TCREUR_Public/120329.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, March 29, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 64

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

OGX AUSTRIA: Moody's Rates US$1-Bil. Sr. Unsecured Notes 'B1'


A Z E R B A I J A N

TECHNIKABANK: Moody's Reviews 'B3/E+' Ratings for Downgrade
UNIBANK COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B'


F I N L A N D

STORA ENSO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

NOVEMBER AG: Cologne Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings
PFLEIDERER AG: To File for Insolvency; Restructuring Plan Blocked
SMP DEUTCHLAND: Fitch Publishes 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Central Bank Winds Up Three Small Cooperative Banks


I C E L A N D

OSWESTRY ACQUICO: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: CB Says Promissory Notes Source of Financial Risk
LOMBARD STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'


I T A L Y

MONDOMUTUI CARIPARMA: S&P Lowers Collection Acct. Rating to 'BB+'
* ITALY: Moody's Says Jan. Leasing ABS Performance Deteriorated


N E T H E R L A N D S

ZIGGO BOND: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'Ba1'; Outlook Stable


R O M A N I A

MURFATLAR: Constanta Court Approves Insolvency Bid
* ROMANIA: Corporate Insolvencies Up 10% in 2011


R U S S I A

MTS BANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
ROSBANK OJSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings From 'BB+/B'
SBERBANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
SKB-BANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion


S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C

* SLOVAK REPUBLIC: Moody's Changes Banking System Outlook to Neg.


S P A I N

TDA 25: S&P Affirms Ratings on Three Note Classes at 'D'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: To Delist Shares; Gets Bankruptcy Reprieve


U K R A I N E

AVANGARDCO INVESTMENTS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ITV PLC: Fitch Lifts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
LONDON & WESTCOUNTRY: Blames Collapse on RBS Mis-selling of Swaps
PREMIER FOODS: Moody's Withdraws 'B3' Corporate Family Rating


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Eurozone Needs to Double Bailout Fund, OECD Head Says
* Moody's Says Weak Demand Weighs on Global Paper Companies


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OGX AUSTRIA: Moody's Rates US$1-Bil. Sr. Unsecured Notes 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B1 rating to OGX Austria
GmbH's proposed US$1 billion senior unsecured notes due 2022. The
proposed notes will be guaranteed by OGX Petroleo e Gas
Participacoes S.A. (OGX), OGX Petroleo e Gas Ltda. and OGX Campos
Petroleo e Gas S.A. At the same time, Moody's affirmed OGX's B1
Corporate Family Rating with a stable outlook.

"While OGX's rating outlook remains stable, flexibility within
the B1 rating has been diminished by higher debt levels and
moderate project delays and cost increases," commented Gretchen
French, Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst. "However, with
first oil now on-line, the company is no longer pre-operational,
increased production diversity is expected in 2012, and a
supportive oil price environment should benefit operating cash
flows."

Ratings Rationale

OGX's B1 Corporate Family Rating is supported by the company's
large, world scale resource base, which provides excellent
reserves and production growth potential, energy sector
experienced management team and board, and solid liquidity
position. The rating is restrained by the company's still early
stage development status, with only one well producing and no
proven reserves, large up-front capital spending, with high
staging and execution risk, early stage small scale and
concentrated production operations through the third quarter of
2013, and high front-end leverage, with lack of free cash flow
until 2014.

OGX's resource base provides excellent reserves and production
growth potential more indicative of an investment grade profile.
As of December 31, 2010, based on volumetric reservoir estimates,
third-party engineering firm DeGolyer and MacNaughton has
estimated net 2C contingent resources of approximately 0.7
billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). These resources are
primarily oil resources located in the Campos Basin, but also
include a relatively smaller amount of natural gas resources in
the ParnaĦba Basin. However, none of these barrels are classified
as proven reserves under SEC definitions and the company
currently only has one producing well. First oil production was
only recently achieved in January of 2012 from the Waimea Complex
in the Campos Basin.

Moody's expects a portion of OGX's contingent resources will be
converted to proven reserves after the company submits a
declaration of commerciality for the Waimea accumulation to the
Brazilian National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuel Agency
(ANP), which is expected to occur in the second quarter of 2012.
In addition, the company expects to submit a declaration of
commerciality for the Waikiki Complex in the second half of 2012.
By year-end 2012, Moody's expects around 84-120 million boe will
in contingent resources will be converted to proven reserves.

OGX's first oil came online three months behind the previous
October 2011 target, as the company experienced delays in receipt
of approval from the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and
Natural Renewable Resources (IBAMA) for environmental licenses to
install and operate the offshore production facilities in the
Campos Basin, as well as certain weather delays. Management
expects production of around 10-13 thousand barrels per day (bpd)
from its first producing well, which is on the lower side of the
company's original estimated range of 10-20 thousand bpd, as the
company appears to be choking back production levels in order to
preserve reservoir pressure and prevent premature water
breakthrough, consistent with reservoir management best
practices.

Moody's expects production from the Waimea complex to average
just under 23 thousand bpd in 2012 from the connection of two
additional horizontal wells in the future, and two injection
wells. These three producing wells represent significant
production concentration over the next 12-18 months. While the
company expects to have 11 horizontal production wells on-stream
and up to 150,000 bpd of oil production by year-end 2013,
significant production ramp up isn't expected until after the
third quarter of 2013. The company's production ramp up schedule
faces inherent staging and execution risk, as well as geological
risk, including water encroachment risk, reservoir rock quality,
and unknown production decline curves.

OGX has modified its development plan somewhat, due to material
delays in the construction of two wellhead platforms, which are
being constructed in Brazil by Techint. As a result of the
wellhead platform delays, OGX expects to solely utilize three
FPSOs through 2013 (OSX-1, the first FPSO, has been on-stream
since January and two additional FPSOs are currently under
construction), which will require more costly subsea completions
(around US$50 million per well), as opposed to cheaper dry
completions on the wellhead platform (which cost around US$20
million per well). Moody's notes that the modified development
plan should enable OGX to still meet its production ramp up
forecast through year-end 2013.

The company's operating costs and capital spending trajectory has
risen above original expectations, due to the revised development
plan discussed above, increased exploration spending, including
spending in the pre-salt in the Santos Basin, higher than
projected operating lease costs on its FPSOs, and costs incurred
to buy out a 20% stake from Maersk's in blocks BM-C-37 and BM-C-
38 in the Campos Basin, and become operator of the two blocks. As
a result, Moody's assumption of cash flow deficits has increased
by $1.5 billion, even with Moody's assumption of a supportive oil
price outlook benefiting operating cash flows and assuming no
material delays in OGX's production ramp up forecast through
year-end 2013.

OGX continues to have a solid liquidity position. The company
should have sufficient liquidity over the near to medium term
following the proposed notes issuance. Balance sheet cash will be
the primary funding source for its exploration and development
initiatives through 2013 given limited anticipated production and
internal cash flow generation. At December 31, 2011 and pro forma
for the proposed US$1 billion notes issuance, the company had
approximately US$3.9 billion of cash and cash equivalents. The
company also had US$28 million in marketable securities at
December 31, 2011.

Due to the high level of unsecured debt in the total capital
structure of OGX, the proposed notes are rated B1, the same level
as the Corporate Family Rating. The OGX subsidiary guarantees of
the proposed notes comprise over 75% of OGX's resources. OGX
Maranhao Petroleo e Gas Ltda., which holds the interest in the
Parnaiba blocks, is not a guarantor of the senior notes. In
January 2012, OGX Maranhao entered into three secured loans for
R$600 million (US$331 million) in order to finance the
development of the Parnaiba Basin. These loans are guaranteed by
OGX and affiliate company MPX. While the secured debt at OGX
Maranhao is not sufficiently large enough to result in notching
considerations for the senior notes, if OGX were to incur
material levels of secured debt in the future, the notes could
face notching pressure down from the Corporate Family Rating.

The B1 ratings and stable rating outlook remain highly
prospective and assume reasonable achievement of production
forecasts over the next 12-18 months. The company faces
significant staging and execution risk in achieving its
production growth targets.

The B1 rating could face positive momentum going forward based on
the production and proven reserve growth potential from OGX's
large resource base. Success in meeting production growth targets
in 2012 and substantial progress on the construction of the two
additional FPSOs and wellhead platforms could result in positive
rating action.

Material delays or production shortfalls (worse than Moody's
stress case scenario of a six month delay) or diminished
liquidity could result in negative pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in rating OGX was the Global
Independent Exploration and Production Industry Methodology
published in December 2011.

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, OGX is one of the largest
independent exploration and production companies in Latin
America.


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TECHNIKABANK: Moody's Reviews 'B3/E+' Ratings for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
B3 long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings and E+
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR, mapping to B3 on
the long-term scale) of Azerbaijan-based Technikabank.

The rating announcement follows a public news report from an
Azerbaijan news agency on March 14 that the bank's chairman of
the supervisory board was arrested over allegations of fraud.

Ratings Rationale

-- REVIEW OF TECHNIKABANK'S RATINGS

Moody's decision to place Technikabank's ratings on review for
downgrade follows a public news report that the bank's minority
shareholder -- also acting as the bank's chairman of the
supervisory board -- Mr. Etibar Aliyev, was arrested over
allegations of fraud.

Moody's notes that these developments could have negative
implications for the bank's creditworthiness; namely, there is a
risk that Technikabank's liquidity profile might deteriorate as a
result of weaker relationships between the bank and its key
customers.

As no public statements were made either by local law enforcement
authorities or the Central Bank of Azerbaijan regarding
Technikabank's possible involvement in this case, Moody's
incorporates a degree of information risk into its rating
assessment of Technikabank.

-- FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

Over the next few months, Moody's will monitor the implications
of the reported arrest of the bank's chairman of the supervisory
board on Technikabank's liquidity, financial performance and
customer base.

Moody's says that Technikabank's ratings could face downward
pressure if the prolonged uncertainty with regards of allegations
-- or further negative publicity surrounding the bank -- lead to
material negative implications for the bank's liquidity, business
franchise and its financial fundamentals.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Domiciled in Baku, Azerbaijan, Technikabank reported -- as at end
February 2012 -- total assets of US$800 million and shareholders'
equity of US$101 million, according to non-audited local GAAP.


UNIBANK COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Azebaijan-based Unibank Commercial
Bank (UB) and Demirbank's (Demir) Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) to 'B' from 'B-'.  At the same time, Fitch has
affirmed Technikabank (TB) and AGBank's (AGB) Long-term IDRs at
'B-'.  The Outlooks on all four banks are Stable.

The upgrades of UB and Demir reflects Fitch's acknowledgement of
their relatively sound credit profiles in the post-crisis
environment, as reflected by either better asset quality metrics
(in the case of Demir) or greater loss absorption capacity (UB)
compared to peers.  Although both banks' profitability has been
notably reduced relative to pre-crisis levels, they have
continued to generate profits on a cash basis, while accumulated
problem loans have been properly recognized and prudently
reserved.

In Fitch's view, UB and Demir also have somewhat sounder
corporate governance than peers, translating into greater
transparency, lower related party lending and lesser accounting
risks.  Cooperation with international financial institutions
(which hold minority stakes in both banks) has also been
beneficial in terms of capital and liquidity replenishment, in
particular for Unibank.

The ratings of TB and AGB continue to reflect their weaker credit
metrics, in particular significant unreserved non-performing
loans (NPLs) and potential for further NPL recognition from
restructured loans, combined with only moderate capacity to
absorb additional credit losses.  The quality of their capital
and reported profits is also undermined by the high proportion of
accrued interest income not received in cash (particularly in the
case of AGB).

However, Fitch notes that asset quality pressures have abated
somewhat at both banks, and the currently supportive operating
environment is allowing them to gradually absorb accumulated
problems through business growth.  Strong deposit inflows are
also supporting sector liquidity, and allowing the banks to
manage refinancing needs.

Upward potential for the ratings of all four banks is currently
constrained by their limited franchises and generally high
balance sheet concentrations, resulting in weak financial
flexibility.  Additional challenges arise from the generally high
risk profiles of local borrowers and the cyclical oil-dependent
economy, which is potentially vulnerable to external shocks.

Downward pressure on the ratings could emerge in the case of
deterioration in the operating environment, which would be
particularly sensitive for banks that demonstrated high growth
rates in 2011 (above 20% in the case of UB, AGB and TB).
Increased competition in the retail segment, which is the focus
of business development for all four banks, may also be
detrimental to the banks' credit profiles through margin
compression and potential loosening of underwriting standards.

Downward pressure on TB's profile additionally arises from its
high exposure to the construction sector (which exceeded the
bank's equity at end-2011), the poor liquidity of its corporate
loan book (which is dominated by project-finance loans with
significant grace periods) and some corporate governance concerns
due to low transparency in respect to ultimate shareholder
control of the bank.  Unlike its peers, TB has not received fresh
equity during the past four years, and the shareholders' capacity
for capital replenishment cannot be assessed.

The rating actions are as follows:

AGB

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Demir

  -- Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

UB

  -- Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

TB

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'


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STORA ENSO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all of its credit
ratings on Finland-based forest products group Stora Enso Oyj,
including the 'BB' long-term corporate credit rating. The outlook
is stable.

"The affirmation follows an announcement by Stora Enso on
March 20, 2012, that it intends to build a EUR1.6 billion
consumer board and pulp mill in China. The mill will be 85% owned
by Stora Enso and the balance by local partners. The affirmation
primarily reflects our assumption that the group's credit metrics
will not weaken significantly beyond levels that we had already
factored into the ratings as we already expected higher
investment levels. This is further supported by our current near-
term industry outlook of only moderate average variations in
volumes and selling prices compared with 2011," S&P said.

"In our updated financial base case, Stora Enso's credit measures
will weaken as a consequence of rising debt levels connected to
its main investment projects. For example, although we currently
forecast that adjusted funds from operations to debt will remain
at about 20%, we believe that free operating cash flows will be
neutral to marginally negative. While adjusted debt to EBITDA
will temporarily increase to about 4x by 2013 in our forecast, we
believe that this is mitigated by the medium term upside earnings
and cash flow generation potential of the group's investment
programs, and our assumption that the weakening is temporary,"
S&P said.

"Given firm investment plans, we consider ratings leeway to be
lower now than in November 2011, when we revised the outlook to
stable. Deteriorating market conditions, for example as a result
of macroeconomic pressures or input cost inflation, could put
pressure on the ratings over the next two years, as this could
cause the group's credit metrics to weaken even more than we
currently forecast," S&P said.

"The ratings on Stora Enso continue to reflect our view of the
group's 'fair' business risk and 'significant' financial risk
profiles," S&P said.

"The fair business risk profile is based on the group's exposure
to the highly competitive, commoditized, and cyclical forest
product industry (especially graphic paper), and its relatively
weak, albeit improved, profitability," S&P said.

These negative factors are balanced by strong positions in the
relatively stable and less export-dependent packaging segments,
significant pulp and energy integration including low-cost South
American assets, and broad product and geographic diversity.

The group's significant financial risk profile is based on its
cyclical and weakening operating cash flow generation, which is
offset by a balanced capital structure with modest debt leverage
and strong liquidity.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Stora Enso can
maintain adjusted funds from operations to debt of about 20% and
adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3x-3.5x over the medium term. This
will depend upon investments coming in on time and budget," S&P
said.


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NOVEMBER AG: Cologne Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Local Court of Cologne instituted insolvency proceedings
against the assets of November AG due to illiquidity and debt
overload.

The lawyer Dr. jur. Michael Jaffe was appointed insolvency
administrator.

The insolvency administrator can be reached at:

         Dr. jur. Michael Jaffe
         Sachsenring 85
         D- 50677 Cologne
         Germany
         Telephone: +49 (0) 221 933 39 39-0


PFLEIDERER AG: To File for Insolvency; Restructuring Plan Blocked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pfleiderer AG on March 27 disclosed that the implementation of
its restructuring plan had been blocked by the Higher Regional
Court in Frankfurt.

The Management Board of Pfleiderer is now preparing to file an
application for insolvency in order to implement its
restructuring.

This application in Germany to institute insolvency proceedings
would only affect Pfleiderer and would have no direct effect on
its operating subsidiaries such as Uniboard.

Angela Cullen at Bloomberg News reports that an 88% decline over
the past 12 months has reduced the Neumarkt-based company's
market value to EUR11.8 million (US$15.8 million).

Headquartered in Neumarkt, Germany, Pfleiderer AG --
http://www.pfleiderer.com/-- is a producer and supplier of
engineered wood products.  It acts as a partner for wood trade
outlets, interior designers, the building and do-it-yourself
trade, and the furniture industry in more than 80 countries
worldwide.  The Company offers a range of base products, such as
raw chipboard and particleboard, tongue and groove board, medium-
density fiberboard and high- density fiberboard, and surfaced
products, such as melamine-faced chipboard, high-pressure
laminates and post-forming elements, laminate flooring and a
range of films and surfacings.  The Company operates through
three geographical segments: Western Europe, including Germany
and Sweden; Eastern Europe, consisting of Poland and Russia, and
North America, comprised of Canada and the United States.


SMP DEUTCHLAND: Fitch Publishes 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published SMP Deutschland GmbH's (SMP) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' and Short-term IDR of
'B'.  The Outlook is Stable.  SMP was formerly known as Peguform
GmbH.

SMP's stand-alone Long-term IDR of 'B-' reflects contractual
linkages under the EUR180 million debt facility dated November 2,
2011, encompassing SMP and SMP Iberica S.L. as co-borrowers, and
certain immediate group entities as guarantors.  The final IDR of
'B' includes a one-notch uplift which represents Fitch's
assessment of the strategic and operational (non-contractual)
linkages with its parent, Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd (MSSL).

SMP's stand-alone IDR reflects its strong and long-standing
relationship with Volkswagen Group AG ('A-'/Stable) as a large
Tier One supplier of the original equipment manufacturers'
(OEM's) bumpers, door panels and other plastic automotive
components.  However, this rating is constrained by the company's
exposure to the volatile automotive supply industry, pricing
pressure from OEMs and in emerging markets, raw material price
volatility, a low profitability compared to peers, a lack of
product diversification, significant customer concentration, as
well as its moderately efficient plant operations.  Fitch further
notes that although it is an important supplier, underperformance
of SMP could lead its customers to switch a significant portion
of their business to other suppliers.

The final IDR benefits from a one-notch uplift representing
potential support from the stronger credit and business profiles
of its parent, MSSL, which indirectly owns 40.8% of SMP.  Fitch
believes, for two reasons, that MSSL is likely to provide support
to SMP, should the latter have temporary difficulties.  Firstly,
MSSL has a strategic interest in SMP's strong relationship with
Volkswagen and, secondly, SMP's facility agreement contains a
cross-default clause which, in case of a SMP or SMP Iberica
default, would also affect a EUR190 million acquisition facility
guaranteed by MSSL (51%) and by MSSL's ultimate parent SMFL
(49%).  Fitch does not consolidate this debt, or other group debt
higher up in the group structure, when rating SMP, as its EUR180m
debt facility agreement has permitted payment mechanisms in place
to restrict SMP's direct servicing of such external debt.

SMP's financial profile is supported by its moderate leverage,
which compares well with similarly rated companies.  Fitch
expects that, in the absence of a severe market downturn, cash
flow from operations should be sufficient to cover debt repayment
and planned investment requirements.  Fitch further expects that
the funds from operations (FFO) lease adjusted leverage of close
to 4.0x in 2012 will gradually decline towards 3x by 2014.

Due to limited and volatile cash flow generation, liquidity is a
concern. Fitch has assessed the available liquidity at any time
throughout 2012 to be EUR35 million.  This figure comprises
unrestricted cash of EUR33 million as at end-December 2011,
Fitch-expected free cash flow (FCF) of about EUR11 million in
2012, debt repayments of EUR14 million in 2012 and EUR5 million
available under a committed EUR30 million shareholder loan from
Forgu GmbH (Forgu).  The liquidity is required to finance peak to
trough working capital swings of about EUR15 million.  In
addition, as at December 31, 2011, the company may draw up to
EUR30m under non-committed bilateral and permitted debt
facilities without breaching financial covenants.

Although permitted payment restrictions between SMP and its
direct parent, Forgu, exist, Fitch considers that the
contemplated profit-and-loss pooling agreement between SMP and
Forgu would weaken SMP's ringfencing.

An EBIT margin above 5%, a FCF margin above 2% and an FFO lease
adjusted leverage below 3.0x would be positive for the rating.
Conversely, SMP's stand-alone rating would not be consistent with
an EBIT margin below 2%, a negative FCF margin or an FFO-lease
adjusted leverage above 4.0x on a sustained basis.


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* GREECE: Central Bank Winds Up Three Small Cooperative Banks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports Greece's central bank said on Monday it had
liquidated three small cooperative banks which were no longer
viable, the third time since October it has wound up small
lenders to protect savers.

In October, Reuters relates, it effectively nationalized Proton
Bank and in December it liquidated ailing TBank.

According to the report, bank sources said the three lenders
liquidated on Monday, Achaiki, Lamias and Lesvou-Limnou, had
operations with between three and five branches each.

"The license of the three cooperative banks was revoked and they
were put in special liquidation," the central bank said in a
statement.

Reuters relates that the Bank of Greece said commercial banks
which do business in the areas where the three failed lenders
operated have already expressed interest in taking over their
deposits.


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OSWESTRY ACQUICO: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Oswestry Acquico Ltd., the parent
company of U.K.-based frozen food retailer Iceland Foods Group
Ltd. (Iceland Foods). The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we assigned our 'B+' issue rating to Oswestry
Acquico's GBP860 million senior secured bank debt and GBP25
million revolving credit facility. The recovery rating on these
facilities is '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-
70%) recovery in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"The rating on Oswestry Acquico reflects our assessment of
Iceland Foods' business risk profile as 'fair' and its financial
risk profile as 'highly leveraged.' Iceland Foods was acquired by
Oswestry Acquico in a management buyout transaction, with
management now holding 43% of equity," S&P said.

"Iceland Foods' 'fair' business risk profile reflects our view of
its positioning as a midsize player in the U.K. retail market
with a strong focus on the frozen food subsegment. Iceland Foods'
customer base is largely value-focused and is very sensitive to
pricing," S&P said.

"The group's 'highly leveraged' financial risk profile reflects
our view of its high leverage after the management buyout
transaction, which we estimate will peak at about 6.1x Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA at the end of the financial year
to March 30, 2012. The group's 'adequate' liquidity and positive
free cash flow somewhat mitigate its high leverage. In our base-
case credit assessment, we forecast free operating cash flow
(FOCF) of about GBP108 million in 2013 (approaching a healthy 10%
of debt) due to modest capital expenditures and working capital
requirements, and continued EBITDA cash interest coverage in
excess of 2x," S&P said.

"In our view, notwithstanding the highly competitive U.K. market
and difficult macroeconomic conditions, Iceland Foods' business
model will continue to be relatively resilient and the group
should be able to maintain its market position in the value
frozen food segment," S&P said.

"We also anticipate that the group should be able to maintain the
necessary financial flexibility to service its highly leveraged
debt structure and undergo modest deleveraging through internal
cash generation," S&P said.

"The rating could come under pressure if Iceland Foods' EBITDA
cash interest coverage slips to less than 2x as a result of
operating pressures or higher-than-anticipated levels of
discretionary spending. We could also take a negative rating
action in the medium term if unexpected operating setbacks from
weakening market share, high commodity prices, or working capital
needs were to cause FOCF to decline by a factor of more than one-
half, causing liquidity to become 'less than adequate,'" S&P
said.

"We would consider upgrading the group if it were to continue to
post strong organic sales growth, combined with resilient
profitability and high cash conversion, causing the adjusted
ratio of debt to EBITDA to fall to less than 5x on a sustainable
basis," S&P said.


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ANGLO IRISH: CB Says Promissory Notes Source of Financial Risk
--------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that Central Bank
governor Patrick Honohan warned on Tuesday the payments on the
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide promissory notes have
become "a source of risk to financial stability" to Ireland.

Mr. Honohan told the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance,
Public Expenditure and Reform a deal on the next EUR3.06 billion
payment on March 31 was likely to be successful, the Irish Times
relates.

The Government provided promissory notes -- State IOUs which
promised to make annual payments over a long period -- to Anglo
and Irish Nationwide in 2010 to cover EUR31 billion of the EUR35
billion bailout costs to the public of the two failed
institutions, the Irish Times discloses.

Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, which was formerly Anglo and
is winding down the two institutions, uses the promissory notes
as collateral to borrow emergency loans from the Irish Central
Bank in a transaction approved by the ECB, the Irish Times says.

The Government authorities -- together with the troika of the
ECB, the EU Commission and the International Monetary Fund -- are
in "technical discussions" on changing the promissory notes in a
wider restructuring of the banks, the Irish Times notes.

The Central Bank is actively studying ways of "enhancing the
security of the arrangements surrounding the provision of
liquidity to IBRC and ensure that avoidable deleveraging costs to
the system as a whole are not incurred in the disposal of non-
core assets," the Irish Times quotes Mr. Honohan as saying.

Mr. Honohan, as cited by the Irish Times, said that the
settlement of the EUR3.1 billion payment on March 31 with a long-
term Government bond instead of cash, expected within days, was a
"very considerable step forward" and "a very definite gain" on
the ability of the State to repay its debts.

According to the Irish Times, Mr. Honohan said that there would
be "no net cash outlay" to the State under the terms of the deal
being worked for the March 31 payment to settle the EUR3.06
billion installment by issuing a Government bond instead of
paying in cash.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 19,
2011, BBC News related that Anglo Irish Bank has changed its name
to Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).  Anglo Irish merged
with Irish Nationwide Building Society this year, BBC recounted.
The two lenders received EUR35 billion (GBP30.7 billion; US$48.5
billion) of state capital, BBC disclosed.  That was more than
half the entire bill for bailing out the country's banks, BBC
noted.  The two groups have had their boards overhauled, their
deposits sold off and are being wound down over the next 10
years, BBC said.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products
and solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.


LOMBARD STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Lombard Street CLO I PLC's class A, Rev Ln Fac, B, C, and E
notes. "At the same time, we have affirmed our rating on the
class D notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance, and the application of our relevant criteria for
transactions of this type," S&P said.

"For our review of the transaction's performance, we used data
from the trustee report (dated Feb. 16, 2012), in addition to our
cash flow analysis. We have taken into account recent
developments in the transaction, and have applied our 2010
counterparty criteria, as well as our cash flow criteria," S&P
said.

"From our analysis, we have observed a decline in the proportion
of assets that we consider to be rated in the 'CCC' category
('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-'), and an increase in the proportion of
defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective default], and 'D')
since we last reviewed the transaction," S&P said.

"We have also noted an increase in the weighted-average spread
earned on Lombard Street CLO I's collateral pool. All par value
tests are now in compliance with their minimum requirement
triggers, compared with the class C, D, and E notes failing their
par value tests during our April 2010 review. With a shorter
weighted-average life, the scenario default rates have reduced at
each rating level since our previous review," S&P said.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
in order to determine the break-even default rate. In our
analysis, we have used the reported portfolio balance that we
consider to be performing, the principal cash balance, the
current weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that we considered to be appropriate. We have
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using various
default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability rating
category, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses and our
2010 counterparty criteria, we consider the credit enhancement
available to the class A, Rev Ln Fac, B, C, and E notes in this
transaction to be commensurate with higher ratings. We have
therefore raised our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P
said.

"We consider the credit enhancement available for the class D
notes to be commensurate with the current rating. We have
therefore affirmed our rating on the class D notes," S&P said.

"None of the notes was constrained by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test we
introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P said.

"We have analyzed the derivative counterparty exposure to the
transaction under scenarios where the counterparty failed to
perform. We have concluded that the derivative exposure is
currently sufficiently limited, so as not to affect the assigned
ratings," S&P said.

Lombard Street CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
              To                 From

Lombard Street CLO I PLC
EUR392 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A             AA (sf)            A+ (sf)
Rev Ln Fac    AA (sf)            A+ (sf)
B             A+ (sf)            A (sf)
C             A- (sf)            BBB (sf)
E             BB- (sf)           B (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D             BB+ (sf)


=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONDOMUTUI CARIPARMA: S&P Lowers Collection Acct. Rating to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'A- (sf)' from 'AA+
(sf)' its credit rating on MondoMutui Cariparma S.r.l.'s class A
notes following a restructuring of the transaction.

"The rating action follows our review of the amended transaction
documents, subsequent to a restructuring after the downgrade of
Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza, which in this transaction
acts as swap counterparty, bank account provider, liquidity
facility provider, and servicer," S&P said.

"On Feb. 10, 2012, we lowered our rating on Cassa di Risparmio di
Parma e Piacenza to BBB+/Negative/A-2 from A/Watch Neg/A-1.
Following that downgrade, our rating on Cassa di Risparmio di
Parma e Piacenza became lower than the minimum rating threshold
that a derivative counterparty must have to support a 'AA+ (sf)'
rated security without posting collateral. This meant that the
swap counterparty had to post collateral according to our current
criteria to allow the class A notes to maintain their 'AA+ (sf)'
rating," S&P said.

"At the same time, as account bank and liquidity facility
provider, Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza had to take
certain remedies (i.e., replacing itself or obtaining a
guarantor) in order to allow the class A notes to maintain their
'AA+ (sf)' rating," S&P said.

During the remedy period for the collateral posting, S&P received
written communication that the swap documentation would be
amended in order to:

* Lower to 'BBB' from 'A/A-1' the rating threshold, which, if
   breached, would require the swap counterparty to post
   collateral in order to stay in the transaction; and

* To lower to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+' the rating threshold, which, if
   breached, would require the swap counterparty to replace
   itself or obtain a guarantee.

"During the remedy period provisioned for the account bank, we
received written communication that the eligibility requirement
for the account bank would be amended in order to lower to 'BBB-'
from 'A/A-1' the minimum rating threshold, which, if breached,
would require the account bank to replace itself or obtain a
guarantee," S&P said.

The servicing agreement has also been amended. The replacement
threshold on the collection account has been lowered to 'BB+'
from 'BBB/A-2'.

"We understand that the amendments have been executed, and that
the representative of noteholders consented to them," S&P said.

"According to the new downgrade language in place, which
effectively imposes a cap on the rating on the class A notes, the
maximum rating achievable is 'A-'; therefore, we have lowered our
rating on the class A notes to 'A- (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)'," S&P
said.

MondoMutui Cariparma is an Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in November 2009. The
underlying portfolio comprises mortgage loans granted to
individuals in Italy.

        STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* ITALY: Moody's Says Jan. Leasing ABS Performance Deteriorated
---------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Italian leasing asset-backed securities
(ABS) market deteriorated in the three-month period leading to
January 2012, according to the latest index report published by
Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's net default index (as a percentage of original balance +
cumulated replenishments + cumulated additions) increased only
slightly to 2.84% in January 2012, from 2.76% in November 2011.
The total delinquencies index, as of current pool balance, ended
at 5.14% in January 2012. This represented a quarter-on-quarter
rise from 4.8% in November 2011 and an approximate 40% year-over-
year increase from January 2011.

On February 28, the Italian Banking Association announced another
extension of the payment holiday scheme, allowing small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) borrowers to request the suspension
of their principal payment for up to 12 months (six months for
non-real estate leasing contracts). The payment holiday scheme
was first introduced by the Italian Banking Association in August
2009 and it has now been extended for the third time. It is
important to note that leases that can benefit from this
suspension should be either performing or not more than 90 days
in arrears.

Looking at the delinquency trend, Moody's sees a decrease between
January 2010 and the third quarter of 2011 in most vintages,
which could be also partially attributed to the implementation of
the payment holiday scheme. Overall, the payment holiday
framework is credit negative for Italian structured finance
transactions that contain SME loans/leases, as it may lead to a
delay in defaults for weaker borrower that take advantage of the
suspension of payment scheme.

The average constant prepayment rate (CPR) decreased to 1.44% in
January 2012, from 1.86% in November 2011.

On February 17, 2012, Moody's lowered the highest achievable
structured finance rating in Italy to Aa2 from Aaa, after the
downgrade of the rating of the Italy sovereign debt to A3 from
A2.

As of January 2012, the total outstanding pool balance was
EUR14.2 billion, which represents a year-on-year increase of
around 1%. The increase can be attributed to the new transactions
closed in the last quarter of 2011 for a total volume of around
EUR3 billon. As of March 27, there are 27 outstanding
transactions in the Italian Leasing market.

New charts have been introduced to the Italian Leasing Indices
report showing the gross cumulative default (as a percentage of
original balance + cumulated replenishments + cumulated
additions) and a number of charts showing performance by
originators in the Italian Leasing market, which have at least
two outstanding transactions.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ZIGGO BOND: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'Ba1'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the corporate family (CFR)
and probability-of-default (PDR) ratings of Ziggo Bond Company
B.V. to Ba1 (from Ba2). Concurrently, Moody's has also upgraded
the rating on the EUR750 million senior secured notes (due 2017)
to Baa3 from Ba1 and the rating on the EUR1.2 billion senior
notes (due 2018) to Ba2 from B1. The outlook for all ratings for
Ziggo and its rated subsidiaries is stable.

The upgrade follows the successful completion of Ziggo's initial
public offering on Amsterdam's Euronext NYSE exchange on
March 26, 2012. The ordinary shares offered in the initial public
offering ("IPO") of Ziggo NV (the new ultimate holding company of
Ziggo) have been priced at EUR18.50 per ordinary share (the high-
end of its indicative price range of EUR16.50 to EUR18.50 per
share) resulting in a market capitalization of EUR3.7 billion.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade to Ba1 is based on: (i) the solid operating
performance of the company; (ii) its publicly articulated
financial policy of maintaining reported Net Debt/ EBITDA at 3.5x
in the 'long-term', thereby reinforcing its focus on near-term
de-leveraging; and (iii) its good free cash flow generation.

The IPO involved a secondary sale of 25% of Ziggo's ordinary
shares held by its founding shareholders including affiliates of
Cinven and Warburg Pincus, and is therefore leverage neutral. The
company's reported Net Debt/ EBITDA stood at 3.9x as of December
31, 2011 and Moody's adjusted Gross Debt/ EBITDA stood broadly at
the same level.

Ziggo will be paying EUR220 million in dividends for 2012 and
intends to maintain a pay-out policy of distributing at least 50%
of its 'free cash flow to equity' in dividends, going forward.
This implies that company's free cash flow (as calculated by
Moody's) will concurrently weaken to accommodate the dividends
from 2012 onwards. Nevertheless, going forward Moody's would
expect the company to gradually de-leverage to 3.5x reported Net
Debt/ EBITDA.

During 2011, Ziggo's revenues continued to grow solidly (7% on an
organic basis) to EUR1.48 billion. Its EBITDA margin remained
strong at 56.5%. Following the growth in revenue generating units
('RGUs') and bundled subscribers, triple play penetration of home
passed reached 30%. Broadband and telephony penetration reached
around 40% and 32% respectively. Moody's believes there remains
room for Ziggo to continue to grow by pursuing the current
bundling strategy and increasing broadband market share. In
addition, as of December 2011 around 72% of Ziggo's total TV
subscribers had activated digital smart cards with 44% of those
subscribers signing up for digital pay TV packages. Although
Moody's notes that some lower ARPU analogue TV subscribers may
not all transition to Ziggo's digital offering, Moody's expects
to see further contribution to revenue and EBITDA from the uptake
of digital and wider penetration of interactive services as well
as new growth opportunities like 'TV Everywhere' and B2B
broadband and telephony services.

Ziggo operates a state-of-the-art network, fully DOCSIS3.0
enabled and offers high broadband speeds up to 120 Mbps across
its geographic market. Moody's believes that the company remains
well positioned to grow in its major product lines, supported by
its established infrastructure.

Ziggo's liquidity profile is acceptable for its needs. Ziggo had
approximately EUR113 million of cash at 30 December 2011.

Any upward pressure towards investment grade is unlikely to occur
in the short term and would require amongst other things (i)
Gross Adjusted Debt/ EBITDA sustained at around 3.0x; (ii)
further simplification of the company's borrowing and ownership
structure; and (iii) evidence that Ziggo can continue to sustain
and improve its market position despite intense competition.

The rating could come under downward pressure if the company's
operating performance deteriorates substantially and/or its Gross
Adjusted Debt/EBITDA moves towards 4.0x on a sustained basis with
constrained free cash flow generation (as defined by Moody's).

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Cable
Television Industry published in July 2009, and Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Ziggo, with central offices in Utrecht, is the largest cable
operator in the Netherlands. For FY2011, the company reported
approximately EUR1.48 billion in revenue and EUR835 million in
reported EBITDA.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


MURFATLAR: Constanta Court Approves Insolvency Bid
--------------------------------------------------
Simona Bazavan at business-review.ro reports that Constanta Court
has approved the insolvency request of Romanian wine producer
Murfatlar.

Cosmin Popescu, the company's GM, said Murfatlar was forced to
take this step after being faced with cash flow problems.

"The main consequence of the slow money recovery rate -- a
general characteristic of the business environment at present --
is that it makes it difficult to pay off outstanding debts," the
report quotes Mr. Popescu as saying.

business-review.ro relates that Murfatlar said the insolvency
procedure will not affect its objectives and development plans.


* ROMANIA: Corporate Insolvencies Up 10% in 2011
------------------------------------------------
Romania Insider reports that the number of insolvent companies in
Romania increased by 10% at the end of 2011, compared to the
beginning of the same year, to some 37,400, according to the
Romanian ZRP Insolvency, part of the Zamfirescu Racoti Predoiu
law firm.

"According to some estimation, the insolvency services market
amounted to some EUR25 million in 2011, close to the level of
2010," ZRP Insolvency said in a statement.

Over 20,000 companies went insolvent during last year.
Some 43.8 percent of the insolvency procedures were opened at the
request of the creditor, while 56.2% were opened at the request
of the debtor, the report notes.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MTS BANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on MTS
Bank (previously - Moscow Bank for Reconstruction & Development)
and includes certain regulatory disclosures regarding its
ratings. This release does not constitute any change in Moody's
ratings or rating rationale for MTS Bank.

Moody's current ratings on MTS Bank are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of B1

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of B1

Bank Financial Strength ratings of E+

Subordinate (foreign currency) ratings of B2

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of NP

Rating Rationale

Moody's assigns a standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating
(BFSR) of E+ to MTS Bank (previously Moscow Bank for
Reconstruction and Development), which maps to the long-term
scale of B2. The BFSR is constrained by considerable
concentrations in MTS Bank's loan portfolio and funding base, as
well as the bank's weak financial performance and operating
efficiency. The factor underpinning MTS Bank's E+ BFSR and B2
long-term scale at their current levels is the strategic and
operational support provided by the bank's parent JSFC Sistema
(rated Ba3 on long-term corporate family rating with stable
outlook), which is proven, inter alia, by regular capital
injections to the bank by its shareholder and the provision of
subordinated loans.

MTS Bank's Global Local Currency (GLC) deposit ratings of B1
(negative outlook) /Not Prime do not incorporate any element of
systemic support given the bank's limited franchise value and its
low importance for the Russian banking system as a whole. At the
same time, Moody's maintains its assumption of a moderate
probability of parental support to MTS Bank from JSFC Sistema
(which controlled directly or indirectly 99.25% in MTS Bank as at
YE2010), in case of need. The rating agency also recognizes the
high degree of interdependence between the parent and the
subsidiary, as evidenced by MTS Bank's involvement in providing
financial services to the Sistema group of companies. These
assumptions currently result in a one-notch uplift of MTS Bank's
deposit ratings to B1 (with negative outlook) from its long-terms
scale of B2.

Rating Outlook

MTS Bank's E+ BFSR carries a stable outlook, while the outlook on
MTS Bank's B1 long-term deposit ratings, its local currency
senior unsecured debt rating, as well as the bank's B2 foreign
currency subordinated debt rating is negative. The negative
outlook on MTS Bank's deposit and debt ratings primarily reflects
the bank's weak financial performance with the Return on Average
Assets (ROAA) and Return on Average Equity (ROAE) ratios reported
at 0.3% and 5.0%, respectively, in 2010. In the same reporting
period, its net interest margin (NIM) yielded just 2%, which is
considerably lower than most Russian banks' NIMs. Moreover, in
2011, the rating agency has not observed any significant
improvement in the bank's financial performance and expects that
poor recurring earnings combined with high administrative costs
will likely cause negative bottom-line IFRS result for the
current reporting period.

Furthermore, approximately one third of MTS Bank's total
consolidated loan book stands for loans issued by its 66%-owned
subsidiary East West United Bank S.A.(EWUB, based in Luxembourg),
which extends loans to wealthy individuals and their businesses.
These borrowers are predominantly reported under financial
services industry, and the majority of such loans are
collateralized by pledges of cash (as reported in MTS Bank's 2010
IFRS statements), but since the purpose of the named lending
operations have not been disclosed to Moody's in all the
necessary details, the ultimate quality of this portion of the
group's loan book is difficult to assess and this raises
concerns.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

The upward potential of MTS Bank's standalone ratings is limited,
given the bank's weak financial fundamentals and low transparency
of a significant portion of its loan portfolio (as represented by
loans booked on EWUB).

What Could Change the Rating - Down

The volatile economic and operating environment -- coupled with
MTS Bank's lack of clear competitive advantages in the Russian
banking market -- continues to exert negative pressure on its
standalone credit strength, resulting in poor profitability and
cost-efficiency metrics. MTS Bank's position within its current
BFSR category could weaken if (i) these negative trends are not
offset by timely capital injections from shareholders; or (ii)
the bank's liquidity position comes under pressure as a result of
the high concentration of its customer funding base. If this
occurs -- leading to a re-mapping of MTS Bank's E+ BFSR to B3 on
the long-term scale, as opposed to B2 currently -- MTS Bank's
supported B1 debt and deposit ratings, as well as the bank's B2
foreign-currency subordinated debt rating, might be downgraded.
Furthermore, if Moody's considers that the parental support to
MTS Bank from JSFC Sistema has weakened, this might cause a
removal of the support uplift from the bank's deposit ratings and
their realignment with its standalone credit strength.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.


ROSBANK OJSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings From 'BB+/B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long- and short-
term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based Rosbank OJSC
JSCB to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BB+/B' and the Russia national scale
rating to 'ruAAA' from 'ruAA+'. "the same time, we withdrew all
the ratings at the bank's request. The outlook at the time of
withdrawal was stable," S&P said

"e revised our assessment of Rosbank's risk position to
'adequate' from 'moderate' as our criteria define these terms,"
S&P said

"The upgrade reflected our view of Rosbank's improving risk
position through stronger risk management integration, benefiting
significantly from the experience and supervision of its parent.
Revision of our assessment of Rosbank's risk position was also
supported by the bank's lower credit costs than the sector
average, as the banking system recovers from the slowdown in the
Russian economy in recent years," S&P said.

"Our ratings on Rosbank reflected the bank's 'moderate' business
position, 'adequate' capital and earnings, 'adequate' risk
position, 'average' funding, and 'adequate' liquidity, as our
criteria define these terms," S&P said.

"Our assessment of the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
was 'bb-'. The long-term rating on Rosbank incorporated three
notches of uplift from our assessment of its SACP to reflect its
'strategically important' status to its parent, Societe Generale
(A/Stable/A-1)," S&P said.

RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOT
Issuer Credit Rating       BBB-

SACP                       bb-
Anchor                    bb
Business Position         Moderate (-1)
Capital and Earnings      Adequate (0)
Risk Position             Adequate (0)
Funding and Liquidity     Average and Adequate (0)

Support                    +3
GRE Support               0
Group Support             +3
Sovereign Support         0

Additional Factors         0


SBERBANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on
Sberbank and includes certain regulatory disclosures regarding
its ratings. The release does not constitute any change in
Moody's ratings or rating rationale for Sberbank.

Moody's current ratings on Sberbank are:

Senior Unsecured (foreign currency) ratings of A3

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic currency) ratings of A3

Long Term Bank Deposits (foreign currency) ratings of Baa1

Bank Financial Strength ratings of D+

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of P-2

BACKED Senior Unsecured (foreign currency) ratings of A3

BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN Program (foreign currency) ratings of
(P)A3

BACKED Subordinate MTN Program (foreign currency) ratings of
(P)Baa1

BACKED Other Short Term (foreign currency) ratings of (P)P-2

Ratings Rationale

Moody's assigns a standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) of D+ to Sberbank, mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale.
The rating is underpinned by the bank's leading franchise in
Russia (based on a strong brand name, government ownership and
unrivalled countrywide branch network) and its dominant position
in all major market segments. Moody's also notes Sberbank's
strong earnings-generating ability and good financial
fundamentals.

The BFSR is constrained by the bank's credit risk appetite
reflected in moderate single-party loan concentrations, and weak
albeit improving loan quality. In addition, Moody's believes that
there could be corporate governance issues deriving from
Sberbank's majority ownership by the Central Bank of Russia
(CBR), the country's banking regulator. The rating also
incorporates the risks associated with the operating environment
in Russia.

The bank's A3 Global Local Currency (GLC) deposit and debt
ratings incorporate its Ba1 standalone credit strength and
Moody's assessment of the unquestioned probability of systemic
support from the Russian government (a component of Moody's Joint
Default Analysis (JDA) methodology), due to Sberbank's position
as the largest bank in Russia and the key role it plays in the
domestic economy.

Rating Outlook

Sberbank's D+ BFSR carries a stable outlook.

The bank's A3 GLC deposit and debt ratings also carry a stable
outlook, in line with the outlook on the Russian sovereign
ratings and ceilings.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Any future positive rating action on Sberbank's D+ BFSR would
require improvements in asset quality (other credit factors being
constant). The bank's debt and deposit ratings have limited
upside potential without improvements in the bank's standalone
credit profile.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Downward pressure could be exerted on the BFSR as a result of a
substantial negative shift in the bank's financial performance or
material deterioration in asset quality and capitalization.
Sberbank's deposit and debt ratings could be downgraded if the
likelihood of external support is perceived to be lower or if the
sovereign ratings of Russia are downgraded. Moody's notes that in
the longer term, the supported ratings of Sberbank could come
under pressure if the CBR decreases its stake in the bank to
below 50%.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.


SKB-BANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on SKB-
Bank and includes certain regulatory disclosures regarding its
ratings. The release does not constitute any change in Moody's
ratings or rating rationale for SKB-Bank.

Moody's current ratings on SKB-Bank are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of B1

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of B1

Bank Financial Strength ratings of E+

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of NP

Rating Rationale

Moody's assigns a standalone E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
(BFSR) to SKB-Bank (SKB), which maps to the long-term scale of
B1. The rating reflects the bank's (i) recognized brand name and
entrenched market positions in its home region of Yekaterinburg
and Sverdlovsk Oblast along with further diversification in other
regions; (ii) advanced corporate governance and risk management
practices; (iii) improving financial fundamentals; as well as
(iv) capital support from the bank's shareholders. At the same
time, SKB's BFSR is constrained by (i) relatively high single-
name concentration of the loan book; (ii) a costly and
predominantly short-term funding base; as well as (iii) an
unseasoned retail loan book.

SKB's Global Local Currency (GLC) deposit ratings of B1/Not Prime
do not incorporate any element of systemic support given the
bank's limited franchise value and its low importance for the
Russian banking system as a whole. Moreover, in Moody's
assessment, the bank's ownership by Mr. Dmitry Pumpyansky
(72.74%) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD, 25.01%) does not result in any probability of support for
the bank from its shareholders, in the event of distress.
Therefore, SKB's deposit ratings are based solely on its long-
term scale.

Rating Outlook

All of SKB's ratings carry a stable outlook.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

An upgrade of SKB's ratings is unlikely in short to medium term
as this would require significant widening of the bank's market
franchise and strengthening its fundamental metrics, accompanied
by a substantial decrease in concentration of the loan book and
solid capitalisation levels.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Moody's could downgrade the bank's ratings in the event of a
substantial deterioration in its asset quality, liquidity profile
and/or profitability metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.


=============================
S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C
=============================


* SLOVAK REPUBLIC: Moody's Changes Banking System Outlook to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook on the Slovakian banking system has been changed to
negative from stable, caused by the downside risks to economic
growth and asset quality within the system, says Moody's
Investors Service in a new Banking System Outlook published
March 27.

Moody's expects the Slovakian operating environment will weaken
over the outlook period, amidst the broader European Union
economic slowdown. This will exert pressure on asset quality,
which, in turn, will dampen the banks' profitability. These
factors are balanced against expectations of continued good
system-wide liquidity and adequate capitalization.

Slovakia's economic performance largely depends on external
demand and is significantly aligned with developments in the
external macro environment in Europe and the country's main
trading partners, Germany and Czech Republic. As such, Slovakia's
dependence on export-oriented industries presents a key credit
risk to the banks' performance, because softening demand for
these industries' production will lead to higher unemployment
levels and non-performing loans (NPLs).

Moody's expects Slovakia's GDP growth trajectory to decelerate to
about 1.7% for 2012, down from 3.1% in 2011 and 4% in 2010, with
further downside risks as continued uncertainty hinders business
and consumer confidence in the country and the broader euro area.

Despite a recovery in profits in the last two years, Moody's
believes that the weakening operating environment will depress
banks' profitability, due to several macro and domestic specific
factors, such as: (i) a slowdown in lending growth; (ii) a likely
increase in loan-loss charges, reversing the lower charges
recorded in 2010 and 2011; (iii) the payment of a new bank tax,
which will be levied by the government for the first time in
2012; and (iv) pressures on interest margins, more recently
driven by increased competition for deposits.

Moody's recognizes that system NPLs stabilized in 2011 at 5.9%.
However, overall, Moody's expects that the deceleration of
economic growth in 2012 will contribute to an increase in the
rate of formation of new NPLs as well as higher loan-loss
provisions. High credit concentrations in the banks' loan books
will likely exacerbate the potential downside risks to asset-
quality trends. Additional downside risks include the high
proportion of high loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages in the banks'
loan portfolios, declining real-estate prices, growing household
indebtedness and rising unemployment in the higher income
segment.

Despite these negative factors, Slovakian banks' capitalization
has strengthened in recent years as a result of profit retention,
thus providing adequate loss-absorption capacity under Moody's
scenario analysis, whilst funding and liquidity profiles will
likely remain relatively stable, as banks fully fund their loan
books through deposits, which reduces their sensitivity to
changes in market confidence.

Although the system is now facing new risks, as many local banks
are owned by Western European banks, which are currently under
pressure to repatriate capital, or potentially to sell weaker
subsidiaries, the rating agency recognizes that the National Bank
of Slovakia introduced stricter capital rules to protect capital
buffers of local banks, particularly from foreign owners'
requests for higher dividend payments, which will partially
mitigate these risks.

Moody's also notes that the weakening creditworthiness of the
Slovakian government, downgraded earlier this year to A2, and of
the main foreign owners of Slovakian banks (on review for
downgrade since February 2012) indicate, in Moody's view, a
diminishing capacity to provide support to the local banks, in
case of need.


=========
S P A I N
=========


TDA 25: S&P Affirms Ratings on Three Note Classes at 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and kept on
CreditWatch negative its credit rating on TDA 25, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class A notes. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class B, C, and D notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow what we consider to be deteriorating
performance within the residential mortgage pool backing this
transaction, and a lack of information about the extent to which
the noncompliance of Credifimo with some of its representations
as originator in TDA 28, as identified by an audit of TDA 28's
assets originated by Credifimo, could be repeated in TDA 25. The
contribution of Credifimo, E.F.C., S.A.U. as originator in TDA 25
is 83% of the outstanding pool balance (76% of the original pool
balance)," S&P said.

In TDA 25, the loans originated by Credifimo have, on average,
shown weaker performance than the rest of the loans in the
portfolio. Credifimo originated 99% of the defaulted loans in the
pool.

Delinquency levels in TDA 25's underlying mortgage portfolio
continue to be high. At the end of January 2012, the outstanding
balance of defaulted loans (loans in arrears for more than 12
months) represented 24.58% of the collateral balance (14.89% of
the original balance).

"Due to the high level of defaults in the securitized pool, our
rating on the class A notes depends substantially on the amount
of actual and expected recoveries on these defaulted assets. We
consider the recovery levels for these loans to be low (as of
December 2011, cumulative reported defaults were EUR43.4 million,
and reported cumulative recoveries have totaled EUR2.3 million
since closing). In addition, the trustee currently owns 67 unsold
repossessed properties on the issuer's behalf, and we expect the
proceeds that are recovered on these properties to be low. Due to
the deterioration of the credit quality of the portfolio and the
low level of recoveries experienced by the underlying collateral,
the level of performing collateral (nondefaulted loans) available
to the transaction to service the amounts due under the notes
has continued to reduce," S&P said.

"Based on the amount of performing portfolio balance available to
the fund, the class A notes are undercollateralized by 16.34% of
their current balance (as of September 2011, they were
undercollateralized by 14.56%). The credit enhancement provided
by the performing balance is negative for all classes of notes,"
S&P said.

"Based on the most recent data available for the transaction, our
cash flow analysis indicates that a 'B (sf)' rating is not
commensurate with the credit enhancement available to the class A
notes, as the transaction experiences interest and principal
shortfalls under all of our cash flow scenarios. Taking all the
above factors into consideration, we have lowered to 'CCC (sf)'
and kept on CreditWatch negative our rating on TDA 25's class A
notes. We are seeking further information about the extent to
which the noncompliance of Credifimo with some of its
representations as originator in TDA 28, could be repeated in TDA
25," S&P said.

"In September 2008, due to insufficient excess spread to cover
defaults, the issuer fully drew the reserve fund, which has
remained at zero since then. Furthermore, TDA 25 breached the
interest-deferral triggers on the class B, C, and D notes in
2009, and all the interest amounts due under these notes have
since been deferred to pay the amounts due under the class A
notes. As a result, we lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on all of
these classes of notes in 2009 (see 'Related Criteria And
Research'). We have  affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes," S&P said.

TDA 25 securitizes a portfolio of Spanish residential mortgages
granted by Banco Gallego, S.A. (currently 17.2% of the total
pool, versus 23.8% at closing) and Credifimo (currently 82.8% of
the total pool, versus 76.2% at closing). They both service their
loans. The transaction closed in August 2006 with a weighted-
average seasoning of 19.3 months.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                  Rating
             To                       From

TDA 25, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR310.054 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes

Rating Lowered and Remaining on CreditWatch Negative

A            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg       B (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

B            D (sf)
C            D (sf)
D            D (sf)


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: To Delist Shares; Gets Bankruptcy Reprieve
--------------------------------------------------------------
Leigh Baldwin at Bloomberg News reports that Petroplus Holdings
AG plans to delist its shares in May.

The company said on Wednesday that a Swiss court granted it and a
subsidiary, Petroplus Marketing AG, bankruptcy proceedings for
six months until Sept. 27, with the company's stock expected to
end trading on May 11.

According to Bloomberg, Petroplus said in a statement that
subsidiaries are also disposing of assets, including refineries.

"Petroplus no longer has control over these subsidiaries and does
not have full information regarding their current business
activities," Bloomberg quotes the company as saying.  This means
it's "unable to produce consolidated financial statements."

Petroplus is seeking buyers for five European refineries,
Bloomberg discloses.

Coryton is the only Petroplus refinery still operating, Bloomberg
states.

Bloomberg notes that the statement said another subsidiary,
Petroplus Finance Ltd., will apply to delist a US$150 million
convertible bond due in 2015.

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is Europe's
largest independent oil refiner.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


AVANGARDCO INVESTMENTS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avangardco Investments Public
Limited's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'.  Fitch has also affirmed Avangardco's
National Long-term Rating at 'A+(ukr)'.  The Outlooks for the
Long-term ratings are Stable.  The foreign currency senior
unsecured rating has been affirmed at 'B'/'RR4'.

The rating action resolves the Rating Watch Negative (RWN)
applied to all ratings on September 14, 2011, following the
announcement of the transfer of ownership of Oleg Bahkmatyuk's
77.5% stake in Avangardco to Ukrlandfarming PLC, an unrated
company 100% controlled by Mr. Bahkmatyuk.

The rating affirmation reflects Fitch's expectations of limited
ties between Ukrlandfarming and Avangardco in the near-term and
the effective legal ring-fencing in Fitch's view, thus treating
Avangardco's credit standing separately from its parent under the
agency's parent-subsidiary linkage criteria.  Fitch understands
there are no cross-default clauses neither at the parent nor at
Avangardco level and that cash pooling is managed separately.

Fitch understands that Ukrlandfarming is a more leveraged entity,
given past acquisitions, relative to Avangardco.  However, the
negative pledges in Avangardco's Eurobond currently prevents it
from any meaningful cash up-streaming to Ukrlandfarming -- if
needed to help service its own debt -- primarily by a debt
incurrence maximum leverage test of 3x which, if incurred, Fitch
would not view as compatible with a 'B' rating.

However, Fitch gets comfort from the different strategic
incentives for Ukrlandfarming to sell high-quality grain at the
highest possible price, primarily to the export markets, whereas
Avangardco will procure forage grain at the lowest possible price
exploiting the inefficiencies in the Ukrainian agriculture
market.  Therefore, the agency estimates a diminished likelihood
of related-party grain purchase transactions even though
Avangardco will retain an option to do so in open tenders.
Moreover, this is based on Mr. Bahkmatyuk's explicit commitment
to avoid related-party transactions, as noted in the unqualified
audit report from KPMG on Avangardco's 2011 financial accounts.

Under the current group structure, the Stable Outlook reflects
Fitch's expectations that both businesses will be managed
separately.  For Avangardco, the Stable Outlook is also premised
on a continuing conservative financial policy resulting in lease-
adjusted gross debt/EBITDAR below 1.5x and positive free cash
flow post 2012.

At present, Fitch has not assessed the effect of a potential
merger between Ukrlandfarming and its subsidiary. In case of
merger with Ukrlandfarming, a combined 'B' credit profile
requires strengthening in corporate governance for the group,
including the establishment of a non-executive board, and greater
information transparency at the parent and group levels.

The 'B' rating reflects Avangardco's strong financial performance
in 2011.  Fitch recognizes the limited further upside in the
domestic market given the large market share of industrialized
eggs and high per capita egg consumption, and thus greater
reliance on export markets to deliver on its growth targets and
absorb large new egg production capacity coming on stream later
in 2012 and 2013.  Although Fitch concurs with management in the
export potential to other CIS countries, Middle East, North
Africa and Asia, the European market remains closed until Ukraine
reaches a trade agreement with the EU.

Avangardco's liquidity cushion will be eroded in 2012 due to its
high planned capex of close to US$300 million -- a high portion
of which is already contracted with equipment suppliers -- as
well as likely compression in profitability from elevated grain
prices and its US$105 million in short-term debt.

The ratings could come under pressure if lease-adjusted gross
debt/EBITDAR increases above 2.5x (FY11: 1.5x), weakening pricing
power drives EBITDA margin below 30% (excluding effect from
revaluation of biological assets at fair value, after income from
special VAT treatment) or if its free cash flow remains negative.

In accordance with Fitch's policies the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action which is different than the original rating
committee outcome.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ITV PLC: Fitch Lifts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded ITV plc's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BB+' from 'BB'
respectively. The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The upgrade is a result of ITV's progress in improving its non-TV
advertising businesses, particularly in content production, as
part of management's five-year transformation program.  The
company's strong financial performance has continued with cash
flow generation in 2011 exceeding Fitch's expectations.  ITV's
funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage was 0.5x at the
end of 2011 compared to 1.0x at the end of 2010.

"ITV's credit profile is much improved with a strong balance
sheet, more diversified revenue mix and a core TV business which
is performing well in a weak economic environment," says Damien
Chew, Senior Director in Fitch's European Telecoms, Media and
Technology team.  "Management have the interesting challenge of
how to best utilize a growing cash pile."

Cyclical exposure to the UK economy is less of a concern then it
was previously.  Better visibility of profits at ITV Studios,
ITV's content production business, as new programming commissions
have increased, coupled with solid cost control in the broadcast
business means that ITV is less susceptible to a significant
downturn in TV advertising revenue.  Fitch's analysis shows that
in such a scenario ITV's EBITDA would remain substantially above
the levels seen in 2008 and 2009 and leverage remain manageable
even with continued dividend payments in 2012.  However, FFO
adjusted net leverage above 2.0x times for a sustained period of
time would be considered incompatible with a 'BB+' rating level.

Structural changes in the media industry remain the primary
concern.  The continued growth of the internet, digitization of
content and the change in consumer viewing patterns have had a
significant impact on content creation and content aggregation
and distribution.  These factors could erode ITV's ability to
reach a large UK audience for advertisers and have a negative
impact on long-term revenue and profitability, and therefore lead
to negative rating action.

Fitch believes ITV could make acquisitions to bolster its content
business.  Such acquisitions could improve ITV's operating
profile. Because of ITV's currently strong balance sheet, any
acquisition of up to GBP300 million in value would fit
comfortably within the 'BB+'/Stable rating.  Any transactions
larger in size would be treated by Fitch as event risk.

ITV is unlikely to see positive rating action in the next 12-24
months.  For an upgrade to investment grade, Fitch would need to
see evidence that structural changes in the media industry are
turning out to be more benign to ITV.  There must also be
significant progress on management's five-year plan to sustain
its core TV advertising business as well as the development of
other revenue streams, and evidence of a successful track record
in content creation with global reach.


LONDON & WESTCOUNTRY: Blames Collapse on RBS Mis-selling of Swaps
----------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Wilson at Bloomberg News reports that calls for an inquiry
into the interest rate swap mis-selling scandal has intensified
after Royal Bank of Scotland was accused of forcing London &
Westcountry Estates into administration.

London & Westcountry Estates blamed its collapse on a complex
derivative RBS sold it in July 2008 -- just before rates were cut
to historic lows, the Telegraph relates.

According to the Telegraph, as administrators from Ernst & Young
were on Tuesday sent to LWE's Plymouth offices, the company's
chairman, Michael Hockin, branded state-backed RBS a "disgrace".
He claimed the lender's 10-year swap against a GBP57 million
three-year loan had cost his business at least GBP5 million in
extra payments over the past three years, the Telegraph notes.

Gary Streeter MP, the Telegraph says, called for a parliamentary
debate on banks' alleged mis-selling of interest swaps.

Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the Treasury Select Committee, has
already called on the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to
investigate claims, after a Telegraph investigation, that
thousands of small businesses could have been sold inappropriate
interest rate swap products, the Telegraph notes.

Administrators to LWE were appointed by US private equity firm
Blackstone, which last year signed a joint venture deal with RBS
to manage a GBP1.4 billion property portfolio, the Telegraph
discloses.  RBS sold the portfolio, including LWE's debt, for
about GBP975 million, with the bank retaining a 75% stake and
Blackstone taking a 25% holding and acting as the asset manager,
the Telegraph recounts.

According to the Telegraph, a spokesman for RBS said the bank had
spent a "considerable amount of time and effort" to reach an
agreement with LWE and that the administration process was the
only "viable option remaining".  RBS has always denied
allegations that it mis-sold interest-rate swaps, the Telegraph
states.

Blackstone, as cited by the Telegraph, said its attempts to reach
a constructive solution had been "rebuffed" and the
administration was necessary to "safeguard our investors'
interests and indeed those of LWE's tenants".

London & Westcountry Estates is a family-owned operator of 28
business parks in southern England.


PREMIER FOODS: Moody's Withdraws 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B3 corporate family
rating (CFR) of Premier Foods plc.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the rating for its own
business reasons.

Headquartered in St Albans, Premier Foods plc is the largest
manufacturer and distributor of food in the UK, with a focus on
ambient grocery and bread products. The company has around 12,000
employees producing foods from around 43 facilities.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Eurozone Needs to Double Bailout Fund, OECD Head Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Angelo Gurria, the head of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), has said that
the eurozone needs to double its bailout fund to EUR1 trillion
(US$1.3 trillion; GBP836 billion).

But German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she would favor
only a temporary increase to EUR700 billion, BBC notes.

Some fear that the fund could not cope with another bailout, BBC
says.

So far, Greece, Republic of Ireland and Portugal have been bailed
out, BBC discloses.

Mr. Gurria, as cited by BBC, said that the finance ministers of
the 17 nations in the euro, who are meeting later this week,
should boost the fund, adding that the current commitments are
not enough to restore market confidence.

The eurozone created the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) in 2010 to serve as a temporary bailout fund, BBC relates.

Under the EFSF, countries with top credit ratings, who can borrow
money cheaply, can then lend it on to countries that are
struggling, BBC discloses.

A new permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism,
is due to be established later this year, BBC states.


* Moody's Says Weak Demand Weighs on Global Paper Companies
-----------------------------------------------------------
The negative outlook for the global paper and forest products
sector reflects weakening demand and lower prices, according to a
new industry outlook by Moody's Investors Service.

"The weak economic environment in Europe coupled with the secular
decline in paper consumption is driving down demand," said
Ed Sustar, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer. "We
anticipate that average prices for most product grades in the
sector will be lower in 2012 as excess capacity causes product
inventories to increase slightly ".

The report notes that offsetting soft demand and low pricing with
cost-cutting measures will be difficult for most paper companies,
as aggregate input costs for fiber, chemicals and energy will be
flat . As a result, Moody's expects aggregate operating income
for the global paper and forest products industry will decline in
2012.

"Consolidation within product grades should help some producers
better align their production and expansion plans with demand,
and prevent the build-up of inventory that leads to weaker
pricing", said Mr. Sustar. It is also expected that production
discipline and further consolidation will lead to the elimination
of high-cost operating capacity.

Moody's expects that European producers will see a continuing
decline in demand and pricing, as the Euro area enters a mild
recession in 2012, while North American producers may see a
slight decline in operating income, reflecting lower pricing and
paper demand. Operating income for Latin American producers will
also decrease due to weakening prices for market pulp and
declining demand for exports, but this will be partially offset
by resilient domestic demand.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
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Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *