TCREUR_Public/120123.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, January 23, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 16

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
HEART OF LA DEFENSE: Gains Creditor Protection After Ruling
REMY COINTREAU: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'


G E R M A N Y

COMMERZBANK AG: Needs to Raise EUR5.3 Billion in Capital
COMMERZBANK AG: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+
SCHLECKER: Seeks Bankruptcy Protection After Financing Talks Fail


H U N G A R Y

NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

CLAVOS EURO: S&P Raises Rating on Class V Notes to 'B+'
EIRCOM GROUP: Top Lenders Hold Workshops on Examinership Process


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: At Risk of Nationalization; Seeks Additional Capital
FONDIARIA-SAI SPA: S&P Affirms 'B' Counterparty Credit Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
ARDAGH PACKAGING: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

EURO-GALAXY CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'


R U S S I A

IC RUSS-INVEST: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
ROSBANK: Fitch Says 'D' Individual Rating Unaffected


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: In Talks with Youngman; Brightwell Mulls Bid


S W I T Z E R L A N D

PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: To Sell Three Refineries to Avert Bankruptcy


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DECO 6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'C (sf)'
HMV GROUP: Gets Debt Reprieve From Banks & Suppliers
ITV PLC: S&P Affirms Rating on Unsecured Notes at 'BB'
YELL GROUP: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 16 to 20, 2012


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on France-based car rental firm Europcar
Groupe S.A. and Europcar's subsidiary, Europcar International
S.A.S.U (ECI), to 'B' from 'B+'. At the same time, Standard &
Poor's lowered the issue ratings on the group's debt instruments
by one notch to reflect the lower corporate credit rating. The
recovery ratings are unchanged. The outlooks are negative.

"The downgrade primarily reflects the absence of an improvement
in Europcar's revenues and operating margin in 2011 that we had
expected. In addition, it reflects our revised base-case scenario
that assumes a slight contraction in revenues and operating
margin in 2012. The contraction factors in our weaker economic
outlook for Western Europe, where Europcar generates nearly all
revenues. In the first nine months of 2011, Europcar's revenues
and operating margins were flat, compared with our expectations
for mid-single-digit revenue growth and gradual improvement in
operating margin. Our base case for 2012 assumes that an economic
slowdown will lower revenues, but less than during the recession
of 2008-2009 when they dropped 13%," S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects our view that Europcar is facing
an execution risk associated with the refinancing of its upcoming
debt maturities. While our base case assumes a successful
refinancing of these maturities in the first half of 2012,
current capital market conditions pose challenges in achieving
this and at a reasonable cost. Should Europcar not be successful
in addressing its refinancing needs in the first half of 2012, we
would likely revise downward our assessment of Europcar's
liquidity score to 'weak.' This would lead to a downgrade of
probably one notch with the possibility of a further downgrade
depending on the company's progress in refinancing the facilities
beyond the first half of 2012," S&P said.

"For the 'B' rating, we consider ratios of FFO to debt close to
10% and an EBITDA interest cover of above 2x to be commensurate
with the rating. Both our base-case and downward sensitivity
case, the latter assumes a 12% decline in revenues, anticipate
that Europcar will achieve ratios in line with our targets for
the rating. A recession or higher cost of funding could pose a
risk to achieving these targets and could put further downward
pressure on the rating," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable should Europcar
successfully address the refinancing of its 2012-2013 maturities
in the first half of 2012 and maintain operating performance in
line with our expectations," S&P said.


HEART OF LA DEFENSE: Gains Creditor Protection After Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Heather Smith at Bloomberg News reports that Paris office complex
Coeur Defense's owners won an appeal and gained protection from
creditors 10 months after France's highest appeals court said
their 2008 filing had been improperly voided.

The Versailles appeals court confirmed the opening of so-called
safeguard procedures for Heart of La Defense SAS and its parent
Dame Luxembourg Sarl, the owners of Europe's biggest office
complex, Bloomberg relates.  The ruling keeps them under court
observation and allows them to continue operations, Bloomberg
notes.

"The two entities are back in safeguard, so both have
protection," Bloomberg quotes Jean-Philippe Robe, a lawyer for
the company known as HOLD and Dame Luxembourg, as saying.

According to Bloomberg, Thursday's decision clarifies "any type
of difficulty qualifies a company to obtain court protection, as
long as they are of a magnitude sufficient enough that the debtor
cannot deal with them alone."

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. formed HOLD as a securitization
vehicle to buy the property for EUR2.11 billion (US$2.7 billion)
in March 2007, a record for Paris, Bloomberg discloses.  The bank
collapsed in September 2008 and HOLD and Dame Luxembourg
subsequently filed for safeguard in France after failing to
reach a new interest-rate swap agreement on EUR1.6 billion in
loans used to fund the acquisition, Bloomberg recounts.

Coeur Defense, designed by Jean-Paul Viguier and completed in
2001, is in the Paris financial district of La Defense.  It
consists of two 180-meter (590-foot) towers and three other
buildings totaling 182,000 square meters (1.96 million square
feet).  It was valued at EUR1.8 billion following Lehman's
collapse, Bloomberg states.


REMY COINTREAU: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on French spirits manufacturer Remy Cointreau S.A.
to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook is stable.

"We also raised our issue rating on Remy Cointreau's senior
unsecured notes to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The recovery rating on the
notes remains unchanged at '3', reflecting our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
Despite numerical coverage in excess of 70%, we have capped
our recovery rating in the 50%-70% range, reflecting our
unfavorable view of the French insolvency regime," S&P said.

"The upgrade primarily reflects Remy Cointreau's strong
performance over the past two years, and the subsequent
significant improvement in its credit metrics. It further
reflects our opinion that future sound operating performance will
enable the group to maintain adjusted debt leverage below 3x over
the next 12 months despite our view of its aggressive financial
policy," S&P said.

Remy Cointreau has performed soundly over the past two years, in
particular during the last nine months to December 2011, when its
cognac division grew 36.7% organically. Consequently, the group's
debt protection metrics have improved, with adjusted leverage
falling significantly to 0.7x at the end of September 2011 from
3.5x at the end of September 2009.

"The group has also exited the Maxxium distribution joint venture
and set up its own distribution network since the 2008 recession.
We believe that having control over its distribution could help
Remy Cointreau offset the impact of slowing consumer demand
because it will be able to bring its new products to the market
faster than when it had to compete with the other three spirits
makers in the Maxxium group," S&P said.

"Finally, we believe Remy Cointreau's strategy of moving upmarket
and increasing its market shares in premium categories has made
the group more resilient to economic downturn, since premium
categories are less exposed to economic cycles," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Remy Cointreau
will continue to perform solidly over the next 12 months. We
believe this should enable the group to keep Standard &Poor's
adjusted leverage below 3x and adequate headroom under its
leverage covenant, despite what we view as an aggressive
financial policy," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if Remy Cointreau's performance
deteriorated significantly, leading to a weakening of the group's
liquidity, in particular if covenant headroom was to fall below
20%. We calculate that, if Remy Cointreau goes ahead with the
entire share buyback program by January 2013, the group will be
outside the above-mentioned ratio if its operating margins
decline by 250-300 basis points or more. A large and mostly debt-
financed acquisition might also make us consider a negative
rating action," S&P said.

"We consider that rating upside is remote at this stage, given
the group's lack of established financial policy," S&P said.


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G E R M A N Y
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COMMERZBANK AG: Needs to Raise EUR5.3 Billion in Capital
--------------------------------------------------------
James Wilson at The Financial Times reports that Commerzbank AG
need to find EUR5.3 billion of capital to satisfy the European
Banking Authority is a huge burden for a bank in its fourth year
of government support and desperate to avoid further state help.

According to the FT, Commerzbank -- which after its capital
raising handed back to Berlin EUR3.3 billion of what it described
as "surplus capital" -- has now been stricken by the way the
focus of the financial crisis has shifted to sovereign debt.  Of
the EUR5.3 billion capital hole identified by the EBA,
EUR4.9 billion stems from cuts in the value of Commerzbank's bond
holdings, the FT notes.

Commerzbank's Eurohypo subsidiary was one of Europe's biggest
investors in sovereign bonds and the bank holds EUR13 billion of
peripheral debt, the FT discloses.

Getting rid of Eurohypo would help Commerzbank, which has already
agreed to European Commission demands to dispose of the business
by 2014 as a compensation for the bank's bail-out, the FT says.
However, it is almost impossible in current market conditions to
imagine a buyer for a business with such a huge refinancing
burden, according to the FT.

Foisting Eurohypo on to the German state, which would be possible
under emergency bank rescue laws due to be resurrected and partly
amplified, has been considered by Commerzbank, the FT discloses.
Yet it would be a politically toxic move, bring more state aid
proceedings from Brussels and severely embarrass Martin Blessing,
its chief executive, the FT states.

Commerzbank appears now to believe it can scramble together the
EUR5.3 billion it needs to satisfy the EBA, the FT says.  It can
squeeze some capital out of hybrid bond conversions and looks
likely to get some support from Allianz, the insurer that still
holds some subordinate capital and equity in Commerzbank as a
result of its sale of Dresdner, the FT notes.

But the main remedy proposed by Commerzbank will be a big cut in
its risk-weighted assets, freeing up some capital, the FT states.

In a separate report, the Financial Times' Patrick Jenkins,
Rachel Sanderson and James Wilson noted that the regulator gave
Commzerbank until June to plug the capital deficit, with a
deadline of Jan. 20 to submit a clear plan.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 25,
2011, the Financial Times related that Commerzbank received more
than EUR16 billion of hybrid capital from the government, which
also took a 25% equity stake in a 2009 bail-out in return for a
further EUR1.8 billion, according to the FT.  The bank, which has
a market capitalization of EUR8.3 billion, needed support after
acquiring troubled rival Dresdner Bank, the FT disclosed.

Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Commerzbank AG --
http://www.commerzbank.com/-- is the parent company of a
financial services group active around the world.  The group's
operating business is organized into six segments providing each
other with mutually beneficial synergies: Private and Business
Customers, Mittelstandsbank, Central and Eastern Europe,
Corporates & Markets, Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance
and Treasury.


COMMERZBANK AG: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank
financial strength ratings (BFSRs) of Commerzbank AG and
Commerzbank Europe (Ireland) (CBE(I)) to D+ from C-, that of
Eurohypo AG to E+ from D-, and kept the revised ratings on review
for further downgrade. At the same time, Moody's has placed on
review for downgrade the A2/Prime-1 senior debt and deposit
ratings of Commerzbank AG, Commerzbank International S.A. (CISAL)
and CBE(I), as well as the A3/Prime-1 ratings of Eurohypo AG. The
D BFSR and Prime-2 short-term debt ratings of Deutsche
Schiffsbank were unaffected by the rating actions, but its A3
senior debt and deposit ratings were placed on review, direction
uncertain, ahead of their alignment with the debt ratings of
Commerzbank AG. The review for downgrade of the ratings of
various hybrid instruments of Commerzbank Group, initiated on
November 7, 2011, has been extended.

Moody's says that the weakening resilience and eroding franchise
of Eurohypo AG were the key drivers for the BFSR downgrades and
various rating reviews for downgrade initiated for the five
Commerzbank Group entities.

More specifically, Eurohypo AG's BFSR was downgraded to E+ from
D-, now mapping to B3 (previously Ba3) on the long-term scale.
This reflects the bank's continued franchise erosion, high
vulnerability to market shocks and uncertain future. This, in
turn, adversely affects the credit profile and stability -- and
therefore the ratings -- of the whole Commerzbank Group. As a
result, Commerzbank AG's BFSR and that of its Irish subsidiary,
CBE(I), were downgraded to D+ from C-, mapping to Baa3
(previously Baa2). The standalone BFSRs of these three banks
remain on review for further downgrade.

Concurrently, the C+ BFSR (mapping to A2 on the long-term scale)
of CISAL was placed on review for downgrade, as this is the same
rating level as Commerzbank's A2 senior debt rating, now on
review for downgrade.

Additionally, Commerzbank's rating for senior subordinated debt
was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, and the same instruments as well
as the hybrid Tier III program of Eurohypo to Ba3/Ba3(hyb) from
Ba1/Ba1(hyb). These ratings remain on review for downgrade. The
Ba3 rating for Eurohypo's subordinated debt represents a wider
notching of -2 notches (instead of -1) from the adjusted
standalone credit assessment, which incorporates parental (but
not government) support. Furthermore, the downgrade to Ba1 from
Baa3, on review for further downgrade, of Commerzbank's
subordinated debt also applies to the debt instrument issued by
Dresdner Funding Trust IV, as this displays the same risk profile
as Commerzbank's senior subordinated debt.

RATINGS RATIONALE

-- BFSR DOWNGRADE OF COMMERZBANK

The downgrade of Commerzbank's standalone BFSR to D+ from C-
reflects the rising risk and earnings constraints stemming from
Eurohypo's exposures and persistent loss generation. In the
context of deteriorating sovereign credit profiles and the
ongoing euro area debt crisis, these constraints represent a
major burden for the group that (i) continues to overhaul and
consolidate various parts of its businesses; and (ii) displays
weak earnings power.

Through the existing profit & loss transfer agreement -- and as
the principal provider of senior unsecured debt -- Commerzbank AG
bears a very high degree of responsibility for Eurohypo's
obligations, which closely links the earnings prospects of both
banks.

-- BFSR DOWNGRADE OF EUROHYPO

The downgrade of Eurohypo's standalone BFSR to E+ from D-
reflects the considerable fragility of its franchise, considering
(i) the rising probability of further large credit losses (in the
context of Eurohypo's remaining exposure to Greece); (ii) the
bank's reliance on Commerzbank for its funding needs; and (iii)
the prospect of regulatory changes that might materially affect
the functioning of Eurohypo's business model.

The deteriorating euro area sovereign debt markets imply that
Eurohypo will likely require support for an extended period.
Given its inadequate economic capital and lack of market access
for unsecured long-term funds, Moody's believes that Eurohypo --
as a standalone bank -- could not weather a further weakening of
the yet-unresolved euro area debt crisis. While the rating agency
notes Eurohypo's progress in deleveraging and the improved 11.4%
Tier 1 ratio reported as of 30 June 2011, it cautions that the
bank's high leverage implies a limited capacity to absorb
unexpected losses.

Another important consideration for the BFSR downgrade to E+ was
the additional franchise erosion due to the recently announced
freeze in new underwriting in Eurohypo's commercial real-estate
(CRE) segment, which has effectively halted any new business
activity at Eurohypo. Moody's notes that further seasoning of the
CRE loan portfolio might negatively affect net interest margins
and non-performing loan ratios.

-- COMMERZBANK EUROPE (IRELAND)

The downgrade of the BFSR of CBE(I) to D+ (as well as the review
of this rating and the A2/Prime-1 debt ratings) mirrors the
rating action on Commerzbank's ratings. This follows Moody's
approach of maintaining the same ratings for the parent bank and
subsidiary, which takes into account the high level of
integration in (and dependence on) the parent bank.

-- COMMERZBANK INTERNATIONAL S.A. (CISAL)

The review for downgrade of CISAL's C+ BFSR and the A2/Prime-1
debt and deposit ratings reflects that these ratings are capped
at the debt and deposit ratings of Commerzbank. CISAL displays a
considerably stronger credit profile on a standalone basis, and
its A2 debt and deposit ratings currently do not benefit from any
support assumptions (or rating uplift). In the absence of any
ring-fencing of the Luxembourg entity (and given upstream lending
to the parent bank) the agency does not assign a BFSR -- nor debt
and deposit ratings -- higher than the senior debt ratings of
Commerzbank. Any downgrade of Commerzbank's debt ratings would
negatively affect CISAL's BFSR and debt ratings.

-- DEUTSCHE SCHIFFSBANK

Given the recent announcement that Commerzbank plans to merge the
German ship-finance specialist with the parent bank in the course
of H1 2012, the review with direction uncertain of the long-term
senior debt and deposit ratings of Deutsche Schiffsbank was
initiated because these ratings will be aligned with those of
Commerzbank upon closing of the transaction.

FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

The review of Eurohypo's ratings will focus on:

- The loss potential and loss-absorption capacity of the bank in
   an adverse scenario of the euro area debt crisis;

- Whether the recently announced freeze of new underwriting in
   commercial real estate will likely be reversed post June 2012
   or marks a shift towards an unwinding scenario for
   Commerzbank's largest and most risky subsidiary; and

- Considerations of short and long-term support probabilities.

The review of the ratings for Commerzbank and other group
entities will focus on:

- The strategic response of Commerzbank's senior management in
   the context of the regulatory capital shortfall calculated by
   the European Banking Authority (EBA) in December 2011, as well
   as the measures that will be taken to improve the group's
   regulatory capital levels;

- The magnitude of the ramifications for Commerzbank's franchise
   and future earnings prospects in the context of this strategic
   response and likely measures; and

- Considerations of short and long-term support probabilities.

Moody's will likely continue to assess the systemic support
probability for Commerzbank as high. This takes into account the
25% + 1 share ownership of Commerzbank group by the German
government, and also that the German government has announced
that it will reinstall the support facilities of the Financial
Market Stabilisation Agency (FMSA, previously referred to as
SoFFin) that were first established after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in 2008 and then closed at the end of 2010. Moody's
assumptions of systemic support may (partly) compensate for the
pressure on debt ratings that arises from the weaker standalone
BFSRs of Commerzbank and its subsidiaries.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A severe worsening of the euro area debt crisis could adversely
affect both Eurohypo's ratings and those of Commerzbank and its
other subsidiaries.

Positive ratings pressure on the ratings of Commerzbank and its
other European subsidiaries would be subject to a material
reduction of its non-core assets and/or a containment of the
risks posed by these assets.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.


SCHLECKER: Seeks Bankruptcy Protection After Financing Talks Fail
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Uwe Hessler at Deutsche Welle reports that Schlecker has said it
plans to file for bankruptcy protection, after negotiations for
interim financing of its operations failed.

According to Deutsche Welle, the company said that stores are to
remain open for the time being.

Schleckerhas come under heavy criticism for poor management
practices and outdated stores in recent years, Deutsche Welle
notes.

By seeking bankruptcy protection from its creditors, Schlecker
hopes to push through a restructuring plan aimed at making the
chain competitive again, Deutsche Welle states.

"The ultimate goal of the insolvency is to maintain a large part
of our stores, and as many jobs as possible," Deutsche Welle
quotes the company as saying.

Schlecker has been facing intense competition from other
drugstore chains in a market where profit margins have been
dwindling for years, Deutsche Welle notes.

However, insolvency procedures have not yet been officially set
in motion. "We haven't yet received a formal request for
bankruptcy protection from Schlecker," a spokesman for the
district court in Ulm, as cited by Deutsche Welle, said.

Schlecker is Germany's biggest drugstore chain.  The company has
roughly 7,500 branches and 11,000 employees in Germany.


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H U N G A R Y
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NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating to Hungary-based fertilizer producer
Nitrogenmuvek Zrt. The outlook is negative.

"We also assigned a 'BB-' to the company's EUR50 million bonds
issued in July 2011 and due Jan. 29, 2013," S&P said.

"The ratings reflect our assessment of the company's business
risk profile as 'weak' and the financial risk profile as
significant," S&P said.

Nitrogenmuvek is a small nitrogen-based fertilizer producer with
annual capacity of almost 1 million tons and a large share of the
domestic market. The company's profits are, however, cyclical,
and it is exposed to single plant and potential Hungarian country
risk. Nitrogenmuvek strengthened its balance sheet during 2011--
the company reported it moved into a net cash position in fourth-
quarter 2011.

"Business risk pressure points include asset concentration, as a
single plant provides all production. We believe the company's
profit and operating cash flow base is moderate. We also believe
the company is potentially exposed to increasing country risk in
the Republic of Hungary (BB+/Negative/B), which we estimate
should provide over 70% of the company's 2011 EBITDA," S&P said.

"Supportive business factors include 2011's very favorable
industry conditions. We expect high selling prices to persist in
2012 and 2013, although we have factored some softening into our
base-line scenario. We estimate that Nitrogenmuvek's EBITDA
margins will remain above 20% in 2012 and 2013. Another positive
factor is modest maintenance capital expenditure (capex), which
is only a fraction of EBITDA. Long-term demand for fertilizers
remains supportive, given increasing food needs combined with
diminishing arable lands, especially those of prime quality.
Nitrogenmuvek is energy efficient, as its gas use is much lower
than the EU average. The company's efficiency projects will
further this advantage. We note positively that the company has
multiple sources of gas, and that it buys less expensive
feedstock from Germany. We expect the company to retain its
strong market position in its home country -- it reported a 67%
market share in 2010. Exports to nearby European countries
provide additional profit sources and lessen the company's
exposure to Hungary," S&P said.

"The negative outlook on Nitrogenmuvek primarily reflects our
view of country-related pressure, given our downgrade of Hungary
on Dec. 21, 2011. Risks potentially include working capital
needs, higher taxes, and a negative currency impact. A downgrade
of Hungary might lead us to lower the rating on the company. Any
rating action would hinge on our assessment of the likely
impact on the company's operating environment as well as the
surplus cash forecast compared with the January 2013 debt
maturity. Our base-line scenario assumes Nitrogenmuvek will
exhibit operational resilience in 2012, as fertilizer prices are
set internationally and will likely continue to provide support,"
S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we believed country-
related pressures were receding. This could happen if we affirmed
the ratings on Hungary and assigned a stable outlook. The other
key factor for a stable outlook would be increased visibility on
cash availability to cover the January 2013 bond or other
potential foreign-currency denominated debt," S&P said.


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CLAVOS EURO: S&P Raises Rating on Class V Notes to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on CLAVOS Euro CDO Ltd.'s outstanding EUR356.022 million
notes (excluding the combo note balance).

Specifically, S&P:

  -- Affirmed its ratings on the class I-A1, I-A2, I-B, and IV
     notes; and

  -- Raised its ratings on the class II, III, and V notes.

CLAVOS Euro CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance and our application of all relevant criteria for
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P said.

"For our review of the transaction's performance, we used data
from the trustee report dated Dec. 8, 2011, in addition to our
cash flow analysis. We have taken into account recent
developments in the transaction and reviewed it under our 2010
counterparty criteria, as well as our cash flow criteria," S&P
related.

"We have observed positive rating migration in the portfolio
since we last reviewed the transaction in February 2010. The
proportion of assets rated in the 'CCC' rating category has
dropped to about EUR27.7 million (7.0% of the portfolio balance)
from EUR38.0 million (9.5% of the portfolio balance) when we last
took rating action. In addition, the proportion of defaulted
assets (rated 'CC' and below) in the pool has decreased slightly
to 12.7 million from 14.4 million over the same period," S&P
said.

The transaction has also benefitted from the reduction of the
class I-A1 and I-A2 notional amount, as well as a reduction in
the class V notional amount. The repayment of the liabilities has
been a result of a breach of the class I overcollateralization
ratio test, which requires the issuer to use available proceeds
to repay the class I-A1 and I-A2 notes on a pro rata basis. It
has also resulted from the breach of the class V
overcollateralization ratio test, which requires the issuer to
use available interest proceeds to redeem the class V notes until
the test is back in compliance.

"We also note that the reported weighted-average spread earned on
CLAVOS Euro CDO's collateral pool has increased to about 3.57%
(up from 2.96% when we last took rating action). Apart from the
class V overcollateralization ratio test, all coverage tests are
reported to be in compliance with their trigger levels," S&P
said.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate. In our analysis, we
used the performing portfolio balance (excluding assets rated
'CC' and below), the principal cash balance, the current
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that we considered appropriate. We have incorporated various cash
flow stress scenarios using various default patterns, levels, and
timings for each liability rating category, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses and our
2010 counterparty criteria, the credit enhancement available to
the class I-A1, I-A2, I-B, and IV notes is commensurate with
their current ratings. We have therefore affirmed our ratings on
these classes of notes," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the credit enhancement available to the class
II, III, and V notes is commensurate with higher ratings than
previously assigned. We have therefore raised our ratings on
these classes of notes," S&P said.

"None of the classes were constrained by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test we
introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate CDOs. The
supplemental test excludes analysis of the combo notes," S&P
said.

"Citibank N.A. currently provides the currency swaps on the
non-euro-denominated assets in the portfolio. We have applied our
2010 counterparty criteria and, in our view, the swap documents
do not completely reflect these criteria. However, we have
analyzed the transaction's exposure to the counterparty, and we
consider that this is sufficiently limited so as not to affect
our rating on the class I-A1, I-A2, or I-B notes if the swap
counterparty failed to perform," S&P said.

           Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                 From

CLAVOS Euro CDO Ltd.
EUR409 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

II          A (sf)             A- (sf)
III         BBB (sf)           BBB- (sf)
V           B+ (sf)            B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

I-A1        AA+ (sf)
I-A2        AA+ (sf)
I-B         AA- (sf)
IV          BB+ (sf)


EIRCOM GROUP: Top Lenders Hold Workshops on Examinership Process
----------------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that Eircom Group's
international lenders have been holding workshops to familiarize
themselves with the Irish "examinership" system.

Irish Independent says it's the clearest sign yet that the
company is rapidly lurching towards the courts to restructure its
EUR3.75 billion debts.

The Irish Independent has learned that Eircom's top lenders have
hired insolvency accountant Kieran Wallace of KPMG as "shadow
examinership adviser".

The KPMG partner is advising Eircom's most senior or "first lien"
lenders, a group made up of dozens of hedge funds and banks owed
EUR2.6 billion, Irish Independent discloses.

Around 150 of the first-lien investors have attended 12 training
seminars in London plus a session in Dublin over the past two
weeks, Irish Independent relates.

At the sessions, lenders were brought up to speed on the
examinership process, Irish Independent discloses.  The Irish
legal system was explained in detail and compared to the UK and
US bankruptcy regimes that are more familiar to most of the
global money managers, Irish Independent recounts.

The sessions were organized by the coordinating committee that
represents the "first lien" or top-ranked Eircom lenders, Irish
Independent states.

A separate group of lower ranked "second-lien" lenders owed a
further EUR350 million has already been working with its own
local experts, Irish Independent notes.

They have hired David Carson of rival insolvency experts Deloitte
as adviser, Irish Independent discloses.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: At Risk of Nationalization; Seeks Additional Capital
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Jenkins, Rachel Sanderson and James Wilson at the
Financial Times report that Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
is seen to be at the greatest risk of at least partial
nationalization.

MPS was shown to have a EUR3.3 billion capital shortfall in
December stress tests conducted by the European Banking
Authority, the FT discloses.

The regulator gave the bank until June to raise additional
capital, with a deadline of Jan. 20 to submit a clear plan, the
FT notes.

According to the FT, three people familiar with the matter said
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the state financing agency, could
provide funds either directly to the bank or indirectly through
its main shareholder, the Monte dei Paschi foundation.
The FT relates that one of the people familiar with the matter
said it hopes to raise the funds demanded by the EBA through
joint venture deals, the sale of real estate, deleveraging of
risk-weighted assets and the conversion of EUR1.1 billion of
structured equity products into capital.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 29,
2011, Dow Jones Newswires related that Banca Monte dei Paschi di
Siena's controlling shareholder reached a standstill agreement on
a total return swap contract it holds with a creditor, Credit
Suisse Group AS, the latest in its push for more time to pay off
its debts.  The Italian bank's shareholder, Fondazione Monte dei
Paschi di Siena, said in a statement that the agreement on the
Fresh 2008 contract would run until March 15, Dow Jones
disclosed.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


FONDIARIA-SAI SPA: S&P Affirms 'B' Counterparty Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' counterparty
credit and insurer financial strength ratings on Italy-based
composite insurer Fondiaria-SAI SpA, its core subsidiary Milano
Assicurazioni SpA and its nonstrategically important subsidiary
SIAT - Societa Italiana Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni pA
(SIAT).

"We are maintaining the ratings on CreditWatch developing, where
we placed them on Dec. 29, 2011," S&P said.

Italy's Unipol Gruppo Finanziario SpA (Unipol), composite insurer
Unipol group's holding company, said on Jan. 13, 2012 it would
buy 51.287% of Premafin (not rated), Fondiaria-SAI's holding
company.

The CreditWatch developing action reflects the possibility that
we could lower, affirm, or raise the ratings on Fondiaria-SAI,
Milano Assicurazioni, and SIAT-Societů Italiana Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazioni.

"We could raise the ratings if Premafin's acquisition by Unipol
is completed successfully and results in an improvement in
Fondiaria-SAI group's financial profile. Unipol's financial
profile is stronger than Fondiaria-SAI group's, and the
acquisition is conditional on Unipol being able to participate in
Fondiaria-SAI's recapitalization," S&P said.

The downside rating risk stems from potential regulatory
intervention if the group fails to successfully implement the
proposed capital increase, or the merger with Unipol
Assicurazioni SpA.

Additional downside risk could arise if the difficult operating
and financial environments were to lead to a further
deterioration in Fondiaria-SAI group's credit profile.

"We expect to resolve or update the CreditWatch developing
placements on Fondiaria-SAI, Milano Assicurazioni and SIAT-
Societa Italiana Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni pA within the
next three months, when we expect more information on the
likelihood of the successful execution of the acquisition by
Unipol to be available," S&P said.

The CreditWatch resolutions also depend on developments at
Fondiaria-SAI group and the actions it will take to reduce the
potential for capital erosion in the future.

"We could lower the ratings on Fondiaria-SAI, Milano
Assicurazioni, and SIAT-Societa Italiana Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazioni if the proposed acquisition or the proposed
capital increase do not materialize, if we come to believe there
is an increasing risk of regulatory intervention, or if
Fondiaria-SAI group continues to struggle in the current tough
operating and financial environment," S&P said.

"We could potentially raise the ratings to 'BBB' range if the
acquisition went ahead or the capital increase was successful,
resulting in significant improvement in capitalization and
regulatory solvency, and if we believed that Fondiaria-SAI group
was unlikely to post further unexpected substantial technical or
financial losses," S&P said.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Ardagh Packaging Group
plc's (Ardagh) corporate family rating and probability of default
rating at B2 and changed the outlook on the ratings to stable
from positive. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a provisional (P)B3
(LGD 5, 73%) rating to the proposed US$250 million senior
unsecured notes due 2020. All other instrument ratings of the
group, including the Ba3 (LGD 2, 23%) rating of the US$375
million senior secured notes due in 2017, that will be increased
by US$160 million, have been affirmed.

The proceeds from the proposed issuance are expected to remain
within the group initially, though Moody's understands that
Ardagh is in advanced negotiations for the potential acquisition
of two bolt-on companies in the packaging segment. The proceeds
would be used to fund the purchase price should these
acquisitions materialize.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect the rating agency's credit
opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review
of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the instrument mentioned above. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Rating Rationale

"The change in outlook to stable from positive reflects the
group's continued debt financed acquisition activity, that
results in a materially slower than expected pace of deleverage"
explains Anke Rindermann, Moody's lead analyst for Ardagh. She
adds: "While the incremental debt amount is moderate compared to
the group's total debt load, Moody's cautions that in combination
with lower than expected operating performance of the existing
business, Ardagh will not achieve credit metrics commensurate
with a higher rating in the short term". High cost inflation over
2011, some volume weakness in particular in the metal division as
well as a longer than expected integration process of the Impress
assets have resulted in operating profitability below Moody's
expectation and leave Ardagh with a highly leveraged financial
profile as indicated by Debt/EBITDA around 6x per year end 2011.
While Moody's expects Ardagh to recover most of the higher cost
base over 2012, this will in Moody's view not enable Ardagh to
reduce leverage meaningfully.

The stable outlook is based on Moody's assumption of gradual
earnings enhancement in the underlying business on the back of a
recovery of higher input costs and a smooth integration of
potential bolt-on acquisitions that should allow Ardagh to
gradually improve debt protection metrics. The stable outlook is
also based on the assumption of the group preserving a solid
liquidity cushion, including sufficient leeway under financial
covenants, which have tightened materially over 2011 as a result
of weaker than expected operating profitability.

More positively, the affirmation of the group's B2 corporate
family rating reflects (i) Ardagh's solid scale with sales in
excess of EUR3 billion and good market positions of the combined
group in the rather low-cyclical food and beverage industry,
where Ardagh generates the vast majority of sales; (ii) an
improving geographic spread with the focus of operations still on
the European market but with activities also to include Impress
existing presence in North America and Australasia; as well as
(iii) an improved substrate diversity from a pure glass container
focus to a mix of glass and metal.

These positive rating drivers are balanced by (i) high leverage
following the acquisition of Impress and more recently FiPar and
Boxal as well as potential further bolt-on acquisition activity
(ii) the exposure to volatile raw material prices which need to
be passed on to customers in a timely fashion to preserve solid
profitability levels as well as (iii) an aggressive financial
policy as evidenced by full debt financing of recent acquisitions
as well as a debt financed shareholder distribution in 2011.

The ratings could be upgraded should Ardagh be able to reduce
leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA towards 5 times and keep
interest coverage in terms of (EBITDA-Capex)/Interest around 1.5x
by improving its operating profitability and continued free cash
flow generation.

A deterioration in profitability, caused for instance by
increasing competition or the inability to manage volatile raw
material costs, negative free cash flow or Debt/EBITDA
sustainably above 6 times and interest coverage in terms of
(EBITDA-Capex)/Interest towards 1x could put negative pressure on
the ratings.

The provisional instrument ratings are based on indicative terms
and conditions received so far according to which (i) the
proposed Senior Secured Notes benefit from the same guarantors
and security package as Ardagh's existing Senior Secured Notes,
and (ii) the proposed senior unsecured notes benefit from the
same guarantee package as Ardagh's existing senior unsecured
notes. Ardagh's existing senior secured notes are supported by
senior guarantees of subsidiaries representing at least 85% of
consolidated assets and EBITDA and security interests which
Moody's understands comprise the clear majority of the
guarantors' assets. While Ardagh's senior unsecured debt is
supported by guarantees from the same entities that guarantee the
senior secured debt, it does not benefit from any tangible
collateral.

The two notch uplift of the secured notes compared to the
corporate family rating is driven by limited priority debt
sitting ahead of these notes, which in Moody's view should result
in limited losses to be borne by the secured notes holders in a
default scenario. Priority debt sitting ahead of the secured
notes in Ardagh's capital structure relates to the group's EUR100
million revolving credit facility that benefits from priority
access to proceeds from certain collateral. Moody's has ranked
trade payables of the group in line with senior secured debt. The
group's senior unsecured notes are rated two notches below the
corporate family rating, reflecting the implemented effective
subordination relative to a sizeable amount of senior secured
debt that ranks ahead in the capital structure with a closer
proximity to operating cash flows and assets. If Ardagh were to
implement the proposed asset backed financing to replace the
existing working capital facilities, Moody's does not expect a
change in the ratings of the company's debt instruments.

Assignments:

   Issuer: Ardagh Packaging Finance plc

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range
      of 73 - LGD5 to (P)B3

Outlook Actions:

   Issuer: Ardagh Packaging Group plc

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

The principal methodology used in rating Ardagh was the Global
Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers
Industry Methodology, published June 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Ardagh Glass Group, registered in Luxembourg, is a leading
supplier of glass and metal containers by volume focusing on the
European food and beverage market with some operations also in
North America and Australasia. Pro forma for the acquisition of
Impress in late 2010, which more than doubled the size of the
group, the company generated sales of about EUR3.1 billion in the
last twelve months ending September 2011.


ARDAGH PACKAGING: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to negative from
stable its outlooks on Luxembourg-based glass-container and metal
packaging manufacturer Ardagh Packaging Group PLC (Ardagh) and
related entities Ardagh Packaging Holdings Ltd. and ARD Finance
S.A.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B+' long-term corporate
credit ratings on Ardagh, Ardagh Packaging Holdings, and ARD
Finance. In addition, we affirmed our 'BB-' issue ratings on the
group's secured debt instruments and 'B-' issue ratings on the
group's unsecured debt instruments," S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that Ardagh may be unable
to recover its credit metrics to a level we consider commensurate
with the rating, due to a slowing pace of debt deleveraging
following a $410 million (EUR318 million) bond issue to fund
external growth," S&P said.

"Ardagh's credit metrics remain at the low end of our guidelines
for the rating, including Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of about 10% for the rolling 12 months
to Sept. 30, 2011. Furthermore, debt reduction is unlikely to
progress in line with our previous forecasts following the recent
bond issue and the largely debt-funded acquisition of metals
packaging manufacturer Impress Cooperatieve U.A. in December
2010," S&P said.

In addition, Ardagh has entered into an agreement to acquire
(subject to certain closing conditions) European aluminum
container manufacturer the Boxal group of companies, for about
EUR85 million. Ardagh is also in advanced discussions regarding
the potential acquisitions of two other (unrelated) packaging
businesses, which are active in the sectors in which Ardagh
operates. The group intends to fund the acquisitions with the
bond issue proceeds and cash on the balance sheet.

"We view the weakened credit measures as limiting Ardagh's
headroom within the current rating for any significant financial
underperformance or likely ongoing debt-funded external growth
through acquisitions in 2012. Our base-case 2012 forecasts
include adjusted FFO to debt of just less than 10% and adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 6x, following the $410 million (EUR318
million) bond issue and assuming that targeted acquisitions are
completed as planned. As per management guidance, we have not
included any further acquisitions in our base-case forecast, but
note that bolt-on acquisitions continue to represent a large part
of the group's strategy. Furthermore, in our view, a more
significant acquisition is not out of the question, especially if
the group manages to complete an IPO over the medium term," S&P
said.

"In our view, Ardagh may be unable to recover its credit metrics
to levels commensurate with our rating guidelines, specifically,
adjusted FFO to debt of above 10% and adjusted debt to EBITDA in
the range of 5x-6x. We could lower the ratings if Ardagh's credit
measures were to deteriorate further -- for example, because of
further debt-funded acquisitions, financial underperformance, or
unexpected material shareholder returns. We could also lower the
ratings if free operating cash flow generation were to
deteriorate significantly over a sustained period," S&P said.

"Conversely, we could consider revising the outlook to stable if
the group were to deleverage and improve its credit measures in
line with those we consider commensurate with a 'B+' rating. This
could occur if Ardagh were to use an IPO to reduce debt, although
we consider this unlikely in the near term because financial
market conditions remain challenging," S&P said.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


EURO-GALAXY CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Euro-Galaxy CLO B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, and E
notes.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance, using data from the latest available trustee report
dated Nov. 30, 2011, in addition to our cash flow analysis. We
have taken into account recent developments in the transaction
and have applied our 2010 counterparty criteria," S&P said.

"Our analysis indicates that the credit enhancement available for
all of the rated notes has increased since we last reviewed the
transaction on Dec. 17, 2009. In our opinion, this is due to an
increase in the aggregate collateral balance of the portfolio.
The weighted-average spread earned on the collateral pool has
also increased since our last review," S&P said.

"In addition, our analysis indicates that the weighted-average
maturity of the portfolio has decreased, and we have observed
positive rating migration in the portfolio -- in particular a
decrease in the 'CCC' rating category -- since our December 2009
review. This has led to a reduction in our scenario default
rates (SDRs) for all rating categories," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. In
our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
considered to be performing, the current weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios,
using alternative default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"From our analysis, 9.3% of the performing assets are non-euro-
denominated, and this currency mismatch is hedged under specific
asset-swap agreements. Our cash flow analysis also considered
scenarios where the currency swap counterparty does not perform
and where, as a result, the transaction is exposed to changes in
currency rates," S&P said.

"Our credit and cash flow analyses indicate that the credit
enhancement available to the class A-1, A-2, B-1, and B-2 notes
is now at a level that is commensurate with a higher rating than
we previously assigned, when we assume that the swap
counterparties do not perform. We have therefore raised to 'AA+
(sf)' from 'AA (sf)' our ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes,
and to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' our ratings on the class B-1 and
B-2 notes," S&P said.

"The improvements we have seen in the transaction's performance
since our December 2009 review have also benefited the class C,
D, and E notes, and we believe the credit enhancement levels
available to these classes are now commensurate with higher
ratings than previously assigned. We have therefore raised our
ratings on these classes of notes. As the ratings on the class C,
D, and E notes remain lower than the ratings on any of the
counterparties in the transaction, they are not affected by the
application of our 2010 counterparty criteria," S&P said.

"Our ratings on the class C and E notes were constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test that we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for
corporate collateralized debt obligations," S&P said.

Euro-Galaxy CLO is a managed cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in
September 2006 and is managed by Pinebridge Investments Europe
Ltd.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class                 Rating
               To               From

Euro-Galaxy CLO B.V.
EUR412.775 Million Senior Secured Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1           AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)
A-2           AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)
B-1           AA- (sf)          A- (sf)
B-2           AA- (sf)          A- (sf)
C             BBB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)          BB- (sf)
E             B+ (sf)           CCC+ (sf)


===========
R U S S I A
===========


IC RUSS-INVEST: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian-based OJSC Investment Company
IC Russ-Invest's (IC Russ-Invest) Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'B', National Long-term rating at 'BBB-(rus)' and Short-
term IDR at 'B'.  The Outlooks for the Long-term IDR and National
Long-term rating are Stable.

The ratings reflect the high volatility of IC Russ-Invest's
earnings driven by their significant exposure to Russian market
risk and corporate governance concerns specific to a relatively
small and lightly-regulated company which is 59%-controlled by
its president who is the main decision maker.  On the positive
side, the ratings reflect the absence of any debt and plans to
raise any, at least in the medium term.

IC Russ-Invest is effectively a company similar to an investment
fund and its activities are largely limited to asset allocation
decisions.  The company's other activities and business lines are
negligible in terms of revenue contribution.  The bulk of the
company's revenue is generated from the proprietary trading of
Russian equities and bonds.  However, management is attempting to
diversify the company's business through trading on European
exchange and developing the brokerage business.

IC Russ-Invest's balance sheet was almost 80% equity financed at
end-2010 under IFRS, which significantly mitigates the liquidity
risk.  The cash cushion covered 125% of non-equity funding at
end-2010.  Liabilities largely consist of dividends payable,
which are due to inactive shareholders, amounts due on an
overdraft facility with a clearing house and derivative
liabilities, which are mirrored by similar derivative assets.

The ratings' upside is currently limited.  Downward pressure on
the ratings could arise mainly from significant changes in
leverage.


ROSBANK: Fitch Says 'D' Individual Rating Unaffected
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on six Russian foreign-
owned banks' Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of 'BBB+' to
Stable from Positive and affirmed their ratings.  At the same
time, Fitch has affirmed the Long-term IDRs of four Russian
state-owned banks: Sberbank -- Savings Bank of the Russian
Federation, Vnesheconombank (VEB), Bank VTB (VTB) and Russian
Agricultural Bank (RusAg) -- at 'BBB' with Stable Outlooks.  The
agency also affirmed the IDRs of some of their subsidiaries.

The rating actions follow Fitch's revision of the Russian
Federation's Outlook to Stable from Positive and the affirmation
of its Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB' on January 16, 2012.

The revision of the Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs of ZAO
Raiffeisenbank, ZAO Citibank, Rosbank, OJSC Nordea Bank, ZAO
Danske Bank and SEB Bank JSC, which are all rated 'BBB+',
reflects the reduced likelihood of an upgrade of Russia's Country
Ceiling of 'BBB+' following the change in the sovereign Outlook.
Russia's Country Ceiling captures transfer and convertibility
risks and limits the extent to which support from the foreign
shareholders of these banks can be factored into their Long-term
foreign currency IDRs.  The banks' Long-term local currency IDRs,
where assigned, also take account of Russian country risks.

ZAO Raiffeisenbank is a 100%-subsidiary of Raiffeisen Bank
International AG ('A'/Stable), ZAO Citibank is 100%-owned by
Citigroup Inc. ('A'/Stable), Rosbank is 82.4%-owned by France's
Societe Generale ('A+'/Negative), Nordea Bank is 100%-owned by
Nordea Bank AB ('AA-'/Stable), ZAO Danske Bank is 100%-owned by
Danske Bank A/S ('A'/Negative) and SEB Bank JSC is 100%-owned by
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB ('A+'/Stable).  The Long- and
Short-term IDRs and Support Ratings of these six banks reflects
the high probability of support that would likely be forthcoming
from their majority shareholders, in case of need.

The Long-term IDRs of Sberbank, VEB, VTB and RusAg are affirmed
at the same level as the Long-term IDR of the Russian Federation,
at 'BBB'.  The ratings of all four banks continue to be
underpinned by Fitch's view of the high probability of support
from the Russian authorities, in case of need, given their
majority state ownership; close association between the
government and the four banks, based on supportive policy
statements and strong board representation; the systemic
importance of the commercial banks and VEB's development bank
status; and the track record of providing both new equity and
subordinated debt to the banks during the recent crisis. At the
same time, Fitch also considers Sberbank's standalone credit
profile, as reflected in its Viability Rating of 'bbb', merits a
'BBB' Long-term IDR, i.e. without taking into account the
benefits of potential support.

The Russian state owns 60% of Sberbank's ordinary shares and
75.5% of VTB. RusAg is fully state-owned, while VEB is a state
corporation established by the Russian Federation.  The
government has announced its intention to reduce its stakes in
VTB, Sberbank and RusAg in the medium term, under some scenarios
below 50% after 2013.  If this materializes, Fitch may moderately
revise downwards its assessment of the probability of support for
the affected institutions.  Nevertheless, a high probability of
government support would likely still be factored into the banks'
ratings given their systemic importance, and the fact that the
authorities would probably still remain the largest single
shareholder in each case and retain a close association with the
banks.

As Fitch has previously stated, if the Russian Federation's Long-
term IDRs are upgraded to 'BBB+' -- notwithstanding the recent
revision of the Outlook to Stable -- the Support Rating Floors,
and hence also Long-term IDRs, of Sberbank, VEB, VTB and RusAg
would probably be affirmed at 'BBB'.  This reflects Fitch's usual
practice of notching the ratings of state-owned banks down from
their respective sovereigns at higher rating levels.  It also
reflects the agency's view that if there was a deep financial
crisis in Russia, there is some risk that the sovereign would
cease to provide full and timely support to state-owned banks and
other quasi-sovereigns, including to allow them to make all
payments to bondholders, before it defaulted on its own
obligations.

The rating actions are as follows:

ZAO Raiffeisenbank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb+'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D'; unaffected

ZAO Citibank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb+'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D'; unaffected

Rosbank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb-'; Rating Watch Positive; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; Rating Watch Positive; unaffected

OJSC Nordea Bank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; unaffected

ZAO Danske Bank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

SEB Bank JSC

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Positive
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Sberbank - Savings Bank of the Russian Federation

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bbb'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C'; unaffected

Sberbank Leasing

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Vnesheconombank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

OJSC VEB-Leasing

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

Bank VTB (JSC)

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D'; unaffected

CJSC Bank VTB24

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D'; unaffected

VTB Leasing

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

VTB Capital plc

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; unaffected
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

VTB Bank (Austria) AG

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; unaffected

Russian Agricultural Bank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
  -- Viability Rating: 'b+'; unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'D'; unaffected


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: In Talks with Youngman; Brightwell Mulls Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile
Co., the Chinese carmaker that was in talks to buy Saab
Automobile before the Swedish company's bankruptcy, said it's in
discussions about Saab.

According to Bloomberg, Pang Caiping, head of the Saab task force
at the Chinese company, said in a mobile text message on Friday
that Youngman is exchanging information and discussions are
occurring in China and in Europe.

                       Brightwell Bid Plan

Meanwhile, Ola Kinnander at Bloomberg News reports that
Brightwell Holdings BV, a Turkish private-equity firm, said it
plans to bid for Saab and revive its manufacturing.

"We will make a bid very shortly, there's no question," Bloomberg
quotes Zamier Ahmed, a board member of the Istanbul-based group,
as saying on Friday in a phone interview.

Mr. Ahmed, as cited by Bloomberg, said that Brightwell, which
invests in energy, transport and technology, wants to buy all of
Saab and plans to keep production in Sweden.  He said that his
firm is in discussions with the administrators overseeing Saab's
bankruptcy as well as with Saab Chief Executive Officer
Victor Muller, Bloomberg relates.

Mr. Ahmed said that Brightwell will need at least two weeks
before submitting any offer as it's still evaluating Saab's
assets, including inventories, to decide how much to pay,
Bloomberg notes.  He said that any transaction will require
approval from Saab's former owner, General Motors Co., as well as
the Swedish government and the European Investment Bank,
according to Bloomberg.

                          No Formal Bids

In a separate report, Patrick Lannin at Reuters relates that the
receivers for Saab said on Saturday they are talking with several
bidders and would like to sell the Swedish company as a whole,
but there have been no formal bids yet.

"We have had discussions with a number of interested parties.
Some of them are interested in the factory as a whole and some of
them are interested in parts of it," Hans Bergvist, one of the
receivers, told Reuters in a telephone interview.

"There have been no formal bids," Reuters quotes fellow receiver
Anne-Marie Pouteaux as saying.

Neither Mr. Bergvist nor Ms. Pouteaux would name any of the
parties interested in buying Saab or parts of it, Reuters notes.

                            About Saab

Saab, or Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget (Swedish Aircraft
Company), was founded in 1937 as an aircraft manufacturer and
revealed its first prototype passenger car 10 years later after
the formation of the Saab Car Division.  In 1990, Saab
Automobile AB was created as a separate company, jointly owned by
the Saab Scania Group and General Motors, and became a wholly-
owned GM subsidiary in 2000. In February 2010, Spyker Cars N.V.
was renamed Swedish Automobile N.V. (Swan) on June 15, 2011.

Saab Automobile AB currently employs approximately 3,700 staff in
Sweden, where it operates production and technical development
facilities at its headquarters in Trollhattan, 70 km north of
Gothenburg.  Saab Cars North America is located in Royal Oak,
Michigan employing approximately 50 people responsible for sales,
marketing and administration duties for the North American
market.

On Dec. 19, 2011, Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab
Automobile AB (Saab Automobile), Saab Automobile Tools AB and
Saab Powertrain AB filed for bankruptcy with the District Court
in Vanersborg, Sweden.  After having received the recent position
of GM on the contemplated transaction with Saab Automobile,
Youngman informed Saab Automobile that the funding to continue
and complete the reorganization of Saab Automobile could not be
concluded.  The Board of Saab Automobile subsequently decided
that the company without further funding will be insolvent and
that filing bankruptcy is in the best interests of its creditors.
Swan does not expect to realize any value from its shares in Saab
Automobile and will write off its interest in Saab Automobile
completely.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: To Sell Three Refineries to Avert Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Swint and Nidaa Bakhsh at Bloomberg News report that
Petroplus Holdings AG, which is fighting to avoid bankruptcy, may
sell three of its five oil refineries in Europe.

According to Bloomberg, Petroplus said in a statement on Friday
that the company has started a "sales process" for its Petit
Couronne refinery in France and is "evaluating strategic
alternatives" for its Antwerp plant in Belgium and Cressier site
in Switzerland.

Cressier has been shut down, while labor action is restricting
the lifting of products at Couronne and Antwerp, Bloomberg
discloses.

Petroplus had its credit lines suspended last month, preventing
it from supplying its plants with crude, Bloomberg recounts.
Only two of its five European refineries are still operating, and
they are at reduced capacity, Bloomberg notes.

Switzerland's RSR radio reported last week that Socar Trading
Co., a unit of Azerbaijan's state-backed energy company, is
interested in buying the Cressier plan, Bloomberg recounts.  BP
Plc, which buys refined products from Petroplus's Coryton, U.K.,
refinery to supply its service stations in England, is
considering ways to help the company, Bloomberg says, citing the
Sunday Times of London.

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is Europe's
largest independent refiner.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 20,
2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
issuer credit ratings on Switzerland-based refiner Petroplus
Holding AG to 'CC' from 'CCC+'.  "At the same time, we lowered
our long-term issue ratings on senior unsecured notes totaling
US$1.6 billion and a US$150 million convertible bond issued by
finance subsidiary Petroplus Finance Ltd. (Bermuda) to 'C' from
'CCC'.  The recovery ratings of '5' on all rated instruments
remain unchanged," S&P said.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DECO 6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'C (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A2 and Class
B, Class C and Class D Notes issued by Deco 6 -- UK Large Loan 2
plc (amounts reflect initial outstandings):

   -- GBP259.9M Class A2 Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
      on Mar 3, 2011 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- GBP43M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
      on Mar 3, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- GBP49.1M Class C Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously
      on Mar 3, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- GBP30.119911M Class D Notes, Downgraded to C (sf);
      previously on Mar 3, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade action on Classes A2, B, C & D reflects Moody's
increased loss expectation for the pool since its last review.
This is primarily due to the default of the two remaining loans
in the pool coupled with lower property values that Moody's
attributes to the collateral.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Based on its reassessment of the underlying property values, the
weighted average (WA) Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the
securitized pool is 131% and on a whole loan basis is 133%. This
compares with the prior review WA LTV of 102% on the securitized
pool and 104% on a whole loan basis. Moody's notes that for both
of the remaining currently performing specially serviced loans,
the Moody's LTV ratios on the whole loan are above 100%. As both
loans undergo work-out, Moody's expects large losses on these
loans, ranging between 25-50% for both loans.

The ratings of the Classes of Notes are sensitive to 1) the work-
out strategies for both loans, 2) the current and expected
ongoing weak refinancing market for non-prime properties and 3)
challenging occupational market trends for non-prime properties.
Specifically, the Mapeley loan (63% of the current pool) is
marked by significant value volatility due to deteriorating
vacancy and cash flow performance on the underlying portfolio.
Moody's considered in its analysis, two work-out scenarios
including an outright sale of the portfolio and a loan
restructure through its maturity in July 2015. However, given the
current leasing profile and a soft lending market for non-prime
properties, Moody's believes the loan will continue to be highly
leveraged with a minimal chance for refinance. For the Brunel
loan, as Moody's expects limited increase in non-prime property
values in the next two years, along with a depressed retail
climate, this loan will be highly leveraged at its maturity date
in April 2012.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realised losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2013, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) strong
differentiation between prime and secondary properties, with
further value declines expected for non-prime properties, and
(iii) occupational markets will remain under pressure in the
short term and will only slowly recover in the medium term in
line with anticipated economic recovery. Overall, Moody's central
global macroeconomic scenario is for a material slowdown in
growth in 2012 for most of the world's largest economies fueled
by fiscal consolidation efforts, household and banking sector
deleveraging and persistently high unemployment levels.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(November 28, 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit
of countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions in some countries, which could result in rating
downgrades.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

As of the October 2011 interest payment date (IPD), the
transaction's total pool balance was GBP272.1 million, down by
51% since closing. This reduction is mainly due to the prepayment
of the largest loan at closing (Canary Wharf Loan) in March 2006.
The prepayment proceeds were applied modified pro-rata. Most
recently, a prepayment of the St. Enoch Shopping Centre loan of
GBP95.0 million occurred, which was applied in accordance with
the pre-enforcement waterfall, repaying the remaining outstanding
balance of Class A1 (GBP61.5 million), as well as GBP33.7 million
of the A2 Class. As a result, two loans remain which are secured
by 21 properties that are mainly in use as retail (37%) and
office (63%).

The sequential payment trigger in the transaction has been
breached and all principal proceeds should be allocated
sequentially to the notes going forward.

With both loans projected to not cover full principal and
interest payments, Moody's anticipates potential drawings from
the liquidity facility and Moody's analysis considers future
reductions in the facility due to current and anticipated
appraisal reductions arising from the value declines of the
properties securing both loans. The current total available
commitment at the end of the period is GBP23.2 million. An
appraisal reduction of GBP22.8 million relating to the Brunel
loan has been taken and with the default of the Mapeley loan,
Moody's anticipates a lower revaluation of the collateral to
trigger additional appraisal reduction.

As of the last IPD, the remaining two loans in the portfolio are
current and in special servicing. Both loans were transferred
into special servicing due to DSCR covenant breaches. The Mapeley
loan (63% of the pool) transferred in October 2011 and is
specially serviced by Hatfield Philips International Limited, and
The Brunel Shopping Centre loan (37% of the pool) transferred in
June 2011 and is specially serviced by Solutus Advisors Limited.

The largest loan is the Mapeley loan (63% of the pool) which is
secured by an office portfolio located in regional towns spread
throughout England, Scotland and Wales. Currently, the portfolio
consist of 20 properties which are let to more than 20 tenants,
with the top-3 tenants contributing approximately 68% of total
rental income. The current reported interest coverage ratio (ICR)
is 0.99x (as of October 2011), compared to 1.35x at last review.
Deterioration has occurred due to the second largest tenant (27%
of total rent) vacating the property at the end of 2011, which
has negatively impacted rental cash flows. The current portfolio
vacancy is 27.5%. Additionally, the outstanding portfolio has a
short weighted average (WA) lease to expiry or break of 2.7
years, with large rollover exposures from the Secretary of State
(46% of rent) and the City of Edinburgh Council (16% of rent).
With an ICR below 1.0x, rental income does not and is not
expected to enable the properties to cover the debt service.
However, for a two-year period ending July 2011, 50% of the
surplus cash flow was trapped with the balance placed in a
reserve for any future loan and property payment requirements.
Moody's anticipates the current accumulated balance of
approximately GBP14 million will be available to service interest
payments and/or fund re-leasing expenses required given the
existing adverse lease profile for this loan. Moody's property
value of GBP122.6 million considers the (i) secondary quality of
the properties, (ii) some potential rental income deterioration
resulting mainly from the existing lease expiry profile and (iii)
reletting costs to outfit new tenants. Since last review, the
loan has gone into default, and Moody's LTV has increased to 139%
from 101%.

The Brunel Shopping Centre loan (37% of the pool), which matures
in April 2012, is secured by a shopping centre located in Swindon
town centre, approximately 80 miles west of London. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2011 due to a DSCR
breach and is current. The DSCR's for the whole and securitized
loan are 0.86x and 0.92x, respectively, as per October 2011 IPD
and limited visibility exists regarding the duration of ongoing
loan restructuring negotiations between the special servicer and
borrower. Based on the revaluation as of October 2011, the
current underwriter's whole loan and securitized LTV is 123% and
116%, respectively. Based on the most recent valuation, the
servicer has realized an appraisal reduction of GBP22.8 million.
Per the Q4 2011 Quarterly Investor report from the special
servicer, the shopping centre vacancy has improved to 6%,
compared to 9% at last review. Despite a reduction in vacancy,
cash flow performance has declined and given the high Moody's
whole LTV ratio of 123% and the transfer into special servicing
due to a DSCR covenant breach, there is a very high likelihood
that this loan will not repay as scheduled on its maturity date
in April 2012.

Portfolio Loss Exposure: Moody's expects a large amount of losses
on the securitized portfolio, stemming mainly from the adverse
performance of the loans in special servicing which make up 100%
of the pool. The likelihood of higher than expected losses on the
portfolio has resulted in the rating action. Given the existing
credit enhancement and their respective payment priority in the
capital structure (given sequential trigger breach), the Class A2
and B notes have been downgraded to a level commensurate with
Moody's loss expectations. For the Class C and Class D Notes, the
prospect for repayment of principal has diminished substantially;
therefore, the ratings have been lowered to Ca and C,
respectively.

Rating Methodology

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006, and Update on Moody's Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS Transactions in EMEA published in June
2005.

Other factors used in this rating are described in EMEA CMBS:
2011 Central Scenarios published in February 2011.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's transaction assessment is summarised in a
press release dated 3 March 2011. The last Performance Overview
for this transaction was published on 08 Dec 2011.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.


HMV GROUP: Gets Debt Reprieve From Banks & Suppliers
----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that HMV Group struck a deal with banks and
suppliers aimed at halving its debts in the next few years.

BBC relates that the company said it was being given
"significantly enhanced" headroom in which to recover.

According to BBC, the new deal with suppliers gives them 2.5% of
the shares in HMV and should cut debt by 50% within three years.

The company said the new deal would have a "materially positive
impact" on the group's profitability and cash flow, BBC notes.

Earlier this month, the company reported a sharp fall in sales
for the Christmas period, with like-for-like sales, which strip
out the effect of shop closures, down by 8.1% in the five weeks
to the end of December, BBC recounts.

The group then reiterated concerns about its ability to trade in
its current form, BBC discloses.

Its banks have agreed to waive a test of its finances which was
due this month, BBC states.

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of
pre-recorded music, video, electronic games and related
entertainment products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the
retailing of books principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The
Company operates in four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV
International, HMV Live, and Waterstone's.


ITV PLC: S&P Affirms Rating on Unsecured Notes at 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to '3' from '4' its
recovery rating on the unsecured notes issued by U.K.-based
broadcaster ITV PLC (BB/Stable/B). "The recovery rating of '3'
reflects our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for
creditors in the event of a payment default. At the same time, we
affirmed our issue rating on the unsecured notes at 'BB', in line
with the long-term corporate credit rating on ITV," S&P said.

"We have revised our recovery rating on the unsecured notes
following ITV's deleveraging of its capital structure, mostly
through its recent repurchase of some of the unsecured notes. We
therefore forecast that less unsecured debt would be outstanding
at our hypothetical point of default in 2016," S&P said.

"Our issue and recovery ratings are supported by our valuation of
ITV as a going concern, given the strength of its brand,
licenses, programming rights, market share, and industry
knowledge and experience, which we believe could retain some
value at default. On the other hand, the recovery rating is
limited by the unsecured nature of the notes. The hypothetical
recovery prospects are also sensitive to our assumptions about
the value of ITV's pension deficit," S&P said.

                        Recovery Analysis

ITV's unsecured notes include a 10% Eurobond due 2014 (which
currently amounts to GBP126 million); 5.375% notes due 2015
(which have been partly repaid, with GBP154 million outstanding
in 2011); GBP135 million convertible notes due 2016; and GBP250
million notes maturing in 2017. The EUR54 million Eurobond due
2011 and the GBP110 million floating-rate notes due 2013 were
fully repaid in 2011. The various outstanding unsecured notes
rank pari passu with one another. We assume that the GBP125
million invoice-discounting bank facility, which is currently
undrawn, is structurally senior and would rank prior to the
unsecured notes in an event of default," S&P said.

"In our hypothetical scenario, we simulate a payment default. We
believe that the key risk that ITV faces relates to the potential
increase in competitive pressure from alternative media in a
prolonged tough macroeconomic environment. The volatility of the
business' advertising revenues poses a further risk, in our
opinion. When combined with ITV's operating leverage, we believe
that these operating risks would trigger a hypothetical default
by 2016. (Under our previous recovery scenario, prior to the
recent deleveraging, we projected a default in 2015)," S&P said.

"Our going-concern valuation yields a stressed enterprise value
of approximately GBP740 million, which is equivalent to 5.75x
EBITDA, assuming that EBITDA declines to approximately GBP130
million by the time of default," S&P said.

"In order to determine recoveries, we deduct from the enterprise
value priority liabilities comprising enforcement costs, 50% of
the net pension deficit, a fully drawn invoice-discounting bank
facility, and related prepetition interest. Assuming about GBP460
million of senior unsecured notes outstanding at default,
including six months of prepetition interest, we see sufficient
value for recovery in the 50%-70% range, translating into a
recovery rating of '3'," S&P said.

Recovery prospects for the unsecured notes could be constrained
if the capital structure changes materially by the time of
default. In particular, this could occur if the company raises
additional pari passu- or priority-ranking debt on the path to
default. A material increase in the pension liabilities by the
time of default could also reduce recovery prospects for the
unsecured noteholders," S&P said.

Ratings List

Rating Revised
                                       To                 From
ITV PLC
Unsecured Debt
  Recovery Rating                      3                  4

Rating Affirmed

ITV PLC
Unsecured Debt                        BB                 BB


YELL GROUP: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based classified directories
publisher Yell Group PLC (Yell) to 'SD' (Selective Default) from
'CC'.

"The downgrade reflects the application of our criteria on subpar
repurchase transactions to Yell's subpar debt repurchase on
Jan. 19, 2012. Under our criteria, we view such a transaction as
tantamount to a default," S&P said.

"The debt repurchase follows the company's announcement that it
obtained the required consent from the majority of its senior
lenders to amend its 2009 term debt agreement. Under the new
terms, Yell reduced its revolving credit facility to GBP75
million from GBP173 million and reset the covenant test on its
net debt-to-EBITDA ratio to restore an appropriate level of
headroom (about 20%, based on the company's new business plan),"
S&P said.

The company's 2009 amended and restated credit agreement allows
for ongoing subpar repurchases of its term debt until its
maturity in 2014, as long as certain conditions are met. About
GBP110 million of cash is still available for repurchasing debt.

"We anticipate declines of about 10% and 12% in Yell's revenues
and EBITDA in financial 2012 (ending March 31, 2012). We also
anticipate a further decline in revenues and EBITDA in financial
2013, although we believe the pace of decline in the top line
will moderate," S&P said.

"We aim to reassess our ratings on Yell in due course, in line
with our criteria. Our reassessment will include the possibility
of further subpar debt repurchases," S&P said.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 16 to 20, 2012
---------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT          5.470   8/28/2013      EUR      59.25
BAWAG                     5.310   2/12/2023      EUR      60.92
BAWAG                     5.400   2/12/2023      EUR      61.43
BAWAG                     5.430   2/26/2024      EUR      56.98
BUNDES IMMOBIL            4.050   1/18/2027      EUR      98.92
BUNDES IMMOBIL            4.070   1/19/2032      EUR      98.62
HAA-BANK INTL AG          5.270    4/7/2028      EUR      51.73
HYPO NOE GRUPPE           4.000   1/24/2029      EUR      98.27
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       3.44
KOMMUNALKREDIT            6.080  12/13/2018      EUR      73.25
KOMMUNALKREDIT            4.900   6/23/2031      EUR      47.50
KOMMUNALKREDIT            5.430   2/13/2024      EUR      59.38
KOMMUNALKREDIT            4.440  12/20/2030      EUR      44.50
OEBB INFRASTRUKT          4.000   12/9/2031      EUR     102.42
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.750   4/30/2021      EUR      68.75
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.160   5/20/2025      EUR      69.96
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.810   7/29/2025      EUR      63.88
OESTER VOLKSBK            5.270    2/8/2027      EUR      47.48
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.170   7/29/2015      EUR      59.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           4.500   9/28/2035      EUR      43.83
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.730  12/11/2023      EUR      63.78
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.470   2/28/2028      EUR      56.04
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.500  12/29/2023      EUR      62.04

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      19.77
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750    5/1/2018      EUR      62.63
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750    5/1/2018      EUR      62.75
ONTEX IV                  9.000   4/15/2019      EUR      72.63
ONTEX IV                  9.000   4/15/2019      EUR      72.31

BULGARIA
--------
BULGARIA GOVT             4.500   1/18/2019      EUR      99.87
PETROL AD-SOFIA           8.375   1/26/2017      EUR      79.75
ZAGREBACKI HOLD           5.500   7/10/2017      EUR      67.20

CYPRUS
------
AVANGARDCO INVES         10.000  10/29/2015      USD      75.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000    1/4/2015      EUR      76.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000   2/28/2015      EUR      75.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000   4/20/2015      EUR      74.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.250    6/9/2015      EUR      72.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750   9/30/2015      EUR      70.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          3.750   11/1/2015      EUR      65.52
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750   12/2/2015      EUR      69.38
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    1/2/2016      EUR      68.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   3/30/2016      EUR      67.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    6/2/2016      EUR      67.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.000    6/9/2016      EUR      69.27
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   7/11/2016      EUR      66.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   10/9/2016      EUR      65.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.600  10/26/2016      EUR      72.38
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    1/4/2017      EUR      65.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   2/15/2017      EUR      64.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    4/2/2017      EUR      64.38
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.600   4/15/2017      EUR      68.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   9/28/2017      EUR      63.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.100   1/29/2018      EUR      64.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   4/23/2018      EUR      62.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600  10/23/2018      EUR      61.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   2/26/2019      EUR      60.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100   6/24/2019      EUR      66.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.625    2/3/2020      EUR      60.91
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.350    6/9/2020      EUR      60.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000    6/9/2021      EUR      62.62
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.500   8/25/2021      EUR      63.77
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100   4/20/2020      EUR      64.50
MARFIN POPULAR            4.350  11/20/2014      EUR      44.38
REP OF CYPRUS             4.375   7/15/2014      EUR      70.37
REP OF CYPRUS             4.750   2/25/2016      EUR      60.96

DENMARK
-------
DONG A/S                  4.875   1/12/2032      GBP      99.52
FIN-DANISH IND            4.910    7/6/2021      EUR      60.63
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR      58.90
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500    2/3/2016      TRY      72.73
NYKREDIT                  3.500   10/1/2044      DKK      96.18
REALKREDIT DNMRK          2.000    1/1/2020      EUR      91.47
REALKREDIT DNMRK          2.000    1/1/2023      EUR      88.99
REALKREDIT DNMRK          2.000    4/1/2014      EUR     100.49
REALKREDIT DNMRK          2.000    1/1/2022      EUR      87.81

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC          9.750    1/2/2013      TRY      99.33
MUNI FINANCE PLC          5.500   3/25/2014      MXN     102.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  10/28/2015      TRY      73.20
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR      74.33
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR      72.26
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   9/24/2020      CAD      70.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/21/2018      ZAR      63.87
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   3/17/2025      CAD      53.01
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.250   6/28/2040      CAD      20.66
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR      49.58
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/10/2021      NZD      64.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  10/27/2016      TRY      68.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/17/2016      ZAR      72.60
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  12/21/2016      TRY      67.74
MUNI FINANCE PLC          1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR      70.38
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/16/2017      TRY      61.71
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR      64.76

FRANCE
------
AGENCE FRANCAISE          3.125    1/4/2024      EUR      93.44
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      10.88
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.75
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       4.60
AREVA SA                  3.500   3/22/2021      EUR      75.26
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      20.09
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      50.74
BANQ FED CRD MUT          5.300   12/6/2018      EUR      93.92
BANQUE PSA FIN            6.000   7/16/2014      EUR     101.81
BNP PARIBAS              10.050   7/24/2012      USD      33.63
BNP PARIBAS               2.890   5/16/2036      JPY      57.33
BPCE                      3.750   7/21/2017      EUR      96.01
BPCE                      3.455   9/16/2025      EUR      68.60
BPCE SFH                  4.000   3/23/2022      EUR      98.67
CAISSE AMORT DET          5.120   12/1/2025      NOK     111.53
CAISSE AMORT DET          4.125   4/25/2023      EUR     102.65
CAISSE AMORT DET          2.625   1/15/2015      EUR     101.36
CALYON                    6.000   6/18/2047      EUR      10.52
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      37.28
CEGEDIM SA                7.000   7/27/2015      EUR      75.88
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      28.26
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      19.12
CLUB MEDITERRANE          5.000    6/8/2012      EUR      15.82
CMA CGM                   8.500   4/15/2017      USD      45.50
CMA CGM                   8.875   4/15/2019      EUR      45.25
CMA CGM                   8.875   4/15/2019      EUR      45.09
CMA CGM                   8.500   4/15/2017      USD      45.42
CNP ASSURANCES            6.000   9/14/2040      EUR      65.63
CNP ASSURANCES            6.875   9/30/2041      EUR      66.46
CNP ASSURANCES            7.375   9/30/2041      GBP      74.01
CRED AGRICOLE SA          4.000   9/30/2022      EUR      69.23
CRED AGRICOLE SA          3.900   4/19/2021      EUR      72.98
CRED MUT ARK HL           4.650  12/13/2041      EUR     101.17
CREDIT AGRI CIB           4.850   9/17/2030      USD      73.08
CREDIT AGRI CIB           4.910   11/3/2030      USD      74.56
CREDIT AGRICOLE           4.050  12/22/2020      EUR      74.58
CREDIT AGRICOLE           3.750  10/20/2020      EUR      73.41
CREDIT LOCAL FRA          3.750   5/26/2020      EUR      55.09
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          5.037    8/4/2020      EUR      60.77
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.550    4/2/2020      EUR      59.64
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.500   2/25/2020      EUR      59.42
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.110   9/18/2018      EUR      64.11
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.020   3/13/2017      EUR      74.80
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          4.680    3/9/2029      CAD      73.56
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          1.000  12/23/2024      EUR      59.20
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          2.875   4/23/2030      CHF      72.18
ELEC DE FRANCE            3.875   1/18/2022      EUR      98.74
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.36
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375   4/15/2018      EUR      56.00
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375   4/15/2018      EUR      58.13
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      22.09
FONCIERE REGIONS          3.340    1/1/2017      EUR      71.93
FRANCE TELECOM            5.375   1/13/2042      USD      99.29
GIE PSA TRESORER          6.000   9/19/2033      EUR      71.52
GROUPAMA SA               7.875  10/27/2039      EUR      53.09
HOPITAUX DE PARI          4.100    1/5/2032      EUR      98.80
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      42.43
IXIS CIB                  5.400    1/9/2033      EUR      71.35
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      16.88
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      17.99
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      59.06
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      42.55
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875    6/1/2018      EUR      61.67
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875    6/1/2018      EUR      62.46
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      24.33
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      69.75
PUBLICIS GROUPE           3.125   7/30/2014      EUR      39.40
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      50.25
RCI BANQUE                5.625   3/13/2015      EUR     102.15
RESEAU FERRE FRA          4.250   10/7/2026      EUR     101.84
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      20.92
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.900   3/10/2031      USD      74.80
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.860   3/11/2031      USD      74.43
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.910   3/16/2031      USD      74.87
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.920   3/17/2031      USD      74.96
SOCIETE GENERALE          5.860   4/26/2031      USD      74.65
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       8.22
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      52.74
THEOLIA                   2.700    1/1/2041      EUR       8.39
VIVENDI SA                4.125   7/18/2017      EUR     100.29
ZLOMREX INT FIN           8.500    2/1/2014      EUR      73.25
ZLOMREX INT FIN           8.500    2/1/2014      EUR      73.25

GERMANY
-------
AAREAL BANK AG            2.000    2/1/2016      EUR     100.07
AAREAL BANK AG            2.000   6/15/2015      EUR     100.28
AAREAL BANK AG            2.850   6/10/2016      EUR      92.79
AAREAL BANK AG            2.250   1/30/2013      EUR      98.39
BAYERISCHE HYPO           5.000  12/21/2029      EUR      60.88
BAYERISCHE LNDBK          4.500    2/7/2019      EUR      67.36
BAYERISCHE LNDBK          2.000   12/9/2014      EUR     101.37
BAYERNLABO                1.150   1/15/2013      EUR      99.85
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.600   4/14/2023      EUR      61.75
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.450   2/20/2023      EUR      61.13
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.270   1/15/2019      EUR      64.88
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          5.640   1/30/2024      EUR      60.75
BREMER LANDESBK           2.875   6/21/2017      EUR      90.14
BREMER LANDESBK           3.250   1/10/2022      EUR      80.69
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000   3/30/2018      EUR      23.29
COMMERZBANK AG            6.625   8/30/2019      GBP      69.62
COMMERZBANK AG            4.000  11/30/2017      EUR      22.60
COMMERZBANK AG            5.625  11/29/2017      EUR      69.00
COMMERZBANK AG            5.000   4/20/2018      EUR      23.27
COREALCREDIT              1.000  12/20/2013      EUR      97.94
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          6.050   9/27/2022      EUR      65.38
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          5.300  11/20/2023      EUR      58.88
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          2.000    1/9/2014      EUR     100.09
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.700   7/31/2023      EUR      58.41
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.550   4/14/2020      EUR      72.37
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.210   6/20/2022      EUR      64.53
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.000   2/25/2020      EUR      70.10
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.290   5/31/2021      EUR      62.24
DT PFANDBRIEFBAN          2.250   1/18/2016      EUR      99.96
DZ BANK AG                1.460   9/15/2014      EUR      99.36
ERSTE ABWICKLUNG          1.660   1/20/2016      EUR      99.94
ERSTE ABWICKLUNG          1.200   12/6/2012      EUR     100.13
EUROHYPO AG               5.560   8/18/2023      EUR      48.75
EUROHYPO AG               3.830   9/21/2020      EUR      46.88
EUROHYPO AG               6.490   7/17/2017      EUR      66.88
EUROHYPO AG               5.110    8/6/2018      EUR      58.25
FRANKFURT SPARKA          2.900    6/1/2016      EUR      93.02
FRANKFURT SPARKA          2.700    6/1/2015      EUR      94.76
GEM DT LAENDER            1.625   1/26/2017      EUR      99.31
GOTHAER ALLG VER          5.527   9/29/2026      EUR      69.06
HAMBURG FREIE HA          1.670   1/25/2017      EUR      98.30
HAMBURGER SPARKA          1.710  10/31/2017      EUR      95.53
HAPAG-LLOYD               9.750  10/15/2017      USD      80.88
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500   5/15/2018      EUR      66.63
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500   5/15/2018      EUR      66.63
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250   4/15/2018      EUR      63.07
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250   4/15/2018      EUR      63.13
HSH NORDBANK AG           4.375   2/14/2017      EUR      56.88
HSH NORDBANK AG           2.375   4/15/2016      EUR      91.39
IKB DEUT INDUSTR          4.500    7/9/2013      EUR      71.51
KREISSPK KOELN            1.660   9/29/2017      EUR      97.48
L-BANK FOERDERBK          0.500   5/10/2027      CAD      51.40
LAND HESSEN               1.750   2/10/2017      EUR      99.98
LANDBK HESSEN-TH          2.750  12/15/2017      EUR     101.82
LANDESBK BERLIN           2.500   1/16/2018      EUR      86.69
LANDESBK BERLIN           2.330  12/16/2016      EUR      89.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT           1.375  11/14/2012      EUR     100.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           1.750  11/28/2012      EUR     100.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           1.320    1/4/2013      EUR      99.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT           1.250   1/21/2013      EUR      99.59
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.250  10/20/2015      EUR      26.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.500  12/16/2016      EUR      97.87
LB BADEN-WUERTT           4.070   12/9/2019      EUR     110.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.800   2/23/2037      JPY      38.59
LFA FOERDERBK BY          1.500  12/15/2015      EUR      99.70
NORDDEUTSCHE L/B          2.250   12/8/2014      EUR     100.46
NORDDEUTSCHE L/B          2.125  11/25/2013      EUR     100.66
NORDRHEIN-WEST            0.875  12/19/2012      EUR      99.88
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN          5.875   2/10/2016      EUR      55.00
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       0.68
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       1.00
RHEINISCHE HYPBK          6.600   5/29/2022      EUR      55.50
SACHSEN - ANHALT          1.000   1/23/2014      EUR      99.86
SOLARWORLD AG             6.375   7/13/2016      EUR      63.88
SOLARWORLD AG             6.125   1/21/2017      EUR      62.63
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       1.64
THUERINGEN LAND           2.250   1/13/2020      EUR      97.32
TUI AG                    5.500  11/17/2014      EUR      65.21
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      41.03
UNICREDIT BANK A          2.700  12/14/2018      EUR      95.92
VOLKSWAGEN BANK           5.500    6/7/2024      EUR      59.18
VOLKSWAGEN BANK           5.400   9/26/2023      EUR      61.63
WESTLB AG                 2.500  12/29/2014      EUR      95.15
WESTLB AG                 2.490   1/11/2016      EUR      92.55
WESTLB AG                 3.230   12/9/2016      EUR      98.73
WGZ BANK                  2.125   11/7/2016      EUR      96.62
WL BANK                   1.710   1/23/2017      EUR      96.44
WL BANK                   1.250    1/6/2014      EUR     100.14

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.057   3/26/2013      EUR      51.74
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.301   8/12/2014      EUR      30.41
ATHENS URBAN TRN          5.008   7/18/2017      EUR      14.44
ATHENS URBAN TRN          4.851   9/19/2016      EUR      16.06
FAGE DAIRY IND            7.500   1/15/2015      EUR      75.50
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.900   7/25/2025      EUR      19.50
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.300   7/25/2030      EUR      20.99
HELLENIC REPUB            4.625   6/25/2013      USD      38.75
HELLENIC REPUB            2.125    7/5/2013      CHF      36.50
HELLENIC REPUB            4.590    4/8/2016      EUR      19.88
HELLENIC REPUB            5.000   3/11/2019      EUR      25.50
HELLENIC REPUB            6.140   4/14/2028      EUR       9.88
HELLENIC REPUB            5.200   7/17/2034      EUR      24.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300   7/20/2017      EUR      20.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.675   10/9/2017      EUR      20.43
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.590    4/3/2018      EUR      20.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   7/20/2018      EUR      21.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.014   2/27/2019      EUR      20.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.959    3/4/2019      EUR      22.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.000   7/19/2019      EUR      20.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500  10/22/2019      EUR      21.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.250   6/19/2020      EUR      23.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900  10/22/2022      EUR      20.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.700   3/20/2024      EUR      19.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.100   8/20/2015      EUR      21.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.300   3/20/2026      EUR      20.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700   7/20/2015      EUR      22.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500   9/20/2037      EUR      20.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   9/20/2040      EUR      20.48
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.113   9/30/2014      EUR      21.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.500   8/20/2014      EUR      21.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    7/1/2014      EUR      25.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500   5/20/2014      EUR      23.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500   1/11/2014      EUR      22.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.702   9/30/2015      EUR      19.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.100   8/20/2012      EUR      30.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI          1.000   6/30/2012      EUR      61.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250   6/20/2012      EUR      63.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250   5/18/2012      EUR      32.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300   3/20/2012      EUR      38.48
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.520   9/30/2013      EUR      24.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.000   8/20/2013      EUR      21.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.427   7/31/2013      EUR      31.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.900    7/3/2013      EUR      35.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          7.500   5/20/2013      EUR      30.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   5/20/2013      EUR      26.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900   4/20/2017      EUR      20.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.506   3/31/2013      EUR      37.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700  11/10/2015      EUR      22.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.600   7/20/2016      EUR      19.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.020   9/13/2016      EUR      19.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.225    3/1/2017      EUR      19.65
NATL BK GREECE            3.875   10/7/2016      EUR      68.34
YIOULA GLASSWORK          9.000   12/1/2015      EUR      44.13
YIOULA GLASSWORK          9.000   12/1/2015      EUR      44.13

GUERNSEY
--------
CREDIT AGRICOLE           4.050   6/27/2021      EUR      91.50
FHB MORTGAGE BAN          4.500   3/22/2022      EUR      56.63

HUNGARY
-------
HUNGARY INT BILL          6.750    1/2/2013      HUF      98.88
HUNGARY INT BILL          6.500  12/12/2012      HUF      98.74
HUNGARY INT BILL          6.000  11/28/2012      HUF      98.40
OTP BANK                  5.270   9/19/2016      EUR      74.21
REP OF HUNGARY            3.875   2/24/2020      EUR      70.74
REP OF HUNGARY            2.110  10/26/2017      JPY      65.71

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.580   4/28/2028      EUR      50.21
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000   2/12/2030      EUR      44.93
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000    3/1/2030      EUR      44.90
ALLIED IRISH BKS         10.000   7/28/2016      EUR     124.01
ALLIED IRISH BKS         12.500   6/25/2035      GBP      75.00
BANESTO FINANC            5.000   3/23/2030      EUR      70.51
BANK OF IRELAND           5.600   9/18/2023      EUR      41.00
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000   7/30/2016      EUR      74.13
BANK OF IRELAND           4.473  11/30/2016      EUR      62.00
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000   2/12/2020      GBP      71.50
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000   2/12/2020      EUR      61.00
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.760    9/7/2029      EUR      49.74
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.360  10/12/2029      EUR      46.94
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.400   11/6/2029      EUR      47.17
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.450    3/1/2030      EUR      47.12
DEPFA ACS BANK            0.500    3/3/2025      CAD      51.90
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125   3/16/2037      USD      69.67
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125   3/16/2037      USD      69.94
DEPFA ACS BANK            3.250   7/31/2031      CHF      71.73
DEPFA ACS BANK            4.900   8/24/2035      CAD      69.59
IRISH LIFE PERM           4.000   3/10/2015      EUR      73.88
UT2 FUNDING PLC           5.321   6/30/2016      EUR      64.00

ITALY
-----
BANCA MARCHE              5.500   9/16/2030      EUR      61.38
BANCA MARCHE              4.300    1/4/2020      EUR      74.19
BANCA MARCHE              5.125   5/14/2024      ITL      67.40
BANCA MARCHE              4.360    1/4/2022      ITL      68.84
BANCA MARCHE              3.900   8/17/2020      EUR      69.80
BANCA MARCHE              4.700   8/16/2021      EUR      71.66
BANCA MARCHE              4.000   5/26/2021      EUR      67.29
BANCA MARCHE              3.700    9/1/2020      EUR      68.61
BANCA MARCHE              3.600  11/12/2020      EUR      67.16
BANCA MARCHE              4.000   1/10/2021      EUR      68.66
BANCA MARCHE              4.000    7/9/2020      EUR      70.77
BANCA POP BERGAM          5.320  11/27/2022      EUR      72.49
BANCA POP LODI            5.250    4/3/2029      EUR      62.81
BANCA POP MILANO          4.500   4/18/2018      EUR      70.13
BANCA POP MILANO          4.000   4/23/2020      EUR      73.21
BANCA POP MILANO          7.125    3/1/2021      EUR      76.27
BANCA POP VICENT          3.250   8/26/2014      EUR      90.78
BANCA POP VICENT          4.970   4/20/2027      EUR      64.34
BANCO POPOLARE            6.375   5/31/2021      EUR      71.53
BANCO POPOLARE            6.000   11/5/2020      EUR      73.99
BP CIVIDALE               3.180   5/19/2020      EUR      74.59
BTPS                      4.000    2/1/2037      EUR      69.56
BTPS I/L                  2.100   9/15/2021      EUR      73.69
BTPS I/L                  2.600   9/15/2023      EUR      74.64
BTPS I/L                  3.100   9/15/2026      EUR      74.96
BTPS I/L                  2.550   9/15/2041      EUR      65.85
BTPS I/L                  2.350   9/15/2035      EUR      65.42
CASSA RISP FERRA          4.500   11/2/2020      EUR      60.88
CASSA RISP FERRA          3.400   9/17/2017      EUR      67.75
CIR SPA                   5.750  12/16/2024      EUR      74.68
CITY OF ROME              5.345   1/27/2048      EUR      70.28
CITY OF VENICE            4.265   3/26/2026      EUR      65.51
CITY OF VENICE            4.265   3/26/2026      EUR      65.90
CO BRAONE                 4.567   6/30/2037      EUR      65.71
CO CASTELMASSA            3.960   3/31/2026      EUR      63.32
CO MANERBA GARDA          4.640   6/30/2024      EUR      71.20
COMUNE DI MILANO          4.019   6/29/2035      EUR      58.88
FINMECCANICA SPA          4.875   3/24/2025      EUR      69.91
INTESA SANPAOLO           2.882   4/20/2020      EUR      72.64
MONTE DEI PASCHI          5.750   9/30/2016      GBP      67.07
REGION OF CAMPAN          4.849   6/29/2026      EUR      66.70
REGION OF LAZIO           5.695   6/23/2028      EUR      72.77
REGION OF LAZIO           5.695   6/23/2028      EUR      73.41
REGION OF LIGURI          4.795  11/22/2034      EUR      67.46
REGION OF LOMBAR          5.804  10/25/2032      USD      70.53
REGION OF MARCHE          4.648   6/27/2023      EUR      73.52
REGION OF UMBRIA          5.087   6/15/2037      EUR      70.36
REP OF ITALY              2.870   5/19/2036      JPY      40.75
REP OF ITALY              1.850   9/15/2057      EUR      46.24
REP OF ITALY              4.850   6/11/2060      EUR      62.99
REP OF ITALY              5.200   7/31/2034      EUR      70.41
REP OF ITALY              5.250   12/7/2034      GBP      73.89
REP OF ITALY              2.000   9/15/2062      EUR      48.57
REP OF ITALY              2.200   9/15/2058      EUR      53.48
REP OF ITALY              4.490    4/5/2027      EUR      69.85
SANPAOLO IMI              3.750    3/2/2020      EUR      74.07
SEAT PAGINE              10.500   1/31/2017      EUR      51.17
SEAT PAGINE              10.500   1/31/2017      EUR      50.75
SEAT PAGINE              10.500   1/31/2017      EUR      51.00
SEAT PAGINE              10.500   1/31/2017      EUR      51.40
TELECOM ITALIA            5.250   3/17/2055      EUR      66.76
UBI BANCA SPCA            6.250  11/18/2018      EUR      48.42
UNICREDIT SPA             5.000   4/21/2021      EUR      69.90
UNICREDIT SPA             6.040    3/3/2023      EUR      72.52
UNICREDIT SPA             5.050   4/25/2022      EUR      67.88
UNICREDIT SPA             4.750   4/26/2020      EUR      70.90
UNICREDIT SPA             4.500   9/22/2019      EUR      75.20
UNICREDIT SPA             5.160   6/14/2020      EUR      72.80
UNICREDITO ITALI          5.000    2/1/2016      GBP      71.49
UNICREDITO ITALI          6.375  10/16/2018      GBP      72.00
UNICREDITO ITALI          4.750   4/12/2027      EUR      70.89
UNIPOL ASSICURAZ          5.660   7/28/2023      EUR      54.00

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      24.30
BNP FORTIS FDG            6.750  12/15/2016      AUD     101.04
CONTROLINVESTE            3.000   1/28/2015      EUR      69.83
ESFG INTERNATION          6.875  10/21/2019      EUR      61.68
FMC FINANCE VIII          5.250   7/31/2019      EUR     100.92
INTRALOT LUX SA           2.250  12/20/2013      EUR      72.11
UBI BANCA INT             8.750  10/29/2012      EUR      71.98
UNICREDITO LUXEM          6.000  10/31/2017      USD      73.60
UNICREDITO LUXEM          6.000  10/31/2017      USD      77.95

NETHERLANDS
-----------
ABN AMRO BANK NV          4.750   1/11/2019      EUR     102.62
AI FINANCE B.V.          10.875   7/15/2012      USD      74.50
APP INTL FINANCE         11.750   10/1/2005      USD       0.01
ASTANA FINANCE            7.875    6/8/2010      EUR       4.75
ASTANA FINANCE            9.000  11/16/2011      USD       4.25
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   9/15/2016      TRY      69.89
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/3/2021      NZD      67.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   3/29/2021      USD      73.41
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   3/29/2021      NZD      66.77
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   5/12/2021      ZAR      44.71
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   6/22/2021      ZAR      44.25
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   2/24/2025      CAD      63.57
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   5/25/2016      TRY      71.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   3/17/2016      TRY      72.24
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   6/22/2016      TRY      70.97
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   4/27/2016      TRY      71.69
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500   5/15/2014      USD      32.75
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500   5/15/2014      USD      32.63
BMW FINANCE NV            3.250   1/14/2019      EUR      99.71
BMW FINANCE NV            3.500   7/17/2015      NOK     100.57
BMW FINANCE NV            5.500   7/20/2015      AUD      99.80
BMW FINANCE NV            2.125   1/13/2015      EUR     100.36
BRIT INSURANCE            6.625   12/9/2030      GBP      54.01
CLONDALKIN BV             8.000   3/15/2014      EUR      75.33
DEXIA FUNDING             5.875    2/9/2017      GBP      99.25
FINANCE & CREDIT         10.500   1/25/2014      USD      55.00
FRIESLAND BANK            4.210  12/29/2025      EUR      64.98
INDAH KIAT INTL          12.500   6/15/2006      USD       0.01
ING BANK NV               5.400    2/1/2032      USD      98.70
ING BANK NV               4.200  12/19/2035      EUR      59.94
MAGYAR TELECOM            9.500  12/15/2016      EUR      64.50
MAGYAR TELECOM            9.500  12/15/2016      EUR      64.50
NATL INVESTER BK         25.983    5/7/2029      EUR      15.77
NED WATERSCHAPBK          0.500   3/11/2025      CAD      59.73
NEDER FINANCIER           1.390   1/25/2017      EUR      95.95
NETHERLANDS GOVT          0.750   4/15/2015      EUR      99.94
NIB CAPITAL BANK          4.510  12/16/2035      EUR      58.48
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          4.375   3/24/2017      EUR      74.51
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          4.500   6/16/2025      EUR      59.97
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          5.000   11/4/2019      EUR      69.33
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      19.50
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   2/28/2012      EUR      37.30
RABOBANK                  4.030  12/29/2014      AUD      96.60
RABOBANK                  3.000   1/20/2015      NOK      99.22
RABOBANK                  3.000   2/16/2015      EUR     102.06
RABOBANK                  0.500   1/30/2017      AUD      77.21
RABOBANK                  2.000    2/6/2019      CHF      99.86
RABOBANK                  0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR      70.82
RBS NV                    2.000  10/29/2020      USD      74.50
RBS NV                    5.208  11/16/2030      USD      71.00
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          5.000   2/27/2037      EUR      73.41
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          2.910   6/21/2036      JPY      61.69
REPSOL INTL FIN           4.875   2/19/2019      EUR     101.71
SNS BANK                  5.300   1/27/2023      EUR      68.80
SNS BANK                  4.580   3/20/2026      EUR      56.76
SNS BANK                  5.215   12/3/2027      EUR      59.94
SNS BANK                  6.625   5/14/2018      EUR      80.60
SNS BANK                  6.250  10/26/2020      EUR      71.95
SNS BANK                  4.650  10/19/2021      EUR      67.96
SNS BANK                  5.250   4/11/2023      EUR      67.72
SRLEV NV                  9.000   4/15/2041      EUR      68.29
TJIWI KIMIA FIN          13.250    8/1/2001      USD       0.01
VOLKSWAGEN FIN            3.500    2/2/2016      NOK      99.39
VOLKSWAGEN FIN            4.625  11/24/2014      NZD     100.91
VOLKSWAGEN INTFN          2.125   1/19/2015      EUR     100.02
VOLKSWAGEN INTFN          3.250   1/21/2019      EUR     100.10

NORWAY
------
BUSKERUD FYLKES           2.502   4/17/2012      NOK     100.03
DNB BANK                  4.250   1/18/2022      EUR      99.35
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   7/26/2016      ZAR      72.02
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   5/25/2018      ZAR      61.05
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR      74.08
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR      74.47
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   5/25/2016      ZAR      73.03
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   7/29/2016      TRY      70.26
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   7/29/2016      ZAR      71.93
NORSKE SKOGIND            6.125  10/15/2015      USD      62.63
NORSKE SKOGIND            6.125  10/15/2015      USD      62.63
NORSKE SKOGIND           11.750   6/15/2016      EUR      68.38
NORSKE SKOGIND           11.750   6/15/2016      EUR      68.83
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.000   6/26/2017      EUR      58.83
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125  10/15/2033      USD      44.38
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125  10/15/2033      USD      44.38
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      50.55
SANDNES KOMMUNE           2.537   4/20/2012      NOK     100.00
TERRA BOLIGKR             2.250   1/25/2017      EUR      99.15
TROMSO KOMMUNE            2.527   4/20/2012      NOK     100.00

POLAND
------
POLAND GOVT BOND          5.000   4/25/2037      PLN      85.00
REP OF POLAND             2.648   3/29/2034      JPY      74.47
REP OF POLAND             5.125  10/15/2024      EUR      95.90

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG          4.750   6/22/2017      EUR      67.57
BANCO COM PORTUG          3.750   10/8/2016      EUR      68.37
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600   9/15/2016      EUR      69.91
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600   1/26/2017      EUR      67.91
BRISA                     4.500   12/5/2016      EUR      65.22
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.250   1/27/2020      EUR      67.70
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.380   10/1/2038      EUR      50.42
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.455   8/20/2017      EUR      70.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.500  11/13/2017      EUR      73.88
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          3.875   12/6/2016      EUR      72.65
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.320    8/5/2021      EUR      61.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.980    3/3/2028      EUR      58.13
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.400   10/8/2019      EUR      61.50
COMBOIOS DE PORT          4.170  10/16/2019      EUR      48.00
METRO DE LISBOA           5.750    2/4/2019      EUR      47.88
METRO DE LISBOA           4.061   12/4/2026      EUR      45.00
METRO DE LISBOA           7.300  12/23/2025      EUR      57.75
METRO DE LISBOA           4.799   12/7/2027      EUR      46.25
MONTEPIO GERAL            5.000    2/8/2017      EUR      61.75
PARPUBLICA                3.500    7/8/2013      EUR      75.25
PARPUBLICA                4.191  10/15/2014      EUR      68.00
PARPUBLICA                5.250   9/28/2017      EUR      71.29
PARPUBLICA                4.200  11/16/2026      EUR      30.00
PARPUBLICA                3.567   9/22/2020      EUR      39.63
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500   3/25/2015      USD      71.17
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500   3/25/2015      USD      71.17
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.350  10/15/2015      EUR      64.97
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.600  10/15/2014      EUR      68.96
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.100   4/15/2037      EUR      42.34
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.375   6/16/2014      EUR      72.90
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.850   4/15/2021      EUR      47.23
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.800   6/15/2020      EUR      48.07
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.750   6/14/2019      EUR      48.83
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.450   6/15/2018      EUR      50.20
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.350  10/16/2017      EUR      51.14
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.200  10/15/2016      EUR      57.63
PORTUGUESE OT'S           6.400   2/15/2016      EUR      67.06
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.950  10/25/2023      EUR      46.26
REFER                     4.000   3/16/2015      EUR      38.38
REFER                     4.250  12/13/2021      EUR      29.75
REFER                     5.875   2/18/2019      EUR      47.25
REFER                     4.047  11/16/2026      EUR      38.00
REFER                     4.675  10/16/2024      EUR      38.00

RUSSIA
------
ARIZK                     3.000  12/20/2030      RUB      50.10
BANK ZENIT OJSC           8.750  11/15/2014      RUB     100.00
DVTG-FINANS              17.000   8/29/2013      RUB      55.55
DVTG-FINANS               7.750   7/18/2013      RUB      20.29
GAZPROMBANK OJSC          8.500  12/20/2014      RUB     100.57
IART                      8.500    8/4/2013      RUB       1.00
KAZAN                     8.000  12/21/2016      RUB     100.00
MIRAX                    17.000   9/17/2012      RUB      23.20
MOSMART FINANS            0.010   4/12/2012      RUB       2.00
NLMK                      8.950  11/11/2014      RUB     100.80
NOK                      12.500   8/26/2014      RUB       5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA          1.000  12/17/2012      RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE            9.000   6/12/2012      RUB      65.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000   4/23/2015      RUB      63.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000   4/23/2015      RUB      68.30
RBC OJSC                  3.270   4/19/2018      RUB      38.10
RUSSIAN STANDARD         11.000   11/7/2014      RUB     101.30

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750   6/30/2025      EUR      54.75
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.750   5/25/2027      EUR      62.05
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.250  10/25/2023      EUR      65.62
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750  12/14/2022      EUR      63.44
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.000   3/24/2021      EUR      71.39
AYUNTAM DE MADRD          4.550   6/16/2036      EUR      63.73
BANCAJA                   1.500   5/22/2018      EUR      62.22
BANCAJA EMI SA            2.755   5/11/2037      JPY      73.91
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          4.500   2/16/2022      EUR      69.01
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          6.025    3/3/2033      EUR      56.60
BANCO CASTILLA            1.500   6/23/2021      EUR      62.85
BANCO POP ESPAN           5.702  12/22/2019      EUR      67.79
BANKINTER SA              6.000  12/18/2028      EUR      72.37
BANKINTER SA              4.625  12/29/2014      EUR     100.18
BBVA SUB CAP UNI          2.750  10/22/2035      JPY      42.25
BBVA SUB CAP UNI          5.750   3/11/2018      GBP      75.02
CAIXA TERRASSA            4.700    8/9/2021      EUR      43.16
CAIXABANK                 4.250   1/26/2017      EUR      96.32
CAJA ESPANA               5.500   4/17/2017      EUR      91.33
CAJA MADRID               4.125   3/24/2036      EUR      66.63
CAJA MADRID               5.020   2/26/2038      EUR      74.14
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          3.875   5/23/2025      EUR      56.74
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          4.250   4/10/2031      EUR      51.53
CEDULAS TDA A-4           4.125   4/10/2021      EUR      72.36
CEDULAS TDA A-5           4.250   3/28/2027      EUR      56.39
COMUN AUTO CANAR          4.200  10/25/2036      EUR      53.80
COMUN AUTO CANAR          3.900  11/30/2035      EUR      51.27
COMUNIDAD ARAGON          4.646   7/11/2036      EUR      54.44
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          3.869  11/23/2020      EUR      71.64
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          4.063  11/23/2035      EUR      52.83
COMUNIDAD MADRID          4.300   9/15/2026      EUR      73.49
DIPUTACION FOR            4.323  12/29/2023      EUR      73.08
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.750   3/24/2016      CHF      66.16
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.125   10/1/2014      CHF      74.62
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.400   5/13/2030      EUR      63.29
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.315   9/10/2015      CHF      69.26
GEN DE CATALUNYA          6.350  11/30/2041      EUR      66.84
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.965    9/8/2039      JPY      40.39
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.220   4/26/2035      EUR      49.64
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.690  10/28/2034      EUR      54.91
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.950   10/1/2030      EUR      67.36
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.900   5/28/2030      EUR      66.45
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.900   9/15/2021      EUR      70.51
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.801   7/31/2020      EUR      72.01
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.250   10/5/2023      EUR      67.82
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.219   9/10/2029      EUR      63.27
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.355  11/10/2015      CHF      68.19
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.325   10/5/2028      EUR      66.15
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.900   5/20/2024      EUR      71.33
GENERAL DE ALQUI          2.750   8/20/2012      EUR      66.45
GENERAL VALENCIA          5.900  11/30/2032      EUR      56.50
GENERAL VALENCIA          4.900   3/17/2020      EUR      70.25
GENERAL VALENCIA          4.000   11/2/2016      EUR      78.20
GRP BANCA CIVICA          6.750   1/25/2018      EUR      99.90
IBERDROLA FIN SA          4.750   1/25/2016      EUR     101.56
IM CEDULAS 10             4.500   2/21/2022      EUR      74.25
IM CEDULAS 5              3.500   6/15/2020      EUR      71.25
IM CEDULAS 7              4.000   3/31/2021      EUR      72.37
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.570  10/22/2021      CHF      65.87
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          4.625   1/31/2017      EUR      98.90
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          3.250   6/28/2024      CHF      64.25
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.100   2/23/2021      JPY      66.43
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          3.250   2/10/2015      EUR      96.97
INSTITUT CATALA           4.250   6/15/2024      EUR      67.72
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.170   7/29/2039      JPY      44.48
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           4.250  10/31/2036      EUR      51.28
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.150   5/24/2034      EUR      60.06
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           6.600  11/29/2030      EUR      73.89
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.700   7/20/2028      EUR      68.48
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.000   7/13/2022      EUR      73.77
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.050  12/10/2020      JPY      72.42
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.065   7/29/2039      JPY      43.30
JUNTA CASTILLA            4.650   11/8/2022      EUR      72.94
JUNTA LA MANCHA           4.588   9/24/2017      EUR      74.57
JUNTA LA MANCHA           5.950    9/9/2030      EUR      49.80
JUNTA LA MANCHA           7.705   2/15/2033      EUR      60.88
JUNTA LA MANCHA           4.625  11/30/2022      EUR      55.75
JUNTA LA MANCHA           3.875   1/31/2036      EUR      32.13
JUNTA LA MANCHA           6.000   1/15/2021      EUR      69.75
JUNTA LA MANCHA           5.800   1/30/2021      EUR      69.63
JUNTA LA MANCHA           6.000   1/31/2021      EUR      70.96
JUNTA LA MANCHA           2.810  10/14/2022      JPY      58.13
JUNTA LA MANCHA           4.875   3/18/2020      EUR      66.75
MAPFRE SA                 5.921   7/24/2037      EUR      65.99
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      70.08
SANTANDER ISSUAN          6.533  10/24/2017      GBP      74.09
SANTANDER ISSUAN          5.750   1/31/2018      GBP      73.78
XUNTA DE GALICIA          5.350  11/22/2028      EUR      61.74
XUNTA DE GALICIA          4.025  11/28/2035      EUR      46.25

SWEDEN
------
EILEME 2 AB              11.625   1/31/2020      USD     100.63
LANSFORSAKRINGAR          4.500   6/21/2017      SEK     106.14
NORDEA BANK AB            3.200   1/10/2014      SEK     100.09
NORDEA BANK AB            3.350   7/11/2014      SEK     100.15
NORDEA HYPOTEK            3.535   11/9/2021      SEK     100.88
SKANDINAV ENSKIL          3.875   4/12/2017      EUR     101.30
SVENSKA HNDLSBKN          3.375   7/17/2017      EUR     100.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000    3/9/2012      USD      10.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED          6.500   1/27/2012      USD      10.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED          8.000   1/27/2012      USD       3.36
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500   2/28/2012      USD       8.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000    3/9/2012      USD      10.77
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.750   3/23/2012      USD       8.69
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.250   4/27/2012      USD       8.54
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500   6/12/2012      USD       7.35
SWEDISH EXP CRED          6.800   1/27/2015      TRY      93.10
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   9/29/2015      TRY      73.03
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500  11/27/2015      TRY      72.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500    3/3/2016      ZAR      74.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   6/14/2016      ZAR      72.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   6/29/2016      TRY      68.96
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/25/2016      ZAR      71.40
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/26/2016      ZAR      71.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   9/20/2016      ZAR      70.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   9/30/2016      ZAR      70.78
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/25/2021      ZAR      44.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/26/2021      AUD      62.98
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500  12/17/2027      USD      54.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   1/25/2028      USD      54.26

SWITZERLAND
-----------
ABB LTD                   1.500  11/23/2018      CHF      99.84
ADECCO SA                 2.125    2/8/2016      CHF     100.17
BANQ CANTON FRIB          1.125    2/1/2022      CHF      99.13
CREDIT SUIS GUER          2.125   1/18/2017      EUR      99.14
GIVAUDAN SA               2.125   12/7/2021      CHF     103.02
PFAND SCHWZ HYPO          1.500   1/21/2028      CHF      99.92
PFAND SCHWZ HYPO          0.625   1/23/2017      CHF     100.28
PFAND SCHWZ HYPO          1.375  11/30/2021      CHF     101.39
SWISS (GOVT)              3.250   6/27/2027      CHF     131.03
SWISS REINS CO L          2.125   9/22/2017      CHF     102.69
UBS AG                   10.530   1/23/2012      USD      39.31
UBS AG                   12.400   3/14/2012      USD      11.51
UBS AG                    8.380   3/20/2012      USD      26.93
UBS AG                    8.720   3/20/2012      USD      28.82
UBS AG                    9.250   3/20/2012      USD      11.41
UBS AG                   10.070   3/23/2012      USD      31.69
UBS AG                   13.300   5/23/2012      USD       3.42
UBS AG                   10.960   7/20/2012      USD      22.14
UBS AG                   12.040   7/31/2012      USD      22.69
UBS AG                    9.500   8/10/2012      USD      28.42
UBS AG                    8.650   8/29/2012      USD      32.84
UBS AG                    9.430   8/31/2012      USD      33.26
UBS AG                    9.400   8/23/2013      USD      54.92
UBS AG                   11.020  10/21/2013      USD      57.00
UBS AG JERSEY             2.000   1/17/2014      USD     101.19
UBS AG JERSEY             1.650   8/13/2013      USD      99.69
UBS AG JERSEY             1.650   7/24/2013      USD      97.91
UBS AG JERSEY             3.220   7/31/2012      EUR      41.90
UBS AG LONDON             1.875   1/23/2015      USD      99.80
ZUERCHER KBK              1.250   1/31/2022      CHF     100.44

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS          5.000   8/26/2030      USD      68.40
ABBEY NATL TREAS          4.250   4/12/2021      EUR      99.92
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          6.000   6/20/2014      EUR      70.88
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          4.500   6/21/2013      EUR      75.00
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250   2/15/2018      GBP      70.32
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250   2/15/2018      GBP      70.38
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.408    2/9/2027      JPY      62.97
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.340  12/28/2026      JPY      63.79
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.359   3/27/2029      JPY      57.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/29/2012      USD       9.16
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   7/20/2012      USD       8.31
BARCLAYS BK PLC           7.000   7/27/2012      USD       9.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.500   7/27/2012      USD      10.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.800   7/31/2012      USD      24.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000   8/28/2012      USD      10.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.250   8/31/2012      USD      31.55
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.500   8/31/2012      USD      22.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/11/2012      USD      10.16
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/11/2012      USD      10.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/28/2012      USD      10.18
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000   10/1/2012      USD      10.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.550   1/23/2012      USD      11.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.250   1/31/2012      USD       7.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.650   1/31/2012      USD      19.78
BARCLAYS BK PLC          14.000   10/1/2012      USD       9.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.500  10/16/2012      USD      10.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000  10/16/2012      USD      10.63
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.000  12/22/2031      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.250  12/15/2031      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           4.000  11/10/2023      USD      89.87
BARCLAYS BK PLC           4.250    3/2/2022      EUR     104.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC           4.000   1/26/2022      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           4.500  12/22/2021      USD      99.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC           4.125   1/12/2020      USD      98.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC           5.000  12/23/2018      USD      98.85
BARCLAYS BK PLC           3.250   1/26/2018      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           3.000   1/26/2016      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           3.125   1/12/2016      USD     100.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC           3.000   1/30/2015      USD      99.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC           1.000   1/13/2015      JPY      98.90
BARCLAYS BK PLC           3.250  12/30/2014      USD      99.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC           2.125    9/8/2014      EUR     100.25
BEAZLEY GROUP LT          7.250  10/17/2026      GBP      76.83
BRADFORD&BIN BLD          4.910    2/1/2047      EUR      68.78
CEVA GROUP PLC            8.500   6/30/2018      EUR      47.00
CEVA GROUP PLC           10.000   6/30/2018      EUR      56.88
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.625  11/16/2021      GBP      68.83
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          4.750  11/11/2021      GBP      98.53
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.875   3/28/2033      GBP      68.53
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.750   12/2/2024      GBP      65.56
EFG HELLAS PLC            6.010    1/9/2036      EUR      36.38
EFG HELLAS PLC            5.400   11/2/2047      EUR      13.38
EFG HELLAS PLC            4.375   2/11/2013      EUR      66.34
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.350   7/22/2014      EUR      51.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.000   12/2/2021      EUR      29.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.100   12/9/2021      EUR      30.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.000   2/28/2013      EUR      70.63
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.375   9/26/2031      GBP      57.84
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875    5/9/2025      GBP      59.76
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.500   12/6/2018      GBP      70.04
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875   2/15/2021      GBP      64.53
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      45.69
EX-IM BK OF UKRA          5.793    2/9/2016      USD      70.99
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500    6/1/2019      GBP      62.63
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500    6/1/2019      GBP      62.81
HBOS PLC                  6.000   11/1/2033      USD      70.88
HBOS PLC                  6.000   11/1/2033      USD      70.88
HBOS PLC                  4.500   3/18/2030      EUR      59.30
HBOS PLC                  4.375  10/30/2019      EUR      72.45
HBOS PLC                  5.374   6/30/2021      EUR      64.75
HSBC BANK PLC             4.750   3/24/2046      GBP      71.18
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          7.869   8/25/2020      GBP      77.86
LBG CAPITAL NO.1          7.975   9/15/2024      GBP      70.79
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          9.000   7/15/2029      GBP      69.92
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          8.500    6/7/2032      GBP      70.43
LLOYDS TSB BANK          10.750  12/16/2021      GBP     100.34
LLOYDS TSB BANK          11.875  12/16/2021      EUR     105.35
LLOYDS TSB BANK           5.125    3/7/2025      GBP      99.59
LLOYDS TSB BANK           5.750    7/9/2025      GBP      74.17
LLOYDS TSB BANK           3.500   1/11/2017      EUR     100.75
LOUIS NO1 PLC            10.000   12/1/2016      EUR      61.75
LOUIS NO1 PLC             8.500   12/1/2014      EUR      66.30
LOUIS NO1 PLC            10.000   12/1/2016      EUR      61.75
MATALAN                   9.625   3/31/2017      GBP      53.75
MATALAN                   9.625   3/31/2017      GBP      53.56
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      42.72
MORRISON(WM) SUP          4.625   12/8/2023      GBP     105.47
NEW HOSPITALS ST          1.777   2/26/2047      GBP      61.53
NOMURA BANK INTL          0.800  12/21/2020      EUR      67.06
OTE PLC                   4.625   5/20/2016      EUR      61.61
OTE PLC                   5.000    8/5/2013      EUR      73.99
OTE PLC                   7.250    4/8/2014      EUR      68.01
PRIVATBANK                5.799    2/9/2016      USD      58.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          5.168   6/29/2030      EUR      57.98
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          2.300  11/26/2024      JPY      72.35
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          5.125   1/13/2024      GBP     100.22
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.625   9/22/2021      EUR      70.50
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.700    7/3/2018      USD      77.00
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          6.500   2/17/2017      AUD      73.58
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          3.375  11/23/2016      EUR      99.84
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          4.750  12/15/2014      USD      99.78
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          6.000   12/7/2014      AUD      95.20
SPIRIT ISSUER             5.472  12/28/2028      GBP      68.80
THOMAS COOK GR            6.750   6/22/2015      EUR      49.14
THOMAS COOK GR            7.750   6/22/2017      GBP      46.83
TREASURY                  4.000    9/7/2016      GBP     113.77
UNIQUE PUB FIN            5.659   6/30/2027      GBP      63.88
UNIQUE PUB FIN            7.395   3/28/2024      GBP      47.88
UNIQUE PUB FIN            6.464   3/30/2032      GBP      30.64
UNIQUE PUB FIN            6.542   3/30/2021      GBP      71.85
WELLINGTON PUB            7.335   1/15/2029      GBP      64.85
WESSEX WATER FIN          1.369   7/31/2057      GBP      74.86
YORKSHRE BLD SOC          6.375   4/26/2024      GBP      74.70


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *