TCREUR_Public/120220.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, February 20, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 36



ALMA TOUR: Officially Declared Bankrupt by Sofia Court


CONTAINERSHIP CO: Remains Protected by Chapter 15 Filing


GROUPAMA SA: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Subordinated Notes
PEUGEOT SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Ratings
YPSO HOLDING: S&P Raises Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'


ADAM OPEL: Turnaround Plan Expected in the Next Couple of Months
DECO 9: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'CCsf'
EUROPROP SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
QIMONDA AG: Seeks to Recover EUR1.7 Billion From Former Parent


LEO BURNETT: Publicis Offers Partial Compensation to Clients
* GREECE: Nears Debt Restructuring Deal


ICELAND FOODS: Founder Inks Deal to Acquire Biz for GBP1.5-Mil.


BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Affirms Rating on UK Covered Bond Program
BHT GROUP: Enters Into Examinership; Owes EUR31.8 Million
MOTIF FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'B' Ratings on Two Debt Obligations


PININFARINA SPA: Has Debt Restructuring Deal with Banks


BTA BANK: Gets 22 Months in Jail for Breaching Asset Freeze Order


ELM BV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Series 79 Notes to 'Caa3'
LISTRINDO CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to US$500MM Notes
NXP BV: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New Secured Term Loan
OPERA FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Four Note Classes to 'Dsf'


CONCEFA: Managing Board Opts for Insolvency
ROMPLUMB: Court Names CITR as Legal Liquidator


AYT NOVACAIXAGALICIA: DBRS Discontinues BB Rating on Cl. B Notes
IM CAJAMAR: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ca' Rating to EUR94.5MM Notes
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
SANTANDER TOTTA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Preference Shares

* SWITZERLAND: Swiss Machine Maker Insolvencies Up 35% in 2011

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUCTION ATRIUM: Ceases Trading; May Enter Liquidation Next Month
BRIDGE HALL: Alexander David Buys Firms for GBP30,000
F&C ASSET: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
DONAGHY LTD: In Provisional Liquidation; 175 Workers Lose Jobs
DUNEDIN INDEPENDENT: Goes Into Liquidation

HELLAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Files for Chapter Bankruptcy
MOTORCARE ELITE: FSA Probe on Worthless Insurance Policies
NORTHERN WHIG: Goes Into Receivership, Cuts 21 Jobs
PEACOCKS: Has Only One Remaining Bidder for the Business
PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Inks Coryton Crude Supply Deal with Founder

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Seeks to Resolve Tax Dispute Quickly
ST. LUKES: Goes Into Administration, Unable to Sell Business
SUPREMA CONCEPTS: Class Creations Buys Firm Out of Administration
YELL GROUP: Internet Directories Unit Revenues Down 15.7%


* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 13 to February 17, 2012



ALMA TOUR: Officially Declared Bankrupt by Sofia Court
------------------------------------------------------ reports that Sofia City Court has officially
declared Alma Tour bankrupt.

The scandal-hit Alma Tour and Alma Tour Fly, a company within the
group, filed for bankruptcy in October, recounts.

Problems with Alma Tour surfaced in early September, when close
to 1,000 international tourists, most of them Russians, were
stranded at Bulgarian Black Sea airports of Burgas and Varna, recounts.

Their flights were cancelled by national air carrier Bulgaria Air
over what it claimed to be EUR3.6 million debts from Alma Tour,
which had booked the tourists' trips, discloses.

On Sept. 13, Bulgaria Air claimed Alma Tour had problems in
repaying its bank loans in the summer, namely a credit in the
amount of US$8 million for the financing of its airline
transportation services and in the amount of EUR18 million for
hotel accommodations, relates.

The biggest creditor of Alma Tour was said to be the Bulgarian
Commercial Corporate Bank, with which the company had pledged its
assets for EUR13 million, notes.

Alma Tour was a Bulgarian tour operator.


CONTAINERSHIP CO: Remains Protected by Chapter 15 Filing
The Norwegian Securities Dealers Association on Feb. 13 disclosed
that the Southern District Court of New York has ruled in favor
of TCC ASA Danish subsidiary TCC A/S in bankruptcy to the extent
that TCC A/S will remain protected by the Chapter 15 filing while
collecting outstanding compensation for MQC shortfalls and
Southern District Court of New York will remain the forum for any
dispute as stipulated in the relevant Service Contracts.

                     About Containership Co.

Denmark-based The Containership Co. is a company formed in 2009
to operate container ships between China and Los Angeles,

The company filed for reconstruction in Denmark in April 2011.
The same month, the Danish court approved the restructuring plan.

On May 31, 2011, the company filed for protection in the U.S.
under Chapter 15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11-12622).

The Chapter 15 petition was signed by Jorgen Hauschildt, as court
appointed receiver or reconstructor in the bankruptcy proceeding
before the Copenhagen Maritime & Commercial Court, Bankruptcy
Division, Denmark.

The Company, which has its corporate headquarters in Norway and
operational head office in Denmark, owns one and charters five
container vessels.  The Debtor is estimated to have US$1 million
to US$10 million in assets and up to US$50 million in liabilities
in the Chapter 15 petition.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New York ruled in July that Denmark
was home to the so-called foreign main proceeding.  The U.S.
judge granted relief in Chapter 15, formally halting creditor
actions in the U.S.  The Company filed under Chapter 15 in the
U.S. so that the U.S. bankruptcy judge can prevent creditors from
seizing the vessels when they come to the U.S.

Containership was founded with US$25 million from a private
placement.  It first sailed in April 2010 and ran up a
US$7.4 million loss last year before taxes on revenue of
US$83.8 million.

Jeremy O. Harwood, Esq., at Blank Rome, LLP, in New York, serves
as counsel for the petitioner.


GROUPAMA SA: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Subordinated Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB' debt rating
on two series of subordinated notes issued in July 1999 by French
insurer Groupama S.A. (Groupama; BBB-/Watch Neg/--) and due in
July 2029. These notes were redeemed in full by Groupama on
Jan. 22, 2010.

Groupama S.A.
EUR500MM subordinated notes due July 2029 (ISIN: FR0000495665)
EUR250MM subordinated notes due July 2029 (ISIN: FR0000495657)

Rating Withdrawn            To                    From
                            NR                    BB/Watch Neg

PEUGEOT SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
incorporated European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A. (PSA) to
negative from stable. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB+/B'
long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on PSA," S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that PSA's cash flow
coverage ratios are currently lower than what we consider to be
commensurate with the 'BB+' rating, and that its ability to
reduce debt in the near term relies primarily on divestments,
because the likelihood of PSA generating positive free operating
cash flow this year appears low. Reported industrial net debt on
Dec. 31, 2011, had increased by some EUR2 billion year-on-year
following free operating cash flow (FOCF) of negative EUR1.6
billion in 2011. Consequently, we revised our assessment of PSA's
financial risk profile to 'significant' from 'intermediate,' in
accordance with our criteria. We consider that PSA's recent weak
operating performance is likely to continue in 2012 as a result
of its high operating leverage, negative volume growth, and stiff
competition in its European home market this year," S&P said.

"The ratings on PSA reflect our view, under our base-case
scenario, that the group's core automotive operations will report
minimal positive operating earnings in 2012, in a European car
market where sales are likely to be down by at least 5% over the
year. We expect steady contributions from PSA's captive finance
subsidiary, Banque PSA Finance and its two industrial
subsidiaries, Faurecia and Gefco in 2012. Second-half results are
also likely to be slightly better than first-half figures in the
automotive division, thanks partly to an upward revision in the
group's cost-cutting program to EUR1 billion. In our base case,
Peugeot should consequently generate recurring operating income
on a full-year basis above EUR1 billion, falling only slightly
short of the EUR1.3 billion posted in 2011," S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade in
the coming 12 months, if we consider that PSA is not able to
demonstrate a near-term ability to improve its ratio of FFO to
debt to about 25%--the level we see as commensurate with the
current rating," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings on PSA if a potential recession in
Europe extends through 2012 or if PSA fails to deliver on
divestments that we expect should exceed EUR1 billion in 2012.
Even in our base-case scenario of slow but positive economic
growth in Europe in 2012, any marked improvement in PSA's credit
ratios would likely only stem from further progress in its asset
streamlining, including divestments and plant closures, as well
as a conservative approach to capex, dividends, and working
capital management," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we see clear evidence
of improving credit ratios, specifically FFO to debt to above
25%, which will partly depend on sufficiently supportive industry
conditions but also on PSA's demonstrated ability to reduce its
debt," S&P said.

YPSO HOLDING: S&P Raises Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on France's sole cable operator Ypso Holding Sarl
(Ypso) to 'B' from 'CCC+'. "We also removed the rating from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where we placed it on
July 22, 2011. The outlook is negative," S&P said.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B' issue rating on the
EUR360.2 million senior secured notes issued by Luxembourg-based
special purpose vehicle (SPV) Numericable Finance & Co. S.C.A.
(not rated). We also affirmed our 'B' issue rating on the
EUR360.2 million C facility, onlent with the issue proceeds to
Ypso France S.A.S., a direct subsidiary of Ypso Holding Sarl. The
recovery rating on the C facility is unchanged at '3', indicating
our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default. We have not assigned a corporate
credit rating to Numericable Finance & Co., nor have we assigned
a recovery rating to the senior secured notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow Ypso's announcement of its successful
issue of EUR360.2 million of senior secured notes due in 2019 and
the two-year extension of a large part of its exposure under
existing credit facilities in 2012-2014. We understand that Ypso
will use the proceeds of the notes to prepay part of its existing
credit facilities," S&P said.

"We see the completion of this refinancing plan, which also
includes a covenant reset and the creation of a new revolving
credit facility (RCF), as an important step that has enabled Ypso
to improve its debt maturity profile and financial flexibility.
Still, we note the very high coupon of 12.385% attached to the
senior secured notes--which were priced to yield 13%--potentially
makes further access to capital markets uneconomical for Ypso,"
S&P said.

"The negative outlook signals that we could lower the rating by
one notch by the end of first-quarter 2013 if Ypso's funding
costs or refinancing activity diverge significantly from our base
case. We believe the very high yield on Ypso's recently issued
senior secured notes could pave the way for a rise in Ypso's
interest costs as it continues refinancing its debt maturities at
higher rates. In turn, we believe that this could lead Ypso to
record significantly less than the EUR110 million FOCF annually
and adequate covenant headroom that we expect in our base case.
Alternatively, if concerns over refinancing costs deter the
group's management from proactively refinancing debt 2014-2017
maturities, we could downgrade Ypso because we see such future
refinancing as necessary for the group to maintain an adequate
liquidity position," S&P said.

"We believe Ypso is likely to meet its 2012-2013 financial
obligations," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12 months if
the group successfully refinanced a substantial part of its
senior bank debt maturing from June 2014 onward, while preserving
sound FOCF generation in line with our base case, and sustaining
resilient operating performance and adequate liquidity," S&P


ADAM OPEL: Turnaround Plan Expected in the Next Couple of Months
Tim Higgins and Chris Reiter at Bloomberg News report that
General Motors Co., which on Thursday posted a record annual
profit of US$9.19 billion for 2011, said more cost cuts are
coming for its money-losing Europe unit after the last turnaround
plan failed to end losses there.

"We have to match capacity with demand, and demand has
been falling," Bloomberg quotes Chief Executive Officer Dan
Akerson as saying of Europe on Thursday during a conference call
with analysts.  "We are looking at everything in order to achieve
a better break-even point, a lower break-even point, and scale.
There's more to come on this, I think, in the next couple of

The automaker's Europe business, including the Opel brand, lost
US$747 million last year before taxes and interest, Bloomberg
discloses.  Bloomberg notes that while that's an improvement from
US$1.95 billion lost in 2010, it's not break-even as Detroit-
based GM had planned until November when it pulled back the
forecast as the European outlook worsened.

While GM has gained ground in the U.S., Ruesselsheim, Germany-
based Opel and sister brand Vauxhall in the U.K. have continued
to lose market share under pressure from competitors such as
Volkswagen AG and Hyundai Motor Co., Bloomberg states.  A drawn-
out rescue effort in the wake of GM's bankruptcy, including an
aborted sale, also soured consumers on the brand, Bloomberg says.

"Opel's Achilles heel is its lack of flexibility," Bloomberg
quotes Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, director of the Center for
Automotive Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, as
saying.  "As soon as Europe weakens, the company runs into

Bloomberg relates that Opel Chief Executive Officer Karl-
Friedrich Stracke said the automaker is in talks with Opel's
unions to lower the break-even level of unit sales by reducing
costs and raising the number of shifts at Opel's factories to
three from two.  Mr. Stracke, as cited by Bloomberg, said the
talks will probably take "a couple months."  He said that the
company is in talks with GM partner SAIC Motor Corp. on expanding
into China, according to Bloomberg.

In Europe, where GM hasn't recorded an annual profit for more
than a decade, the average of three industry analysts' estimates
was for the fourth-quarter loss to increase to US$358 million
from a deficit of US$292 million in the third quarter.

GM Europe lost US$562 million in the fourth quarter, little
changed from a loss of US$568 million a year earlier, Bloomberg
dicsloses.  Last quarter's loss included about US$200 million in
restructuring costs that weren't reflected in the estimates,
Bloomberg notes.

Plant closures won't be part of the near-term solution as GM is
bound by labor contracts that prohibit shutdowns and forced
layoffs until 2014, Bloomberg says.  Mr. Stracke said that GM
planned to stick to plans to invest EUR11 billion in Opel through
2014, Bloomberg relates.

Adam Opel GmbH -- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).
Its high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of
Opel models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the
Astra sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside
North America.

DECO 9: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes at 'CCsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO 9 - Pan Europe 3 plc's class A2
and B notes and affirmed the others, as follows:

  -- EUR196.5m class A1 (XS0262559296) affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- EUR312.0m class A2 (XS0262561276) downgraded to 'Asf' from
     'AAsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR39.0m class B (XS0262561946) downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'Asf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR37.6m class C (XS0262562753) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

  -- EUR15.2m class D (XS0262563215) affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook

  -- EUR21.5m class E (XS0262563728) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook

  -- EUR34.2m class F (XS0262564452) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Estimate (RE) RE90%

  -- EUR6.7m class G (XS0262565004) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned

  -- EUR10.0m class H (XS0262565939) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned

  -- EUR4.8m class J (XS0262566234) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned

The downgrade of the class A2 and B notes reflects the
deteriorating performance of the Dresdner loan, the second
largest loan in the portfolio.  The affirmation of the other
classes reflects the stable performance of the remaining loans
within the past year.

Vacancy in the Dresdner loan has increased to 24% from 15% a year
ago.  Further lease break options have been exercised for EUR11.1
million of passing rent, which will increase vacancy in the
coming months.  The integration of Dresdner Bank AG into
Commerzbank AG, following a 2009 merger, is the main reason for
the closures of Dresdner Bank branches and offices, which serve
as collateral for this loan.

The largest loan in the portfolio, the syndicated Treveria loan,
is in liquidation after various events of default led to its
acceleration in July 2010.  The loan pays a floating rate of
interest and as such is exposed to any rises to the three-month
Euribor reference rate, as it is currently unhedged.  However, in
the short term, the current interest rate levels positively
affect the debt service payments owed by the borrower.

Originally, a portfolio sale was intended, but this strategy was
abandoned due to low bids for the portfolio as a whole.  The
special servicer is currently selling the assets separately.  As
of end-2011, it had completed five sales, with 55 assets
remaining in the portfolio.  All the sale prices were higher than
the allocated loan amounts for the respective properties.

However, Fitch expects the loan to incur a loss due to the
secondary quality of the real estate.  A 50% syndication of the
Treveria loan is included in the EuroProp (EMC) S.A. (Compartment
1) CMBS, the final legal maturity of which is April 2013.  This
may force the special servicer to accept lower bids on the
remaining assets in order to dispose of them before this date.

Three loans, representing 15% of the remaining transaction
balance are scheduled to mature in the next six months.  The
Goettingen (April 2012) and Coop Fishman loans (April 2012) are
secured by retail assets in Germany and Switzerland,
respectively.  Fitch does not expect either loan to incur a loss,
as investor interest in retail assets remains buoyant, and
Fitch's LTV for both loans is moderate.  The Ascom loan, maturing
in July 2012, is secured by an office property in Switzerland,
and should also benefit from investor demand.  Fitch expects the
loan to repay in full at maturity.

EUROPROP SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has placed EuroProp (EMC) S.A. (Compartment 1)'s
class A and B notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN), as follows:

  -- EUR145.6m class A (XS0260127161): 'Asf'; placed on RWN

  -- EUR40.9m class B (XS0260129373): 'Bsf'; placed on RWN

  -- EUR28.1m class C (XS0260130207): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     assigned Recovery Estimate 'RE90%'

  -- EUR30.5m class D (XS0260130975): affirmed at 'CCsf';
     assigned 'RE0%'

  -- EUR15.8m class E (XS0260132088): affirmed at 'CCsf';
     assigned 'RE0%'

The RWN on the Class A and B notes reflects the short time to the
final legal maturity in April 2013.  All assets of the remaining
loan need to be sold by this date and the realised sale proceeds
may be constrained by this short timeframe. Fitch will closely
follow the sales developments.

The only remaining loan, EUR260.9 million Sunrise, is secured by
mostly secondary quality retail properties spread across Germany.
The performance of the assets has stabilized after a significant
increase in vacancy in 2010.  The portfolio is currently 14.5%
vacant, unchanged from last year and up from 4.4% at closing.

The Sunrise loan defaulted in July 2010 for breach of various
loan covenants and was subsequently transferred to special
servicing.  Consequently, some of the underlying borrowers were
placed into administration.  Despite this, the special servicer
agreed to dispose of the properties in an orderly manner, through
an asset sale, without needing to go through a formal mortgage
enforcement process.

Originally, a portfolio sale was intended, but this strategy was
abandoned due to low bids for the portfolio as a whole.  The
special servicer is current selling the assets separately.  Five
sales were completed by the end of 2011; with 55 assets remaining
in the portfolio.  In each case, the net recoveries exceeded the
allocated loan amounts for the respective properties.  However,
Fitch expects the loan to incur a loss due to the quality of the
assets and the constraints posed by the approaching final legal

QIMONDA AG: Seeks to Recover EUR1.7 Billion From Former Parent
Peter Dinkloh and Jens Hack at Reuters report that the
administrator of Qimonda AG is requesting EUR1.7 billion
(US$2.23 billion) from its former parent Infineon, claiming
Qimonda paid Infineon for a business in 2006 that was negative in

According to Reuters, Infineon said on Tuesday that in 2006,
Qimonda gave new shares to Infineon in return for Infineon's
memory business, a deal that is now being probed in an ongoing
lawsuit brought by the administrator.

Reuters relates that Infineon cited the insolvency administrator
as saying the memory business "was not only not equivalent to the
price of the new shares issued in return, namely EUR600 million,
but was actually negative".

It is the first time that Qimonda's insolvency administrator
specifies parts of the damages he is claiming from Infineon,
Reuters states.  Infineon, as cited by Reuters, said that he has
also lodged further unspecified claims as part of a so-called
"declaratory judgment" the administrator is seeking.  Infineon
said that the company considers the claims "unjustified" and will
continue to defend itself against them, Reuters notes.

Qimonda spun off Qimonda in 2006 and the company went insolvent
in 2009 after Infineon refused to invest more money in the
company and efforts of state aid failed, Reuters recounts.

                         About Qimonda AG

Qimonda AG (NYSE: QI) -- was a global
memory supplier with a diversified DRAM product portfolio.  The
Company generated net sales of EUR1.79 billion in financial year
2008 and had -- prior to its announcement of a repositioning of
its business -- roughly 12,200 employees worldwide, of which
1,400 were in Munich, 3,200 in Dresden and 2,800 in Richmond, Va.

Qimonda AG commenced insolvency proceedings in a local court in
Munich, Germany, on Jan. 23, 2009.  On June 15, 2009, QAG filed
a petition (Bankr. E.D. Va. Case No. 09-14766) for relief under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Qimonda North America Corp., an indirect and wholly owned
subsidiary of QAG, is the North American sales and marketing
subsidiary of QAG.  QNA is also the parent company of Qimonda
Richmond LLC.  QNA and QR sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 09-10589) on Feb. 20, 2009.  Mark D. Collins,
Esq., Michael J. Merchant, Esq., and Lee E. Kaufman, Esq., at
Richards Layton & Finger PA, in Wilmington Delaware; and Mark
Thompson, Esq., Morris J. Massel, Esq., and Terry Sanders, Esq.,
at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, in New York City, represented
the Debtors as counsel.  Roberta A. DeAngelis, the United States
Trustee for Region 3, appointed seven creditors to serve on an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Jones Day and Ashby &
Geddes represented the Committee.  In its bankruptcy petition,
Qimonda Richmond, LLC, estimated more than US$1 billion in assets
and debts.  The information, the Chapter 11 Debtors said, was
based on QR's financial records which are maintained on a
consolidated basis with QNA.

In September 2011, the Chapter 11 Debtors won confirmation of
their Chapter 11 liquidation plan which projects that unsecured
creditors with claims between US$33 million and US$35 million
would have a recovery between 6.1% and 11.1%.  No secured claims
of significance remained.


LEO BURNETT: Publicis Offers Partial Compensation to Clients
Amy Thomson at Bloomberg News reports that Publicis Groupe SA
said it is offering partial compensation to Greek television and
radio clients which lost money after the unit of its local Leo
Burnett advertising agency failed to pay bills.

Greek TV and radio stations didn't receive payments for
advertising space when Leo Burnett's Greek unit, which had booked
spots for companies such as Procter & Gamble Co., went into a
pre-bankruptcy process in July, Bloomberg discloses.  The
division ran into trouble after a local TV company it did
business with, Alter TV, went bankrupt and several Greek clients
stopped making payments, Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, Senior Vice President Mathias Emmerich
said on Tuesday in an interview that Publicis, France's largest
advertising agency, is offering local broadcasters about 60% of
what they were owed for ad bookings from companies outside of
Greece.  Mr. Emmerich, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the Alter
TV bankruptcy left "the advertising agencies in Greece with bad
debt of EUR180 million (US$236 million)".

Bloomberg notes that a spokesman said on Tuesday that Antenna
Group, a Greek television and radio company, is owed between EUR3
million and EUR10 million and is rejecting the settlement offer.
According to Bloomberg, the privately-held broadcaster, whose
assets include the ANT1 television channel and Rythmos FM radio
station, is considering "a range of options to recover
outstanding sums."

Mr. Emmerich said that four other local media companies, Alpha
TV, Star TV, Skai TV and Mega TV, agreed to the deal, Bloomberg

* GREECE: Nears Debt Restructuring Deal
Riva Froymovich at Dow Jones Newswires report that a top euro-
zone official on Wednesday expressed optimism that a long-awaited
accord with Greece could be wrapped up soon, potentially clearing
the way for a new bailout and debt restructuring.

According to Dow Jones, Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg prime
minister who heads up the euro-zone ministers' meetings, said
there had been "substantial further progress" since Tuesday in
talks between Greece and its so-called troika of international
official lenders -- the European Union, the International
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.

After a teleconference among the ministers on Wednesday,
Mr. Juncker, as cited by Dow Jones, said the lenders had received
assurances of support for the austerity program that will
accompany the deal from the two party leaders in Greece's ruling
coalition -- New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras and Socialist
party chief George Papandreou -- and said EUR325 million (US$428
million) of additional budget cuts for this year had been
identified, as the lenders required.

But he said further moves were necessary before the agreement
could be sealed-- measures to make sure the agreed program of
economic overhauls was implemented and to ensure that servicing
the debt would be a priority for Greece, Dow Jones relates.

According to Dow Jones, an official from a euro-zone government
said the ministers were seeking "some sort of permanent presence
for the troika" in Greece "with enough authority and manpower."

They were also looking for Greece to agree to open a special
escrow account for debt servicing, Dow Jones discloses.

The restructuring -- to be accomplished through an exchange of new
bonds with half of the face value of existing government bonds --
must be completed before late March, when a EUR14.5 billion bond
matures, Dow Jones states.

Officials familiar with the negotiations said some governments
may try to separate an accord over the debt restructuring from
the negotiations over the bailout needed to help plug the gaps in
Greek government finances caused by its inability to borrow from
the financial markets, Dow Jones notes.


ICELAND FOODS: Founder Inks Deal to Acquire Biz for GBP1.5-Mil.
Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that Malcolm
Walker, the founder and chief executive of Iceland Foods, is
poised to acquire the frozen food specialist for about
GBP1.5 billion.

According to the FT, Mr. Walker and the management of Iceland
Foods have signed an exclusivity deal with the Resolution
committee of Landsbanki, which is selling the failed Icelandic
bank's majority stake in Iceland Foods.

The exclusivity arrangement means that Mr. Walker now has the
right to negotiate a deal with Landsbanki and Glitnir to acquire
the value supermarket, the FT says.

Under Mr. Walker's pre-emption rights, he had 42 days to match
any offer, the FT discloses.  However, he appears to have
leapfrogged this process, the FT notes.

Mr. Walker is not thought to be working with any private equity
backers, but is funding the purchase with debt and other
financing, the FT says.

It is understood that the equity proceeds from the sale of shares
in Iceland Foods would be GBP1.55 billion, but the enterprise
value is about GBP1.4 billion as there is about GBP150 million of
surplus cash in the business, the FT discloses.

The Resolution committee of Landsbanki put its 67% stake in
Iceland Foods up for sale last year and appointed Merrill Lynch
and UBS to sell it, the FT recounts.  Glitnir also had a 10%
stake, the FT states.

                   About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Affirms Rating on UK Covered Bond Program
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'A-' credit
ratings on Bank of Ireland's U.K. covered bond program and all
related series of covered bonds issued under it. "At the same
time, we assigned a negative outlook to the ratings on these
covered bonds," S&P said.

"The affirmation follows our affirmation of and negative outlook
on our credit ratings on the issuer, Bank of Ireland
(BB+/Negative/B)," S&P said.

"We have applied our five-step criteria process. In steps one and
two, we have assessed the current asset-liability mismatch (ALMM)
risk, the program's categorization, the maximum potential covered
bond ratings uplift, the cash flow and market value risk, and the
credit enhancement provided," S&P said.

"As a result of our analysis and given the 'BB+/Negative' long-
term rating on Bank of Ireland, we have determined a maximum
achievable rating of 'A-/Negative' for the covered bonds. This is
based on a current program categorization of '2' and an ALMM
classification of 'high', which under our criteria enables us to
assign to the covered bonds a maximum ratings uplift of four
notches above our long-term rating on Bank of Ireland," S&P said.

"We have therefore affirmed our ratings on the program and the
covered bonds at the maximum achievable rating of 'A-/Negative',"
S&P said.

The negative outlook on these covered bond ratings reflects the
negative outlook on Bank of Ireland.

"We are able to assign the maximum achievable rating on these
covered bonds because we believe that the current available
credit enhancement in the program is commensurate with a 'A-'
rating," S&P said.

Ratings List

Program/      To                    From
Country: Covered bond type

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative; Negative
Outlook Assigned

Bank of Ireland Covered Bond Programme (The Governor and Company
of the Bank of Ireland Global Covered Bond Programme)

              A-/Negative           A-/Watch Neg

U.K.: Structured Covered Bonds

BHT GROUP: Enters Into Examinership; Owes EUR31.8 Million
RTE News reports that BHT Group, which operates Tubs and Tiles,
Heat Merchants and Brooks, has gone into examinership with debts
of EUR31.8 million.

According to RTE, EUR21.8 million of the group's debts are owed
to unsecured trade creditors.

The High Court approved the appointment of Kieran Wallace of KPMG
as examiner on Thursday, RTE relates.

In a statement, the company's board said the move was due to a
difficult trading environment in the construction and home
improvement sectors during 2011 and at the start of 2012, RTE

The businesses will continue to trade normally during the three-
month period of the examinership, RTE says.

BHT Group provides building, plumbing, tiling and flooring goods.

MOTIF FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'B' Ratings on Two Debt Obligations
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
Motif Finance (Ireland) PLC's series 2007-3 and series 2007-4.

The rating actions follow the issuer's repurchase and subsequent
cancellation of the notes.

Motif Finance (Ireland)'s series 2007-3 and 2007-4 closed in
April 2007 and May 2007. Their reference portfolios are based on
the on-the-run iTraxx Europe and CDX NA IG indices.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at;

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To            From

Ratings Withdrawn

Motif Finance (Ireland) PLC
EUR5 Million Adjustable Leverage Debt Obligations Series 2007-3

            NR            B (sf)

Motif Finance (Ireland) PLC
US$10 Million Adjustable Leverage Debt Obligations Series 2007-4

            NR            B (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PININFARINA SPA: Has Debt Restructuring Deal with Banks
Jennifer Clark at Reuters reports that Pininfarina SpA said it
had reached a debt restructuring deal with banks after long-
running talks.

According to Reuters, Chief Executive Silvio Pietro Angori told
shareholders on Wednesday that the company will complete a
EUR182.6 million (US$239.8 million) debt restructuring deal with
13 creditor banks by the end of March.

The agreement with creditor banks will allow the loss-making
company to pay back debt by the end of 2018, rather than 2015 as
previously planned, Reuters notes.

Pininfarina has struggled to return to profit in recent years,
after being forced to shut down manufacturing operations to focus
on design and engineering services, Reuters relates.

Pininfarina is an Italian company, famous for designs including
the Ferrari FF and Maserati Gran Turismo.  The company was
founded in 1930 by Battista "Pinin" Farina.


BTA BANK: Gets 22 Months in Jail for Breaching Asset Freeze Order
Erik Larson at Bloomberg News reports that Mukhtar Ablyazov, the
former chairman of Kazakhstan's BTA Bank, was sentenced to 22
months in a U.K. jail for breaching a court-ordered freeze on his
assets and lying under oath in a US$5 billion fraud lawsuit.

According to Bloomberg, Judge Nigel Teare said on Thursday in
London that the violations were "deliberate and brazen" and
require that Mr. Ablyazov be placed in immediate custody.

BTA, the biggest Kazakh lender before defaulting on US$12 billion
of debt in 2009, filed a series of civil suits against
Mr. Ablyazov and ex-Chief Executive Officer Roman Solodchenko
claiming they took more than US$5 billion from the bank using
fake loans, back-dated documents and offshore companies,
Bloomberg recounts.  Both men have denied the claims, Bloomberg

Lawyers for BTA, which restructured its debt after being
nationalized, said Mr. Ablyazov violated a 2009 court order by
failing to reveal all his assets, including a house in the
British countryside and a London mansion, each valued at
GBP20 million (US$31.6 million), two apartments in the U.K.
capital worth GBP1 million each, and an offshore firm that
allegedly carried out a US$300 million fraud against the bank,
Bloomberg relates.

Bloomberg notes that an earlier dispute over Mr. Ablyazov's asset
disclosure in the case resulted in an order placing an estimated
US$5 billion of his wealth into receivership.  Judge Teare, as
cited by Bloomberg, said that Mr. Ablyazov may serve only half
the sentence imposed on Thursday under U.K. rules.

                           About BTA Bank

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, BTA reported total assets
and total equity deficit of US$12.2 billion and US$1.48 billion,
respectively, at end-H1 2011, according to the bank's IFRS
financial statements.  BTA's net loss for H1 2011 amounted to
US$701 million.

                      *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Dec. 12, 2011,
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded BTA Bank's (BTA) long-
term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B3,
the long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ca
from Caa2 and the long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt
rating to C from Caa3.


ELM BV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Series 79 Notes to 'Caa3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of this note
issued by ELM B.V.:

Issuer: ELM B.V. - Series 79 - Leveraged Asset-Backed Securities

   -- EUR22,500,000 Floating Rate Credit Linked Secured Notes due
      2026 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16,
      2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

This transaction is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation referencing a managed portfolio of 60 European ABS
assets. At present, the portfolio is composed mainly of Prime and
Subprime RMBS (74.2%) and CMBS (23.9%). Series 79 has a current
thicknesses of 5.16% and a credit enhancement of 0%.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the credit deterioration of the reference portfolio which is
mainly driven by the six notch downgrade to B1 of the reference
entity 'DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 plc A2' to which current
exposure is 5.77%. The 10 year weighted average rating factor
(WARF) of the current portfolio is 171 equivalent to an average
rating of the current portfolio of A3. This compares to a 10-year
WARF of 43, at the time of the last rating action in September
2011, equivalent to an average rating of A1. At the moment
approximately 15% of the reference portfolio is on watch for

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

1) Moody's considered a model run where 'Celtic Residential Irish
   Mortgage Securitisation No. 9 Plc A2', which is under review
   for possible downgrade is stressed by 2 more notches than the
   standard notching assumptions. This run generated a result
   that is consistent with the rating assigned.

2) Moody's considered a model run where assets originated in
   Ireland, Spain and Italy are stressed by 1 more notch than the
   standard notching assumptions. This run generated a result
   that is consistent with the rating assigned.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as 27% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Ireland, Spain and
Italy. The transaction's performance may also be impacted either
positively or negatively by general macro uncertainties such as
those surrounding future housing prices, pace of residential
mortgage foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing,
unemployment rates and interest rates.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(28 November 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit of
countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions with meaningful exposure to some of these countries.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's
CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's
default probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity
is modelled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

LISTRINDO CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to US$500MM Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba2 senior
unsecured bond rating to the US$500 million, 6.95%, 7-year notes
issued by Listrindo Capital B.V.

The notes are unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by PT
Cikarang Listrodo.

Moody's has also affirmed Cikarang's Ba2 corporate family rating
and existing senior unsecured notes rating.

The ratings outlook is negative.

Ratings Rationale

The definitive rating on this debt obligation confirms the
provisional bond rating assigned on January 30, 2012, based on
the fact that the amount raised from the bond issue and the
covenants stated in the Offering Memorandum Circular dated
February 13, 2012, are consistent with Moody's expectations.

About US$310 million of the new issue will be used to repurchase
the tendered 2015 notes and pay the consenting holders. The
balance of US$190 million will be used to pay the expenses
related to the offering and the remaining amount has been
earmarked for capital expenditure and general corporate purposes.

The principal methodology used in rating Cikarang was the Power
Generation Projects published in December 2008.

PT Cikarang Listrindo is the sole IPP supplier of electricity to
a wide range of mostly foreign-owned companies in five industrial
estates in the Cikarang area outside of Jakarta. It owns and
operates a 646MW natural gas-fired combined cycle power station,
and distributes directly to companies on the industrial estates.

Its capacity expansion plan, upon completion, will increase
installed generation capacity to 755MW by mid-2012 and 1035MW by
end- 2016. It also has an offtake agreement for part of its power
with PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN, Baa3/stable). Cikarang is
owned by three Indonesian families.

NXP BV: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New Secured Term Loan
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 rating (with a loss
given default assessment (LGD) of 4, 63%) to the proposed
US$475 million senior secured term loan by NXP B.V. ("NXP"), due
2019. Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded the ratings on the
group's existing senior secured notes and term loans to B3 (LGD4,
63%) from B2 (LGD4, 53%). In addition, the rating agency has
affirmed NXP's Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and Probability of
Default Rating (PDR) at B2 and the outlook remains positive.

Moody's expects to withdraw the Caa1 (LGD6, 91%) ratings on NXP's
unsecured debt once the group has substantially redeemed US$775
million of senior unsecured notes due 2015. The US$475 million
senior secured term loan will be issued by NXP B.V. and NXP
Funding LLC.

The assigned rating to the new term loan is based on the
preliminary documentation received which is substantially in line
with the credit agreement of March 4, 2011 for existing term
loans downgraded to B3 and assumes that the final documentation
will not be materially different and the transaction will be
completed as outlined below.


   Issuer: NXP B.V.

   -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to B3,
      LGD4, 63% from B2, LGD4, 54 %

   -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B3,
      LGD4, 63% from a range of B2, LGD4, 53%


   Issuer: NXP B.V.

   -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B3, LGD4,
      63 %

Ratings Rationale

"Moody's assignment of the B3 rating to NXP's US$475 million
senior term loan reflects that it will rank pari passu with NXP's
existing senior secured debt, but junior to the group's EUR500
million senior facilities agreement and its super priority
notes," says Kathrin Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst for NXP. In
line with Moody's Loss Given Default Methodology, the rating
agency's one-notch downgrade of the ratings on NXP's existing
senior secured notes and term loans reflects the eliminated layer
of senior unsecured debt following the group's announced
redemption of US$775 million of senior unsecured notes due 2015.

On February 13, 2012, NXP announced that NXP B.V. and NXP Funding
LLC intend to fully redeem the group's euro- and US dollar-
denominated senior unsecured notes, totalling US$775 million and
due October 2015. The senior notes are currently rated rated Caa1
(LGD6, 91%) by Moody's. The proposed redemption will be financed
by the issuance of new senior secured term loans of up to US$475
million due 2019 and a US$300 million drawdown under NXP's
existing EUR500 million super senior revolving credit facility.
The new senior secured term loan will be drawn as additional
loans under NXP's existing senior secured term loan facility
agreement as of March 2011 and amended in November 2011.

The announced refinancing will lengthen NXP's debt maturity
profile and reduce the group's annual interest burden. However,
it also changes NXP's capital mix because virtually all of the
group's unsecured financial debt will be redeemed. As a
consequence, the previous cushion that supported the ratings for
secured debt in Moody's Loss Given Default methodology will be
largely eliminated, hence the downgrade of the secured instrument
ratings to B3 (LGD4, 63%) from B2 (LGD4, 53%).

Moody's groups NXP's pro-forma debt package following the
transaction into the following three categories of priority of
claims: (i) the EUR500 million revolving credit facility and two
series of super-priority notes of around US$260 million, which
share the security arrangements for the secured notes and term
loans, but rank senior in a liquidation scenario; (ii)
approximately US$1.8 billion in senior secured notes and around
US$1.475 billion in secured term loans secured by first-priority
liens on (a) substantially all assets except cash of the issuer
and its guarantor (material wholly owned subsidiaries); (b) the
issuer's equity interests in all material wholly owned
subsidiaries; and (c) any intercompany loans; and (iii) around
US$250 million in underfunded pension obligations and short-term
lease rejection claims per December 31, 2010. Moody's has ranked
US$455 million of trade payables as per December 31, 2011 with
the super-priority debt.

NXP's B2 CFR remains constrained by (i) the high technology risk
and inherent cyclicality of the semiconductor industry; (ii)
currently limited demand visibility in NXP's markets due to
heightened macroeconomic uncertainty; (iii) NXP's very volatile
historical performance, significant cash burn in downturn
yeARSand continued negative free cash flows in 2011; and (iv) the
group's still relatively high leverage for the peak of the cycle
(3.4x debt/EBITDA in the last 12 months to 30 September 2011).

However, more positively, NXP's B2 CFR continues to be supported
by the group's well-established leadership positions in different
markets with different underlying growth drivers, and by a
broadening range of innovative products. These leadership
positions are underpinned by substantial barriers to market
entry, customer loyalty and a diversified customer base in the
automatic identification, consumer electronics and automotive
industries. The B2 CFR also factors in NXP's operating
flexibility and cost reductions achieved through the
implementation of its Redesign program, which make the group
better positioned to withstand a downturn in future.

The current positive outlook on the B2 CFR continues to reflect
Moody's expectation that NXP will return to positive free cash
flow (FCF) generation in the next few quarters, benefiting from
the finalization of its restructuring efforts and more stringent
working capital management. Robust cash generation would also
support further progress in deleveraging.

In the fourth quarter 2011, macroeconomic uncertainty dampened
NXP's revenue growth rates (-14% year-on-year) and capacity
utilization rates (71% in Q4 2011 vs. 97% in Q4 2010 and 79% in
Q3 2011). NXP reported negative free cash flow of US$74 million
in the same quarter. Continued softness in demand could delay a
return to positive FCF and a reduction in leverage ratios.


Moody's would consider a rating upgrade if (i) NXP exhibits free
cash flow of above EUR300 million on a last-12-months basis
(around -US$108 million as reported by December 2011); and (ii)
the group sustains solid profitability and a gross debt/last-12-
months EBITDA ratio at or below 3.5x (4.1x estimated for FY

The rating outlook could be stabilized in case of NXP's inability
to substantially reverse the negative trend in load factors and
working capital in the coming quarters and if NXP fails to return
to positive FCF generation near term.

Negative rating pressure would develop if NXP experiences a
return to significant annual cash burn or declining semiconductor
volumes, depressing its profitability such that its debt/EBITDA
ratio rises, and remains, above 5.0x.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating NXP B.V. was the Global
Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in November 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, NXP Semiconductors is a
leading semiconductor company. Its High Performance Mixed Signal
and Standard Product solutions are used in a wide range of
applications, including automotive, identification, wireless
infrastructure, lighting, industrial, mobile, consumer and
computing. NXP posted sales of US$4.2 billion in 2011.

OPERA FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Four Note Classes to 'Dsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Opera Finance (Uni-Invest) B.V.'s
outstanding tranches as follows:

  -- EUR358.8m class A (XS0218487436) downgraded to 'Dsf' from

  -- EUR9.6m class B (XS0218489135) downgraded to 'Dsf' from

  -- EUR94.3m class C (XS0218490653) downgraded to 'Dsf' from

  -- EUR59.1m class D (XS0218492279) downgraded to 'Dsf' from

Having failed to complete the sales process of Uni-Invest Holding
B.V. that was started in mid-2011, the transaction reached its
legal final maturity without repaying outstanding principal

A notice to noteholders was issued confirming that the issuer had
not received payment of principal in the amount outstanding of
the senior loan and that if this was not remedied within three
days that a note event of default would occur.  An earlier notice
on February 8, 2012, stated that an ad-hoc class A noteholder
steering committee had been formed to consider the options open
to the noteholders in directing the foreclosure of the issuer
security post legal final maturity.

During the auction process, the asset portfolio had attracted a
number of bidders and although any enforcement process will now
be concluded after the legal final maturity, Fitch expects that
at least the class A noteholders will receive significant
recoveries, net of sales/workout costs, at some point in the
future.  The failure to repay at legal final maturity should now
mean that the class A noteholders have complete control of the
enforcement process.  The timing and recovery amount of any such
enforcement remains difficult to accurately assess, although the
removal of the time pressure associated with the approach of the
legal final maturity should allow noteholders to extract the
highest possible price for the assets.

Fitch will continue to monitor the transaction's performance.


CONCEFA: Managing Board Opts for Insolvency
SeeNews reports that Concefa said on Thursday its managing board
has decided that the company should file for insolvency.

According to SeeNews, Concefa said in a statement filed to the
Bucharest Stock Exchange that the company will request that Casa
de Insolventa Transilvania be appointed as its administrator.

Last month, Romanian company Covin Comimpex filed with a court in
the central city of Sibiu an insolvency petition against Concefa
over a debt of RON116,000 (US$34,690/EUR26,660).

Concefa is a Romanian construction company.

ROMPLUMB: Court Names CITR as Legal Liquidator
The Diplomat Bucharest reports that the insolvency-specialized
company Casa de Insolventa Transilvania (CITR) has been named by
the Court of Justice in Maramures as the legal liquidator for
state-owned Romplumb plant located in Baia Mare.

For the next future, the CITR will analyze the insolvency file
and will draft a reorganization plan for the company, together
with the plant's board.

Romplumb is established as commercial company in 1990 and
produces slug-based products.


AYT NOVACAIXAGALICIA: DBRS Discontinues BB Rating on Cl. B Notes
DBRS, Inc. has discontinued ratings on the AyT Novacaixagalicia
Hipotecario I, FTA notes.  The securitization fund was liquidated
and the Class A and Class B notes were fully repaid on January
31, 2012.  The Class A and Class B Notes previously rated AAA
(sf) and BB (sf), respectively, are now both rated Discontinued-
Repaid due to repayment to the noteholders.

IM CAJAMAR: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ca' Rating to EUR94.5MM Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to the debt to be issued by IM CAJAMAR EMPRESAS 4 FTA
(the Fondo):

   -- EUR840.0M Serie A notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

   -- EUR210.0M Serie B notes, Assigned (P)Caa1 (sf)

   -- EUR94.5M Serie C notes, Assigned (P)Ca (sf)

IM CAJAMAR EMPRESAS 4 FTA is a securitization of loans mainly
granted to self-employed and small- and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) by Cajamar (Baa3/P-3; Negative Outlook). At closing, the
Fondo -- a newly formed limited liability entity incorporated
under the laws of Spain -- will issue three series of rated notes
and will also enter into a loan agreement to finance the purchase
of the loans (at par) from Cajamar. Cajamar will act as Servicer
of the loans for the Fondo, while InterMoney Titulizacion
S.G.F.T., S.A. will be the Management Company ("Gestora") of the

Ratings Rationale

The provisional pool of underlying assets was, as of January
2012, composed of a portfolio of 18,007 contracts granted to
obligors located in Spain. The loans were originated mainly
between 2003 and 2011, with a weighted average seasoning of 3.1
yeARSand a weighted average remaining term of 7.5 years. About
56% of the pool is unsecured while the rest is secured by
mortgage guarantees over different types of properties.
Geographically, the pool is concentrated mostly in Andalusia
(44%) and Murcia (31%). At closing, there will be no loans more
than 30 days in arreARS(0-30 bucket limited to 5%).

According to Moody's, this deal benefits from several credit
strengths, such as a relatively low concentration in the Building
and Real Estate sector for the Spanish market (8.8% in the
provisional pool according to Moody's industry classification), a
low percentage of bullet loans (2.5%) and a very granular
portfolio (effective number of obligors over 1,600) which Moody's
took into consideration in its portfolio analysis. However,
Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit
weaknesses, including regional concentration in Andalusia and
Murcia (75%) and high commingling risk, compared to other Spanish
SME deals, as the deal collections and reserve fund (9% of Series
A and B at closing) will be initially deposited in Cajamar
(Baa3/P-3) . These characteristics were reflected in Moody's
analysis and provisional ratings, where several simulations
tested the available credit enhancement and reserve fund to cover
potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in the
transaction structure.

The ratings are primarily based on the credit quality of the
portfolio, its diversity, the structural features of the
transaction and its legal integrity.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 12.3%, with a coefficient of variation of 61.2% and a
recovery rate of 50%. Moody's also tested other set of
assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis. For
instance, if the assumed default probability of 12.3% used in
determining the initial rating was changed to 15.3% and the
recovery rate of 50% was changed to 40%, the model-indicated
rating for Serie A, Serie B and Serie C of (P)A3(sf), (P)Caa1(sf)
and (P)Ca(sf) would have changed to (P)Baa2(sf), (P)Caa1(sf) and
(P)Ca(sf) respectively. For more details, please refer to the
full Parameter Sensitivity analysis included in the New Issue
Report of this transaction.

The global V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is
in line with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. The main
source of uncertainty in the analysis relate to the Transaction
Complexity. This element has been assigned a Medium/High V-Score,
as opposed to Medium assignment for the sector V-Score. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector " published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default
assumptions in the rating analysis of granular Small and Mid-
sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA", published in March 2009 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in Europe,
Middle East and Africa", published in June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the Inverse Normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. On the recovery side
Moody's assumes a stochastic (normal) recovery distribution which
is correlated to the default distribution. In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

  -- EUR63.8m class E: affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
     revised to 0% from 10%

  -- EUR21.8m class F: affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate 0%.

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Santander Consumer Spain Auto 06 FTA,
07-1 FTA and Santander Financiacion 2's ratings.  The agency has
also affirmed Santander Consumer Spain 09-1 FTA and Santander
Consumer Spain Auto 10-1 FTA's ratings.

The upgrade of Santander Consumer Spain Auto 06's class B, C and
D notes and Santander Consumer Spain Auto 07-1's class B and C
notes is due to an improvement in the performance of the
underlying pool and an increase in the available credit support.
Fitch believes both transactions will continue to benefit from
deleveraging, resulting in further increases in available credit
enhancement in future periods.

Arrears have displayed a decreasing trend across both
transactions in the past two years.  As of the most recent
interest payment date (IPD), 30 days-past-due (dpd) delinquencies
stood at 5.4% and 8% for 06 and 07-1 respectively, down from
peaks of 6.8%, and 10% in July 2009.  As a result, excess spread
trends are increasingly positive, and Fitch expects the reserve
fund to continue to increase for 07-1 given the decreasing
delinquency pipeline.  The reserve fund for Santander 06 reached
its target amount of EUR20.25 million in January 2011.

Santander Consumer Spain 06 incorporated an interest deferral
trigger at closing, which is set for the class D note once write
offs without recoveries hit 3.91% of the initial balance.
Santander have been basing this trigger on write offs including
recoveries, currently 3.69%, which means that the trigger has not
been breached and it is unclear at what point this would happen.
Deferred interest would be used to repay senior note principal,
however to date, no deferral of interest has occurred.

For Santander Consumer Spain 09-1, FTA and Santander Consumer
Spain Auto 10-1, Fitch has affirmed the ratings of all tranches
and revised the Outlooks for the class B notes of 09-1 and the
class B and C notes of 10-1 to Positive from Stable.  For the 09-
1 deal, 30+dpd delinquencies have displayed a stable trend of
around 6% since July 2009.  30+dpd delinquencies for Santander
10-1 have displayed an increasing trend but had only reached a
low 2.3% as of November 2011.

Fitch notes that excess spread has remained positive for both
transactions since outset and the reserve funds have been topped
up to their required amount at each payment date.

For Santander Financiacion, the upgrades at the top of the
structure reflect significant deleveraging resulting in increased
credit enhancement for the class B and C notes.  However, the
reserve fund has been completely utilized to offset significant
losses as the level of bad debts has exceeded the guaranteed
excess spread since February 2009 leading to principal deficiency
ledger (PDL) balances of EUR74.7 million as of November 2011.
The agency expects this PDL to increase slowly in the short term
as excess spread remains negative.

The rating actions are as follows:

Santander Consumer Spain Auto 06, FTA:

  -- EUR24.5m class A: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- EUR22.3m class B: upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable
  -- EUR22.3m class C: upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
  -- EUR22.9m class D: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
  -- EUR10.2m class E: upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate revised to 90% from 10%

Santander Consumer Spain Auto 07-1, FTA:

  -- EUR280.9m class A: upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable
  -- EUR78m class B: upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  -- EUR20m class C: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
  -- EUR40m class D: affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 50%.

Santander Consumer Spain 09-1, FTA:

  -- EUR180.5m class A: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- EUR99.4m class B : affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
     Positive from Stable
  -- EUR37.8m class C: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR35.7m class D: affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate
     revised to 70% from 30%.

Santander Consumer Spain 10-1, FTA:

  -- EUR299.2m class A: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- EUR57.0m class B : affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook revised to
     Positive from Stable
  -- EUR49.5m class C: affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook revised to
     Positive from Stable

Santander Financiacion 2, FTA:

  -- EUR49.1m class B: upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
  -- EUR44.9m class C : upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative
  -- EUR29.0m class D: affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 30%
  -- EUR63.8m class E: affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
     revised to 0% from 10%
  -- EUR21.8m class F: affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate 0%.

SANTANDER TOTTA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Preference Shares
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Santander Totta SGPS's and its bank
subsidiary, Banco Santander Totta SA's Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) to 'BBB' from 'A' and its Short-term IDR to 'F3'
from 'F1' and removed the ratings from Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).  The Long-term IDRs have a Negative Outlook.  The agency
has also downgraded the two institutions' Support Ratings to '2'
from '1, and removed from RWN.

These rating actions reflect a weakening of potential parent bank
support following the downgrade of Spain's Banco Santander and a
reassessment of the link between support being forthcoming and
sovereign/banking sector risks in Portugal.

Fitch believes there still to be a high probability that
Santander Totta and Banco Santander Totta SA would be supported
by Banco Santander, if needed, and this drives their Long-term
IDRs which are two notches higher than the Portuguese sovereign
Long-term IDR ('BB+'/Negative).

However, Banco Santander's propensity and ultimate ability to
provide full and timely support to Santander Totta and Banco
Santander Totta SA is linked to the banking sector and sovereign
risks in Portugal, which are closely correlated.  The most likely
cause of a further downgrade of the Long-term IDRs of Santander
Totta and Banco Santander Totta SA would be a Portuguese
sovereign downgrade.  As a result their Long-term IDRs, like
Portugal, are also on Negative Outlook.

In accordance with Fitch's criteria on 'Rating Bank Regulatory
Capital and Similar Securities', Banco Santander Totta SA's
preference shares have been affirmed at 'BB+' and notched down
twice from its Long-term IDR.  The notching only reflects
relative loss severity as, in Fitch's view, the potential for
parental support should be able to neutralise the non-performance
risk of these preference shares.

Santander Totta is a Portuguese holding company ultimately owned
by Banco Santander.  Banco Santander Totta SA is its main
subsidiary and is Portugal's fourth largest bank.

The ratings actions are as follows:

Santander Totta:

  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative; Removed from RWN
  -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F3' from 'F1'; Removed from
  -- Viability Rating unaffected at 'bb-'
  -- Support Rating downgraded to '2' from '1', removed from RWN

Banco Santander Totta S.A.:

  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative; Removed from RWN
  -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F3' from 'F1'; Removed from
  -- Viability Rating unaffected at 'bb-'
  -- Support Rating downgraded to '2' from '1', removed from RWN
  -- Senior debt downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A'; removed from RWN
  -- Commercial paper and short-term debt downgraded to 'F3' from
     'F1'; removed from RWN
  -- Preference shares affirmed at 'BB+', removed from RWP

The rating impact, if any, from the above rating actions on
Santander Totta's securitization transactions and covered bonds
will be detailed in separate comments.

With the exception of the rating action taken today on Banco
Santander Totta SA's preference shares which also took into
account Fitch's 'Rating Bank Regulatory Capital and Similar
Securities' criteria, The rating actions have been driven by
those aspects of its 'Global Financial Institutions Rating
Criteria' relating to support.


* SWITZERLAND: Swiss Machine Maker Insolvencies Up 35% in 2011
Global Insolvency, citing Dow Jones Daily Bankruptcy Review,
reports that the number of insolvencies among Swiss machine
makers rose an annual 35% last year, as the strength of the Swiss
franc crimped demand in their key euro-region markets.

According to Global Insolvency, a survey by Credita AG noted that
"With around 80% of Swiss machinery output being exported, and
two-thirds of that to the euro zone, the franc's appreciation,
particularly versus the euro, had a big impact on the sector".

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUCTION ATRIUM: Ceases Trading; May Enter Liquidation Next Month
Antiques Trade Gazette reports that Auction Atrium has ceased
trading, still owing a six-figure sum to consignors.  The firm is
likely to formally enter liquidation later this month.

According to the report, Peter Whalley, a partner in the
Southampton office of Thames Valley and South Coast accountants
James Cowper, who have been called in as administrators, believes
Auction Atrium's bespoke online software and timed bidding
platform has a considerable value and expressions of interest
have already been received.

Mr. Whalley added that, as there were no secured creditors (such
as a bank or mortgage company) or preferential unsecured
creditors (unpaid employees), vendors would be first in line to
receive a percentage of any money realised from the sale of
assets, the report relates.

Action Atrium staff were seemingly under the impression a client
escrow account was in place, but managing director Allison Earl
Woessner told ATG that the financial structure of the company had
changed in July 2009, following new backing and the appointment
of financial director Roy Anderson. It meant that vendors' money
could then be used as operational cash when deemed necessary.

ATG relates that Ms. Woessner said the management team continued
to receive messages of support from clients who believed Auction
Atrium had had a positive impact on the London auction market and
stressed that her number one priority was paying vendors.

Auction Atrium is a Kensington Church-based online auction house.

BRIDGE HALL: Alexander David Buys Firms for GBP30,000
----------------------------------------------------- reports that Alexander David Securities has
agreed to acquire the business of Bridge Hall Stockbrokers
Limited for a total consideration of GBP30,000.

BHSL currently comprises 939 private clients and approximately
GBP6 million of client funds.

According to, BHSL is now in liquidation and
is no longer trading, and is no longer authorized to offer
clients any service.  This transaction will significantly
increase the number of clients available to Alexander David and
its funds under advisory management, the report notes.

The company has not taken on any other liabilities or obligations
from BHSL, says

F&C ASSET: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long- and short-
term counterparty credit ratings on U.K.-based asset manager F&C
Asset Management PLC (F&C) to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'. The
outlook is stable. "In addition, we lowered the rating on F&C's
junior subordinated debt to 'B+' from 'BB'," S&P said.

"The rating action reflects our view that F&C's persistently weak
cash flow coverage and high balance sheet leverage will show
little improvement over the one-year outlook horizon. While we
recognize that F&C's multi-year transition plan, announced in
October 2011, has the potential to gradually improve its
financial profile and refocus its strategic priorities on 'core'
institutional market segments, we note the execution risks in the
context of continued market uncertainty and the long
implementation cycle of the plan," S&P said.

"The ratings on F&C reflect Standard & Poor's view of its
relatively weak profitability and cash flow, high balance sheet
leverage, weak fund flow track record, and uneven investment
performance across product groups. The ratings are supported by
its competitive market position in the institutional segment,
diversity of its product offerings, and absence of short-term
debt," S&P said.

"F&C is a midsize U.K.-based asset manager with reported assets
under management (AUM) of GBP100.1 billion (US$158 billion) at
Dec. 31, 2011. F&C's AUM are biased toward insurance clients (54%
of AUM), but this concentration is partially mitigated by long-
term exclusivity contracts, expiring between October 2013 and
October 2015, that require significant notice for a withdrawal of
funds by these clients. We note, however, that Millennium BCP, a
major insurance client, is able to terminate its insurance and
sub-advisory contracts at much shorter notice. We further note
that Friends Life has given F&C 12-months notice of its intention
to withdraw GBP2.3 billion of assets," S&P said.

"F&C remains highly leveraged relative to peers and debt service
metrics are low relative to similarly rated asset managers. We
note that management has stated that it wishes to allocate free
cash to reduce debt over the medium term. Our base-case
expectation is that F&C's gross interest coverage ratio (EBITDA-
to-interest expense) will remain around 4x over the next 12
months. Contingent on management's execution of announced debt
reduction plans, we expect this ratio to improve to around 5x by
end-2013. We expect that the debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain
around 3x over the next 12 months with a gradual improvement to
the 2.6x-2.7x level by end-2013. We note that F&C has
satisfactory liquidity and has no short-term debt due," S&P said.

"F&C's AUM at end-2011 was down 5.4% over the prior year due to
uneven investment performance (with particular weakness in
equities) and net outflows. We consider that F&C has a weak long-
term track record of attracting net new money. Increased market
volatility since June 2011, coupled with external event-driven
client developments and corporate uncertainty early in the year
related to board changes, have, in our opinion, led to a reversal
of the tentative turnaround in net inflows seen in 2010. During
2011, net outflows excluding insurance assets totaled GBP1.3
billion versus GBP0.3 billion of net inflows in 2010. While we
continue to expect a difficult environment for fund flows, a
degree of certainty regarding the strategic direction of the
firm should help investor confidence," S&P said.

"F&C's focus on institutional assets (84% of AUM, including the
insurance assets) and fixed income (59% of AUM) results in a
relatively low average fee margin compared with peers. We
consider that operating margins and cash flow are weaker than
peers with a similar mix of institutional/fixed income AUM.
However, we note management's continued focus on cost alignment
and on expanding incremental profit margin (as opposed to fee
margin) through scalable products," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that F&C's debt
service and leverage metrics will not deteriorate over the one-
year outlook horizon. We consider that F&C's transition plan will
gradually, over the longer term, place its financial profile on a
more sustainable footing," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if we expect that debt service and
leverage measures will weaken. We could also lower the ratings if
we observe a substantial setback in fund flows. The ratings could
also come under pressure if F&C's strategic focus on
institutional clients fails to result in new mandates on a
consistent basis," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to positive if F&C demonstrates
progress on delivering on its strategic plan, and improving fund
flows and investment performance, combined with a material
improvement in its financial profile," S&P said.

DONAGHY LTD: In Provisional Liquidation; 175 Workers Lose Jobs
Press Association reports that Donaghy Limited has gone into
provisional liquidation with the loss of 175 jobs.  KPMG LLP were
appointed joint provisional liquidators of the company.

The company had been experiencing "severe cashflow pressures" due
to the economic downturn, the news agency says.

Donaghy Limited employed 185 full-time employees, around 20 of
which were office-based with the remainder site-based.

On Tuesday, the report says, 175 of the staff were made
redundant. The remaining 10 staff will help the provisional
liquidators to safeguard the company's assets, which mainly
comprise of plant and hire equipment and debtors, according to
the news agency.

"Despite Donaghy's strong reputation in the Scottish construction
sector, the business has unfortunately experienced an extremely
challenging trading period in recent months and throughout last
year, largely due to the well-publicised downturn in the
construction sector," the report quotes Blair Nimmo, joint
provisional liquidator and head of restructuring for KPMG in
Scotland, as saying.

"The business was experiencing declining margins as tenders
became increasingly competitive, ultimately leading to severe
cashflow pressures.  Regrettably, we had no option but to close
the business and to make most of the employees redundant."

Donaghy Limited was employed on more than 30 construction sites,
mainly across central Scotland, when it went into liquidation.

DUNEDIN INDEPENDENT: Goes Into Liquidation
The Herald Scotland reports that Dunedin Independent has been put
into liquidation less than two years after being acquired for
GBP4 million.

The report relates that Swiss based Helvetia Wealth took over the
Edinburgh firm in September 2010.

Then in July last year, Helvetia restructured its UK operations
with 16 Dunedin staff transferring over to Melville Independent
in the Scottish capital as the parent group positioned the
business towards a fee charging structure, according to The
Herald Scotland.

The remaining Dunedin employees were tasked with working on lower
value clients but the firm's investment portfolios have been
badly affected by falling UK property values, the report relays.

The Herald Scotland notes that as a result of the "untenable"
financial position KPMG was appointed as liquidator with the loss
of a small number of jobs.

The remaining Dunedin clients have been advised to contact the
Edinburgh office of the accountancy firm with any queries, the
report adds.

Dunedin Independent was once Scotland's largest privately-owned
independent financial advisers and managed around GBP350 million
of assets, the Herald Scotland discloses.

HELLAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Files for Chapter Bankruptcy
Dawn McCarty at Bloomberg News reports that Hellas
Telecommunications Luxembourg II SCA filed for Chapter 15
bankruptcy to put on hold certain lawsuits pending against the
company in New York State Supreme Court.

According to Bloomberg, the company, based in London, listed both
debt and assets of more than US$100 million in documents filed on
Thursday in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan.

"Chapter 15 recognition of the English proceeding would stay the
pending litigation (as against the company) and prevent the
petitioners from needlessly expending time and money defending
actions in which they may be the proper plaintiffs," Bloomberg
quotes Andrew Lawrence Hosking and Carl Jackson, authorized
foreign representatives of Hellas Telecommunications Luxembourg,
as saying in court papers.

The case is In re Hellas Telecommunications Luxembourg II SCA,
12-10631, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York

Hellas Telecommunications II SCA provides GSM mobile
telecommunications services and UMTS services in Greece.

MOTORCARE ELITE: FSA Probe on Worthless Insurance Policies
BBC News reports that financial regulators are investigating the
collapse of Motorcare Elite (2008), a car warranties firm which
they say has left some customers with worthless policies.

A BBC Wales investigation found some policies sold by Motorcare.

According to the report, the Llantwit Major-based firm was set up
by Harby Panesar, who appeared on TV when he spent a reported
GBP20,000 on his daughter's birthday party.  Now bankrupt, he
insists the policies were properly underwritten.

The BBC Wales consumer affairs programme X-Ray found that
Motorcare sold car breakdown warranties to car dealers who sold
them on to consumers, the report relates.

According to BBC News, the company said they were backed by
insurance underwriters, but after the firm collapsed it emerged
that some policies were not backed by insurance and were

The report relates that the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
has issued a statement saying: "If you were a customer of motor
breakdown insurance firm Motorcare Elite, there is the
possibility you were sold a policy which has now turned out to be

"Information we have seen suggests that when Motorcare sold some
policies to customers, it may have failed to properly register
their details and premiums," the FSA, as cited by BBC, said.

NORTHERN WHIG: Goes Into Receivership, Cuts 21 Jobs
The Press Association reports that PriceWaterhouseCoopers has
said some 21 commercial print workers have been made redundant in
Belfast after the Northern Whig Ltd went into receivership.

"Unfortunately the company's trading position has deteriorated,
due largely to declining turnover in the current difficult
economic climate. . . . Despite the efforts of the directors to
secure a way forward for the business, cashflow pressures led to
the business ceasing to trade last week, with all employees being
made redundant. . . .  Since our appointment our immediate
objective has been to determine the precise financial position of
the company, and to examine potential sale opportunities," the
report quoted receiver Stephen Cave as saying.

The Northern Whig was originally one of Ireland's oldest
newspapers.  Founded in 1824, the Whig published continuously
until it closed in 1963.

PEACOCKS: Has Only One Remaining Bidder for the Business
Jamie Grierson at The Scotsman reports that thousands of staff at
collapsed retailer Peacocks were facing further uncertainty on
Tuesday amid reports that only one company remained in the race
to salvage the firm.

The chain, which has 563 stores and 48 concessions, and parent
company, Peacock Group, collapsed under a debt mountain last
month in the biggest retail failure since Woolworths, placing
7,500 jobs in jeopardy, the Scotsman recounts.

According to the Scotsman, reports say that Indian textile and
clothing giant S Kumars Nationwide (SKNL) is understood to be the
only remaining suitor for the business after interest from bid
rivals Edinburgh Woollen Mill and Pakistani clothing giant
Alshair Fiyaz faded.

PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Inks Coryton Crude Supply Deal with Founder
Zaida Espana and Claire Milhench at Reuters report that British
refinery Coryton will continue to operate for at least three more
months after Marcel Van Poecke, a co-founder of insolvent owner
Petroplus Holdings AG, teamed up with Morgan Stanley and investor
KKR to provide fresh crude supplies.

According to Reuters, traders and analysts say that Coryton is
the most coveted asset of the five refineries owned by Petroplus
around Europe.  It has been running at half capacity since banks
stopped financing Petroplus in late December, Reuters discloses.

PwC, the company's UK administrator, said on Wednesday it had
signed a deal with Mr. Van Poecke's investment vehicle,
AtlastInvest, Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. and private
equity investor KKR Asset Management LLC for temporary relief,
Reuters relates.

Reuters notes that a PwC spokeswoman said the group will provide
crude to the plant, pay a fee for its refining services, and
retain ownership of the refined products.

Richard Howitt, member of the European parliament for Essex where
the plant is located, said in a statement that Coryton is a major
gasoline supplier in southeast England, and its closure would put
as many as 1,000 jobs at risk, according to Reuters.

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is Europe's
largest independent oil refiner.

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Seeks to Resolve Tax Dispute Quickly
Christopher Elser at Bloomberg News reports that Rangers soccer
club, the Scottish team that entered a form of bankruptcy on
Tuesday, will attempt to resolve its dispute with U.K. tax
authorities quickly.

"Our first priority has been to ensure that the football club
continues to function and this is being achieved with the help of
staff, players and management," Bloomberg quotes Paul Clark and
David Whitehouse, of the team's administrators, Duff and Phelps,
as saying.

The team's parent, Rangers Football Club Plc, went into
administration because of unpaid bills owed to the U.K.,
Bloomberg relates.

Owner Craig Whyte on Tuesday placed the club into administration
after HM Revenue & Customs went to court in Edinburgh to force
the move on its terms, which would have allowed the government to
appoint the executives overseeing the bankruptcy, Bloomberg

                  About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC --
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station,  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.

George Bevir at Broadcast reports that DCD Media has acquired the
brand, assets and senior management of post facility Sequence
Post-Production Ltd.

The London-based post house was put into voluntary liquidation at
the start of February after it ran into financial difficulties at
the end of last year, Broadcast relates.

Broadcast quotes Sequence founder Ben Foakes as saying that "the
business had lacked capital investment and business support.
Despite our recent circumstances, we are very pleased to have
been recognized by such an established group for our quality of

According to the report, Mr. Foakes said recently established
company DCD Post Production Ltd will trade as Sequence "to ensure
the smoothest transition possible back into work".

DCD Media chief executive David Green said the deal would boost
the independent production and distribution group's in-house
capabilities and "deliver added benefit across the group's
production operations".

The group's production companies include September, Prospect,
Matchlight, Rize USA, Westpark Pictures and DCD Pictures.

Sequence was set up in 2004.  In 2006, it opened a facility at
Pinewood Studios.  Sequence moved to its current Fitzrovia base
in 2010.

ST. LUKES: Goes Into Administration, Unable to Sell Business
The Independent reports that St Luke's Healthcare, which treats
and looks after adults and adolescents with mental health
problems and brain injuries, has gone into administration.

The director-owned group had recently been looking to revive
plans to sell out to private equity, a move that has been
abandoned twice due to the credit crunch and subsequent economic
downturn, according to The Independent.

The report relates that last year it had hoped to get
GBP100 million for its 14 facilities in London, Essex, Hampshire
and South Wales.

SUPREMA CONCEPTS: Class Creations Buys Firm Out of Administration
Baines & Ernst Corporate Limited were approached for advice by
Suprema Concepts Limited's Director, Mrs. Caroline Peebles Brown.
Suprema Concepts Limited was under increasing pressure from HM
Revenue & Customs over an historic debt relating to when the
business was purchased by Mrs. Peebles Brown in 2008.

HMRC were about to issue a Winding-Up Petition for Suprema
Concepts Limited to go into Compulsory Liquidation, with a likely
closure of the factory and the loss of 19 jobs.

On advice from Imogen Davidson, Insolvency Practitioner and
Director at Baines & Ernst Corporate, Mrs. Peebles Brown chose to
put Suprema Concepts Limited into Administration to protect it
from action by HMRC while a rescue plan could be formulated.

The company went into Administration on Jan. 27, 2012, with
Imogen Davidson appointed as Administrator.

Suprema Concepts Limited was working on a number of high profile
contracts at the point of entering Administration and these were
continued with no interruption to service.  In tandem with a
short period of successful trading, the business was marketed for
sale on a confidential basis, with a number of potential
investors expressing interest.  A sale of the business and assets
of Suprema Concepts Limited was completed on Feb. 3, 2012, to
Class Creations Limited, an existing company owned and managed by
Mrs. Peebles Brown.

All 19 staff were transferred to the purchaser on Feb. 3, 2012,
with no redundancies.

The staff and directors worked with the Administrator, Imogen
Davidson, to achieve a very successful outcome.  The business is
continuing to provide the same high quality service it has always
maintained.  It is also likely that creditors may receive a
dividend of up to 30p/GBP once the company's debtors are

Mrs. Davidson commented: "It is a successful outcome for all when
Administration works to save a business and protect staff jobs.
Customers were supportive of the Administration and are
continuing to work with the purchaser.  When you compare the
result to a Compulsory Liquidation, with the likely loss of all
staff jobs and a nil return to creditors, it is clear the right
decisions were made".

YELL GROUP: Internet Directories Unit Revenues Down 15.7%
Mark Wembridge at The Financial Times reports that Yell Group's
efforts to stem hemorrhaging sales appear to be faltering after
revenue declines from both print and online directories
accelerated in the third quarter.

The company is implementing a strategic about-face to reduce its
reliance on shrinking print revenues, switching its focus to
providing digital services to small businesses, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, in the face of intense competition from the
likes of Google, the debt-laden group on Tuesday reported that
revenues from its internet directories division had fallen by
15.7% year-on-year to GBP77.6 million in the three months ended
December 31 against a 9.7% fall in the first half.

Yell reported a 15.1% year-on-year fall in group revenues to
GBP382.8 million in the third quarter, but pre-tax profit almost
doubled to GBP16.6 million on the back of cost cuts, the FT

In December, Yell reached agreement with lenders over the terms
of its GBP2.6 billion net debt that gave it more headroom within
its banking covenants and more time to implement its turnaround
strategy, the FT recounts.

The agreement followed weeks of talks where two sets of lenders
clashed over the restructuring, and resulted in Yell agreeing to
pay GBP22 million in fees to the banks in return for the extra
flexibility on its loan covenants, the FT notes.

                         About Yell Group

Headquartered in Reading, England, Yell Group plc -- is an international directories
business operating in the classified advertising market through
printed, online, and phone media in the U.K. and the US.  Yell
also owns 100% of TPI (renamed "Yell Publicidad"), the largest
publisher of yellow and white pages in Spain, with operations in
certain countries in Latin America.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 27,
2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based classified directories
publisher Yell Group PLC to 'B-' from 'SD' (Selective Default).
The outlook is negative.  "The upgrade reflects our reassessment
of Yell's credit profile after the completion of its first subpar
debt repurchase on Jan. 19, 2012.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 13 to February 17, 2012

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency    Price
------                  ------    --------  --------    -----

BA CREDITANSTALT          5.470   8/28/2013      EUR     67.63
BAWAG                     5.310   2/12/2023      EUR     72.43
BAWAG                     5.430   2/26/2024      EUR     70.48
BAWAG                     5.400   2/12/2023      EUR     72.95
ERSTE BANK                6.000   7/31/2014      EUR     68.00
ERSTE BANK                6.000    2/1/2014      EUR     72.88
HAA-BANK INTL AG          5.270    4/7/2028      EUR     69.07
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR      3.79
KOMMUNALKREDIT            4.440  12/20/2030      EUR     60.00
KOMMUNALKREDIT            4.900   6/23/2031      EUR     63.75
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.810   7/29/2025      EUR     64.38
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.160   5/20/2025      EUR     67.93
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.750   4/30/2021      EUR     68.52
OESTER VOLKSBK            4.170   7/29/2015      EUR     65.50
OESTER VOLKSBK            5.270    2/8/2027      EUR     64.42
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           4.500   9/28/2035      EUR     56.04
RAIFF ZENTRALBK           5.470   2/28/2028      EUR     69.88

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR     19.91
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750    5/1/2018      EUR     68.00
IDEAL STANDARD I         11.750    5/1/2018      EUR     68.00
ONTEX IV                  9.000   4/15/2019      EUR     76.02

AVANGARDCO INVES         10.000  10/29/2015      USD     75.76
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   2/15/2017      EUR     63.25
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750   9/30/2015      EUR     73.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          3.750   11/1/2015      EUR     67.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.750   12/2/2015      EUR     72.18
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    1/2/2016      EUR     68.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   3/30/2016      EUR     67.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    6/2/2016      EUR     66.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.000    6/9/2016      EUR     69.10
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   7/11/2016      EUR     66.13
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   10/9/2016      EUR     64.88
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.600  10/26/2016      EUR     71.38
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    1/4/2017      EUR     63.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500    4/2/2017      EUR     62.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.600   4/15/2017      EUR     68.66
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.500   9/28/2017      EUR     60.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.100   1/29/2018      EUR     61.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   4/23/2018      EUR     59.00
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600  10/23/2018      EUR     57.63
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.600   2/26/2019      EUR     56.75
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100   6/24/2019      EUR     62.50
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          4.625    2/3/2020      EUR     55.73
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.100   4/20/2020      EUR     63.20
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          5.350    6/9/2020      EUR     59.39
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.000    6/9/2021      EUR     60.33
CYPRUS GOVT BOND          6.500   8/25/2021      EUR     61.53
MARFIN POPULAR            4.350  11/20/2014      EUR     55.38
REP OF CYPRUS             4.375   7/15/2014      EUR     77.21
REP OF CYPRUS             4.750   2/25/2016      EUR     67.04

FIN-DANISH IND            4.910    7/6/2021      EUR     63.75

KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR     50.85
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500   2/23/2017      ZAR     70.71
KOMMUNEKREDIT             0.500   1/25/2017      ZAR     71.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/21/2018      ZAR     62.55
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/21/2018      TRY     66.72
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR     64.51
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/16/2017      TRY     64.50
MUNI FINANCE PLC          1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR     70.32
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  12/21/2016      TRY     73.89
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   12/6/2016      TRY     74.83
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/17/2016      ZAR     72.52
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  10/27/2016      TRY     74.49
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR     72.51
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/10/2021      NZD     63.17
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  12/21/2021      NZD     63.75
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR     53.13
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   9/24/2020      CAD     69.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  12/20/2018      ZAR     63.34
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500  12/14/2018      TRY     66.56
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.500   3/17/2025      CAD     53.04
MUNI FINANCE PLC          0.250   6/28/2040      CAD     20.66

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR     11.15
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR      3.05
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR      5.01
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR     21.20
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR     53.16
BNP PARIBAS               2.890   5/16/2036      JPY     59.53
BNP PARIBAS              10.050   7/24/2012      USD     33.63
CALYON                    6.000   6/18/2047      EUR     16.37
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR     39.44
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR     30.03
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR     19.29
CLUB MEDITERRANE          5.000    6/8/2012      EUR     16.10
CMA CGM                   8.875   4/15/2019      EUR     52.67
CMA CGM                   8.500   4/15/2017      USD     53.00
CMA CGM                   8.500   4/15/2017      USD     51.67
CMA CGM                   8.875   4/15/2019      EUR     54.25
CNP ASSURANCES            6.000   9/14/2040      EUR     74.28
CREDIT LOCAL FRA          3.750   5/26/2020      EUR     62.44
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.110   9/18/2018      EUR     71.46
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.500   2/25/2020      EUR     66.99
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          4.550    4/2/2020      EUR     67.24
DEXIA CRED LOCAL          5.037    8/4/2020      EUR     68.21
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          2.875   4/23/2030      CHF     67.49
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          1.000  12/23/2024      EUR     64.06
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY          4.680    3/9/2029      CAD     70.45
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR     56.94
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375   4/15/2018      EUR     61.31
EUROPCAR GROUPE           9.375   4/15/2018      EUR     61.38
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR     23.12
GROUPAMA SA               7.875  10/27/2039      EUR     58.49
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR     44.70
IXIS CIB                  5.400    1/9/2033      EUR     72.60
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR     17.55
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR     18.68
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR     63.25
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR     43.82
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875    6/1/2018      EUR     71.09
PAGESJAUNES FINA          8.875    6/1/2018      EUR     70.50
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR     24.86
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR     70.31
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR     51.82
PUBLICIS GROUPE           3.125   7/30/2014      EUR     41.07
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR     20.89
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR      8.69
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR     54.22
THEOLIA                   2.700    1/1/2041      EUR      9.19

BAYERISCHE HYPO           5.000  12/21/2029      EUR     68.28
BAYERISCHE LNDBK          4.500    2/7/2019      EUR     71.68
BHW BAUSPARKASSE          4.270   1/15/2019      EUR     72.13
COMMERZBANK AG            5.625  11/29/2017      EUR     76.00
COMMERZBANK AG            6.300   3/15/2022      EUR     72.25
COMMERZBANK AG            6.360   3/15/2022      EUR     72.50
COMMERZBANK AG            6.460   6/24/2022      EUR     72.25
DEUTSCHE HYP HAN          5.300  11/20/2023      EUR     74.50
DRESDNER BANK AG          7.160   8/14/2024      EUR     68.38
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.700   7/31/2023      EUR     64.64
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.180   2/28/2023      EUR     65.38
DRESDNER BANK AG          6.210   6/20/2022      EUR     70.94
DRESDNER BANK AG          7.350   6/13/2028      EUR     65.75
DRESDNER BANK AG          5.290   5/31/2021      EUR     68.31
EUROHYPO AG               5.560   8/18/2023      EUR     70.50
EUROHYPO AG               5.110    8/6/2018      EUR     70.25
EUROHYPO AG               3.830   9/21/2020      EUR     62.75
GOTHAER ALLG VER          5.527   9/29/2026      EUR     74.97
HAPAG-LLOYD               9.750  10/15/2017      USD     88.63
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500   5/15/2018      EUR     65.38
HECKLER & KOCH            9.500   5/15/2018      EUR     65.76
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250   4/15/2018      EUR     66.38
HEIDELBERG DRUCK          9.250   4/15/2018      EUR     66.41
L-BANK FOERDERBK          0.500   5/10/2027      CAD     50.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.250  10/20/2015      EUR     26.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.500   1/30/2034      EUR     62.01
LB BADEN-WUERTT           2.800   2/23/2037      JPY     47.78
PRAKTIKER BAU-UN          5.875   2/10/2016      EUR     55.99
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR      0.89
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD      1.00
RHEINISCHE HYPBK          6.600   5/29/2022      EUR     74.13
SOLARWORLD AG             6.375   7/13/2016      EUR     59.89
SOLARWORLD AG             6.125   1/21/2017      EUR     58.49
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR      2.08
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR     51.34
TUI AG                    5.500  11/17/2014      EUR     73.78
VOLKSWAGEN BANK           5.400   9/26/2023      EUR     74.33
VOLKSWAGEN BANK           5.500    6/7/2024      EUR     73.23

HELLENIC REP I/L          2.900   7/25/2025      EUR     16.97
HELLENIC REP I/L          2.300   7/25/2030      EUR     16.77
HELLENIC REPUB            4.625   6/25/2013      USD     36.63
HELLENIC REPUB            2.125    7/5/2013      CHF     40.25
HELLENIC REPUB            4.590    4/8/2016      EUR     14.88
HELLENIC REPUB            5.000   3/11/2019      EUR     28.63
HELLENIC REPUB            6.140   4/14/2028      EUR     28.63
HELLENIC REPUB            5.200   7/17/2034      EUR     21.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700  11/10/2015      EUR     20.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500   9/20/2037      EUR     20.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.250   6/19/2020      EUR     19.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900  10/22/2022      EUR     20.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.161   9/17/2019      EUR     20.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500  10/22/2019      EUR     18.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.959    3/4/2019      EUR     21.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.000   7/19/2019      EUR     18.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.014   2/27/2019      EUR     20.05
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   7/20/2018      EUR     19.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.590    4/3/2018      EUR     19.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.675   10/9/2017      EUR     19.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300   7/20/2017      EUR     18.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.900   4/20/2017      EUR     18.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.225    3/1/2017      EUR     18.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.020   9/13/2016      EUR     18.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.600   7/20/2016      EUR     20.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.300   3/20/2012      EUR     36.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250   5/18/2012      EUR     26.34
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.250   6/20/2012      EUR     66.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI          1.000   6/30/2012      EUR     64.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.100   8/20/2012      EUR     23.34
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.506   3/31/2013      EUR     38.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   5/20/2013      EUR     20.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI          7.500   5/20/2013      EUR     28.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.900    7/3/2013      EUR     21.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.427   7/31/2013      EUR     31.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.000   8/20/2013      EUR     20.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.520   9/30/2013      EUR     24.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.500   1/11/2014      EUR     23.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500   5/20/2014      EUR     18.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.500    7/1/2014      EUR     21.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.500   8/20/2014      EUR     18.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.113   9/30/2014      EUR     21.34
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.700   7/20/2015      EUR     18.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI          6.100   8/20/2015      EUR     18.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI          3.702   9/30/2015      EUR     19.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.600   9/20/2040      EUR     20.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI          4.700   3/20/2024      EUR     20.12
HELLENIC REPUBLI          5.300   3/20/2026      EUR     18.78
NATL BK GREECE            3.875   10/7/2016      EUR     68.66
YIOULA GLASSWORK          9.000   12/1/2015      EUR     44.88
YIOULA GLASSWORK          9.000   12/1/2015      EUR     45.13

FHB MORTGAGE BAN          4.500   3/22/2022      EUR     59.25

AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.580   4/28/2028      EUR     54.37
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000   2/12/2030      EUR     48.81
AIB MORTGAGE BNK          5.000    3/1/2030      EUR     48.79
BANK OF IRELAND           5.600   9/18/2023      EUR     46.25
BANK OF IRELAND          10.000   2/12/2020      EUR     60.50
BANK OF IRELAND           4.473  11/30/2016      EUR     67.88
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.450    3/1/2030      EUR     50.75
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.360  10/12/2029      EUR     50.43
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.400   11/6/2029      EUR     50.68
BK IRELAND MTGE           5.760    9/7/2029      EUR     53.42
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125   3/16/2037      USD     70.00
DEPFA ACS BANK            0.500    3/3/2025      CAD     36.90
DEPFA ACS BANK            4.900   8/24/2035      CAD     69.58
DEPFA ACS BANK            5.125   3/16/2037      USD     70.00
DEPFA ACS BANK            3.250   7/31/2031      CHF     74.82
UT2 FUNDING PLC           5.321   6/30/2016      EUR     71.02

BANCA MARCHE              4.000   5/26/2021      EUR     74.20
BANCA MARCHE              3.600  11/12/2020      EUR     73.84
BANCA MARCHE              5.500   9/16/2030      EUR     69.55
BANCA POP VICENT          4.970   4/20/2027      EUR     70.14
BTPS I/L                  2.350   9/15/2035      EUR     73.59
BTPS I/L                  2.550   9/15/2041      EUR     74.66
CIR SPA                   5.750  12/16/2024      EUR     77.35
CITY OF ROME              5.345   1/27/2048      EUR     73.99
CITY OF VENICE            4.265   3/26/2026      EUR     72.95
CITY OF VENICE            4.265   3/26/2026      EUR     73.39
CO BRAONE                 4.567   6/30/2037      EUR     70.58
CO CASTELMASSA            3.960   3/31/2026      EUR     70.48
COMUNE DI MILANO          4.019   6/29/2035      EUR     62.31
ICCREA BANCAIMPR          5.220   4/11/2017      EUR     61.50
REGION OF CAMPAN          4.849   6/29/2026      EUR     75.00
REGION OF LIGURI          4.795  11/22/2034      EUR     71.01
REGION OF LOMBAR          5.804  10/25/2032      USD     76.31
REGION OF UMBRIA          5.087   6/15/2037      EUR     73.86
REP OF ITALY              4.850   6/11/2060      EUR     71.98
REP OF ITALY              2.870   5/19/2036      JPY     45.70
REP OF ITALY              1.850   9/15/2057      EUR     54.34
REP OF ITALY              2.200   9/15/2058      EUR     61.30
REP OF ITALY              5.250   12/7/2034      GBP     71.58
REP OF ITALY              2.000   9/15/2062      EUR     55.97
ROMULUS FINANCE           5.441   2/20/2023      GBP     64.93
SANPAOLO IMI              5.625   3/18/2024      GBP     77.50
SEAT PAGINE              10.500   1/31/2017      EUR     61.00
TELECOM ITALIA            5.250   3/17/2055      EUR     72.09
UBI BANCA SPCA            6.250  11/18/2018      EUR     49.20
UNIPOL ASSICURAZ          5.660   7/28/2023      EUR     67.04

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR     24.51
CONTROLINVESTE            3.000   1/28/2015      EUR     71.76
ESFG INTERNATION          6.875  10/21/2019      EUR     60.29
INTRALOT LUX SA           2.250  12/20/2013      EUR     67.96
LIGHTHOUSE INTL           8.000   4/30/2014      EUR     13.00
UBI BANCA INT             8.750  10/29/2012      EUR     72.73

APP INTL FINANCE         11.750   10/1/2005      USD      0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   9/15/2016      TRY     71.81
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500    3/3/2021      NZD     69.59
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   5/25/2016      TRY     73.27
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   3/29/2021      NZD     69.33
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   5/12/2021      ZAR     46.86
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   6/22/2021      ZAR     46.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   4/27/2016      TRY     73.63
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   3/17/2016      TRY     74.18
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   2/24/2025      CAD     63.92
BK NED GEMEENTEN          0.500   6/22/2016      TRY     72.90
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500   5/15/2014      USD     27.00
BLT FINANCE BV            7.500   5/15/2014      USD     27.10
BRIT INSURANCE            6.625   12/9/2030      GBP     56.93
EDP FINANCE BV            4.125   6/29/2020      EUR     73.62
FRIESLAND BANK            4.210  12/29/2025      EUR     70.76
ING BANK NV               4.200  12/19/2035      EUR     65.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.870   10/8/2013      USD     34.50
NATL INVESTER BK         25.983    5/7/2029      EUR     16.35
NED WATERSCHAPBK          0.500   3/11/2025      CAD     60.23
NIB CAPITAL BANK          4.510  12/16/2035      EUR     59.78
PORTUGAL TEL FIN          4.500   6/16/2025      EUR     65.11
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   2/28/2012      EUR     28.12
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR     19.47
RABOBANK                  0.500  10/27/2016      ZAR     72.27
RABOBANK                  0.500  11/26/2021      ZAR     46.64
RBS NV                    3.588  11/16/2030      USD     71.00
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          2.910   6/21/2036      JPY     62.14
RBS NV EX-ABN NV          6.500   5/17/2018      AUD     74.75
SNS BANK                  4.650  10/19/2021      EUR     73.05
SNS BANK                  5.300   1/27/2023      EUR     74.47
SNS BANK                  5.215   12/3/2027      EUR     66.09
SNS BANK                  5.250   4/11/2023      EUR     73.37
SNS BANK                  6.625   5/14/2018      EUR     85.78
SNS BANK                  6.250  10/26/2020      EUR     76.95
SNS BANK                  4.580   3/20/2026      EUR     63.21
SRLEV NV                  9.000   4/15/2041      EUR     75.65
TJIWI KIMIA FIN          13.250    8/1/2001      USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS             1.570   2/14/2018      JPY     72.81
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   7/29/2016      ZAR     72.72
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR     74.87
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   5/25/2016      ZAR     73.82
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   7/26/2016      ZAR     72.80
KOMMUNALBANKEN            0.500   5/25/2018      ZAR     61.84
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.000   6/26/2017      EUR     66.13
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125  10/15/2033      USD     55.00
NORSKE SKOGIND            7.125  10/15/2033      USD     55.00
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR     64.64
RENEWABLE CORP            9.750    5/3/2018      NOK     71.22

REP OF POLAND             2.648   3/29/2034      JPY     74.30

BANCO COM PORTUG          3.750   10/8/2016      EUR     71.20
BANCO COM PORTUG          4.750   6/22/2017      EUR     71.72
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600   1/26/2017      EUR     72.68
BANCO ESPIRITO            4.600   9/15/2016      EUR     74.79
BRISA                     4.500   12/5/2016      EUR     66.48
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.250   1/27/2020      EUR     71.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.320    8/5/2021      EUR     62.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          5.380   10/1/2038      EUR     53.97
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.455   8/20/2017      EUR     71.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO          4.400   10/8/2019      EUR     62.38
COMBOIOS DE PORT          4.170  10/16/2019      EUR     45.90
METRO DE LISBOA           5.750    2/4/2019      EUR     55.13
METRO DE LISBOA           7.300  12/23/2025      EUR     45.25
METRO DE LISBOA           4.061   12/4/2026      EUR     44.25
METRO DE LISBOA           4.799   12/7/2027      EUR     39.75
MONTEPIO GERAL            5.000    2/8/2017      EUR     61.75
PARPUBLICA                4.191  10/15/2014      EUR     69.13
PARPUBLICA                4.200  11/16/2026      EUR     42.63
PARPUBLICA                3.567   9/22/2020      EUR     45.38
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500   3/25/2015      USD     70.59
PORTUGAL (REP)            3.500   3/25/2015      USD     70.59
PORTUGUESE OT'S           6.400   2/15/2016      EUR     73.40
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.100   4/15/2037      EUR     46.21
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.950  10/25/2023      EUR     53.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.350  10/15/2015      EUR     69.79
PORTUGUESE OT'S           3.850   4/15/2021      EUR     55.18
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.200  10/15/2016      EUR     64.86
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.350  10/16/2017      EUR     60.03
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.800   6/15/2020      EUR     56.01
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.750   6/14/2019      EUR     57.13
PORTUGUESE OT'S           4.450   6/15/2018      EUR     58.36
REFER                     4.250  12/13/2021      EUR     30.75
REFER                     4.047  11/16/2026      EUR     39.93
REFER                     5.875   2/18/2019      EUR     46.75
REFER                     4.000   3/16/2015      EUR     42.00
REFER                     4.675  10/16/2024      EUR     39.93

ARIZK                     3.000  12/20/2030      RUB     51.84
DVTG-FINANS               7.750   7/18/2013      RUB     20.29
DVTG-FINANS              17.000   8/29/2013      RUB     55.55
MIRAX                    17.000   9/17/2012      RUB     20.21
MOSMART FINANS            0.010   4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
NOK                      12.500   8/26/2014      RUB      5.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA          1.000  12/17/2012      RUB      0.02
PROTON-FINANCE            9.000   6/12/2012      RUB     65.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000   4/23/2015      RUB     74.00
RBC OJSC                  3.270   4/19/2018      RUB     45.00
RBC OJSC                  7.000   4/23/2015      RUB     74.00
SATURN                    8.000    6/6/2014      RUB      2.02
SERBIA T-BONDS            5.850   2/16/2026      EUR     74.25

AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.750   5/25/2027      EUR     63.38
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.250  10/25/2023      EUR     65.81
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750  12/14/2022      EUR     63.75
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          4.000   3/24/2021      EUR     73.42
AYT CEDULAS CAJA          3.750   6/30/2025      EUR     57.03
AYUNTAM DE MADRD          4.550   6/16/2036      EUR     64.21
BANCAJA                   1.500   5/22/2018      EUR     65.50
BANCAJA EMI SA            2.755   5/11/2037      JPY     72.44
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          6.025    3/3/2033      EUR     57.92
BANCO BILBAO VIZ          4.500   2/16/2022      EUR     71.97
BANCO CASTILLA            1.500   6/23/2021      EUR     64.73
BASQUE GOV'T              4.600    1/7/2025      EUR     73.62
BBVA SUB CAP UNI          2.750  10/22/2035      JPY     50.92
CAIXA TERRASSA            4.700    8/9/2021      EUR     49.41
CAJA MADRID               4.125   3/24/2036      EUR     68.11
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          4.250   4/10/2031      EUR     54.51
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO          3.875   5/23/2025      EUR     59.60
CEDULAS TDA A-4           4.125   4/10/2021      EUR     73.72
CEDULAS TDA A-5           4.250   3/28/2027      EUR     58.56
COMUN AUTO CANAR          4.200  10/25/2036      EUR     49.05
COMUN AUTO CANAR          5.750  10/15/2029      EUR     72.61
COMUN AUTO CANAR          3.900  11/30/2035      EUR     48.44
COMUN NAVARRA             4.000  11/23/2021      EUR     70.60
COMUNIDAD ARAGON          4.470   7/12/2021      EUR     71.23
COMUNIDAD ARAGON          4.815  10/10/2022      EUR     70.12
COMUNIDAD ARAGON          4.646   7/11/2036      EUR     53.87
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          4.063  11/23/2035      EUR     45.79
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          3.869  11/23/2020      EUR     63.69
COMUNIDAD BALEAR          4.796    3/4/2020      EUR     70.72
COMUNIDAD MADRID          4.300   9/15/2026      EUR     73.31
DIPUTACION FOR            4.323  12/29/2023      EUR     64.49
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.219   9/10/2029      EUR     60.92
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.325   10/5/2028      EUR     63.29
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.900   5/20/2024      EUR     71.61
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.250   10/5/2023      EUR     68.01
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.900   9/15/2021      EUR     70.75
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.801   7/31/2020      EUR     72.53
GEN DE CATALUNYA          6.350  11/30/2041      EUR     66.63
GEN DE CATALUNYA          2.965    9/8/2039      JPY     49.41
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.220   4/26/2035      EUR     49.50
GEN DE CATALUNYA          4.690  10/28/2034      EUR     54.01
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.950   10/1/2030      EUR     66.03
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.900   5/28/2030      EUR     66.57
GEN DE CATALUNYA          5.400   5/13/2030      EUR     61.99
GENERAL DE ALQUI          2.750   8/20/2012      EUR     71.35
GENERAL VALENCIA          4.900   3/17/2020      EUR     61.13
GENERAL VALENCIA          3.250    7/6/2015      EUR     72.38
GENERAL VALENCIA          4.000   11/2/2016      EUR     79.13
GENERAL VALENCIA          5.900  11/30/2032      EUR     56.63
IM CEDULAS 10             4.500   2/21/2022      EUR     74.49
IM CEDULAS 5              3.500   6/15/2020      EUR     72.41
IM CEDULAS 7              4.000   3/31/2021      EUR     74.74
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          2.100   2/23/2021      JPY     73.41
INSTIT CRDT OFCL          3.250   6/28/2024      CHF     74.82
INSTITUT CATALA           4.250   6/15/2024      EUR     61.79
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.000   7/13/2022      EUR     69.67
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.170   7/29/2039      JPY     53.01
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           3.065   7/29/2039      JPY     51.69
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.150   5/24/2034      EUR     55.40
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           6.600  11/29/2030      EUR     69.14
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           4.250  10/31/2036      EUR     46.45
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           5.700   7/20/2028      EUR     64.09
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           4.125   1/20/2020      EUR     71.56
JUNTA ANDALUCIA           4.850   3/17/2020      EUR     74.80
JUNTA CASTILLA            4.650   11/8/2022      EUR     66.10
JUNTA LA MANCHA           5.800   1/30/2021      EUR     71.50
JUNTA LA MANCHA           3.875   1/31/2036      EUR     32.63
JUNTA LA MANCHA           4.625  11/30/2022      EUR     57.38
JUNTA LA MANCHA           2.810  10/14/2022      JPY     67.25
JUNTA LA MANCHA           5.950    9/9/2030      EUR     51.27
JUNTA LA MANCHA           7.705   2/15/2033      EUR     62.25
JUNTA LA MANCHA           6.000   1/15/2021      EUR     71.63
JUNTA LA MANCHA           4.875   3/18/2020      EUR     68.75
JUNTA LA MANCHA           6.000   1/31/2021      EUR     72.85
MAPFRE SA                 5.921   7/24/2037      EUR     69.08
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR     67.93
SANTANDER ISSUAN          5.750   1/31/2018      GBP     73.34
SANTANDER ISSUAN          6.533  10/24/2017      GBP     76.71
XUNTA DE GALICIA          4.025  11/28/2035      EUR     46.70
XUNTA DE GALICIA          5.350  11/22/2028      EUR     63.14

SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   1/25/2028      USD     52.84
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500  12/17/2027      USD     53.33
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   2/22/2022      ZAR     47.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   1/31/2022      ZAR     51.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/26/2021      AUD     63.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/25/2021      ZAR     49.30
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   9/30/2016      ZAR     72.03
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/26/2016      ZAR     72.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   8/25/2016      ZAR     72.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   6/29/2016      TRY     71.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   6/14/2016      ZAR     73.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500  11/27/2015      TRY     74.61
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500   6/12/2012      USD      7.49
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.250   4/27/2012      USD      8.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED          9.750   3/23/2012      USD      8.82
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000    3/9/2012      USD     10.56
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.000    3/9/2012      USD     10.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED          7.500   2/28/2012      USD      9.51
SWEDISH EXP CRED          0.500   9/20/2016      ZAR     72.15

CRED SUIS NY              8.000   1/25/2013      USD     48.69
UBS AG                   11.760   7/31/2012      USD     27.51
UBS AG                   12.040   7/31/2012      USD     23.69
UBS AG                    9.500   8/10/2012      USD     28.25
UBS AG                    8.650   8/29/2012      USD     33.17
UBS AG                    9.430   8/31/2012      USD     33.74
UBS AG                   13.340  10/24/2012      USD     46.27
UBS AG                    9.400   8/23/2013      USD     54.92
UBS AG                    9.650   8/23/2013      USD     33.90
UBS AG                   13.830  12/17/2013      USD     20.11
UBS AG                   10.960   7/20/2012      USD     22.14
UBS AG                   13.700   5/23/2012      USD     13.57
UBS AG                   13.300   5/23/2012      USD      3.45
UBS AG                   10.070   3/23/2012      USD     35.42
UBS AG                    9.250   3/20/2012      USD     14.18
UBS AG                    8.720   3/20/2012      USD     32.11
UBS AG                    8.380   3/20/2012      USD     26.93
UBS AG                   12.400   3/14/2012      USD     11.51
UBS AG JERSEY             3.220   7/31/2012      EUR     41.97

ABBEY NATL PLC            6.500  10/21/2030      GBP     73.43
ALLIANC&LEIC BLD          5.875   8/14/2031      GBP     73.16
ALPHA CREDIT GRP          6.000   6/20/2014      EUR     69.50
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250   2/15/2018      GBP     75.50
BAKKAVOR FIN 2            8.250   2/15/2018      GBP     75.00
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.359   3/27/2029      JPY     59.54
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.408    2/9/2027      JPY     64.65
BANK OF SCOTLAND          2.340  12/28/2026      JPY     65.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/28/2012      USD     10.38
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.500  10/16/2012      USD     10.69
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/11/2012      USD     10.61
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   9/11/2012      USD     10.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000   8/28/2012      USD     10.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.800   7/31/2012      USD     24.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.500   7/27/2012      USD      9.38
BARCLAYS BK PLC           7.000   7/27/2012      USD      9.63
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   7/20/2012      USD      8.49
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/29/2012      USD      9.67
BARCLAYS BK PLC          12.950   4/20/2012      USD     23.40
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000  10/16/2012      USD     10.60
BARCLAYS BK PLC          14.000   10/1/2012      USD     10.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC           9.000   10/1/2012      USD     10.10
BRADFORD&BIN BLD          4.910    2/1/2047      EUR     69.33
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.875   3/28/2033      GBP     68.34
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.750   12/2/2024      GBP     69.99
CO-OPERATIVE BNK          5.625  11/16/2021      GBP     71.75
EFG HELLAS PLC            5.400   11/2/2047      EUR     22.13
EFG HELLAS PLC            6.010    1/9/2036      EUR     30.13
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.100   12/9/2021      EUR     36.75
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          4.350   7/22/2014      EUR     60.63
EMPORIKI GRP FIN          5.000   12/2/2021      EUR     36.38
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875    5/9/2025      GBP     65.75
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.375   9/26/2031      GBP     64.94
ENTERPRISE INNS           6.875   2/15/2021      GBP     69.25
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD     54.16
EX-IM BK OF UKRA          5.793    2/9/2016      USD     77.98
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500    6/1/2019      GBP     69.17
GALA ELECTRIC CA         11.500    6/1/2019      GBP     68.88
HBOS PLC                  6.000   11/1/2033      USD     54.89
HBOS PLC                  4.375  10/30/2019      EUR     75.49
HBOS PLC                  6.000   11/1/2033      USD     54.89
HBOS PLC                  5.374   6/30/2021      EUR     68.88
HBOS PLC                  4.500   3/18/2030      EUR     65.26
LBG CAPITAL NO.2          8.500    6/7/2032      GBP     73.89
MATALAN                   9.625   3/31/2017      GBP     60.50
MATALAN                   9.625   3/31/2017      GBP     59.75
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD     47.43
NOMURA BANK INTL          0.800  12/21/2020      EUR     65.21
OTE PLC                   7.250    4/8/2014      EUR     66.35
OTE PLC                   4.625   5/20/2016      EUR     60.14
OTE PLC                   5.000    8/5/2013      EUR     71.08
PRIVATBANK                5.799    2/9/2016      USD     67.61
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          2.300  11/26/2024      JPY     72.88
ROYAL BK SCOTLND          5.168   6/29/2030      EUR     57.11
SPIRIT ISSUER             5.472  12/28/2028      GBP     71.71
THOMAS COOK GR            6.750   6/22/2015      EUR     44.30
THOMAS COOK GR            7.750   6/22/2017      GBP     42.25
UNIQUE PUB FIN            6.464   3/30/2032      GBP     38.20
UNIQUE PUB FIN            5.659   6/30/2027      GBP     72.17
WESSEX WATER FIN          1.499  11/29/2058      GBP     71.88
WESSEX WATER FIN          1.369   7/31/2057      GBP     71.59


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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