TCREUR_Public/111212.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, December 12, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 245



DEXIA SA: Won't Have to Comply with EBA Capital Demand


* BULGARIA: Some Hospitals May Face Bankruptcy Over Mismanagement


HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 CFR; Outlook Stable


COMMERZBANK AG: Won't Take More Help From Government
* GERMANY: Six Banks Fail to Meet EU Recapitalization Bar


CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Reviews Caa2 Rating on EUR89.5M Notes


BTA BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Caa2'
FOOD CONTRACT: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to KZT40-Bil. Bonds
KAZAKH MORTGAGE: Fitch Puts 'B-' Rating on Class C Notes on RWN


ING VERZEKERINGEN: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating


SANTANDER TOTTA: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'bb-'


MY BANK: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'E'
MY BANK: Moody's Interfax Lowers National Scale Ratings to
* KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Local Currency Rating


AHORRO CORPORACION: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to 'Ba1'
FTYPYME BANCAJA 6: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
PRIVATE MEDIA: Posts EUR1.3-Mil. Net Loss in 2011 Third Quarter


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Reported by Administrator for Incurring New Debt

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BARRATTS PRICELESS: In Administration; 3,840 Jobs at Risk
CITY GREENWICH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on GBP165-Mil. Bonds
MACASKILL HAULAGE: In Provisional Liquidation; 44 Jobs Affected
MEDIA SQUARE: Bought Out of Administration by Management
WELLINGTON PUB: Fitch Cuts Rating on GBP35.7-Mil. Notes to 'B'


* EUROPE: Banks Need EUR114.7 Billion of Extra Capital, EBA Says
* BOND PRICING: For the Week December 5 to December 9, 2011



DEXIA SA: Won't Have to Comply with EBA Capital Demand
Frank Connelly at Bloomberg News reports that Dexia SA, the
French-Belgian lender that's being broken up, said it won't have
to comply with capital rules set by the European Banking
Authority because it's planning to "radically shrink in size."

The EBA, Europe's banking regulator, said on Thursday that Dexia
would need to raise EUR6.3 billion (US$8.4 billion) by mid-2012
to reach a 9% target for core Tier 1 capital after markdowns of
sovereign-debt holdings, a figure the company said shrank to
EUR4.2 billion after the Belgian government's takeover of Dexia
Bank Belgium SA on Oct. 20, Bloomberg relates.  In any event, the
company's break-up plan means it will be exempt, Bloomberg

Dexia put its banking units in Luxembourg and Turkey (DENIZ), its
asset-management division and a 50% stake in a custody joint
venture with Royal Bank of Canada up for sale to reduce the need
for regulatory capital, Bloomberg discloses.  The lender also
obtained government guarantees on as much as EUR90 billion of
loans and bonds, which still need to be approved by the European

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 11,
2011, BBC News related that Dexia was hit by GBP5.41 billion
(US$8.7 billion; EUR6.32 billion) of costs relating to the sale
of its Belgian bank and losses on Greek debt.  The
nationalization of Dexia Bank Belgium cost it EUR4 billion, BBC
disclosed.  Dexia also took a loss of EUR2.3 billion on Greek
government bonds in the third quarter, BBC said.  The bank also
announced that the board had agreed a capital injection of
EUR4.2 billion to comply with French financial regulations on
minimum capital levels, according BBC.  Dexia said it would
convert EUR2.5 billion of loans into capital for this
requirement, BBC recounted.

Dexia SA -- is a Belgian-based bank and
insurance carrier that focuses on Public and Wholesale Banking,
providing local public finance actors with banking and financial
solutions, and on Retail and Commercial Banking in Europe, mainly
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Turkey.


* BULGARIA: Some Hospitals May Face Bankruptcy Over Mismanagement
Standart News reports that Bulgarian Healthcare Minister Stefan
Konstantinov told the national Darik Radio on Saturday that "The
Bulgarian government will not order the close-down of state-run
hospitals, but some may still go bankrupt as a result of

The minister made it a point that the hospital's owner or, in the
case of the state-run hospitals, the state or the municipality,
is responsible for its management, and added that the financially
unstable hospitals shall be declared bankrupt or restructured,
Standart relates.

"There are enough public hospitals in Bulgaria and I think we can
afford closing down the insolvent ones," Standart quotes
Mr. Konstantinov as saying.


HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 long-term corporate
family rating (CFR) and a Ba1 Probability of Default Rating (PDR)
rating to Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. ("HEP"), a holding
company for the dominant Croatian vertically integrated energy
group, which carries out the generation, transmission,
distribution and supply of electricity as well as the
distribution and supply of gas and heating. The outlook is
stable. This is the first time that Moody's has assigned a rating
to HEP.

Moody's has used a 50% family recovery rate in deriving the PDR
given the presence of unsecured and secured financial obligations
in the capital structure. Ratings of any individual debt
instrument will be assigned separately based on the correct
prioritization of its claim within the corporate family

Ratings Rationale

"Although benefiting from HEP's dominant position in Croatia's
energy sector, favorable generation mix and solid level of
vertical integration, the Ba1 rating assigned to the company also
reflects its substantial future investment needs and exposure to
significant refinancing, foreign exchange and interest-rate
risks," says Richard Miratsky, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior
Analyst and lead analyst for HEP. "In addition, the rating is
constrained by the new and developing regulatory regime in
Croatia, which lacks a track record of transparent and consistent
application and is subject to significant political influence,"
adds Mr. Miratsky.

Given its 100% ownership by the government of Croatia, HEP falls
within the scope of Moody's rating methodology for government-
related issuers (GRIs). In accordance with the methodology, HEP's
Ba1 issuer rating incorporates an uplift for potential government
support to its standalone credit quality. This is expressed by
Moody's as a Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) of 13 (on a scale
of 1 to 21, where 1 represents the lowest risk and 13 is
equivalent to a Ba3 rating). The uplift to the BCA, currently at
two notches, is a result of (i) the credit quality of HEP's sole
shareholder, the Government of Croatia (Baa3, stable outlook);
(ii) Moody's assessment of a high probability of government
support in the event of HEP experiencing financial distress; and
(iii) very high level of default dependence (i.e., degree of
exposure to common drivers of credit quality).

HEP's BCA is supported by a favorable generation mix, which
includes a high proportion of low-cost hydro and nuclear
generation capacities. This protects the company's dominant
position in the domestic market, leaving limited room for any
significant growth of competition in the near future, despite
recent market liberalization. Although HEP is among the top 10
utilities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it is relatively
small compared with other European utilities, with 4 gigawatts
(GW) of installed capacity. Given that more than half of HEP's
production is generated by the clean sources of hydro and nuclear
power (65% in 2009 and 70% in 2010), the company has low
greenhouse gas emissions. This will represent a competitive
advantage when Croatia enters the European Union and the
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). However, the high proportion of
hydro-based generation in HEP's generation mix exposes the
company to potentially significant volatility in hydrological
conditions. This exposure has significantly affected the
company's past financial performance.

HEP's business profile is further supported by solid vertical
integration as the company covers the whole electricity value
chain, including electricity generation, transmission and supply.
Furthermore, households account for 43% of HEP's overall customer
portfolio, which helps to stabilize the company's volumes.
Despite the gradual liberalization of the Croatian electricity
market that started in 2008, HEP still generates a relatively
high proportion of its revenues from regulated activities, which
in general terms Moody's views positively. However, the immature
and significantly politically influenced regulatory environment
in Croatia significantly constrains HEP's rating. Low heating and
gas tariffs, which historically have not allowed HEP to fully
recover operating and investment costs, reflect political
influence and emphasis on social considerations in regulatory

HEP's recent historical financial performance has been strong,
mainly due to extremely good hydrological conditions during 2009
and 2010. This enabled higher utilization of hydro power plants,
as well as reductions in output from comparatively expensive
thermal power plants and in imported electricity needed to cover
domestic consumption. However, Moody's expects HEP's financial
profile to weaken in the medium term as it continues to increase
leverage in order to fund its ambitious capital expenditure
(capex). HEP's aging generation fleet requires substantial
investments for reconstruction and replacements. Together with
its ambitious plan for construction of new generation capacities,
the investment plan represents a significant burden on the
company's forecast financial performance. HEP's capex plan for
the next five years (2011-15) amounts to EUR2.5 billion, which
will necessitate a sizeable increase in leverage. Unless
supported by significant growth in tariffs, HEP's financial
profile could weaken below the levels that are set in its
financial policy and commensurate with its current rating. For
HEP to maintain its Ba1 rating, the company would need to
maintain a funds from operations (FFO)/interest coverage ratio of
at least 4x and an FFO/ debt ratio above 20%.

HEP's short-term liquidity position is supported by expected
solid cash flow generation and reasonable headroom under its
committed short-term facilities. However, in Moody's view,
liquidity could become stretched by the demanding maturity
profile of HEP's long-term debt, which culminates in 2012 and
2013, and the company's sizeable investment program. Given the
currently adverse economic environment, HEP could find it
difficult to raise the substantial amount of new debt that it
needs to fund this program. Moreover, further pressure could be
exerted on HEP's liquidity position as a result of the government
requiring the company to pay out a 50% dividend from its
exceptionally high 2010 profit.

Moody's notes that HEP is significantly exposed to foreign
exchange risk, as more than 80% of its debt is denominated in
foreign currency and the majority of its revenues generated in
the local currency, leaving limited scope for a natural hedge.
Furthermore, a significant portion of HEP's costs is also
denominated in foreign currency. This is because the company
needs to import around 20% of the electricity needed to cover
domestic consumption, as well as import a sizeable portion of its
inputs. Historically, the Croatian Kuna has been relatively
stable, as this has been the main strategic goal of the Croatian
national bank. However, any potential weakening of the exchange
rate poses a significant risk to HEP's financial performance.

The stable outlook reflects (i) Moody's expectation that HEP will
remain the leading electricity utility in Croatia; and (ii) the
company's financial flexibility to deal with the challenges of
its corporate development and investment plans in the medium
term. However, Moody's cautions that rating stability over the
longer term will ultimately depend on HEP's ability and
willingness to adjust its ambitious capital investment program
according to the development of its operating and financial

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Given HEP's significant investment program and associated funding
requirements, Moody's sees limited potential for a rating upgrade
over the medium term. However, if accompanied by a positive track
record of regulatory developments, upward pressure could be
exerted on the rating as a result of a sustainable improvement in
HEP's financial profile and cash-flow-based debt coverage

Conversely, the rating could come under downward pressure if (i)
HEP's FFO/interest coverage ratio were to fall below 4x; and (ii)
its FFO/ debt ratio were to decline below 20%. This could be
caused by, for example, (i) operational underperformance; (ii)
higher-than-expected dividend payments; or (iii) material
increases in capex, without offsetting balance-sheet measures.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating Hrvatska Elektroprivreda
d.d. was the Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities Industry
Methodology published in August 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009 and
the Government-Related Issuers Methodology Update published in
July 2010.

Headquartered in Zagreb, Croatia, HEP generated 15.8 terawatt
hours (TWh) of electricity and EUR1.6 billion in revenues in the
year ended December 2010. HEP is 100% owned by the government of


COMMERZBANK AG: Won't Take More Help From Government
Philipp Halstrick and Edward Taylor at Reuters reports that
Germany's Commerzbank AG stood by its commitment to avoid taking
more help from Berlin, which would tip it nearer to full

"We stand by our intention not to make use of additional public
funds," Reuters quotes Eric Strutz, finance director, as saying
in a statement.

Europe's banks must find EUR114.7 billion (GBP97.8 billion) of
extra capital, more than predicted two months ago, to make them
strong enough to withstand the euro zone debt crisis and restore
investor confidence, Reuters relates.

According to the Reuters, the European Banking Authority (EBA)
said that German banks need to find EUR13.1 billion, more than
double the 5.2 billion estimated in October.

Commerzbank needs EUR5.3 billion and Deutsche Bank needs EUR3.2
billion, Reuters discloses.

In a Dec. 5 report, James Wilson at the Financial Times related
that Commerzbank took steps to strengthen its capital as the
German government prepared to reactivate crisis measures that
would allow it to inject money into struggling institutions.

The bank, Germany's second-largest by assets, is to generate a
one-off capital boost by spending up to EUR600 million to buy
back hybrid equity from investors, the first of an expected
series of moves to improve its balance sheet that may require
government support, the FT disclosed.

Commerzbank has been dragged into a precarious capital position
by regulators' higher capital demands and stricter valuations of
banks' sovereign bond holdings, in the wake of the eurozone debt
crisis, the FT notes.  Commerzbank has one of the largest
portfolios of eurozone government debt, the FT said.

The bank, already 25% owned by the German government since a
bail-out in 2009, has held talks with the government about what
help it might require, the FT recounted.  According to the FT,
one idea is to offload sovereign debt into a state-backed "bad
bank", although no decisions have been taken.

Germany's finance ministry said on Dec. 5 it wanted "as soon as
possible" to take legal steps to reactivate a bank stabilization
law, which would pave the way for any help for Commerzbank, the
FT recounted.

The law, which expired at the end of 2010, allowed the government
to restructure banks including Hypo Real Estate and WestLB
through injecting capital and shunting assets into bad banks, the
FT disclosed.  Berlin wants to reactivate it to help banks that
cannot achieve EBA requirements by other means, the FT said.

Commerzbank wants to avoid further recourse to state help after
an EUR11 billion capital increase this year that repaid part of
Berlin's aid, the FT stated.  It is trying to manage capital by
stopping lending in many areas of business and exploring sales of
parts of its balance sheet, according to the FT.  The bank lost
EUR687 million in the third quarter because of the burden from
the sovereign debt crisis, the FT said.

Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Commerzbank AG -- is the parent company of a
financial services group active around the world.  The group's
operating business is organized into six segments providing each
other with mutually beneficial synergies: Private and Business
Customers, Mittelstandsbank, Central and Eastern Europe,
Corporates & Markets, Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance
and Treasury.

* GERMANY: Six Banks Fail to Meet EU Recapitalization Bar
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that the London-based European
Banking Authority (EBA) said six German banks failed Thursday to
clear a bar set by European regulators, and will need to raise
EUR13.1 billion (US17.5 billion dollars) by the end of June.

The massive shortfalls at Germany's two biggest banks, Deutsche
Bank (EUR3.2 billion short) and Commerzbank (EUR5.3 billion
short), highlighted the risk of contagion in the EU's biggest
economy, DPA notes.

The four other German banks that failed the test as of the end of
September were smaller units: DZ Bank and three regional banks,
Helaba, NordLB and WestLB, DPA discloses.


CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Reviews Caa2 Rating on EUR89.5M Notes
Moody's Investors Service has completed a review of the
performance of the Irish RMBS market and updated its portfolio
loss assumptions for 15 transactions.

Moody's has also placed the ratings of 19 tranches in six
transactions on review for downgrade because of worse than
expected performance.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions take into account (i) the deterioration in
performance in the 15 transactions; (ii) the level of credit
enhancement supporting the notes; and (iii) Moody's outlook for
Irish RMBS.

Transaction Performance

The performance of the Irish RMBS market has deteriorated since
Moody's last reviewed the assumptions on the portfolio in March
2011. The index of 90+ arrears has increased sharply to 8.8% from
6.7%, while the 360+ day delinquency index has increased to 2.9%
from 1.9%. Annualised redemption rates remain low at 4.1%,
indicating that portfolios will remain outstanding for a longer
period of time, exacerbating the uncertainty regarding future
performance. For more information on collateral performance,
please see Moody's quarterly "Irish Prime RMBS Indices".

The performance of all of the Irish transactions has
deteriorated. Thus far in 2011, 90+ day delinquencies in the
Celtic series have on average increased around 40%, while 360+
day delinquencies have increased approximately 70%. The most
severe increases in arrears have been in the Fastnet series, in
which 90+ day delinquencies have doubled on average, and 360+ day
delinquencies have increased approximately 150% since Q4 2010.

Moody's assessment shows that on average 5%-6% of the mortgages
in the Irish RMBS portfolios are currently in forbearance and
have been modified. Data provided show that on average 30% to 50%
of modified loans have fallen back into arrears, which Moody's
has taken into account in revising its portfolio expected losses.

Key Collateral Assumptions Revised

Moody's has revised its expected loss assumptions for the Irish
RMBS portfolios, completing a roll rate analysis of delinquencies
based on the assumption that most of the currently delinquent
loans will not be able to cure their arrears.

Moody's increased its lifetime expected loss assumptions to a
range of 5% to 17% of the current pool balance, from the previous
3.5% to 13.0%. On average, Moody's has increased the expected
loss assumption for this sector from 8.7% to 10.4%. These
assumptions correspond to (i) an average expected default rate of
approximately 23% of the current balance and (ii) an average loss
severity of 45%. The actual levels vary by transaction, depending
on portfolio characteristics such as indexed LTV, seasoning and
performance to date.

Expected loss assumptions remain subject to uncertainty with
regard to general economic activity, interest rates and house
prices. Lower than assumed realized recovery rates or higher than
assumed default rates would negatively affect the ratings of some
of the transactions.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(28 November 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit of
countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions in some countries, which could result in rating

Sensitivities, cash-flow analysis and stress scenarios have not
been updated as the rating action has been primarily driven by
the analysis of the available credit enhancement.

Credit Enhancement

Moody's has updated its expected loss assumptions for 15 of the
22 outstanding Irish RMBS transactions it rates. Moody's
identified and placed on review for downgrade 19 tranches in six
transactions whose ratings are at risk because credit enhancement
is insufficient to offset the increase in the loss assumptions.
In the other nine transactions, credit enhancement on all notes
can withstand the increase in the expected loss on the

Outlook for Irish RMBS

Moody's expects arrears to continue to grow, albeit at a slower
rate, through 2012, and to remain at elevated levels for several
years. Increasing unemployment and lower incomes arising from
austerity measures will continue to hurt borrowers' ability to
meet their financial obligations. In addition to higher arrears,
loss severities will rise as the proportion of loans in negative
equity increases and house prices decline further. Lenders will
continue to avoid recognizing losses by offering more loan

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa
published in October 2009.

List of affected securities


   -- EUR1253M A2 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR89.5M B Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Caa2 (sf)


   -- EUR385M A2a Notes, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- US$328M A2b Notes, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- EUR1388.8M A3a Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to A3 (sf)

   -- GBP586M A3c Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- EUR77M Ba Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3

   -- EUR147.4M Ca Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Caa2 (sf)

   -- GBP17.5M Cc Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Celtic Residential Irish Mortgage Securitisation No.9 Plc

   -- EUR1067.5M A2 Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa1 (sf)

   -- EUR70M B Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Emerald Mortgages No. 4 p.l.c.

   -- EUR1428M A Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa1 (sf)

   -- EUR34.5M B Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- EUR37.5M C Notes, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to
     Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 4 Ltd

   -- EUR2080M A1 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR2080M A2 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR2080M A3 Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded
      to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Kildare Securities limited

   -- EUR90.6M C Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- EUR26.55M D Notes, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
      to Caa1 (sf)


BTA BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Caa2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded BTA Bank's (BTA) long-
term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B3,
the long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ca
from Caa2 and the long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt
rating to C from Caa3.

The downgrades were prompted by Moody's assessment that BTA's
credit profile has weakened, reflecting a lack of a return to
profitability, a capital deficit and a possible further debt

Concurrently, BTA's standalone E bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) has been affirmed. However, Moody's now maps the E BFSR to
Ca on the long-term rating scale from Caa2 previously. The BFSR
and the subordinated debt rating carry a stable outlook, whilst
the outlook is developing on the senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the downgrades reflect the ongoing weakening of
BTA's credit profile and the increased risks that it might not be
able to meet its obligations in the short-to-medium term. Despite
the restructuring of BTA's market borrowings -- with an
approximate 70% haircut for creditors in September 2010 -- BTA
has been unable to return to profitability and recover its
capital. According to BTA's IFRS report, the capital deficit was
US$1.48 billion (12.2% of the total assets) as of end-H1 2011.

Moody's estimates that only around 20%-25% of BTA's loan book
currently generates cash earnings; therefore, its operating
activity is persistently depleting its liquidity reserves. The
only sources of replenishing liquidity are new deposits and loan
repayments, which renders its liquidity position unsustainable.
Moody's believes that the lack of capital and recurring income
and cash flows increases the possibility that BTA may have to
restructure its debt again to restore capitalisation and reduce
funding costs. Under that scenario, Moody's estimates that the
possible losses for BTA's senior debt holders may range between

Moody's notes that BTA is currently controlled by the Kazakhstan
government through the Sovereign Wealth Fund "Samruk-Kazyna", and
that the Fund has supported the bank -- in terms of capital and
liquidity -- during the global financial crisis. Therefore,
Moody's assessment incorporates a moderate probability that
systemic support would be extended to BTA's depositors in case of
need. As a result, BTA's long-term Caa2 deposit ratings currently
benefit from a two-notch uplift from the Ca standalone credit

However, Moody's does not include any systemic support in the
bank's debt ratings, reflecting the country's lack of support to
debt holders during the crisis. Consequently, BTA's senior
unsecured debt rating is in line with its Ca standalone credit
strength. The C debt rating assigned to BTA's subordinated debt
is one notch below the Ca senior unsecured ratings assigned to
its senior unsecured debt, and reflects claims subordination.

The developing outlook assigned to the senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings reflects the possibility of both upwards and
downwards rating movements over the next 12 to 18 months.

What Could Change the Rating - UP

In the medium-term, the debt ratings may be upgraded if BTA is
able to improve its financial performance, or if the losses for
its bondholders from a possible debt restructuring are less than
what is currently anticipated. Similarly, the deposit rating may
benefit from an improvement in BTA's financial performance. .

What Could Change the Rating - DOWN

BTA's debt ratings may be downgraded if the losses for its
bondholders from a possible debt restructuring exceed 50% of
their investments. BTA's deposit ratings could be downgraded if
it defaults on its deposits.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, BTA reported total assets
and total equity deficit of US$12.2 billion and US$1.48 billion,
respectively, at end-H1 2011, according to the bank's IFRS
financial statements. BTA's net loss for H1 2011 amounted to
US$701 million.

FOOD CONTRACT: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to KZT40-Bil. Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba3 rating
and a loss-given default assessment of 4(LGD-4) to the KZT40
billion (around US$270 million) worth of 7.5% bonds of JSC
National Company Food Contract Corporation (FCC), the largest
grain trader in Kazakhstan. The final terms of the bonds are in
line with the drafts reviewed for the provisional (P)Ba3
instrument rating assignment.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on 27 October 2011. Moody's
ratings rationale was set out in a press release issued on that

Principal Methodology

FCC's ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's
considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as
the company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared
with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and
financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to
intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against
other issuers both within and outside FCC's core industry and
believes FCC's ratings are comparable to those of other issuers
with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009 and the
Government-Related Issuers methodology published in July 2010.

FCC's principal mandate is to maintain state grain reserves at
the levels required to supply the Kazakh population, to ensure
timely grain replenishment and to provide loans to farmers. The
company is also responsible for keeping accounting records and
monitoring the quality, quantity and security of state grain
resources. The company has the rights to perform commercial
operations -- on behalf of the state -- related to grain sales
and other non-oil related activities such as cotton production,
bio-diesel and bio-ethanol production, and more recently
horticultural production. At the end of December 2010, FCC
reported revenues of KZT79 billion (around US$530 million) and
EBIT of KZT11.4 billion (around US$75 million).

KAZAKH MORTGAGE: Fitch Puts 'B-' Rating on Class C Notes on RWN
Fitch Ratings has placed Kazakh Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-I
B.V.'s (Kazakh MBS) notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN), as

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0293196266): 'BB+sf'; Placed on RWN
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0293196696): 'Bsf'; Placed on RWN
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0293196779): 'B-sf'; Placed on RWN

The RWN is a result of certain regulatory evolutions that could
affect the indexation mechanism of the mortgage portfolio to USD.
Kazakh MBS is a securitization of mortgage loans originated by
BTA Ipoteka (BTAI), a wholly-owned subsidiary of BTA Bank (rated

The transaction's mortgage loans are denominated in Kazakhstani
Tenge (KZT) and were until now indexed to USD.  Fitch understands
that during this year a general move has taken place in public
opinion, as well as the regulatory and judicial environment
against the currency indexation of mortgage loans in Kazakhstan.
Earlier in 2011, Parliament prohibited indexation for new
mortgages and BTAI has already started to remove the currency
indexation feature from the loans on its books.  More importantly
for the transaction, BTAI faced a court case in relation to a
mortgage loan included in the transaction.  In October 2011 the
Supreme Court of Kazakhstan provided a recommendation on the
matter, which, in Fitch's understanding could effectively
represent case law.  BTAI informed Fitch that as a result, the
currency indexation feature is being removed for all BTAI loans,
either on the bank's books and in the transaction.

The agency still needs to clarify whether this action would
involve in particular (i) a retroactive resetting of the KZT
amount of the loan according to the KZT/USD exchange rate as of a
date in the past and (ii) the refund (and perhaps set-off) of
certain amounts paid in excess by borrowers due to the indexation
feature, as the recommendation issued by the Supreme Court seems
to suggest.  Fitch will also consider the risk of future
depreciation of KZT relative to USD, as in absence of currency
indexation of the loans this would translate into direct losses
for the transaction.

Fitch believes that the implications of the above described
events could have a significant impact on the ratings of the
notes.  It expects to resolve the RWN in the first quarter of


ING VERZEKERINGEN: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the senior debt rating
of ING Verzekeringen N.V., the holding company for all the ING
Group's insurance activities, to Baa2 from Baa1. At the same
time, Moody's downgraded the guaranteed provisional senior debt
rating of ING America Insurance Holding, Inc. to (P)Baa2 from
(P)Baa1. Moody's assigned a developing outlook to these ratings.

In the same rating action, Moody's has affirmed the Ba1(hyb)
rating of the subordinated debt issued by ING Verzekeringen, with
a positive outlook, and affirmed ING Verzekeringen's P-2 short-
term debt rating, as well as the guaranteed P-2 short-term debt
rating of ING America Insurance Holding, Inc (ING AIH).

The rating action follows the announcement by ING Group of a
EUR0.9 -- 1.1 billion reserve charge it expects to take for
policyholder behavior assumption changes related to guarantees in
the variable annuity (VA) block at its US operations.  Moody's
has commented separately on the rating implications for ING's US
operations. Ratings at ING Bank and ING NV (the ultimate holding
company) and the A1 rating of Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc.'s
senior debt guaranteed by ING N.V. are unaffected.

Rating Rationale

Commenting on the downgrade of ING Verzekeringen's senior debt
rating, Moody's said that the reserve charge was sizable relative
to ING US operations' earnings and capital, and weakens the US
operation's stand-alone credit quality.  Moody's notes that ING
Verzekeringen's other insurance operations -- primarily in Europe
and Asia -- are not directly affected by the reserve charge. In
addition, Moody's notes that some support for the US operations
to offset the reserve charge may come from the wider ING Group.
However, the US still constitutes the largest operation of the
insurance group, accounting for 38% of gross written premiums and
42% of the underlying result as at H1 2011, and the weakening of
the US operations' credit profile consequently has negative
credit implications for the insurance holding company's debt

Commenting on the developing outlook on ING Verzekeringen's
senior debt rating, the rating agency said that it reflects the
uncertainties related to the IPO process of ING's insurance
operations. Negatively, the execution risks associated with the
separation of the insurance activities continue to pose pressure
on ING Verzekerigen's rating. Further uncertainty exists with
regards to ING Verzekeringen's ultimate position in the
organizational structure following the IPOs. Positively, the
stated intention to reduce leverage and repay debts of ING
Verzekeringen, and the potential profits that could be generated
by the IPOs, could result in an improvement of the holding's
financial flexibility.

The affirmation of ING Verzekeringen's P-2 short-term rating
reflects its Baa2 long-term debt rating, as well as the potential
liquidity support that the company could receive from ING Group.

The downgrade of ING AIH's provisional senior debt to (P)Baa2
from (P)Baa1 and affirmation of its P-2 short-term debt rating
mirrors the action on ING Verzekeringen's ratings, as these debts
are guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen.

Commenting on the Ba1(hyb) subordinated debt rating, Moody's said
that this debt is currently rated two notches below the Baa2
senior debt rating, instead of one notch which is typical in
Moody's notching guidelines. This wider notching continues to
reflect the risk of a coupon deferral associated with the
execution risk posed by ING Group's restructuring process.
Nonetheless, the affirmation of the rating with a positive
outlook also reflects the possibility that this rating may be
upgraded, if and when the risk associated with ING Group's
restructuring process ends or diminishes significantly.

Moody's said that ING Verzekeringen's senior debt rating could be
further downgraded if there is additional weakening of the
financial strength of the insurance operations that it holds, or
a worsening of the leverage position of the company. Conversely,
the rating could be upgraded if there is significant improvement
of the financial strength of its insurance operations, or
significant deleveraging and substantial repayment of debt.


These ratings were downgraded and assigned a developing outlook:

ING Verzekeringen -- senior debt rating to Baa2 from Baa1;

ING Verzekeringen -- provisional senior debt rating to (P)Baa2
from (P)Baa1;

ING America Insurance Holding, Inc. -- provisional senior debt
rating to (P)Baa2 from (P)Baa1 (guaranteed by ING

This rating was affirmed with a positive outlook:

ING Verzekeringen -- subordinated debt rating (dated, cumulative
with optional coupon deferral mechanism) at Ba1(hyb);

ING Verzekeringen -- provisional subordinated debt rating at

This rating was affirmed with a stable outlook:

Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc. -- guaranteed senior debt rating
at A1 (guaranteed by ING N.V.)

These ratings were affirmed:

ING Verzekeringen -- short-term debt rating at P-2;

ING Verzekeringen -- provisional short-term debt rating at (P)P-

ING America Insurance Holding, Inc. -- short-term debt rating at
P-2 (guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen);

ING America Insurance Holding, Inc. -- provisional short-term
debt rating at (P) P-2 (guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen).

The principal methodology used in rating of ING Verzekeringen
N.V. was Moody's Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers, May

Based in Amsterdam, ING Verzekeringen N.V. had total
shareholders' equity of EUR19.6 billion as of June 30, 2011. ING
Verzekeringen reported Gross Premiums Written EUR14.5 billion in
the first half of 2011, and a net income of EUR781 million.


SANTANDER TOTTA: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'bb-'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Santander Totta SGPS and its bank
subsidiary's (Banco Santander Totta SA; BST) Long and Short-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'A' and 'F1' from 'AA-' and
'F1+', respectively and their Viability Ratings (VR) to 'bb-'
from 'bb'.  The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are Negative.

The rating actions follow the downgrade of Portugal's sovereign
rating to 'BB+'/Negative from 'BBB-'.  The Negative Outlooks are
in line with that on the Spanish parent bank (Banco Santander
'AA-'/Negative) and Portugal's sovereign.

The downgrade of the banks' IDRs reflect Fitch's view that while
the probability of support from Banco Santander is extremely high
(the banks' Support Ratings have been affirmed at '1'), the
weakening economic outlook and deteriorating risk profile of
Portugal and its financial sector mean Fitch no longer considers
it appropriate to equalize Santander Totta and BST's ratings with
those of their ultimate parent, Banco Santander.

Fitch has also downgraded the two banks' VRs to reflect the
agency's expectations that further pressure on funding and
liquidity will prevail due to continued strong wholesale funding
constraints and deposit competition. Despite an improvement,
helped by loan reduction and good deposit growth, Santander
Totta's net loans/deposits ratio as per Bank of Portugal remains
above the average for the largest Portuguese banks at 145% at
end-Q311.  The bank will have to further improve this ratio in
order to meet the 120% mark by end-2014 required by the Bank of
Portugal under the IMF/EU support package.

In addition, escalating credit quality issues due to Portugal's
weak economic environment and prospects will place further
pressure on asset quality, profitability and hence internal
capital generation.  However, Fitch recognizes Santander Totta's
good retail franchise and comparatively better asset quality
indicators than its domestic peers.  Its non-performing loan
ratio (under Bank of Portugal's more stringent definition) was
2.34% at end-Q311.

While Santander's Totta's cost base benefits from being part of
Banco Santander, lower revenues, particularly net interest
revenue, affected its cost/income ratio which deteriorated to 61%
in Q311 from 50% in 2010.  Together with higher loan impairment
charges, this resulted in a decline of its operating ROAA to
0.38% (0.86% in 2010).

Fitch expects Santander Totta to meet the higher regulatory
capital requirements.  However, like its peers, this is necessary
to counteract further loan quality deterioration and its
significant Portuguese sovereign debt exposure (79% of equity at

The ratings actions are as follows:

Santander Totta SGPS:

  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative
  -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb'
  -- Individual Rating affirmed at 'C/D'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '1'


  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative
  -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb'
  -- Individual Rating affirmed at 'C/D'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '1'
  -- Senior debt downgraded to 'A' from 'AA-'
  -- Commercial paper and short-term debt downgraded to 'F1' from
  -- Preference shares unaffected at 'BB+'

The rating impact, if any, from the above rating actions on
Portuguese banks' securitization transactions and covered bonds
will be detailed in separate comments.


MY BANK: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'E'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded My Bank's standalone
bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E from E+, the long-term
local and foreign currency bank deposit ratings to Caa1 from B3
and the local currency debt ratings assigned to the bank's senior
unsecured bond issues maturing in August 2012 and in April 2015
to Caa1 from B3. The outlook on all ratings is now stable. At the
same time, My Bank's Not-Prime short-term local and foreign
currency deposit ratings remained unchanged.

Moody's downgrade of My Bank's ratings is based on the bank's
audited financial statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, and
its unaudited results for the first nine months of 2011, prepared
under Russian Accounting Standards (RAS).

Ratings Rationale

"Moody's decision to downgrade My Bank's long-term deposit
ratings to Caa1 is driven by worsening of the bank's risk
profile, still weak capital adequacy and the bank's inability to
generate sufficient recurring revenues to cover its
administrative expenses," says Maxim Bogdashkin, a Moody's
Assistant Vice-President and lead analyst for the issuer.

Moody's observed that over the past year, My Bank has continued
risky investment and lending practices (i) with the level of
investments in financial instruments -- mainly fixed income
securities -- exceeding 4x Tier 1 capital as at Q3 2011, and (ii)
with lending to financial companies that execute risky securities
operations accounting for around 2x Tier 1 capital. Moody's notes
that My Bank's risky lending practices are combined with loose
standards for loan collateralization. Specifically, loans to
financial companies are only 27% collateralized by underlying
securities. Moody's also does not rule out the possibility that
the level of My Bank's related-party transactions could be
significantly underreported.

Moody's regards My Bank's capital as insufficient (with the N1
regulatory capital adequacy ratio reaching 12.6% as at Q3 2011
compared with an also low 13.2% as at YE2010) to cover losses
that might materialize from the bank's assets. In the absence of
the shareholder's direct support to My Bank (which is recorded in
the profit and loss account as other income -- under RAS), My
Bank would have incurred a loss of around RUB500 million (US$16
million) over the first three quarters of 2011, thereby exerting
further pressure on the bank's already weak capital adequacy.

Moody's notes that although My Bank's shareholder (Mr. Gleb
Fetisov) continues to support the bank, the bank's ratings do not
incorporate any uplift from external support.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, My Bank reported total assets of
RUB20.1 billion (US$630 million) under unaudited RAS as at Q3
2011. The bank recorded a net profit of RUB1.7 million
(US$53,000) over the first nine months of 2011.

MY BANK: Moody's Interfax Lowers National Scale Ratings to
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded My Bank's long-term
national scale rating (NSR) to from The NSR
carries no specific outlook.

Moody's downgrade of My Bank's NSR is based on the bank's audited
financial statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, and its
unaudited results for the first nine months of 2011, prepared
under Russian Accounting Standards (RAS).

Ratings Rationale

"Moody's decision to downgrade My Bank's long-term deposit
ratings to Caa1 is driven by worsening of the bank's risk
profile, still weak capital adequacy and the bank's inability to
generate sufficient recurring revenues to cover its
administrative expenses," says Maxim Bogdashkin, a Moody's
Assistant Vice-President and lead analyst for the issuer.

Moody's observed that over the past year, My Bank has continued
risky investment and lending practices (i) with the level of
investments in financial instruments -- mainly fixed income
securities -- exceeding 4x Tier 1 capital as at Q3 2011, and (ii)
with lending to financial companies that execute risky securities
operations accounting for around 2x Tier 1 capital. Moody's notes
that My Bank's risky lending practices are combined with loose
standards for loan collateralization. Specifically, loans to
financial companies are only 27% collateralized by underlying
securities. Moody's also does not rule out the possibility that
the level of My Bank's related-party transactions could be
significantly underreported.

Moody's regards My Bank's capital as insufficient (with the N1
regulatory capital adequacy ratio reaching 12.6% as at Q3 2011
compared with an also low 13.2% as at YE2010) to cover losses
that might materialize from the bank's assets. In the absence of
the shareholder's direct support to My Bank (which is recorded in
the profit and loss account as other income -- under RAS), My
Bank would have incurred a loss of around RUB500 million (US$16
million) over the first three quarters of 2011, thereby exerting
further pressure on the bank's already weak capital adequacy.

Moody's notes that although My Bank's shareholder (Mr. Gleb
Fetisov) continues to support the bank, the bank's ratings do not
incorporate any uplift from external support.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, My Bank reported total assets of
RUB20.1 billion (US$630 million) under unaudited RAS as at Q3
2011. The bank recorded a net profit of RUB1.7 million
(US$53,000) over the first nine months of 2011.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance
published in August 2010 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).

* KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Local Currency Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Russian Republic of Karelia's RUB1
billion domestic bond issue (RU000A0JRYA9), due November 30,
2016, a final Long-term local currency rating of 'BB-' and a
final National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'.

The region has Long-term local and foreign currency ratings of
'BB-' and a National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'.  The Long-
term ratings have Stable Outlooks.  The region's Short-term
foreign currency rating is 'B'.

The bond issue has an amortizing structure and has a fixed-rate
step-down coupon.  The first four coupon rates were set on 2
December 2011 at 9.99%.  The fifth to eighth coupon rates have
been set at 9.74%.  The ninth and tenth coupon rates have been
set at 9.49%.

The proceeds from the bond issue will be used to refinance
maturing debt and to fund capital expenditure.


AHORRO CORPORACION: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the issuer ratings of Ahorro
Corporacion Financiera (ACF) to Ba1/Non-Prime from Baa3/Prime 3.
The rating outlook remains negative.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
September 8, 2011.

Rating Rationale

The downgrade was driven by Moody's concern that ACF's earnings
remain under pressure from the current adverse operating
environment and the diminishing business flow generated by its
traditional clients - the Spanish savings bank - which is driven
by their ongoing restructuring and consolidation process. In view
of these pressures, Moody's believes that ACF faces significant
constraints to its business model given its limited geographic
diversification negatively affecting its franchise strength. More
recently, ACF had successfully downsized its labor force to adapt
it to some of these challenges, reducing its compensation
expenses by 23% during the first nine months of 2011, compared
with the first nine months in 2010. Moody's is concerned
nevertheless to what extent further headcount reductions may
start to erode the firm's market position in fixed income and
equities as it faces considerable competition from global capital
market intermediaries operating in Spain. Although the firm has
attracted new clients, including some Spanish regional
governments and utility companies, this was not enough to offset
a 33% decline in revenue during the first three quarters of 2011,
compared with the same period last year; this will affect ACF's
earnings strength in the short to medium term. ACF's limited risk
management controls resulted in meaningful losses in 2008 and
2009 although, Moody's notes a number of procedural changes
aiming to improve the firm's risk quality framework.

However, Moody's considers that ACF benefits from its adequate
capital position and its market share in Spain's equity and
derivatives markets. Furthermore, the firm is likely to remain a
strategic service provider of capital market activities for a
core number of its shareholders, the Spanish savings banks. These
banks will face limitations in the development of their own
investment banking activities, partly due to higher capital
requirements for those activities.

Therefore, the rating also incorporates one notch of uplift given
the high probability of support from its shareholders in the
event of distress. Recent changes in the board of directors of
ACF's parent company Grupo Ahorro Corporacion have confirmed that
some of its stronger shareholders will remain highly involved
with the firm's operational strategy. Moody's further notes that
ACF's shareholders are providing liquidity support in the form of
secured and unsecured credit lines as the firm continues to rely
on repo funding to meet its liquidity requirements.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that ACF will remain
exposed to a weak operating environment and intensifying
competition from larger international firms, as well as the
company's pressure on its financial flexibility.

What Could Change the Ratings Up

An upgrade of ACF's issuer ratings is unlikely given its negative
outlook. However, an improvement in the firm's rating could be
driven by (i) a significant improvement in Spain's operating
environment; (ii) an improvement in ACF's franchise strength
following a considerable diversification in the firm's client
base; (iii) its merger with a stronger peer.

What Could Change the Ratings Down

A rating downgrade could be prompted by (i) a further
deterioration of its role as service provider for the savings
banks; a downgrade on its shareholder's ratings as it would
affect the likelihood of receiving support if required; (iii) a
deterioration on its liquidity position with a decrease in net
cash capital; or (iv) additional pressure on its profitability or

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Securities Industry Methodology published in December 2006.

Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, ACF reported total unaudited
consolidated assets of EUR2.8 billion as of September 30, 2011.

FTYPYME BANCAJA 6: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FTPYME Bancaja 3 and FTPYME Bancaja 6.

The affirmation of FTPYME Bancaja 3 reflects the transaction's
improved performance, which has been mainly driven by the
increased volume of recoveries.  The recovery rate has doubled
since May and currently stands at 37%. The principal deficiency
ledger (PDL) has been cleared and reserved fund has been topped
up to EUR1.7 million which represents 33% of its required
minimum. Defaults have declined to EUR8.6 million versus EUR11.9
in May 2011.

Fitch notes that the current portfolio has relatively high
obligor concentration with the top one, 10 and 20 obligors
representing 4%, 22% and 33% of the outstanding balance,
respectively. In addition, the portfolio's 39% exposure to real
estate and construction sectors is also a concern.

The revision of the Outlook on FTPYME Bancaja 6's class A2 notes
to Positive from Stable reflects the increased level of credit
enhancement (CE) and the notes' ability to withstand Fitch's
stress scenarios.

The affirmation of FTPYME Bancaja 6 is based on the sufficient
levels of CE as well as strong recoveries, which mitigate the
deterioration in the transaction's performance. Currently, the
weighted average recovery rate stands at 39%. Loans over 90 days
in arrears have increased by EUR5 million since the last review
in June 2011 to a current 7.4% of the outstanding balance.
Defaults are high at 13% of the portfolio's balance and likely to
increase further as a result of potential migration of the long
term arrears. In addition, while CE is still higher than it was
in May 2011for the class B and C notes, it has declined quarter
on quarter due to increasing defaults and subsequent drawings on
the reserve fund. As of October's report, the reserve fund stands
at EUR2.4 million which is well below the required EUR27 million.

The rating actions are as follows:

FTPYME Bancaja 3, FTA

  -- EUR34.8m Class A3(G) (ISIN ES0304501028): affirmed at
     'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

  -- EUR12.4m Class B (ISIN ES0304501036): affirmed at 'AAsf',
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR20.0m Class C (ISIN ES0304501044): affirmed at 'Bsf',
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR8.2m Class D (ISIN ES0304501051): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Estimate (RE) of 50%

FTPYME Bancaja 6, FTA

  -- EUR87.3m Class A2 (ISIN ES0339735013): affirmed at 'Asf' ';
     Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

  -- EUR70.3m Class A3(G) (ISIN ES0339735021): affirmed at 'AA-
     sf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR47.5m Class B (ISIN ES0339735039): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned RE of 50%

  -- EUR22.5m Class C (ISIN ES0339735047): affirmed at 'CCsf';
     assign RE of 30%

  -- EUR27.0m Class D (ISIN ES0339735054): affirmed at 'Csf';
     assigned RE of 0%

PRIVATE MEDIA: Posts EUR1.3-Mil. Net Loss in 2011 Third Quarter
Private Media Group, Inc., filed its quarterly report on Form
10-Q, reporting a net loss of EUR1.3 million on net sales of
EUR4.8 million for the three months ended Sept. 30, 2011,
compared with a net loss of $2.6 million on net sales of EUR5.9
million for the same period of 2010.

The Company reported a net loss of EUR3.4 million on net sales of
EUR14.8 million for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2011,
compared with a net loss of EUR3.7 million on net sales of
EUR18.3 million for the same period last year.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2011, showed
EUR34.0 million in total assets, EUR13.6 million in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of EUR20.4 million.

As reported in the TCR on June 8, 2011, BDO Auditores, S.L., in
Barcelona, Spain, expressed substantial doubt about Private Media
Group's ability to continue as a going concern, following the
Company's 2010 results.  The independent auditors noted that the
Company has not yet reestablished profitable operations, has
suffered recurring losses from operations over the past years,
and has a working capital deficit.

A copy of the Form 10-Q is available for free at:


Based in Barcelona, Spain, Private Media Group, Inc. (NASDAQ:
PRVT) -- was incorporated in the State of
Nevada.  The Company provides adult media content for a wide
range of media platforms.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Reported by Administrator for Incurring New Debt
According to Dow Jones Newswires' Christina Zander, a Swedish
court said Friday that the administrator of Saab Automobile AB's
restructuring process has reported the troubled car maker for
incurring new debt, which isn't allowed for companies under court
protection from creditors.

The administrator, Guy Lofalk, said he was informed by the
company on Dec. 8 that it was SEK30 million (EUR3.3 million) in
new debt, Dow Jones relates.

Saab Automobile, owned by Swedish Automobile NV has been
operating under creditor protection since September while trying
to restructure its operations, but the administrator Wednesday
applied to the district court for the restructuring process to
end due to lack of funds, Dow Jones discloses.

The company now has until Dec. 15 to come in with a reply to the
administrators report as well as to submit fresh rescue plans
before the court decides whether to terminate the restructuring,
Dow Jones notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 9,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Saab Automobile Chief Executive
Officer Victor Muller said that the company is in discussions
with Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile and a Chinese bank to
secure loans that it needs in a "very few days" to avert
bankruptcy.  Mr. Muller said Saab needs to borrow about EUR600
million (US$803 million) and was talking to Youngman
representatives in Stockholm on Wednesday, Bloomberg disclosed.
Mr. Muller, as cited by Bloomberg, said that unlike Saab's
earlier agreements with Youngman, this deal wouldn't involve the
Chinese manufacturer taking a stake in Saab, which would allow
the transaction to proceed without the approval of former owner
General Motors Co.  GM, which licenses technology to Saab, has
disapproved of previous proposals in which Youngman would take
ownership, Bloomberg noted.  Pang Da agreed in October to buy a
40% stake in Saab, and that deal collapsed when GM objected,
Bloomberg recounted.  Bloomberg noted that Mr. Muller said the
Vaenersborg District Court in southwestern Sweden is likely to
rule this week on the application by the administrator to end
Saab's court-administered reorganization.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BARRATTS PRICELESS: In Administration; 3,840 Jobs at Risk
BBC News reports that Barratts Priceless Group has been placed
into administration again, placing the jobs of 3,840 people at

"Barratts and Priceless Shoes have faced a downturn in trading as
a result of the difficult economic conditions," BBC quotes
administrators Deloitte as saying.

The previous administration of Barratts resulted in 220 of its
380 stores being closed, BBC notes.

The firm is one of several High Street names that have been hit
hard by weak demand over the past couple of years, BBC discloses.

Barratts Priceless Group is a bradford-based high street shoe
firm.  The company has 191 stores, under the Barratts and
Priceless Shoes names, in the UK.  It also operates 371
concessions in department stores around the country.

CITY GREENWICH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on GBP165-Mil. Bonds
Fitch Ratings has affirmed City Greenwich Lewisham Rail Link
plc's (CGLR) GBP165 million senior secured bonds due 2020 at
'BB+' with a Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects that CGRL's performance over the past
year has been in line with Fitch's expectations.  The key rating
factors are i) volume-linked patronage; ii) the transaction's
structural features; and iii) the capacity of the project to meet
debt service.  Fitch has also based the rating on cash flow
forecasts and ratio analysis, which support both the affirmation
and the Stable Outlook.

The project's remuneration changed from availability payments to
a volume-linked usage fee in January 2010.  Patronage levels that
were below previous forecasts resulted in a debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) -- excluding project's cash balances -- below or
close to breakeven levels. The robust patronage growth over the
past three years (up year-on-year by 3.2% in 2009, 4.9% in 2010
and 5.2% in the first nine months of 2011), together with the
current high level of RPI (to which the usage fee is linked),
have resulted in performance improving.  The DSCR (ex-cash) as at
the end of June 2011 stood at 0.95x, slightly higher than the
forecasted 0.90x.  The project met scheduled debt service by
drawing c.GBP1.0 million from its healthy cash position (c.
GBP17.4 million of previously locked-up cash).  The latest
financial forecast as of June 2011 indicated a minimum DSCR of
1.05x for the December 2011 payment date.

Strict project cost control, continued above trend inflation and
the expected boost to the patronage from the 2012 London Olympic
Games should help boost the project's position over the short
term, although the longer-term trend remains unclear for the
latter two factors.  Under the current projections, the cash
lock-up ratio, set at a DSCR level of 1.2x (ex-cash) is forecast
to be satisfied during 2012, enabling sponsors to release a
substantial sum of trapped cash.  This might prove detrimental to
the transaction if patronage after the Olympics is challenged by
difficult economic environment and the patronage forecast proves
to be less robust than expected.

Positively, performance deductions, still a factor affecting cash
flows, remain negligible and the average forecast DSCR (ex-cash)
is at a healthy 1.86x.  The average DSCR ratio shows an
improvement of c.20 bps from last year's forecast due to current
higher than expected inflation, reduced insurance and staff
costs, and a decrease in corporation tax assumptions in line with
the government's 2011 Budget announcement to cut corporation tax.
The forecast average DSCR also benefits from a reduction in
scheduled debt service after 2016.

Fitch notes that some of the transaction's structural features
are relatively weak, including a six-month interest-only debt
service reserve account, the lack of a maintenance reserve
account and the fact that the equity has been substantially paid

The Stable Outlook reflects the expected continued improvement in
the project's cash flows and the return of cover ratios to more
solid levels above the lock-up trigger over the short to medium

CGLR holds a 24-and-half-year concession until March 2021, under
a government private finance initiative, to build and maintain a
portion of the Docklands Light Railway network (Lewisham
Extension), serving the Greenwich and Canary Wharf areas.

MACASKILL HAULAGE: In Provisional Liquidation; 44 Jobs Affected
The Press and Journal reports that MacAskill Haulage has gone
into provisional liquidation with the loss of 44 jobs.

KPMG was called in to wind up the firm at the request of owner
Derick Murray, the Press and Journal discloses.

Blair Nimmo and Tony Friar have been appointed joint provisional
liquidators, the Press and Journal relates.

Stornoway-based MacAskill Haulage is the largest haulage firm in
the Western Isles.

MEDIA SQUARE: Bought Out of Administration by Management
The Scotsman reports that Media Square was acquired in a
management buy-out on Thursday.

The move came just hours after shares were suspended and
administrators were appointed to the firm whose bankers had
turned down a request for extra funding, the Scotsman relates.

The group has been acquired by MSQ Partners, an employee-owned
company which will be led by former Johnston Press chairman
Roger Parry and chief executive Peter Reid who held the same
posts at Media Square, the Scotsman discloses.

"The debt burden of Media Square was holding back the businesses
and as part of the transaction a much more appropriate and
sustainable financial structure has been implemented," the
Scotsman quotes Mr. Reid as saying.

Earlier this month, Media Square had warned it was at risk of
breaching covenants on GBP25.8 million of borrowings unless it
received extra financing, the Scotsman recounts.

The company, as cited by the Scotsman, said it needed the short-
term funds as it entered its "seasonal peak in working capital

Its financial position had been exacerbated by a bad debt after
the collapse of US brokerage firm MF Global which was a client,
the Scotsman notes.

Media Square is the Aim-quoted marketing services company behind
PR firm Smarts.  It is the UK's fifth largest quoted marketing

WELLINGTON PUB: Fitch Cuts Rating on GBP35.7-Mil. Notes to 'B'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Wellington Pub Company plc's fixed
rate notes, as follows:

  -- GBP132.5m class A fixed-rate notes due 2029: downgraded to
     'BB' from 'A-'; Negative Outlook

  -- GBP35.7m class B fixed-rate notes due 2029: downgraded to
     'B' from 'BBB-'; Negative Outlook

The downgrades are mainly driven by changes to the financial
metrics applied in Fitch's rating criteria.  These changes are
compounded by further declines in business performance, limited
scope for operational change and structural weaknesses.  The
Negative Outlook reflects the agency's view that Wellington's
performance remains challenged by macro-economic factors such as
the uncertainty about the jobs' market, the ongoing change in
consumer behavior especially affecting wet-led pubs (more than
80% of the portfolio), further exposure to alcohol taxation, the
continued strength of the off-trade, all coinciding with a large
number of leases coming up for renewal next year.

The agency's base case FCF DSCR (minimum of both the average and
median DSCRs to the notes' legal final maturity) under its
revised criteria for the class A and B notes is c.  1.25x and
1.0x, respectively.  The minimum FCF DSCR for class A in Fitch's
base case is c. 1.15x and expect to occur towards the end of the
transaction's life.

Fitch's FCF forecasts only give credit to operating cash flows.
The agency forecasts DSCRs will be constrained by modest declines
in EBITDA, mainly due to a portion of lease expiries that are
assumed not to be renewed and the resulting void costs as well as
rental value declines and repossessions.  FCF is forecast to
decline more than EBITDA as Fitch understands that Wellington is
expected to resume corporate income tax payments from 2012
onwards after group loss carry forwards have recently been
exhausted.  However, the transaction benefits from a flat,
annuity debt profile for class A and even a downward sloping
profile for
class B.

The lease renewal process remains an area of concern for Fitch as
a significant portion of the portfolio is due for renewal over
the next three years - almost 15% of all leases are set to expire
by 2012.  Wellington continues to experience a shortage of
experienced and financially strong tenants looking to enter
substantive agreements for residential pubs, and as a result,
around 102 pubs are currently not on long leaseholds, of which 52
are vacant.  During the past four quarters, 38 properties have
been repossessed.  More are expected in the next few quarters,
partly due to expiring leases but also rising rental arrears
deemed non-recoverable.  About one-third of the portfolio is
currently in arrears with its rental payments by more than 180
days.  If a pub becomes vacant it takes on average 10 months to
find a replacement tenant, although some pubs have remained
closed for much longer.  Consequently the closed house costs
(e.g. security, legal, utilities, business rates, etc.) have
remained high.

Overall operating expenses have stabilized over the past four
quarters (reduced by 1.2%) after they rose by almost 24% during
the previous 12 months. This is mainly due to the number of pubs
not on substantive agreements stabilizing (albeit at a high
level) -- 102 pubs this year (as per November 2011) vs. 100 pubs
last year, the sale of four vacant pubs during the year and the
fact that Wellington managed to negotiate the controllable closed
house costs on the remaining estate slightly down (e.g. security
costs). TTM rental income dropped by 4.5% compared to the same
period last year (vs. a similar decline of 4.4% the year before)
whereas TTM EBITDA fell by 5.6% -- significantly less than
previously (decline of 14.9% the year before).  However, there is
a risk that if the 50 pubs on temporary agreements closed (or a
proportion of them) and a larger portion of the long leasehold
pubs expiring in 2012 did not extend/renew, operating costs would
increase and EBITDA would be further pressured.

Another area of concern is the state of repair of the portfolio.
All substantive agreements are on full repairing and insuring
(FRI) leases, placing the obligation to maintain the properties
on the tenant.  However, with tenants struggling to pay their
rent (as indicated by the high delinquencies) the asset manager
estimates that about 80% of the portfolio is suffering from some
degree of deferred maintenance.  Wellington tends to spend
comparatively small amounts of capex on currently vacant

Wellington is a securitization of rental income from 811 free-of-
tie pubs predominantly located in residential areas mainly in the
south-east of the UK. As the landlord only receives a dry rent,
there is limited visibility of the trading performance of the
pubs.  Consequently, Wellington is less able to estimate the
affordability of the tenants' rental payment and has no influence
in the publicans' offering (e.g. encouraging stronger focus on
food, etc.).  Also, the income volatility over the past years has
shown that the income earned from dry rent is not necessarily
more stable than the income of tied estates or even managed
houses, especially in a severe downturn.

Unlike traditional whole business securitizations (WBS) featuring
an issuer-borrower loan structure, the transaction's pubs are
directly owned by the bond issuer.  The operational risk is
mitigated to some extent by Wellington merely being a property
holding company with the actual management of the estate
outsourced to Criterion Asset Management Limited.  However, in
the agency's view, the transaction's risk profile is still
negatively impacted by the structure mainly due to a low
liquidity support (only a liquidity reserve account covering
around four months of debt service) and the lack of a financial
covenant which in other WBS transactions gives bondholders more
control by being able to appoint an administrative receiver well
ahead of a payment default.  As the liquidity reserve is not
tranched among the class A and B notes, it could potentially be
depleted by drawings to support the subordinated class B notes
with nothing left to support the class A notes if needed.  This
makes the class A notes more vulnerable than suggested by an
average or median DSCR but gives greater emphasis to minimum DSCR

While the September 2011 DSCR (based on quarterly EBITDA) was
reported as 1.18x, the cash release income cover test (set at
1.25x) has not been breached due to previous surplus amounts
being retained on the transaction account.  The cash release
income cover test is based on actual cash held at the transaction
account and not just EBITDA. Fitch also understands that
operating expenses have been supported by continuously deferring
certain holding company fees payable by Wellington.  However, as
the accrued amount is due to be paid upon demand, cash
accumulated on the transaction account could be released if the
deferred holding company fees were called upon.

Fitch used its UK whole business securitization criteria to
review the transaction's structure, financial data and cash flow
projections and to stress-test each of the rated instruments.


* EUROPE: Banks Need EUR114.7 Billion of Extra Capital, EBA Says
Philipp Halstrick and Edward Taylor at Reuters report that
Europe's banks must find EUR114.7 billion (GBP97.8 billion) of
extra capital, more than predicted two months ago, to make them
strong enough to withstand the euro zone debt crisis and restore
investor confidence.

According to Reuters, Europe's banking watchdog, said the capital
shortfall across 71 banks was almost 8% higher than the EUR106.4
billion (US$142 billion) estimated in October, telling banks in
Germany, Italy, Austria and Belgium to find more cash.

Banks will look to fill any shortfall through rights issues,
shrinking loans to customers, selling assets or cutting dividends
or pay for staff, Reuters says.  National governments may have to
bail out any lender unable to find the cash, Reuters notes.

Reuters relates that the European Banking Authority (EBA) said
German banks need to find EUR13.1 billion, more than double the
EUR5.2 billion estimated in October.

Spanish banks need to find an unchanged EUR26.2 billion,
including EUR15.3 billion at Santander and EUR6.3 billion at
BBVA, Reuters discloses.

Greek banks have been told they need an extra EUR30 billion of
capital, but this should be covered by an existing program of
aid, while EUR9 billion of the shortfall in Spain will be met by
debt that converts into equity, Reuters states.

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said he expected banks
to meet their commitments by mid-2012, according to Reuters.

In all, some 31 of the 71 banks tested need extra capital,
Reuters says.  The EBA, as cited by Reuters, said that they have
until January 20 to present their plans and need to fulfill the
capital requirements by end-June. Several banks have taken action
to improve capital since the end of September, Reuters notes.

The EBA's recapitalization plan is part of a three-pronged
approach that also deals with sovereign debt exposures and
improving access to funding, Reuters notes.  The aim is to
restore confidence without crimping lending in a fragile economy,
Reuters discloses.

The European Central Bank said on Thursday it would start
offering banks liquidity funding for 3 years for the first time
ever, to try to head off a credit crunch, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, the EBA said banks should have core Tier 1
capital of at least 9% of risk-weighted assets, which exceeds the
7% minimum world leaders have agreed to phase in from 2013.

Banks in France will need EUR7.3 billion, down from EUR8.8
billion in October and banks in Italy will need EUR15.4 billion
up from EUR14.8 billion, Reuters discloses.

Austrian banks need EUR3.9 billion up from EUR2.9 billion and
Belgian banks need EUR6.3 billion up from EUR4.1 billion, Reuters

British banks, as previously, do not need any extra capital,
Reuters notes.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week December 5 to December 9, 2011

Issuer                  Coupon     Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------     --------  --------     -----

BA CREDITANSTALT          5.470    8/28/2013      EUR      54.00
BAWAG                     5.400    2/12/2023      EUR      56.94
BAWAG                     5.430    2/26/2024      EUR      51.94
BAWAG                     5.310    2/12/2023      EUR      56.43
HAA-BANK INTL AG          5.270     4/7/2028      EUR      44.14
IMMOFINANZ                4.250     3/8/2018      EUR       3.42
KOMMUNALKREDIT            5.430    2/13/2024      EUR      54.25
KOMMUNALKREDIT            4.900    6/23/2031      EUR      42.88
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.750    4/30/2021      EUR      68.89
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.160    5/20/2025      EUR      68.42
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.810    7/29/2025      EUR      60.88
OESTER VOLKSBK            5.270     2/8/2027      EUR      39.80
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.170    7/29/2015      EUR      58.88
OESTER VOLKSBK            3.700     6/3/2025      EUR      74.67
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           4.500    9/28/2035      EUR      39.96
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.470    2/28/2028      EUR      50.83
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.500   12/29/2023      EUR      58.17
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.730   12/11/2023      EUR      59.89
RAIFFEISEN BK IN          6.625    5/18/2021      EUR      73.05

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000     6/1/2016      EUR      19.61
EURONAV SA                6.500    1/31/2015      USD      74.51
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750     5/1/2018      EUR      60.67
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750     5/1/2018      EUR      61.13
ONTEX IV                  9.000    4/15/2019      EUR      71.50
ONTEX IV                  9.000    4/15/2019      EUR      71.00

PETROL AD-SOFIA           8.375    1/26/2012      EUR      70.13

AVANGARDCO INVES         10.000   10/29/2015      USD      76.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    2/15/2017      EUR      65.81
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.500    8/25/2021      EUR      67.10
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000     6/9/2021      EUR      65.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    9/28/2017      EUR      64.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.350     6/9/2020      EUR      64.30
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.600    4/15/2017      EUR      69.35
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600    4/23/2018      EUR      64.08
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   10/23/2018      EUR      63.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600    2/26/2019      EUR      63.29
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100    4/20/2020      EUR      68.05
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.250     6/9/2015      EUR      71.64
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750    9/30/2015      EUR      69.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          3.750    11/1/2015      EUR      66.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750    12/2/2015      EUR      68.73
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     1/2/2016      EUR      69.45
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    3/30/2016      EUR      68.56
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     6/2/2016      EUR      67.94
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.000     6/9/2016      EUR      68.80
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    7/11/2016      EUR      67.57
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    10/9/2016      EUR      66.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.600   10/26/2016      EUR      73.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     1/4/2017      EUR      66.12
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500     4/2/2017      EUR      65.51
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.100    1/29/2018      EUR      66.32
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.625     2/3/2020      EUR      60.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100    6/24/2019      EUR      69.91
MARFIN POPULAR            4.350   11/20/2014      EUR      32.25
MARFIN POPULAR            4.375    9/21/2012      EUR      70.59
REP OF CYPRUS             4.750    2/25/2016      EUR      58.88
REP OF CYPRUS             4.375    7/15/2014      EUR      67.56

FIN-DANISH IND            4.910     7/6/2021      EUR      56.00
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR      45.90
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500     2/3/2016      TRY      72.88

MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   12/20/2018      ZAR      66.15
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/10/2021      NZD      64.62
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   12/21/2021      NZD      70.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    3/17/2025      CAD      62.87
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.250    6/28/2040      CAD      24.70
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR      74.18
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR      72.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   10/27/2016      ZAR      71.26
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   10/27/2016      TRY      70.67
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/17/2016      ZAR      72.70
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    12/6/2016      TRY      74.11
MUNI FINANCE PLC          1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR      67.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/16/2017      TRY      61.65
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR      60.57
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/21/2018      ZAR      61.37
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/21/2018      TRY      63.58
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR      49.73
TALVIVAARA                4.000   12/16/2015      EUR      67.39

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970     4/1/2015      EUR      10.92
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000     1/1/2015      EUR       2.34
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720     1/1/2015      EUR       4.49
ASSYSTEM                  4.000     1/1/2017      EUR      20.04
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500     1/1/2016      EUR      50.64
AXA SA                    5.250    4/16/2040      EUR      71.65
BNP PARIBAS               2.890    5/16/2036      JPY      59.37
BNP PARIBAS               5.210     3/3/2031      USD      74.86
BNP PARIBAS               4.850   11/26/2030      USD      71.74
CALYON                    6.000    6/18/2047      EUR       6.89
CALYON                    5.800   10/29/2029      USD      63.59
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500     1/1/2014      EUR      37.63
CAP GEMINI SOGET          1.000     1/1/2012      EUR      42.11
CEGEDIM SA                7.000    7/27/2015      EUR      69.33
CGG VERITAS               1.750     1/1/2016      EUR      26.20
CIE FIN FONCIER           3.250   12/30/2044      EUR      75.08
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110    11/1/2015      EUR      17.02
CLUB MEDITERRANE          5.000     6/8/2012      EUR      11.87
CMA CGM                   8.875    4/15/2019      EUR      39.25
CMA CGM                   8.500    4/15/2017      USD      40.50
CMA CGM                   8.875    4/15/2019      EUR      38.00
CMA CGM                   8.500    4/15/2017      USD      39.67
CNP ASSURANCES            6.875    9/30/2041      EUR      64.14
CNP ASSURANCES            5.250    5/16/2023      EUR      75.14
CNP ASSURANCES            6.000    9/14/2040      EUR      62.38
CRED AGRICOLE SA          3.900    4/19/2021      EUR      70.26
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.080   11/23/2030      USD      54.99
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.690   11/26/2030      USD      60.30
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.400    12/9/2030      USD      57.65
CREDIT AGRI CIB           6.000   12/23/2030      USD      60.38
CREDIT AGRI CIB           6.050    1/14/2031      USD      63.23
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.950    1/19/2031      USD      62.33
CREDIT AGRI CIB           6.150    2/11/2031      USD      63.78
CREDIT AGRI CIB           6.220    3/17/2031      USD      64.45
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.880     4/8/2031      USD      62.77
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.850    5/27/2031      USD      60.83
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.650    6/10/2031      USD      59.07
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.610    6/15/2031      USD      58.69
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.830    6/30/2031      USD      60.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB           4.910    11/3/2030      USD      54.68
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.850    6/30/2031      USD      60.78
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.450    11/9/2030      USD      58.24
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.350   10/29/2030      USD      57.43
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.300   10/22/2030      USD      57.14
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.250   10/18/2030      USD      56.67
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.300   10/12/2030      USD      54.92
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.300    10/7/2030      USD      57.09
CREDIT AGRI CIB           4.850    9/17/2030      USD      53.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.270     8/5/2030      USD      57.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB           5.680    3/22/2026      USD      71.50
CREDIT AGRICOLE           4.500   12/22/2019      EUR      67.60
CREDIT AGRICOLE           4.050   12/22/2020      EUR      71.83
CREDIT AGRICOLE           3.750   10/20/2020      EUR      70.70
CREDIT LOCAL FRA          3.750    5/26/2020      EUR      48.55
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.020    3/13/2017      EUR      68.06
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.110    9/18/2018      EUR      57.36
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.500    2/25/2020      EUR      52.77
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.550     4/2/2020      EUR      52.74
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          5.037     8/4/2020      EUR      53.82
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          3.400    3/26/2015      EUR      75.19
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          2.875    4/23/2030      CHF      69.24
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          1.000   12/23/2024      EUR      58.81
EURAZEO                   6.250    6/10/2014      EUR      54.43
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375    4/15/2018      EUR      51.72
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375    4/15/2018      EUR      52.75
FAURECIA                  4.500     1/1/2015      EUR      20.05
FONCIERE REGIONS          3.340     1/1/2017      EUR      71.17
GIE PSA TRESORER          6.000    9/19/2033      EUR      65.70
GROUPAMA SA               7.875   10/27/2039      EUR      43.65
INGENICO                  2.750     1/1/2017      EUR      42.63
ITALCEMENTI FIN           5.375    3/19/2020      EUR      73.79
IXIS CIB                  5.375   11/29/2027      EUR      70.87
IXIS CIB                  5.400     1/9/2033      EUR      64.58
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125    7/31/2014      EUR      17.62
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125    7/31/2015      EUR      16.36
NEXANS SA                 4.000     1/1/2016      EUR      57.50
NOVASEP HLDG              9.750   12/15/2016      USD      43.00
ORPEA                     3.875     1/1/2016      EUR      43.44
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875     6/1/2018      EUR      69.96
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875     6/1/2018      EUR      70.13
PEUGEOT SA                4.450     1/1/2016      EUR      23.32
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000    10/1/2015      EUR      68.96
PUBLICIS GROUPE           3.125    7/30/2014      EUR      36.58
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000    1/18/2018      EUR      49.00
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750     4/1/2020      EUR      20.72
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.900    3/10/2031      USD      64.28
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.860    4/26/2031      USD      64.09
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.920    3/17/2031      USD      64.43
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.910    3/16/2031      USD      64.34
SOCIETE GENERALE          6.010    3/15/2031      USD      65.26
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.940    3/14/2031      USD      64.63
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.860    3/11/2031      USD      63.91
SOITEC                    6.250     9/9/2014      EUR       7.58
TEM                       4.250     1/1/2015      EUR      50.97
THEOLIA                   2.700     1/1/2041      EUR       7.93

BAYERISCHE HYPO           5.000   12/21/2029      EUR      57.68
BAYERISCHE LNDBK          4.500     2/7/2019      EUR      63.28
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.270    1/15/2019      EUR      61.00
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.480     3/3/2026      EUR      74.59
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          3.970     9/4/2024      EUR      74.87
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.600    4/14/2023      EUR      56.63
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.640    1/30/2024      EUR      55.63
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.450    2/20/2023      EUR      56.13
COMMERZBANK AG            6.360    3/15/2022      EUR      58.45
COMMERZBANK AG            6.300    3/15/2022      EUR      58.30
COMMERZBANK AG            6.460    6/24/2022      EUR      58.20
COMMERZBANK AG            7.750    3/16/2021      EUR      69.89
COMMERZBANK AG            6.625    8/30/2019      GBP      72.37
COMMERZBANK AG            6.375    3/22/2019      EUR      68.01
COMMERZBANK AG            6.500    5/14/2018      EUR      71.06
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000   10/30/2017      EUR      67.88
COMMERZBANK AG            6.600    4/23/2018      EUR      71.88
COMMERZBANK AG            6.654     5/9/2018      EUR      72.10
COMMERZBANK AG            5.625   11/29/2017      EUR      69.29
COMMERZBANK AG            4.000   11/30/2017      EUR      20.06
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000    3/30/2018      EUR      19.19
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000    4/20/2018      EUR      19.20
DEUT GENOS-HYPBK          6.610    3/21/2022      EUR      74.24
DEUTSCHE BK SING          4.860    6/30/2031      USD      74.83
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          5.300   11/20/2023      EUR      54.00
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          6.050    9/27/2022      EUR      60.13
DRESDNER BANK AG          7.350    6/13/2028      EUR      51.92
DRESDNER BANK AG          7.160    8/14/2024      EUR      55.09
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.375     5/8/2018      EUR      68.75
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.635    6/18/2018      EUR      69.60
DRESDNER BANK AG          7.250    6/24/2019      EUR      70.66
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.000    2/25/2020      EUR      63.01
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.550    4/14/2020      EUR      65.14
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.290    5/31/2021      EUR      55.33
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.210    6/20/2022      EUR      56.99
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.180    2/28/2023      EUR      53.58
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.700    7/31/2023      EUR      50.90
ESCADA AG                 7.500     4/1/2012      EUR       8.92
EUROHYPO AG               5.560    8/18/2023      EUR      60.88
EUROHYPO AG               6.490    7/17/2017      EUR       3.63
EUROHYPO AG               3.830    9/21/2020      EUR      57.75
EUROHYPO AG               5.110     8/6/2018      EUR      72.25
GOTHAER ALLG VER          5.527    9/29/2026      EUR      68.55
HAPAG-LLOYD               9.750   10/15/2017      USD      69.13
HAPAG-LLOYD               9.750   10/15/2017      USD      69.13
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500    5/15/2018      EUR      65.38
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500    5/15/2018      EUR      65.20
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250    4/15/2018      EUR      61.20
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250    4/15/2018      EUR      61.63
HSH NORDBANK AG           4.375    2/14/2017      EUR      50.39
HVB REAL ESTATE           6.570    3/18/2022      EUR      70.91
L-BANK FOERDERBK          0.500    5/10/2027      CAD      50.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.250   10/20/2015      EUR      27.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.500    1/30/2034      EUR      70.28
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.800    2/23/2037      JPY      40.20
Q-CELLS                   6.750   10/21/2015      EUR       0.88
RHEINISCHE HYPBK          6.600    5/29/2022      EUR      69.75
SOLARWORLD AG             6.375    7/13/2016      EUR      54.95
SOLARWORLD AG             6.125    1/21/2017      EUR      53.95
STYROLUTION GRP           7.625    5/15/2016      EUR      72.25
STYROLUTION GRP           7.625    5/15/2016      EUR      71.27
TAG IMMO AG               6.500   12/10/2015      EUR       7.63
TUI AG                    2.750    3/24/2016      EUR      33.82
TUI AG                    5.500   11/17/2014      EUR      51.36

ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.851    9/19/2016      EUR      20.50
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.301    8/12/2014      EUR      21.86
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.057    3/26/2013      EUR      35.42
ATHENS URBAN TRN          5.008    7/18/2017      EUR      22.18
FAGE DAIRY IND            7.500    1/15/2015      EUR      73.38
FAGE DAIRY IND            7.500    1/15/2015      EUR      73.33
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.900    7/25/2025      EUR      22.70
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.300    7/25/2030      EUR      27.79
HELLENIC REPUB            4.590     4/8/2016      EUR      19.50
HELLENIC REPUB            2.125     7/5/2013      CHF      46.00
HELLENIC REPUB            6.140    4/14/2028      EUR      27.13
HELLENIC REPUB            4.625    6/25/2013      USD      33.25
HELLENIC REPUB            5.000    3/11/2019      EUR      30.00
HELLENIC REPUB            5.200    7/17/2034      EUR      25.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500   10/22/2019      EUR      20.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.000    7/19/2019      EUR      20.46
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    7/20/2018      EUR      19.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.590     4/3/2018      EUR      21.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300    7/20/2017      EUR      20.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900    4/20/2017      EUR      20.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.225     3/1/2017      EUR      23.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.020    9/13/2016      EUR      22.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.600    7/20/2016      EUR      20.47
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.000    8/20/2013      EUR      24.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.702    9/30/2015      EUR      22.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700   11/10/2015      EUR      24.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500    1/11/2014      EUR      22.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.520    9/30/2013      EUR      25.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700    7/20/2015      EUR      20.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.100    8/20/2015      EUR      22.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.500    8/20/2014      EUR      21.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.113    9/30/2014      EUR      24.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.985    7/25/2014      EUR      23.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    5/20/2014      EUR      22.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250    5/18/2012      EUR      34.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500     7/1/2014      EUR      26.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    9/20/2040      EUR      19.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    9/20/2037      EUR      19.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300    3/20/2012      EUR      40.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.700    3/20/2024      EUR      19.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900   10/22/2022      EUR      20.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.250    6/19/2020      EUR      20.53
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.300    3/20/2026      EUR      19.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.427    7/31/2013      EUR      32.29
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250    6/20/2012      EUR      60.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI          1.000    6/30/2012      EUR      58.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.100    8/20/2012      EUR      31.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.506    3/31/2013      EUR      37.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600    5/20/2013      EUR      26.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI          7.500    5/20/2013      EUR      32.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.900     7/3/2013      EUR      29.88
NATL BK GREECE            3.875    10/7/2016      EUR      56.57

CALYON FIN GUER           6.000     9/4/2029      USD      64.42
CREDIT AGRICOLE           5.600    2/25/2030      USD      61.08

OTP BANK                  5.270    9/19/2016      EUR      73.78
REP OF HUNGARY            4.000    5/20/2016      CHF      70.98
REP OF HUNGARY            3.875    2/24/2020      EUR      73.49

AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.580    4/28/2028      EUR      48.13
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000     3/1/2030      EUR      43.03
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000    2/12/2030      EUR      43.06
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          4.875    6/29/2017      EUR      74.34
ALLIED IRISH BKS          5.625   11/12/2014      EUR      72.75
ALLIED IRISH BKS          4.000    3/19/2015      EUR      70.62
ALLIED IRISH BKS         12.500    6/25/2035      GBP      38.38
ANGLO IRISH BANK          4.000    4/15/2015      EUR      71.94
BANESTO FINANC            5.000    3/23/2030      EUR      63.73
BANESTO FINANC            5.000     6/1/2024      EUR      71.77
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000    2/12/2020      EUR      50.25
BANK OF IRELAND           3.780     4/1/2015      EUR      74.44
BANK OF IRELAND           3.585    4/21/2015      EUR      73.38
BANK OF IRELAND           4.473   11/30/2016      EUR      56.63
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000    2/12/2020      GBP      37.38
BANK OF IRELAND           5.600    9/18/2023      EUR      38.88
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.360   10/12/2029      EUR      43.18
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.760     9/7/2029      EUR      45.85
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.450     3/1/2030      EUR      43.36
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.400    11/6/2029      EUR      43.42
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125    3/16/2037      USD      70.25
DEPFA ACS BANK            3.250    7/31/2031      CHF      67.62
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125    3/16/2037      USD      70.62
DEPFA ACS BANK            3.000   12/17/2024      CHF      74.51
DEPFA ACS BANK            3.278    7/17/2026      CHF      74.54
DEPFA ACS BANK            0.500     3/3/2025      CAD      50.96
DEPFA ACS BANK            4.900    8/24/2035      CAD      70.36
EBS BLDG SOCIETY          4.000    2/25/2015      EUR      71.91
IRISH LIFE PERM           4.000    3/10/2015      EUR      72.52
UT2 FUNDING PLC           5.321    6/30/2016      EUR      52.98

BANCA 121 SPA             6.370   12/21/2026      EUR      67.22
BANCA MARCHE              5.500    9/16/2030      EUR      58.69
BANCA MARCHE              5.125    5/14/2024      ITL      65.46
BANCA MARCHE              4.360     1/4/2022      ITL      67.33
BANCA MARCHE              4.700    8/16/2021      EUR      69.09
BANCA MARCHE              4.000    5/26/2021      EUR      64.74
BANCA MARCHE              4.000    1/10/2021      EUR      65.95
BANCA MARCHE              3.600   11/12/2020      EUR      64.45
BANCA MARCHE              5.400    9/16/2020      EUR      74.87
BANCA MARCHE              3.700     9/1/2020      EUR      65.73
BANCA MARCHE              3.900    8/17/2020      EUR      66.86
BANCA MARCHE              4.000     7/9/2020      EUR      67.74
BANCA MARCHE              4.300     1/4/2020      EUR      70.77
BANCA MARCHE              3.200    9/27/2017      EUR      72.19
BANCA MARCHE              3.200    5/10/2017      EUR      74.11
BANCA MARCHE              3.200    6/21/2017      EUR      73.50
BANCA NAZ LAVORO          4.652     2/3/2023      EUR      68.41
BANCA POP EMILIA          4.000    4/12/2020      EUR      68.60
BANCA POP ETRURI          4.600    5/12/2015      EUR      74.38
BANCA POP ETRURI          4.000   12/31/2017      EUR      62.38
BANCA POP ETRURI          5.000    3/31/2021      EUR      58.00
BANCA POP ETRURI          4.150    2/16/2018      EUR      62.75
BANCA POP ETRURI          4.250     8/1/2016      EUR      67.75
BANCA POP ETRURI          4.250    5/16/2016      EUR      68.75
BANCA POP LODI            3.750    2/28/2018      EUR      69.14
BANCA POP LODI            3.625    3/31/2017      EUR      73.15
BANCA POP LODI            5.250     4/3/2029      EUR      49.46
BANCA POP MILANO          4.500    4/18/2018      EUR      64.38
BANCA POP MILANO          7.125     3/1/2021      EUR      68.88
BANCA POP VICENT          4.250    9/16/2016      EUR      74.42
BANCA POP VICENT          5.290    6/28/2017      EUR      74.00
BANCA POP VICENT          5.000    3/25/2021      EUR      58.61
BANCA POP VICENT          5.000    5/30/2021      EUR      57.93
BANCA POP VICENT          5.000    6/30/2021      EUR      57.32
BANCA POP VICENT          4.970    4/20/2027      EUR      42.73
BANCA POP VICENT          5.000    3/31/2021      EUR      58.57
BANCA POP VICENT          4.000    5/16/2016      EUR      74.58
BANCA POP VICENT          3.750    4/29/2016      EUR      74.19
BANCA POP VICENT          4.000    4/18/2016      EUR      75.18
BANCA POP VICENT          4.000    6/15/2016      EUR      74.19
BANCA SELLA               3.600    11/5/2019      EUR      68.27
BANCA SELLA               5.070    3/15/2021      EUR      73.46
BANCO POPOLARE            3.500    1/31/2016      EUR      74.15
BANCO POPOLARE            6.375    5/31/2021      EUR      63.48
BANCO POPOLARE            6.000    11/5/2020      EUR      66.67
BANCO POPOLARE            2.900   11/30/2016      EUR      72.39
BANCO POPOLARE            3.000   10/29/2016      EUR      73.28
BANCO POPOLARE            4.750    4/28/2017      EUR      74.21
BP CIVIDALE               3.180    5/19/2020      EUR      64.44
BTPS                      4.000     2/1/2037      EUR      68.33
BTPS I/L                  2.600    9/15/2023      EUR      70.20
BTPS I/L                  3.100    9/15/2026      EUR      69.23
BTPS I/L                  2.100    9/15/2021      EUR      71.09
BTPS I/L                  2.350    9/15/2035      EUR      61.11
BTPS I/L                  2.550    9/15/2041      EUR      62.34
CASSA RISP CENTO          4.500    9/12/2015      EUR      71.88
CASSA RISP CESEN          3.400     9/7/2017      EUR      74.13
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.500    11/2/2020      EUR      56.38
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.000    1/18/2015      EUR      72.13
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.000    4/15/2015      EUR      73.50
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.000     8/5/2015      EUR      71.63
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.000     9/2/2015      EUR      71.38
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.500     3/5/2016      EUR      67.13
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.000    11/2/2016      EUR      66.13
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.575     2/2/2017      EUR      67.00
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.400    9/17/2017      EUR      61.25
CIR SPA                   5.750   12/16/2024      EUR      68.75
COMUNE DI MILANO          4.019    6/29/2035      EUR      75.33
FINMECCANICA SPA          4.875    3/24/2025      EUR      64.59
INTESA SANPAOLO           4.000     9/2/2022      EUR      73.68
INTESA SANPAOLO           2.882    4/20/2020      EUR      69.46
MEDIOBANCA                4.190    6/20/2020      EUR      73.96
MEDIOBANCA                2.200    12/7/2017      EUR      72.94
MONTE DEI PASCHI          3.750    8/30/2020      EUR      66.15
MONTE DEI PASCHI          5.000    4/21/2020      EUR      73.61
MONTE DEI PASCHI          5.750    9/30/2016      GBP      66.49
REGION OF LOMBAR          5.804   10/25/2032      USD      84.62
REP OF ITALY              2.000    9/15/2062      EUR      46.43
REP OF ITALY              4.850    6/11/2060      EUR      66.55
REP OF ITALY              2.200    9/15/2058      EUR      51.21
REP OF ITALY              1.850    9/15/2057      EUR      44.17
REP OF ITALY              2.870    5/19/2036      JPY      44.03
REP OF ITALY              5.200    7/31/2034      EUR      73.00
REP OF ITALY              4.490     4/5/2027      EUR      69.81
ROMULUS FINANCE           5.441    2/20/2023      GBP      63.53
SANPAOLO IMI              3.750     3/2/2020      EUR      71.14
SANPAOLO IMI              4.375    6/26/2018      EUR      72.99
SEAT PAGINE              10.500    1/31/2017      EUR      57.25
SEAT PAGINE              10.500    1/31/2017      EUR      56.93
SEAT PAGINE              10.500    1/31/2017      EUR      57.20
SEAT PAGINE              10.500    1/31/2017      EUR      57.00
TELECOM ITALIA            5.250    3/17/2055      EUR      64.03
UBI BANCA SPCA            4.600    7/28/2018      EUR      69.17
UNICREDIT SPA             6.040     3/3/2023      EUR      67.97
UNICREDIT SPA             4.350    8/25/2022      EUR      67.66
UNICREDIT SPA             5.050    4/25/2022      EUR      63.80
UNICREDIT SPA             5.000    4/21/2021      EUR      66.01
UNICREDIT SPA             5.160    6/14/2020      EUR      68.93
UNICREDIT SPA             4.500    9/22/2019      EUR      71.86
UNICREDIT SPA             5.370    6/19/2019      EUR      72.56
UNICREDIT SPA             6.700     6/5/2018      EUR      69.16
UNICREDITO ITALI          6.375   10/16/2018      GBP      71.07
UNICREDITO ITALI          3.950     2/1/2016      EUR      71.81
UNICREDITO ITALI          5.000     2/1/2016      GBP      62.58
UNICREDITO ITALI          4.750    4/12/2027      EUR      58.74
UNIPOL ASSICURAZ          5.660    7/28/2023      EUR      55.30
VENETO BANCA              3.500    5/16/2016      EUR      72.44
VENETO BANCA              5.000    4/29/2016      EUR      74.51
VENETO BANCA              2.250   11/22/2015      EUR      73.78
VENETO BANCA              5.000    5/16/2016      EUR      74.14
VENETO BANCA              4.500    5/25/2016      EUR      73.63

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250     4/1/2014      EUR      22.77
CONTROLINVESTE            3.000    1/28/2015      EUR      64.26
ESFG INTERNATION          6.875   10/21/2019      EUR      52.92
FINMECCANICA FIN          5.250    1/21/2022      EUR      67.56
TELECOM IT CAP            6.375   11/15/2033      USD      75.05
TELECOM IT CAP            6.000    9/30/2034      USD      76.75
TELECOM IT CAP            6.375   11/15/2033      USD      75.05
UBI BANCA INT             8.750   10/29/2012      EUR      67.86

AI FINANCE B.V.          10.875    7/15/2012      USD      74.50
APP INTL FINANCE         11.750    10/1/2005      USD       0.00
ASTANA FINANCE            9.000   11/16/2011      USD       8.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    4/27/2016      TRY      71.54
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    5/25/2016      TRY      71.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    9/15/2016      TRY      69.55
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500     3/3/2021      NZD      65.75
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/29/2021      NZD      65.49
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/29/2021      USD      73.73
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR      43.80
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR      43.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    2/24/2025      CAD      59.85
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    6/22/2016      TRY      70.74
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/17/2016      TRY      72.13
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500    5/15/2014      USD      41.25
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500    5/15/2014      USD      40.13
BRIT INSURANCE            6.625    12/9/2030      GBP      53.96
CEMEX FIN EUROPE          4.750     3/5/2014      EUR      73.36
DEXIA FUNDING             5.875     2/9/2017      GBP      56.92
EDP FINANCE BV            4.125    6/29/2020      EUR      74.00
ELEC DE CAR FIN           8.500    4/10/2018      USD      58.75
FINANCE & CREDIT         10.500    1/25/2014      USD      59.98
FRIESLAND BANK            4.210   12/29/2025      EUR      55.49
FRIESLAND BANK            5.320    2/26/2024      EUR      69.90
INDAH KIAT INTL          12.500    6/15/2006      USD       0.01
ING BANK NV               4.200   12/19/2035      EUR      61.75
ING BANK NV               5.380   10/28/2031      USD      75.07
ING BANK NV               5.230    9/30/2031      USD      73.59
KBC IFIMA NV              4.000    9/20/2020      EUR      71.53
KBC IFIMA NV              4.600    9/13/2021      EUR      72.55
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.870    10/8/2013      USD      33.00
MAGYAR TELECOM            9.500   12/15/2016      EUR      69.00
MAGYAR TELECOM            9.500   12/15/2016      EUR      69.34
MARFRIG HLDG EUR          8.375     5/9/2018      USD      69.99
MARFRIG HLDG EUR          8.375     5/9/2018      USD      71.03
NATL INVESTER BK         25.983     5/7/2029      EUR      13.02
NED WATERSCHAPBK          0.500    3/11/2025      CAD      60.52
NIB CAPITAL BANK          4.510   12/16/2035      EUR      56.21
POLYSINDO FIN             9.375    7/30/2007      USD       0.01
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          5.000    11/4/2019      EUR      73.09
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          4.500    6/16/2025      EUR      62.86
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375    2/28/2012      EUR      42.99
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750    5/26/2014      EUR      21.38
RABOBANK                  0.500   11/26/2021      ZAR      50.12
RABOBANK                  0.500   10/27/2016      ZAR      71.37
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          5.000    2/27/2037      EUR      60.35
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          2.910    6/21/2036      JPY      62.04
SIDETUR FINANCE          10.000    4/20/2016      USD      79.00
SNS BANK                  5.215    12/3/2027      EUR      54.59
SNS BANK                  4.580    3/20/2026      EUR      51.64
SNS BANK                  5.250    4/11/2023      EUR      64.23
SNS BANK                  5.300    1/27/2023      EUR      65.38
SNS BANK                  4.650   10/19/2021      EUR      65.23
SNS BANK                  6.250   10/26/2020      EUR      62.47
SNS BANK                  6.625    5/14/2018      EUR      74.69
SRLEV NV                  9.000    4/15/2041      EUR      63.59
TJIWI KIMIA FIN          13.250     8/1/2001      USD       0.01

EKSPORTFINANS             2.250    2/11/2021      CHF      74.08
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR      74.14
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR      60.62
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR      71.88
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/29/2016      TRY      69.30
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR      73.04
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR      74.55
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR      72.06
NORSKE SKOGIND            6.125   10/15/2015      USD      55.25
NORSKE SKOGIND           11.750    6/15/2016      EUR      63.85
NORSKE SKOGIND           11.750    6/15/2016      EUR      64.13
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.000    6/26/2017      EUR      53.26
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125   10/15/2033      USD      43.25
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125   10/15/2033      USD      42.90
NORSKE SKOGIND            6.125   10/15/2015      USD      55.25
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500     6/4/2014      EUR      53.37
SPAREBANKEN RGLD          4.170    12/7/2035      EUR      71.47


POLAND GOVT BOND          5.000    4/25/2037      PLN      70.23
REP OF POLAND             2.648    3/29/2034      JPY      74.16
REP OF POLAND             4.250    7/20/2055      EUR      73.18

BANCO BPI                 1.000    4/10/2014      EUR      74.38
BANCO COM PORTUG          3.750    10/8/2016      EUR      65.77
BANCO COM PORTUG          4.750    6/22/2017      EUR      66.17
BANCO COM PORTUG          5.625    4/23/2014      EUR      69.01
BANCO ESPIRITO            3.875    1/21/2015      EUR      69.23
BANCO ESPIRITO            3.375    2/17/2015      EUR      75.85
BANCO ESPIRITO            6.160    7/23/2015      EUR      71.00
BANCO ESPIRITO            6.875    7/15/2016      EUR      68.75
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600    9/15/2016      EUR      68.34
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600    1/26/2017      EUR      66.24
BRISA                     4.500    12/5/2016      EUR      68.73
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.380    10/1/2038      EUR      48.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.400    10/8/2019      EUR      73.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.570    8/12/2016      EUR      74.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.500   11/13/2017      EUR      70.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          3.875    12/6/2016      EUR      68.66
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.750    2/14/2016      EUR      74.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.980     3/3/2028      EUR      52.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.250    1/27/2020      EUR      65.31
COMBOIOS DE PORT          4.170   10/16/2019      EUR      49.31
METRO DE LISBOA           4.799    12/7/2027      EUR      66.09
METRO DE LISBOA           4.061    12/4/2026      EUR      54.94
METRO DE LISBOA           7.300   12/23/2025      EUR      72.90
METRO DE LISBOA           5.750     2/4/2019      EUR      60.18
MONTEPIO GERAL            5.000     2/8/2017      EUR      61.50
PARPUBLICA                5.250    9/28/2017      EUR      69.51
PARPUBLICA                4.191   10/15/2014      EUR      65.88
PARPUBLICA                3.567    9/22/2020      EUR      39.88
PARPUBLICA                3.500     7/8/2013      EUR      70.00
PARPUBLICA                4.200   11/16/2026      EUR      36.88
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500    3/25/2015      USD      70.24
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500    3/25/2015      USD      70.24
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.100    4/15/2037      EUR      48.28
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.200   10/15/2016      EUR      62.06
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.950   10/25/2023      EUR      49.98
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.850    4/15/2021      EUR      52.02
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.800    6/15/2020      EUR      53.12
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.750    6/14/2019      EUR      54.63
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.450    6/15/2018      EUR      55.56
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.350   10/16/2017      EUR      57.40
PORTUGUESE OT'S           6.400    2/15/2016      EUR      70.97
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.350   10/15/2015      EUR      68.92
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.600   10/15/2014      EUR      71.33
REFER                     5.875    2/18/2019      EUR      54.13
REFER                     4.047   11/16/2026      EUR      51.89
REFER                     4.250   12/13/2021      EUR      52.38
REFER                     4.000    3/16/2015      EUR      55.38
REFER                     4.675   10/16/2024      EUR      52.88

ARIZK                     3.000   12/20/2030      RUB      50.40
DVTG-FINANS              17.000    8/29/2013      RUB      55.55
DVTG-FINANS               7.750    7/18/2013      RUB      20.29
IART                      8.500     8/4/2013      RUB       1.00
MIRAX                    17.000    9/17/2012      RUB      30.09
MOSMART FINANS            0.010    4/12/2012      RUB       1.81
NOK                      12.500    8/26/2014      RUB       5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA          1.000   12/17/2012      RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE            9.000    6/12/2012      RUB      65.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000    4/23/2015      RUB      63.01
RBC OJSC                  7.000    4/23/2015      RUB      65.55
RBC OJSC                  3.270    4/19/2018      RUB      38.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.250   10/25/2023      EUR      64.26
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750    6/30/2025      EUR      53.79
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.750    5/25/2027      EUR      61.34
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.000    3/31/2020      EUR      72.95
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.000    3/24/2021      EUR      70.29
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750   12/14/2022      EUR      62.19
BANCAJA                   1.500    5/22/2018      EUR      61.75
BANCAJA EMI SA            2.755    5/11/2037      JPY      74.72
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          6.025     3/3/2033      EUR      58.74
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          6.200     7/4/2023      EUR      70.38
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          4.500    2/16/2022      EUR      68.86
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          4.375   10/20/2019      EUR      72.90
BANCO POP ESPAN           5.702   12/22/2019      EUR      69.04
BANKINTER SA              6.000   12/18/2028      EUR      70.98
BBVA SUB CAP UNI          2.750   10/22/2035      JPY      43.85
CAIXA TERRASSA            4.700     8/9/2021      EUR      40.61
CAJA CASTIL-MAN           1.500    6/23/2021      EUR      56.14
CAJA MADRID               4.000     2/3/2025      EUR      72.22
CAJA MADRID               5.020    2/26/2038      EUR      72.53
CAJA MADRID               4.125    3/24/2036      EUR      64.05
CEDULAS TDA 5             4.125   11/29/2019      EUR      73.72
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          3.875    5/23/2025      EUR      56.15
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          4.250    4/10/2031      EUR      49.76
CEDULAS TDA A-4           4.125    4/10/2021      EUR      71.39
CEDULAS TDA A-5           4.250    3/28/2027      EUR      55.45
CEMEX ESPANA LUX          8.875    5/12/2017      EUR      71.25
CEMEX ESPANA LUX          9.250    5/12/2020      USD      72.50
CEMEX ESPANA LUX          8.875    5/12/2017      EUR      70.17
CEMEX ESPANA LUX          9.250    5/12/2020      USD      73.63
COMUN AUTO CANAR          3.900   11/30/2035      EUR      65.85
COMUN AUTO CANAR          4.200   10/25/2036      EUR      69.15
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          4.063   11/23/2035      EUR      68.83
COMUNIDAD MADRID          4.300    9/15/2026      EUR      74.48
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.950    2/11/2020      EUR      74.35
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.750    3/24/2016      CHF      60.16
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.355   11/10/2015      CHF      71.94
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.315    9/10/2015      CHF      72.75
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.125    10/1/2014      CHF      67.62
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.220    4/26/2035      EUR      71.36
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.690   10/28/2034      EUR      53.22
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.965     9/8/2039      JPY      37.48
GENERAL DE ALQUI          2.750    8/20/2012      EUR      72.14
GENERAL VALENCIA          5.900   11/30/2032      EUR      69.39
IM CEDULAS 10             4.500    2/21/2022      EUR      72.05
IM CEDULAS 5              3.500    6/15/2020      EUR      69.52
IM CEDULAS 7              4.000    3/31/2021      EUR      70.03
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.250    11/7/2017      CHF      75.09
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.799    11/5/2018      CHF      74.18
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.570   10/22/2021      CHF      62.18
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          3.250    6/28/2024      CHF      59.61
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          5.000    3/31/2020      CAD      75.49
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.100    2/23/2021      JPY      64.68
INSTITUT CATALA           4.250    6/15/2024      EUR      74.57
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.065    7/29/2039      JPY      40.17
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.050   12/10/2020      JPY      69.75
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.170    7/29/2039      JPY      41.27
JUNTA LA MANCHA           3.875    1/31/2036      EUR      61.25
JUNTA LA MANCHA           2.810   10/14/2022      JPY      54.75
MAPFRE SA                 5.921    7/24/2037      EUR      63.02
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500     5/1/2016      EUR      73.88
SANTANDER ISSUAN          5.750    1/31/2018      GBP      77.03
SANTANDER ISSUAN          6.533   10/24/2017      GBP      74.71
SPANISH GOV'T             4.200    1/31/2037      EUR      70.39
XUNTA DE GALICIA          4.025   11/28/2035      EUR      49.80

SAS AB                    7.500     4/1/2015      SEK      74.70
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    9/29/2015      TRY      73.31
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500    6/12/2012      USD       7.47
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR      72.22
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.250    4/27/2012      USD       7.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    9/30/2016      ZAR      70.32
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000     3/9/2012      USD      10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.750    3/23/2012      USD       7.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500    2/28/2012      USD       8.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    6/29/2016      TRY      69.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED          8.000    1/27/2012      USD       3.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED          6.500    1/27/2012      USD       7.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED          2.130    1/10/2012      USD      10.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED          2.000    12/7/2011      USD      10.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000     3/9/2012      USD      10.27
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/26/2016      ZAR      70.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    9/20/2016      ZAR      70.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    1/25/2028      USD      55.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   12/17/2027      USD      55.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/26/2021      AUD      63.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/25/2021      ZAR      44.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR      74.06
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    8/25/2016      ZAR      70.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   11/27/2015      TRY      72.47

CRED SUIS NY              9.000   10/12/2012      USD      22.48
CRED SUIS NY              8.000   11/16/2012      USD      56.80
CYTOS BIOTECH             2.875    2/20/2012      CHF      74.40
UBS AG                   10.960    7/20/2012      USD      22.79
UBS AG                   12.040    7/31/2012      USD      27.27
UBS AG                    9.500    8/10/2012      USD      28.42
UBS AG                    9.430    8/31/2012      USD      30.37
UBS AG                   10.910     9/7/2012      USD      41.08
UBS AG                   10.200    10/1/2012      USD      71.89
UBS AG                   10.500   10/15/2012      USD      67.33
UBS AG                   11.020   10/21/2013      USD      57.00
UBS AG                   17.150   12/27/2011      EUR      43.40
UBS AG                    9.090   12/27/2011      EUR      54.08
UBS AG                   10.530    1/23/2012      USD      37.92
UBS AG                    8.720    3/20/2012      USD      25.33
UBS AG                    9.250    3/20/2012      USD      11.24
UBS AG                    8.710    3/26/2012      EUR      55.21
UBS AG                   13.730    3/26/2012      EUR      48.10
UBS AG                   12.350    3/27/2012      USD      23.65
UBS AG                   13.300    5/23/2012      USD       3.26
UBS AG                   13.700    5/23/2012      USD      11.14
UBS AG                    7.070    6/25/2012      EUR      70.94
UBS AG JERSEY            10.140   12/30/2011      USD      14.46
UBS AG JERSEY             3.220    7/31/2012      EUR      38.91

ABBEY NATL TREAS          5.000    8/26/2030      USD      54.61
AIR BERLIN                8.250    4/19/2018      EUR      74.01
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          4.000   11/16/2012      EUR      69.25
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          4.400    2/12/2013      EUR      65.00
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          3.250    2/25/2013      EUR      61.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          5.500    6/20/2013      EUR      61.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          4.500    6/21/2013      EUR      56.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          6.000    6/20/2014      EUR      50.88
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250    2/15/2018      GBP      69.15
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250    2/15/2018      GBP      68.35
BANK NADRA                8.000    6/22/2017      USD      44.65
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.860   12/13/2021      CHF      72.73
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.340   12/28/2026      JPY      64.37
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.408     2/9/2027      JPY      63.70
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.359    3/27/2029      JPY      59.20
BANK OF SCOTLAND          4.800    4/24/2027      EUR      68.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.250    8/29/2031      USD      72.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.000     6/3/2041      USD      71.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000    6/29/2012      USD       8.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000    7/20/2012      USD       8.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC           7.000    7/27/2012      USD       8.98
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.500    7/27/2012      USD       7.56
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.400    7/31/2012      USD       9.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.800    7/31/2012      USD      23.21
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000    8/28/2012      USD      10.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.250    8/31/2012      USD      31.55
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.500    8/31/2012      USD      22.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000    9/11/2012      USD       9.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000    9/28/2012      USD       9.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000    10/1/2012      USD       9.40
BARCLAYS BK PLC          14.000    10/1/2012      USD       9.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.500   10/16/2012      USD       9.84
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000   10/16/2012      USD      10.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.420     5/5/2031      USD      74.98
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.100    5/26/2031      USD      74.27
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.200    8/25/2031      USD      73.31
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.230    8/26/2031      USD      73.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.200    8/29/2031      USD      72.98
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.550    1/23/2012      USD      11.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.350    1/23/2012      USD      26.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.250    1/31/2012      USD       8.76
BRADFORD&BIN BLD          4.910     2/1/2047      EUR      66.94
CEVA GROUP PLC            8.500    6/30/2018      EUR      53.25
CEVA GROUP PLC           10.000    6/30/2018      EUR      55.75
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.625   11/16/2021      GBP      70.30
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.750    12/2/2024      GBP      68.12
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.875    3/28/2033      GBP      66.46
CONSORT HEALTH            2.068    6/19/2042      GBP      71.11
DISCOVERY EDUCAT          1.948    3/31/2037      GBP      71.32
EFG HELLAS PLC            5.400    11/2/2047      EUR       8.13
EFG HELLAS PLC            4.375    2/11/2013      EUR      57.38
EFG HELLAS PLC            6.010     1/9/2036      EUR      33.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.000    2/28/2013      EUR      55.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.100    12/9/2021      EUR      15.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.000    12/2/2021      EUR      14.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.350    7/22/2014      EUR      33.25
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875     5/9/2025      GBP      59.14
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875    2/15/2021      GBP      63.00
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.375    9/26/2031      GBP      56.38
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.500    12/6/2018      GBP      65.80
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250     2/1/2016      USD      62.69
EX-IM BK OF UKRA          5.793     2/9/2016      USD      70.00
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500     6/1/2019      GBP      63.17
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500     6/1/2019      GBP      66.07
GRAINGER PLC              3.625    5/17/2014      GBP      74.58
HBOS PLC                  4.375   10/30/2019      EUR      65.91
HBOS PLC                  5.374    6/30/2021      EUR      59.25
HBOS PLC                  7.070     4/8/2023      EUR      67.97
HBOS PLC                  4.500    3/18/2030      EUR      56.81
HBOS PLC                  6.000    11/1/2033      USD      72.37
HBOS PLC                  6.000    11/1/2033      USD      72.37
HEALTHCARE SUPP           2.067    2/19/2043      GBP      73.28
HSBC BANK PLC             4.750    3/24/2046      GBP      69.69
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          6.439    5/23/2020      EUR      67.76
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          7.375    3/12/2020      EUR      69.43
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          7.625   10/14/2020      EUR      70.25
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          7.975    9/15/2024      GBP      66.64
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          7.625    12/9/2019      GBP      69.06
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          6.385    5/12/2020      EUR      67.84
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          8.500     6/7/2032      GBP      67.68
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          9.000    7/15/2029      GBP      65.16
LLOYDS TSB BANK           5.750     7/9/2025      GBP      73.28
LLOYDS TSB BANK           4.500   12/13/2024      EUR      70.69
LOUIS NO1 PLC             8.500    12/1/2014      EUR      69.75
LOUIS NO1 PLC            10.000    12/1/2016      EUR      60.25
LOUIS NO1 PLC            10.000    12/1/2016      EUR      60.25
MATALAN                   9.625    3/31/2017      GBP      49.17
MATALAN                   9.625    3/31/2017      GBP      47.94
MATALAN                   8.875    4/29/2016      GBP      71.40
MATALAN                   8.875    4/29/2016      GBP      71.17
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750     9/8/2013      USD      54.43
NATIONWIDE BLDG           5.600    8/19/2030      USD      71.57
NEW HOSPITALS ST          1.777    2/26/2047      GBP      57.12
NOMURA BANK INTL          0.800   12/21/2020      EUR      69.86
NORTHERN ROCK             5.750    2/28/2017      GBP      70.83
OTE PLC                   7.250     4/8/2014      EUR      66.91
OTE PLC                   5.000     8/5/2013      EUR      71.54
OTE PLC                   4.625    5/20/2016      EUR      57.41
PIRAEUS GRP FIN           4.000    9/17/2012      EUR      63.65
PRIVATBANK                5.799     2/9/2016      USD      60.16
PUNCH TAVERNS             7.567    4/15/2026      GBP      58.54
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          2.375    11/2/2015      CHF      73.92
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.350    1/23/2017      EUR      72.94
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.700     7/3/2018      USD      68.90
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          5.000    9/30/2020      EUR      74.76
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.625    9/22/2021      EUR      63.18
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.100    8/11/2023      EUR      72.48
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          2.300   11/26/2024      JPY      71.06
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          5.250   11/14/2033      EUR      69.91
SPIRIT ISSUER             5.472   12/28/2028      GBP      67.15
THOMAS COOK GR            6.750    6/22/2015      EUR      37.26
THOMAS COOK GR            7.750    6/22/2017      GBP      35.95
TUI TRAVEL PLC            4.900    4/27/2017      GBP      74.28
TXU EASTERN FNDG          6.450    5/15/2005      USD       0.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN            5.659    6/30/2027      GBP      60.38
UNIQUE PUB FIN            6.542    3/30/2021      GBP      70.02


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *