024      EUR     52.00
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.170     7/29/2015      EUR     59.13
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.780      6/7/2030      EUR     71.86
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.810     7/29/2025      EUR     60.38
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.160     5/20/2025      EUR     61.56
OESTER VOLKSBK           3.700      6/3/2025      EUR     66.63
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.000    12/14/2023      EUR     71.64
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.810      5/9/2035      EUR     70.42
OESTER VOLKSBK           5.050      8/5/2030      EUR     73.84
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.750      3/1/2022      EUR     72.11
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.750     4/30/2021      EUR     61.73
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.520      3/1/2021      EUR     71.96
OESTER VOLKSBK           3.750    10/13/2020      EUR     75.51
OESTER VOLKSBK           5.000     6/12/2020      EUR     75.27
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.260     3/22/2024      EUR     73.45
OESTER VOLKSBK           5.270      2/8/2027      EUR     38.74
RAIFF LB OBEROST         4.620     9/17/2030      EUR     74.19
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.470     2/28/2028      EUR     50.15
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.500    12/29/2023      EUR     56.19
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          4.500     9/28/2035      EUR     39.17
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          5.730    12/11/2023      EUR     57.86
RAIFFEISEN BK IN         6.625     5/18/2021      EUR     71.73

BELGIUM KINGDOM          3.625    10/21/2052      EUR     75.67
COMM FRANC BELG          3.620     3/17/2058      EUR     74.73
ECONOCOM GROUP           4.000      6/1/2016      EUR     19.27
EURONAV SA               6.500     1/31/2015      USD     74.12
IDEAL STANDARD I        11.750      5/1/2018      EUR     59.75
IDEAL STANDARD I        11.750      5/1/2018      EUR     59.70
ONTEX IV                 9.000     4/15/2019      EUR     70.75
ONTEX IV                 9.000     4/15/2019      EUR     69.40

PETROL AD-SOFIA          8.375     1/26/2012      EUR     70.13

AVANGARDCO INVES        10.000    10/29/2015      USD     78.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.500     8/25/2021      EUR     74.07
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.000      6/9/2021      EUR     72.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.350      6/9/2020      EUR     70.09
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.100     4/20/2020      EUR     73.95
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.625      2/3/2020      EUR     65.72
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         6.100     6/24/2019      EUR     75.34
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600     2/26/2019      EUR     68.21
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600    10/23/2018      EUR     68.31
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.600     4/23/2018      EUR     68.48
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.100     1/29/2018      EUR     70.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500     9/28/2017      EUR     68.57
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.600     4/15/2017      EUR     73.32
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500      4/2/2017      EUR     69.34
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.250      6/9/2015      EUR     74.43
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500      1/2/2016      EUR     72.52
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500     2/15/2017      EUR     69.54
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.750     9/30/2015      EUR     72.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         3.750     11/1/2015      EUR     70.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.750     12/2/2015      EUR     71.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500      6/2/2016      EUR     71.27
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500     3/30/2016      EUR     71.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500      1/4/2017      EUR     69.78
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500     10/9/2016      EUR     70.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         4.500     7/11/2016      EUR     70.96
CYPRUS GOVT BOND         5.000      6/9/2016      EUR     72.24
MARFIN POPULAR           4.375     9/21/2012      EUR     70.20
MARFIN POPULAR           4.350    11/20/2014      EUR     32.50
REP OF CYPRUS            4.750     2/25/2016      EUR     66.33
REP OF CYPRUS            4.375     7/15/2014      EUR     73.26

FIN-DANISH IND           4.910      7/6/2021      EUR     55.63
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500    12/14/2020      ZAR     46.60
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500      2/3/2016      TRY     72.16

MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500      2/9/2016      ZAR     74.26
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500     4/26/2016      ZAR     72.91
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    10/27/2016      ZAR     71.56
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    10/27/2016      TRY     71.41
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500     12/6/2016      TRY     74.09
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000     6/30/2017      ZAR     66.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500     3/17/2025      CAD     62.15
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    11/16/2017      TRY     60.64
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500     4/27/2018      ZAR     60.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    11/21/2018      ZAR     67.32
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    11/21/2018      TRY     64.31
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    12/20/2018      ZAR     66.15
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    11/25/2020      ZAR     49.67
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    11/10/2021      NZD     62.92
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.250     6/28/2040      CAD     24.62
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500    12/21/2021      NZD     69.26
TALVIVAARA               4.000    12/16/2015      EUR     67.73

AIR FRANCE-KLM           4.970      4/1/2015      EUR     10.40
ALCATEL-LUCENT           5.000      1/1/2015      EUR      2.35
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG         6.720      1/1/2015      EUR      4.68
ASSYSTEM                 4.000      1/1/2017      EUR     20.07
ATOS ORIGIN SA           2.500      1/1/2016      EUR     51.51
AXA SA                   5.250     4/16/2040      EUR     67.51
BANQ FED CRD MUT         5.000      3/1/2047      EUR     75.11
BNP PARIBAS              5.780     3/10/2041      USD     75.35
BNP PARIBAS              5.325     2/22/2031      USD     74.15
BNP PARIBAS              5.303     2/23/2031      USD     73.92
BNP PARIBAS              5.260     2/25/2031      USD     73.47
BNP PARIBAS              5.290     2/25/2031      USD     73.78
BNP PARIBAS              5.245      3/2/2031      USD     73.33
BNP PARIBAS              5.210      3/3/2031      USD     72.97
BNP PARIBAS              5.400     5/18/2031      USD     73.93
BNP PARIBAS              5.505     6/22/2031      USD     75.63
BNP PARIBAS              2.890     5/16/2036      JPY     57.40
BNP PARIBAS              5.350     2/18/2031      USD     74.42
BNP PARIBAS              5.700     3/11/2041      USD     74.63
BNP PARIBAS              5.820     3/14/2041      USD     75.87
BNP PARIBAS              5.850     3/15/2041      USD     76.18
BNP PARIBAS              5.830     3/16/2041      USD     75.98
BNP PARIBAS              5.870     3/17/2041      USD     76.39
BNP PARIBAS              5.390    10/27/2029      USD     76.16
BNP PARIBAS              4.850    11/26/2030      USD     69.87
BNP PARIBAS              5.380     2/18/2031      USD     74.73
BNP PARIBAS              5.405     2/18/2031      USD     74.98
CALYON                   6.000     6/18/2047      EUR      2.45
CALYON                   5.800    10/29/2029      USD     64.13
CAP GEMINI SOGET         3.500      1/1/2014      EUR     38.20
CAP GEMINI SOGET         1.000      1/1/2012      EUR     42.11
CEGEDIM SA               7.000     7/27/2015      EUR     68.92
CGG VERITAS              1.750      1/1/2016      EUR     26.52
CIE FIN FONCIER          3.250    12/30/2044      EUR     73.63
CLUB MEDITERRANE         5.000      6/8/2012      EUR     11.79
CLUB MEDITERRANE         6.110     11/1/2015      EUR     17.23
CMA CGM                  8.500     4/15/2017      USD     36.00
CMA CGM                  8.875     4/15/2019      EUR     37.63
CMA CGM                  8.875     4/15/2019      EUR     36.58
CMA CGM                  8.500     4/15/2017      USD     41.25
CNP ASSURANCES           6.875     9/30/2041      EUR     62.04
CNP ASSURANCES           5.250     5/16/2023      EUR     74.19
CNP ASSURANCES           6.000     9/14/2040      EUR     60.99
CRED AGRICOLE SA         3.900     4/19/2021      EUR     67.52
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.850     6/30/2031      USD     61.72
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.830     6/30/2031      USD     61.54
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.610     6/15/2031      USD     59.65
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.650     6/10/2031      USD     60.03
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.850     5/27/2031      USD     61.78
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.880      4/8/2031      USD     63.67
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.220     3/17/2031      USD     65.31
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.150     2/11/2031      USD     64.63
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.950     1/19/2031      USD     63.22
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.050     1/14/2031      USD     64.09
CREDIT AGRI CIB          6.000    12/23/2030      USD     61.28
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.400     12/9/2030      USD     58.58
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.690    11/26/2030      USD     61.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.080    11/23/2030      USD     55.92
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.450     11/9/2030      USD     59.14
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.910     11/3/2030      USD     55.59
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.350    10/29/2030      USD     58.32
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300    10/22/2030      USD     58.04
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.250    10/18/2030      USD     57.58
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300    10/12/2030      USD     55.85
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.300     10/7/2030      USD     57.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB          4.850     9/17/2030      USD     54.09
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.680     3/22/2026      USD     71.07
CREDIT AGRI CIB          5.270      8/5/2030      USD     58.02
CREDIT AGRICOLE          4.500    12/22/2019      EUR     64.37
CREDIT AGRICOLE          3.750    10/20/2020      EUR     67.96
CREDIT AGRICOLE          4.050    12/22/2020      EUR     69.05
CREDIT LOCAL FRA         3.750     5/26/2020      EUR     47.95
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         2.930    12/22/2014      EUR     74.74
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         3.400     3/26/2015      EUR     74.04
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.020     3/13/2017      EUR     67.11
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         5.037      8/4/2020      EUR     53.21
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.550      4/2/2020      EUR     52.17
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.500     2/25/2020      EUR     52.15
DEXIA CRED LOCAL         4.110     9/18/2018      EUR     56.72
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY         1.000    12/23/2024      EUR     57.83
EURAZEO                  6.250     6/10/2014      EUR     55.65
EUROPCAR GROUPE          9.375     4/15/2018      EUR     52.38
EUROPCAR GROUPE          9.375     4/15/2018      EUR     52.25
FAURECIA                 4.500      1/1/2015      EUR     21.26
FONCIERE REGIONS         3.340      1/1/2017      EUR     71.93
GIE PSA TRESORER         6.000     9/19/2033      EUR     64.94
GROUPAMA SA              7.875    10/27/2039      EUR     39.09
INGENICO                 2.750      1/1/2017      EUR     42.42
ITALCEMENTI FIN          5.375     3/19/2020      EUR     71.44
IXIS CIB                 5.375    11/29/2027      EUR     72.15
IXIS CIB                 5.400      1/9/2033      EUR     65.54
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125     7/31/2014      EUR     17.95
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125     7/31/2015      EUR     16.78
NEXANS SA                4.000      1/1/2016      EUR     58.54
NOVASEP HLDG             9.750    12/15/2016      USD     43.00
ORPEA                    3.875      1/1/2016      EUR     43.33
PAGESJAUNES FINA         8.875      6/1/2018      EUR     69.38
PAGESJAUNES FINA         8.875      6/1/2018      EUR     69.58
PEUGEOT SA               4.450      1/1/2016      EUR     23.76
PIERRE VACANCES          4.000     10/1/2015      EUR     67.89
PUBLICIS GROUPE          1.000     1/18/2018      EUR     48.86
PUBLICIS GROUPE          3.125     7/30/2014      EUR     37.20
SOC AIR FRANCE           2.750      4/1/2020      EUR     20.56
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.940     3/14/2031      USD     65.32
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.920     3/17/2031      USD     65.13
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.910     3/16/2031      USD     65.04
SOCIETE GENERALE         6.010     3/15/2031      USD     65.95
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.900     3/10/2031      USD     64.98
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.860     3/11/2031      USD     64.61
SOCIETE GENERALE         5.860     4/26/2031      USD     64.81
SOITEC                   6.250      9/9/2014      EUR      7.65
TEM                      4.250      1/1/2015      EUR     51.39
THEOLIA                  2.700      1/1/2041      EUR      8.23

BAYERISCHE HYPO          5.000    12/21/2029      EUR     61.73
BAYERISCHE LNDBK         4.500      2/7/2019      EUR     62.98
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         4.480      3/3/2026      EUR     73.25
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         3.970      9/4/2024      EUR     72.40
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.640     1/30/2024      EUR     53.25
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         4.270     1/15/2019      EUR     59.00
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.450     2/20/2023      EUR     53.75
BHW BAUSPARKASSE         5.600     4/14/2023      EUR     54.25
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000    10/30/2017      EUR     65.35
COMMERZBANK AG           5.625    11/29/2017      EUR     68.44
COMMERZBANK AG           4.000    11/30/2017      EUR     18.73
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000     3/30/2018      EUR     17.84
COMMERZBANK AG           5.000     4/20/2018      EUR     17.86
COMMERZBANK AG           6.600     4/23/2018      EUR     69.23
COMMERZBANK AG           6.654      5/9/2018      EUR     69.45
COMMERZBANK AG           6.500     5/14/2018      EUR     68.44
COMMERZBANK AG           6.375     3/22/2019      EUR     65.64
COMMERZBANK AG           6.625     8/30/2019      GBP     64.46
COMMERZBANK AG           7.750     3/16/2021      EUR     67.55
COMMERZBANK AG           6.300     3/15/2022      EUR     55.66
COMMERZBANK AG           6.360     3/15/2022      EUR     55.82
COMMERZBANK AG           6.460     6/24/2022      EUR     55.59
DEUT GENOS-HYPBK         6.610     3/21/2022      EUR     68.29
DEUTSCHE BK SING         4.860     6/30/2031      USD     75.52
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN         6.050     9/27/2022      EUR     57.75
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN         5.300    11/20/2023      EUR     51.63
DG BANK                  4.500      9/1/2028      EUR     75.60
DRESDNER BANK AG         7.250     6/24/2019      EUR     67.98
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.375      5/8/2018      EUR     66.16
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.635     6/18/2018      EUR     66.98
DRESDNER BANK AG         7.350     6/13/2028      EUR     50.37
DRESDNER BANK AG         7.160     8/14/2024      EUR     52.76
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.400     4/23/2018      EUR     73.75
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.180     2/28/2023      EUR     51.14
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.550     4/14/2020      EUR     62.50
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.000     2/25/2020      EUR     60.46
DRESDNER BANK AG         5.700     7/31/2023      EUR     48.57
DRESDNER BANK AG         6.210     6/20/2022      EUR     54.43
DRESDNER BANK AG         5.290     5/31/2021      EUR     52.88
EUROHYPO AG              6.490     7/17/2017      EUR      3.75
EUROHYPO AG              5.560     8/18/2023      EUR     58.50
EUROHYPO AG              5.110      8/6/2018      EUR     70.13
EUROHYPO AG              3.830     9/21/2020      EUR     55.63
GOTHAER ALLG VER         5.527     9/29/2026      EUR     69.05
HAPAG-LLOYD              9.750    10/15/2017      USD     64.50
HAPAG-LLOYD              9.750    10/15/2017      USD     78.00
HECKLER & KOCH           9.500     5/15/2018      EUR     63.38
HECKLER & KOCH           9.500     5/15/2018      EUR     64.60
HEIDELBERG DRUCK         9.250     4/15/2018      EUR     59.38
HEIDELBERG DRUCK         9.250     4/15/2018      EUR     60.01
HSH NORDBANK AG          4.375     2/14/2017      EUR     49.45
HSH NORDBANK AG          4.730    12/15/2025      EUR     73.42
HVB REAL ESTATE          6.570     3/18/2022      EUR     68.14
L-BANK FOERDERBK         0.500     5/10/2027      CAD     51.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.800     2/23/2037      JPY     40.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          5.250    10/20/2015      EUR     27.19
Q-CELLS                  6.750    10/21/2015      EUR      0.89
RHEINISCHE HYPBK         6.600     5/29/2022      EUR     67.38
SOLARWORLD AG            6.125     1/21/2017      EUR     53.70
SOLARWORLD AG            6.375     7/13/2016      EUR     54.19
STYROLUTION GRP          7.625     5/15/2016      EUR     67.50
STYROLUTION GRP          7.625     5/15/2016      EUR     68.29
TAG IMMO AG              6.500    12/10/2015      EUR      7.69
TUI AG                   5.500    11/17/2014      EUR     53.64
TUI AG                   2.750     3/24/2016      EUR     34.13

ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.057     3/26/2013      EUR     32.45
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.851     9/19/2016      EUR     22.27
ATHENS URBAN TRN         5.008     7/18/2017      EUR     24.62
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.301     8/12/2014      EUR     21.39
FAGE DAIRY IND           7.500     1/15/2015      EUR     72.38
FAGE DAIRY IND           7.500     1/15/2015      EUR     72.38
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.300     7/25/2030      EUR     27.32
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.900     7/25/2025      EUR     17.00
HELLENIC REPUB           4.625     6/25/2013      USD     31.38
HELLENIC REPUB           6.140     4/14/2028      EUR     17.75
HELLENIC REPUB           2.125      7/5/2013      CHF     45.38
HELLENIC REPUB           4.590      4/8/2016      EUR     21.13
HELLENIC REPUB           5.200     7/17/2034      EUR     13.38
HELLENIC REPUB           5.000     3/11/2019      EUR     29.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.300     3/20/2026      EUR     22.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500     9/20/2037      EUR     22.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600     9/20/2040      EUR     22.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300     3/20/2012      EUR     39.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.700     3/20/2024      EUR     23.05
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.250     5/18/2012      EUR     36.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.250     6/20/2012      EUR     61.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         1.000     6/30/2012      EUR     59.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.100     8/20/2012      EUR     31.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.506     3/31/2013      EUR     38.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600     5/20/2013      EUR     26.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI         7.500     5/20/2013      EUR     31.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.900      7/3/2013      EUR     31.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.427     7/31/2013      EUR     33.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.000     8/20/2013      EUR     27.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.520     9/30/2013      EUR     27.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500     1/11/2014      EUR     25.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500     5/20/2014      EUR     25.20
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500      7/1/2014      EUR     29.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.985     7/25/2014      EUR     25.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.500     8/20/2014      EUR     24.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.113     9/30/2014      EUR     25.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700     7/20/2015      EUR     23.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.100     8/20/2015      EUR     26.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.702     9/30/2015      EUR     24.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700    11/10/2015      EUR     24.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.600     7/20/2016      EUR     23.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.020     9/13/2016      EUR     24.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.225      3/1/2017      EUR     25.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900     4/20/2017      EUR     23.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300     7/20/2017      EUR     22.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.590      4/3/2018      EUR     23.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600     7/20/2018      EUR     22.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.000     7/19/2019      EUR     22.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500    10/22/2019      EUR     22.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.250     6/19/2020      EUR     23.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900    10/22/2022      EUR     23.69
NATL BK GREECE           3.875     10/7/2016      EUR     55.78

CALYON FIN GUER          6.000      9/4/2029      USD     64.91
CREDIT AGRICOLE          5.600     2/25/2030      USD     61.75

OTP BANK                 5.270     9/19/2016      EUR     72.18
REP OF HUNGARY           3.875     2/24/2020      EUR     69.83
REP OF HUNGARY           4.000     5/20/2016      CHF     70.86

AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000      3/1/2030      EUR     44.21
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000     2/12/2030      EUR     44.24
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.580     4/28/2028      EUR     49.47
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         4.875     6/29/2017      EUR     74.26
ALLIED IRISH BKS        12.500     6/25/2035      GBP     38.50
ALLIED IRISH BKS         4.000     3/19/2015      EUR     73.13
ALLIED IRISH BKS         5.625    11/12/2014      EUR     71.83
ANGLO IRISH BANK         4.000     4/15/2015      EUR     72.80
BANESTO FINANC           6.050      7/2/2025      EUR     72.03
BANESTO FINANC           5.000     3/23/2030      EUR     58.36
BANESTO FINANC           5.000      6/1/2024      EUR     67.73
BANK OF IRELAND          4.473    11/30/2016      EUR     56.50
BANK OF IRELAND          5.600     9/18/2023      EUR     38.75
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000     2/12/2020      EUR     50.25
BANK OF IRELAND          3.585     4/21/2015      EUR     73.88
BANK OF IRELAND          3.780      4/1/2015      EUR     74.97
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000     2/12/2020      GBP     37.38
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.360    10/12/2029      EUR     46.16
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.400     11/6/2029      EUR     46.40
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.450      3/1/2030      EUR     46.33
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.760      9/7/2029      EUR     48.93
DEPFA ACS BANK           3.000    12/17/2024      CHF     74.47
DEPFA ACS BANK           0.500      3/3/2025      CAD     49.65
DEPFA ACS BANK           3.278     7/17/2026      CHF     74.11
DEPFA ACS BANK           3.250     7/31/2031      CHF     67.65
DEPFA ACS BANK           4.900     8/24/2035      CAD     69.18
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125     3/16/2037      USD     69.52
EBS BLDG SOCIETY         4.000     2/25/2015      EUR     71.61
IRISH GOVT               5.400     3/13/2025      EUR     73.10
IRISH GOVT               4.500     4/18/2020      EUR     73.77
IRISH LIFE PERM          4.000     3/10/2015      EUR     72.63
UT2 FUNDING PLC          5.321     6/30/2016      EUR     51.49

BANCA 121 SPA            6.370    12/21/2026      EUR     71.39
BANCA IMI SPA            3.500     2/21/2017      EUR     73.32
BANCA IMI SPA            3.500     6/30/2016      EUR     76.25
BANCA MARCHE             4.700     8/16/2021      EUR     66.04
BANCA MARCHE             5.125     5/14/2024      ITL     61.84
BANCA MARCHE             4.000     5/26/2021      EUR     61.77
BANCA MARCHE             4.000     1/10/2021      EUR     62.94
BANCA MARCHE             3.600    11/12/2020      EUR     61.54
BANCA MARCHE             5.500     9/16/2030      EUR     55.76
BANCA MARCHE             3.750      3/1/2017      EUR     74.58
BANCA MARCHE             3.200     5/10/2017      EUR     71.50
BANCA MARCHE             5.400     9/16/2020      EUR     71.33
BANCA MARCHE             3.200     6/21/2017      EUR     70.84
BANCA MARCHE             3.200     9/27/2017      EUR     69.47
BANCA MARCHE             3.700      9/1/2020      EUR     62.04
BANCA MARCHE             4.500      3/4/2018      EUR     73.44
BANCA MARCHE             4.300      1/4/2020      EUR     66.99
BANCA MARCHE             4.000      7/9/2020      EUR     64.00
BANCA MARCHE             3.900     8/17/2020      EUR     63.14
BANCA MARCHE             4.360      1/4/2022      ITL     63.67
BANCA NAZ LAVORO         4.652      2/3/2023      EUR     65.64
BANCA NAZ LAVORO         4.400      4/1/2019      EUR     74.19
BANCA POP ALTO           1.000     7/14/2015      EUR     74.25
BANCA POP ALTO           0.900     7/14/2015      EUR     74.81
BANCA POP EMILIA         4.000     4/12/2020      EUR     65.47
BANCA POP ETRURI         5.000     5/16/2021      EUR     70.12
BANCA POP ETRURI         4.150     2/16/2018      EUR     92.63
BANCA POP ETRURI         4.000     3/31/2018      EUR     71.34
BANCA POP ETRURI         5.000      8/1/2021      EUR     69.72
BANCA POP ETRURI         4.500     1/31/2021      EUR     67.56
BANCA POP LODI           5.250      4/3/2029      EUR     53.60
BANCA POP LODI           3.625     3/31/2017      EUR     73.96
BANCA POP LODI           3.750     2/28/2018      EUR     70.36
BANCA POP MILANO         3.400     8/12/2015      EUR     70.91
BANCA POP MILANO         3.000    10/14/2015      EUR     68.56
BANCA POP MILANO         3.000     1/16/2016      EUR     66.92
BANCA POP MILANO         3.250      3/4/2016      EUR     67.64
BANCA POP MILANO         3.000     3/31/2016      EUR     65.63
BANCA POP MILANO         2.900     8/30/2016      EUR     62.96
BANCA POP MILANO         3.000     9/29/2016      EUR     62.61
BANCA POP MILANO         3.375     1/15/2017      EUR     62.24
BANCA POP MILANO         2.650     6/30/2015      EUR     69.82
BANCA POP MILANO         3.375     4/16/2017      EUR     60.87
BANCA POP MILANO         3.250     6/30/2017      EUR     57.84
BANCA POP MILANO         3.625     7/16/2017      EUR     60.50
BANCA POP MILANO         3.125     4/15/2015      EUR     72.17
BANCA POP MILANO         3.100     9/30/2017      EUR     57.47
BANCA POP MILANO         3.875    10/15/2017      EUR     60.62
BANCA POP MILANO         4.100     3/31/2018      EUR     59.18
BANCA POP MILANO         4.500     4/18/2018      EUR     64.00
BANCA POP MILANO         3.500     6/30/2018      EUR     55.46
BANCA POP MILANO         4.000     4/23/2020      EUR     50.19
BANCA POP MILANO         7.125      3/1/2021      EUR     67.23
BANCA POP MILANO         3.300     7/29/2015      EUR     70.55
BANCA POP MILANO         3.125     1/14/2015      EUR     73.85
BANCA POP MILANO         3.000     7/15/2015      EUR     70.22
BANCA POP MILANO         4.000     8/11/2015      EUR     72.31
BANCA POP VICENT         3.000     3/31/2015      EUR     75.79
BANCA POP VICENT         4.250     9/16/2016      EUR     71.94
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000     3/25/2021      EUR     56.58
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000      8/5/2016      EUR     75.19
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     6/15/2016      EUR     71.21
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     5/16/2016      EUR     72.07
BANCA POP VICENT         3.750     4/29/2016      EUR     71.68
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     4/18/2016      EUR     72.21
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     3/30/2016      EUR     73.05
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     3/25/2016      EUR     73.22
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     3/15/2016      EUR     73.38
BANCA POP VICENT         4.000     7/31/2015      EUR     76.18
BANCA POP VICENT         5.290     6/28/2017      EUR     71.48
BANCA POP VICENT         3.800     6/30/2015      EUR     76.44
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000     3/31/2021      EUR     56.55
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000     5/30/2021      EUR     55.99
BANCA POP VICENT         5.000     6/30/2021      EUR     55.41
BANCA POP VICENT         4.970     4/20/2027      EUR     41.04
BANCA SELLA              5.070     3/15/2021      EUR     70.46
BANCA SELLA              3.600     11/5/2019      EUR     65.30
BANCO DESIO BRIA         3.750     5/16/2018      EUR     74.83
BANCO POPOLARE           6.375     5/31/2021      EUR     61.94
BANCO POPOLARE           4.750     4/28/2017      EUR     73.00
BANCO POPOLARE           2.500     1/10/2016      EUR     76.02
BANCO POPOLARE           6.000     11/5/2020      EUR     61.90
BANCO POPOLARE           3.500     1/31/2016      EUR     74.27
BANCO POPOLARE           3.000    10/29/2016      EUR     73.78
BANCO POPOLARE           2.900    11/30/2016      EUR     72.86
BP CIVIDALE              3.180     5/19/2020      EUR     61.76
BTPS                     4.000      2/1/2037      EUR     70.00
BTPS I/L                 2.100     9/15/2021      EUR     72.60
BTPS I/L                 2.350     9/15/2019      EUR     77.60
BTPS I/L                 2.600     9/15/2023      EUR     73.28
BTPS I/L                 2.350     9/15/2035      EUR     67.31
BTPS I/L                 2.550     9/15/2041      EUR     67.14
BTPS I/L                 3.100     9/15/2026      EUR     73.33
CASSA RISP BOLZA         1.650     7/23/2015      EUR     75.03
CASSA RISP CENTO         4.500     9/12/2015      EUR     72.00
CASSA RISP CESEN         3.400      9/7/2017      EUR     71.46
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.500     11/2/2020      EUR     56.13
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.000     1/18/2015      EUR     72.25
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000     4/15/2015      EUR     73.63
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000      8/5/2015      EUR     71.75
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000      9/2/2015      EUR     71.50
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.500      3/5/2016      EUR     67.25
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.000     11/2/2016      EUR     66.00
CASSA RISP FERRA         4.575      2/2/2017      EUR     66.88
CASSA RISP FERRA         3.400     9/17/2017      EUR     61.00
CIR SPA                  5.750    12/16/2024      EUR     70.40
COMUNE DI MILANO         4.019     6/29/2035      EUR     73.71
ENEL (ENTNZENEL)         5.584     11/7/2033      GBP     74.29
FINMECCANICA SPA         4.875     3/24/2025      EUR     65.63
ICCREA BANCA SPA         4.000     5/16/2016      EUR     75.52
INTESA SANPAOLO          3.000     12/3/2017      EUR     74.27
INTESA SANPAOLO          5.750     5/28/2018      EUR     73.00
INTESA SANPAOLO          6.160     6/27/2018      EUR     73.57
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.350     1/28/2020      EUR     76.45
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.375     2/12/2020      EUR     74.03
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.125     4/14/2020      EUR     76.28
INTESA SANPAOLO          2.882     4/20/2020      EUR     67.17
INTESA SANPAOLO          5.150     7/16/2020      EUR     75.57
INTESA SANPAOLO          5.250     1/28/2022      GBP     74.61
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.630     2/19/2023      EUR     74.84
INTESA SANPAOLO          4.000      9/2/2022      EUR     71.23
MEDIOBANCA               2.200     12/7/2017      EUR     69.53
MEDIOBANCA               4.190     6/20/2020      EUR     70.58
MEDIOBANCA               3.800     6/20/2018      EUR     75.80
MONTE DEI PASCHI         5.600      9/9/2020      EUR     73.37
MONTE DEI PASCHI         3.750     8/30/2020      EUR     67.64
MONTE DEI PASCHI         5.000     4/21/2020      EUR     71.20
REP OF ITALY             2.000     9/15/2062      EUR     49.11
REP OF ITALY             4.850     6/11/2060      EUR     67.65
REP OF ITALY             5.200     7/31/2034      EUR     73.91
REP OF ITALY             2.200     9/15/2058      EUR     54.06
REP OF ITALY             1.850     9/15/2057      EUR     46.75
REP OF ITALY             2.870     5/19/2036      JPY     47.71
REP OF ITALY             2.850      9/1/2022      EUR     74.87
REP OF ITALY             6.000      8/4/2028      GBP     74.45
REP OF ITALY             4.490      4/5/2027      EUR     69.26
REP OF ITALY             2.500     1/30/2018      CHF     77.07
REP OF ITALY             2.750    11/11/2018      EUR     73.71
SANPAOLO IMI             4.375     6/26/2018      EUR     70.99
SANPAOLO IMI             3.750      3/2/2020      EUR     70.47
SEAT PAGINE             10.500     1/31/2017      EUR     56.40
SEAT PAGINE             10.500     1/31/2017      EUR     56.00
SEAT PAGINE             10.500     1/31/2017      EUR     56.13
SEAT PAGINE             10.500     1/31/2017      EUR     56.13
TELECOM ITALIA           5.250     3/17/2055      EUR     63.66
UBI BANCA SPCA           4.600     7/28/2018      EUR     66.92
UGF ASSICURAZION         5.660     7/28/2023      EUR     51.74
UNICREDIT SPA            6.700      6/5/2018      EUR     61.63
UNICREDIT SPA            6.125     4/19/2021      EUR     69.64
UNICREDIT SPA            5.160     6/14/2020      EUR     63.22
UNICREDIT SPA            4.500     9/22/2019      EUR     68.99
UNICREDIT SPA            5.370     6/19/2019      EUR     66.29
UNICREDIT SPA            3.879     8/23/2018      EUR     70.45
UNICREDIT SPA            6.040      3/3/2023      EUR     62.34
UNICREDIT SPA            4.350     8/25/2022      EUR     60.97
UNICREDIT SPA            5.050     4/25/2022      EUR     58.43
UNICREDIT SPA            5.000     4/21/2021      EUR     60.46
UNICREDITO ITALI         4.750     4/12/2027      EUR     52.78
UNICREDITO ITALI         5.750     9/26/2017      EUR     71.99
UNICREDITO ITALI         5.000      2/1/2016      GBP     60.04
UNICREDITO ITALI         3.950      2/1/2016      EUR     69.07
UNICREDITO ITALI         4.375     1/29/2020      EUR     71.20
UNICREDITO ITALI         6.375    10/16/2018      GBP     71.06
VENETO BANCA             2.250    11/22/2015      EUR     74.05
VENETO BANCA             5.000     4/29/2016      EUR     74.60
VENETO BANCA             3.500     5/16/2016      EUR     72.51
VENETO BANCA             4.500     5/25/2016      EUR     73.71
VENETO BANCA             5.000     5/16/2016      EUR     74.23

ARCELORMITTAL            7.250      4/1/2014      EUR     23.21
BEVERAGE PACK            9.500     6/15/2017      EUR     75.20
CONTROLINVESTE           3.000     1/28/2015      EUR     63.77
ESFG INTERNATION         6.875    10/21/2019      EUR     53.02
FINMECCANICA FIN         5.250     1/21/2022      EUR     67.28
KION FINANCE             7.875     4/15/2018      EUR     76.07
KION FINANCE             7.875     4/15/2018      EUR     74.38
TELECOM IT CAP           6.375    11/15/2033      USD     73.59
TELECOM IT CAP           6.375    11/15/2033      USD     73.59
TELECOM IT CAP           6.000     9/30/2034      USD     74.00
TELECOM IT CAP           6.375    11/15/2033      USD     73.65
UBI BANCA INT            8.750    10/29/2012      EUR     69.56
ZINC CAPITAL             8.875     5/15/2018      EUR     76.00

APP INTL FINANCE        11.750     10/1/2005      USD      0.01
ASTANA FINANCE           9.000    11/16/2011      USD      8.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     2/24/2025      CAD     58.66
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     3/17/2016      TRY     71.41
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     6/22/2021      ZAR     44.05
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     5/25/2016      TRY     70.46
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     6/22/2016      TRY     70.06
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     9/15/2016      TRY     68.91
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500      3/3/2021      NZD     64.83
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     3/29/2021      NZD     64.56
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     3/29/2021      USD     73.35
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     5/12/2021      ZAR     44.47
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500     4/27/2016      TRY     70.83
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500     5/15/2014      USD     39.25
BLT FINANCE BV           7.500     5/15/2014      USD     37.75
BRIT INSURANCE           6.625     12/9/2030      GBP     51.02
CEMEX FIN EUROPE         4.750      3/5/2014      EUR     70.10
DEXIA FUNDING            5.875      2/9/2017      GBP     56.77
EDP FINANCE BV           4.125     6/29/2020      EUR     73.73
EDP FINANCE BV           4.900     10/1/2019      USD     74.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN          8.500     4/10/2018      USD     58.75
ENEL FIN INTL NV         5.750     9/14/2040      GBP     73.25
FINANCE & CREDIT        10.500     1/25/2014      USD     57.59
FRIESLAND BANK           5.320     2/26/2024      EUR     69.01
FRIESLAND BANK           4.210    12/29/2025      EUR     55.76
INDAH KIAT INTL         12.500     6/15/2006      USD      0.01
ING BANK NV              4.200    12/19/2035      EUR     63.92
KBC IFIMA NV             4.000     9/20/2020      EUR     72.47
KBC IFIMA NV             4.600     9/13/2021      EUR     74.09
LEHMAN BROS TSY          4.870     10/8/2013      USD     33.00
MAGYAR TELECOM           9.500    12/15/2016      EUR     70.88
MAGYAR TELECOM           9.500    12/15/2016      EUR     70.51
MARFRIG HLDG EUR         8.375      5/9/2018      USD     70.25
NATL INVESTER BK        25.983      5/7/2029      EUR     14.32
NED WATERSCHAPBK         0.500     3/11/2025      CAD     59.43
NIB CAPITAL BANK         4.510    12/16/2035      EUR     56.72
POLYSINDO FIN            9.375     7/30/2007      USD      0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN         5.000     11/4/2019      EUR     72.72
PORTUGAL TEL FIN         4.500     6/16/2025      EUR     63.07
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         5.750     5/26/2014      EUR     23.18
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         1.375     2/28/2012      EUR     43.74
RABOBANK                 0.500    10/27/2016      ZAR     71.83
RABOBANK                 0.500    11/26/2021      ZAR     50.12
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         2.910     6/21/2036      JPY     62.36
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         5.000     2/27/2037      EUR     65.12
SIDETUR FINANCE         10.000     4/20/2016      USD     68.00
SNS BANK                 5.215     12/3/2027      EUR     62.33
SNS BANK                 4.580     3/20/2026      EUR     58.75
SNS BANK                 6.625     5/14/2018      EUR     73.58
SNS BANK                 6.250    10/26/2020      EUR     65.11
SRLEV NV                 9.000     4/15/2041      EUR     60.19
TJIWI KIMIA FIN         13.250      8/1/2001      USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS            0.720     7/28/2016      JPY     73.61
EKSPORTFINANS            2.250     2/11/2021      CHF     74.05
EKSPORTFINANS            0.500      5/9/2030      CAD     40.02
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     7/29/2016      TRY     69.00
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     5/25/2018      ZAR     61.22
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     7/29/2016      ZAR     72.08
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500      3/1/2016      ZAR     74.62
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     7/26/2016      ZAR     72.27
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     5/25/2016      ZAR     73.18
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500     3/24/2016      ZAR     74.23
NORSKE SKOGIND          11.750     6/15/2016      EUR     63.13
NORSKE SKOGIND          11.750     6/15/2016      EUR     63.05
NORSKE SKOGIND           6.125    10/15/2015      USD     55.38
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.000     6/26/2017      EUR     52.34
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125    10/15/2033      USD     40.38
NORSKE SKOGIND           7.125    10/15/2033      USD     40.38
NORSKE SKOGIND           6.125    10/15/2015      USD     57.10
RENEWABLE CORP           6.500      6/4/2014      EUR     58.33

SPAREBANKEN RGLD         4.170     12/7/2035      EUR     74.93
POLAND GOVT BOND         5.000     4/25/2037      PLN     68.92
POLAND-PAR CPN           3.000    10/27/2024      USD     74.92
POLAND-REGD-RSTA         2.810    11/16/2037      JPY     76.54
REP OF POLAND            2.648     3/29/2034      JPY     73.73
REP OF POLAND            4.250     7/20/2055      EUR     72.11

BANCO BPI                1.000     4/10/2014      EUR     74.50
BANCO COM PORTUG         5.625     4/23/2014      EUR     68.06
BANCO COM PORTUG         9.250    10/13/2014      EUR     74.68
BANCO COM PORTUG         4.750     6/22/2017      EUR     65.16
BANCO COM PORTUG         3.750     10/8/2016      EUR     65.48
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.160     7/23/2015      EUR     70.13
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600     9/15/2016      EUR     68.24
BANCO ESPIRITO           4.600     1/26/2017      EUR     66.28
BANCO ESPIRITO           6.875     7/15/2016      EUR     68.20
BANCO ESPIRITO           3.375     2/17/2015      EUR     74.94
BANCO ESPIRITO           3.875     1/21/2015      EUR     68.57
BRISA                    4.500     12/5/2016      EUR     69.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.380     10/1/2038      EUR     48.67
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.980      3/3/2028      EUR     50.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.250     1/27/2020      EUR     64.74
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.500    11/13/2017      EUR     68.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.750     2/14/2016      EUR     74.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         3.511     10/7/2014      EUR     73.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         3.875     12/6/2016      EUR     68.51
METRO DE LISBOA          4.061     12/4/2026      EUR     55.19
METRO DE LISBOA          7.300    12/23/2025      EUR     73.32
METRO DE LISBOA          5.750      2/4/2019      EUR     61.15
METRO DE LISBOA          4.799     12/7/2027      EUR     65.52
MONTEPIO GERAL           5.000      2/8/2017      EUR     61.38
PARPUBLICA               4.200    11/16/2026      EUR     46.88
PARPUBLICA               3.567     9/22/2020      EUR     47.88
PARPUBLICA               5.250     9/28/2017      EUR     72.19
PARPUBLICA               4.191    10/15/2014      EUR     68.38
PARPUBLICA               3.500      7/8/2013      EUR     76.88
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500     3/25/2015      USD     68.91
PORTUGAL (REP)           3.500     3/25/2015      USD     68.91
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.100     4/15/2037      EUR     46.39
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.950    10/25/2023      EUR     48.85
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.850     4/15/2021      EUR     48.41
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.800     6/15/2020      EUR     49.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.750     6/14/2019      EUR     50.99
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.450     6/15/2018      EUR     52.12
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.350    10/16/2017      EUR     53.21
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.200    10/15/2016      EUR     57.65
PORTUGUESE OT'S          6.400     2/15/2016      EUR     67.75
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.350    10/15/2015      EUR     64.51
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.600    10/15/2014      EUR     68.31
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.375     6/16/2014      EUR     71.63
REFER                    5.875     2/18/2019      EUR     57.75
REFER                    4.675    10/16/2024      EUR     52.75
REFER                    4.000     3/16/2015      EUR     49.50
REFER                    4.250    12/13/2021      EUR     49.88
REFER                    4.047    11/16/2026      EUR     51.93

ARIZK                    3.000    12/20/2030      RUB     51.11
DVTG-FINANS             17.000     8/29/2013      RUB     55.55
DVTG-FINANS              7.750     7/18/2013      RUB     20.29
IART                     8.500      8/4/2013      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                   17.000     9/17/2012      RUB     30.06
MOSMART FINANS           0.010     4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
NOK                     12.500     8/26/2014      RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA         1.000    12/17/2012      RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE           9.000     6/12/2012      RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC                 3.270     4/19/2018      RUB     37.52
RBC OJSC                 7.000     4/23/2015      RUB     63.01
RBC OJSC                 7.000     4/23/2015      RUB     65.52
SATURN                   8.500      6/6/2014      RUB     98.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.250    10/25/2023      EUR     63.34
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750    12/14/2022      EUR     60.27
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.000     3/24/2021      EUR     69.87
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.750     5/25/2027      EUR     59.78
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750     6/30/2025      EUR     51.97
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.000     3/31/2020      EUR     72.90
AYUNTAM DE MADRD         4.550     6/16/2036      EUR     73.66
BANCAJA                  1.500     5/22/2018      EUR     59.97
BANCAJA EMI SA           2.755     5/11/2037      JPY     73.71
BANCO BILBAO VIZ         4.375    10/20/2019      EUR     73.75
BANCO BILBAO VIZ         6.025      3/3/2033      EUR     58.95
BANCO BILBAO VIZ         6.200      7/4/2023      EUR     66.98
BANCO BILBAO VIZ         4.500     2/16/2022      EUR     68.62
BANCO POP ESPAN          5.702    12/22/2019      EUR     69.21
BANKINTER SA             6.000    12/18/2028      EUR     73.74
BBVA SUB CAP UNI         2.750    10/22/2035      JPY     44.02
CAIXA TERRASSA           4.700      8/9/2021      EUR     39.87
CAJA CASTIL-MAN          1.500     6/23/2021      EUR     52.92
CAJA MADRID              4.000      2/3/2025      EUR     71.41
CAJA MADRID              5.020     2/26/2038      EUR     71.07
CAJA MADRID              5.405     7/21/2038      EUR     75.48
CAJA MADRID              4.125     3/24/2036      EUR     62.09
CEDULAS TDA 5            4.125    11/29/2019      EUR     73.46
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         3.875     5/23/2025      EUR     54.28
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         4.250     4/10/2031      EUR     46.26
CEDULAS TDA A-4          4.125     4/10/2021      EUR     72.00
CEDULAS TDA A-5          4.250     3/28/2027      EUR     53.58
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         9.250     5/12/2020      USD     71.88
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         8.875     5/12/2017      EUR     69.00
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         8.875     5/12/2017      EUR     69.38
CEMEX ESPANA LUX         9.250     5/12/2020      USD     72.25
COMUN AUTO CANAR         3.900    11/30/2035      EUR     65.58
COMUN AUTO CANAR         4.200    10/25/2036      EUR     68.95
COMUNIDAD BALEAR         4.063    11/23/2035      EUR     70.99
COMUNIDAD MADRID         4.300     9/15/2026      EUR     74.60
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.965      9/8/2039      JPY     40.05
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.750     3/24/2016      CHF     70.36
GEN DE CATALUNYA         2.125     10/1/2014      CHF     67.08
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.690    10/28/2034      EUR     69.34
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.220     4/26/2035      EUR     64.20
GENERAL DE ALQUI         2.750     8/20/2012      EUR     65.77
GENERAL VALENCIA         5.900    11/30/2032      EUR     73.88
IM CEDULAS 10            4.500     2/21/2022      EUR     71.07
IM CEDULAS 5             3.500     6/15/2020      EUR     70.40
IM CEDULAS 7             4.000     3/31/2021      EUR     69.15
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         5.000     3/31/2020      CAD     73.82
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         2.799     11/5/2018      CHF     74.15
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         2.570    10/22/2021      CHF     62.32
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         3.250     6/28/2024      CHF     60.81
INSTIT CRDT OFCL         2.100     2/23/2021      JPY     64.10
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          3.170     7/29/2039      JPY     44.00
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          3.065     7/29/2039      JPY     42.84
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          3.050    12/10/2020      JPY     69.19
JUNTA LA MANCHA          2.810    10/14/2022      JPY     54.52
JUNTA LA MANCHA          4.453    11/28/2016      CAD     75.13
JUNTA LA MANCHA          3.875     1/31/2036      EUR     63.13
MAPFRE SA                5.921     7/24/2037      EUR     63.23
SACYR VALLEHERM          6.500      5/1/2016      EUR     74.31
SANTANDER ISSUAN         6.533    10/24/2017      GBP     74.65
SANTANDER ISSUAN         4.750     5/29/2019      EUR     72.98
SANTANDER ISSUAN         4.500     9/30/2019      EUR     73.61
SANTANDER ISSUAN         5.435    10/24/2017      EUR     75.99
SPAIN KINGDOM            5.250      4/6/2029      GBP     75.35
SPANISH GOV'T            4.200     1/31/2037      EUR     75.49
XUNTA DE GALICIA         4.025    11/28/2035      EUR     73.74

SAS AB                   7.500      4/1/2015      SEK     74.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     8/25/2021      ZAR     44.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.000     12/7/2011      USD     10.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.130     1/10/2012      USD     10.14
SWEDISH EXP CRED         6.500     1/27/2012      USD      7.27
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000     1/27/2012      USD      4.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500     2/28/2012      USD      8.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000      3/9/2012      USD      9.49
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000      3/9/2012      USD     10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.750     3/23/2012      USD      7.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.250     4/27/2012      USD      7.21
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500     6/12/2012      USD      7.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     9/29/2015      TRY     73.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500    11/27/2015      TRY     72.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500      3/3/2016      ZAR     73.98
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     6/14/2016      ZAR     72.14
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     6/29/2016      TRY     69.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     8/25/2016      ZAR     70.85
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     8/26/2016      ZAR     70.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     9/20/2016      ZAR     70.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     9/30/2016      ZAR     70.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     8/26/2021      AUD     62.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500    12/17/2027      USD     55.15
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500     1/25/2028      USD     54.87

CRED SUIS NY             8.000    11/16/2012      USD     56.80
CRED SUIS NY             9.000    10/12/2012      USD     22.48
CYTOS BIOTECH            2.875     2/20/2012      CHF     72.33
UBS AG                  12.350     3/27/2012      USD     23.65
UBS AG                  13.300     5/23/2012      USD      3.12
UBS AG                  13.700     5/23/2012      USD     11.14
UBS AG                  14.000     5/23/2012      USD      7.00
UBS AG                  10.960     7/20/2012      USD     22.79
UBS AG                  12.040     7/31/2012      USD     27.27
UBS AG                   9.500     8/10/2012      USD     28.41
UBS AG                   9.430     8/31/2012      USD     30.37
UBS AG                  10.200     10/1/2012      USD     71.89
UBS AG                  10.500    10/15/2012      USD     67.33
UBS AG                  10.530     1/23/2012      USD     37.92
UBS AG                   8.720     3/20/2012      USD     25.33
UBS AG                   9.250     3/20/2012      USD     11.24
UBS AG JERSEY           10.140    12/30/2011      USD     14.46
UBS AG JERSEY            3.220     7/31/2012      EUR     38.80

ABBEY NATL TREAS         5.000     8/26/2030      USD     54.73
ABBEY NATL TREAS         3.770     9/13/2020      EUR     72.74
AIR BERLIN               8.250     4/19/2018      EUR     69.99
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.500     6/21/2013      EUR     53.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         5.500     6/20/2013      EUR     58.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         3.875     9/17/2012      EUR     73.24
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.000    11/16/2012      EUR     66.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         4.400     2/12/2013      EUR     62.13
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         3.250     2/25/2013      EUR     58.50
ALPHA CREDIT GRP         6.000     6/20/2014      EUR     47.13
BAKKAVOR FIN 2           8.250     2/15/2018      GBP     68.33
BAKKAVOR FIN 2           8.250     2/15/2018      GBP     68.33
BANK OF SCOTLAND         4.800     4/24/2027      EUR     74.24
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.359     3/27/2029      JPY     64.94
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.340    12/28/2026      JPY     69.17
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.860    12/13/2021      CHF     72.28
BANK OF SCOTLAND         2.408      2/9/2027      JPY     69.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000     6/29/2012      USD      9.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.000     7/20/2012      USD      8.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC          7.000     7/27/2012      USD      8.19
BARCLAYS BK PLC         11.500     7/27/2012      USD      7.66
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.400     7/31/2012      USD      9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.800     7/31/2012      USD     23.21
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000     8/28/2012      USD     10.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.500     8/31/2012      USD     22.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000     9/11/2012      USD      9.94
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.000     9/28/2012      USD      9.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000     10/1/2012      USD      9.98
BARCLAYS BK PLC         14.000     10/1/2012      USD      9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.500    10/16/2012      USD      9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.000    10/16/2012      USD     10.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.750     9/14/2026      GBP     72.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.420      5/5/2031      USD     72.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.100     5/26/2031      USD     72.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.390      8/4/2031      USD     73.40
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.200     8/25/2031      USD     71.12
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.230     8/26/2031      USD     71.19
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.200     8/29/2031      USD     70.81
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.250     8/29/2031      USD     69.92
BARCLAYS BK PLC          6.330     9/23/2032      GBP     73.62
BARCLAYS BK PLC          5.000      6/3/2041      USD     68.27
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.550     1/23/2012      USD     10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.350     1/23/2012      USD     26.18
BRADFORD&BIN BLD         4.910      2/1/2047      EUR     67.43
CEVA GROUP PLC           8.500     6/30/2018      EUR     52.50
CEVA GROUP PLC          10.000     6/30/2018      EUR     56.13
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.750     12/2/2024      GBP     67.29
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.875     3/28/2033      GBP     65.22
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.625    11/16/2021      GBP     76.80
CONSORT HEALTH           2.068     6/19/2042      GBP    103.09
EC FINANCE               9.750      8/1/2017      EUR     73.91
EC FINANCE               9.750      8/1/2017      EUR     74.13
EFG HELLAS PLC           4.375     2/11/2013      EUR     57.11
EFG HELLAS PLC           5.400     11/2/2047      EUR      8.75
EFG HELLAS PLC           6.010      1/9/2036      EUR     33.00
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.350     7/22/2014      EUR     33.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.000     12/2/2021      EUR     14.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.100     12/9/2021      EUR     13.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         4.000     2/28/2013      EUR     54.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN         5.000     12/2/2021      EUR     14.88
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.875     2/15/2021      GBP     63.82
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.500     12/6/2018      GBP     68.40
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.375     9/26/2031      GBP     61.02
ENTERPRISE INNS          6.875      5/9/2025      GBP     63.37
ESSAR ENERGY             4.250      2/1/2016      USD     63.24
EX-IM BK OF UKRA         5.793      2/9/2016      USD     70.03
F&C ASSET MNGMT          6.750    12/20/2026      GBP     65.02
GALA ELECTRIC CA        11.500      6/1/2019      GBP     66.07
GALA ELECTRIC CA        11.500      6/1/2019      GBP     66.17
GRAINGER PLC             3.625     5/17/2014      GBP     74.62
HBOS PLC                 6.000     11/1/2033      USD     73.57
HBOS PLC                 5.374     6/30/2021      EUR     56.38
HBOS PLC                 4.375    10/30/2019      EUR     66.91
HBOS PLC                 6.000     11/1/2033      USD     73.57
HBOS PLC                 4.500     3/18/2030      EUR     58.35
HBOS PLC                 7.070      4/8/2023      EUR     70.93
HEALTHCARE SUPP          2.067     2/19/2043      GBP     72.92
HSBC BANK PLC            4.750     3/24/2046      GBP     69.53
INEOS GRP HLDG           7.875     2/15/2016      EUR     74.19
INEOS GRP HLDG           7.875     2/15/2016      EUR     72.38
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.869     8/25/2020      GBP     70.66
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         6.439     5/23/2020      EUR     65.88
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.588     5/12/2020      GBP     69.73
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.975     9/15/2024      GBP     64.43
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.375     3/12/2020      EUR     68.96
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.867    12/17/2019      GBP     70.61
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.875     11/1/2020      USD     78.50
LBG CAPITAL NO.1         7.625    10/14/2020      EUR     68.13
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         9.000    12/15/2019      GBP     74.62
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         9.875     2/10/2023      GBP     74.91
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         8.500      6/7/2032      GBP     62.29
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         7.875     3/19/2020      USD     72.13
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         9.000     7/15/2029      GBP     66.86
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         6.385     5/12/2020      EUR     65.86
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         9.125     7/15/2020      GBP     73.99
LBG CAPITAL NO.2         7.625     12/9/2019      GBP     68.90
LLOYDS TSB BANK          6.500     3/24/2020      EUR     73.66
LLOYDS TSB BANK          5.750      7/9/2025      GBP     73.15
LLOYDS TSB BANK          4.500    12/13/2024      EUR     71.19
LOUIS NO1 PLC           10.000     12/1/2016      EUR     59.90
LOUIS NO1 PLC           10.000     12/1/2016      EUR     60.25
LOUIS NO1 PLC            8.500     12/1/2014      EUR     67.88
MATALAN                  9.625     3/31/2017      GBP     48.25
MATALAN                  9.625     3/31/2017      GBP     48.19
MATALAN                  8.875     4/29/2016      GBP     70.98
MAX PETROLEUM            6.750      9/8/2013      USD     56.90
NATL WESTMSTR BK         6.500      9/7/2021      GBP     73.95
NEW HOSPITALS ST         1.777     2/26/2047      GBP     56.88
NOMURA BANK INTL         0.800    12/21/2020      EUR     70.40
OTE PLC                  4.625     5/20/2016      EUR     57.32
OTE PLC                  7.250      4/8/2014      EUR     66.28
OTE PLC                  5.000      8/5/2013      EUR     70.62
PIRAEUS GRP FIN          4.000     9/17/2012      EUR     64.47
PRIVATBANK               5.799      2/9/2016      USD     61.98
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         5.250    11/14/2033      EUR     65.41
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.100     8/11/2023      EUR     67.78
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.625     9/22/2021      EUR     59.50
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.700      7/3/2018      USD     63.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         4.350     1/23/2017      EUR     69.30
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         2.375     11/2/2015      CHF     73.63
SPIRIT ISSUER            5.472    12/28/2028      GBP     67.63
THOMAS COOK GR           6.750     6/22/2015      EUR     37.22
THOMAS COOK GR           7.750     6/22/2017      GBP     35.80
TUI TRAVEL PLC           4.900     4/27/2017      GBP     73.13
TXU EASTERN FNDG         6.450     5/15/2005      USD      0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN           5.659     6/30/2027      GBP     60.07
UNIQUE PUB FIN           6.542     3/30/2021      GBP     69.00


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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