TCREUR_Public/120210.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, February 10, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 30

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

VTB BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'D-' Bank Financial Strength Rating


G E R M A N Y

ADAM OPEL: Expects Losses to Widen; GM Mulls Job Cuts
PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Ingolstadt Refinery Attracts Interest
PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Down 4.4% in November 2011


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Fails to Finalize Terms of EUR13-Bil. Bailout


H U N G A R Y

MALEV ZRT: To Undergo Liquidation in Near Future


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'CCCsf'
G SQUARE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Notes Classes to 'D (sf)'
TORA COMPANY: IBRC Appoints Ernst & Young as Receivers


I T A L Y

SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'


L A T V I A

BALTIJAS AVIACIJAS: Court Drops Insolvency Bid


L I T H U A N I A

SNORAS BANK: Commission Commences Bankruptcy Investigation


L U X E M B O U R G

ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to US$260MM Notes
EUROPROP SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
MOSSI & GHISOLFI: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'


N E T H E R L A N D S

CEVA GROUP: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
CEVA GROUP: S&P Raises Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA 2: Fitch Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. B2 Notes
HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA 3: Fitch Cuts Class B2 Note Rating to 'B-'
MARCO POLO: Committee Investigation Extended Period to Feb. 29


R U S S I A

MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating
SISTEMA JSFC: S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
SITRONICS JSC: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'B-'


S P A I N

BANKIA: Expects to Meet Provisioning Requirements
BANKIA: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'
CAJA DE AHORROS: Unveils Losses of EUR2.7 Billion in 2011
CAJA INGENIEROS: Moody's Rates EUR67.5MM Notes at '(P)B1'
CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Debt Ratings for Downgrade

GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Lifts Rating on EUR5.7-Mil. Notes to 'CCCsf'
IM FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCSf'
NCG BANCO: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOTIVE: U.S. Unit Plans to Seek Ch. 11 in Detroit


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABBEYCREST PLC: Business Assets Sold Following Administration
BELLATRIX PLC: S&P Retains 'D' Rating on Class E Notes
BOYER ALLAN: To Liquidate Hedge Fund
CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B+(exp)' Rating to Class B Notes
DECO 6: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'

ENVIRON GROUP: Enters Into Administration
FOUR SEASONS: To Raise Up to GBP230 Million in New Equity
* U.K. Firms Feel The Heat as Consumer Confidence Stays Low


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Corporate Debt Capacity


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
=============


VTB BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'D-' Bank Financial Strength Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of VTB Bank
(Austria) AG (VTBA): D- Bank Financial Strength rating (BFSR);
Baa3 longterm local and foreign currency deposit ratings; P-3
short-term local and foreign currency deposits rating.

Prior to this withdrawal, VTBA's BFSR mapped to Ba3 on the long-
term scale and carried a stable outlook.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The rating withdrawal does not reflect a change in the bank's
creditworthiness.

Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, VTBA reported total
consolidated assets of EUR7.5 billion at YE2010, according to the
bank's annual report.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


ADAM OPEL: Expects Losses to Widen; GM Mulls Job Cuts
-----------------------------------------------------
Sharon Terlep and Christoph Rauwald at The Wall Street Journal
report that General Motors Co. is preparing to disclose
"horrendous" fourth quarter losses out of its European
Opel/Vauxhall unit and is demanding deep cuts from labor unions
there.

"There is increasing frustration with Opel and a feeling that the
cuts two years ago did not go nearly deep enough," the Journal
quotes the official as saying. "If Opel is going to get fixed, it
is going to get fixed now and cuts are going to be deep."

According to the Journal, people familiar with the matter said
that GM executives are preparing a plan for its European
operation that could include more plant closings and job cuts.
GM and the union are discussing moving some production to Germany
from Korea, one of those people said, to offset job losses, the
Journal notes.

The Detroit auto maker's turnaround of its Opel and Vauxhall
units hit a roadblock amid a European debt crisis that has added
to GM's long-standing troubles in the region, the Journal says.

The people familiar with the matter said that as part of the
discussions, GM is considering closing assembly plants in Bochum,
Germany, where it employs about 3,100 workers, and Ellesmere
Port, England, where it has about 2,100 workers, the Journal
relates.

GM executives are eager to devise a plan, but they have yet to
reach any deal with labor unions, the Journal discloses.

According to the Journal, a person familiar with the situation
said that GM, in addition to pushing for production cuts, is
looking to reduce materials costs, save money on suppliers and
reduce waste within the company.  The person, as cited by the
Journal, said that the company has also been overhauling Opel's
management team.

German unions are expected to fight the cuts and push GM to look
elsewhere for savings, the Journal notes.

The auto maker lost US$580 million in Europe through the first
nine months of 2011, the Journal recounts.  On Feb. 16, GM is
expected to report those losses widened in its fourth quarter,
the Journal says.

Adam Opel GmbH -- http://www.opel.com/-- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).
Its high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of
Opel models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the
Astra sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside
North America.


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Ingolstadt Refinery Attracts Interest
---------------------------------------------------------
Nadine Skoczylas and Aaron Kirchfeld at Bloomberg News report
that Petroplus Holdings AG's bankruptcy administrator in Germany
said the company is getting significant interest for its
Ingolstadt refinery.

According to Bloomberg, there are strategic, financial buyers
interested in the company's German operations.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 25,
2012, Petroplus Holdings AG disclosed that the company and its
subsidiaries received notices of acceleration on Jan. 23 from the
lenders under its Revolving Credit Facility after negotiations
with lenders to reopen credit lines needed to maintain operations
and meet financial obligations failed.  The lenders served
notices of acceleration, commenced enforcement actions and
appointed a receiver in respect of Petroplus Marketing AG's
assets in the UK.  Such acceleration constitutes an event of
default under the U$1.75 billion aggregate principal amount of
outstanding senior notes and convertible bonds of Petroplus
Finance Limited.

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is Europe's
largest independent oil refiner.


PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Germany-based pharmaceuticals wholesaler PHOENIX
Pharmahandel GmbH & Co. KG to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook is
stable.

"At the same time, we raised the issue rating on PHOENIX's
syndicated loan facilities to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The recovery
rating on these facilities is unchanged at '4', indicating our
assessment of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
default," S&P said.

"We also raised our issue rating on the company's EUR506 million
senior unsecured notes, due in 2014, to 'B+' from 'B'. The
recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '6', indicating
our view of negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect PHOENIX's continued deleveraging to
date, despite a seasonal buildup of inventory in October 2011.
They also reflect our belief that PHOENIX should be able to
continue to absorb the negative effects of health care reforms
that are currently underway in Germany and other countries.
Furthermore, we continue to view the group's financial policy as
supportive to the new ratings," S&P said.

The company's financial debt totaled about EUR2.1 billion
(US$2.94 billion) at the end of October 2011, the third quarter
of the fiscal year ended Jan. 31, 2012.

"PHOENIX was able to continue reducing debt in the first three
quarters of fiscal 2012. This is after significant progress by
the end of fiscal 2011, when leverage (as defined by the ratio of
pension-and-lease-adjusted net debt to EBITDA) was 3.9x after
almost 7x 12 months earlier. We estimate the leverage ratio for
the full fiscal year to Jan. 31, 2012, to be lower than the
3.9x achieved by fiscal year-end 2011. This is although leverage
increased slightly during the quarter ended Oct. 31, 2011,
because of a seasonal increase in inventory. On a fully-adjusted
basis, PHOENIX could have already reduced leverage to about 3.5x,
from our estimates. We therefore consider the group's financial
risk profile to have improved to 'significant' from
'aggressive,'" S&P said.

"Operating margins are likely to have weakened slightly to about
2.6% in fiscal 2012, from 2.8% a year ago, partly due to the
effect of German health care reforms. Nevertheless, we believe
PHOENIX able to recover at least part of this in fiscal 2013.
This is because PHOENIX has just implemented a new sales policy,
whose main aim is to alleviate pressure on margins from Germany's
health care reform measures. Also, likely weaker margins in
fiscal 2012 partly reflect initial personnel cost overruns
related to PHOENIX's consolidation of Italian and Dutch
acquisitions, which we anticipate should contribute more
meaningfully to profits in the following quarters," S&P said.

"In our base-case scenario, we assume sales growth of about 2%
for the group in fiscal 2013, based on PHOENIX's generally good
resilience to adverse regulatory conditions compared with its
peers' and likely acquisition-related sales increases. This top-
line scenario we believe could generate EBITDA of about EUR600
million in fiscal 2013, based on our assumption of a small
improvement in the gross margin," S&P said.

"Our view of management's financial policy, including its
cautious investing policy and no dividend payments over the next
three years, supports the ratings and our assumption of further
deleveraging. This is also evident from management's strategic
focus on working capital. There was some working capital
expansion during the third quarter of fiscal 2012, which is a
normal seasonal pattern as PHOENIX stocks up on infection-related
medicines ahead of the winter season. However, we believe that
most of the group's efficiency gains are likely to be sustainable
in future," S&P said.

The ratings are tempered in our view by the group's improved but
still "significant" financial risk profile and exposure to margin
pressure from highly regulated health care markets. They continue
to be supported by drug demand, which is fuelled by ageing
populations and consumer lifestyle decisions. Additional rating
supports are PHOENIX's positioning as the European and German
market leader, holding 17% and 28% market shares.

"The stable outlook reflects our assessment that PHOENIX has
reached what we believe is sustainable leverage of less than 4x
on a fully adjusted basis. Although we consider further
deleveraging to be possible, but slower than in the recent past,
we are mindful of the company's financial policy," S&P said.

"We view the ratings as commensurate with PHOENIX maintaining a
fully adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 3.5x. We view this
outcome as highly likely if the company generates sales growth of
about 1.5% and free cash flow of about EUR300 million annually.
We would consider a negative ratings action if PHOENIX's sales
and cash flow were lower than we currently anticipate," S&P said.

"A potential upgrade would likely be consistent with sustainable
leverage approaching 3x. This could in our opinion occur if
revenue growth exceeded 2% and annual free cash flow were more
than EUR400 million, assuming that the company maintains what we
view as a favorable financial policy," S&P said.


* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Down 4.4% in November 2011
------------------------------------------------------------
Margit Feher at Dow Jones Newswires reports that the number of
German companies filing for insolvency in November fell compared
with the year earlier.

According to Dow Jones, the Federal Statistics Office said
Thursday that business insolvencies fell 4.4% on the year earlier
to 2,389.  In the first 11 months of the year, corporate
insolvencies fell 6.3% to 27,606, Dow Jones discloses.

The outstanding claims of creditors in insolvency cases totaled
around EUR2.4 billion in November, rising from EUR2.3 billion a
year earlier, Dow Jones notes.


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G R E E C E
===========


* GREECE: Fails to Finalize Terms of EUR13-Bil. Bailout
-------------------------------------------------------
Demetris Nellas and Derek Gatopoulos at The Associated Press
report that Greece failed to finalize terms for a crucial
EUR130 billion bailout Thursday, but Finance Minister Evangelos
Venizelos headed to Brussels to meet top EU officials, hoping to
rescue the agreement and stave off bankruptcy.

The Athens talks stalled after leaders of the three parties
backing Greece's coalition government approved sweeping new
austerity measures but failed to agree to creditors' demands to
make EUR300 million (US$398 million) in pension cuts, the AP
relates.

According to the AP, Mr. Venizelos issued a dramatic plea to the
coalition leaders to swiftly resolve their differences, warning
that Greece's "survival over the coming years" depends on bailout
and a related debt-relief agreement with private creditors.

A disorderly bankruptcy by Greece would likely lead to its exit
from the euro common currency, a situation that European
officials have insisted is impossible because it would hurt other
weak countries like Portugal, Ireland and Italy, the AP notes.


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H U N G A R Y
=============


MALEV ZRT: To Undergo Liquidation in Near Future
------------------------------------------------
Zoltan Simon at Bloomberg News reports that the Development
Ministry said Hungary will liquidate Malev Zrt. in the "near
future" and is seeking a compromise with Budapest Airport on
compensation payments stemming from the collapse of the state-
owned carrier.

Malev, weighed down by debts of HUF60 billion (US$275 million),
halted flights on Feb. 3 after 66 years in operation, Bloomberg
relates.   Malev went bankrupt after the European Commission, the
regulatory arm of the European Union, ruled last month that the
airline must return the equivalent of US$390 million in
government aid from 2007 to 2010, Bloomberg recounts.

"Malev's liquidation can start in the near future once a court
concludes that the company is insolvent," Bloomberg quotes the
Development Ministry as saying in an e-mailed response to
questions.  The ministry, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the
government, which is in "continuous negotiations" with the
management of Budapest Airport, is "seeking a rational,
manageable compromise".

                     Airport Privatization

Bloomberg notes that the ministry said while Malev's liquidation
"doesn't directly trigger legal consequences," according to the
airport privatization contract, the expected decline in airport
revenue may force compensation payments in an "extreme case".
German construction company Hochtief AG owns 50% of the airport.

According to Bloomberg, the ministry said that "the exact amount
may depend on several factors, but can reach several hundred
billion forint".

Bloomberg notes that a state document published on Dec. 5 showed
that plunging revenue as the result of Malev's collapse may
trigger a clause in Budapest Airport's privatization contract
that will force the government to pay the operator EUR1.5 billion
(US$2 billion), with "critical consequences" for the budget.  The
government sold a majority stake in the airport in 2005, and
Hochtief has been a shareholder since May 2007, Bloomberg
recounts.

According to MTI-Econews, government accountability commissioner
Gyula Budai said at a press conference on Wednesday that if Malev
goes under liquidation, the state could have to pay Budapest
Airport, which operates the airline's base, almost HUF1 trillion.

Mr.Budai said that under the privatization contract signed by
Budapest Airport, the state must pay 90% of senior debt taken out
by the company and 97% of capital injections it made at the
airport if Malev goes under liquidation, MTI-Econews relates.  He
put the senior debt at EUR 1.5 billion, in addition to the HUF60
billion value of the company's shares and HUF390 billion for
75-year management rights for the airport and HUF15 billion for
tangible assets, MTI-Econews discloses.

Mr. Budai, as cited by MTI-Econews, said that under the terms of
the privatization contract, the amount to be paid in the event of
Malev's liquidation was the same as that if the Treasury Assets
Directorate (KVI) were to terminate Budapest Airport's asset
management contra

Malev Zrt. is the flag carrier and principal airline of Hungary.


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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'CCCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avoca CLO V plc; Avoca CLO VI plc;
Avoca CLO VII plc; and Avoca CLO VIII Ltd.

The performance of all four portfolios has stabilized over the
past two years although each has slightly deteriorated since the
last review in April 2011.  The 'CCC' and below bucket ranges
from 7.9% for Avoca CLO VIII to 14.3% for Avoca CLO V.  This
compares with a range of 4.6% (Avoca CLO VIII) to 10.1% (Avoca
CLO V) in April 2011.

The over-collateralization (OC) tests have been stable for all
four transactions with the class A and B tests always in
compliance.  The mezzanine OC tests are failing for Avoca CLO V
but passing for the remaining deals.  The junior OC test and the
interest diversion test are failing for all four transactions.
Breaches of the OC tests have triggered the use of some interest
proceeds for the sequential repayment of principal on the notes.

The affirmation of all notes reflects adequate levels of credit
enhancement for their ratings.  All four transactions have
accumulated additional CE since April 2011.  Fitch expects the
transactions to benefit from more rapid deleveraging following
the end of their respective reinvestment periods.  Avoca CLO V
has the earliest scheduled reinvestment period end in August
2012, while the other transactions are expected to enter the
amortization phase during 2013 and 2014.

Fitch believes that a material risk for the transactions is that
the underlying assets' maturity may extend beyond their reported
weighted average life.  While none of the transaction portfolios
currently contains assets with legal final maturities beyond the
maturity of the respective securitization, there is a risk that
existing assets might be amended and have their maturities
extended.  Fitch incorporated this extension risk into its
analysis of the portfolios.

The Negative Outlooks on the mezzanine and junior notes reflect
their vulnerability to a clustering of defaults and negative
rating migration in the European leveraged loan market due to the
approaching refinancing wall.

Avoca CLO V plc; Avoca CLO VI plc; Avoca CLO VII plc; and Avoca
CLO VIII Ltd are securitizations of primarily senior secured
loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine loans and high-yield bonds. The
transactions closed between 2006 and 2007.   The transaction
portfolios are actively managed by Avoca Capital Holdings.

The rating actions are as follows:

Avoca CLO V plc

  -- EUR215.6m class A1A (ISIN XS0256535567): affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR60.9m class A1B (ISIN XS0256536029): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR46.5m class A2 (ISIN XS0256536532): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR34.5m class B (ISIN XS0256536888): affirmed at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR23.5m class C1 (ISIN XS0256537423): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR9.5m class C2 (ISIN XS0256538157): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR22.5m class D (ISIN XS0256538405): affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR22.0m class E (ISIN XS0256539122): affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR12.3m class F (ISIN XS0256539635): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     Recovery Estimate is RE 0%

Avoca CLO VI plc

  -- EUR300.7m class A1 (ISIN XS0272579763): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR64.0m class A2 (ISIN XS0272580266): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR19.4m class B (ISIN XS0272580779): affirmed at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR31.5m class C (ISIN XS0272580936): affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR20.0m class D (ISIN XS0272582395): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR23.9m class E (ISIN XS0272583286): affirmed at 'B+sf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR10.0m class F (ISIN XS0272583955): affirmed at 'B-sf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR5.1m class V (ISIN XS0272586891): affirmed at BBBsf;
     Outlook Negative

Avoca CLO VII plc

  -- EUR284.0m class A-1 (ISIN XS0289562745): affirmed at AAAsf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR62.5m class A-2 (ISIN XS0289563396): affirmed at AAAsf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR145.0m class A-3 (ISIN XS0289564014): affirmed at AAAsf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR48.5m class B (ISIN XS0289565763): affirmed at AAsf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR42.0m class C1 (ISIN XS0289566571): affirmed at Asf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR4.5m class C2 (ISIN XS0290383412): affirmed at Asf;
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR23.0m class D1 (ISIN XS0289566902): affirmed at BBBsf;
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR8.5m class D2 (ISIN XS0290383768): affirmed at BBBsf;
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR28.3m class E1 (ISIN XS0289567546): affirmed at Bsf;
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR2.8m class E2 (ISIN XS0290384493): affirmed at Bsf;
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR14.0m class F (ISIN XS0289568437): affirmed at CCCsf;
     Recovery Estimate is RE 0%
  -- EUR40.0m class V (ISIN XS0290386431): affirmed at AAAsf;
     Outlook Stable

Avoca CLO VIII Ltd

  -- EUR295.9m class A1 (ISIN XS0312372112): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR52.6m class A2 (ISIN XS0312377772): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR34.0m class B (ISIN XS0312378747): affirmed at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR30.0m class C (ISIN XS0312379984): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR21.5m class D (ISIN XS0312380305): affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR21.5m class E (ISIN XS0312380727): affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Negative
  -- EUR8.0m class U (ISIN 0312381451): affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook Negative


G SQUARE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Notes Classes to 'D (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)' its credit ratings on the class C, D, and E notes in G
Square Finance 2007-1 Ltd., and affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on
the class A-1, A-2, and B notes. "We subsequently withdrew the
ratings, the withdrawals to become effective after 30 days," S&P
said.

The rating actions follow continuing par value losses in the
portfolio resulting from defaults in the transaction's underlying
U.S. structured finance assets.

"Our analysis of G Square Finance 2007-1's December 2011
transaction report shows that the issuer has assets with an
aggregate par value of US$671.79 million, versus outstanding
liabilities of US$1,666.73 million. The liabilities include
US$1,537.02 million class A-1 notes, which in accordance with the
transaction documents must be fully repaid before any other class
of notes can be repaid," S&P said.

"In our opinion, it is clear from the transaction's monthly
reports that the issuer has insufficient assets to fully repay
any class of notes in the transaction. As a result, we consider
that 'D' is the appropriate level for all ratings in the
transaction. We have therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' our ratings on
the class C, D, and E notes, and affirmed at 'D (sf)' our ratings
on the class A-1, A-2, and B notes. In 30 days' time, we will
withdraw the ratings," S&P said.

G Square Finance 2007-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
with a portfolio of primarily U.S. structured finance securities.
The transaction closed in May 2007.

               Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at;

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class                    Rating
                To                   From

G Square Finance 2007-1 Ltd.
US$1.7 Billion Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Withdrawn

C               D (sf)               CC (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

D               D (sf)               CC (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

E               D (sf)               CC (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and Withdrawn

A-1             D (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

A-2             D (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

B               D (sf)
                NR                   D (sf)

NR--Not rated.


TORA COMPANY: IBRC Appoints Ernst & Young as Receivers
------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that Irish Bank
Resolution Corporation, formerly known as Anglo Irish Bank, has
taken control of Tora Company Ltd.

David Hughes and Luke Charlton of Ernst & Young have been
appointed as receivers to Tora, Irish Independent relates.

Tora Ltd. is controlled by Johnny Ronan's and Richard Barrett's
Treasury Holdings, which is locked in a legal battle with state-
owned bad-bank National Asset Management Agency.  Tora is a
subsidiary of a second company called Brossbar, which is owned
equally by Harry Crosbie and Treasury.  It controls the Wool
Store, a property in the Dublin docklands, alongside Harry
Crosbie.  The most recent accounts for Tora date back to 2010,
and value the property at over EUR2.7 million, down from
EUR3.5 million a year earlier, Irish Independent discloses.


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I T A L Y
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SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Italy-based international publisher of
classified directories SEAT PagineGialle SpA (SEAT) to 'D'
(Default) from 'SD' (Selective Default).

"At the same time, we lowered our issue rating on SEAT's
outstanding EUR750 million senior secured bonds due 2017 to 'D'
from 'CCC-'. The recovery rating on this debt instrument remains
unchanged at '2', indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-
90%) recovery in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

All our other issue and recovery ratings on SEAT's debt are
unchanged.

"The downgrade of SEAT's EUR750 million senior secured bonds
reflects the company's failure to pay its coupon payment on this
instrument within five business days after the scheduled due
date. The payment due date was Jan. 31, 2012. The downgrade of
SEAT reflects our understanding that SEAT has now failed to pay
all, or substantially all, of its obligations as they came due.
(The interest payments and debt amortization requirements on
SEAT's secured bank debt and subordinated notes, due in late
2011, have already been delayed)," S&P said.

SEAT is in the process of restructuring its balance sheet. The
company's decision not to pay its coupon payment was consistent
with its recent resolution not to pay maturity payments on the
subordinated notes at related entity Lighthouse International Co.
S.A. and on SEAT's senior secured bank debt, pending negotiations
for the approval of a consensual restructuring agreement by all
stakeholders involved.

"Under our criteria 'Timeliness of Payments: Grace Periods,
Guarantees, And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings,' published Dec. 23,
2010, we consider the extension of a payment maturity as
tantamount to a default if the payment is not made within five
business days after the scheduled due date. This is irrespective
of any grace period stipulated in the indenture," S&P said.

"We will examine the progress on SEAT's pending debt
restructuring over the coming months in the context of the
company's aim to reduce leverage in a way that is agreeable to
all the main stakeholders. If and when SEAT emerges from any form
of reorganization, we will reassess the ratings, taking into
account the factors that precipitated the default, as well as any
gains from the reorganization process," S&P said.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


BALTIJAS AVIACIJAS: Court Drops Insolvency Bid
----------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course reports that Riga District Court has turned
down an insolvency petition against Baltijas Aviacijas sistemas,
submitted by the Veriko company.  Therefore, BAS has been
recognized as a solvent company.

According to Baltic Course, LETA reports that the court rejected
the insolvency petition as unfounded.

The court's ruling cannot be appealed; the full version of the
ruling was released February 7.

Baltic Court recalls that BAS and national airline airBaltic
turned to the court asking that proceedings be reopened and the
case be considered on its own merits, however, the court found no
arguments for a repeat review of the insolvency petition, and
rejected both appeals.

Veriko had turned to courts claiming that BAS be ruled insolvent
over a debt of LVL3,600 that the company originally owed to
Norvik banka.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 27,
2012, The Baltic Times reports that airBaltic Corporation made an
offer to cover the debt of Baltijas Aviacijas Sistemas to Veriko
for brokerage services.  Veriko filed the insolvency claim
against BAS.  If this offer goes through, airBaltic in turn wants
the insolvency claim dropped, the Baltic Times noted.

Baltijas Aviacijas Sistemas is the private shareholder of the
Latvian national airline airBaltic.


=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


SNORAS BANK: Commission Commences Bankruptcy Investigation
----------------------------------------------------------
Rokas M. Tracevskis at The Baltic Times reports that on Feb. 2,
members of the parliamentary commission to investigate the
circumstances of the Snoras Bank bankruptcy gathered for their
first sitting.  The commission of 12 MPs is expected to present
its conclusion by June 1, the Baltic Times notes.

"It is important that all the members of commission avoid
pressure from any interest group," the Baltic Times quotes
Liberal Movement MP Petras Austrevicius as saying.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 29,
2011, Bloomberg News, citing the Baltic News Service, related
that the Vilnius district court backed the Lithuanian central
bank's request to begin bankruptcy proceedings against Bankas
Snoras after the lender collapsed in November.

Bankas Snoras AB is Lithuania's fifth biggest lender.  Snoras
held LTL6.05 billion in deposits and had assets of
LTL8.14 billion at the end of September.  It competes with
Scandinavian lenders including SEB AB, Swedbank AB (SWEDA), and
Nordea AB.  It also controls investment bank Finasta and Latvian
lender Latvijas Krajbanka AS.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to US$260MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
Ardagh's recent bond issuance, comprising US$260 million Senior
Unsecured Notes due 2020, jointly issued by Ardagh Packaging
Finance plc and Ardagh MP Holdings USA Inc rated B3 (LGD 5, 73%)
and a US$160 million top up to the existing Senior Secured Notes
due 2017 issued by Ardagh Packaging Finance plc, rated Ba3 (LGD
2, 23%).

Assignments:

   Issuer: Ardagh Packaging Finance plc

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range of
      23 - LGD2 to Ba3

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range
      of 73 - LGD5 to B3

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive ratings on these debt obligations confirm the
provisional ratings assigned on January 18, 2012.

The proceeds from the issuance are expected to remain within the
group initially, though Moody's understands that Ardagh is in
advanced negotiations for the potential acquisition of two bolt-
on companies in the packaging segment. The proceeds would be used
to fund the purchase price should these acquisitions materialize.

The Senior Secured Notes are supported by senior guarantees of
subsidiaries representing at least 85% of consolidated assets and
EBITDA and security interests which Moody's understands comprise
the clear majority of the guarantors' assets. While the senior
unsecured notes are supported by guarantees from the same
entities that guarantee the senior secured debt, though on a
senior subordinated basis, they do not benefit from any tangible
collateral.

The two notch uplift of the secured notes compared to the
corporate family rating is driven by limited priority debt
sitting ahead of these notes, which in Moody's view should result
in limited losses to be borne by the secured notes holders in a
default scenario. Priority debt sitting ahead of the secured
notes in Ardagh's capital structure relates to the group's EUR100
million revolving credit facility that benefits from priority
access to proceeds from certain collateral. The group's senior
unsecured notes are rated two notches below the corporate family
rating, reflecting the implemented effective subordination
relative to a sizeable amount of senior secured debt that ranks
ahead in the capital structure with a closer proximity to
operating cash flows and assets. If Ardagh were to implement the
proposed asset backed financing to replace the existing working
capital facilities, Moody's will not expect a change in the
ratings of the company's debt instruments.

Ardagh's B2 Corporate Family Rating reflects (i) the group's
solid scale with sales in excess of EUR3 billion and good market
positions in the rather low-cyclical food and beverage industry;
(ii) an improving geographic spread with the focus of operations
still on the European market but with activities also to include
its metal can operations (former Impress) in North America and
Australasia; as well as (iii) a good substrate diversity covering
both glass and metal.

These positive rating drivers are balanced by (i) high leverage
following the acquisition of Impress in 2010, a producer of metal
cans, and more recently FiPar and Boxal, as well as potential
further bolt-on acquisition activity, resulting in a highly
leveraged financial profile with pro forma adjusted debt/EBITDA
levels of around 6 times; (ii) the exposure to volatile raw
material prices, which need to be passed on to customers in a
timely fashion to preserve solid profitability levels as well as
(iii) an aggressive financial policy as evidenced by full debt
financing of recent acquisitions as well as a debt financed
shareholder distributions in 2011.

The ratings could be upgraded should Ardagh be able to reduce
leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA towards 5 times and keep
interest coverage in terms of (EBITDA-Capex)/Interest around 1.5x
by improving its operating profitability and continued free cash
flow generation.

A deterioration in profitability, caused for instance by
increasing competition or the inability to manage volatile raw
material costs, negative free cash flow or a more aggressive
capital structure as indicated by Debt/EBITDA moving sustainably
above 6 times and interest coverage in terms of (EBITDA-
Capex)/Interest towards 1x as well as tightening headroom under
the company's financial covenants could put negative pressure on
the ratings.

The principal methodology used in rating Ardagh was the Global
Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers
Industry Methodology, published June 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Ardagh Glass Group, registered in Luxembourg, is a leading
supplier of glass and metal containers by volume focusing on the
European food and beverage market with some operations also in
North America and Australasia. Pro forma for the acquisition of
Impress in late 2010, which more than doubled the size of the
group, the company generated sales of about EUR3.1 billion in the
last twelve months ending September 2011.


EUROPROP SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed EuroProp (EMC) S.A. (Compartment 1)'s
class A and B notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN), as follows:

  -- EUR145.6m class A (XS0260127161): 'Asf'; placed on RWN
  -- EUR40.9m class B (XS0260129373): 'Bsf'; placed on RWN
  -- EUR28.1m class C (XS0260130207): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Estimate 'RE90%'
  -- EUR30.5m class D (XS0260130975): affirmed at 'CCsf';
     assigned 'RE0%'
  -- EUR15.8m class E (XS0260132088): affirmed at 'CCsf';
     assigned 'RE0%'

The RWN on the Class A and B notes reflects the short time to the
final legal maturity in August 2013.  All assets of the remaining
loan need to be sold by this date and the realised sale proceeds
may be constrained by this short timeframe.  Fitch will closely
follow the sales developments.

The only remaining loan, EUR260.9 million Sunrise, is secured by
mostly secondary quality retail properties spread across Germany.
The performance of the assets has stabilized after a significant
increase in vacancy in 2010.  The portfolio is currently 14.5%
vacant, unchanged from last year and up from 4.4% at closing.

The Sunrise loan defaulted in July 2010 for breach of various
loan covenants and was subsequently transferred to special
servicing.  Consequently, some of the underlying borrowers were
placed into administration.  Despite this, the special servicer
agreed to dispose of the properties in an orderly manner, through
an asset sale, without needing to go through a formal mortgage
enforcement process.

Originally, a portfolio sale was intended, but this strategy was
abandoned due to low bids for the portfolio as a whole.  The
special servicer is current selling the assets separately.   Five
sales were completed by the end of 2011; with 55 assets remaining
in the portfolio.  In each case, the net recoveries exceeded the
allocated loan amounts for the respective properties.  However,
Fitch expects the loan to incur a loss due to the quality of the
assets and the constraints posed by the approaching final legal
maturity.


MOSSI & GHISOLFI: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Mossi & Ghisolfi International SA's
(M&G International) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BB', with a Stable Outlook.  Fitch has also assigned an expected
rating of 'BB-(EXP)' to the prospective US$500 million senior
secured notes to be issued by the company's US subsidiary, M&G
Finance Corporation, and guaranteed by certain entities within
the M&G International group.  The final rating is contingent on
the receipt of final documents conforming to information already
received.

The US$500 million senior secured notes will be issued to finance
two co-sited plants for the production of PET (polyethylene
terephthalate) and PTA (terephthalic acid) to be built in Corpus
Christi, Texas.  The prospective notes are expected to be secured
by liens on the assets of the US subsidiary M&G Polymers USA LLC,
namely the PET plant of Apple Grove and the two future PET and
PTA plants.  The notes will be guaranteed by the parent company
M&G International SA and by its US and Mexican operating
subsidiaries, which together represent 69% of the LTM EBITDA as
of September 30, 2011 and 58% of M&G International's total assets
(as of September 30, 2011).

The secured notes will be structurally subordinated to the bank
loans, both secured and unsecured, issued by the Brazilian
operating subsidiaries that are not guarantors of the notes.
This debt amounted to EUR243 million (equivalent) at September
2011 out of a total consolidated debt for M&G International of
EUR566 million.  The new secured notes will also be structurally
subordinated to EUR111 million of bank loans raised by the
Mexican operating subsidiaries which are secured.  EUR74 million
of loans in Mexico (including EUR37 million secured loans) are
secured against receivables from the US operating company
(effectively guaranteed by the US operating company).  In
addition, certain financing agreements in the Mexican and Brazil
subsidiaries could restrict dividend payments from these
subsidiaries to the parent company M&G International, thus
limiting access to liquidity and operating cash flows for the US
subsidiary that will issue the notes.  The agency believes the
existing built collateral of the notes offers only limited
benefit to noteholders, given the significant execution risk on
the two new US plant.

The affirmation of M&G International's rating reflects its strong
market position in the PET sector and its solid market shares in
the North and South American markets.  In particular, Fitch
considers M&G International is exposed to lower business
cyclicality compared to competitors.  M&G International's key
customer base is characterized by multiple long-term contracts,
which typically have a tenor of over three years, providing some
protection against volume declines during downturns.  The above-
industry average size of the group's operating facilities and its
modern production capacity support the company's low-cost
position and offer some protection against margin erosion.
Fitch also views positively M&G International's strong presence
in Brazil and Mexico, which offers higher long-term growth
potential compared with the more mature US market. However, the
agency considers risk factors to be the limited diversification
of the group in terms of products and geographies, as well as the
high customer concentration.

The ratings are constrained by M&G International's financial
profile, as debt and interest coverage metrics are in line with
the mid-to-low end of the 'BB' rating category.  Based on its
conservative estimates, the agency expects the FFO net leverage
ratio to increase to a peak of 4.4x in 2013 from 3.1x at
December 2010 as a consequence of capital expenditure associated
with the new PET and PTA plants (totalling circa US$750 million).
This level of leverage would not be in line with the 'BB' rating
level, thus leaving limited financial flexibility.  However, the
agency expects significant and fast deleveraging as soon as the
new plants are up and running and cost benefits materialize.
However, Fitch notes that the construction of these plants
remains subject to certain execution risks, including cost
overruns and financing risk.  The long build times imply a time
lag between the capex significant cash out-flows and the benefits
in terms of improved EBITDA and cash generation.  The investment
could therefore result in an increased pressure on M&G
International's liquidity and leverage.

Fitch also considers that the numerous transactions between M&G
International and other companies in the M&G group reduce the
overall transparency and represent a risk factor.  Although the
agency notes that certain covenants included in the prospective
bond documentation should limit new related party transactions in
the future, the current corporate governance concerns could prove
an obstacle to an investment grade rating.

In calculating leverage ratios, Fitch did not include in its debt
calculation the EUR133 million hybrid bonds issued by M&G
International that were bought back by its shareholder, M&G
Finanziaria.  Management has indicated that part of outstandings
will not be repaid in cash by M&G International to M&G Finanziara
but will be offset against other intra-group credits.  The
remaining part of the hybrid bond that is still held by third
parties (EUR67 million) was considered as full debt by Fitch,
with no equity credit.  As permitted under the documentation,
since 2009 M&G International has chosen not to pay accrued, or
resume paying, interest on these bonds.

Fitch considers M&G International's liquidity as adequate for the
current rating level.  Liquidity is supported by EUR71 million
available cash (net of EUR45 million restricted cash, pledged as
a guarantee for a loan issued by the shareholder company M&G
Finanziaria Srl) and EUR75 million available committed
facilities. Together with the expected positive CFO for 2012,
liquidity is sufficient to cover the EUR140 million debt
maturities in 2012 (including short-term facilities).

A significant improvement in trading conditions and operating
cash flow generation, allowing the company to finance the new
investment plan whilst maintaining FFO net leverage below 3.0x,
could drive a positive rating action.  Conversely, a
deterioration in trading conditions and cost overruns for the new
capex that lead to FFO net leverage above 4.5x, would likely
drive a negative rating action.

The expected rating of 'BB(exp)' previously assigned to a
prospective US$500 million senior unsecured bond has been
withdrawn, as these notes were eventually not issued.

M&G International is one of the world leaders in the production
of bottle-grade PET resins, used for packaging in the food and
beverage industries.  The company owns three production sites in
US, Mexico and Brazil.  The company is a subsidiary of M&G
Finanziaria Srl an Italian chemical company, ultimately owned by
the Ghisolfi family.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CEVA GROUP: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded CEVA Group Plc's corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to B3
from Caa1. Moody's also upgraded the ratings on CEVA's senior
secured bank and revolving facilities and senior secured notes
due 2017 to Ba3 from B1; and the priority lien notes due 2016 to
B3 from Caa1. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a Ba3 definitive
rating to Ceva's recent issuance of US$325 million senior secured
notes due 2017, and a Caa2 definitive rating to the recent
issuance of US$620 million of senior notes due 2020; and
confirmed the Caa1 ratings of the junior priority lien notes due
2018. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions follow the completion by CEVA of a debt
refinancing with the issuance of the new notes, together with the
exchange of certain debt held by CEVA's main shareholder Apollo.
The new notes have been used to refinance existing CEVA
indebtedness; whilst the debt exchange by Apollo has reduced
CEVA's overall indebtedness.

The upgrade of CEVA's CFR and PDR to B3 from Caa1 reflects the
deleveraging of the business post the conversion of around EUR514
million in CEVA's debt held by the shareholder Apollo into
preferred equity in a holding company above the restricted group.
Furthermore, it reflects the improvement in liquidity profile
after the refinancing of nearly EUR700 million in near term
maturities associated with the issuance of the new notes and the
increase in the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) by EUR100 million
to EUR179 million.

The B3 CFR also reflects the still high adjusted leverage, at
around 6.5x pro-forma for the transaction, in the context of
CEVA's currently thin operating margins as a result of
difficulties experienced by the logistics market and strong
competition within the industry. The rating is also impacted by
the high cost of servicing the group's debt, which may limit
near-term free cash flow generation. However, the rating is
supported by the group's brand recognition as one of the largest
logistics service providers and its global presence, servicing
many of the largest blue-chip companies in the world, although
with a limited market share in absolute terms. These credit
strengths are offset by CEVA's high financial leverage, the
current weak economic outlook in key reference markets and the
group's exposure to some cyclical sectors.

CEVA's liquidity is acceptable for its near-term requirements.
The refinancing of debt maturing in 2013-2016 leaves the first
significant debt maturity in 2016. Pro forma for the transaction,
the cash balance as of September 30, 2011 was approximately
EUR203 million and the total availability under the increased RCF
and ABL Facility (both due in 2015) was EUR222 million. However,
whilst interest expense will be reduced as a result of the
transaction, Moody's still expects negligible free cash flow in
FY2012.

The new instruments were issued at the same level, CEVA Group
plc, and guaranteed by the same subsidiaries that guarantee the
senior secured credit facilities. In total, the guarantors
represent 59% of the group's aggregate revenues and 53% of its
aggregate EBITDA for the year ended December 2010.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that operating
trends will continue to improve aided by the successful
implementation of some of the company's cost-saving plans. It
also reflects Moody's expectation that the company can preserve
an adequate liquidity profile.

The ratings could potentially be upgraded if there is an
improvement in the company's operating performance leading to
adjusted leverage below 6x and EBIT interest cover sustainably
above 1x. Any upgrade would also anticipate sustained
improvements in free cash flow generation. A rating downgrade
could occur as a result of adjusted leverage moving over 7x, or a
deterioration in CEVA's liquidity position or free cash flow
generation.

CEVA's ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's
considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as
the company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared
with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and
financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to
intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against
other issuers both within and outside CEVA's core industry and
believes CEVA's ratings are comparable to those of other issuers
with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

CEVA Group plc is the fourth largest integrated logistics
provider in the world in terms of revenues (EUR7 billion as at
September 30, 2011 on a last-12-months (LTM) basis). As at
financial year-end (FYE) 2010, CEVA had a presence in more than
170 countries worldwide, employing around 50,000 people and
managing approximately 10 million square meters of warehouse
facilities.


CEVA GROUP: S&P Raises Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Netherlands-based integrated logistics services
provider CEVA Group PLC (CEVA) to 'B' from 'B-'. "We also removed
the ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on Jan. 24, 2012. The outlook is stable,"
S&P said.

"In addition, we raised the ratings on various senior secured
notes and removed them from CreditWatch positive," S&P said.

"We also affirmed the ratings on various senior unsecured and
senior subordinated notes and removed them from CreditWatch
Positive. We subsequently withdrew the ratings on the notes after
they were repaid as a part of CEVA's refinancing," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow CEVA's completed issuance of a total
of US$945 million-equivalent new senior notes due 2017 and 2020,
the proceeds of which were used to refinance existing debt, most
importantly bank loans maturing in 2013. The rating action also
follows the company's conversion into equity of about EUR860
million of debt held by Apollo Global Management, LLC, CEVA's
controlling shareholder," S&P said.

"We believe these transactions have reduced CEVA's financial
leverage, and thereby its cash interest costs. The company has
also enhanced its liquidity profile and financial flexibility,
eliminating major debt maturities until 2015," S&P said.

"Although we believe these transactions have improved CEVA's
financial risk profile, it nevertheless remains 'highly
leveraged,' according to our classifications. We calculate that,
in the 12 months to Sept. 30, 2011, CEVA's credit ratios pro
forma the transactions remained weak but strengthened to an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 8.0x and adjusted funds
from operations to debt of about 4%. This compares with about 10x
and about 2% before the transactions," S&P said.

"Our base-case scenario envisages that CEVA's credit measures
will improve gradually over the medium term. This would primarily
stem from an expansion in EBITDA and cash flow, due to enhanced
profitability and a lower cash interest burden. We anticipate
that free operating cash flow generation will be fairly limited
in 2012 and 2013 and will not contribute materially to reducing
debt," S&P said.

"The rating on CEVA continues to be constrained by our view of
the company's 'highly leveraged' financial risk profile and very
aggressive financial policy. This credit weakness is, however,
mitigated by our view of CEVA's business risk profile as 'fair,'
according to our classifications," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that CEVA's strong
liquidity will support its debt service and ongoing operational
needs in the near to medium term," S&P said.

"The outlook also incorporates the group's weak, albeit somewhat
improved credit measures following the debt-to-equity swap, and
our opinion that credit measures are unlikely to improve
materially. We believe that the ratings could come under pressure
if the group's liquidity position were to materially weaken. We
could consider a positive rating action over the medium term if
the company generated free operating cash flow, reduced leverage,
and improved its credit measures to levels we consider
sustainably commensurate with a higher rating," S&P said.


HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA 2: Fitch Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. B2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 B.V.'s
notes, as follows:

  -- Class A1VF: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A1T (XS0262176364): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2 (XS0262176794): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A3 (XS0262176877): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class A4E (XS0262177172): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class A4F (XS0262177255): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class B1E (XS0262177339): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class B1F (XS0262640575): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class B2 (XS0262177412): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class S1 (XS0262178907): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class S4 (XS0262179467): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

The affirmations of the notes reflect levels of credit
enhancement commensurate with their ratings. The ratings of the
combination notes S1 and S4 have been affirmed in line with the
affirmations on their respective rated component notes.

The performance of the portfolio has stabilized since the last
review in April 2011.  The reported 'CCC' bucket has increased to
9.9% of the portfolio from 8.4% at the last review.  The reported
over-collateralization (OC) tests have improved since the last
review. There is currently one defaulted asset in the portfolio,
making up 0.6% of the portfolio.

The Negative Outlooks on the mezzanine and junior notes reflect
their vulnerability to a clustering of defaults and negative
rating migration in the European leveraged loan market due to the
approaching refinancing wall.


HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA 3: Fitch Cuts Class B2 Note Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes and affirmed three
classes of Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V.'s notes.  The agency
has removed classes A2 to B2, S3 and S4 from Rating Watch
Negative (RWN) and assigned Negative Outlooks to classes A3 to
B2, S3 and S4 and a Stable Outlook to class A2.  The rating
actions are as follows:

  -- Class A1-T (XS0306976266): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A1-VF (NL0006005498): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2 (XS0306976696): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; removed from
     RWN; Stable Outlook
  -- Class A3 (XS0306977157): downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'Asf';
     removed from RWN; Negative Outlook
  -- Class A4 (XS0306977314): downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from
     'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; Negative Outlook
  -- Class B1 (XS0306978981): downgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'BBsf';
     removed from RWN; Negative Outlook
  -- Class B2 (XS0306979955): downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf';
     removed from RWN; Negative Outlook
  -- Class S3 (XS0306981423): downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B+sf';
     removed from RWN; Negative Outlook
  -- Class S4 (XS0306981779): downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from
     'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; Negative Outlook

The performance of the portfolio has stabilized since the last
review in April 2011.  The reported 'CCC' bucket has increased
slightly to 9.8% of the portfolio from 9.2% at the last review.
The reported over-collateralization (OC) tests have improved
since the last review.  There are currently no defaulted assets
in the portfolio.

The affirmations of the class A1-T, A1-VF and A2 notes reflect
levels of credit enhancement commensurate with their ratings.

The agency has removed classes A2 to B2, S3 and S4 from RWN and
downgraded classes A3 to B2, S3 and S4 by one notch due to the
continuing uncertainty over the treatment of defaulted assets for
the purpose of the coverage tests.  The process of clarifying the
defaulted assets definition for Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 is
still ongoing.  Fitch notes that pending resolution of the
defaulted assets definition issue, the trustee calculates the OC
ratios by taking defaulted assets at the lower of market value or
recovery estimates instead of at par.  Additionally, if an OC
test is breached, the amounts that were to be diverted would
instead currently be held in a suspense account by the trustee.

Nevertheless, Fitch expects events that lead to a Rating Watch to
be resolved within a short period of time and although
discussions are ongoing between the relevant parties, Fitch has
no further visibility on a potential outcome.

In Fitch's view, if defaulted assets were to be treated as
performing for the purpose of the OC tests, the classes A3 to B2
OC tests will not divert excess spread as efficiently, which
would in turn result in diminished protection for classes A3 to
B2 in a high defaults scenario.  The agency therefore believes
that the current levels of credit enhancement for classes A3 to
B2 are insufficient to support their previous ratings without the
benefit of excess spread diversion.

The ratings of the combination notes S3 and S4 have been
downgraded in line with the rating actions on their respective
rated component notes.

The agency has affirmed the class A1-T, A1-VF and A2 notes
because the class A2 OC test contains a haircut for excess 'CCC'
assets above 7.5% of the portfolio.  This should partially
capture excess spread via an increase in the 'CCC' bucket, which
would typically increase ahead of any increase in defaults.

The agency notes that 75% of the noteholders of each class of
notes is required to pass extraordinary resolutions approving the
relevant documentation amendments.  The agency also notes that
the collateral manager has shared relevant information about its
efforts in resolving this issue.   This issue was resolved in the
Harbourmaster CLO 7 and 8 transactions. If the defaulted assets
definition issue is resolved such that defaults are marked at
lower of market value and recovery estimates instead of at par
for the purpose of the OC tests, the agency's analysis of the
notes would take this into consideration as part of its ongoing
surveillance of the transaction.

The Negative Outlooks on the mezzanine and junior notes reflect
their vulnerability to a clustering of defaults and negative
rating migration in the European leveraged loan market due to the
approaching refinancing wall.

Fitch employed its global rating criteria for corporate CDOs to
analyze the quality of the underlying assets.  In accordance with
the agency's cash flow analysis criteria, Fitch also modelled the
transactions' priority of payments including relevant structural
features such as the excess spread-trapping mechanism and
coverage tests.  Although some credit protection remains for the
downgraded notes, they are highly dependent on portfolio recovery
prospects.


MARCO POLO: Committee Investigation Extended Period to Feb. 29
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. and its debtor affiliates seek to enter
into a stipulation with the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc for an extension of
the Committee's "investigation period" through Feb. 29, 2012.

The Final DIP Loan Order entered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York provided the Committee with an
initial 60-day Investigation Period from Oct. 3 to Dec. 3, 2011.
By an earlier agreement by the parties, the Investigation Period
was extended to Feb. 1, 2012.

The parties now wish to continue the extension of the
Investigation Period through Feb. 29, 2012, to have time to
address certain issues germane to the Investigation Period.

                         About Marco Polo

Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial
vessel management company that specializes in providing
commercial and technical vessel management services to third
parties.  Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the
name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate
headquarters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  The primary assets
consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in
international trade, and call upon ports worldwide.

Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29,
2011.  The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management
B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V.

Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the
sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano.
The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based
Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International
Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo.  Falm and Poule
didn't file bankruptcy petitions.

The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate
& Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on
the cusp of seizing two more on July 29.  The arrest of the
vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court.  Credit
Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million
on July 29.  The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the
two other vessels.

The cases are before Judge James M. Peck.  Evan D. Flaschen,
Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J. Schoulder, Esq., at
Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as the Debtors' bankruptcy
counsel.  Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC serves as notice and
claims agent.

The petition noted that the Debtors' assets and debts are both
more than US$100 million and less than US$500 million.

Tracy Hope Davis, United States Trustee for Region 2, appointed
three members to serve on the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors.  The Committee has retained Blank Rome LLP as its
attorney.

Secured lender Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank is
represented by Alfred E. Yudes, Jr., Esq., and Jane Freeberg
Sarma, Esq., at Watson, Farley & Williams (New York) LLP.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating on Russia-based telecoms operator Mobile
TeleSystems (OJSC) (MTS). The outlook is stable. In addition, the
rating was removed from CreditWatch, where it was placed with
negative implications on Aug. 2, 2011.

The affirmation of the ratings follows MTS' repayment of $400
million notes issued by subsidiary Mobile Telesystems Finance
S.A. (MTS Finance, unrated) and guaranteed by MTS.

"It also reflects our view that related residual risks are
unlikely to impact MTS' credit quality. While an arbitral award
of US$210 million has not been paid by MTS Finance, we believe
the risks for MTS are not sufficiently significant to have any
impact on the credit rating," S&P said.

"In our base-case assessment of MTS we assume that revenue growth
will slow to a rate of 2%-5% and could be further reduced by
depreciation of the Russian ruble against the company's reporting
currency (U.S. dollar) and decreasing consumer spending in Russia
and other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
We also assume that MTS will maintain its EBITDA margin at above
40%, despite intense competition. We expect capital expenditures
to decline compared with 2011 levels, which should allow for
stronger free cash flow generation. This should help reduce
leverage from our estimate of 1.5x on Dec. 30, 2011, allowing for
more headroom against the rating target of 2x. That said, we
believe that MTS could be considering acquisitions in Russia and
will continue paying sizable dividends, which could limit its
potential to reduce leverage," S&P said.

"The rating on MTS, is constrained by the credit profile of
Sistema (JSFC), its majority shareholder (51.2%). We consider the
credit quality and corporate governance of MTS and Sistema to be
closely linked," S&P said.

"In our stand-alone assessment, MTS' main credit risks are
associated with the company's organic and external growth plans,
intensifying competition, and the risks associated with operating
in Russia," S&P said.

"The company's strong business and financial characteristics,
based on solid positions in the Russian and Ukrainian mobile
telephony markets, mitigate these risks, in our opinion. These
characteristics include improving economies of scale, sound
operating profitability, strong cash flows, and adequate
liquidity," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that MTS will perform in
line with our base case scenario, which includes low-single-digit
percentage revenue growth, a consolidated EBITDA margin of above
40%, and positive discretionary cash flow," S&P said.


SISTEMA JSFC: S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating on Russian operating holding company
Sistema (JSFC). At the same time, the rating was removed from
CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative implications on
Aug. 2, 2011. The outlook is stable.

The rating affirmation follows a similar rating action on
Sistema's strongest subsidiary, Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC) (MTS;
BB/Stable/--).

"In our base-case assessment, we assume that Sistema's
consolidated revenue growth will slow over the next few quarters,
reflecting market saturation and weakening retail consumption. In
our base case, we also assume a reduction in revenues and EBITDA
at subsidiary OAO ANK Bashneft (not rated), in line with our
global oil price assumptions, which could lead to negative
revenues for Sistema. That said, we believe Sistema's majority-
owned assets, MTS and Bashneft, will maintain a resilient
operating performance and continue to support Sistema's business
risk profile. We also expect that Sistema's incoming dividends
will be lower over the next 12 months because both MTS and
Bashneft have sizable investment programs, which will limit their
free cash flow generation capacity and might not allow for
substantial dividends similar to those in 2010," S&P said.

"The rating on Sistema is constrained, in our view, by the
company's aggressive growth orientation, appetite for
acquisitions, and very aggressive corporate governance practices.
In addition, Sistema has a number of projects that we believe
could require additional debt financing or increase consolidated
leverage. The continuously strong performance of Sistema's core
assets, its improving revenue and asset diversity, and its
tangible progress in streamlining operations support the ratings,
in our view," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Sistema's two largest
subsidiaries will generate positive free operating cash flow,
which should support a gradual decline of consolidated leverage
and reduce debt at the parent company level," S&P said.

"The rating has limited upside over the next 12 months, in our
view. This reflects our view that any improvements to the
company's very aggressive corporate governance practices would
take time," S&P said.

"We would consider a negative rating action if Sistema's
consolidated debt leverage increased to 3x, which could most
likely stem from large debt-financed acquisitions. We could also
lower the rating if we observed further negative developments in
the company's corporate governance practices," S&P said.


SITRONICS JSC: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based JSC Sitronics's
(Sitronics) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'B-' with a Negative Outlook. Fitch has also affirmed
Sitronics's senior unsecured foreign currency rating at 'B-'.
The agency has also affirmed its Long-term local currency IDR at
'B-' with a Negative Outlook, its senior unsecured local currency
rating at 'B-', National Long-term rating at 'BB-(rus)' with a
Negative Outlook and national senior unsecured rating at 'BB-
(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects the tangible support from Sitronics's
parent JSFC Sistema ('BB-', Stable) and its material financial
exposure to this subsidiary.  The company's standalone profile is
below the 'B-' level, but due to the moderate-to-strong linkage
(now through JSC RTI) and evidences of tangible support from
Sistema, Sitronics's IDR is notched up.  Fitch believes this
support would likely remain in place only if investment into
Sitronics retains positive equity value and does not expose the
holding to significant additional losses.  The Negative Outlook
reflects the company's continuing operational difficulties and
its inability to turn around the company's financial performance.

Fitch estimates that Sitronics's leverage is likely to increase
by end-11 primarily due to expected weaker EBITDA generation,
while net debt by end-11 is unlikely to increase materially.  As
the result, net debt/EBITDA leverage is likely to increase by
end-11 closer to 6.0x compared to 5.3x at end-10.

Sitronics's margins, which have been generally low and volatile
during the past few years, declined in 2011 with the company's
reported OIBDA margin for the first nine months of 2011 at only
4.4% compared with 7.4% for the same period in 2010.  The
company's revenue in the same period substantially grew by 36% to
US$926.7 million from US$682.5 million.  Fitch believes that
margins may improve after the launch of 90-nanometre integrated
circuit production, although are likely to stay below 2010 levels
(EBITDA margin in 2010 was 10.5%) in the short-to-mid-term.  Due
to this and high interest payments, free cash flow (FCF)
generation is likely to remain negative in the short-to-medium
term.

The company have successfully refinanced or rescheduled all its
debt with maturity in 2011 and by end-11 is likely to accumulate
an adequate cash position to meet short-term obligations during
2012.  In November, Sitronics refinanced a US$230 million loan
from the Bank of Moscow by signing a new seven-year loan
agreements for the same amount with JSC RTI.  During 2011
Intracom Telecom (a subsidiary of Sitronics where it has 51%)
reduced a EUR120 million syndicated loan by EUR30 million and at
end-2011 extended this loan for two months with an option to
extend further (Sitronics guarantees 51% of this debt which had
maturity in July 2010).  Sitronics's cash position at end of
June-11 was US$127 million in cash and cash equivalents (US$152
million end of June-10), but by end-11 the cash position is
likely to improve due to the expected cash inflow from working
capital in Q411 in line with 2010 (cash end-10 was US$262
million).  Fitch expects Sitronics to be able to pay interest
with internal cash flow, although funds from operations
(FFO)/interest payments which fell below 2.0x in 2010 is
estimated by Fitch to remain in that territory in the mid-term.

Sitronics still remains heavily reliant on orders from Sistema,
which accounted for 40.2% of its revenue in 2010, although this
concentration adds some stability to the company's sales.
Overall, although Sitronics is a niche player with strong
positions in several markets within the Russian and CIS
territories, Fitch believes that the company will find it
difficult to close the competitive gap with other global
companies due to its small scale and focus on less-advanced
technologies.

Ongoing financial support from Sistema remains critical for
Sitronics's operating sustainability due to its weak FCF
generation, high leverage and substantial refinancing risks.
Sistema's financial exposure to Sitronics is material.  Sistema
effectively protects Rosnano's US$230 million investment into
Sitronics-Nano, a JV with Sitronics, through a put option
mechanism.

Fitch notes that the company's IDR might be downgraded if
Sitronics were not able to repay its domestic bonds of RUB2
billion and RUB3 billion with an investor put option in June 2012
and October 2012 respectively, if Sistema's support would start
to weaken and/or if last 12 months EBITDA (in Fitch's metrics)
margin would decline below 6%.

Fitch also affirmed the 'B-' local currency and 'BB-(rus)'
national instrument ratings to Sitronics two domestic exchanged-
traded Ruble bonds as follows: series one RUB2 billion bond with
a stated maturity in June 2013 and investor put option in June
2012 and series two RUB3 billion bond with a stated maturity in
October 2013 and investor put option in October 2012.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANKIA: Expects to Meet Provisioning Requirements
-------------------------------------------------
Jesus Aguado at Reuters reports that Bankia Chairman Rodrigo Rato
said on Wednesday the bank expects to meet the government's
requirements for provisioning in the banking sector without
outside help.

"Bankia will comply with the government's requirements and will
do so with its own resources, and will comply in the period set
out by the government in 2012 to clean up bank balances," Reuters
quotes Mr. Rato as saying.

As reported by the Trouble Company Reporter-Europe on July 6,
2011, The Financial Times related that Bankia launched a deeply
discounted stock listing it race to raise private funds and avoid
partial nationalization.  It planned to raise EUR3 billion to
EUR4 billion in private funds to avoid partial nationalization,
the FT disclosed.

Bankia is a Spanish saving bank.

As reported by the Troubled Company on July, 11, 2011, Moody's
Investors Service assigned a standalone Bank Financial Strength
of D+ to Bankia.


BANKIA: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Bankia's senior debt and
deposit ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from Baa2/Prime-2 and its
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D- from D+.
The D- standalone BSFR maps to Ba3 on the long-term scale.

In a related rating action, Moody's also downgraded to Ba3 from
Ba2 the long-term issuer rating of Banco Financiero y de Ahorro
(BFA) -- Bankia's holding company -- and the ratings of its
hybrid instruments, namely, its subordinated debt to Caa1 from
B2, the ratings on junior subordinated debt to Caa2 (hyb) from B3
(hyb) and the ratings on its preferred shares to Ca(hyb) from
Caa2(hyb).

All of Bankia's and BFA's ratings have a negative outlook.

The action concludes the rating review initiated on December 12,
2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

DOWNGRADE OF BANKIA'S BFSR

Moody's decision to downgrade Bankia's standalone BFSR to D- from
D+ reflects the bank's weak risk absorption capacity under
various scenarios of further real estate asset quality
deterioration. The magnitude of the capital shortfall
(benchmarked against the required regulatory 8% minimum core tier
1 ratio) that Bankia would experience, after incorporating its
ability to generate capital, is more consistent with a stand-
alone rating in the low-end of the D category. Moody's has
applied a range of scenarios using commercial real estate
impairments seen at some Spanish banks that have been intervened
and had been subject to a clean-up exercise by the Spanish
regulator such as Banco CAM, but also incorporating some of the
scenarios applied in other countries with similar commercial real
estate sector dynamics such as Ireland.

The above analysis also incorporates Moody's reviewed forecasts
for a substantial deterioration of the country's macroeconomic
indicators which will further reduce the earning (and thus
capital) generation capacity of Spanish banks and which are
likely to depress asset quality further. Moreover, the new
provisioning requirements recently approved by the Spanish
government will add further pressure on banks' already weakened
earnings capacity and capital levels.

The downgrade also reflects Bankia's sizeable debt maturities for
the current year -- amounting to around EUR20 billion -- against
a background of restricted access to capital markets for most
Spanish banks. The bank expects to address these outflows
primarily through deleveraging but also by increasing its
reliance on ECB funding which Moody's thinks increasingly exposes
the bank to concentration and political risks. Moreover, Bankia's
sizeable activity in repo markets makes it vulnerable to margin
call risks adding pressure on the bank's liquidity management in
times of stress.

The negative outlook on Bankia's rating is consistent with the
negative outlook on the Spanish financial system which continues
to provide a challenging backdrop for Bankia's operations.

DOWNGRADE OF BANKIA'S DEBT RATINGS

In the action Moody's has also downgraded Bankia's debt and
deposit ratings to Baa3 Prime-3. Following the downgrade of the
bank's BFSR, Moody's has broadened the uplift from its standalone
rating to three notches (from 2), to reflect Moody's assessment
of very high likelihood of systemic support.

The outlook on the senior debt and deposit ratings is negative,
reflecting the negative outlook on Bankia's standalone credit
profile.

DOWNGRADE OF BFA'S RATINGS

The downgrade of BFA's issuer ratings to Ba3 together with its
subordinated debt and preferred ratings is triggered by the
downgrade of Bankia, its operating company. The ratings of BFA
are positioned three notches below those of its operating
companies.

Although BFA has maintained its current legal status of a
commercial bank, it neither takes deposits nor carries out any
banking activities. This structure produces a structural
subordination of BFA's current creditors to those of the
operating bank as the payment of BFA's debt will be largely
dependent on the dividends upstreamed from Bankia, which will be
BFA's most significant source of revenues (together with other
revenues arising from equity holdings).

In addition to structural subordination, the three notch rating
differential between Bankia and BFA reflects primarily two
additional factors that shape the risk profile of BFA: (i) the
risk stemming from BFA's portfolio of foreclosed land as well as
doubtful and substandard loans related to land development, which
had not been transferred to Bankia and which could be subject to
additional impairments (ii) the weak profitability outlook for
BFA, which is also likely to be impacted by further potential
impairments of these assets, which could exceed the value of
expected dividends in Moody's stress scenarios.

The negative outlook on BFA's rating follows Moody's decision of
assigning a negative outlook to the rating of Bankia.

POTENTIAL TRIGGERS OF A DOWNGRADE/UPGRADE

Any upward pressure on Bankia's BFSR would require (i) stronger
Tier 1 and tangible common equity (TCE) ratios to offset
estimated credit losses under Moody's scenarios, (ii) a stronger
credit profile with materially lower credit risk concentration,
both by borrower and to the real estate sector; (iii) a sustained
recovery of asset quality indicators; and (iv) a stronger
internal capital generation underpinned by a more stable earnings
stream coupled with an improvement in risk-weighted recurring
profitability indicators.

We note that an upgrade of Bankia's BFSR and long-term ratings is
unlikely in the near term, given Moody's negative outlook.
Furthermore, Moody's expects that the currently challenging
domestic operating environment will continue to subdue growth and
exert downward pressure on margins resulting from the high level
of non-earning assets and increased funding costs. This is likely
to limit internal capital generation from recurrent sources.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.


CAJA DE AHORROS: Unveils Losses of EUR2.7 Billion in 2011
---------------------------------------------------------
Agence France Press reports that Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo
announced losses of EUR2.713 billion (US$3.6 billion) for 2011.

The bank known as CAM, formerly Spain's 10th biggest, was taken
over by Banco Sabadell as part of a shake-up to stabilize the
financial sector which was hit hard by the collapse of a building
boom in 2008, AFP relates.

Its earnings figures filed to the Spanish stock market authority
on Wednesday night showed it had taken a hit of EUR2.383 billion
from the fall in value of its financial assets, leading to a net
loss for the year of EUR2.713 billion, according to AFP.

Sabadell's executive director Jaime Guardiola in December
estimated the total losses weighing on CAM at EUR12 billion at
least, AFP notes.

Under the agreement to sell CAM to Banco Sabadell, Spain's bank
rescue fund will provide some relief, assuming 80% of CAM's
losses over 10 years, AFP discloses.

The central bank took charge of CAM in July and offloaded it for
EUR5.249 billion to a public guarantee fund, which sold it on to
Catalonia-based Banco Sabadell for a symbolic one euro in
December, AFP recounts.

CAM is based in the eastern coastal region of Alicante which was
one of the worst hit by the bursting of the property bubble, AFP
states.

Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM) is a savings bank that
attracts deposits and provides commercial banking services in
Spain.


CAJA INGENIEROS: Moody's Rates EUR67.5MM Notes at '(P)B1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional ratings
to the debt to be issued by CAJA INGENIEROS AYT 2, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos:

Issuer: Caja Ingenieros AyT 2, FTA

   -- EUR382.5M Serie A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR67.5M Serie B Notes, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

CAJA INGENIEROS AYT 2, FTA is a securitization of loans granted
by Caja de Credito de los Ingenieros, sociedad Cooperativa de
Credito (N.R) to Spanish individuals. Caja Ingenieros is acting
as Servicer of the loans while Ahorro y Titulizacion S.G.F.T.,
S.A. is the Management Company.

As of January 2012, the provisional pool was composed of a
portfolio of 2,816 contracts granted to 2,722 obligors located in
Spain. The assets supporting the notes are prime mortgage loans
secured on residential properties located in Spain. The Current
Weighted Average LTV is 58%. The assets were originated between
1997 and 2011, with a weighted average seasoning of 3.75 years
and a weighted average remaining term of 27.1 years.
Geographically, the pool is located mostly in Catalonia (69%) and
Andalusia (12%). 0.6% of the pool corresponds to loans in
principal grace periods. 2.2% of the loans were granted to non
Spanish nationals.

According to Moody's, the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) a reserve fund fully funded upfront equal to 8% of
the notes to cover potential shortfalls in interest and
principal, (ii) relatively low weighted-average current LTV
(based on valuation at origination) of 58% (No loans over 80%
LTV), (iii) All loans are first-lien mortgages on residential
properties (89.4% owner occupied) located in Spain and granted to
Spanish nationals (only 2.2% non Spanish nationals) and (iv) very
strong performance in previous deal of this originator, with low
variability including through the current downturn.

Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit
weaknesses, including: (i) No interest rate swap in place to
cover the interest rate risk; (ii) geographical concentration in
the region of Catalonia (69%) and (iii) the originator (and
servicer) is not publicly rated. However, there is a back-up
servicer agreement at closing with Banco Cooperativo Espa¤ol
(A1/P-1 On Review for Possible Downgrade)

Moody's analysis focused primarily on (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical performance
information and other statistical information; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided via excess-spread, the cash reserve and the
subordination of the notes. As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising
Severity of Euro Area Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing
of All EU Sovereigns' (28 November 2011), the risk of sovereign
defaults or the exit of countries from the Euro area is rising.
As a result, Moody's could lower the maximum achievable rating
for structured finance transactions in some countries, which
could result in rating downgrades.

The resulting key assumptions of Moody's analysis for this
transaction are a MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement of 15.0% and a
expected loss of 2.35%.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector. Only two sub
components underlying the V Score have been assessed higher than
the average for the Spanish RMBS sector. Market Value Sensitivity
is Medium because There is no hedging for the interest rate risk.
Back-up Servicer Arrangement is assessed as Medium because the
originator is not Rated. However, There is a back-up servicer
appointed at closing, although it will only step in if the
management deems it is necessary.

Moody's also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the
rated notes. For instance, if the assumed MILAN Aaa Credit
Enhancement of 15% used in determining the initial rating was
changed to 21% and the expected loss of 2.35% was changed to
3.3%, the model-indicated rating for Series A and Series B of Aaa
and B1 would have changed to Aa1 and B3 respectively.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa published in
October 2009, Moody's Updated Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS
published in October 2009, Cash Flow Analysis in EMEA RMBS:
Testing Structural Features with the MARCO Model (Moody's
Analyser of Residential Cash Flows) published in January 2006 and
Revising Default/Loss Assumptions Over the Life of an ABS/RMBS
Transaction published in December 2008.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.


CATALUNYA BANC: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Debt Ratings for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Catalunya Banc's debt and deposit ratings at Ba1, while at the
same time downgrading Catalunya Banc's standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) to E+ from D. The E+ standalone BSFR maps
to B1 on the long-term scale and has a developing outlook.
Moody's has also downgraded the bank's dated subordinated debt to
B2 from Ba3 and the preference shares to Caa2 (hyb) from B3
(hyb), all of them with a developing outlook. The bank's
government guaranteed debt is rated A1 with a negative outlook.

Ratings Rationale

DOWNGRADE OF CATALUNYA BANC'S BFSR

Moody's decision to downgrade Catalunya Banc's standalone BFSR to
E+ from D reflects (i) the expected impact on the bank's
profitability and capitalization levels that Moody's believes
will stem from the Spanish government's recently announced higher
provisioning requirements for most real estate exposures, as well
as (ii) the increasing challenges in the operating environment,
with the economy in recession and very high unemployment levels,
which is likely to put further pressure on asset quality.
Furthermore, Moody's believes that current solvency levels are
insufficient to shield Catalunya Banc against the risks embedded
in its balance sheet, especially since the economic outlook has
become more challenging. Moody's is concerned that despite the
actions taken by the new management team, Catalunya Banc may be
unable to generate sufficient earnings and capital to offset this
capital shortfall and meet new provisioning requirements and that
very likely the bank will require further external support.

More specifically, the downgrade takes into consideration: (i)
Catalunya Banc's weak liquidity position, with a funding deficit
that is namely covered by the ECB and domestic public debt repos;
(ii) weak asset quality indicators -- with a non performing asset
ratio (problem loans plus real estate assets) close to 20% at end
September 2011 --, which are expected to deteriorate further
during 2012 given the very negative outlook for the Spanish
economy and; (iii) weak revenue generation capacity that will be
further affected by the expected increase in non earning assets,
declining lending volumes resulting from the ongoing deleveraging
process and higher funding costs.

On September 30, 2011, the state-owned fund ("FROB", Fund for the
Orderly Restructuring of the Banking System) made a capital
injection of EUR1,718 million into Catalunya Banc, which enabled
the bank to achieve a core capital of 10.8% and to comply with
minimum regulatory capital ratios. Following the capital
injection, which was in the form of ordinary shares, the FROB now
controls 89.7% of Catalunya Banc's capital. Although the law
allows the FROB to remain in the bank's capital for at least two
years, it has publicly announced its aim to divest its stake in
the short-term.

By placing a developing outlook on Catalunya Banc's BFSR the
rating agency notes the possibility (i) for the bank's rating to
be upgraded if it is acquired by a stronger peer; (ii) of
negative rating actions if the resulting entity after the auction
displays a weaker credit profile than Catalunya Banc's standalone
financial strength; and (iii) of Catalunya Banc's standalone
rating being downgraded (including the potential for a multi-
notch downgrade) if the sale process fails to succeed and the
government does not provide sufficient support to the bank.

DOWNGRADE OF THE SENIOR SUBORDINATED DEBT AND PREFERENCE SHARES

At the same time, Moody's has also downgraded the bank's senior
subordinated debt to B2 from Ba3 and the preference shares to
Caa2 (hyb) from B3 (hyb). The downgrades are driven by the
downgrade of the bank's BFSR and reflect the relatively higher
risk of these instruments compared to senior unsecured debt.

REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE OF CATALUNYA BANC'S SENIOR DEBT AND DEPOSIT
RATINGS

In the action Moody's has placed Catalunya Banc's debt and
deposit ratings at Ba1 on review for downgrade. Following the
downgrade of the bank's BFSR, Moody's has maintained the debt
ratings at their current levels to reflect a very high likelihood
of the FROB to continue providing sufficient support to Catalunya
Banc until the auction process is completed, which could underpin
the ratings at their current level.

The review for possible downgrade reflects the risk that
Catalunya Banc's debt ratings could be aligned with its
standalone BFSR and therefore downgraded by several notches in
case the bank will not be acquired by a stronger peer and/or
supported by the government in such a way that benefits all
senior creditors.

POTENTIAL TRIGGERS OF A DOWNGRADE/UPGRADE

Downward pressure would be exerted on Catalunya Banc's standalone
credit strength following (i) greater-than-expected deterioration
in its risk-absorption capacity and a depletion of its capital
levels; (ii) a further weakening of its liquidity position;
and/or (iii) weakening of the bank's franchise.

The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone
BFSR, and any change to the BFSR would likely also affect these
ratings. In addition, downward pressure on Catalunya Banc's debt
and deposit ratings could be exerted if the FROB fails to provide
sufficient support to the bank.

An improvement of Catalunya Banc's standalone rating could be
driven by (i) its acquisition by a stronger peer; (ii) an
improved liquidity position, with normalized access to wholesale
funding and broader diversification of its funding sources; (iii)
reduction of its real-estate and related assets; and (iv)
enhanced access to capital.

METHODOLOGY

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Barcelona (Spain), Catalunya Banc had EUR74,5
billion assets at end-September 2011.


GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Lifts Rating on EUR5.7-Mil. Notes to 'CCCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded GC FTGENCAT SABADELL 1, FTA's notes,
as follows:

  -- EUR117.5m class A(G) notes upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf',
     Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  -- EUR19.8m class B notes upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf',
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR5.7m class C notes upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf', RE to
     50% from 0%

The rating actions follow a review of the transaction's
performance.  The upgrades were driven by the increased in
transaction's protection due to rapid amortization of the notes
and the transaction's performance.

The transaction is a securitization of a static pool of leasing
contracts originated by Banco de Sabadell ('BBB+'/'F2'/RWN) to
small and medium-sized Spanish enterprises (SMEs) in Spain.  The
transaction closed in December 2005 and started to amortize on
June 2008.  To date, the transaction has amortized 71% of its
original portfolio principal balance.  Due to the notes'
sequential amortization, credit enhancement for the class A(G), B
and C notes has increased to 20.4%, 6.6% and 2.6% from 7.0%, 3.0%
and 1.9%, respectively, since closing.

The transaction's performance has been gradually deteriorating
with delinquency rate (excluding one-month delinquent loans; ie
30d+ delinquent loans over outstanding balance) increasing to
4.6% of the outstanding portfolio balance as of December 2011.
Default levels continue to increase with current cumulative
defaults at 3.3% as a percentage of original balance, compared to
the agencies' base case assumption of 2.6% at the same point in
seasoning.  Fitch expects defaults to increase further given the
existing and expected delinquency pipeline, some of which are
likely to migrate into default.  Fitch expects the ratio of
cumulative defaults to reach 5% during the life of the
transaction. The transaction has not suffered any principal
deficiency ledger since closing.

The reserve fund (RF) stands at EUR3.7 million, which is lower
than the required EUR9.5 million.  Nevertheless, during the last
two payment periods the RF has been partly replenished due to
some recoveries from the defaulted assets coming into the
transaction.  The replenishing of the RF indicates that the
junior notes are less exposed to further spikes on defaults.  No
deferral trigger for the class B, C and D notes has occurred
since outset.

In its most up to date credit analysis, Fitch revised upward the
expected base case default and loss rate of the portfolio to
reflect the observed behavior of the assets through the economic
cycle, which were then compared against existing subordination
levels available for each tranche.   In its modelling, Fitch also
adjusted downwards the expected recovery rate assumption based on
the actual recoveries and expectations to 20%. Fitch also took
into account the actual seasoning (6 years), excess spread levels
(65bps guaranteed by the swap agreement) and industry and lessee
concentration risks.


IM FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCSf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed IM FTGENCAT SABADELL 2's Class A(G)
notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and affirmed the Class B and
C notes, as follows:

  -- EUR191.8m Class A(G) notes; 'Asf'; placed on RWN
  -- EUR19.8m Class B notes; affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RR 50%
  -- EUR5.7m Class C notes; affirmed at 'CCsf', RR 0%

The rating actions follow a credit review of the transaction's
performance and the assessment of counterparty exposure to Banco
de Sabadell ('BBB+'/'F1'/RWN) which continue to serve as bank
account, paying agent and/or swap counterparty of the SPV.  Under
Fitch's structured finance counterparty criteria, the minimum
rating threshold is 'BBB+'/'F2' with no RWN status to support SF
notes rated at or below 'A+sf'.

Fitch believes that the transaction has counterparty arrangements
that are currently in breach of 'A'/'F1' rating triggers captured
by the transaction documents.  Nevertheless, Fitch has received
written confirmation from the SPV management company that
remedial actions will be implemented shortly to mitigate these
open counterparty risks. Fitch expects to resolve the RWN in the
next four weeks.

If the counterparty risks are properly mitigated, Fitch believes
the levels of Class A(G) credit enhancement are commensurate with
the current ratings.  The transaction closed in June 2006 and
started to amortize on April 2009.  To date, the transaction has
amortized 53% of its original portfolio principal balance.  Due
to the notes' sequential amortization, credit enhancement for the
class A(G) has increased to 12.1% from 7.0% since closing.

The affirmation of the class B notes reflects the increased in
protection offered by the reserve fund and by the thin class C
tranche.  The affirmation of the class C notes also reflects the
increased protection offered by the reserve fund.

During the last two payment periods, the reserve fund has
slightly replenished due to a reduction in defaults, available
excess spread and flow of some recoveries.  The reserve fund now
appears to have stabilized at approximately EUR1.2 million,
however this remains well below the EUR9.5 million target.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization of a pool of
finance leases on real estate and certain other assets originated
in Spain by Banco de Sabadell.  Only the lease receivables
portion of the lease contracts are securitized.  All obligors are
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) located in the region
of Catalunya, the home region of the originator.


NCG BANCO: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded NCG Banco's debt and
deposit ratings to Ba1/Not-Prime from Baa3/P-3. The ratings
remain on review for downgrade.

At the same time Moody's has downgraded NCG Banco's standalone
bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E+ from D+. The E+
standalone BSFR maps to B1 on the long-term scale and has a
developing outlook. Moody's has also downgraded the bank's dated
subordinated debt to B2 from Ba2, the junior subordinated debt to
B3 (hyb) from Ba3 (hyb) and the preference shares to Caa2 (hyb)
from B2 (hyb), all of them with a developing outlook. The bank's
government guaranteed debt is rated A1 with a negative outlook.

The rating action extends the rating review initiated on
December 12, 2011. For further details please see "Moody's
reviews Spanish banks' ratings for downgrade; removes systemic
support for subordinated debt".

Ratings Rationale

DOWNGRADE OF NCG BANCO'S BFSR

Moody's decision to downgrade NCG Banco's standalone BFSR to E+
from D+, reflects the material deterioration on the bank's credit
profile and the increased likelihood of NCG Banco to require
further support either from public or private sources to
compensate for the capital shortfall stemming from (i) Moody's
calculation of embedded expected losses on its balance sheet; and
(ii) the new provisioning requirements approved by the Spanish
government on February 3, 2012.

The downgrade also reflects: (i) NCG Banco's weak liquidity
position, with a funding deficit that is namely covered by ECB
and domestic public debt Repo; (ii) weak asset quality indicators
--with a non performing asset ratio (problem loans plus real
estate assets) of 15% at end September 2011--, which are expected
to deteriorate further during 2012 given the very negative
outlook for the Spanish economy and; (iii) weak revenue
generation capacity that will be further affected by the expected
increase in non earning assets, and declining lending volumes
resulting from the ongoing deleveraging process.

On October 10, 2011, the state-owned fund ("FROB", Fund for the
Orderly Restructuring of the Banking System) made a capital
injection of EUR2,465 million into NCG Banco, which enabled the
bank to achieve a core capital of 10% and to comply with minimum
regulatory capital ratios. Following the capital injection, which
was in the form of ordinary shares, the FROB controls 90% of NCG
Banco's capital. Although the law allows the FROB to remain in
the bank's capital for at least two years, it has publicly
announced its aim to divest its stake in the short-term.

By placing a developing outlook on NCG Banco's BFSR the rating
agency notes the possibility (i) for the bank's rating to be
upgraded if it is acquired by a stronger peer or if it is
successful in attracting sufficient capital from private
investors; (ii) of negative rating actions if the resulting
entity after the auction displays a weaker credit profile than
NCG Banco's standalone financial strength; and (iii) of NCG
Banco's standalone rating being downgraded (including the
potential for a multi-notch downgrade) if the sale process fails
to succeed and the government does not provide sufficient support
to the bank.

DOWNGRADE OF THE SENIOR SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRIDS

At the same time, Moody's has also downgraded the bank's senior
subordinated debt to B2 from Ba2, junior subordinated debt to B3
(hyb) from Ba3 (hyb) and the preference shares to Caa2 (hyb) from
B2 (hyb). The downgrades are driven by the downgrade of the
bank's BFSR and reflect the relatively higher risk of these
instruments compared to senior unsecured debt.

DOWNGRADE OF NCG BANCO'S SENIOR DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS

In the action Moody's has also downgraded NCG Banco's debt and
deposit ratings to Ba1/Not Prime from Baa3/P-3. The downgrade
follows the downgrade of the bank's BFSR and reflects the
considerably higher risk for creditors stemming from the bank's
weaker standalone financial strength profile and the heightened
likelihood of needing external support.

Despite this risk, the downgrade of the bank's debt and deposit
ratings at this stage has not been as pronounced as that of its
standalone rating, reflecting Moody's expectation that some
support by the FROB is expected, which, if proving to be
substantial, could see the ratings confirmed at the current
level. However, Moody's placed the bank's debt and deposits
ratings on review for downgrade to reflect the risk that NCG
Banco's debt ratings could be aligned with its standalone BFSR
and therefore downgraded by several more notches in case the
government (via FROB) would be unwilling to provide the extensive
support that is currently expected to be forthcoming for the bank
in case of need.

During the review period, Moody's will focus on any measures of
support from the FROB or any potential acquirer.

POTENTIAL TRIGGERS OF A DOWNGRADE/UPGRADE

Downward pressure would be exerted on NCG Banco's standalone
credit strength following (i) greater-than-expected deterioration
in its risk-absorption capacity and a depletion of its capital
levels; (ii) a further weakening of its liquidity position;
and/or (iii) weakening of the bank's franchise.

The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone
BFSR, and any change to the BFSR would likely also affect these
ratings. In addition, downward pressure on NCG Banco's debt and
deposit ratings could be exerted if the FROB fails to provide
sufficient support to the bank.

An improvement of NCG Banco's standalone rating could be driven
by (i) its acquisition by a stronger peer; (ii) an improved
liquidity position, with normalized access to wholesale funding
and broader diversification of its funding sources; (iii)
reduction of its real-estate and related assets; and (iv)
enhanced access to capital.

Methodology

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Vigo (Spain), NCG Banco had EUR72 billion assets
at end-September 2011.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOTIVE: U.S. Unit Plans to Seek Ch. 11 in Detroit
----------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that Saab Cars North
America said it will file for Chapter 11 protection in Michigan,
a move that comes a little more than a week after some of its
dealerships sought to push the Swedish auto maker's U.S. unit
into bankruptcy proceedings in Delaware.

According to a separate Daily Bankruptcy Review, the receivers in
charge of Swedish car maker Saab Automobile's bankruptcy have
received some bids for the company's estate, one of which is from
Chinese car maker Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile Co.

                      Involuntary Case

More than 40 U.S.-based Saab dealerships submitted an involuntary
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for Saab Cars North
America, Inc. on Jan. 30, 2012.

The petitioners, represented by counsel Wilk Auslander LLP,
assert claims totaling US$1.2 million on account of "unpaid
warranty and incentive reimbursement and related obligations"
and/or "parts and warranty reimbursement."

Leonard A. Bellavia, Esq., at Bellavia Gentile & Associates, in
New York, signed the Chapter 11 petition on behalf of the
dealers.

The creditors want the vehicle inventory and the parts business
to be sold, free of liens from Ally Financial Inc. and
Caterpillar Inc., and "to have an appropriate forum to address
the claims of the dealers," Leonard A. Bellavia said in an e-mail
to Bloomberg News.

Following its parent's bankruptcy filing in December, Saab Cars
N.A., the U.S. sales and distribution unit of Swedish car maker
Saab Automobile AB, announced that it is pursuing an out-of-court
resolution for SCNA operations.  SCNA said it is aggressively
investigating all options aimed at reinstating its parts business
in North America in a timely manner.

                     About Saab North America

Saab Cars N.A. named in December an outside administrator to run
the company as part of a plan to avoid immediate liquidation
following its parent company's bankruptcy filing.  The U.S.
operation's chief operating officer Tim Colbeck said the outside
firm, McTevia & Associates, will attempt to resume the unit's
operations including warranty work and business with dealers that
essentially stopped with the bankruptcy filing.

                            About Saab

Saab, or Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget (Swedish Aircraft
Company), was founded in 1937 as an aircraft manufacturer and
revealed its first prototype passenger car 10 years later after
the formation of the Saab Car Division.  In 1990, Saab
Automobile AB was created as a separate company, jointly owned by
the Saab Scania Group and General Motors, and became a wholly-
owned GM subsidiary in 2000. In February 2010, Spyker Cars N.V.
was renamed Swedish Automobile N.V. (Swan) on June 15, 2011.

Saab Automobile AB currently employs approximately 3,700 staff in
Sweden, where it operates production and technical development
facilities at its headquarters in Trollhattan, 70 km north of
Gothenburg.  Saab Cars North America is located in Royal Oak,
Michigan employing approximately 50 people responsible for sales,
marketing and administration duties for the North American
market.

On Dec. 19, 2011, Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab
Automobile AB (Saab Automobile), Saab Automobile Tools AB and
Saab Powertrain AB filed for bankruptcy with the District Court
in Vanersborg, Sweden.  After having received the recent position
of GM on the contemplated transaction with Saab Automobile,
Youngman informed Saab Automobile that the funding to continue
and complete the reorganization of Saab Automobile could not be
concluded.  The Board of Saab Automobile subsequently decided
that the company without further funding will be insolvent and
that filing bankruptcy is in the best interests of its creditors.
Swan does not expect to realize any value from its shares in Saab
Automobile and will write off its interest in Saab Automobile
completely.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABBEYCREST PLC: Business Assets Sold Following Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Malcolm Titley and Andrew Poxon of Leonard Curtis, the
Joint Administrators to Abbeycrest plc, have sold the business
and business assets of Brown & Newirth Limited to Chrysus Trading
Limited and sold the shares of Abbeycrest Thailand Limited to
Chrysus Holdco Limited.

At this stage, it is not anticipated that there will be a return
to shareholders, however shareholders will be kept informed as
appropriate.

Abbeycrest plc (LON:ACR) is a United Kingdom-based company.  It
is engaged in jewelry designer, manufacturer and distributor.
The company has operations in United Kingdom, Thailand and Hong
Kong.


BELLATRIX PLC: S&P Retains 'D' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'AA+ (sf)' credit
ratings on BELLATRIX (ECLIPSE 2005-2) PLC's commercial mortgage-
backed class A and B notes following their redemption. All other
rated classes of notes are unaffected.

"As per the January 2012 cash manager report, the class A and B
notes fully redeemed on Jan. 25, 2012, following the partial
repayment of the Tintagel House and Admiral Portfolio loans. We
have thus withdrawn our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P
said.

"The other rated notes in this transaction remain unaffected by
the rating action," S&P said.

BELLATRIX (ECLIPSE 2005-2) closed in 2005 with notes totaling
GBP393.69 million. The notes have a legal final maturity date in
January 2017.

     Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"Our ratings in this transaction are based on our criteria for
rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).
However, these criteria are under review," S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result
in changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.

               Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at;

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To             From

BELLATRIX (ECLIPSE 2005-2) PLC
GBP393.69 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Withdrawn

A          NR              AA+ (sf)
B          NR              AA+ (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

C          AA+ (sf)
D          A (sf)
E          D (sf)

NR--Not rated.


BOYER ALLAN: To Liquidate Hedge Fund
------------------------------------
HFMWeek reports that Boyer Allan Investment Management, one of
London's longest-running hedge fund managers, is shutting down.

The London- and Hong Kong-based emerging markets specialist,
established in 1998, is returning money to outside investors and
is in the process of spinning out its final vehicle, the Boyer
Allan Emea Fund, according to the report.

HFMWeek discloses that the firm's penultimate fund, the Pacific
Opportunities Fund, spun out last month, and started trading
under a new investment manager, London-based Stone Drum Partners,
on February 1.  Andrew Tay and Charlie Erith are the fund's co-
managers.

About US$400 million in remaining outside capital has been
largely returned to investors, the report notes.  The firm
managed about US$2 billion in assets at its peak.

According to HFMWeek, sources said the decision was made last
year as a result of a myriad of factors.  Co-founders Johnny
Boyer and Nicholas Allan were believed to be no longer enjoying
the fund management business, finding market conditions "even
harder than in 2008," the report notes.

The firm's "strategy wasn't right for the markets and it's hard
to retool the entire DNA," a source told HFMWeek.  "US pensions
don't like long-bias funds anymore."

High running costs were also cited, with the cost base closer
reflecting a firm running $2 billion as opposed to $400 million,
HFMWeek discloses.

HFMWeek states that Boyer Allan has endured a tough period of
late, with assets dropping to just over $500 million in December.

That month, reports revealed that the firm was shutting its pan-
Asia Boyer Allan Pacific fund, which had lost 18.7% through
November, and its Greater China fund, down 7.8% for the year,
according to HFMWeek.

Boyer Allan Investment Management is a specialist manager of
Asian equity absolute return funds.


CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B+(exp)' Rating to Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CPUK Finance Limited's senior secured
notes expected ratings, as follows:

  -- GBP267.5m class A1 fixed-rate secured notes due 2042:
     'BBB(exp)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- GBP472.5m class A2 fixed-rate secured notes due 2042:
     'BBB(exp)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- GBP270.0m class B fixed-rate secured notes due 2042: 'B+
     (exp)'; Outlook Stable.

The ratings reflect the resilient operating profile of Center
Parcs (Operating Company) Limited (Center Parcs, forming the
borrower group together with four property holding companies
among others).  This is underscored by a strong financial
performance, even during periods of economic stress, resulting
from its unique offering as a leading provider of high quality
fully self-contained forest village short-break holidays in the
UK, high barriers to entry and its strong market position.
Center Parcs has high revenue visibility through advanced
bookings and stable cash generation.

It currently operates four purpose-built holiday villages in the
UK: Sherwood Forest in Nottinghamshire; Longleat Forest in
Wiltshire; Elveden Forest in Suffolk and Whinfell Forest in
Cumbria.

The expected ratings also reflect the structural protections
(mainly benefiting the senior ranking class A notes) which
include faster amortization than traditional whole business
securitization (WBS) through a cash sweep and a comprehensive WBS
security and covenant package, including full senior ranking
asset and share security available for the benefit of the
noteholders, with the security granted by way of the usual fixed
and (qualifying) floating security under an issuer-borrower loan
structure.  In addition, there is the ability for class A
noteholders to gain greater control earlier on in the transaction
if the class A notes are not refinanced one year past their
expected maturity (2018 in the case of class A1 notes) which
would result in a borrower event of default.

The expected ratings for class B notes reflect their deep
subordination in comparison to class A notes both in terms of
ranking in the priority of payments and in terms of controlling
rights, their interest deferral mechanism kicking in earlier than
in traditional WBS transactions and the fact that they do not
benefit from the liquidity facility.

The Fitch base case debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) (minimum
of average and median DSCRs to legal final maturity of the notes)
-- at 2.0x for class A -- are more conservative than for WBS
managed pub transactions at the same rating level.  In Fitch's
view, more conservative coverage ratios are warranted due to the
holiday park industry's higher obsolescence risk and niche
product offering, which makes Center Parcs more vulnerable to any
changes in its operating environment.  For these reasons, Fitch
considers it unlikely that CPUK Finance's ratings would increase
above the 'BBB' category even in the event of outperformance.


DECO 6: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 PLC's commercial
mortgage-backed notes.

"The transaction closed in December 2005 and was initially
secured by four loans (Canary Wharf, St Enoch, Brunel, and
Mapeley). Two of the loans, Canary Wharf and St Enoch, have
prepaid and were both secured by prime, well-let assets in their
respective office and retail sectors. In contrast, the two
remaining loans in the transaction, Brunel and Mapeley, are
secured by secondary properties in regional areas of the U.K.,
which are currently experiencing declines in market rental and
capital value. As a result of tenant lease breaks, tenant
insolvencies, and a weakened rental market, cash flows have
declined at a greater rate than expected. In our opinion, the
secondary nature of the properties and the continued
deterioration of the regional office and retail sectors are
likely to result in increased susceptibility to vacancies, which
will further depress property values," S&P said.

                           Brunel Loan

The Brunel loan matures in April 2012 and is secured against the
Brunel Shopping Centre in Swindon. The loan has been in special
servicing since June 2011, as a result of numerous breaches of
the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) covenant of 1.1x (current
DSCR, 0.92x). The issuer has instructed LPA (Law Of Property Act)
receivers to take control of the rental income during the ongoing
loan restructuring talks.

A new valuation reports a revised figure of GBP87,200,000, which
reflects a 33% decline from the valuation of GBP130 million at
closing and a senior loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 116%.

"This triggered an appraisal reduction of the liquidity facility
(which reduced the amount available to draw under the facility)
to GBP26 million. The liquidity facility is not available to
cover special servicing fees; however, these fees are typically
met at the top of the intercreditor waterfall arrangement at the
expense of the junior lender. There has been no drawing on the
liquidity facility and no interest shortfalls to date, since the
borrower has been covering the shortfalls in income," S&P said.

"Given that the loan has a senior LTV ratio of 116%, that the
asset income is currently insufficient to cover interest
payments, and that the secondary real-estate market is suffering
declines in rental and capital value, we believe the current
restrictive lending conditions will compound the difficulties the
borrower faces in refinancing this loan. In view of these
factors, even if the loan is restructured as a result of the
ongoing discussions, we consider that principal losses are
likely. Moreover, if the borrower ceases to top-up the income,
interest shortfalls could occur, and costs that the liquidity
facility does not cover could cause further shortfalls at the
note level," S&P said.

                           Mapeley Loan

"The Mapeley loan matures in July 2015 and is secured against a
portfolio of 20 secondary office properties located throughout
the U.K. The loan defaulted in October 2011, due to a breach of
the interest coverage ratio (ICR) covenant of 1.15x (current ICR,
0.99x) and the servicer subsequently transferred the loan into
special servicing. As per the transaction documents, excess cash
has been trapped since 2009 to assist with property/loan
requirements and currently stands at GBP11 million. We believe
this is available to top up any future loan interest shortfalls,
or potential shortfalls arising from special servicing fees," S&P
said.

"In September 2011, British Telecommunications PLC (BT), which
was the sole tenant in Delta Point Croydon (252,000 sq ft),
vacated the property upon expiry of its lease, causing the
occupancy rate to fall to 76%, from 98% at closing. BT
represented 27% of the portfolio's gross income and its departure
has caused the net operating income to fall substantially to
GBP9.6 million at present, from GBP15.9 million at closing," S&P
said.

"The special servicer (Hatfield Philips International Ltd.) has
instructed a new valuation; the borrower is to simultaneously
produce an asset management strategy for the portfolio. Given the
portfolio income, the weighted-average unexpired lease term
(WAULT) of 2.6 years, and the current market deterioration in
secondary office yields, we believe that an updated open market
valuation is likely to be substantially lower than the October
2008 figure of GBP222 million. The sponsor, Fortress Investment
Group LLC, also indicated to the special servicer that it will
not inject new equity into the loan," S&P said.

"If the Mapeley loan is enforced, material swap break costs would
be crystallized. These would rank senior to payments to the
noteholders. The continuing weakness in the global economy has
led interest rates to remain low; as a result, swap costs have
not decreased over the past few years. We believe potential swap
break costs are currently in the region of GBP20 million," S&P
said.

"We understand that the special servicer, Hatfield Philips, is
implementing an asset management strategy that aims to improve
portfolio cash flow generation in the medium term. This would
avoid significant swap break costs that would crystallize in an
enforcement scenario. Although there are three years left to
develop and implement a sustainable strategy for the portfolio,
we view the prospects of full recovery at or before note maturity
as limited, given the factors discussed," S&P said.

                         Rating Actions

"We have lowered our ratings on the class C and D notes, to
reflect our view that these classes could experience principal
losses or interest shortfalls in the near term. Further
deterioration in the commercial real estate markets could make
the class B notes vulnerable to future losses; we have lowered
our rating on this class of notes to reflect this risk. We have
lowered our rating on the class A2 notes by one notch to reflect
the overall credit deterioration in the pool; however, we expect
this class to recover the full principal amount," S&P said.

DECO 6 - U.K. Large Loan 2 is a U.K. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction, which closed in December 2005 with
notes totaling GBP555.18 million. The notes have a final legal
maturity in July 2017.

             Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European CMBS. However, these criteria are under review,"
S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result in
changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.

               Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at;

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class             Rating
            To            From

DECO 6 - U.K. Large Loan 2 PLC
GBP555.119 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Fixed-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A2          A (sf)         A+  (sf)
B           BB+ (sf)       A+  (sf)
C           B- (sf)        BBB (sf)
D           CCC- (sf)      BB- (sf)


ENVIRON GROUP: Enters Into Administration
-----------------------------------------
Environ Group (Investments) Plc has appointed Stephen Cork and
Joanne Milner of Cork Gully LLP as administrators of the
Company.

Environ Group (Investments) plc is a holding company focused on
acquiring companies within the UK's Support Services Sector.


FOUR SEASONS: To Raise Up to GBP230 Million in New Equity
---------------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy at The Financial Times reports that Four Seasons will
seek to raise up to GBP230 million in new equity from existing
shareholders and private equity groups, as it tries to refinance
GBP780 million in debt before a September deadline.

The FT relates that an aggressive expansion strategy before the
financial crisis left the company burdened with debt of
GBP1.6 billion, which was halved in 2009 through a debt-for-
equity swap.

According to the FT, Pete Calveley, Four Seasons' chief
executive, said that the reduced net debt of GBP780 million,
which falls due in September, is still too much to refinance in
the current weak debt market.  Although the company intends to
pay off the existing debt in full and on time, it believes it
will be able to raise only a significantly smaller amount of new
debt, the FT notes.

"The amount of debt we raise will be somewhere between five and
seven times our [2012] earnings -- probably somewhere in the
middle," the FT quotes Mr. Calveley as saying.  "Inevitably,
there will be a gap between the debt we can raise and the debt we
need to refinance.  How much the gap will be is determined by
which debt solution we choose."

Four Seasons' anticipated raising of GBP550 million-GBP770
million in new debt means it needs to secure a new equity
injection of GBP10 million-GBP230 million before September,
depending on how much debt is raised, the FT states.  It will
require support from shareholders including Royal Bank of
Scotland, which took a 40% stake in the company in exchange for
writing off debt in 2009, according to the FT.

"We are making sure we're keeping more than one option open," the
FT quotes Mr. Calveley as saying.  "We're now in detailed
discussions with our shareholders, regarding whether they're
interested in participating in bridging the gap."  He said that
the company was also in talks with other potential equity
investors, including private equity groups, the FT notes.

Mr. Calveley, as cited by the FT, said that the company, which is
being advised by Rothschild and Gleacher Shacklock, expected to
have agreed on a solution with investors and creditors within two
months, and hoped to conclude the refinancing by July.

Four Seasons Health Care -- http://www.fshc.co.uk/-- is one of
the largest care home (nursing home) operators in the UK.  The
company runs some 300 nursing homes, and its Huntercombe division
operates about eight specialized health care centers (which
provide mental health and rehabilitation services) in England,
Scotland, North Ireland, and the Isle of Man.  Allianz Capital
Partners, the private equity arm of Allianz Group, acquired the
company from Alchemy Partners for GBP775 million in 2004.


* U.K. Firms Feel The Heat as Consumer Confidence Stays Low
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that U.K. companies in
the hospitality, retail and wholesale sectors are increasingly
falling into distressed territory as consumer confidence levels
remain low, according to analysis from two law firms.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Corporate Debt Capacity
--------------------------------------
Author: Gordon Donaldson
Publisher: Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2000 (reprint of 1961
book published by the President and Fellows of Harvard College).
List Price: 294 pages. $34.95 trade paper, ISBN 1-58798-034-7.

"The research project who results are reported in this volume was
primarily concerned with the risk element involved in the
utilization of debt as a source of permanent capital for
business," Bertrand Fox, Director of Research, succinctly writes
in the "Foreword".  The research project was funded by and
conducted by an organization connected with Harvard College, the
original publishers of this book in the early 1960s.

The research was not a body of data for analysis as research
typically is in business studies or sociological studies.  In the
end, Donaldson recommends perspectives and practices going beyond
the research.  This doesn't necessarily go against the findings
of the research, but rather shows the limitations of the thinking
of most businesspersons at the time or their blind spots
regarding the role of debt, especially with respect to potentials
for growth, longevity, and other interests of business
management.

The businesses are not identified.  Given Donaldson's credibility
and reputation and the Harvard name behind the research project
however, the research data is taken as factual and reliable.  The
research was garnered from participating corporations and
financial institutions.

Though there are a few tables, the research is not limited to
financial information strictly as figures and other balance sheet
data.  Donaldson was interested as much in corporate leaders'
psychology and presumptions about debt more than current debt
situations and corporate policies regarding debt.  Financial
institutions were included as part of the study as well because
their views toward corporate debt and the way they worked with
the financial parts of corporations had an effect on corporate
debt of the time.

As Donaldson found from the research, both corporations and
financial institutions understood debt in conventional,
traditional, ways.  For the corporations, these ways could be
hampering operations and strategy.  The ways corporations were
being hampered were unseen however unless they started looking at
their books differently and became open to taking on debt
differently.  Donaldson's singular achievement was to see in the
research ways in which corporations were being hampered and in
thus propose a new way of regarding debt.  This was a
revolutionary step for the large majority of businesses.  And for
even the small number of businesses which were pursuing
unconventional debt practices, Donaldson's studies and new
perspective put these on solid ground giving better guidance.

Donaldson's readings of the research reflect corporate managers'
own statements (also part of the research) regarding their views
on their company's financial analysis and debt.  Managers are
quoted, "Our management is essentially conservative."; "The word
which describes our corporate image is 'dignified'."; "I supposed
in a way we're lazy."  The author treats these as "attitudes"--as
in a chapter "Management Attitudes to Non-Debt Sources"--
realizing that it is such "attitudes" more than what financial
figures disclose or debt itself which colors practices about the
fundamental business matter of debt.

Donaldson brings into the open managers false sense of debt.
This false sense is bound in with conventional, inherited
concepts and images of a corporation having no relation to facts.
Such conventional views are perpetuated by an aversion to risk.
The less debt, the less risk, according to the prevailing
precept.  But Donaldson points out that managers who observe this
actually often pursue greater risks in product development,
entering new markets, mergers, and other activities.

Corporate "attitudes" to debt since the book's 1961 publication
attest to the deep influence of Donaldson's groundbreaking
perspective.  Consumer debt, the growth of credit cards, and
other financial phenomena also evidence changed regard of debt
found in Donaldson's work.  The tipping of the balance to too
much debt for many corporations and beyond cannot be attributed
to the book however.  For in urging new concepts and uses of debt
for the better management of corporations, Donaldson also goes
into determination and control of risks entailed in new types of
debt.

Gordon Donaldson retired in 1993 after close to 20 years at the
Harvard Business School.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *