TCREUR_Public/120116.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, January 16, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 11



COMMERCIAL METAL: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Note Ratings to 'Ba2'


TEREOS: Moody's Keeps 'Ba3' Long-Term Corporate Family Rating
VEGA CONTAINER: Moody's Maintains 'Ba3' Rating on Class A Notes


MANROLAND AG: Administrator to Decide on Winning Bidder
METEOR GUMMIWERKE: Debts, Liquidity Woes Prompt Insolvency Filing
SOLAR MILLENNIUM: May Be Acquired as a Whole, FT Deutschland Says


ARANYBIKA HOTEL: Put Up for Sale by Liquidator for Ninth Time


BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Puts Ratings on Covered Bonds on Watch Neg.
CORNERSTONE TITAN: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR75.1MM Notes to Caa1
EIRCOM GROUP: To Seek Fresh Covenant Waiver From Senior Lenders


SEAT PAGINE: May Extend Debt Restructuring Proposal Deadline


BANCO BPI: S&P Cuts Ratings on Public-Sector Covered Bonds


ARGON CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on SKK300-Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'


FONDO UCI 10: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
FONDO UCI 12: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB'
* SPAIN: Moody's Says Loans with High LTVs More Likely to Default
* VALENCIA: Moody's Cuts Ratings to 'Ba3' Over Liquidity Issues


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to 'Caa2'


* TURKEY: Moody's Releases Review Report on Turkish Corporates

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LAMBDA FINANCE: S&P Maintains 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Quinn Emanuel Hired by Lehman Europe
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Bond Rating to 'Ba3'


* Moody's Says Prospects for EMEA 2012 Corp. Ratings are Negative
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Eurozone Sovereigns
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 9, 2012 to January 13, 2012



COMMERCIAL METAL: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Note Ratings to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service confirmed Commercial Metal Company's
(CMC) Ba1 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and probability of
default rating. At the same time, Moody's downgraded the senior
unsecured note ratings to Ba2 from Ba1. The confirmation of the
CFR results from the expiry of IEP Metals Sub LLC's (an affiliate
of Carl Icahn) tender offer for the company and the withdrawal of
nominees for board election. This concludes the review initiated
on December 6, 2011. The outlook is negative.

Ratings Rationale

CMC's Ba1 Corporate Family Rating reflects the fact that although
improvement in the company's performance is evidenced, after
adjusting for impairment charges and the exit from CMC Sisak
(CMCS), the company's debt protection metrics still remain weak
and leverage relatively high as evidenced by the debt/EBITDA
ratio of approximately 5.1x and the EBIT/interest ratio of
roughly 1.3x for the twelve months ended November 30, 2011. The
rating also reflects our expectations that, despite the recent
announcements that CMC will be exiting its unprofitable CMCS
subsidiary in Croatia, and is undertaking a number of other right
sizing actions, including the closure of several rebar facilities
domestically and internationally, the time horizon to metrics
appropriate for a higher rating will be protracted and the
company will continue to operate with relatively high leverage
and weak debt protection metrics over the next 12 to 18 months.
This principally reflects our view that the steel industry in the
US is facing headwinds and that performance in CMC's Americas
Fabrication segment, while evidencing a turnaround, will remain
challenged given ongoing weakness in the commercial construction
industry and legacy backlogs that need to be worked off.
Consequently, we expect debt protection metrics to only improve
slowly and EBIT/interest to remain below 3x and debt/EBITDA to
remain around 4x. In addition, the rating incorporates the
company's vulnerability to the volatility in steel demand and

The downgrade of the senior unsecured note ratings to Ba2
reflects the impact of the new revolving credit facility (unrated
by Moody's) on the liability waterfall in Moody's Loss Given
Default Methodology and the lower position of the senior
unsecured debt in the capital structure. While the revolver
currently is secured only by the pledge of stock of material
domestic and certain foreign subsidiaries, it requires the pledge
of receivables and inventory should the company's ratings be
downgraded to levels as specified in the credit agreement.
Therefore, under Moody's Loss Given Default Methodology, the
revolver is treated as having an effectively senior position
resulting in a potential higher loss absorption for the unsecured

The negative outlook reflects our view of the headwinds facing
the steel industry over the next twelve to eighteen months as
well as our expectations that the commercial construction
industry will not show meaningful signs of strengthening until at
least 2013, says Moody's.  As a consequence, CMC's performance
remains vulnerable to these market conditions. The outlook also
reflects the volatility of the steel markets and of steel prices,
which we expect to continue to be a factor in 2012.

CMC's rating could be downgraded if economic weakness and
increased competition dampen sales growth, leading to a further
deterioration in operating performance and credit metrics.
Quantitatively, the rating could be downgraded if the EBIT margin
does not show improvement towards 4%, and debt-to-EBITDA and
EBIT-to-interest expense is likely to be sustained above 4.0
times and below 2.5 times, respectively.

The rating is unlikely to be upgraded in the near term, given the
challenges facing CMC. The rating could be upgraded should
economic fundamentals in the U.S. strengthen and evidence better
sustainability than has been experienced in recent years.
Quantitatively, the rating could be upgraded if the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio is sustainable at or below 3x, the EBIT/interest
ratio above 4x and the free cash flow/debt ratio above 8%.

The principal methodology used in rating Commerical Metals
Company was the Global Steel Industry Methodology published in
January 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Irving, Texas, Commercial Metals Company (CMC)
manufactures steel through its four minimills and one micromill
in the United States.  It also has a presence in Europe through
its minimill in Poland and is in the process of closing its
operations in Croatia. On a go forward basis, the company will
have an estimated annual production capacity of approximately 4.7
million tons. CMC also operates steel fabrication facilities, a
copper tube mill, ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal recycling
facilities, and is involved in the marketing and distribution of
steel, other metals and industrial raw materials. CMC generated
revenues of approximately $8.1 billion and shipped approximately
4.1 million tons of steel in the twelve months ended November 30,


TEREOS: Moody's Keeps 'Ba3' Long-Term Corporate Family Rating
Moody's maintains the following ratings on Tereos and its
following affiliates:

  Long Term Corporate Family (foreign currency) rating of Ba3

  Probability of Default rating of Ba3

Tereos Europe

  BACKED Senior Secured (domestic currency) ratings of B1;

Ratings Rationale

Tereos's Ba3 CFR reflects (i) high leverage, given the firm's
significant and growing exposure to commodity price volatility as
it expands outside of the regulated European sugar market; (ii)
large Capex program in Brazil which constrains debt reduction;
and (iii) relatively tight covenants.

However, more positively, the rating also reflects: (i) Tereos's
position as the third-largest sugar producer in Europe; (ii) its
pre-eminent position in the French beet sugar industry, one of
the most competitive in Europe; (iii) its diversification by
geography (Europe and Brazil), product (cane sugar, beet sugar
and starch) and end use (food, fuel and industrial applications);
and (iv) its stable sources of raw materials, the result of its
co-operative structure in Europe and its long-term supply
contracts and partial vertical integration in Brazil.

Additionally, the company completed the refinancing of
approximately EUR 1.4 billion in bank debt, which simplified its
debt structure and extended its debt maturity profile, also
positive for the credit.

The stable outlook on the rating reflects Moody's expectation
that Tereos's credit metrics will improve at the end of FY
2010/2011 with an adjusted debt to EBITDA below 4.0x. Moody's
also notes that the company's pursuit of growth is likely to
preclude significant reductions in the absolute amount of debt on
its balance sheet, leaving improvements due to increases in
EBITDA vulnerable to reversal. The stable outlook also reflects
Tereos' improved liquidity profile. Moody's will continue to
monitor the execution of the partnership with Petrobras and any
further expansion into Brazil or elsewhere.

In Moody's view, positive pressure on the rating is unlikely in
the short-term. However, upwards pressure could develop if Tereos
were to demonstrate a strengthening in cash flow generation and
operating performance, and a track record of deleveraging with a
debt/EBITDA ratio comfortably below 3.5x on a sustained basis.

Conversely, negative rating pressure could develop if: (i)
Tereos's debt/EBITDA ratio were to remain above 4.0x on a
consistent basis; (ii) its liquidity were to tighten; or (iii)
concerns were to develop about continued access to credit

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Agricultural Cooperatives Industry Methodology published in March
2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Lille, France, Tereos is the third-largest
European producer of sugar from sugar beet, the third largest
European producer of starch and alcohol from cereals and a
leading Brazilian producer of sugar and ethanol from sugar cane.
For the nine months ended June 30, 2011 the company posted
revenues of EUR3.4 billion.

VEGA CONTAINER: Moody's Maintains 'Ba3' Rating on Class A Notes
Moody's Investors Service stated that the long-term credit
ratings of the notes issued by Vega Container Vessel 2006-1 are
unaffected following the recent one notch downgrade of CMA CGM

Ratings Rationale

Moody's did not take any rating action on the Ba3(sf) rating of
the Class A Notes although the corporate family rating of CMA CGM
S.A. ("CMA"), the only charterparty of the financed container
vessels in this deal, was downgraded to B2/Negative outlook (from
B1) on December 2, 2011. The transaction is designed to finance a
fleet of container vessels for CMA, one of the largest container
shipping companies in the world.

The underlying rating of the Class A Notes reflects (i) Moody's
view of CMA's credit quality and the assessment of the
probability that it will default on its obligations under the
transaction and (ii) Moody's view of the additional degree of
protection provided by the legal and financial arrangements of
the transaction to the Class A Noteholders in the event of
default by CMA, based on an estimate of the probability and
severity of a shortfall for the Class A Notes in the event of a
sale of the collateral and liquidation of the transaction
following such default. This view is based, in part, on a
quantitative model of the transaction and factors in the
characteristics of the collateral pool, the volatility of vessel
prices and the structural enhancements of the transaction. It
also takes into account an element of uncertainty as to the
timing required for the legal proceedings relating to the
enforcement, repossession and sale of the collateral. Further the
rating takes into account: (i) a simple interest and principal
priority of payments, with sequential amortization of the notes;
(ii) a liquidity facility covering approximately 36 months worth
of Class A interest payments provided by DNB Nor (Aa3/P-1); and
(iii) a reserve fund which can be used to cover potential
enforcement costs. Hence even though the CMA now has a higher
default probability, the transaction ratings remain stable due to
the transaction features and the value given to the collateral
(as described above).

Should the rating of CMA however further deteriorate in the
future, the rating of the notes could be negatively affected.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(28 November 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit of
countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions in some countries, which could result in rating

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Shipping Loans for Structured Finance
Transactions, published in November 2010.


MANROLAND AG: Administrator to Decide on Winning Bidder
Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News, citing Reuters, reports that
Manroland AG's insolvency administrator Werner Schneider was
expected to decide last weekend on the winning bidder for the
company's plants in Augsburg, Plauen and Offenbach, Germany.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 6,
2012, Bloomberg News related that Manroland, which filed for
insolvency in November, has attracted interest from close to 10
bidders.  Bloomberg disclosed that two people familiar with the
matter said domestic and foreign strategic buyers and financial
investors have handed in offers for the company.  Werner
Schneider, Manroland's administrator, said in a statement on
Jan. 4 that he is aiming to find a buyer for "key company
segments" by the end of the current insolvency proceedings on
Jan. 31, Bloomberg recounted.

METEOR GUMMIWERKE: Debts, Liquidity Woes Prompt Insolvency Filing
Allison Connolly at Bloomberg News reports that Meteor Gummiwerke
K. H. Baedje GmbH & Co. KG said in a statement on Friday that it
filed for insolvency due to problems with liquidity and

Meteor Gummiwerke K. H. Baedje GmbH & Co. KG is a Bietigheim-
Bissingen, Germany-based manufacturer of rubber materials.

SOLAR MILLENNIUM: May Be Acquired as a Whole, FT Deutschland Says
According to Bloomberg News' Richard Weiss, Financial Times
Deutschland, citing comments by Volker Boehm, said Solar
Millennium AG's insolvency administrator reported that the
company may be bought as a whole, as there are strategic as well
as financial investors interested in acquiring the firm.

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Boehm, as cited by the newspaper, said
the due diligence process could start this week.

The newspaper said that Ferrostaal AG as well as an unnamed
construction company are among the parties interested, Bloomberg

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 9,
2012, Bloomberg News related that Solar Millennium's insolvency
administrator is seeking to sell parts or all of the company.
Bloomberg disclosed that Mr. Boehm said in a statement on Jan. 5
that it's seeking buyers for the company's 60 or so project units
and stakes, including Oakland, California-based Solar Trust of
America LLC, which is planning the world's biggest solar plant.

Solar Millennium AG is an Erlangen-based solar company.  It had
focused on developing solar-thermal plants in Europe and the U.S.


ARANYBIKA HOTEL: Put Up for Sale by Liquidator for Ninth Time
MTI-Econews, citing business daily Napi Gazdasag, reports that
the Aranybika Hotel in Debrecen is being put on the block for the
ninth time by its liquidator.

According to MTI, liquidator Kelet-Holding is offering the hotel
for HUF1.35 billion, well under the HUF2 billion it asked when
the hotel was first offered in November 2010.  There were no
interested parties the last time the hotel was offered in
December, MTI notes.


BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Puts Ratings on Covered Bonds on Watch Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its 'A-' long-term credit ratings on Bank of Ireland's U.K.
covered bond program and all series of covered bonds issued under

"The CreditWatch negative placement follows our Dec. 8, 2011
CreditWatch negative placement of our long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings and our senior unsecured debt ratings
on Bank of Ireland (BB+/Watch Neg/B)," S&P said.

"Under our criteria for rating covered bonds, we evaluate the
maximum potential rating on a covered bond program as the bank's
issuer credit rating (ICR) raised by the maximum number of
notches of ratings uplift. The maximum number of notches of
uplift results from our assessment and classification of the
program's asset-liability mismatch (ALMM) risk and the program
categorization," S&P said.

"When determining the program categorization, we consider
primarily our view of the jurisdiction of a program and its
ability to access external financing or monetize the cover pool.
Finally, we assign the covered bonds to one of three
distinct categories. Under our criteria, to achieve the maximum
potential number of notches of uplift, the available credit
enhancement needs to be commensurate with the target credit
enhancement," S&P said.

"Following our analysis, and given our view of the U.K. legal and
the program's contractual framework, we have categorized Bank of
Ireland's U.K. mortgage covered bonds in category '2' and
determined a 'high' ALMM classification. Under our criteria,
these combinations enable us to assign to the covered bonds a
maximum potential ratings uplift of four notches above our long-
term ICR on Bank of Ireland," S&P said.

"As our 'A-' ratings on the mortgage covered bonds issued under
Bank of Ireland's U.K. covered bond program benefit from the
maximum four-notch ratings uplift above the ICR, under our rating
approach, a downgrade of the ICR by one or more notches would
directly affect our ratings on the covered bonds. Therefore, we
have placed on CreditWatch negative our 'A-' ratings on the Bank
of Ireland's U.K. covered bond program and all series of covered
bonds issued under it, following the CreditWatch negative
placement of our counterparty credit ratings on Bank of Ireland.
We understand from the issuer that it does not intend to manage
down the ALMM risk in the near future to potentially benefit from
further ratings uplift, and therefore we expect that the ALMM
will remain in the 'high' category," S&P said.

"Our assumptions that we use to calculate the target credit
enhancement in line with our Dec. 16, 2009 ALMM criteria are not
dependent on the ICR, or on the ratings on the covered bonds
themselves. Therefore, all other aspects remaining the same, a
downgrade of the issuer or a downgrade of the covered bonds would
not affect the target credit enhancement level that we deem
commensurate to support the covered bond ratings," S&P said.

"We aim to resolve our CreditWatch negative placement of the
ratings on the covered bonds shortly after we have resolved the
CreditWatch placement of our counterparty ratings on Bank of
Ireland, and based on our review of updated credit and cash flow
information. We expect to affirm or lower by one notch our
ratings on Bank of Ireland's U.K. covered bond program," S&P

Ratings List
Program/      To                  From
Country: Covered bond type

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Negative

Bank of Ireland Covered Bond Programme
(The Governor and Company of the Bank
of Ireland Global Covered Bond Programme)

              A-/Watch Neg        A-/Negative

U.K.: Structured Covered Bonds

CORNERSTONE TITAN: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR75.1MM Notes to Caa1
Moody's Investors Services has downgraded two classes of EMEA
CMBS notes issued by Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 p.l.c.

Issuer: Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 p.l.c.

  EUR333M Class A-2 Notes due 2017 Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1
  (sf); previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  EUR75.1M Class B Notes due 2017 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1
  (sf); previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class E, Class F, Class, G, Class VA,
and Class VB Notes.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade reflects Moody's increased loss expectation for the
pool since its last review. This is primarily due to a sharp
increase in the weighted average Moody's Loan to Value ratio on
the securitized pool to 120% from 104% on the last review, partly
driven by the large decrease of the latest valuation for the
Xanadu portfolio (27.3% of the current pool).

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Approximately 51% of the securitized pool balance matures in
January 2012. The Moody's LTV ratios for these loans are above
90%, translating into high probability of default at maturity

Approximately 25% of the securitized pool balance was in special
servicing as of the October 2011 reporting. The transaction is
overly exposed to non-prime property quality.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realised losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2012, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) values will
overall stabilize but with a strong differentiation between prime
and secondary properties, and (iii) occupational markets will
remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with the anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
is for a material slowdown in growth in 2012 for most of the
world's largest economies fueled by fiscal consolidation efforts,
household and banking sector deleveraging and persistently high
unemployment levels.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(November 28, 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit
of countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions in some countries, which could result in rating


Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 p.l.c. closed in March 2007 and
represents the securitization of initially 32 commercial mortgage
loans originated by Credit Suisse and Capmark Bank Europe plc. As
at the October 2011 interest payment date, 26 loans remain in the
pool. The loans are secured by first-ranking legal mortgages over
116 commercial properties. The pool exhibits an above average
concentration in terms of geographic location (78% Germany, based
on UW market value). Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Large multi-borrower transactions typically have a
Herf of less than 10 with an average of around 5. This pool Herf
is 7, which is down from 8.6 on Moody's prior review.

As of the October 2011 interest payment date, the transaction's
total pool balance was EUR1,032.4 million, down by 22% since
closing due to repayments and prepayments.

The largest loan in the pool is Xanadu (27.3% of the current
pool), which is secured by a portfolio of seven office properties
located throughout Germany. The portfolio is fully let to a
subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG (Baa1) with a weighted average
(WA) remaining lease term of eight years without break options.
Current passing rent is approximately EUR21.5 million per annum
with fixed annual rent increases of 1.2% until lease expiry. The
whole loan LTV based on Moody's current market value estimate is
165% compared to 101% on the last review. A recently disclosed
external valuation based on a ten year discounted cash flow
approach showed a 46% decline in value since closing for the 234%
over-rented portfolio. Moody's gave benefit in its recovery
analysis to the EUR8.4 million sitting in the Cash Trap amount
due to the tenant's rating being below the required level. There
is a high probability of default at maturity in January 2012

The second largest loan is Hugo (17.5% of the current pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of four office properties located
in and around Paris producing annual rent of approximately EUR12
million. The largest tenants are PSA Peugeot Citroen (Baa3) (44%
of the rental income) and Alstom Transport (41%). The WA
remaining lease term is approximately five years. PSA Peugeot
Citroen will not renew its lease upon expiry in July 2012. The
loan LTV based on Moody's current market value estimate is 125%
compared to 108% on the last review. Moody's gave benefit in its
recovery analysis to the EUR8.7 million sitting in the Reserve
Cash Pledge Account as a result of the lease termination notice
from the largest tenant. There is a high probability of default
at maturity in January 2012 (>50%).

The third largest loan is Wolfsburg (9.1% of the current pool),
which is secured by three mixed-use properties (office and
industrial space) located in western Germany with a 27% vacancy
rate. The loan LTV based on Moody's current market value estimate
is 94% compared to 89% on the last review. Net Operating income
is EUR9.6 million, while the WA lease term is 2.61 years. There
is a high probability of default at maturity in July 2013 (>50%).

Moody's expects a large amount of losses on the securitized
portfolio, stemming mainly from the refinancing profile of the
securitized portfolio and the weighted average Moody's Loan to
Value ratio on the securitized pool of 120%.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006, and Update on Moody's Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS Transaction in EMEA published in June

Other factors used in this rating are described in EMEA CMBS:
2011 Central Scenarios published in February 2011.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated May 13, 2011. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on December 20, 2011.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

EIRCOM GROUP: To Seek Fresh Covenant Waiver From Senior Lenders
John Mulligan at Irish Independent reports that Eircom Group will
seek a fresh covenant waiver this week from its senior lenders as
it updates its financial projections in light of the
deteriorating economic Irish environment.

According to Irish Independent, the company, which is likely to
be taken over in coming weeks by senior lenders owed more than
EUR3.7 billion, will seek to extend the waiver beyond its
January 31 date.

The company has breached lending agreements after sharp declines
in its earnings as consumers rein in spending and business
customers cut costs and fail, Irish Independent discloses.

Irish Independent relates that Eircom said the update to its
financial projections currently being undertaken would take into
account its half-year results to the end of December.  It said
that the update is expected to be concluded by the end of this
month, Irish Independent notes.

Meanwhile, Patricia Kuo and Joe Brennan at Bloomberg News report
that Eircom's second-lien lenders proposed writing off 71% of
their loans, as they sought to avoid being virtually wiped out in
a debt restructuring plan.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
that the lenders, owed about EUR350 million (US$446.6 million),
pitched a revised offer to Eircom and its first-lien lenders last
week.  The plan involves junior lenders writing off EUR250
million of loans in exchange for a stake of between 4% and 5% in
the company, Bloomberg discloses.  The lenders would also share
in future Eircom profits, Bloomberg notes.

"The board will consider the new second-lien proposal in due
course," Bloomberg quotes Paul Bradley, a Dublin-based Eircom
spokesman, as saying.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


SEAT PAGINE: May Extend Debt Restructuring Proposal Deadline
Chiara Remondini and Elisa Martinuzzi at Bloomberg News report
that Seat Pagine Gialle SpA may extend a proposal to restructure
its debt to senior bondholders.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
that the senior noteholders, who own about EUR750 million
(US$957 million) of Seat Pagine bonds, may be involved to broaden
approval for the plan and avoid possible legal challenges from

Seat Pagine last month extended the deadline for the acceptance
of its restructuring plan by senior lenders through Jan. 16,
Bloomberg recounts.  The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said that
the company is slated to hold a board meeting on Jan. 17, at
which it probably will extend the deadline for an agreement.

The current proposal includes a debt-for-equity swap for holders
of the Lighthouse bonds, which would make them the biggest
investors in Seat Pagine, Bloomberg discloses.  People familiar
with the matter, according to Bloomberg, said senior bondholders
are arguing that the possible change in control makes them
interested parties in the negotiations.

                    About Seat Pagine Gialle

Seat Pagine Gialle SpA (PG IM) -- is an
Italy-based company that operates multimedia platform for
assisting in the development of business contacts between users
and advertisers.  It is active in the sector of multimedia
profiled advertising, offering print-voice-online directories,
products for the Internet and for satellite and ortophotometric
navigation, and communication services such as one-to-one
marketing.  Its products include EuroPages, PgineBianche,
Tuttocitta and EuroCompass, among others.  Its activity is
divided into four divisions: Directories Italia, operating
through, Seat Pagine Gialle; Directories UK, through TDL
Infomedia Ltd. and its subsidiary Thomson Directories Ltd.;
Directory Assistance, through Telegate AG, Telegate Italia Srl,
11881 Nueva Informacion Telefonica SAU, Telegate 118 000 Sarl,
Telegate Media AG and Prontoseat Srl, and Other Activitites
division, through Consodata SpA, Cipi SpA, Europages SA, Wer
liefert was GmbH and Katalog Yayin ve Tanitim Hizmetleri AS.

                        *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 4,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Italy-based international publisher of
classified directories SEAT Pagine Gialle SpA to 'CC' from
'CCC+'.  S&P said that the outlook is negative.


BANCO BPI: S&P Cuts Ratings on Public-Sector Covered Bonds
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term credit
ratings on Banco BPI S.A.'s (Banco BPI; BB+/Watch Neg/B) public-
sector covered bond program and related series. The ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative.

Banco BPI's public-sector covered bond program was set up in the
Republic of Portugal (BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3) to issue "Obriga‡oes
Sobre o Sector Publico" under a legal framework established in

"The downgrade follows the lowering of our long-term counterparty
rating on Banco BPI to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. Under our criteria for
rating covered bonds, the available credit enhancement level in
the program constrains the potential ratings uplift above our
issuer credit rating on Banco BPI," S&P said.

"Under our criteria for rating nonsovereign issuers and
structured finance transactions, including covered bonds, above
the rating on the related sovereign in the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone), we consider that public-sector
covered bonds have a 'high' sensitivity to sovereign risk," S&P

"A covered bond program that has what we consider to be a 'high'
country-risk exposure would typically only achieve a one-notch
uplift above the rating on the country in which the cover pool
assets are located. Based on these criteria, the maximum
potential rating that we can assign to the public-sector covered
bond program is 'BBB'--two notches above our long-term rating on
Banco BPI," S&P said.

"We have also applied our five-step approach for rating covered
bonds, to evaluate the maximum potential covered bonds ratings
uplift for Banco BPI's public-sector covered bonds," S&P said.

"Under this approach, we use our assessment of the program's
asset-liability mismatch (ALMM) risk to determine firstly an ALMM
classification (step 1) and then a program categorization (step
2)," S&P said.

"When determining the program categorization, we consider
primarily our view on the jurisdiction of a program and its
ability to access external financing or to monetize the cover
pool. Finally, we segment the covered bond program to one of
three distinct categories," S&P said.

"Following our analysis, and given our view on the Portuguese
legal framework, we have categorized the covered bond program in
category '2' and determined a 'low' ALMM classification. Under
our ALMM criteria solely, these combinations would enable us to
assign to the public-sector covered bonds a maximum potential
ratings uplift of six notches above our long-term rating on Banco
BPI (step 3). Given our long-term 'BB+' rating on Banco BPI, the
maximum potential rating on the program would be 'A+'," S&P said.

"In step 4 of our analysis, we analyze the credit and market
risks, to determine the target credit enhancement level that we
consider to be commensurate with the maximum potential uplift
that we determined in step 3," S&P said.

"According to our five-step approach for rating covered bonds, we
assign the first notch of uplift above the ICR if we consider
that the program's available credit enhancement covers the risks
related to the default of the cover pool assets ('asset default
risks') -- including interest rate risk and foreign exchange rate
risk, but excluding market value risk arising from ongoing ALMM,"
S&P said.

"Based on our most recent analysis of the program's credit
quality and cash flow structure (as of June 2011), the program's
available credit enhancement is commensurate with only this first
notch of uplift," S&P said.

"Following our downgrade of Banco BPI, we have lowered to 'BBB-'
from 'BBB' our rating on its public-sector covered bond program
and related series, to reflect this maximum ratings uplift," S&P


"Our ratings on the covered bond program remains on CreditWatch
negative, to reflect the outlook for our rating on Banco BPI. All
else being equal, any future downgrade of Banco BPI would lead to
a downgrade of the covered bond program," S&P said.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch placements of our ratings on
the covered bond program (by either affirming them or lowering
them by one notch), based on updated credit and cash flow
information, once we have resolved the CreditWatch placement of
our rating on Banco BPI," S&P said.

         Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken the rating actions on these covered bonds based on
our criteria for rating covered bonds. As part of our cash flow
analysis, we used Standard & Poor's Covered Bond Monitor to
calculate the target credit enhancement for the covered bonds.
However, the assumptions and methodologies used in this cash
flow analysis are under review," S&P said.

"This review may result in further changes to the criteria. As a
result, our future assumptions and methodologies used in our
Covered Bond Monitor model may differ from our current criteria.
The criteria change may affect the ratings on all outstanding
covered bonds in this program. Until such time that we adopt new
criteria for rating covered bonds, we will continue to rate and
surveil these covered bonds using our existing criteria," S&P

Ratings List

Program/          To                    From
Country:   Covered Bond Type

Ratings Lowered

Banco BPI S.A.

Portugal: Public-Sector Covered Bond Program and Related Series

                  BBB-/Watch Neg        BBB/Watch Neg


ARGON CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on SKK300-Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the following notes issued by Argon Capital PLC.

Issuer: Argon Capital PLC

   Series 99 SKK300,000,000 Limited Recourse Secured Floating
   Rate Credit-Linked Notes due 2012, Downgraded to Ba2;
   previously on Sep 29, 2011 Ba1 Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

This transaction represents a credit linked note issued by Argon
Capital PLC. The Series 99 notes are credit linked to the
reference entity, Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. Merrill Lynch & Co.
Inc., currently rated Baa1 is the swap guarantor and collateral
provider for these notes.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of a
rating action on Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d, whose Baa3 rating
was downgraded to Ba1 on December 23, 2011. For further
information on the underlying action see the press release titled
"Moody's downgrades ratings of four Slovenian banks, negative
outlook" on

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy, 2) more specifically, any
uncertainty associated with the underlying credits in the
transaction could have a direct impact on the repackaged
transaction and 3) additional expected loss associated with
hedging agreements in this transaction may also negatively impact
the ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April

Moody's quantitative analysis of Repacks is designed to estimate
the expected loss "EL" borne by the Repack investor, given the
transaction structure, the Collateral and any other credit risks
arising under the transaction. To this end, Moody's relies on an
EL analysis in which we identify and attach probabilities to
events that might give rise to losses to Repack noteholders.

Moody's EL calculation assesses the probability and severity of
each possible loss-inducing event happening at discrete
(typically one-year) intervals through the life of the
transaction. The EL for each of these time points can then be
aggregated to provide a weighted-average EL for the rated notes.

No additional cash flow analysis or stress scenarios have been
conducted as the rating was directly derived from the rating of
the reference entity, and the collateral and swap guarantor.


FONDO UCI 10: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 10 and Fondo
de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 11.

Specifically, S&P:

    Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
    UCI 10's class B notes;

    Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
    UCI 10's class A notes; and

    Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    all classes of notes in UCI 11.

"In May 2011, we placed or kept on CreditWatch negative our
ratings on all classes of notes in UCI 10 and UCI 11 for credit
reasons. In August 2011, we lowered and kept on CreditWatch
negative our ratings on all classes of notes in both
transactions, due to our view of the increased likelihood of the
loans backing each transaction falling into arrears," S&P said.

"Based on the latest available investor report from the trustee
(dated December 2011), the pools are quite seasoned with low
weighted-average loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 40.30% in UCI 10
and 54.64% in UCI 11. Additionally, the pool factors are low at
26.55% in UCI 10 and 31.43% in UCI 11," S&P said.

"From 2007, these UCI transactions have experienced increasing
levels of severe arrears (defined in this transaction as 90+
days) that peaked in 2009. Since then, we understand that the
servicer, Union de Creditos Inmobiliarios, Establecimiento
Financiero de Credito S.A. (UCI), decided to adopt a more
proactive approach to arrears management and to offer temporary
reductions of monthly installments to borrowers experiencing
payment difficulties. We understand that UCI enters into this
kind of agreement only when it considers the borrower's
difficulties to be temporary," S&P said.

"UCI has provided us with data showing that about 84% of the
loans that were subject to forbearance agreements between the
servicer and the borrower in these transactions are now
performing, meaning that the loans are now current on their
payments. However, in our opinion, these loans are still more at
risk of falling into arrears than loans that have never been in
payment arrangements," S&P said.

"During the last year (December 2010 to December 2011), the ratio
of severe arrears over the current collateral balance has halved
in both transactions, However, in our opinion, the loans
currently in payment arrangements are still more at risk of
falling into arrears than loans that have never been in payment
arrangements. Moreover, such arrangements could, in our view,
postpone the recognition of losses," S&P said.

The data show that borrowers that had entered into payment
arrangements -- with some existing unpaid installments -- are
more at risk of falling back into arrears than borrowers that had
entered into performing arrangements without any unpaid

"We performed our analysis applying an increased foreclosure
frequency rate to loans that are, or have been in payment
arrangements. In UCI 10 and UCI 11, loans that are currently in
payment arrangements total 7.5% and 11.5%," S&P said.

"As a result of this credit and cash flow analysis, and
considering that the reserve funds in both transactions are at
their required levels and that arrears have decreased, we have
affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on all
classes of notes in UCI 11, and on UCI 10's class A notes," S&P

"In UCI 10, the redemption of the class B notes resumed on the
December 2011 payment date for the first time since March 2008.
The redemption of the class B notes has not taken place since
March 2008 as the principal balance of defaulted loans with
arrears of more than 90 days was higher than 2.25% of the
principal balance of the loans," S&P said.

"However, in UCI 10, the reserve fund provides credit enhancement
solely to cover interest shortfalls. It cannot be used to cure
defaulted loans. According to the priority of payments,
replenishment of the reserve fund will happen before it can be
used to cure defaults in the transaction. Therefore, once we
apply commingling and defaults in our cash flow analysis, the
transaction shows an imbalance between the note balance and the
performing assets. This shortfall cannot be cured either by the
cash available in the reserve fund or the excess spread remaining
in the transaction, which is negative once we apply 35 basis
points of servicing fees and interest due on the notes," S&P

In addition, the interest-deferral trigger for the class B notes
is based on current 90+ day arrears and the transaction only uses
the reserve fund to cover interest shortfalls.

"Taking into account the factors, in UCI 10, our cash flow
analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement is
commensurate with a lower rating level for the class B notes.
However we do not expect that the class B notes will default in
the next year. As a result of this analysis, we have lowered and
removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on UCI 10's class B
notes," S&P said.

UCI 10 and 11 are Spanish RMBS transactions backed by pools of
first-ranking mortgages secured over owner-occupied residential
properties in Spain and pools of unsecured personal or second-
lien mortgage loans. The underlying collateral is associated with
first-ranking mortgages originated by UCI.

               Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

Ratings List

Class              Rating
         To                       From

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 10
EUR700 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

B        BB (sf)                  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 10
EUR700 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A        AA (sf)                  AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 11
EUR850 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A        AA (sf)                  AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B        BBB (sf)                 BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C        BB (sf)                  BB (sf)/Watch Neg

FONDO UCI 12: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 12 and Fondo
de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14.

Specifically, S&P:

    Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    all classes of notes in UCI 12;

    Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
    UCI 14's class A notes;

    Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
    UCI 14's class B notes; and

    Affirmed its rating on UCI 14's class C notes.

"In May 2011, we placed or kept on CreditWatch negative our
ratings on the most highly-rated tranches in UCI 12 and UCI 14
because, in our view, these transactions had a relatively high
percentage of loans that were in payment arrangements and were
more at risk of falling into arrears than loans that had never
been in such arrangements," S&P said.

"From 2007, these UCI transactions have experienced increasing
levels of severe arrears (defined in this transaction as 90+
days) that peaked in 2009. We have observed a similar trend in
other Spanish portfolios, but the most recent UCI transactions
have reached higher level of arrears than the average level for
similar Spanish transactions that we rate," S&P said.

"In 2009, we understand that Union de Creditos Inmobiliarios,
Establecimiento Financiero de Credito S.A. (UCI) decided to adopt
a more proactive approach to arrears management and to offer
temporary reductions of monthly installments to borrowers
experiencing difficulties. We understand that UCI enters into
this kind of agreement only when it considers the borrower's
difficulties to be temporary," S&P said

"UCI has provided us with data showing that, in these
transactions, more than 70% (specifically 81% in UCI 12 and 73%
in UCI 14) of the loans that were subject to forbearance
arrangements between the servicer and the borrower are now
performing, meaning that the loans are now current on their
payments," S&P said.

"Based on the most recent available data on the performance of
the loans with temporary reductions of installments, we performed
our analysis applying an increased foreclosure frequency to loans
that are, or have been in payment arrangements. In UCI 12 and UCI
14, loans that are currently in payment arrangements total 15.20%
and 17.94%," S&P said.

"Based on the latest available investor report from the trustee
(dated December 2011), the pool factors are 40.72% for UCI 12 and
47.76% for UCI 14. We consider the seasoning to be considerable
given the closing date of the pool," S&P said.

"In our opinion, severe arrears and defaults are high in UCI 12
and UCI 14 compared with the rest of the Spanish market. During
the last year (December 2010 to December 2011), these
transactions experienced decreasing levels of arrears. As of the
December 2011 payment date, 30+-day arrears over the current
collateral balance were 6.04% in UCI 12 and 9.91% in UCI 14," S&P

"However, in our opinion, the loans currently in payment
arrangements are still more at risk of falling into arrears than
loans that have never been in payment arrangements. Moreover,
such agreements could, in our view, postpone the recognition of
losses and delay interest-deferral triggers on the junior notes,
which would be detrimental to the senior noteholders as interest
flows due on the junior notes are diverted toward the payments
due to the senior noteholders. The reserve fund is at 100% of its
required level for UCI 12 and at 89.02% of the required level for
UCI 14 due to the increase in defaults," S&P said.

"Based on the most recent data available for the transactions,
our cash flow analysis indicates that lower ratings are
commensurate with the credit enhancement available to all of the
notes in UCI 12, and with the class A notes in UCI 14. As a
consequence of all of the above-mentioned factors, we have
lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on all
classes of notes in UCI 12. We have also lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A notes in UCI 14.
These rating actions reflect our view of the weakening
performance of both transactions," S&P said.

"Our cash flow analysis indicates that 'BB (sf)' and 'B- (sf)'
ratings are commensurate with the credit enhancement available to
the class B and C notes in UCI 14. We do not expect that the
class C notes will default in the next year. As a result of our
analysis, we have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
our rating on UCI 14's class B notes and affirmed our rating on
the class C notes," S&P said.

"UCI 12 and 14 are Spanish RMBS transactions backed by pools of
first-ranking mortgages secured over owner-occupied residential
properties in Spain and pools of unsecured personal or second-
lien mortgage loans. The underlying collateral is associated with
first-ranking mortgages originated by UCI," S&P said.

             Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

Ratings List

Class              Rating
             To             From

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 12
EUR900 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A            AA (sf)        AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B            A- (sf)        A (sf)/Watch Neg
C            BB (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14
EUR1,450 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A            A (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14
EUR1,450 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

B            BB (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14
EUR1,450 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

C            B- (sf)        B- (sf)

* SPAIN: Moody's Says Loans with High LTVs More Likely to Default
In a Special Report published on January 12, 2012, Moody's
Investors Service shows that Spanish mortgage loans most likely
to default are those (i) with high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs);
(ii) securitized in arrears of up to 30 days; (iii) made to
foreign residents; or (iv) originated via a broker.

According to the report, LTVs are the main driver of default
frequency, with a dramatic increase in default probability for
mortgages with LTVs of more than 80%. At this level, 1 in 20
loans that do not have any adverse characteristics ("benchmark
loans") can be expected to default. These results confirm the
strong relationship between LTV and wider default probability in
the Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market.

In this report, Moody's notes that, while it is unsurprising that
securitized loans delinquent by up to 30 days at closing should
show weaker performance, their default probability is almost 5x
that of a performing loan. Loans to residents not native to Spain
are the next riskiest, followed by broker-originated loans.

Moody's observed other characteristics that significantly raised
the default probability of Spanish mortgage loans, including a
high loan-to-income ratio or loans on second homes.

In the report, Moody's analyzed a number of other characteristics
that proved to show little predictability with a loan's default
probability, namely: the debt-to-income ratio, borrower income
level, installment amount, property value and the borrower's age.

The report is entitled "Drivers of Spanish Mortgage Loan

* VALENCIA: Moody's Cuts Ratings to 'Ba3' Over Liquidity Issues
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the region of Valencia's
debt ratings by two notches to Ba3 from Ba1 due to the region's
liquidity issues and large forthcoming debt repayments.
Valencia's short-term debt rating is unchanged at Not-Prime.
Valencia's ratings remain on review for downgrade. In addition,
Moody's has placed on review for downgrade the ratings of all
other Spanish sub-sovereigns. This is due to (i) growing
liquidity pressures on Spanish sub-sovereigns; and (ii) Moody's
concerns over whether the regions will achieve the 2012 deficit

Ratings Rationale


The downgrade of Valencia's long-term debt rating by two notches
to Ba3 is based on its growing liquidity problems and large
forthcoming debt repayments in 2012 (EUR4.4 billion). On 27
December, the region missed a payment of EUR123 million to
Deutsche Bank and although it was eventually made within the
contractually allowed grace period, the delay highlights the
region's increasingly pressured liquidity position. While
Valencia has recently contracted short-term loans totalling
EUR1.18 billion (including EUR300 million from Instituto de
Credito Official, a financial institution fully owned by the
central government) and benefits from the advancement of various
state transfers, Moody's views the region's liquidity position as
still very precarious and dependent on supportive measures taken
by the central government.


The placement on review for downgrade of all rated Spanish sub-
sovereigns reflects two factors.

Firstly, the announcement reflects growing liquidity pressures on
regional and local governments, which were prompted by
deteriorating market conditions for sub-sovereign issuers in
Spain. Moody's-rated Spanish regions face approximately EUR17
billion of debt repayments in 2012. As regions' access to capital
markets remains problematic, they are left with few funding
options, usually at high interest rates and with short-term
maturities. Indeed, several regions issued retail bonds in 2011
(EUR10.3 billion, including EUR7.4 billion maturing in 2012),
which further increases refinancing risks (see 'Retail Bond
Issuance by Spanish Regional Governments Is Credit Negative'
released on 9 May 2011), as evidenced by Valencia's failure to
fully refinance its EUR1.5 billion retail bond last December.
Moody's analysis is now increasingly focused on an assessment of
liquidity given that market confidence problems for Spanish
regions are lasting, with even fiscally sound regions now exposed
to liquidity problems.

Secondly, the announcement reflects Moody's concerns about the
regions' capacity to achieve the deficit target for 2012. The
government recently indicated that the regions missed their
deficit target by a wide margin in 2011, with an estimated
deficit-to-GDP of 2.7% against a target of 1.3% (see 'Spanish
Regions Will Miss 2011 Deficit Targets, a Credit Negative' -- 5
December 2011). In this context, the regions' compliance in 2012
is highly uncertain. The regions' compliance to the deficit
objective is further complicated by the deterioration in the
macroeconomic environment, reflected in Moody's current estimate
of a real GDP contraction in Spain of 0.5%-1% in 2012.


The review for downgrade aims to conclude in the next three
months, during which time Moody's will re-examine sub-sovereigns'
level of cash-on-hand together with their access to credit
facilities to assess their ability to meet financing requirements
in 2012 given difficult market conditions. During the review,
Moody's will also examine the credit implications of the central
government's announcement last week to reform the financing
system for regional governments with the view to tighten
government control over regional budgets.


Stabilization of the outlooks would require the execution of
detailed plans from the regional and local administrations to
restore fiscal balances and reverse debt ratios. Changes to the
institutional framework that would result in greater support from
the central government could also provide upward pressure on the

Further deterioration of the operating environment in Spain that
would put pressure on the sovereign rating would negatively
impact the ratings of Spanish sub-sovereigns. Additionally,
failure of any individual sub-sovereign to progress towards
fiscal consolidation targets would add pressure to that specific


The following ratings have been downgraded:

- Region of Valencia: debt ratings downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1;
   under review for downgrade.

- Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas: debt ratings downgraded to
   Ba3 from Ba1, in line with the Generalitat de Valencia's
   downgrade; rating on review for downgrade.

- Notes of CACSA and Universities of Valencia (Universidad de
   Valencia, Universidad de Alicante, Universidad Jaume 1 de
   Castellon and Universidad Politecnica de Valencia): downgraded
   to Ba3 from Ba1; rating on review for downgrade.

- Notes of Feria Valencia: underlying rating downgraded to Ba3
   on review for downgrade from Ba1 (A and B Certificates); the
   rating of Feria Valencia's notes remains at Aa3/negative, in
   line with the financial guarantee provided by Assured
   Guarantee (Europe) Ltd (formerly, Financial Security Assurance
  (UK) Ltd).

At the same time, Moody's has placed under review for downgrade:

- Basque Country: long-term issuer and debt ratings of Aa3;

- Consorcio de Transportes de Bizkaia: long-term issuer rating
   of Aa3;

- Diputacion Foral de Guipuzcoa: long-term issuer rating of Aa3;

- Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia: long-term issuer rating of Aa3;

- Comunidad Aut¢noma de Galicia: long-term issuer rating of A1;

- Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid: long-term issuer rating of A1;

- Junta de Extremadura: long-term issuer rating of A1;

- Junta de Andalucia: long-term issuer and debt ratings of A2;

- Junta de Castilla y Leon: long-term issuer and debt ratings of

- Comunidad Autonoma de Murcia: long-term issuer and debt
   ratings of Baa1;

- Generalitat de Catalunya: long-term issuer and debt ratings of
   Baa2; short-term rating of Prime-3;

- Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha: long-term issuer
   and debt ratings of Ba2.

Methodologies Used

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regional and Local
Governments Outside the US published in May 2008,The Application
of Joint-Default Analysis to Regional and Local Governments
published in December 2008, and Government-Related Issuers:
Methodology Update published in July 2010.

Moody's methodology for rating a security insured by a financial
guarantor considers the higher of: (i) the guarantor's rating;
and (ii) the underlying rating of the security.


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to 'Caa2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating of Petroplus Holdings AG to Caa2 from Caa1 and its
probability of default rating to Caa3 from Caa1. The ratings
assigned to the USD1.6 billion senior unsecured bonds issued by
Petroplus Finance Limited were downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2. All
ratings remain under review for possible downgrade.


Petroplus Holdings AG

Corporate Family Rating -- Caa2 / Under review for Downgrade

Probability of Default Rating -- Caa3 / Under review for

Petroplus Finance Limited (Bermuda)

Senior unsecured / LGD senior unsecured ratings -- Caa3/ Under
review for Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects Moody's increasing concern that the
high degree of financial leverage displayed by Petroplus in the
context of its significantly impaired revenue and cash flow
generation capacity, makes its current capital structure
increasingly unsustainable. In turn, this significantly raises
the likelihood that the company will have to undertake a
restructuring of its debt involving substantial financial losses
for bondholders.

Moody's notes that the suspension of the group's access to all of
its credit lines (including US$1.05 billion of committed credit
facilities) under the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) and its
pledged bank accounts with its RCF lenders on January 5, 2012,
has led Petroplus to take immediate action to curtail its level
of activity. Two of the group's five refineries have already been
shut down, including Petit Couronne where labor actions continue
to restrict the lifting of products. In addition, the Cressier
refinery is expected to run down crude oil stocks and commence a
shut down next week, while throughput at the Ingolstadt and
Coryton refineries has been significantly reduced to 60,000 bpd
and 100,000 bpd respectively. This will contribute to further
constrain Petroplus's revenue and cash flow generation capacity,
which has already been significantly impaired by the very
depressed operating conditions prevailing within the European
refining sector.

At the same time, Moody's acknowledges the temporary agreement
reached by Petroplus with its lenders under its RCF on 11 January
2012. This should provide the group with the financial resources
necessary in the near term to meet critical expenses and maintain
safe ongoing operations at the Coryton and Ingolstadt refineries,
while the company continues negotiations with its RCF lenders
with a view to finalising during the second half of January 2012,
more permanent working capital funding arrangements under an
amended RCF. Moody's also notes that Petroplus is negotiating
with a third party for the supply of crude and feedstock for the
Coryton and Ingolstadt refineries.

The on-going review of the ratings will focus on (a) the outcome
to the ongoing negotiations held by Petroplus with its banks with
a view to securing new credit lines; (b) the ability of the
company to put in place sufficient alternative funding, such as
supplier credit, to operate the business; (c) the effect that the
new funding arrangements and potential restructuring of existing
debt would have on the financial profile of Petroplus and the
status of its existing bondholders; and (d) the outlook for the
group's business performance and cash flow generation under the
revised funding arrangements and in the context of operating
conditions within the European refining sector that Moody's
expects to remain challenging in the intermediate term. We expect
to conclude the review process over the next several weeks.

The principal methodology used in rating Petroplus Holdings AG
was the Global Refining and Marketing Rating Methodology
published in December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


* TURKEY: Moody's Releases Review Report on Turkish Corporates
The stable albeit cautious outlook for Turkish corporates
reflects a number of risk factors that could potentially affect
their credit quality over the next 12-18 months, says Moody's in
a Special Comment report published on January 11, 2012.

"Our stable outlook for non-financial Turkish corporates is based
on our expectation that rated corporates will benefit from
moderate economic growth of 2.5%-3.5% in Turkey in 2012 as a
result of their strong domestic focus," says Martin Kohlhase, a
Vice President -- Senior Analyst in Moody's Corporate Finance
Group and author of the report. "However, our outlook for Turkish
corporates is cautious as a result of various risk factors that
could affect their credit quality going forward, such as those
related to financial market volatility, refinancing and
expansion," adds Mr. Kohlhase.

Moody's recently lowered its GDP growth forecasts for most G-20
economies. This was to reflect the material slowdown in advanced
economies as a result of financial market volatility, combined
with ongoing deleveraging efforts in the public and banking
sectors and persistently high unemployment. As an open economy,
Turkey is vulnerable to the potential spill-over effects of a
drop-off in world trade and foreign direct investment that could

Rising event risk may affect the performance of the Turkish
economy. Moody's notes that Turkey's trade and current account
deficits have deteriorated due to higher domestic consumption and
higher energy prices, as the country imports the vast majority of
its energy requirements. As the deficit is financed by more
volatile sources of capital, such as loans and foreign exchange
deposits, Turkey is more prone to sudden shifts in investor
sentiment, which can create volatility.

Moody's cautions that debt could become harder to repay and
service if the Turkish Lira continues to depreciate. The Turkish
Lira has depreciated by around 20% over the course of 2011
against its key trading currencies, the US dollar and the euro.
Although this provides relief to exporters, it is a burden for
corporates that have significant amounts of dollar-denominated
debt as they face higher refinancing costs. Headroom under
certain financial covenants could also become constrained,
heightening the funding challenge.

Turkish corporates are vulnerable to refinancing risk because
they are heavily reliant for funding on short-term uncommitted
lines from local banks. This is partially explained by the
Turkish tax code, which penalizes debt denominated in foreign
currencies. In addition, Moody's notes that there is a risk that
the European debt crisis could lead European banks, which are
already pulling back from some emerging markets, to retrench from
Turkey too, potentially limiting funding channels.

Expansion is a long-term credit positive, but comes with risks.
Turkish corporates will continue to diversify their operations by
expanding geographically, although ongoing unrest in parts of the
Middle East could stymie some of these efforts. Large
infrastructure investments envisioned by Turkey (e.g., toll
roads, energy) could also present growth opportunities. Moody's
views expansionary moves that reduce corporates' reliance on the
domestic market or a specific industry/asset as credit enhancing
in the long term. However, expansion could also introduce greater
complexity as corporates move beyond familiar jurisdictions and
into new markets.

Moody's report, entitled "Turkish Corporates: 2011 Review & 2012
Outlook", is available on

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LAMBDA FINANCE: S&P Maintains 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Lambda Finance B.V.'s series 2005-1's (also known as Gracechurch
Corporate Loans 2005-1) class A, AB, and B notes and series 2007-
1's (also known as Gracechurch Corporate Loans 2007-1) class A,
AB, and B notes. "Our ratings on the class C, D, E, and F notes
in both transactions are unaffected," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our Nov. 29, 2011 downgrade of
Barclays Bank PLC (A+/Stable/A-1). Both deals are fully funded
synthetic small and midsize enterprise (SME) collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs), referencing portfolios of corporate loans
granted to U.K.-based SME clients of Barclays Bank," S&P said.

"The downgrades of the senior notes to 'AA- (sf)' are due to our
analysis of counterparty risk. The main factor was our analysis
of the cash deposit agreements, as both transactions have
invested the proceeds from the issuance of the credit-linked
notes in cash deposits with Barclays Bank. Thus, the entire
principal portion of the rated notes is cash-collateralized.
According to our 2010 counterparty criteria Barclays Bank is
therefore providing direct substantial support to both
structures," S&P said.

"The transaction documents do not fully reflect our 2010
counterparty criteria, but do reflect our prior counterparty
criteria. Therefore, as per our 2010 counterparty criteria, we
have lowered the ratings on the senior notes to 'AA- (sf), which
is one notch above the long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) of
Barclays Bank," S&P said.

Series 2005-1 and series 2007-1 are fully funded synthetic SME
CLOs originated by Barclays Bank. They reference loans granted to
SMEs in the U.K. The transactions closed in December 2005 and
February 2007, respectively.

          Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                 From

Lambda Finance B.V.
EUR2.074 Billion, GBP1.403 Billion, and US$3.758 Billion
Floating-Rate Notes
(Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2005-1)

Ratings Lowered

A1          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
A2          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
A3          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
AB1         AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
AB2         AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
AB3         AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B1          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B2          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B3          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

C1          A+ (sf)
C2          A+ (sf)
C3          A+ (sf)
D1          BBB+ (sf)
D2          BBB+ (sf)
E           BB (SF)
F           B- (sf)

Lambda Finance B.V.
EUR1.406 Billion, GBP1.396 Billion, and US$2.323 Billion Secured
Floating-Rate Notes
(Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2007-1)

Ratings Lowered

A1          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
A2          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
A3          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
AB1         AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
AB2         AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B1          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B2          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)
B3          AA- (sf)           AA (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

C1          A+ (sf)
C2          A+ (sf)
C3          A+ (sf)
D1          BBB+ (sf)
D2          BBB+ (sf)
E1          BB (sf)
E2          BB (sf)
F1          B- (sf)
F2          B- (sf)

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Quinn Emanuel Hired by Lehman Europe
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, special counsel of the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the Lehman Brothers'
Chapter 11 cases, filed court papers disclosing that its UK-based
office was retained by the administrator of Lehman Brothers
Bankhaus AG.

The UK firm was retained to represent Lehman Brothers Bankhaus in
a matter challenging a counterparty's calculation of amounts owed
under a repurchase agreement.  The firm will represent the
administrator in a litigation involving the counterparty, and
will provide other legal services.

"The representation is narrowly tailored to avoid any conflict
with Quinn Emanuel's representation of the Committee in the
Chapter 11 cases," said Susheel Kirpalani, Esq., a member of the

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed

Additional units, Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred
Somerset LLC, sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009
or more than a year after LBHI and its other affiliates filed
their bankruptcy cases.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase
of Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and
capital markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought
Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

               International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) on Sept. 15, 2008.  The joint
administrators have been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan
Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on
Sept. 16.  Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4
trillion (US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its
affiliates.  ( 215/945-7000)

VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Bond Rating to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Vedanta Resources Plc's
Corporate Family Rating of Ba1 but has lowered the Senior
Unsecured Bond Rating to Ba3 from Ba2. The outlook on both
ratings is maintained at negative.

Ratings Rationale

This rating action follows the completion of the acquisition of a
controlling stake in Cairn India Ltd. ("CIL"), on December 8.
First announced in August 2010, Vedanta has successfully
negotiated the course of approvals, objections and amended
production contract arrangements and now holds 38.5% of CIL
directly, with a further 20% of CIL held by Sesa Goa Ltd.,
Vedanta's 55.1%-owned subsidiary.

While the acquisition of CIL should considerably enhance the
Group's EBITDA, Moody's concern is with the sharply higher debt
burden placed on the Parent company. In order to lift its stake
from 28.5% to 58.5%, Vedanta drew US$2.78 billion from its pre-
arranged acquisition facilities. Coupled with the issue of
US$1.65 billion of bonds in June 2011, debt at the Parent company
level is now in excess of USD9 billion on a pro forma basis. This
compares with a reported Parent equity of US$1 billion at FYE
March 2011.

"In the normal course of events we are concerned about
subordination risk for unsecured bondholders in a holdco due to
the presence of priority debt in operating subsidiaries, but in
Vedanta's case our key concern is the sustainability of bank-like
balance sheet gearing at the Parent company," says Alan Greene, a
Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer.

"While some of the Parent debt is backed by intercompany loans,
the bulk of debt has been applied towards acquisitions. Unless
refinanced with more debt, acquisition debt servicing relies on
equity returns. Sporadic efforts have been made to offset the
lack of parent company profits and to move cash to the Parent
level but the ability to declare regular dividends from the
operations, chiefly in India, and to upstream these via the
intermediate holding companies, is not well established", adds
Mr. Greene, also Moody's lead analyst for Vedanta.

"The overall negative outlook is maintained given our continuing
and various concerns about the Group. The likely timeframe of the
negative outlook is an opportunity for Vedanta to tackle some of
these areas -- namely to improve the group structure, to work
through some regulatory challenges in India and of course to bed-
in the large Cairn acquisition", continues Mr. Greene.

The negative outlook also reflects the slower rate of growth
being seen in India. Already the impact of the depreciating rupee
has been seen with earnings attributable to equity holders of
Vedanta falling to US$28 million in the six months to September
2011, largely as a result of net mark to market losses on
financing arrangements at the Indian subsidiaries. Excluding
these and other special items, underlying attributable profit was
US$186 million for 1H FY12. However, a depreciating rupee
generally supports profitability as revenue is USD-linked while
the bulk of costs are in rupees.

The outlook could be stabilized if Vedanta 1) successfully
integrates CIL, with evidence of a stable and sustainable
production and business profile; 2) cash flow from dividends and
equity realizations materialize in a regular fashion.

There is limited upward pressure on the rating over the near to
medium term. Positive momentum could build if the company
demonstrates the ability to streamline its complex corporate
structure, the planned expansion projects start generating
expected returns and there is evidence of a stable and
sustainable business profile for the company. The group would
also have to demonstrate the following financial metrics on a
sustainable basis: CFO (less dividends)/Adjusted debt over 25% -
30%, Adjusted Debt/ EBITDA below 2.5x -3.0x, and EBIT interest
coverage over 5.0x -- 6.5x.

Conversely, the ratings could come under downward pressure if the
company faces further challenges in the oil and gas operations
under CIL; 2) the parent remains thinly capitalized with less
than expected dividends upstreamed from the core operating
subsidiaries; 3) undertakes further acquisitions, investments or
shareholder remuneration policies that include incremental debt;
or 4) it fails to satisfactorily execute its expansion projects.

Credit metrics that Moody's would consider for a ratings
downgrade include CFO (less dividends)/Adjusted Debt below 15%,
Adjusted Debt to EBITDA exceeding 3.5-4.0x, or EBIT interest
coverage declining to 3.5x or less on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in rating Vedanta was the Global
Mining Industry Methodology published in May 2009.

Headquartered in London, UK, Vedanta Resources plc is a metals
and mining company focusing on integrated zinc, aluminum, copper,
iron ore mining and commercial power generation. Its operations
are predominantly located in India. It is listed on the London
Stock Exchange and is 62.19% owned by Volcan Investments Ltd.


* Moody's Says Prospects for EMEA 2012 Corp. Ratings are Negative
2012 will be a challenging year for non-financial corporates in
Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), says Moody's Investors
Service in a Special Comment report published on Jan. 12, 2012.
The main drivers of this view are the European sovereign debt
crisis, the weak macroeconomic climate, falling consumer
confidence and deteriorating funding conditions.

"We expect that downgrades will continue to substantially exceed
upgrades in the coming year for both investment-grade and
speculative-grade corporates," explains Jean-Michel Carayon, a
Senior Vice President in Moody's Credit Policy Group and co-
author of the report. "This follows on from the deterioration
recorded in late 2011: in Q1-Q3, the ratio of downgrades to
upgrades was less than 2:1, but in Q4 2011 there were nine times
as many downgrades as upgrades."

Moody's expects that financial market turbulence, fiscal
consolidation efforts and banking sector deleveraging will
continue to constrain growth into 2012. The rating agency's
forecasts for the euro area in particular carry a high level of
uncertainty, with significant downside risks which carry negative
implications for corporate creditworthiness.

Moody's notes that the refunding needs of speculative-grade
issuers are significant and their current solid liquidity will
serve as a buffer only in the short term. A prolonged period of
restricted market access could be problematic for many
speculative-grade companies in terms of maintaining adequate
liquidity and thus their ratings.

Based on current macroeconomic scenarios, Moody's projects that
the speculative-grade default rate in 2012 will rise modestly
from the low level (less than 3%) recorded in 2011. If more
pessimistic macro scenarios come to pass, and the euro area
enters a recession, the default rate might rise to the high
single digits.

Government-related issuers (GRIs) and companies with a geographic
concentration in weakly performing economies are more exposed to
negative pressure in a deteriorating economic environment. In
Moody's view, austerity measures will also more directly hurt
corporates that depend on government programs for a large part of
their top-line revenue.

At the start of 2012, the majority of Moody's Industry Sector
Outlooks (ISOs) -- the rating agency's view of the business
conditions that it factors into its corporate ratings -- were
stable. However, the risk of some outlooks turning negative is on
the rise. Cyclical sectors will be particularly exposed in the
event of deteriorating macroeconomic trends. Amongst cyclical
industries, Moody's ISOs for the European steel and global
shipping sectors are now negative. The ISO for European building
materials remains stable but the outlook is skewed to the
downside as the recovery of the industry following the global
financial crisis of 2008-09 has not been as robust as expected.
Amongst consumer-driven sectors, the ISO for European
telecommunications service providers turned negative late last
year, largely due to falling consumer confidence and its
potential impact on revenues.

Moody's notes that, to some extent, emerging markets remain a
mitigating factor against weak demand in the euro area for
geographically diversified corporates. However, there is a risk
that those markets will be increasingly affected by Europe's
sovereign debt crisis and an economic downturn in Europe.

Moody's report, entitled "EMEA Corporates: 2012 Outlook", is
available on

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Eurozone Sovereigns
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services on Jan. 13 completed its
review of its ratings on 16 eurozone sovereigns, resulting in
downgrades for nine eurozone sovereigns and affirmations of the
ratings on seven others.

"We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered the long-term ratings
on Austria, France, Malta, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, by
one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. All ratings on the 16 sovereigns have been removed
from CreditWatch where they were placed with negative
implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first
placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

"The outlooks on our long-term ratings on all but two of the 16
eurozone sovereigns are negative; the outlooks on the long-term
ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable."


"The rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that
the policy initiatives that have been taken by European
policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address
ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In our view, these
stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an
increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone
issuers, (3) a simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and
households, (4) weakening economic growth prospects, and (5) an
open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the
proper approach to address challenges.

"The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent
statements from policymakers lead us to believe that the
agreement reached has not produced a breakthrough of sufficient
size and scope to fully address the eurozone's financial
problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does not supply
sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for
those eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market

"We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a
partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current
financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the
periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial
problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising
external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between
the EMU's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone
risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line
with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable
incomes, eroding national tax revenues.

"Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we
have adjusted downward our political scores (one of the five key
factors in our criteria) for those eurozone sovereigns we had
previously scored in our two highest categories. This reflects
our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of
European policymaking and political institutions have not
been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a
broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.

"In addition to our assessment of the policy response to the
crisis, downgrades in some countries have also been triggered by
external risks. In our view, it is increasingly likely that
refinancing costs for certain countries may remain elevated, that
credit availability and economic growth may further decelerate,
and that pressure on financing conditions may persist.
Accordingly, for those sovereigns we consider most at risk of an
economic downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for
example due to their large cross-border financing needs, we have
adjusted our external score downward."


"We believe that not all sovereigns are equally vulnerable to the
possible extension and intensification of the financial crisis.
Those we consider most at risk of an economic downturn and
deteriorating funding conditions, for example due to the large
cross-border financing needs of its governments or financial
sectors, have been downgraded by two notches, as we lowered the
political score and/or the external score reflecting our view of
the risk of a marked deterioration in the country's external

"On the other hand, we affirmed the ratings of sovereigns which
we believe are likely to be more resilient at their current
rating level in light of their relatively strong external
positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These
credit strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to
neutralize the potential ratings impact from the lowering of our
political score.

"In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone
sovereigns remain at comparatively high levels, with only three
below investment grade (Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece).
Historically, investment-grade rated sovereigns have experienced
very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the 15-year cumulative
default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grades was
1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the 'A' category or


"For those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that
downside risks persist and that a more adverse economic and
financial environment could erode their relative strengths within
the next year or two to a degree that in our view could warrant a
further downward revision of their long-term ratings. We believe
that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone
sovereigns to various degrees are related to the possibility of
further significant fiscal deterioration as a consequence of a
more recessionary macroeconomic environment and/or
vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening of risk
aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at
sustainable rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn
than we currently envisage could also lead to rising stress
levels in the European banking system, potentially leading to
additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank
workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe
that there is a risk that reform fatigue could be mounting,
especially in those countries that have experienced deep
recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak, which could
eventually lead to lower levels of predictability of policy
orientation, potentially leading to another downward adjustment
of the political score, which might lead to lower ratings.

"We believe that important risks related to potential near-term
deterioration of credit conditions remain for a number of
sovereigns. This belief is based on what we see as the
sovereigns' very substantial financing needs in early 2012, the
risk of further downward revisions of economic growth
expectations, and the challenge to maintain political support for
unpopular and possibly more severe austerity measures, as fiscal
targets are endangered by macroeconomic headwinds. Governments
are also aiming to put greater focus on growth-enhancing
structural measures. While these may contribute positively to a
lasting solution of the current crisis, we believe they could
also run counter to powerful national interest groups, whose
resistance could potentially jeopardize the reform momentum and
impede the recovery of market confidence. In our view, it also
remains to be seen whether European banks will indeed use the
ample term funding provided by the ECB to purchase newly issued
sovereign bonds of governments under financial stress.

"We believe that as long as uncertainty about the bond buyers at
primary auctions remains, the risk of a deepening of the crisis
remains a real one. These risks could be exacerbated should
renewed policy disagreements among European policymakers emerge
or the Greek debt restructuring lead to an outcome that further
discourages financial investors to add to their positions
in peripheral sovereign securities.

"For two sovereigns, Germany and Slovakia, we concluded that
downside scenarios that could lead to a lowering of the relevant
credit scores and the sovereign ratings carry a likelihood of
less than one-in-three during 2012 or 2013. Accordingly we have
assigned a stable outlook."


"We have previously stated our belief that an effective strategy
that would buoy confidence and lower the currently elevated
borrowing costs for European sovereigns could include, for
example, a greater pooling of fiscal resources and obligations as
well as enhanced mutual budgetary oversight. We have also
stated that we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of
fiscal austerity alone would risk becoming self-defeating, as
domestic demand falls in line with consumer's rising concerns
about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax

"The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent
statements from policymakers, lead us to believe that the
agreement reached has not produced a breakthrough of sufficient
size and scope to fully address the eurozone's financial
problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does not supply
sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for
those eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market
pressures. Instead, it focuses on what we consider to be a one-
sided approach by emphasizing fiscal austerity without a strong
and consistent program to raise the growth potential of the
economies in the eurozone. While some member states have
implemented measures on the national level to deregulate internal
labor markets, and improve the flexibility of domestic services
sectors, these reforms do not appear to us to be coordinated at
the supra-national level; as evidence, we would note large and
widening discrepancies in activity and unemployment levels among
the 17 eurozone member states.

"Regarding additional resources, the main enhancement we see has
been to bring forward to mid-2012 the start date of the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), the successor vehicle to the European
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). This will marginally increase
these official sources' lending capacity from currently EUR440bn
to EUR500bn. As we noted previously, we expect eurozone
policymakers will accord ESM de-facto preferred creditor status
in the event of a eurozone sovereign default. We believe that the
prospect of subordination to a large creditor, which would have a
key role in any future debt rescheduling, would make a lasting
contribution to the rise in long-term government bond yields of
lower-rated eurozone sovereigns and may reduce their future
market access.

"We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a
partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current
financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the
periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial
problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising
external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between
the EMU's core and the so-called "periphery." In our opinion, the
eurozone periphery has only been able to bear its
underperformance on competitiveness (manifest in sizeable
external deficits) because of funding by the banking systems of
the more competitive northern eurozone economies.

"According to our assessment, the political agreement reached at
the summit did not contain significant new initiatives to address
the near-term funding challenges that have engulfed the eurozone.
The summit focused primarily on a long-term plan to reverse
fiscal imbalances. It proposed to enshrine into national
legislation requirements for structurally balanced budgets.
Certain institutional enhancements have been introduced to
strengthen the enforceability of the fiscal rules compared to the
Stability and Growth Pact, such as reverse qualified majority
voting required to overturn sanctions proposed by the European
Commission in case of violations of the broadly balanced budget
rules. Notwithstanding this progress, we believe that the
enforcement of these measures is far from certain, even if all
member states eventually passed respective legislation by
parliaments (and by referendum, where this is required). Our
assessment is based on several factors, including:

   -- The difficulty of forecasting reliably and precisely
structural deficits, which we expect will likely be at the center
of any decision on whether to impose sanctions;

   -- The ability of individual member states' elected
governments to extricate themselves from the external control of
the European Commission by withdrawing from the intergovernmental
agreement, which will not be part of an EU-wide Treaty; and

   -- The possibility that the appropriateness of these fiscal
rules may come under scrutiny when a recession may, in the eyes
of policymakers, call for fiscal stimulus in order to stabilize
demand, which could be precluded by the need to adhere to the
requirement to balance budgets.

"Details on the exact content and operational procedures of the
rules are still to emerge and -- depending on the stringency of
the rules -- the process of passing national legislation may run
into opposition in some signatory states, which in turn could
lower the confidence of investors and the credibility of
the agreed policies.

"More fundamentally, we believe that the proposed measures do not
directly address the core underlying factors that have
contributed to the market stress. It is our view that the
currently experienced financial stress does not in the first
instance result from fiscal mismanagement. This to us is
supported by the examples of Spain and Ireland, which ran an
average fiscal deficit of 0.4% of GDP and a surplus of 1.6% of
GDP, respectively, during the period 1999-2007 (versus a deficit
of 2.3% of GDP in the case of Germany), while reducing
significantly their public debt ratio during that period. The
policies and rules agreed at the summit would not have indicated
that the boom-time developments in those countries contained the
seeds of the current market turmoil.

While we see a lack of fiscal prudence as having been a major
contributing factor to high public debt levels in some countries,
such as Greece, we believe that the key underlying issue for the
eurozone as a whole is one of a growing divergence in
competitiveness between the core and the so-called "periphery."
Exacerbated by the rapid expansion of European banks' balance
sheets, this has led to large and growing external imbalances,
evident in the size of financial sector claims of net capital-
exporting banking systems on net importing countries. When the
financial markets deteriorated and risk aversion increased, the
financing needs of both the public and financial sectors in the
"periphery" had to be covered to varying degrees by official
funding, including European Central Bank (ECB) liquidity as well
as intergovernmental, EFSF, and IMF loans.


"We have generally adjusted downward our political scores (one of
the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings criteria)
for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two
highest categories. This score change has been a contributing
factor to the rating actions on the relevant sovereigns cited
above. Under the political score, we assess how a government's
institutions and policymaking affect a sovereign's credit
fundamentals by delivering sustainable public finances, promoting
balanced growth, and responding to economic or political shocks.
Our political score also captures the potential effect of
external organizations on policy settings.

"It is our view that the limitations on monetary flexibility
imposed by membership in the eurozone are not adequately
counterbalanced by other eurozone economic policies to avoid the
negative impact on creditworthiness that the eurozone members are
in opinion view currently facing. Financial solidarity among
member states appears to us to be insufficient to prevent
prolonged funding uncertainties. Specifically, we believe that
the current crisis management tools may not be adequate to
restore lasting confidence in the creditworthiness of large
eurozone members such as Italy and Spain. Nor do we think they
are likely to instill sufficient confidence in these sovereigns'
ability to address potential financial system stresses in their
jurisdiction. In such a setting, the prospects of effectively
intervening in the feedback loop between sovereign and financial
sector risk are in our opinion weak."


"We believe that the elusiveness of an effective policy response
is likely to add to caution among households and investors alike,
weighing on the growth outlook for all eurozone members. Our base
case still assumes that the eurozone will record moderate growth
in 2012 and 2013, i.e. 0.2% and 1%, respectively -- down from
0.4% and 1.2% according to our early December forecast, with a
relatively mild recession in the first half of 2012.
Nevertheless, we estimate a 40% probability that a deeper and
more prolonged recession could hit the eurozone, with a likely
reduction of economic activity of 1.5% in 2012. Furthermore, we
believe an even deeper and more prolonged slump cannot be
entirely excluded. We expect this weak macroeconomic outlook if
realized would complicate the implementation of budget plans,
with slippages to be expected, which would likely further dampen
confidence and potentially deepen the recession, as funding and
credit is curtailed and the private sector increases
precautionary savings."


"We did not change the rating on Greece, which had been
downgraded to 'CC' in July 2011, indicating our view of the risk
of imminent default. Negotiations with bondholders have taken
longer than originally anticipated and we believe may now run
close to a large redemption of EUR14.5 billion on March 20, 2012,
raising the specter of a disorderly default. Such an event would
in our view further complicate the restoration of affordable
market access for other sovereigns experiencing market stress. We
understand that the main unresolved issues are related to the
treatment of holdouts, the participation of official creditors,
and the coupon of the new bonds that will be offered (which
partly determine the effective recovery, which we continue to
expect to lie between 30% and 50%). We do not believe that
private-sector involvement will necessarily be a one-off event in
the case of the Greek restructuring and would not be sought in
possible future bail-out packages in a future case of sovereign
insolvency or prolonged loss of market access. All the more so as
official lenders are less likely to bear any future losses as
their lending will be channeled through the ESM, a privileged
creditor that is expected to be senior to bondholders in any
future restructuring."


"In our view, the actions of the ECB have been instrumental in
averting a collapse of market confidence. We see that the ECB has
eased its eligibility criteria, allowing an ever-expanding pool
of assets to be used as collateral for its funding operations,
and has lowered the fixed rate on its main refinancing operation
to 1%, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it has
engaged in unprecedented repurchase operations for financial

In December 2011, it lent financial institutions almost EUR500
billion over three years and announced further unlimited long-
term funding auctions for early 2012. This has greatly relieved
the funding pressure for banks, which will have to redeem over
EUR200 billion of bonded debt (excluding in some jurisdictions
sizeable private placements) in the first quarter alone. By
lowering the ECB deposit rate to 0.25%, we believe that the
central bank has implicitly tried to encourage financial
institutions to engage in a carry trade of borrowing up to three-
year funds cheaply from the central bank and purchasing high-
yielding government bonds. Recent Italian and other primary
auctions suggest to us, however, that banks and other investors
may still only be willing to lend longer term to governments
facing market pressure if they are offered interest rates that,
all other things being equal, will make fiscal consolidation
harder to achieve.

"Reports indicate that many investors had hoped that a
breakthrough at the December summit would have enticed the ECB to
step up its direct government bond purchases in the secondary
market through its Security Market Program (SMP). However, these
hopes were quickly deflated as it became clearer that the ECB
would prefer to provide banks with unlimited funding, partly with
the expectation that those liquid funds in banks' balance sheets
would find their way into primary sovereign bond auctions. This
indirect way of supporting the sovereign bond market may yet be
successful, but we believe that banks may remain cautious when
being faced with primary sovereign offerings, as most financial
institutions have aimed at shrinking their balance sheets by
running down security portfolios in order to comply with higher
capital requirements, which become effective in 2012. We believe
that the ECB has not entirely closed the door to expanding its
involvement in the sovereign bond market but remains reluctant to
do so except in more dramatic circumstances. In our view, this
reluctance is likely prompted by concerns about moral hazard, the
ECB's own credibility (particularly should losses mount), and
potential inflation pressures in the longer term. We think it may
also be the case that the ECB (as well as some eurozone
governments) is concerned that governments' reform efforts would
falter prematurely if market pressure subsides.

"We believe that the risk of a credit crunch remains real in a
number of countries as economic conditions weaken and banks
continue to consolidate their balance sheets in light of tighter
capital requirements and poor market conditions in which to raise
additional equity. However, the monetary policy actions described
above may mitigate the risk of a more extreme tightening of
credit conditions, which, if it were to come to pass, could put
further pressure on economic activity and employment.

"In summary, while the monetary policy reaction has not been as
accommodating as many investors may have anticipated or hoped
for, we believe that it has nevertheless provided significant
breathing space during which progress on policy reform can be
made. Furthermore, the ECB may yet engage in additional
supporting steps should the sovereign and bank funding crises
intensify further. Therefore, we have not changed our monetary
score on eurozone sovereigns.


"In our view, the governments of Mario Monti and Mariano Rajoy
have stepped up initiatives to modernize their economies and
secure the sustainability of public finances over the long term.
We consider that the domestic political management of the crisis
has improved markedly in Italy. Therefore, we have not changed
our political risk score for Italy because we are of the opinion
that the weakening policy environment at the European level is to
a sufficient degree offset by Italy's stronger domestic capacity
to formulate and implement crisis-mitigating economic policies."

"Despite these encouraging developments on domestic policy, we
downgraded both sovereigns by two notches. This is due to our
opinion that Italy and Spain are particularly prone to the risk
of a sudden deterioration in market conditions. Thus, we believe
that, as far as sovereign creditworthiness is concerned, the
deepening of the crisis and the risks of further market
dislocation that could accompany an inconclusive European crisis
management strategy more than offset our view of the enhanced
national policy orientation."


"We have not adjusted our political score backing the rating on
Ireland. This reflects our view that the Irish government's
response to the significant deterioration in its public finances
and the recent crisis in the Irish financial sector has been
proactive and substantive. This offsets our view that the
effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European
policymaking as a whole remains insufficient in addressing the
deepening financial crisis in the eurozone. Excluding government-
funded banking sector recapitalization payments, the authorities
have adjusted Ireland's budget by almost 13% of estimated 2012
GDP since 2008 and plan additional fiscal savings of close to 8%
of GDP for 2012-2015. All other things being equal, we view the
government's fiscal consolidation plan as sufficient to achieve a
general government deficit of about 3% of GDP in 2015. In our
view, there is currently a strong political consensus behind the
fiscal consolidation program and policy implementation so far has
been extremely strong.

"In our view, Ireland has the most flexible and open economy
among the "periphery" sovereigns. We believe that Ireland's
economic adjustment process is further advanced than in the other
sovereigns currently experiencing market pressures. This is
illustrated by the 25% depreciation in the trade-weighted
exchange rate since May 2008 and Irish exports growth contributed
positively to the muted Irish economic recovery in 2011. However,
in our view this also leaves the Irish economy and, ultimately,
the Irish government's fiscal consolidation program susceptible
to worsening external economic conditions, which is reflected in
our negative outlook on the rating."


"Following our placement of the ratings on the eurozone
sovereigns on CreditWatch in December, we also placed a number of
supranational entities on CreditWatch with negative implications.
These included, among others, the European Financial Stability
Fund (EFSF), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European
Union's own funding program. We are currently assessing the
credit implications of the eurozone sovereign downgrades on those
institutions and will publish our updated credit view in the
coming days."

* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 9, 2012 to January 13, 2012

Issuer                   Coupon     Maturity Currency    Price
------                   ------     -------- --------    -----

BA CREDITANSTALT           5.470    8/28/2013     EUR     58.13
BAWAG                      5.310    2/12/2023     EUR     55.32
BAWAG                      5.400    2/12/2023     EUR     55.83
BAWAG                      5.430    2/26/2024     EUR     50.56
HAA-BANK INTL AG           5.270     4/7/2028     EUR     44.40
HYPO-WOHNBAUBANK           3.625     8/8/2023     EUR     66.89
IMMOFINANZ                 4.250     3/8/2018     EUR      3.41
KOMMUNALKREDIT             4.900    6/23/2031     EUR     46.00
KOMMUNALKREDIT             4.440   12/20/2030     EUR     43.13
KOMMUNALKREDIT             5.430    2/13/2024     EUR     57.75
KOMMUNALKREDIT             6.080   12/13/2018     EUR     70.63
OESTER VOLKSBK             5.270     2/8/2027     EUR     40.33
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.170    7/29/2015     EUR     59.50
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.750    4/30/2021     EUR     68.76
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.160    5/20/2025     EUR     70.97
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.810    7/29/2025     EUR     63.88
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.730   12/11/2023     EUR     57.58
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.470    2/28/2028     EUR     50.08
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            5.500   12/29/2023     EUR     55.94
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            4.500    9/28/2035     EUR     38.90
RAIFFEISEN BK IN           6.625    5/18/2021     EUR     72.51

ECONOCOM GROUP             4.000     6/1/2016     EUR     19.58
IDEAL STANDARD I          11.750     5/1/2018     EUR     61.50
IDEAL STANDARD I          11.750     5/1/2018     EUR     61.38
ONTEX IV                   9.000    4/15/2019     EUR     71.88
ONTEX IV                   9.000    4/15/2019     EUR     71.93
ZAGREBACKI HOLD            5.500    7/10/2017     EUR     69.63

AVANGARDCO INVES          10.000   10/29/2015     USD     75.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.350     6/9/2020     EUR     64.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.000     6/9/2021     EUR     66.05
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.500    8/25/2021     EUR     67.42
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     1/2/2016     EUR     67.68
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    3/30/2016     EUR     66.79
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     6/2/2016     EUR     66.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    9/28/2017     EUR     63.24
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.000    4/20/2015     EUR     72.69
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.600   10/26/2016     EUR     71.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.100    1/29/2018     EUR     65.15
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    4/23/2018     EUR     63.06
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     1/4/2017     EUR     64.55
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600   10/23/2018     EUR     62.84
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    2/26/2019     EUR     62.78
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    2/15/2017     EUR     64.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500     4/2/2017     EUR     64.03
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.600    4/15/2017     EUR     67.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.250     6/9/2015     EUR     70.26
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.100    6/24/2019     EUR     69.29
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.625     2/3/2020     EUR     62.15
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.100    4/20/2020     EUR     67.69
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           3.750    11/1/2015     EUR     65.93
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.750    12/2/2015     EUR     66.85
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           6.000     1/4/2015     EUR     74.56
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.750    9/30/2015     EUR     67.59
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           5.000     6/9/2016     EUR     66.58
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    7/11/2016     EUR     65.86
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    10/9/2016     EUR     65.12
MARFIN POPULAR             4.350   11/20/2014     EUR     35.13
MARFIN POPULAR             4.375    9/21/2012     EUR     75.58
REP OF CYPRUS              4.375    7/15/2014     EUR     70.00
REP OF CYPRUS              4.750    2/25/2016     EUR     67.29

FIN-DANISH IND             4.910     7/6/2021     EUR     57.25
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500   12/14/2020     ZAR     47.09
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500     2/3/2016     TRY     71.76

MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   10/28/2015     TRY     72.59
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   12/29/2015     TRY     73.85
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   10/27/2016     ZAR     72.81
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   10/27/2016     TRY     68.29
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    12/6/2016     TRY     67.92
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   12/21/2016     TRY     67.71
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    6/30/2017     ZAR     70.83
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/16/2017     TRY     61.12
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/27/2018     ZAR     65.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/21/2018     TRY     61.07
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/21/2018     ZAR     64.78
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   12/20/2018     ZAR     67.20
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    9/24/2020     CAD     70.85
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/25/2020     ZAR     49.10
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/10/2021     NZD     63.34
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   12/21/2021     NZD     65.27
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    3/17/2025     CAD     53.91
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.250    6/28/2040     CAD     21.08
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/17/2016     ZAR     73.28
TALVIVAARA                 4.000   12/16/2015     EUR     74.25

AIR FRANCE-KLM             4.970     4/1/2015     EUR     10.54
ALCATEL-LUCENT             5.000     1/1/2015     EUR      2.49
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG           6.720     1/1/2015     EUR      4.43
AREVA SA                   3.500    3/22/2021     EUR     72.03
ASSYSTEM                   4.000     1/1/2017     EUR     20.00
ATOS ORIGIN SA             2.500     1/1/2016     EUR     49.75
BNP PARIBAS                2.890    5/16/2036     JPY     55.44
BNP PARIBAS               10.050    7/24/2012     USD     33.63
BPCE                       3.455    9/16/2025     EUR     71.57
CALYON                     5.800   10/29/2029     USD     77.60
CALYON                     6.000    6/18/2047     EUR     12.25
CAP GEMINI SOGET           3.500     1/1/2014     EUR     36.29
CEGEDIM SA                 7.000    7/27/2015     EUR     70.00
CGG VERITAS                1.750     1/1/2016     EUR     28.15
CLUB MEDITERRANE           6.110    11/1/2015     EUR     18.24
CLUB MEDITERRANE           5.000     6/8/2012     EUR     14.18
CMA CGM                    8.875    4/15/2019     EUR     45.75
CMA CGM                    8.500    4/15/2017     USD     46.35
CMA CGM                    8.875    4/15/2019     EUR     46.06
CMA CGM                    8.500    4/15/2017     USD     44.00
CNP ASSURANCES             6.000    9/14/2040     EUR     63.19
CNP ASSURANCES             5.250    5/16/2023     EUR     74.98
CNP ASSURANCES             7.375    9/30/2041     GBP     72.41
CNP ASSURANCES             6.875    9/30/2041     EUR     64.43
CRED AGRICOLE SA           4.000    9/30/2022     EUR     67.18
CRED AGRICOLE SA           3.900    4/19/2021     EUR     71.81
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.830    6/30/2031     USD     76.66
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300   10/12/2030     USD     72.91
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.250   10/18/2030     USD     72.31
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300   10/22/2030     USD     72.73
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.350   10/29/2030     USD     72.97
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.910    11/3/2030     USD     69.73
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.450    11/9/2030     USD     73.82
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.080   11/23/2030     USD     70.37
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.690   11/26/2030     USD     76.15
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.400    12/9/2030     USD     73.33
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.000   12/23/2030     USD     78.68
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.050    1/14/2031     USD     79.19
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.950    1/19/2031     USD     78.42
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.150    2/11/2031     USD     78.51
CREDIT AGRI CIB            6.220    3/17/2031     USD     80.45
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.880     4/8/2031     USD     78.60
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.850    6/30/2031     USD     76.88
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.610    6/15/2031     USD     74.59
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.650    6/10/2031     USD     75.00
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.850    5/27/2031     USD     76.96
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.270     8/5/2030     USD     72.54
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.850    9/17/2030     USD     68.23
CREDIT AGRI CIB            5.300    10/7/2030     USD     72.52
CREDIT AGRICOLE            3.750   10/20/2020     EUR     71.65
CREDIT AGRICOLE            4.050   12/22/2020     EUR     72.80
CREDIT LOCAL FRA           3.750    5/26/2020     EUR     54.35
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           5.037     8/4/2020     EUR     59.87
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.020    3/13/2017     EUR     73.66
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.110    9/18/2018     EUR     63.06
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.550     4/2/2020     EUR     58.78
DEXIA CRED LOCAL           4.500    2/25/2020     EUR     58.63
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           1.000   12/23/2024     EUR     59.67
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           2.875    4/23/2030     CHF     72.18
EURAZEO                    6.250    6/10/2014     EUR     55.51
EUROPCAR GROUPE            9.375    4/15/2018     EUR     58.86
EUROPCAR GROUPE            9.375    4/15/2018     EUR     57.63
FAURECIA                   4.500     1/1/2015     EUR     21.28
FONCIERE REGIONS           3.340     1/1/2017     EUR     69.89
GIE PSA TRESORER           6.000    9/19/2033     EUR     67.54
GROUPAMA SA                7.875   10/27/2039     EUR     52.14
INGENICO                   2.750     1/1/2017     EUR     42.08
ITALCEMENTI FIN            5.375    3/19/2020     EUR     73.46
IXIS CIB                   5.400     1/9/2033     EUR     69.14
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2015     EUR     17.07
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2014     EUR     17.97
NEXANS SA                  4.000     1/1/2016     EUR     57.94
ORPEA                      3.875     1/1/2016     EUR     42.20
PAGESJAUNES FINA           8.875     6/1/2018     EUR     66.63
PAGESJAUNES FINA           8.875     6/1/2018     EUR     66.55
PEUGEOT SA                 4.450     1/1/2016     EUR     23.44
PIERRE VACANCES            4.000    10/1/2015     EUR     70.45
PUBLICIS GROUPE            1.000    1/18/2018     EUR     50.12
PUBLICIS GROUPE            3.125    7/30/2014     EUR     38.85
SOC AIR FRANCE             2.750     4/1/2020     EUR     20.82
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.900    3/10/2031     USD     68.67
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.860    3/11/2031     USD     68.30
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.940    3/14/2031     USD     69.01
SOCIETE GENERALE           6.010    3/15/2031     USD     69.64
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.910    3/16/2031     USD     68.73
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.920    3/17/2031     USD     68.82
SOCIETE GENERALE           5.860    4/26/2031     USD     68.50
SOITEC                     6.250     9/9/2014     EUR      8.01
TEM                        4.250     1/1/2015     EUR     52.29
THEOLIA                    2.700     1/1/2041     EUR      8.48
ZLOMREX INT FIN            8.500     2/1/2014     EUR     73.50
ZLOMREX INT FIN            8.500     2/1/2014     EUR     73.50

BAYERISCHE HYPO            5.000   12/21/2029     EUR     58.00
BAYERISCHE LNDBK           4.500     2/7/2019     EUR     65.66
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.600    4/14/2023     EUR     60.13
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.640    1/30/2024     EUR     59.13
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           4.270    1/15/2019     EUR     62.50
BHW BAUSPARKASSE           5.450    2/20/2023     EUR     59.50
COMMERZBANK AG             5.000   10/30/2017     EUR     72.82
COMMERZBANK AG             4.000   11/30/2017     EUR     19.75
COMMERZBANK AG             5.000    3/30/2018     EUR     18.93
COMMERZBANK AG             5.625   11/29/2017     EUR     67.00
COMMERZBANK AG             5.000    4/20/2018     EUR     18.91
COMMERZBANK AG             6.625    8/30/2019     GBP     70.31
COMMERZBANK AG             6.375    3/22/2019     EUR     74.46
COMMERZBANK AG             6.300    3/15/2022     EUR     64.05
COMMERZBANK AG             6.360    3/15/2022     EUR     64.20
COMMERZBANK AG             6.460    6/24/2022     EUR     64.09
DEUT GENOS-HYPBK           6.610    3/21/2022     EUR     74.92
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN           5.300   11/20/2023     EUR     57.38
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN           6.050    9/27/2022     EUR     63.75
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.550    4/14/2020     EUR     70.73
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.000    2/25/2020     EUR     68.54
DRESDNER BANK AG           7.160    8/14/2024     EUR     61.65
DRESDNER BANK AG           5.700    7/31/2023     EUR     56.80
DRESDNER BANK AG           7.350    6/13/2028     EUR     59.42
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.210    6/20/2022     EUR     62.87
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.635    6/18/2018     EUR     75.01
DRESDNER BANK AG           7.250    6/24/2019     EUR     76.31
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.180    2/28/2023     EUR     59.40
DRESDNER BANK AG           5.290    5/31/2021     EUR     60.69
DRESDNER BANK AG           6.375     5/8/2018     EUR     74.07
ESCADA AG                  7.500     4/1/2012     EUR      8.03
EUROHYPO AG                5.110     8/6/2018     EUR     61.88
EUROHYPO AG                5.560    8/18/2023     EUR     53.25
EUROHYPO AG                3.830    9/21/2020     EUR     51.00
EUROHYPO AG                6.490    7/17/2017     EUR     69.75
GOTHAER ALLG VER           5.527    9/29/2026     EUR     71.42
HAPAG-LLOYD                9.750   10/15/2017     USD     71.50
HAPAG-LLOYD                9.750   10/15/2017     USD     73.00
HECKLER & KOCH             9.500    5/15/2018     EUR     65.50
HECKLER & KOCH             9.500    5/15/2018     EUR     65.50
HEIDELBERG DRUCK           9.250    4/15/2018     EUR     62.50
HEIDELBERG DRUCK           9.250    4/15/2018     EUR     62.91
HSH NORDBANK AG            4.375    2/14/2017     EUR     52.56
HVB REAL ESTATE            6.570    3/18/2022     EUR     71.55
L-BANK FOERDERBK           0.500    5/10/2027     CAD     51.22
LB BADEN-WUERTT            5.250   10/20/2015     EUR     26.84
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.800    2/23/2037     JPY     38.79
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN           5.875    2/10/2016     EUR     63.28
Q-CELLS                    6.750   10/21/2015     EUR      0.69
QIMONDA FINANCE            6.750    3/22/2013     USD      1.00
RHEINISCHE HYPBK           6.600    5/29/2022     EUR     60.50
SOLARWORLD AG              6.125    1/21/2017     EUR     62.95
SOLON AG SOLAR             1.375    12/6/2012     EUR      1.98
TUI AG                     2.750    3/24/2016     EUR     37.50
TUI AG                     5.500   11/17/2014     EUR     59.25
VOLKSWAGEN BANK            5.500     6/7/2024     EUR     52.69
VOLKSWAGEN BANK            5.400    9/26/2023     EUR     55.59

ATHENS URBAN TRN           5.008    7/18/2017     EUR     18.68
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.057    3/26/2013     EUR     40.14
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.851    9/19/2016     EUR     17.28
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.301    8/12/2014     EUR     20.40
FAGE DAIRY IND             7.500    1/15/2015     EUR     74.63
FAGE DAIRY IND             7.500    1/15/2015     EUR     74.63
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.300    7/25/2030     EUR     18.50
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.900    7/25/2025     EUR     19.50
HELLENIC REPUB             2.125     7/5/2013     CHF     35.63
HELLENIC REPUB             4.625    6/25/2013     USD     33.25
HELLENIC REPUB             5.000    3/11/2019     EUR     28.63
HELLENIC REPUB             5.200    7/17/2034     EUR     23.38
HELLENIC REPUB             4.590     4/8/2016     EUR     18.50
HELLENIC REPUB             6.140    4/14/2028     EUR     10.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    9/20/2040     EUR     19.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    9/20/2037     EUR     19.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.300    3/20/2026     EUR     20.43
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.700    3/20/2024     EUR     19.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900   10/22/2022     EUR     20.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.250    6/19/2020     EUR     22.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500   10/22/2019     EUR     20.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.000    7/19/2019     EUR     20.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.959     3/4/2019     EUR     22.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.014    2/27/2019     EUR     21.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    7/20/2018     EUR     21.29
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.590     4/3/2018     EUR     20.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.675    10/9/2017     EUR     20.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    7/20/2017     EUR     20.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900    4/20/2017     EUR     20.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.225     3/1/2017     EUR     19.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.020    9/13/2016     EUR     19.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.600    7/20/2016     EUR     21.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700   11/10/2015     EUR     22.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.702    9/30/2015     EUR     19.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700    7/20/2015     EUR     20.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.113    9/30/2014     EUR     21.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.500    8/20/2014     EUR     20.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500     7/1/2014     EUR     24.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    5/20/2014     EUR     22.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500    1/11/2014     EUR     22.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.520    9/30/2013     EUR     24.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.000    8/20/2013     EUR     23.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.427    7/31/2013     EUR     31.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.900     7/3/2013     EUR     34.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI           7.500    5/20/2013     EUR     32.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    5/20/2013     EUR     26.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.506    3/31/2013     EUR     37.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.100    8/20/2012     EUR     29.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI           1.000    6/30/2012     EUR     61.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.250    6/20/2012     EUR     62.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.250    5/18/2012     EUR     33.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.100    8/20/2015     EUR     21.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    3/20/2012     EUR     43.18
NATL BK G-TENDER           3.875    10/7/2016     EUR     68.48
YIOULA GLASSWORK           9.000    12/1/2015     EUR     44.50
YIOULA GLASSWORK           9.000    12/1/2015     EUR     44.63

CALYON FIN GUER            6.000     9/4/2029     USD     79.62
CREDIT AGRICOLE            5.600    2/25/2030     USD     75.22

FHB MORTGAGE BAN           4.500    3/22/2022     EUR     55.63
OTP BANK                   5.270    9/19/2016     EUR     70.53
REP OF HUNGARY             3.875    2/24/2020     EUR     69.50
REP OF HUNGARY             4.000    5/20/2016     CHF     71.45

AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000    2/12/2030     EUR     45.67
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000     3/1/2030     EUR     45.63
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.580    4/28/2028     EUR     50.95
ALLIED IRISH BKS          12.500    6/25/2035     GBP     40.88
ALLIED IRISH BKS           4.000    3/19/2015     EUR     74.39
ALLIED IRISH BKS           5.625   11/12/2014     EUR     73.28
ANGLO IRISH BANK           4.000    4/15/2015     EUR     75.69
BANESTO FINANC             5.000    3/23/2030     EUR     70.81
BANK OF IRELAND            3.780     4/1/2015     EUR     75.25
BANK OF IRELAND            3.585    4/21/2015     EUR     74.25
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    7/30/2016     EUR     72.88
BANK OF IRELAND            4.473   11/30/2016     EUR     60.00
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020     EUR     60.13
BANK OF IRELAND            5.600    9/18/2023     EUR     39.63
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.450     3/1/2030     EUR     47.06
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.760     9/7/2029     EUR     49.61
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.360   10/12/2029     EUR     46.82
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.400    11/6/2029     EUR     47.05
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037     USD     70.27
DEPFA ACS BANK             0.500     3/3/2025     CAD     51.15
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037     USD     70.88
DEPFA ACS BANK             3.250    7/31/2031     CHF     69.66
DEPFA ACS BANK             4.900    8/24/2035     CAD     70.21
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.000    2/25/2015     EUR     74.65
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.000    3/10/2015     EUR     73.21
UT2 FUNDING PLC            5.321    6/30/2016     EUR     58.94

BANCA MARCHE               4.300     1/4/2020     EUR     68.96
BANCA MARCHE               3.200    5/10/2017     EUR     74.43
BANCA MARCHE               3.200    6/21/2017     EUR     73.76
BANCA MARCHE               3.200    9/27/2017     EUR     72.30
BANCA MARCHE               4.000     7/9/2020     EUR     65.55
BANCA MARCHE               3.900    8/17/2020     EUR     64.60
BANCA MARCHE               3.700     9/1/2020     EUR     63.44
BANCA MARCHE               5.400    9/16/2020     EUR     71.81
BANCA MARCHE               3.600   11/12/2020     EUR     62.02
BANCA MARCHE               4.000    1/10/2021     EUR     63.36
BANCA MARCHE               4.000    5/26/2021     EUR     61.95
BANCA MARCHE               4.700    8/16/2021     EUR     66.14
BANCA MARCHE               4.360     1/4/2022     ITL     63.39
BANCA MARCHE               5.125    5/14/2024     ITL     61.60
BANCA MARCHE               5.500    9/16/2030     EUR     55.69
BANCA POP BERGAM           5.320   11/27/2022     EUR     70.22
BANCA POP LODI             5.250     4/3/2029     EUR     61.83
BANCA POP MILANO           7.125     3/1/2021     EUR     74.56
BANCA POP MILANO           4.500    4/18/2018     EUR     67.25
BANCA POP MILANO           3.100    9/30/2017     EUR     75.48
BANCA POP MILANO           3.500    6/30/2018     EUR     74.65
BANCA POP MILANO           4.000    4/23/2020     EUR     70.93
BANCA POP VICENT           5.000    3/31/2021     EUR     70.52
BANCA POP VICENT           4.970    4/20/2027     EUR     56.71
BANCA POP VICENT           5.000    6/30/2021     EUR     69.27
BANCA POP VICENT           5.000    5/30/2021     EUR     69.94
BANCA POP VICENT           5.000    3/25/2021     EUR     70.54
BANCO POPOLARE             6.375    5/31/2021     EUR     71.27
BANCO POPOLARE             6.000    11/5/2020     EUR     74.02
BP CIVIDALE                3.180    5/19/2020     EUR     72.70
BTPS                       4.000     2/1/2037     EUR     69.33
BTPS I/L                   2.350    9/15/2035     EUR     67.48
BTPS I/L                   2.550    9/15/2041     EUR     66.69
BTPS I/L                   3.100    9/15/2026     EUR     75.99
BTPS I/L                   2.100    9/15/2021     EUR     74.91
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.575     2/2/2017     EUR     75.00
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.000    11/2/2016     EUR     74.13
CASSA RISP FERRA           3.400    9/17/2017     EUR     65.25
CASSA RISP FERRA           4.500    11/2/2020     EUR     57.63
CIR SPA                    5.750   12/16/2024     EUR     72.85
CITY OF VENICE             4.265    3/26/2026     EUR     62.96
CITY OF VENICE             4.265    3/26/2026     EUR     62.60
CO CASTELMASSA             3.960    3/31/2026     EUR     60.36
CO MANERBA GARDA           4.640    6/30/2024     EUR     68.31
COMUNE DI MILANO           4.019    6/29/2035     EUR     54.44
FINMECCANICA SPA           4.875    3/24/2025     EUR     67.51
INTESA SANPAOLO            2.882    4/20/2020     EUR     71.63
MONTE DEI PASCHI           5.750    9/30/2016     GBP     65.82
REGION OF CAMPAN           4.849    6/29/2026     EUR     63.19
REGION OF LOMBAR           5.804   10/25/2032     USD     70.87
REGION OF MARCHE           4.648    6/27/2023     EUR     70.35
REP OF ITALY               5.200    7/31/2034     EUR     70.75
REP OF ITALY               2.200    9/15/2058     EUR     54.68
REP OF ITALY               4.490     4/5/2027     EUR     69.01
REP OF ITALY               1.850    9/15/2057     EUR     47.32
REP OF ITALY               5.250    12/7/2034     GBP     72.82
REP OF ITALY               2.870    5/19/2036     JPY     49.87
REP OF ITALY               4.850    6/11/2060     EUR     63.43
REP OF ITALY               2.000    9/15/2062     EUR     49.70
SANPAOLO IMI               3.750     3/2/2020     EUR     72.10
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017     EUR     54.80
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017     EUR     55.25
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017     EUR     55.25
SEAT PAGINE               10.500    1/31/2017     EUR     55.00
TELECOM ITALIA             5.250    3/17/2055     EUR     66.66
UBI BANCA SPCA             6.250   11/18/2018     EUR     47.36
UNICREDIT SPA              4.350    8/25/2022     EUR     74.31
UNICREDIT SPA              6.040     3/3/2023     EUR     69.02
UNICREDIT SPA              5.050    4/25/2022     EUR     64.41
UNICREDIT SPA              5.000    4/21/2021     EUR     66.10
UNICREDIT SPA              5.160    6/14/2020     EUR     68.65
UNICREDIT SPA              4.750    4/26/2020     EUR     66.80
UNICREDIT SPA              4.500    9/22/2019     EUR     73.15
UNICREDIT SPA              6.700     6/5/2018     EUR     75.45
UNICREDITO ITALI           3.950     2/1/2016     EUR     74.32
UNICREDITO ITALI           5.000     2/1/2016     GBP     67.57
UNICREDITO ITALI           4.750    4/12/2027     EUR     67.76
UNICREDITO ITALI           6.375   10/16/2018     GBP     70.00
UNIPOL ASSICURAZ           5.660    7/28/2023     EUR     54.00

ARCELORMITTAL              7.250     4/1/2014     EUR     23.99
CONTROLINVESTE             3.000    1/28/2015     EUR     64.20
ESFG INTERNATION           6.875   10/21/2019     EUR     54.63
FINMECCANICA FIN           5.250    1/21/2022     EUR     71.84
TELECOM IT CAP             6.000    9/30/2034     USD     77.17
UBI BANCA INT              8.750   10/29/2012     EUR     68.99
UNICREDITO LUXEM           6.000   10/31/2017     USD     72.50
UNICREDITO LUXEM           6.000   10/31/2017     USD     70.88

APP INTL FINANCE          11.750    10/1/2005     USD      0.00
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    2/24/2025     CAD     64.31
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/17/2016     TRY     71.13
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    9/15/2016     TRY     68.86
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2021     ZAR     44.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/12/2021     ZAR     44.58
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021     USD     73.73
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021     NZD     66.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500     3/3/2021     NZD     66.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2016     TRY     69.90
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/25/2016     TRY     70.25
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    4/27/2016     TRY     70.60
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014     USD     39.00
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014     USD     38.25
BRIT INSURANCE             6.625    12/9/2030     GBP     52.16
CLONDALKIN BV              8.000    3/15/2014     EUR     75.13
CLONDALKIN BV              8.000    3/15/2014     EUR     74.63
DEXIA FUNDING              5.875     2/9/2017     GBP     56.87
FINANCE & CREDIT          10.500    1/25/2014     USD     55.00
FRIESLAND BANK             5.320    2/26/2024     EUR     74.76
FRIESLAND BANK             4.210   12/29/2025     EUR     61.98
INDAH KIAT INTL           12.500    6/15/2006     USD      0.01
ING BANK NV                5.230    9/30/2031     USD     78.12
ING BANK NV                4.200   12/19/2035     EUR     56.71
ING BANK NV                5.380   10/28/2031     USD     79.53
MAGYAR TELECOM             9.500   12/15/2016     EUR     62.00
MAGYAR TELECOM             9.500   12/15/2016     EUR     61.55
NATL INVESTER BK          25.983     5/7/2029     EUR     19.91
NED WATERSCHAPBK           0.500    3/11/2025     CAD     62.54
NIB CAPITAL BANK           4.510   12/16/2035     EUR     64.74
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.375    3/24/2017     EUR     74.83
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.500    6/16/2025     EUR     60.44
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           5.000    11/4/2019     EUR     70.40
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           5.750    5/26/2014     EUR     19.51
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           1.375    2/28/2012     EUR     36.70
RABOBANK                   0.500   10/27/2016     ZAR     71.48
RABOBANK                   0.500   11/26/2021     ZAR     42.11
RBS NV                     2.000   10/29/2020     USD     74.50
RBS NV                     5.208   11/16/2030     USD     71.00
RBS NV EX-ABN NV           5.000    2/27/2037     EUR     70.28
RBS NV EX-ABN NV           2.910    6/21/2036     JPY     61.77
SNS BANK                   6.250   10/26/2020     EUR     67.27
SNS BANK                   4.650   10/19/2021     EUR     65.19
SNS BANK                   5.300    1/27/2023     EUR     65.73
SNS BANK                   6.625    5/14/2018     EUR     69.53
SNS BANK                   5.215    12/3/2027     EUR     57.14
SNS BANK                   4.580    3/20/2026     EUR     53.88
SNS BANK                   5.250    4/11/2023     EUR     64.74
SRLEV NV                   9.000    4/15/2041     EUR     67.28
TJIWI KIMIA FIN           13.250     8/1/2001     USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS              2.250    2/11/2021     CHF     74.59
EKSPORTFINANS              0.720    7/28/2016     JPY     77.02
EKSPORTFINANS              1.570    2/14/2018     JPY     73.09
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2018     ZAR     60.60
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016     ZAR     71.78
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016     TRY     69.09
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2016     ZAR     72.91
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    3/24/2016     ZAR     74.00
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500     3/1/2016     ZAR     74.40
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    1/27/2016     ZAR     75.00
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/26/2016     ZAR     71.88
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033     USD     43.63
NORSKE SKOGIND             6.125   10/15/2015     USD     57.63
NORSKE SKOGIND             6.125   10/15/2015     USD     57.63
NORSKE SKOGIND            11.750    6/15/2016     EUR     65.86
NORSKE SKOGIND            11.750    6/15/2016     EUR     64.75
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.000    6/26/2017     EUR     53.85
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033     USD     43.63
RENEWABLE CORP             6.500     6/4/2014     EUR     49.61
RENEWABLE CORP             9.750     5/3/2018     NOK     66.73

POLAND GOVT BOND           5.000    4/25/2037     PLN     85.00
REP OF POLAND              2.648    3/29/2034     JPY     74.83

BANCO COM PORTUG           4.750    6/22/2017     EUR     67.88
BANCO COM PORTUG           3.750    10/8/2016     EUR     68.07
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    9/15/2016     EUR     69.99
BANCO ESPIRITO             6.875    7/15/2016     EUR     72.91
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    1/26/2017     EUR     68.01
BRISA                      4.500    12/5/2016     EUR     65.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.320     8/5/2021     EUR     58.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.455    8/20/2017     EUR     68.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.500   11/13/2017     EUR     70.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.380    10/1/2038     EUR     51.01
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.400    10/8/2019     EUR     59.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.980     3/3/2028     EUR     56.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.250    1/27/2020     EUR     67.92
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           3.875    12/6/2016     EUR     72.73
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.570    8/12/2016     EUR     75.25
METRO DE LISBOA            5.750     2/4/2019     EUR     47.94
METRO DE LISBOA            7.300   12/23/2025     EUR     59.14
METRO DE LISBOA            4.799    12/7/2027     EUR     47.37
METRO DE LISBOA            4.061    12/4/2026     EUR     45.45
MONTEPIO GERAL             5.000     2/8/2017     EUR     61.63
PARPUBLICA                 4.191   10/15/2014     EUR     68.25
PARPUBLICA                 3.567    9/22/2020     EUR     40.25
PARPUBLICA                 5.250    9/28/2017     EUR     71.51
PARPUBLICA                 3.500     7/8/2013     EUR     73.88
PARPUBLICA                 4.200   11/16/2026     EUR     30.00
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015     USD     71.86
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015     USD     71.86
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.600   10/15/2014     EUR     75.09
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.100    4/15/2037     EUR     48.03
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.350   10/15/2015     EUR     72.23
PORTUGUESE OT'S            6.400    2/15/2016     EUR     74.91
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.200   10/15/2016     EUR     65.54
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.950   10/25/2023     EUR     53.22
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.850    4/15/2021     EUR     54.91
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.800    6/15/2020     EUR     55.50
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.350   10/16/2017     EUR     59.74
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.450    6/15/2018     EUR     58.18
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.750    6/14/2019     EUR     56.87
REFER                      5.875    2/18/2019     EUR     47.38
REFER                      4.000    3/16/2015     EUR     39.25
REFER                      4.250   12/13/2021     EUR     29.88
REFER                      4.675   10/16/2024     EUR     38.50

ARIZK                      3.000   12/20/2030     RUB     49.47
DVTG-FINANS               17.000    8/29/2013     RUB     55.55
DVTG-FINANS                7.750    7/18/2013     RUB     20.29
IART                       8.500     8/4/2013     RUB      1.00
MIRAX                     17.000    9/17/2012     RUB     25.04
MOSMART FINANS             0.010    4/12/2012     RUB      2.00
NOK                       12.500    8/26/2014     RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA           1.000   12/17/2012     RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE             9.000    6/12/2012     RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC                   3.270    4/19/2018     RUB     37.50
RBC OJSC                   7.000    4/23/2015     RUB     67.75
RBC OJSC                   7.000    4/23/2015     RUB     63.00
SAHO                      10.000    5/21/2012     RUB     90.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.000    3/31/2020     EUR     75.62
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750    6/30/2025     EUR     55.49
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.000    3/24/2021     EUR     71.98
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.250   10/25/2023     EUR     66.00
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750   12/14/2022     EUR     63.88
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.750    5/25/2027     EUR     63.11
AYUNTAM DE MADRD           4.550    6/16/2036     EUR     66.28
BANCAJA                    1.500    5/22/2018     EUR     61.67
BANCAJA EMI SA             2.755    5/11/2037     JPY     75.00
BANCO BILBAO VIZ           6.025     3/3/2033     EUR     56.44
BANCO BILBAO VIZ           4.375   10/20/2019     EUR     73.56
BANCO BILBAO VIZ           4.500    2/16/2022     EUR     68.21
BANCO CASTILLA             1.500    6/23/2021     EUR     61.25
BANCO POP ESPAN            5.702   12/22/2019     EUR     67.53
BANKINTER SA               6.000   12/18/2028     EUR     71.63
BBVA SUB CAP UNI           2.750   10/22/2035     JPY     42.43
CAIXA TERRASSA             4.700     8/9/2021     EUR     42.62
CAJA MADRID                4.000     2/3/2025     EUR     75.50
CAJA MADRID                4.125    3/24/2036     EUR     67.25
CAJA MADRID                5.020    2/26/2038     EUR     74.24
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           4.250    4/10/2031     EUR     53.02
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           3.875    5/23/2025     EUR     58.23
CEDULAS TDA A-4            4.125    4/10/2021     EUR     73.13
CEDULAS TDA A-5            4.250    3/28/2027     EUR     57.68
COMUN AUTO CANAR           3.900   11/30/2035     EUR     64.35
COMUN AUTO CANAR           4.200   10/25/2036     EUR     67.96
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.470    7/12/2021     EUR     79.45
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.815   10/10/2022     EUR     79.24
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.646    7/11/2036     EUR     57.51
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           4.063   11/23/2035     EUR     52.58
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           3.869   11/23/2020     EUR     71.56
GEN DE CATALUNYA           6.350   11/30/2041     EUR     65.26
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.965     9/8/2039     JPY     37.92
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.220    4/26/2035     EUR     47.73
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.690   10/28/2034     EUR     52.23
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.950    10/1/2030     EUR     65.47
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.900    5/28/2030     EUR     66.09
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.400    5/13/2030     EUR     61.56
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.219    9/10/2029     EUR     60.88
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.325    10/5/2028     EUR     65.80
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.900    5/20/2024     EUR     69.97
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.250    10/5/2023     EUR     66.49
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.900    9/15/2021     EUR     71.12
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.801    7/31/2020     EUR     72.42
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.950    2/11/2020     EUR     74.13
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.750    3/24/2016     CHF     62.72
GEN DE CATALUNYA           2.125    10/1/2014     CHF     71.34
GENERAL DE ALQUI           2.750    8/20/2012     EUR     70.54
GENERAL VALENCIA           5.900   11/30/2032     EUR     59.63
GENERAL VALENCIA           4.900    3/17/2020     EUR     71.00
GENERAL VALENCIA           4.000    11/2/2016     EUR     78.67
IM CEDULAS 10              4.500    2/21/2022     EUR     74.57
IM CEDULAS 5               3.500    6/15/2020     EUR     72.04
IM CEDULAS 7               4.000    3/31/2021     EUR     72.53
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           2.100    2/23/2021     JPY     63.97
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           2.570   10/22/2021     CHF     64.80
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           3.250    6/28/2024     CHF     63.19
INSTITUT CATALA            4.250    6/15/2024     EUR     69.93
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            6.600   11/29/2030     EUR     74.87
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            5.700    7/20/2028     EUR     67.98
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            5.000    7/13/2022     EUR     75.09
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            3.050   12/10/2020     JPY     68.99
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            5.150    5/24/2034     EUR     61.57
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            4.250   10/31/2036     EUR     52.69
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            3.065    7/29/2039     JPY     40.72
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            3.170    7/29/2039     JPY     41.84
JUNTA CASTILLA             4.650    11/8/2022     EUR     73.88
JUNTA LA MANCHA            5.950     9/9/2030     EUR     65.97
JUNTA LA MANCHA            3.875    1/31/2036     EUR     34.75
JUNTA LA MANCHA            2.810   10/14/2022     JPY     54.50
MAPFRE SA                  5.921    7/24/2037     EUR     65.92
SACYR VALLEHERM            6.500     5/1/2016     EUR     70.00
SANTANDER ISSUAN           5.750    1/31/2018     GBP     73.61
SANTANDER ISSUAN           6.533   10/24/2017     GBP     73.85
SANTANDER ISSUAN           4.750    5/29/2019     EUR     74.78
SANTANDER ISSUAN           4.500    9/30/2019     EUR     75.09
XUNTA DE GALICIA           5.350   11/22/2028     EUR     62.72
XUNTA DE GALICIA           4.025   11/28/2035     EUR     45.93

SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   11/27/2015     TRY     71.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/3/2016     ZAR     74.70
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/29/2016     TRY     68.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/25/2016     ZAR     71.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/26/2016     ZAR     71.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    2/28/2012     USD      8.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012     USD     10.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    1/27/2012     USD      2.97
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/14/2016     ZAR     72.86
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.750    3/23/2012     USD      8.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/20/2016     ZAR     71.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/30/2016     ZAR     70.97
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    9/29/2015     TRY     72.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    6/12/2012     USD      7.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.250    4/27/2012     USD      8.18
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012     USD     10.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    1/25/2028     USD     55.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/17/2027     USD     55.63
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/26/2021     AUD     63.35
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    8/25/2021     ZAR     44.29
SWEDISH EXP CRED           6.500    1/27/2012     USD     10.01
CRED SUIS NY               8.000    1/25/2013     USD     48.69
UBS AG                     9.400    8/23/2013     USD     54.92
UBS AG                    11.020   10/21/2013     USD     57.00
UBS AG                     8.650    8/29/2012     USD     32.84
UBS AG                     9.500    8/10/2012     USD     28.42
UBS AG                    12.040    7/31/2012     USD     25.00
UBS AG                    10.960    7/20/2012     USD     22.14
UBS AG                    13.300    5/23/2012     USD      3.44
UBS AG                    10.070    3/23/2012     USD     31.69
UBS AG                     9.250    3/20/2012     USD     11.41
UBS AG                     8.720    3/20/2012     USD     28.82
UBS AG                     8.380    3/20/2012     USD     26.93
UBS AG                    12.400    3/14/2012     USD     11.51
UBS AG                    10.530    1/23/2012     USD     38.79
UBS AG JERSEY              3.220    7/31/2012     EUR     39.96

PROCREDIT BANK            13.500    5/11/2015     UAH     86.05

ABBEY NATL TREAS           5.000    8/26/2030     USD     64.35
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.500    6/21/2013     EUR     70.63
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           5.500    6/20/2013     EUR     73.75
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           6.000    6/20/2014     EUR     66.38
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           3.250    2/25/2013     EUR     74.25
BAKKAVOR FIN 2             8.250    2/15/2018     GBP     68.83
BAKKAVOR FIN 2             8.250    2/15/2018     GBP     68.65
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.359    3/27/2029     JPY     57.91
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.408     2/9/2027     JPY     62.89
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.340   12/28/2026     JPY     63.59
BANK OF SCOTLAND           2.860   12/13/2021     CHF     72.86
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    1/31/2012     USD      7.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.550    1/23/2012     USD     11.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000   10/16/2012     USD     10.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.500   10/16/2012     USD      9.89
BARCLAYS BK PLC           14.000    10/1/2012     USD      9.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000    10/1/2012     USD      9.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.500    8/31/2012     USD     22.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    9/28/2012     USD     10.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    9/11/2012     USD     10.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    8/31/2012     USD     31.55
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.000    8/28/2012     USD     10.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.800    7/31/2012     USD     24.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC           11.500    7/27/2012     USD     10.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC            7.000    7/27/2012     USD      9.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.000    7/20/2012     USD      8.31
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.000    6/29/2012     USD      8.91
CEVA GROUP PLC             8.500    6/30/2018     EUR     46.25
CEVA GROUP PLC            10.000    6/30/2018     EUR     52.75
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.625   11/16/2021     GBP     69.09
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.875    3/28/2033     GBP     68.15
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.750    12/2/2024     GBP     69.15
EFG HELLAS PLC             6.010     1/9/2036     EUR     27.25
EFG HELLAS PLC             5.400    11/2/2047     EUR     11.50
EFG HELLAS PLC             4.375    2/11/2013     EUR     65.22
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013     EUR     65.63
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.350    7/22/2014     EUR     44.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           5.100    12/9/2021     EUR     35.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           5.000    12/2/2021     EUR     35.38
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.875     5/9/2025     GBP     60.06
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.875    2/15/2021     GBP     64.84
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.375    9/26/2031     GBP     55.10
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.500    12/6/2018     GBP     68.38
ESSAR ENERGY               4.250     2/1/2016     USD     57.96
EX-IM BK OF UKRA           5.793     2/9/2016     USD     71.25
GALA ELECTRIC CA          11.500     6/1/2019     GBP     56.90
GALA ELECTRIC CA          11.500     6/1/2019     GBP     59.83
HBOS PLC                   4.500    3/18/2030     EUR     56.72
HBOS PLC                   4.375   10/30/2019     EUR     68.82
HBOS PLC                   7.070     4/8/2023     EUR     70.53
HBOS PLC                   5.374    6/30/2021     EUR     62.38
HSBC BANK PLC              4.750    3/24/2046     GBP     71.45
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.375    3/12/2020     EUR     71.59
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           6.439    5/23/2020     EUR     71.73
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.588    5/12/2020     GBP     75.36
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.625   10/14/2020     EUR     72.23
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.869    8/25/2020     GBP     75.55
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.867   12/17/2019     GBP     76.23
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.875    11/1/2020     USD     79.00
LBG CAPITAL NO.1           7.975    9/15/2024     GBP     68.38
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           7.625    12/9/2019     GBP     73.88
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           8.500     6/7/2032     GBP     61.38
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           9.000    7/15/2029     GBP     65.50
LBG CAPITAL NO.2           6.385    5/12/2020     EUR     71.78
LLOYDS TSB BANK            5.750     7/9/2025     GBP     73.85
LOUIS NO1 PLC             10.000    12/1/2016     EUR     57.88
LOUIS NO1 PLC             10.000    12/1/2016     EUR     57.88
LOUIS NO1 PLC              8.500    12/1/2014     EUR     64.88
MATALAN                    9.625    3/31/2017     GBP     48.64
MATALAN                    8.875    4/29/2016     GBP     71.50
MATALAN                    8.875    4/29/2016     GBP     71.17
MATALAN                    9.625    3/31/2017     GBP     49.13
MAX PETROLEUM              6.750     9/8/2013     USD     42.16
NATIONWIDE BLDG            5.600    8/19/2030     USD     73.97
NEW HOSPITALS ST           1.777    2/26/2047     GBP     62.39
NOMURA BANK INTL           0.800   12/21/2020     EUR     66.98
OTE PLC                    7.250     4/8/2014     EUR     62.53
OTE PLC                    5.000     8/5/2013     EUR     70.07
OTE PLC                    4.625    5/20/2016     EUR     56.78
PIRAEUS GRP FIN            4.000    9/17/2012     EUR     71.54
PRIVATBANK                 5.799     2/9/2016     USD     59.08
PUNCH TAVERNS              8.374    7/15/2029     GBP     58.02
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           5.168    6/29/2030     EUR     59.20
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           2.300   11/26/2024     JPY     71.86
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           2.375    11/2/2015     CHF     74.55
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.700     7/3/2018     USD     75.23
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.625    9/22/2021     EUR     65.74
SPIRIT ISSUER              5.472   12/28/2028     GBP     67.45
THOMAS COOK GR             7.750    6/22/2017     GBP     48.00
THOMAS COOK GR             6.750    6/22/2015     EUR     49.79
UNIQUE PUB FIN             6.542    3/30/2021     GBP     71.93
UNIQUE PUB FIN             5.659    6/30/2027     GBP     63.17
UNIQUE PUB FIN             7.395    3/28/2024     GBP     46.15
WELLINGTON PUB             7.335    1/15/2029     GBP     64.85
WESSEX WATER FIN           1.369    7/31/2057     GBP     42.01


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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