TCREUR_Public/120330.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, March 30, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 65



VEGA CONTAINER 2006-1: Moody's 'Ba3' Rating Unaffected by CMA CGM


ADAM OPEL: General Motors Names Alfred Rieck as Sales Chief


* GREECE: Moody's Says January RMBS & ABS Performance Deteriorate


AVOCA VI: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B+'
CUSTOM HOUSE: 47 Clients Oppose Liquidator's Fees and Costs
EIRCOM GROUP: Files for Examinership in High Court
EIRCOM GROUP: Chief Executive Steps Down Amid Restructuring Talks


ALITALIA SPA: Won't Have to Repay State Aid, EU Court Rules
EUROFIDI: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'


SIA PALINK: Riga Court Ruling Violates Constitution, Senate Says


ORCO PROPERTY: Posts EUR43 Million Net Loss in 2011


* PORTUGAL: Moody's Lowers BFSRs of 5 Portuguese Banks to 'E+'


FIRST UNITED: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
HOME CREDIT: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates RUB5BB Senior Unsecured Bonds 'B+'


PETKIM PETROKIMYA: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EPIC PLC: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCCsf'
GILBERTS HOUSE: To be Placed Into Voluntary Liquidation
GREENLEAF GLOBAL: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Maintains 'CCC' Rating on Class E Notes
VP COMMODITIES: High Court Orders Liquidation


* BOOK REVIEW: All Organizations Are Public



VEGA CONTAINER 2006-1: Moody's 'Ba3' Rating Unaffected by CMA CGM
Moody's Investors Service has announced that the Ba3(sf) rating
of the class A notes issued by Vega Container Vessel 2006-1
remain unaffected following the downgrade of CMA CGM S.A.'s
corporate family rating (CFR) to B3 from B2 and probability of
default rating (PDR) to Caa1 from B2 on March 13, 2012. The
transaction is designed to finance a fleet of container vessels
for CMA CGM, which is one of the largest container shipping
companies in the world.

CMA CGM's downgrade does not affect the class A notes rating, as
the higher default probability of CMA CGM, which is the only
charterparty in this transaction, is mitigated by the transaction
features and the value given to the collateral. Moreover, the
rating agency does not expect a potential restructuring of CMA
CGM's bank loan to affect the rating of the notes, assuming the
restructuring does not affect the company's ability to pay under
the charter contract.

The rating of the class A notes reflects Moody's view of (i) CMA
CGM's credit quality and the assessment of the probability that
it will default on its obligations under the transaction; and
(ii) the additional degree of protection provided by the legal
and financial arrangements of the transaction to the class A
noteholders in the event of a default by CMA CGM. The rating is
based on an estimate of the probability and the severity of a
shortfall for the class A notes in the event of a sale of the
collateral and liquidation of the transaction following such a
default. This estimate is based, in part, on a quantitative model
of the transaction and factors in the characteristics of the
collateral pool, the volatility of vessel prices and the
structural enhancements of the transaction.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
"Approach to Rating Shipping Loans for Structured Finance
Transactions", published in November 2010.


ADAM OPEL: General Motors Names Alfred Rieck as Sales Chief
Tim Higgins at Bloomberg News reports that General Motors Co.
named Alfred Rieck as sales chief of Opel as the company attempts
to end losses in Europe, where auto demand is forecast to fall
for the fifth straight year.

Mr. Rieck, who will be a member of Opel's supervisory board,
takes over his new position on July 1, Bloomberg discloses.  GM
said he replaces Alain Visser, who is leaving the company,
Bloomberg notes.

The company said in a statement that Opel's board met on
Wednesday, Bloomberg relates.

The board, Bloomberg says, is working on a plan to return the
European unit, including the Vauxhall brand in the U.K., to

GM intends to make more cost cuts in the region after its last
revamping effort failed to end deficits, Bloomberg states.  GM
Europe lost US$747 million last year before taxes and interest,
Bloomberg recounts.

"All parties around the table agree that Opel/Vauxhall needs to
return to profitability and to take action to increase revenues,
improve margins and reduce costs," Bloomberg quotes Opel's
statement as saying.  "To that extent, the parties are committed
to continue the dialogue with each other in order to identify the
best possible strategy to improve the company's financial

According to Bloomberg, analysts, including Brian Johnson with
Barclays Capital, have said that GM's factories in Ellesmere
Port, England, and Bochum, Germany, may be at risk to be closed.

                           Union Talks

Christoph Rauwald and Nico Schmidt at Dow Jones Newswires report
that Opel said on Wednesday it will continue talks with labor
unions to turn the struggling business around, but it didn't
elaborate on any proposals or a possible timeframe.

Opel, as cited by Dow Jones, said it aims to "work out an optimal
strategy" together with its labor unions to improve the company's
financial situation. Labor representatives hold half the seats on
the company's supervisory board.

GM's European operations have incurred steep losses over the past
decade as previous restructuring programs failed to bring in the
anticipated results, Dow Jones discloses.

"It appears increasingly inevitable that some of the company's
European facilities will be shuttered eventually," wrote IHS
analyst Tim Urquhart in a note, according to Dow Jones.  "The
company's U.S. management will not accept ongoing losses and talk
of increased production and purchasing efficiencies will not
generate the kind of structural savings that Opel/Vauxhall needs
in a contracting European market."

Europe has been GM's only unprofitable region for fiscal 2011 and
demand for new cars in the region has been shrinking for years,
Dow Jones notes.

Adam Opel GmbH -- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).
Its high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of
Opel models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the
Astra sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside
North America.


* GREECE: Moody's Says January RMBS & ABS Performance Deteriorate
The performance of the Greek residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) market
continued to weaken during the quarter up to January 2012,
according to the latest indices published by Moody's Investors

In RMBS transactions, 90+ day delinquencies increased to 2.91% in
January 2012, from 2.22% in October 2011 and 1.74% in January
2011. The cumulative defaults increased to 0.97% in January 2012,
from 0.92% in October 2011. This was mainly driven by Estia II's
poor performance.

In ABS SME and leasing, 90+ day delinquencies rose to 5.11% in
January 2012, from 1.45% a year ago and 60+ day delinquencies
recorded a strong increase to 8.08% in January 2012, from 3.22%
in January 2011. Cumulative defaults were 5.98%, compared with
0.68% a year before. Due to the withdrawn rating of a number of
transactions, the latest figure reflects only the performance of
Misthosis and Synergatis.

The ratings were withdrawn for all transactions in ABS consumer
loans, leaving no performance data for January 2012. The
historical performances have been kept for reference in this
month indices report.

On January 19, 2012, Moody's downgraded two tranches of two ABS
transactions and 19 tranches of eight RMBS transactions,
concluding the review initiated on 11 November 2011. The rating
action reflected Moody's assessment of the increased probability
and severity of a disorderly default by Greece on its debt, and
the implications of such a default for Greek structured finance

In total, 11 RMBS transactions and 13 ABS transactions launched
and rated by Moody's since 2004 have been included in the index.
The number of ABS transactions has significantly decreased and
currently only two transactions rated by Moody's are included in
the index. On January 5, 2012, Moody's withdrew the ratings of
all tranches for Daneion 2007-1 PLC, leaving no Greek ABS
consumer loans left outstanding. Two additional ABS transactions
are still outstanding but not included in the index given their
specificities. Eight RMBS transactions remain rated by Moody's.

In January 2012, the current outstanding pool balance of Greek
RMBS transactions was EUR3,511 million, compared with EUR4,747
million in January 2011 and the current outstanding pool balance
of ABS transactions was EUR2,238 million, compared with EUR13,233
million in January 2011.


AVOCA VI: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Avoca CLO VI PLC's class A2, B Def, C Def, D Def, E Def, F Def
and class R combination notes, and affirmed the rating on class
A1 notes. "We have also withdrawn our ratings on the class S, T,
and U combination notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our performance review of the
transaction and the application of our 2010 counterparty
criteria," S&P said.

"Since our last review in April 2010, we have observed a
relatively positive rating migration of the underlying portfolio.
Indeed the increase of 'BB' rated assets offset the slight
increase of defaulted assets and 'CCC' rated assets," S&P said.

"At the same time, the credit enhancement available to each class
of notes has slightly increased. This is because there is a small
increase of the aggregate collateral balance from EUR487.5
million to EUR488.7 million, and also because the class A1 notes
have amortized by about EUR1 million in order to cure the junior
par value test and the reinvestment test, which were previously
in breach. None of the other classes has paid down and all
coverage tests are currently in compliance," S&P said.

"Positive factors in our analysis include the reduction of the
weighted-average life and the increase of the weighted-average
spread to 3.20% from 2.70%," S&P said.

"We have subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class. We used the portfolio balance that we consider to be
performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we consider to be
appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using our standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction
with different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Non-euro assets mainly denominated in U.S. dollars and British
pounds sterling account for about 13% of the underlying
portfolio, and the resulting foreign currency risk is hedged via
perfect asset swaps with Credit Suisse
International(A+/Negative/A-1) and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.
(A+/Stable/A-1) as swap counterparties. We have also stressed the
transaction's sensitivity to and reliance on the swap
counterparties, especially for senior classes of notes rated
higher than the swap counterparties, by applying foreign exchange
stresses to the notional amount of non-euro assets. Our analysis
showed that the class A1 notes could withstand a 'AA+' stress
under these conditions, whereas the class A2 notes, which would
otherwise pass at a 'AA+' rating level, could only achieve a
'AA-'," S&P said.

"Therefore, and in accordance with our analysis, we have raised
our ratings on the class A2 B Def, C Def, D Def, E Def, and F Def
and the class R combination notes to levels that appropriately
reflect the current levels of credit enhancement, the portfolio
credit quality, and the transaction's performance. The class F
could achieve a 'B+' level but is capped at 'CCC+' by our largest
obligor test," S&P said.

"We have also observed that the credit support available to the
class A1 notes is commensurate with its current rating, and we
have therefore affirmed our rating on this note," S&P said.

"Finally, we have withdrawn our ratings on the class S, T, and U
combination notes, following confirmation by the trustee that the
notes were decoupled between June 2010 and August 2011," S&P

Avoca CLO VI PLC is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction backed primarily by leveraged loans to
speculative-grade corporate firms. Avoca CLO VI PLC closed in
November 2006 and is managed by Avoca Capital Holdings.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at


Class                     Rating
                          To                From

EUR558.3 mil floating-rate notes

Ratings Raised
A2                         AA- (sf)         A+ (sf)
B Def                      A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C Def                      BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)
D Def                      BB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)
E Def                      B+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
F Def                      CCC+ (sf)        CCC- (sf)
R Combo                    B+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed
A1                                  AA+ (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn
S Combo                    NR               CCC (sf)
T Combo                    NR               CCC- (sf)
U Combo                    NR               CCC- (sf)

NR - Not rated.

CUSTOM HOUSE: 47 Clients Oppose Liquidator's Fees and Costs
Tim Healy and Laura Noonan at report that almost
50 clients of collapsed Custom House Capital (CHC) are opposing
an attempt by the investment firm's liquidator to recover more
than EUR225,000 of his costs from money in CHC's client accounts.

KPMG insolvency specialist Kieran Wallace was appointed
liquidator to CHC last October after Central Bank inspectors
found "systemic and deliberate misuse" of client funds that
ultimately left CHC's clients EUR56 million out of pocket.

On March 26, says, Ms. Justice Mary Finlay
Geoghegan was told Mr. Wallace intended to seek the court's
permission to use money from client accounts to pay his legal
costs and his remuneration in connection with the administration
of the company's equity and segregated cash accounts. notes that the liquidator is seeking some
EUR86,000 in legal fees and remuneration of EUR141,000. It
amounts to about 0.5pc of what is held in each of the relevant
client accounts to cover his fees.

According to the report, Mr. Wallace's lawyers said the
application was relevant to 349 of CHC's client accounts. Of
these, 112 had consented to the liquidator's request.  A further
190 have neither objected nor consented to the liquidator's
application, while some 47 clients are opposing Mr. Wallace's
move, the report notes.

Some of the objectors told the court they intended to oppose
Mr. Wallace's application, on grounds understood to include that
the fees sought were excessive and unfair, says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 25,
2011, The Irish Times said that the High Court has appointed a
liquidator to Custom House Capital after Central Bank inspectors
found "systemic and deliberate misuse" of more than EUR56 million
of client funds.  A 198-page report by two inspectors into the
company described "a sort of Irish Ponzi scheme", Mr. Justice
Gerard Hogan, as cited by The Irish Times, said. related that the Garda Fraud Squad is now
investigating CHC and, within the next few months, expects to
question those who ran some of the investment products where this
misuse occurred, according to a source close to the garda

Custom House Capital is a Dublin investment firm.

EIRCOM GROUP: Files for Examinership in High Court
Joe Brennan and Finbarr Flynn at Bloomberg News report that
Eircom Group Ltd. may be placed in examinership, in the country's
biggest creditor protection petition as it seeks to restructure
EUR3.75 billion of debt.

The filing for examinership, an Irish variant of U.S. Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection, of Eircom and two related companies, was
made in the High Court in Dublin yesterday, Bloomberg relates.

Creditor protection will allow Eircom trade as it reorganizes
debt accumulated through five ownership changes in the past 13
years, Bloomberg notes.

Eircom said March 14 it supports "in principle" a restructuring
plan submitted by a group of first-lien, or most senior, lenders,
after failing to secure sufficient bid interest in an attempt to
sell itself, Bloomberg recounts.

Bloomberg notes that two people with knowledge of the matter said
March 14 that the first-lien lenders proposed writing off 15% of
their loans in exchange for full control of the company.

Bloomberg relates that the people said the lender group, led by
two Blackstone Group LP units, envisage second-lien lenders
recovering EUR35 million, or 10%, of their loans, with more
junior creditors losing virtually all their investment.

According to The Irish Times' Ciaran Hancock, it is understood
that Grant Thornton has been lined up to take on the role of
examiner, subject to court approval.

Under the proposals, Eircom's gross debts would be reduced from
about EUR4 billion currently to about EUR2.35 billion, the Irish
Times notes.

Voting on the restructuring proposals concluded on Wednesday, the
Irish Times discloses.  A majority of first-lien senior lenders
were expected to give their approval to the plan, the Irish Times

The maturity profile on these borrowings would also be extended
to 2017, the Irish Times says.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

EIRCOM GROUP: Chief Executive Steps Down Amid Restructuring Talks
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Eircom Group's
chief executive Paul Donovan has decided to leave the company at
the end of 2012 for "personal reasons".

According to the Irish Times, Mr. Donovan's decision comes as the
company prepares to conclude a major restructuring of its debts
and faces into examinership in the coming days.  Mr. Donovan's
three-year contract with Eircom was due to expire at the end of
June, the Irish Times discloses.

He has agreed to a six-month extension and will leave at the end
of December, the Irish Times notes.

In a statement, Mr. Donovan, as cited by the Irish Times, said
renewing his contract with Eircom would have required a new
"multi-year commitment which I am not in a position to make".

The nine-month notice period will allow Mr. Donovan to complete
the financial restructuring of the business, the Irish Times
states.  It will also give the Eircom board, chaired by Ned
Sullivan, plenty of time to find a replacement for Mr. Donovan,
according to the Irish Times.

Mr. Donovan joined Eircom in July 2009, having spent a number of
years with Vodafone, including a spell in charge of its Irish
arm, the Irish Times recounts.

Since joining Eircom, he has negotiated further restructuring of
employee numbers and work practices; negotiated a deal to resolve
its pension deficit; and led the financial restructuring, the
Irish Times discloses.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


ALITALIA SPA: Won't Have to Repay State Aid, EU Court Rules
Aoife White at Bloomberg News reports that Ryanair Holdings Plc
lost a court challenge that may have forced Alitalia SpA's owners
to repay a EUR300 million (US$401 million) loan from the Italian

According to Bloomberg, a statement from the Luxembourg-based
tribunal said that the European Union General Court dismissed
Ryanair's case and confirmed the European Commission's approval
of the sale of Alitalia's main assets to Compagnia Aerea
Italiana, a group of Italian investors, after the airline's 2008

The court confirmed that CAI, including Intesa Sanpaolo SpA and
Atlantia SpA, wasn't required to repay the state loan that the EU
said was illegal aid, Bloomberg relates.

Air France-KLM Group, Europe's biggest airline, bought 25% of
Alitalia from CAI in 2009, Bloomberg recounts.

"The sale did not have the effect of circumventing the obligation
to recover the aid or of granting aid to the buyers," the court

Ryanair, based in Dublin, said it will appeal the ruling,
Bloomberg notes.

"[Wednes]day's decision allows Alitalia and CAI to avoid repaying
EUR300 million of state aid, which the EU Commission has already
-- in 2008 -- ruled to be illegal," Bloomberg quotes Stephen
McNamara, a Ryanair spokesman, as saying in an e-mailed
statement.  "This highlights the commission's bias towards flag-
carrier airlines, who repeatedly receive illegal state aid but
never have to repay it."

According to Bloomberg, Alitalia said in a statement that it
isn't liable for any of the aid because it isn't seen as a legal
successor to the airline that sought bankruptcy protection.  It
also said it paid the market price for the carrier's assets,
Bloomberg relates.

Based in Rome, Alitalia S.p.A. --
provides air travel services for passengers and air transport of
cargo on national, international and inter-continental routes,
including United States, Canada, Japan and Argentina.  The
Italian government owns 49.9% of Alitalia.

On August 29, 2008, Alitalia declared insolvency and commenced
extraordinary administration procedure at the Tribunal of Rome.
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi appointed Mr. Fantozzi
as extraordinary commissioner.  Under the Bankruptcy Bill, the
Administrator has supplanted the directors and other management
of Alitalia.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
November 7, 2008, Alitalia filed for Chapter 15 protection with
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York.
Italy's national airline experienced financial difficulties for a
number of years caused, in large measure, by a combination of
competition from low-cost air carriers, poor management and
onerous union obligations, according to papers filed with the

In the petition filed October 29, 2008, Prof. Augusto Fantozzi,
the appointed administrator, said the airline's financial
difficulties had been and exacerbated by spiraling fuel prices.

Despite a EUR1.4 billion state-backed restructuring in 1997,
Alitalia posted net losses of EUR256 million and EUR907 million
in 2000 and 2001 respectively.  Alitalia posted EUR93 million in
net profits in 2002 after a EUR1.4 billion capital injection.
The carrier booked annual net losses of EUR520 million in 2003,
EUR813 million in 2004, EUR168 million in 2005, EUR625.6 million
in 2006, and EUR494.64 million in 2007.

EUROFIDI: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Eurofidi's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and Short-term IDR to 'B' from
'F3'.  The Long-term IDR has been placed on Rating Watch Negative

The rating action reflects Fitch's view that support for Eurofidi
from its largest ultimate shareholder, the Region of Piemonte
(RP; 'A-'/RWN) has weakened.  The agency believes that recent
changes in Eurofidi's statutes, driven by European directives,
are an indicator of loosening ties between RP and Eurofidi.
These directives removed the RP's power to directly nominate a
set number of members to Eurofidi's board of directors, including
the chairperson.  In addition, RP's financial profile has
weakened, which was reflected in the region's downgrade in
February 2011.

The RP controls an 18% stake in Eurofidi, indirectly owned
through its fully-owned finance company subsidiary, FinPiemonte
Partecipazioni.  Fitch considers that the RP's participation in
Eurofidi remains strategic to the region given its role in
supporting local SMEs.  However, a further loosening of the ties
between RP and Eurofidi is possible.  Thus, Eurofidi's IDRs,
which are driven by potential support from the RP, are sensitive
to changes in the RP's ability and/or propensity to support

The RWN on Eurofidi's Long-term IDR mirrors that on RP's, and
Eurofidi's Long-term IDR could be downgraded if RP's rating is
downgraded.  Fitch expects to resolve the RWN on Eurofidi's Long-
term IDR once the RWN on RP's Long-term IDR is resolved.  Fitch
notes that the RP's RWN reflects the possible consequences of the
region's deliberation in January 2012 to mandate the financial
manager to cancel former deliberations authorizing interest rate
and amortizing swap transactions.  Once the RWN on the RP's IDR
is resolved, Fitch will assess the impact on its ability and
propensity to support Eurofidi.

In recent years, Eurofidi has significantly diversified its
activities outside its home region of Piemonte, with about 70% of
guarantees issued across nine regions outside Piemonte at end-

Eurofidi's asset quality ratios are weak and have rapidly
deteriorated in the past three years with problem guarantees
accounting for 16.8% of gross guarantees at end-2011.  Its net
credit risk exposure considering counter-guarantees represented
over three times its end-2011 equity.  However annual losses as a
proportion of gross guarantees remained low at 1% of gross
guarantees in 2011.  The increasing level of problem guarantees
is a direct consequence of the domestic economy's continuing weak
performance.  For 2012, Fitch expects the stock of problem
guarantees to deteriorate further as Italy's economy is in
recession.  Overall Fitch considers Eurofidi's risk exposures as
adequately controlled, and it benefits from significant counter-
guarantees from the Italian Central Guarantee Fund.

Eurofidi's regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio reached 15.5% at end-
2011.  Fitch considers that capitalization must remain strong
given the small size of the confidi and the weak domestic
economy, which has caused asset quality to weaken substantially.
The intense use of counter-guarantees as a risk mitigation tool
is seen, by Fitch, as a positive factor as it reduces the
confidi's net credit risk.

Eurofidi is the largest credit-guarantor in Italy.  It is a
regulated entity under Article 107 of the Italian Banking Act and
subject to prudential supervision by the Bank of Italy.


SIA PALINK: Riga Court Ruling Violates Constitution, Senate Says
The Baltic Course reports that Riga Kurzeme District Court's
insolvency ruling against Palink, the operator of "Iki" and
"Cento" chain stores, violated the Constitution's Article 92,
which states that "All individuals have the right to defend his
or her rights and lawful interests in a fair trial", says the
Supreme Court Senate's decision overturning the District Court's

The Baltic Course relates that a copy of the Senate's verdict
obtained by LETA says the Constitution's article was violated as
the Kurzeme District Court misinterpreted the subject of the
insolvency petition against Palink and the reasons for it, and
the court actually reviewed a debt claim.

The Senate, therefore, concluded that the Kurzeme District Court
did not have a legitimate reason to rule Palink insolvent, not
until Palink's dispute over an unpaid debt was resolved by the
other court, The Baltic Course relays.

Thus, The Baltic Course notes, the Senate overturned the Kurzeme
District Court's ruling, and revert the case to the same court to
be reviewed again.

The date for a repeat review of the insolvency claim against
Palink has not yet been set, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 1,
2012, The Baltic Times said Palink was ruled insolvent by the
Riga Kurzeme District Court on Jan. 5.  But on Jan. 13,
Prosecutor General Arvids Kalnins handed in an official protest
to the Supreme Court Senate's Civil Cases Department over the
court's ruling on Palink insolvency.

The insolvency case against Palink was opened following a
petition filed by private individual Sergejs Guscins, who claimed
that Palinkhad not paid for work done by the construction company
Landekss, according to Baltic Times.

Based in Latvia, SIA Palink operates Cento and IKI supermarket
chains.  Its largest owner is the pan-European retailer alliance


ORCO PROPERTY: Posts EUR43 Million Net Loss in 2011
Douglas Lytle at Bloomberg News reports that Orco Property Group
SA, a developer in central Europe overhauling its business and
debt under a court-approved plan, posted a net loss last year of
EUR43 million, following a 2010 profit of EUR223 million.

According to Bloomberg, the company blamed the loss on a bond
restructuring program and said it is still facing "challenging"

Orco Property Group SA -- is a
Luxembourg-based real estate company, specializing in the
development, rental and management of properties in Central and
Eastern Europe.  Through its fully consolidated subsidiaries,
Orco Property Group SA operates in several countries, including
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Croatia
and Russia.  The Company rents and manages real estate and hotels
properties composed of office buildings, apartments with
services, luxury hotels and hotel residences; it also develops
real estate projects as promoter.


* PORTUGAL: Moody's Lowers BFSRs of 5 Portuguese Banks to 'E+'
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on seven
Portuguese banks and banking groups. The senior debt and deposit
ratings for four banks were downgraded by one notch, aligning
their ratings at the same level or one notch below the ratings of
the Portuguese government, which was downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2
on February 13, 2012. The debt and deposit ratings of Banco
Santander Totta (a subsidiary of Banco Santander S.A.) were
lowered by two notches to Ba1. The debt and deposit ratings of
Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) and of Caixa Economica Montepio
Geral (Montepio) were confirmed at Ba3. All ratings have a
negative outlook.

The downgrades of most of the banks' debt and deposit ratings
reflect Moody's downgrades of their standalone bank financial
strength ratings (BFSRs), which are driven by the following key

-- Expected further deterioration of banks' domestic asset
quality and profitability given the country's poor economic
outlook which is driven in part by the austerity measures needed
to address the sovereign's weakening credit profile

-- Additional asset risks stemming from banks' substantial
holdings of government-related debt

-- Prolonged and ongoing lack of access to private wholesale
funding sources;

While none of these pressures are new, in Moody's view they
continue to mount against the backdrop of the ongoing euro debt
crisis. Positively, Moody's recognizes the supportive stance
toward the Portuguese banking system by its government and the
euro area authorities including the ECB. However, as discussed
further below, Moody's has concluded that this supportive stance
does not fully offset the aforementioned negative drivers.

All of the banks' standalone credit assessments have negative
outlooks, reflecting the very challenging operating environment,
which will likely continue to exert negative pressure on the
banks' operating performance. The negative outlooks on the banks'
debt and deposit ratings reflect the negative outlook on their
standalone credit assessments and on the Portuguese government's
Ba3 bond rating.

The rating actions conclude the review for downgrade of
Portuguese banks, initiated on 15 February 2012 (see "Moody's
Reviews Ratings for European Banks"). That review was part of
Moody's wider review of European financial institutions driven in
part by (i) the difficult European operating environment caused
by the prolonged euro area crisis; and (ii) and the deteriorating
creditworthiness of certain euro area sovereigns (including

Moody's has also concluded its review of systemic support
currently incorporated in the ratings of subordinated debt of
Portuguese banks, which was initiated on 29 November 2011, and
removed all systemic support from these ratings.

As a result, the subordinated debt (and, where applicable, junior
subordinated debt) ratings of two banks (Banco Comercial
Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo) have been affected, since the
ratings on those securities are now being notched off these
banks' adjusted standalone credit assessments, which do not
incorporate government support assumptions. This action reflects
Moody's view that creditors holding subordinated debt of
Portuguese banks are more likely to suffer losses than holders of
their senior unsecured debt in the event that the government
provides financial support to the banking system.


* Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD): The standalone BFSR was
  downgraded to E+ (mapping to B1 on the long term scale) from D
  (Ba2) and the debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to
  Ba3/Not Prime from Ba2/Not Prime.

* Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP): The standalone BFSR was
  downgraded to E+ (B2) from E+ (B1) and the debt and deposit
  ratings was confirmed at Ba3/Not Prime.

* Banco Espirito Santo (BES): The standalone BFSR was downgraded
  to E+ (B1) from D- (Ba3) and the debt and deposit ratings were
  downgraded to Ba3/Not Prime from Ba2/Not Prime. Espirito Santo
  Financial Group (ESFG, the parent of BES): The debt ratings
  were downgraded to B2/Not prime from B1/Not Prime.

* Banco BPI (BPI): The standalone BFSR was downgraded to E+ (B1)
  from D (Ba2) and the debt and deposit ratings were downgraded
  to Ba3/Not prime from Ba2/Not Prime.

* Banco Santander Totta (BST): The standalone BFSR was downgraded
  to D- (Ba3) from D+ (Ba1) and the debt and deposit ratings were
  downgraded to Ba1/Not Prime from Baa2/Prime-2.

* Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (Montepio): The standalone BFSR
  was confirmed at D- (Ba3) and the debt and deposit ratings were
  confirmed at Ba3/Not Prime.

* Banco Internacional do Funchal (Banif): The standalone BFSR was
  downgraded to E+ (B2) from D- (Ba3) and the debt and deposit
  ratings were downgraded to B1/Not Prime from Ba3/Not Prime.

A full list of affected ratings can be found at this link:



In Moody's view, the intrinsic credit strength of Portuguese
banks is weakening, primarily owing to the three drivers
mentioned above and discussed below:


Portugal's increasingly challenging economic prospects will
exacerbate the intense pressure on Portuguese banks' already weak
profitability and asset quality. Moody's expects loan loss
provisions to absorb an increasing portion of banks' pre-tax
income. At the same time, margins will be further pressured in
light of the expected increase in non-earning assets, higher
funding costs (particularly of retail deposits) and continued
balance sheet deleveraging.

The Portuguese economy, which Moody's expects to shrink by 3.6%
during 2012, is weighed down by the weakening sovereign credit
profile (reflected in the recent government bond rating downgrade
to Ba3 from Ba2 on February 13, 2012), by the government's
austerity program needed to consolidate the sovereign's debt
position and by an increasingly restricted supply of credit, as
banks seek to reduce risk assets given the demands on them to
deleverage from investors and regulators. The recapitalizations
orchestrated (and most likely funded) by the Portuguese
government as a means of supporting the solvency of the
Portuguese banking system and perhaps ultimately bolstering
confidence in it are likely, in the short term, to further
inhibit credit creation.


Portuguese banks, like most banks, have substantial exposures to
their domestic sovereign. Holdings of government bonds averaged
around 80% of core capital as of end-December 2011 for the seven
banks covered by the announcement. This direct exposure, together
with exposure via counterparties and customers who are themselves
sensitive to the sovereign, means Portuguese banks are highly
sensitive to the sovereign's weakening credit profile.


Portuguese banks face a prolonged loss of access to private
sources of wholesale funding. They are, to all intents and
purposes, unable to operate on a standalone basis without
external funding. Moody's has taken into account the extensive
routine and extraordinary financing made available by the
Portuguese government and the euro area authorities in preserving
the banks' BFSRs and debt and deposit ratings in the 'B' and 'Ba'
category. The rating agency also acknowledges the generally
supportive stance of the euro area authorities including the
supportive effect of recent ECB operations, which have sharply
reduced the risk of any bank failing because of illiquidity.

However, this supportive stance does not mitigate Moody's
concerns. Such extraordinary support will ultimately buy time,
however there is still significant uncertainty about how that
time will be used to resolve the underlying problems driving the
euro area debt crisis or to enable the Portuguese banks to re-
enter the markets. The recent downgrade of the Portuguese
sovereign reflects the heightened uncertainties over the
government's ability to achieve its debt targets given, for
example, the weakening of the Portuguese economy.

In such an environment it is very difficult to see the Portuguese
banks re-entering the private markets in the foreseeable future.
The longer the banks remain reliant on public sector support, the
greater the probability that conditions come to be attached to
continued funding and liquidity support, with negative
consequences for creditors including bondholders. Moody's has
therefore concluded that it should continue to place only limited
additional weight on the availability of routine and
extraordinary funding and liquidity support arrangements in
assessing the banks' standalone strength, and in determining the
appropriate uplift factored into debt and deposit ratings.


Below, the rationale for each bank's standalone credit assessment
is discussed briefly. Moody's assumptions about parental and
government support are discussed below in the section "Rationale
for downgrade of debt ratings and support assumptions".



Moody's believes that the bank continues to display the strongest
financial indicators within the Portuguese banking sector in
terms of capital, profitability and asset quality. However, given
the domestic nature of its operations, the BFSR downgrade to D-
/Ba3 from D+/Ba1 indicates that BST is subject to the same
challenges as the rest of the Portuguese banks, derived from the
very weak operating environment and increased sovereign risk, to
which the bank has significant direct exposure. Furthermore, BST
has traditionally displayed a sizable dependence on wholesale
funding, which has led to an increased reliance on ECB funding
due to the closure of capital markets (9% of total assets at end-
December 2011). Moody's acknowledges that BST is well positioned
to meet the recapitalization and deleveraging targets imposed by
the regulator in conjunction with the European Union, the
European Central Bank and the IMF (the "Troika"). However,
Moody's has eliminated the gap between BST's standalone credit
assessment and the sovereign's government bond rating, both now
at Ba3, to reflect the pressures stemming from the close linkage
between the bank and the sovereign, at a time where further
pressure on the real economy or on market confidence on the
Portuguese government could rapidly spread to the country's
banking sector.


For CGD, the downgrade to an E+ BFSR (mapping to B1 on the long-
term scale) from D (Ba2) reflects Moody's expectations of further
pressure on CGD's credit fundamentals, stemming from the very
weak operating environment and disrupted access to wholesale
funding, as well as its strong interlinks with the sovereign
credit risk from both an ownership perspective and through its
direct government debt holdings and exposure to domestic
operations. The downgrade also captures CGD's difficulty to
generate capital internally to comply with the more stringent
regulatory capital requirements. Moody's expects that this
capital shortfall will be offset by the support provided by the
Portuguese government (CGD's unique shareholder) and will closely
monitor the accomplishment of the bank's deleveraging plan,
which, if fulfilled should have a favorable impact on the bank's
capital position. Furthermore, the bank's liquidity position
should improve once the privatization of BPN (E (Caa1)/B3;
developing outlook) concludes (scheduled for H1 2012), since CGD
currently provides significant liquidity support to BPN.


For BPI, the two-notch downgrade of the BFSR to E+ (mapping to B1
on the long-term scale) from D/Ba2 reflects the bank's
vulnerability to the adverse domestic environment and relatively
high exposure to sovereign risk. Moody's also acknowledges BPI's
increased capital needs deriving from the EBA's requirement for
mid-2012 to cover its sovereign exposures, in addition to Bank of
Portugal's target of a 10% core capital ratio at the end of this
year, combined with a lack of access to capital markets and a
weakened and volatile revenue generation capacity, which has
increased the likelihood that BPI will resort to capital
assistance from the government.

The recapitalization will exert additional strain on
profitability given the cost of such instruments and the need to
comply with the targets of the plan presented to Bank of Portugal
and the Troika in order to repay such capital instruments in due
time. More positively, BPI's stronger-than-average asset-quality
indicators -- combined with modest refinancing requirements over
the next two years -- place BPI in a stronger position relative
to its domestic peers to emerge from the current challenges.


For Banif, the BFSR downgrade to E+ (mapping to B2 on the long-
term scale) from D-/Ba3 is a reflection of the bank's (i) very
weak credit fundamentals, namely asset quality and profitability
(jointly with BCP, Banif displays the highest nonperforming loan
(NPL) ratio of the Portuguese system); (ii) very limited capacity
to internally generate capital; and (iii) high reliance on
wholesale funding, that has translated into a large dependence on
ECB funding (14% of total assets at year-end 2011). The ratings
of Banif have been traditionally constrained by its complex
organizational structure and corporate-governance issues. Moody's
acknowledges that the group has very recently replaced its top
management. In this regard, the rating agency will monitor any
new developments that may affect the bank's main targets within
the funding and recapitalization plan submitted to Bank of
Portugal and the Troika, and will assess any potential effects it
could have on Banif's credit profile. Moody's notes that the
deleveraging plan might affect Banif's profitability, in addition
to the negative transition risk derived from any further
deterioration in the country's operating environment.



For BCP, the E+ BFSR (now mapping to B2 on the long-term scale
from B1) reflects the bank's very weak financial fundamentals
evidenced by (i) high NPL ratio of 6.4% at the end of 2011 (145
bps above the system average, according to Bank of Portugal
criteria); (ii) deteriorating profitability ratios (after
deducting extraordinary charges in 2011); (iii) pressures
stemming from its Greek subsidiary, although BCP has made
significant impairments linked to these operations during 2011;
and (iv) a challenged funding profile, due to its high reliance
on wholesale funds and ongoing restrictions in accessing other
type of funding outside the ECB. In addition, Moody's notes BCP's
significant capital needs to comply with the mid-2012 more
stringent solvency standards (similar to other domestic peers,
Moody's expects that this will be addressed through government
support). The B2 standalone credit assessment also captures BCP's
vulnerability to a further deterioration of the bank's risk-
absorption capacity, if the outlook for the Portuguese economy
becomes more negative.


For BES, the BFSR downgrade to E+ (mapping to B1 on the long-term
scale) from D-/Ba3 captures the effects that the very weak
operating environment and increased sovereign risks may have on
BES's credit profile, due to its high reliance on market funds
and exposure to capital markets activities. The accomplishment of
BES's funding and recapitalization plan will be a key rating
factor going forward, as any slippage in attaining its targets
may result in a need of government support for the bank.

Moody's notes that BES displays a capital shortfall principally
linked to the increased capital standards required by the EBA.
However, BES is confident that this shortfall is likely to be
covered by private funds without resorting to government support.
This will provide the bank some flexibility to accommodate the
more challenging operating environment as it will not be
constrained by the need of redeeming the public capital
instruments. In addition, Moody's also acknowledges that asset-
quality indicators compare favorably with those of its weakest


Moody's has confirmed the standalone credit assessment of
Montepio at D- (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale). This
reflects Montepio's exposure to the same challenges as the other
Portuguese banks, namely due to the domestic nature of its
operations, expected deterioration in asset quality, further
pressure in recurrent revenues and continued lack of access to
market funding, but that these risks were already incorporated
into its relatively low standalone credit assessment.


For five banks (CGD, BPI, BST, BES and Banif), the downgrades of
long-term debt ratings directly reflect the downgrade of the
banks' standalone credit assessments and the downgrade of the
Portuguese sovereign to Ba3 from Ba2, with a negative outlook
(see "Moody's adjusts ratings of 9 European sovereigns to capture
downside risks", February 13, 2012). The debt ratings for ESFG,
the holding company of BES, have been downgraded to B2 from B1 to
reflect the one notch downgrade of BES's standalone credit
assessment. The ratings of ESFG reflect the structural
subordination to its operating company BES.

The debt ratings of BCP were confirmed at Ba3, resulting in two
notches of uplift from its standalone credit assessment of B2,
and based on Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
support from the Portuguese sovereign.

The debt ratings of Montepio were confirmed at Ba3 after the
confirmation of its standalone credit assessment at Ba3. The
bank's debt and deposit ratings have not been affected by the
downgrade of the Portuguese sovereign as they did not benefit
from any rating uplift from systemic support.

BST's debt and deposit ratings of Ba1 incorporate a two-notch
uplift from its standalone credit assessment at D-/Ba3. This
uplift is based on Moody's assessment of a high likelihood of
parental support from Banco Santander S.A. (rated Aa3/B-; on
review for downgrade). BST's debt ratings are two notches above
the Portuguese government bond rating of Ba3; this uplift will
likely be maintained even after the conclusion of the current
rating review of Banco Santander.


Moody's has concluded its review on the systemic support that had
been incorporated in Portuguese banks' subordinated debt ratings.
All systemic support will be removed from these instruments'
ratings. This followed the rating action of 29 November 2011,
when Moody's placed on review for downgrade the ratings of the
senior subordinated and junior subordinated debt of Portuguese
banks (only BCP and BES were affected by the rating review),
together with other subordinated debt in other European countries
which benefited from some rating uplift based on Moody's
assumption of government support.

The removal of the support assumption for Portuguese subordinated
debt reflects Moody's conclusion that losses are more likely to
be imposed on these instruments when the government is otherwise
providing financial support to the banks outside of liquidation
has risen to a level that is incompatible with any remaining
uplift. Moody's acknowledges that the current legal and
regulatory framework remains ostensibly supportive. However,
Moody's believes that the conflict between rising pressure on
banks' capitalization levels and increasingly severe austerity
measures increases the probability that the government will seek
to protect its own balance sheet at the expense of subordinated
creditors, given the lesser contagious impact of such losses on
the financial system.

The subordinated debt ratings have been downgraded for all banks
whose standalone credit assessments have been downgraded.
Furthermore, in the case of BCP and BES, where subordinated debt
ratings had previously benefited from systemic support, the
downgrades of their subordinated debt ratings also reflects the
removal of systemic support.


The downgrade of five banks' junior subordinated debt and of four
banks' preference shares ratings follows the downgrade of these
banks' standalone credit assessments and the downgrade of the
subordinated debt ratings. All of these instruments' ratings have
a negative outlook, in line with the outlook on the banks'
standalone credit assessments.


An upgrade of banks' standalone credit assessments is unlikely in
the short term given the current negative outlook.

The banks' BFSRs could be adversely affected by (i) a greater-
than-expected deterioration in their loss-absorption capacity
(e.g., a reduction of existing capital buffers); (ii) higher
losses than those estimated under Moody's base-case scenario;
(iii) a further material deterioration in their liquidity
position; or (iv) material deterioration on banks' business
franchise as a consequence of a further weakening of the
operating environment.

Negative pressure on the banks' long-term debt and deposit
ratings could result from a further downgrade of the Portuguese
government's rating (Ba3, negative), as well as from a downgrade
of the banks' individual standalone BFSRs.

However, if the current economic environment improves, an upgrade
of the banks' BFSR could be driven by a combination of the
following factors (i) achieving the targeted deleveraging plan
resulting in stronger solvency ratios; (ii) an improved liquidity
position, with lower reliance on ECB funding and normalized
access to long-term wholesale financing; (iii) a sustainable
recovery of asset-quality indicators; (iv) an improved capacity
to generate recurrent revenues on the domestic operations; and/or
(iv) a reduction in their exposure to Portuguese government

An upgrade of the banks debt and deposit ratings could be
triggered by an improvement in their standalone financial


Following the downgrade on February 13 of the Portuguese
government's bond rating to Ba3 from Ba2, Moody's has downgraded
to Ba3 from Ba2 the backed senior debt of CGD and BES. The
backed-Ba3 ratings assigned are based on the unconditional
guarantee, which directly links them to the ratings of the
Portuguese government.


The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.


FIRST UNITED: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on
First United Bank and includes certain regulatory disclosures
regarding its ratings. The release does not constitute any change
in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for First United Bank.

Moody's current ratings on First United Bank and its affiliates

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of B3

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of B3

Bank Financial Strength ratings of E+

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of NP

Rating Rationale

Moody's assigns a standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating
(BFSR) of E+ to First United Bank (FUB), which maps to the long-
term scale of B3. FUB's BFSR is constrained by (i) high
concentrations on both sides of the balance sheet, including
significant dependence on a single source of funding that is also
a related party, and (ii) developing corporate governance and
risk-management practices.

At the same time, the rating derives from the bank's (i) locally
recognised brand name in Samara oblast and (ii) established ties
with a number of large companies, which are particularly
attracted by the positive image of the bank's major shareholder
-- Mr. Leonid Mikhelson (the CEO and one of the owners of Novatek
-- rated Baa3, stable -- Russia's second-largest gas producer
after state-controlled Gazprom).

At the same time, FUB's Global Local Currency (GLC) deposit
ratings of B3/Not Prime do not incorporate any element of
systemic support given the bank's limited franchise value and its
low importance for the Russian banking system as a whole.
Furthermore, the bank's affiliation with Novatek -- via
Mr. Mikhelson -- does not factor in any probability of parental
support from Novatek to FUB. As a result, FUB's GLC deposit
ratings are based solely on its long-term scale.

Rating Outlook

FUB's B3/E+ ratings carry a stable outlook.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

FUB's BFSR has limited upside potential at its current level. At
the same time, improving risk management practices could be
signalled by the bank's ability to maintain (i) an adequate
balance in terms of asset quality, revenues and administrative
expenses, and (ii) a material reduction in concentrations on both
sides of the balance sheet. The sustainable improvements in these
fields could potentially result in an upgrade of the bank's GLC
deposit rating, provided the bank maintains strong asset quality,
sufficient liquidity and adequate capital adequacy.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

A material deterioration in asset quality, as well as an outflow
of key customer deposits, could negatively affect FUB's BFSR and
GLC deposit rating. Further increase in the level of property
investments could also damage the bank's credit quality to the
level, which is not compatible with its current ratings,
although, according to the bank, it did not intend to increase
these investments.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology and published in March 2007.

HOME CREDIT: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on Home
Credit & Finance Bank and includes certain regulatory disclosures
regarding its ratings. The release does not constitute any change
in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for Home Credit & Finance

Moody's current ratings on Home Credit & Finance Bank are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic and foreign currency) ratings of Ba3

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of Ba3

Bank Financial Strength ratings of D-

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of NP

BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN Program (foreign currency) ratings
of (P)Ba3

BACKED Subordinate MTN Program (foreign currency) ratings of

BACKED Other Short Term (foreign currency) ratings of (P)NP

Ratings Rationale

The Ba3/Not Prime/D- ratings assigned to Home Credit and Finance
Bank (HCFB) reflect (i) the bank's niche franchise with high
credit risk exposure to consumer lending; (ii) refinancing risk
as the bank is significantly wholesale funded; (iii) adequate
capitalization and profitability metrics; and (iv) high loan book
granularity and adequate risk management practices.

HCFB's ratings do not incorporate any probability of parental
support given that the bank's ultimate shareholder, the Czech
Republic-based PPF Group, is unrated.

Rating Outlook

All the bank's ratings carry a stable outlook.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Positive rating actions could be triggered by a continued
expansion of the bank's commercial franchise and market share,
coupled with a reduced exposure to credit risk and a more
diversified funding profile.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Negative rating actions could result from any of the following: a
significant deterioration in the bank's liquidity position,
greater-than-expected credit losses in its loan book that would
place severe pressure on capital, or a significant contraction in
its business volumes that could weaken the bank's business
franchise. A material decrease in the bank's capital adequacy
would also be credit-negative.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology and published in March 2007.

RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates RUB5BB Senior Unsecured Bonds 'B+'
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Russian Standard Bank's (RSB) RUB5
billion senior unsecured fixed-rate exchange bonds (BO-02 series)
a Long-term rating of 'B+'.  The notes have a Recovery Rating of

The bonds bear a 9.0% coupon rate.  The issue is due in March
2015 and bondholders have a put option exercisable in April 2013.
RSB's obligations under the bonds rank equally with the claims of
other senior unsecured creditors except claims of retail
depositors, which under Russian law rank above those of other
senior unsecured creditors.  Retail deposits accounted for 63% of
the bank's total liabilities at end-2011, according to statutory

At end-2011, RSB was the 27th largest bank in Russia by assets.
Roustam Tariko indirectly owns 99.9% of RSB's shares.


PETKIM PETROKIMYA: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'
Fitch Ratings is providing further comment on the downgrade taken
on March 26, 2012, with regard to Turkey-based petrochemicals
producer Petkim Petrokimya Holdings A.S.  The company's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) were
downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB- ', whilst its National Long-term
rating was downgraded to 'A-(tur)' from 'A+(tur)'.  The Outlook
on all ratings is Stable.

The rating actions reflected a downgrade of Petkim's standalone
IDR to 'B' from 'BB-' and a simultaneous one notch uplift to 'B+'
for support from State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR; 'BBB-'/Stable), Petkim's main shareholder.

In Fitch's view, Petkim's severe underperformance in Q411
highlights its vulnerability in the face of cyclical downturns
and signals a further weakening in its competitive position, at a
time of reduced demand visibility and increasing price
volatility.  At 5.8%, the reported 2011 EBITDA margin compares
poorly with peers' performances and with Fitch's previous 8.0%
rating case projection.  This was despite a 34% sales growth
driven by export volumes and feedstock cost push, particularly in

The margin squeeze is in part due to sharp drops in global
petrochemicals demand and prices in Q411.  Other adverse factors
were Petkim's stubbornly high naphtha bill, intensifying
competition in Turkey, and an extended cracker turnaround in mid-
2011.  The increasing share of lower-margin trading activities
(11.5% of 2011 sales) also contributed to an erosion in margins.
Fitch projects sluggish growth and additional competitive
pressures in 2012, with a mid single digit drop in revenues and
further margin erosion.  The Stable Outlook reflects the agency's
view that the 'B' rating offers sufficient headroom for the
expected downward pressure on Petkim's metrics.

The downgrade also reflects a shift away from the underleveraged
balance sheet and strong liquidity that had historically
supported Petkim's ratings.  At end-2011, the company had a net
debt position of TRY155 million (US$85 million eq.), gross FFO
leverage was 1.3x and the liquidity ratio was a negative 0.7x.
This was due primarily to high working capital requirements (raw
material costs and trading activity).  Capex of US$90 million
came below the US$131 million budgeted.  The figure is expected
to increase to US$171 million in 2012 to fund the debottlenecking
and expansion initiatives necessary to defend the company's
competitive position.

The one notch uplift to Petkim's standalone ratings is in line
with Fitch's "Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage" methodology
and is underpinned by the cross default clause to 'any member of
the Group' under SOCAR's debut 5-year US$500 million Eurobond
(February 2012).  Other considerations factored into the uplift
include increasing strategic ties illustrated by SOCAR's
acquisition of Turcas's stake in Petkim and the start of the
works on the USD5bn greenfield refinery (to be fully funded by

A negative rating action could result from a visible and
prolonged deterioration in profitability with EBITDA margin
eroding below 5%, and any large debt financed investments or
dividend payments resulting in a sustained FFO leverage ratio
above 2.5x.  Evidence of weakening support from SOCAR or a
deterioration in SOCAR's credit standing would be negative for
the ratings.

Conversely, fundamental and material improvements in Petkim's
business profile and cost position relative to peers could
warrant a positive rating action.  This is not currently
envisaged in the rating horizon.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EPIC PLC: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCCsf'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Epic (Culzean) plc's floating rate
notes due 2019 as follows:

  -- GBP6.2m Class A (XS0286451710) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  -- GBP27.3m Class B (XS0286456198) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
  -- GBP25.8m Class C (XS0286456867) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
  -- GBP21.8m Class D (XS0286457758) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative
  -- GBP9.4m Class E (XS0286458723) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative
  -- GBP12.0m Class F (XS0286459374) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     Recovery Estimate 50%

The affirmation reflects the stable performance of the GBP44.2
million Prime A and GBP20.9 million Prime B loans since the last
rating action in April 2011 and the full redemption of the
GBP167.3 million Metro loan at its maturity in October 2011.  It
also addresses the improving performance of the GBP37.4 million
Friends First loan, following its maturity default in April 2011
and subsequent restructuring and extension.  Finally,
consideration was given to the extensive reliance on The Royal
Bank of Scotland ('A'//Stable/'F1') as swap counterparty and
account bank and potential swap breakage costs on the long-dated
(10 years post loan maturity) interest rate swaps for both of the
Prime loans.

In February 2012, the servicer announced the completion of the
Friends First loan restructuring.  A maturity extension until
January 2014 was agreed, subject to the removal of a 2013 break
option in the leases of the largest tenant (DLA Properties,
accounting for 44% of the borrower's rental income).  The
affected leases have also been extended, moving the various
expiry dates to December 2022.  As part of the incentive package
for the tenants, the borrower will cover part of the tenant's
rent over the first 12 months of the new lease.

The Prime A and Prime B loans are predominantly backed by retail
assets located in London's prime retail locations (e.g. New Bond
Street and Kensington High Street).  Both loans are scheduled to
mature in October 2016, three years prior to final legal
maturity. Given the collaterals' strong performance, Fitch does
not expect a default before loan maturity for both these

The interest rate swaps of the two Prime loans mature 10 years
after loan maturity.  In adverse interest rate scenarios, the
senior-ranking breakage costs arising from a swap termination
could negatively affect the recoveries on these loans.  Also,
given the high leverage of the Friends First loan, a loss on the
most junior tranche remains a possibility. Both factors
contribute to the continued 'CCCsf' rating of the tranche.

In January 2012, the full redemption of the Metro loan, proceeds
of which were applied on a fully sequential basis following the
transaction's sequential trigger breach in April 2011, has
resulted in the class A's current balance of GBP6.2 million.  The
application of disposal proceeds, stemming from the sale of an
asset backing the Prime A loan, should result in the full
redemption of the class A notes in April 2012.  Furthermore, the
Friends First loan is currently amortizing via cash sweep.

GILBERTS HOUSE: To be Placed Into Voluntary Liquidation
BBC News reports that Gilberts House Furnishers will shut down
next week with the loss of 15 jobs.

Begbies Traynor, the company's liquidators, said the economic
downturn and the reduction in the number of house sales had
caused the liquidation of Gilberts.

Liquidators said a creditors meeting would be held on April 5 to
put Gilberts into voluntary liquidation.

According to the report, Bob Young, from Begbies Traynor, said it
was "sad" that a "long-established furniture retailer" had gone
into liquidation.

BBC relates that Mr. Young said customers who paid deposits for
furniture using credit cards and some debit card users should be
able to claim their money back.  Anyone who paid cash would join
the list of creditors, Mr. Young added.

Gilberts House Furnishers is a family-run furniture firm based in

GREENLEAF GLOBAL: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
NDS UK reports that a provisional liquidator has been appointed
to Greenleaf Global Plc.  The petition to wind up Greenleaf was
presented by The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and

The Official Receiver has been appointed Provisional Liquidator
of Greenleaf. The role of the Provisional Liquidator is to
protect assets in the possession or under the control of the
company pending the determination of the petition. The
Provisional Liquidator also has the power to investigate the
affairs of the company insofar as it is necessary to protect the
assets including any third party or trust monies or assets in the
possession of or under the control of the company.

As the matter is now subject to High Court action, no further
information will be made available until the hearing to wind-up
Greenleaf which is due to be heard in the High Court on April 4,

The petition was presented under s124A of the Insolvency Act
1986. The Official Receiver was appointed as Provisional
Liquidator of the company on March 23, 2012.

Greenleaf Global PLC, based in South West London, acted as an
agent for a scheme marketed to the public to lease plots of land
in Togo, West Africa for the cultivation of Jatropha trees, from
which oil can be extracted and used as bio-diesel.

TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Maintains 'CCC' Rating on Class E Notes
Fitch Ratings has maintained Titan Europe 2007-1 (NHP) Limited's
notes on Rating Watch Negative (RWN), as follows:

  -- GBP42.15m class B secured floating-rate notes due 2017:
     'BB'; maintained on RWN

  -- GBP42m class C secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'B+';
     maintained on RWN

  -- GBP58m class D secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'B-';
     maintained on RWN

  -- GBP60m class E secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'CCC'

The rating action is driven by the lack of further information
being made available to Fitch, most notably with regards to the
detailed operating performance of the care home portfolio
(including central costs); the quality of the homes (information
from Christie's most recent site inspection have not been
disclosed yet) providing details about necessary catch-up capex;
and a bottom-up business plan for HC-One.  Fitch understands that
more information will be provided by the borrower by Q412 after
HC-One has prepared a full three year turnaround plan and the
business completes its first 12 months of trading.

Some information has been provided at a noteholder meeting held
on March 23, 2012, suggesting a continued decline of the
performance of the former Southern Cross homes (now operated by
HC-One) with occupancy dropping to 81.6% which is well below the
industry average of ca. 88%.

HC-One's EBITDARM (at the home level before central costs and
rent) fell by 33% from 2009 to 2011 to a run rate of GBP70m.
Central costs have not been disclosed.  However, the entire
former Southern Cross (operating 750 care homes i.e. not only the
NHP portfolio) reported ca. GBP30.5 million of central costs
(before exceptionals) in 2010.

The agency understands that HC-One acquired most of Southern
Cross' back office functions. Furthermore, Court Cavendish'
management fees of GBP1,100 per home per month (amounting to ca.
GBP3.2 million p.a.) need to be funded as well.  While Fitch
expects central costs for the smaller HC-One (compared to the
former Southern Cross) to be lower there may be currently no
excess cash left at HC-One (opco level) after rent to be up-
streamed to the borrower or even to invest in capex.  This may
also explain why the borrower cautiously intends to withhold
further funds.  And even if the homes were already fully invested
(i.e. no further catch-up capex needed), free cash flow (FCF) at
HC-One after central costs and recurring maintenance capex (which
could be in a range of GBP10 million to GBP13 million) may mean
that there is limited excess cash left to be up-streamed after
rent payments of GBP40 million unless the operational performance
of the homes improves materially.

Over the past five years the former Southern Cross spent ca.
GBP500 of capex per bed, compared to an industry average of
GBP1000, resulting in a substantial need for catch-up investment
in order to improve the quality and performance of the homes.  A
few homes are currently being embargoed from accepting new
residents as a result of poor care inspection reports. Management
plans to lift such embargos by the summer by rectifying any

Approximately GBP30 million has already been retained by the
borrower to be invested in HC-One homes (GBP22 million earmarked
for capex this year) as well as for the set-up of the operation
and working capital over the past three interest payment dates
(IPDs).  Also ca. GBP5.6 million was spent on fees to advisors
like lawyers, accountants, etc.

The borrower expressed its intent to retain further rental
payments of "similar" magnitude over the next three IPDs.  That
means that over the next three IPDs already significantly reduced
rent proceeds (GBP49.4 million p.a. compared to GBP74 million
before the rent cuts) -- which are already insufficient to pay
the senior debt service in its entirety -- will be further
reduced with the borrower going to retain funds.  That means more
payment deferrals (under the subordinated forward interest rate
swap and note payments for classes B and below) are likely to be
forthcoming and more servicing advance facility draw-downs may be
necessary.  Fitch understands that Christie's has recently
completed a full property review of all the former Southern Cross
homes which should bring more visibility over any potential
further catch-up capex needs.

Fitch believes it may be challenging to improve the operating
performance of HC-One materially in a short period of time given
the current market environment with public finances being scarce
and HC-One's low exposure to the more lucrative self-pay market
(ca. 16% of overall funding).  Hence, interest payments on class
B and below may keep deferring until final maturity.  However,
the transaction still benefits from a tail period of four years
and 10 months prior to the legal final maturity of the notes in
January 2017, which leaves some time for performance to
stabilize, and a sale/refinancing solution to be found.

To resolve the RWN, Fitch would need more information as to the
detailed operating performance and conditions of the care homes,
as well as more clarity from Court Cavendish with regard to its
strategy for HC-One.  Fitch may decide to take further rating
actions (possibly multi-notch downgrades) once this information
is received.

Titan Europe 2007-1 (NHP) is a securitization of 294 nursing
homes and three residential properties owned by NHP, which are
let on long leases to third-party operators active in the UK
healthcare sector (in particular HC-One, which accounts for 84%
of the estate).

VP COMMODITIES: High Court Orders Liquidation
The Information Daily reports that VP Commodities Ltd has been
ordered into liquidation in the High Court on grounds of public
interest following an investigation by Company Investigations,
part of The Insolvency Service.

The report says the investigation found that the company marketed
plots of land in Grantham, Lincolnshire to investors on the false
basis that it had strong development prospects.

According to the report, the court heard that the company had
been formed to continue the unscrupulous land banking business of
Vinci Trading Ltd, previously closed down on public interest

Vinci Trading Ltd had earlier been investigated by Company
Investigations and ordered to close having misled and exploited
investors by falsely claiming that the land being marketed was
likely to gain planning permission for residential development in
the foreseeable future, The Information Daily relates.

"The public need to be on their guard against the activities of
unscrupulous companies which exploit investors in land banking
with the promise of high returns which may never materialise.
This decision sends a clear message that we will continue to
crack down on companies which deliberately mislead the public in
this way," the report quotes Company Investigations Supervisor
Chris Mayhew as saying.

VP Commodities Ltd is a land banking company selling land in


* BOOK REVIEW: All Organizations Are Public
Author: Barry Bozeman
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 201 pages
List Price: $34.95

Bozeman breaks down the simple, widely-accepted categorization of
organizations into either public or private, with the former
being government organizations and everything else, private.
This view of the innumerable and widely varied organizations in
all parts of the United States has held up since at least the
latter 1800s even though it is demonstrably inapplicable.  It's
plain that not all government organizations are public; the CIA
and FBI are but two that can hardly be labeled this.  And not all
other organizations lumped into the category of private can be
said to be this since they operate in one way or another in the
public domain and are subject in varying ways to varying degrees
to the public's representative, namely the government.

Even in recent decades as government has grown ever larger and
more involved in all areas of the society and corporations have
become more expansive and changeable with globalization, the
simplistic, inaccurate division of public and private continues
to hold up.  The "sector blurring" Bozeman was seeing when he
first wrote this work in the 1980s has increased and accelerated,
making All Organizations Are Public a more relevant and useful
guide to understanding the topology and workings of today's
organizations that it was when it was first published.  The
outsourcing of certain tasks traditionally done by American
servicemen and women to civilian employees of a business
organization is one current example of operations and an
organization which cannot fall neatly into the public-private
categorization.  The more complex relationship-at times virtually
a cooperation-between government and corporations in the
globalization of business is another current example of the
"sector blurring" prompting Bozeman to take the measure of what
was very noticeably happening with modern-day organizations.  He
not only reports what has been going on, but also develops
concepts and devises principles of use for corporate
strategists and managers as well as business school teachers,
entrepreneurs considering starting or expanding a business, and
government officials.

Bozeman's view of modern organizations rests not on the common
and changeable references of popular opinion, the marketplace of
ideas, or the phenomena of consumerism, but on the central social
reality of "political authority."  In doing away with the
conventional, yet misleading categories of public and private,
Bozeman does not leave the reader with a vague, cosmic-like view
of the field of organizations.  The two categories are replaced
with an interrelated set of axioms and corollaries bringing a
logic and order to the vast and diverse world of organizations.
The first axiom is, "Publicness is not a discrete quality but a
multidimensional property.  An organization is public to the
extent that it exerts or is constrained by political authority."
The first corollary to this is, "An organization is private to
the extent that it exerts or is constrained by economic

Bozeman recognizes that government-i.e., "public"-and
organizations formed or owned by regular citizens-i.e.,
"private"-do have differences. They come into being from
different motives and different purposes, and they are related to
the public in different ways and operate differently.
Nonetheless, the structure and operations of all organizations
are affected, and in some cases determined, by the overriding
political authority.  In Bozeman's conception, "publicness refers
to the degree to which the organization is affected by political
authority."  Some are tightly controlled by this political
authority, while others are barely touched by it.  But no
organization is entirely free of such authority.  With his axioms
and corollaries, Bozeman gives principles and characteristics for
apprehending the nature of particular organizations.

Today's research and development (R&D) organizations are a kind
of organization that the conventional public-private
categorization cannot begin to make sense of.  "Research and
development organizations provide a fertile ground for analysis
of dimensions of publicness."  As hybrids involving aspects of
universities, government, and industry, R&D organizations are
playing important economic and social roles in such areas as
health, the environment, demographics, and welfare.  Many are
located at universities and run by faculty members.  Many
corporations have R&D divisions.

The value and relevance of Bozeman's key factor of political
authority is seen especially with respect to R&D organizations.
Current government policies on stem cell research demonstrate how
Bozeman's central factor of "political authority" is applied to
understand any particular organization engaged in such research.
It's a matter of where an organization falls in the spectrum of
degrees of being affected by political authority, not the
uninformative, sterile decision as to whether an organization
should be labeled public or private.

Bozeman's view of organizations takes into account the reality
that the term "private" has little meaning with respect to
organizations.  All organizations, like all citizens, are subject
to the political authority somehow, notably the laws and
regulations.  But Bozeman is not interested simply in arguing for
a new theory of organizations.  His "multidimensional view of
publicness" in tune with the complexity, diversity, and changes
among today's organizations can help readers more effectively
steer and develop their own organization and work with other


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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