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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, April 25, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 82

                            Headlines



B E L A R U S

* CITY OF MINSK: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating


B U L G A R I A

LEAD AND ZINC: Won't Be Declared Insolvent; Workers Get Salaries


F R A N C E

SNP BOAT: Dist. Court Rules in Hotel Le St. James Discovery Rift


G E R M A N Y

GREEN WIND: Epuron Buys German Wind Park From Unit
MUENCHENER HYPOTHEKENBANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
Q-CELLS SE: Several Parties Express Interest
Q-CELLS SE: Insolvency Process to Start in July
SPARKASSE KOELNBONN: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion


H U N G A R Y

LIGET BIOENERGIA: Economic Crisis Prompts Bankruptcy Filing


I C E L A N D

* ICELAND: Ex-PM Acquitted on Major Charges in Collapse Probe


I T A L Y

PARMALAT SPA: Italian Appeal Court Reduces Tanzi's Jail Sentence


R U S S I A

INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion


S P A I N

SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to CCC
* SPAIN: Banking Consolidation to Affect Insurance Industry


S W I T Z E R L A N D

CLARIANT AG: Moody's Rates New CHF285MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'Ba1'
SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+'


T U R K E Y

DENIZBANK: Moody's Retains 'Ba3' Foreign-Currency Deposit Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BEAUMONT VINTNERS: Goes Into Liquidation
FITNESS FIRST: Gets Temporary Debt Reprieve
MARBLE ARCH NO. 4: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB'
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Gets Yearlong Embargo on Signing New Players
TRITON NO. 26: S&P Put 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes on Watch Dev.

* UK: Fine Wine Investors Have Lost GBP100-Mil. Over 4 Years
* UK: Insolvencies in Education Sector Rise 44% in 2011


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
=============


* CITY OF MINSK: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
Belarusian City of Minsk to stable from negative. "At the same
time, we affirmed our 'B-' long-term issuer credit rating on the
city," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow those on the Republic of Belarus. We
view the institutional framework for Belarusian local and
regional governments (LRGs) as centralized. According to our
criteria, a Belarusian LRG cannot be rated higher than the
sovereign, so we cap the long-term rating on Minsk at the level
of the long-term sovereign rating on Belarus," S&P said.

"The rating on Minsk reflects our view of Belarus' volatile and
underfunded system of interbudgetary relations, leading to the
city's very limited budget predictability and flexibility. The
rating is also constrained by Minsk's large infrastructure needs
and high contingent liabilities. Factors supporting the rating
are the city's status as the country's largest administrative,
financial, and commercial center; its consistently very strong
operating surplus; moderate debt burden; and consistently high
cash reserves," S&P said.

"Under our methodology, we assess the indicative credit level
(ICL) for Minsk at 'b+'. The ICL is not a rating, however. It is
a means of assessing an LRG's intrinsic creditworthiness under
the assumption that there is no sovereign rating cap. The ICL
results from the combination of our assessment of an LRG's
individual credit profile and the effects we see of the
institutional framework within which it operates," S&P said.

"We believe that an improvement to the ICL on Minsk within the
next 12 months is very unlikely. On the contrary, the ICL on
Minsk could weaken by one or two levels within the next 12 months
if the city's liquidity position deteriorated significantly as a
result of a rapid accumulation of short-term debt, either
directly or via municipal companies, amid worsening borrowing
conditions," S&P said.

"We believe that the institutional framework under which
Belarusian regional governments operate is very centralized and
evolving, which limits the predictability and flexibility of
Minsk's financial policy. The central government defines the
types, rates, and bases of most taxes, sets norms of regional
spending through established social standards, limits regions'
budget deficits, and authorizes all borrowings. The
predictability of the city's budgetary performance is further
clouded by uncertainty regarding medium-term macroeconomic
indicators, given the significant depreciation of the Belarusian
ruble. The ruble has lost almost 65% of its value against the
reference currency basket, reflected in high inflation, with the
consumer price index reaching 100% (on a cumulative basis) in
2011," S&P said.

"As Belarus' largest administrative, financial, and commercial
center, Minsk is wealthy and diverse relative to other Belarusian
regions, and we expect this will continue to support its
budgetary performance. Despite ongoing economic difficulties, the
city's official unemployment rate is low and its estimated GDP
per capita exceeds the national average by 1.5x. Contrary to the
national trend, the city's population is increasing and Minsk is
the main focal point for investments in Belarus," S&P said.

"The high inflation supports the city's strong budgetary
performance. With rapidly increasing revenues outpacing growth of
expenditures, the city has demonstrated very strong budgetary
results. For 2011, the operating surplus was a solid 37% of
operating revenue and the surplus after capital accounts was 10%.
Nevertheless, spending will likely pick up greatly afterwards,
which would put pressure on the city's financial indicators. In
our base-case scenario, we expect rising salaries and maintenance
costs to decrease the city's operating surplus to a still hefty
15%-17% of operating revenues in 2012-2014," S&P said.

"We note that private investment in Minsk is limited, compelling
the city to maintain high capital spending, both directly and via
its municipal companies, which exposes it to large contingent
liabilities. Minsk has also committed to an ambitious housing
construction program and large-scale infrastructure improvements
ahead of hosting the World Ice Hockey Championship in 2014. In
our base-case scenario, we forecast that rising infrastructure
needs will increase the city's deficit after capital accounts to
7% of total revenues on average in 2012-2014, from 0.5% for
2010," S&P said.

"We believe, however, that for the time being the city benefits
from its sizable debt-raising capacity," S&P said.

The stable outlook on Minsk reflects that on the Republic of
Belarus, because the long-term rating on Minsk is capped by the
long-term foreign currency rating on the sovereign.

"Because our ICL on Minsk is 'b+' and the rating is capped at 'B-
', we don't currently envisage a realistic scenario under which
the ICL would weaken by three levels to fall below the sovereign
rating. Consequently, we would be more likely to downgrade the
city as a result of a downgrade of the sovereign than as a result
of a weakening of the ICL within the outlook horizon," S&P said.

"We could raise the rating on Minsk within the next 12 months,
however, if we were to raise the ratings on Belarus and if Minsk
maintained its strong budgetary performance and solid cash
position, in line with our base-case scenario," S&P said.


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


LEAD AND ZINC: Won't Be Declared Insolvent; Workers Get Salaries
----------------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that the Lead and Zinc Complex in the
southern city of Kardzhali will not be declared insolvent.

According to Novinite.com, the heavily indebted LZC, which has
been out of operation in the past four months, will not have the
fate of Kremikovtzi, the behemoth steel mill near Sofia, which no
longer operates as a result of years of mismanagement.

The creditors and trade unions have agreed to seek a way to fuel
the Lead and Zinc Complex in Kardzhali again, local syndicate
organizations have announced Monday, as cited by BNR,
Novinite.com relates.  They will be seeking to complete the
investment program of the factory through the construction of new
facilities, while the workers have agreed to abstain from new
protests over their delayed salaries for one more week,
Novinite.com notes.

On April 12, after 40-day protests over delayed salaries, the
workers at the Lead and Zinc Complex received some of their
money, totaling BGN500,000, which were distributed on as a result
of the sale of another troubled company, the Gorubso-Madan mining
firm, Novinite.com relates.

Both the LZC and Gorubso-Madan were part of Intertrust Holding
owned by Bulgarian tycoon Valentin Zahariev.  However, both have
descended into debt, leading to workers' protests, and an
intervention by the state arranging the sale of both companies by
Intertrust Holding, Novinite.com says.

Mr. Zahariev owes a total of BGN1.4 million in unpaid salaries to
the Lead and Zinc Complex workers, and the payment of the January
salaries came after 42-day protests by the plant workers which
started in Southern Bulgaria and reach the capital Sofia,
according to Novinite.com.  Mr. Zahariev has raised the needed
cash through the sale of the Gorubso mines in the southern town
of Madan, Novinite.com discloses.

Bulgaria's government has indicated that the LZC in Kardzhali is
also for sale, and that there are three bidders -- one Bulgarian
and two foreign -- vying for it, Novinite.com notes.

Initial data indicate that Mr. Zahariev's debts already amount to
BGN360 million, and are way beyond the earlier known figure of
BGN320 million, Novinite.com states.

A total of 519 employees of the Lead and Zinc Complex in
Kardzhali, the leading Bulgarian non-ferrous metals producer, had
not received salaries for half a year, Novinite.com states.

In early April, the workers filed personal claims in Court
against the owner of the plant, Bulgarian oligarch Valentin
Zahariev, who is also known for mismanagement of what used to be
the largest steel-maker in Bulgaria, the now bankrupt Kremikovtzi
plant near Sofia, Novinite.com recounts.  They demand the
replacement of the entire management, starting with the owner,
Novinite.com relates.

The Lead and Zinc Complex is the largest Bulgarian producer of
non-ferrous metals.


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F R A N C E
===========


SNP BOAT: Dist. Court Rules in Hotel Le St. James Discovery Rift
----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. District Judge K. Michael Moore affirmed in part, and
reversed in part, a bankruptcy court's Oct. 19, 2011 Final
Judgment on Order Denying with Prejudice Motion for Entry of
Order Entrusting M/Y Sixty Five to Foreign Representative for
Administration in French Bankruptcy (Sauvegarde) Proceeding.

In May 2008, SNP Boat Service S.A., a corporation organized under
the laws of France, executed a contract for the sale of a vessel
to a third party.  The terms of the contract required SNP to
accept the trade-in of the M/Y Saint James -- a separate vessel
owned by Hotel Le St. James -- and credit EUR2,500,000 to St.
James' account upon delivery.

SNP designs luxury boats and provides brokerage, charter, and
boat management services associated with its principal line of
business.  Hotel Le St. James is a corporation organized under
the laws of Canada.

The M/Y Saint James was ultimately delivered to SNP; however, SNP
took issue with the condition of the vessel.  SNP claimed the
vessel "had not been delivered in good maintenance and operating
condition."  SNP also claimed that it had not received proper
documentation upon the delivery of the vessel.  Consequently, on
Oct. 22, 2008, SNP informed St. James that the terms of the
contract had not been fulfilled and SNP would not be crediting
St. James' account pursuant to the terms of the contract.  St.
James disputed SNP's conclusion that St. James had breached the
contract in a letter it sent to SNP roughly two days later.

The emerging contract dispute between SNP and St. James then took
on a decisively international flavor.  On Oct. 27, 2008, SNP
initiated an action against St. James in the Commercial Court of
Cannes, France.  On Nov. 6, 2008, St. James initiated a separate
action against SNP in the Court of Montreal in Canada.  At the
Canadian proceeding, SNP argued that the Court of Montreal lacked
both personal jurisdiction over SNP and subject matter
jurisdiction to consider St. James' breach of contract claim.
The Canadian courts denied SNP's jurisdictional arguments at both
the trial and appellate level.

On April 7, 2009, the French Commercial Court approved a French
sauvegarde proceeding for SNP.  The goals of a sauvegarde
proceeding are to "facilitate the reorganization of the debtor in
order to pursue its commercial activity, to maintain its
employments and to repay its debts."

Often compared to reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, a sauvegarde proceeding imposes an automatic
stay on any legal proceeding initiated by creditors of the
debtor.  The French Supreme Court has held that this automatic
stay has an international effect.  On Aug. 25, 2009, St. James
submitted an unsecured claim in the sauvegarde proceeding for the
price of the M/Y Saint James, plus interest, damages, and other
costs.

As the French sauvegarde proceeding was taking place, the
Canadian proceeding was also progressing.  After SNP's
jurisdictional arguments were rejected, SNP's Canadian counsel
withdrew.  The Superior Court of Quebec served notice on SNP and
SNP's Foreign Representative that the Court would enter judgment
against SNP should SNP not obtain replacement counsel and defend
itself in the Canadian litigation.  SNP failed to defend itself,
and on Oct. 16, 2009, the Superior Court of Quebec entered a
default judgment in the amount of C$4,047,500 in favor of St.
James and against SNP.

At some point after obtaining the Canadian judgment, St. James
learned SNP had assets located in Florida, and on Feb. 17, 2010,
St. James domesticated the Canadian Judgment in Broward County,
Florida.  Shortly thereafter, the Broward County Sheriffs office
seized two of SNP's vessels -- the M/Y Sixty Five and the M/Y
Foursome -- pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the state
court.  Before the vessels could be sold to satisfy St. James'
judgment, however, the French Commercial Court designated Pierre-
Louis Ezavin as administrator of SNP, and on April 6, 2010,
Ezavin filed a Chapter 15 Petition in U.S. Bankruptcy Court
seeking recognition of the French sauvegarde proceeding as a
"foreign proceeding" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1515.

On April 28, 2010, the bankruptcy court formally recognized the
French sauvegarde proceeding as a foreign main proceeding and
Ezavin as SNP's foreign representative.  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Sec. 362, the bankruptcy court also ordered a stay with respect
to the sale of any SNP property located within the United States.
Finally, the court released the M/Y Sixty Five to Ezavin's
custody, but prohibited the vessel from leaving the Southern
District of Florida and ordered that any transfer or sale of the
vessel was subject to court approval.

One week later, SNP motioned the bankruptcy court to enter an
order finding the M/Y Sixty Five subject to the jurisdiction of
the French Commercial Court sauvegarde proceeding, and entrusting
the M/Y Sixty Five to Ezavin.  St. James opposed the motion on
several grounds.  A hearing was scheduled for June 8, 2010, but
was ultimately continued to Aug. 9, 2010 due to concerns the
bankruptcy court had regarding international comity.
Complicating matters, on June 17, 2010, the French Commercial
Court entered a declaratory judgment finding SNP not liable for
the EUR2,500,000 price of the M/Y Saint James.

On Aug. 9, 2010, the bankruptcy court granted SNP's Motion to
Continue the Entrustment Motion Hearing.  The court also ordered
the parties to attend a second settlement conference, which was
to take place on Sept. 7, 2010.  The bankruptcy court ordered
that Ezavin and a senior SNP representative with authority to
bind SNP appear in person at the Sept. 7, 2010 settlement
conference.  A status conference was then scheduled for the day
after the settlement conference, at which time matters of
discovery and scheduling were to be discussed.

St. James then served a request for production on SNP, seeking,
inter alia, all documents filed in the sauvegarde proceeding; and
translations of all pleadings in the sauvegarde proceeding.  At
the same time St. James served the request upon SNP, St. James
motioned the bankruptcy court to shorten SNP's deadline to
respond to the production request.  The court granted St. James's
Motion, before granting SNP's motion for reconsideration;
limiting the scope of the production request to a docket sheet of
the sauvegarde proceeding along with select documents from the
docket sheet; and continuing the settlement conference to
November 2010.

The November settlement conference resulted in an impasse and on
Nov. 8, 2010, the Parties had a status conference with the
bankruptcy court.  At the status conference, St. James continued
to argue that further discovery was needed, and for the first
time the existence of a French blocking statute was brought to
the attention of the bankruptcy court.  Before the status
conference adjourned, the bankruptcy court rejected SNP's
suggestion that pre-discovery summary judgment could resolve the
action, and the parties agreed to hold another conference with
the bankruptcy court on Dec. 2, 2010 to discuss the scope of
discovery, a timeline for discovery, and to further examine the
effect of the French blocking statute.

Not satisfied with the bankruptcy court's decision to postpone
summary judgment until after discovery, on Nov. 22, 2010, SNP
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Connection with
its Entrustment Motion.

At the Dec. 20, 2010 status conference, the Parties argued SNP's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and discussed the need for
further discovery.  The effect of the French blocking statute was
also discussed.  Counsel for St. James informed the bankruptcy
court that France has a blocking statute, which, as counsel for
St. James described it, "makes discovery in France not pursuant
to the Hague Convention a criminal act."

The bankruptcy court then denied without prejudice SNP's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, directed the Parties to appear for
a status conference on Dec. 17, 2010 with an agreed upon
discovery plan, and urged the Parties to find a way to conduct
discovery in a manner compliant with the French blocking statute.
At the Dec. 17, 2010 conference before the bankruptcy court, the
Parties agreed that St. James would be able to depose
representatives of SNP in late March 2011.  The depositions would
take place outside of France to avoid violating the French
blocking statute.

To prepare for the March 2011 depositions, St. James served
document requests upon Ezavin and SNP in early February 2011.
Before responding to St. James' requests, on March 10, 2011 SNP
filed a Motion for a Protective Order, seeking to preclude the
depositions of several SNP representatives.  SNP, pursuant to the
advice of new counsel, argued that attempting to circumvent the
French blocking statute outside of France would constitute fraud
in France, and doing so could subject the representatives of SNP
to civil or criminal penalties.  SNP proposed that St. James
initiate an action in France and have all discovery supervised by
the French courts in accordance with the Hague Convention.

Approximately three weeks after filing its Motion for a
Protective Order, SNP responded to St. James' document requests.
SNP informed St. James that no documents would be produced. The
scope of St. James' requests had led SNP to believe St. James was
attempting to re-litigate the original sauvegarde proceeding,5
which, SNP argued, was improper because St. James had filed an
appeal with the French Appellate Courts.  Furthermore, St. James
already had the opportunity to obtain discovery in the sauvegarde
proceeding and was now barred by "res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and principles of comity."

After receiving SNP's response, St. James concluded that SNP was
"intentionally delaying] proceedings, and play[ing] games with
the discovery process."  On April 5, 2011, St. James filed a
motion which argued that the French blocking statute did not bar
discovery in the U.S. bankruptcy court action, and requested that
the bankruptcy court deny with prejudice SNP's Entrustment Motion
and dismiss the proceeding as a sanction for SNP's alleged
misconduct. In the alternative, St. James requested that the
bankruptcy court compel SNP and Ezavin to "properly respond to
discovery."

On April 22, 2011, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on St.
James' Motion for Sanctions and SNP's Motion for a Protective
Order.  At the outset of the hearing, the bankruptcy court warned
SNP that it was "powerfully close" to dismissing the case for
"lack of cooperation on the part of the foreign representative"
and that it was contemplating "other significant rulings,
including denying the motion for an order seeking turnover of the
vessel."  The bankruptcy court noted the "distinct impression" it
had that SNP was neither cooperating nor proceeding in good
faith. The bankruptcy court then entertained counsels' arguments
regarding SNP's alleged misconduct, the applicability of the
French blocking statute, and whether due process had been
afforded to St. James in the French sauvegarde proceeding.

On June 30, 2011, the bankruptcy court issued an Order (1)
Denying SNP's Motion for Protective Order, (2) Denying SNP's
Entrustment Motion, and (3) Granting in-Part & Denying in-Part
St. James' Motion for Sanctions.  The bankruptcy court held that
the French blocking statute did not deprive the bankruptcy court
of its power to order the Parties to engage in discovery.  The
bankruptcy court then cautioned SNP that if discovery was not
conducted prior to an Aug. 19, 2011 status conference "so that
[the] court may determine whether due process was afforded in the
French proceedings," the bankruptcy court would "conclude that
the order granting recognition of the foreign main proceeding was
improvidently entered . . . revoke recognition of the foreign
main proceeding, and . . . abstain from [the] matter under 11
U.S.C. Sec. 305."

Approximately one month later, SNP filed a motion requesting the
bankruptcy court to clarify whether the June 30, 2011 Order
precluded depositions from being held in France or Monaco.  SNP
also requested that the bankruptcy court continue the Aug. 19,
2011 status conference to September due to the month-long August
holiday in France.  On Aug. 4, 2011, the bankruptcy court denied
SNP's motion after having accused SNP of filing the motion as "an
apparent tactical maneuver to present the court with a fait
accompli in late August."

At the Aug. 19, 2011 status conference, SNP once again argued
that the French blocking statute precluded discovery outside the
scope of the Hague Convention, and that the bankruptcy court
lacked authority to inquire whether St. James was afforded due
process in the French sauvegarde proceedings.  The bankruptcy
court disagreed and notified the parties that it intended to deny
with prejudice SNP's Entrustment Motion and abstain from the
action.  On Oct. 20, 2011, the bankruptcy court denied with
prejudice SNP's Entrustment Motion, directed the U.S. Marshals
Service to take possession of the M/Y Sixty Five from Ezavin and
transfer it to the Broward County Sheriffs office, and dismissed
the case.

SNP took an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's Order and
presented these issues to the District Court:

     (1) Whether the bankruptcy court, for the purposes of
         ruling on SNP's Entrustment Motion, erred by insisting
         on discovery that would enable it to determine whether
         St. James was afforded due process in the sauvegarde
         proceeding;

     (2) Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it concluded
         that the French blocking statute did not pose an
         obstacle to compelling the depositions of SNP
         representatives; and

     (3) Whether the bankruptcy court erred by dismissing the
         proceeding as a sanction.

Judge Moore ruled that the bankruptcy court acted within its
discretion when it disregarded the French blocking statute and
ordered that the representatives of SNP be deposed. The
bankruptcy court, however, abused its discretion when it ordered
discovery to determine whether St. James' interests were
sufficiently protected in the specific French sauvegarde
proceeding.  Furthermore, the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion when it dismissed SNP's Entrustment Motion with
Prejudice as a sanction.

Judge Moore ruled that the Bankruptcy Court's Final Judgment and
Order Denying with Prejudice Motion for Entry of Order Entrusting
M/Y Sixty Five to Foreign Representative, both dated Oct. 20,
2011, are vacated.  The Bankruptcy Court's Discovery Order dated
June 30, 2011 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the District Court's Opinion.

The case before the District Court is, SNP BOAT SERVICE S.A.,
Appellant, v. HOTEL LE ST. JAMES, Appellee, Case No. 11-cv-62671-
KMM (S.D. Fla.).  A copy of the District Court's April 18, 2012
Order is available at http://is.gd/UlFVDifrom Leagle.com.

SNP Boat Services is represented by:

          Charles M. Tatelbaum, Esq.
          James Henry Wyman, Esq.
          Esperanza Segarra, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          One East Broward Blvd., Suite 1010
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Tel: 954-375-1133
          Fax: 954-467-1024
          E-mail: ctatelbaum@hinshawlaw.com
                  jwyman@hinshawlaw.com
                  esegarra@hinshawlaw.com

Hotel Le St. James is represented by:

          Ceci Culpepper Berman, Esq.
          Scott A. Underwood, Esq.
          FOWLER WHITE BOGGS P.A.
          501 E. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Tel: (813) 222-2031
          Fax: (813) 229-8313
          E-mail: cberman@fowlerwhite.com
                  Scott.Underwood@fowlerwhite.com

                      About SNP Boat Services

Cannes, France-based SNP Boat Service SA aka Service Navigation
De Plaisance Boat Service SA is a unit of the Rodriguez Group SA
which makes luxury yachts.  The Rodriguez Group owns 99.7% of SNP
Boat.

Adorno & Yoss, LLP, filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition for
SNP Boat (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 10-18891) on April 6, 2010 to
seek recognition of SNP's restructuring in France and stop
lawsuits by creditors in the U.S.

Mark S. Roher, Esq., serves as counsel to the petitioner.  The
Debtor estimated assets and debts both ranging from US$100
million to US$500 million.


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G E R M A N Y
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GREEN WIND: Epuron Buys German Wind Park From Unit
--------------------------------------------------
Sally Bakewell at Bloomberg News reports that Epuron Holding
GmbH, a wind-power developer held by an Impax Asset Management
Ltd. fund, bought a German wind park from a unit of Green Wind
Energy A/S.

According to Bloomberg, London-based Impax said in a statement on
Monday that Epuron bought the 28-megawatt Cottbuser Halde park in
eastern Germany that has 14 turbines made by Vestas Wind Systems
A/S and has operated since early 2009.  Impax did not disclose
the terms of the deal, Bloomberg states.

Impax, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the farm has a long-term
loan from Deutsche Kreditbank AG.

Bloomberg relates that Impax said Green Wind "is currently in
reconstruction proceedings under Danish bankruptcy law".

The statement said that the purchase was funded by Impax New
Energy Investors II LP, the owner of Epuron since early 2011,
Bloomberg notes.

Green Wind's listing on Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen was deleted
April 11, Bloomberg recounts.


MUENCHENER HYPOTHEKENBANK: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on
Muenchener Hypothekenbank eG and includes certain regulatory
disclosures regarding its ratings.  The release does not
constitute any change in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for
Muenchener Hypothekenbank eG.

Moody's current ratings on Muenchener Hypothekenbank eG and its
affiliates are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic and foreign currency) ratings of A2

Senior Unsecured MTN Program (domestic currency) ratings of (P)A2

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of A2

Bank Financial Strength ratings of D+

Commercial Paper (domestic currency) ratings of P-1

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of P-1

Short Term Deposit Note/CD Program (domestic currency) ratings of
P-1

Other Short Term (domestic currency) ratings of (P)P-1

GFW Capital GmbH

Junior Subordinate (domestic currency) Baa3, (hyb)

Isar Capital Funding I Limited Partnership

Preferred Stock Non-cumulative (domestic currency) ratings of
Baa3, (hyb)

RATING RATIONALE

Moody's assigns a BFSR of D+ (stable outlook) to MuenchenerHyp,
which maps to ba1 in terms of standalone credit strength. The
rating reflects the bank's solid business franchise as a
residential mortgage lender, its significant position as a
Pfandbrief (covered bond) issuer in the German market and its
affiliation with the German co-operative banks, which gives the
bank access to a nationwide network of branches. The rating also
reflects the bank's modest financial fundamentals, given its weak
profitability and only moderately acceptable capitalization
coupled with concerns about the bank's ongoing asset-quality
pressures related to international commercial real estate (CRE)
and selected exposures with the bank's financial institutions and
sovereign portfolio.

MuenchenerHyp's A2 long-term global local currency (GLC) debt and
deposit ratings are based on (i) the bank's intrinsic credit
strength, reflected in its standalone credit strength of ba1;
(ii) Moody's assessment of a very high probability of cross-
sector support from the Association of German Co-operative Banks
(FinanzGruppe "BVR " or Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken
und Raiffeisenbanken; unrated) which results in an adjusted
standalone credit strength of a3; and (iii) that the German
cooperative sector - and thereby indirectly MuenchenerHyp --
would continue to benefit from a high probability of systemic
support. Hence, MuenchenerHyp's A2 long-term ratings benefit from
a five-notch rating uplift.

Rating Outlook

The stable outlook on the D+ BFSR is underpinned by
MuenchenerHyp's conservative risk profile in its core residential
real-estate and domestic public-finance activities. Furthermore,
it reflects Moody's expectation that MuenchenerHyp will continue
to improve its relative risk position through the discontinuation
of its US CRE business, which was a key driver of problem loans.
The stable outlook incorporates Moody's assumption that the bank
will be able to manage the EUR1.5 billion total disclosed
exposures related to sovereigns and banks in countries that are
currently subject to credit quality pressures.

The stable outlook on the A2 long-term ratings follows the stable
outlook on the BFSR and Moody's assumption that the long-term
rating would sustain moderate pressure on the bank's standalone
profile.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Upward pressure on MuenchenerHyp's standalone rating could result
from (i) an improved quantity and quality of capital; (ii) rising
and sustained profitability without compromising underwriting
standards or risk appetite; and (iii) overall lower asset-quality
pressures, in particular a shrinking of its portfolio of non-
performing loans and a further reduction of exposures to
countries currently facing credit quality pressures.

There will be no upward pressure on MuenchenerHyp's A2 debt and
deposit ratings for the foreseeable future, given that these
ratings already factor in substantial co-operative sector support
for the bank and systemic support for the sector.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Moody's would consider a downgrade of the BFSR if MuenchenerHyp
(i) experienced a further deterioration in non-performing loans;
or (ii) suffered credit deterioration in its securities
portfolio. The BFSR could be lowered if the bank faces
difficulties in converting its existing Tier 1 instruments into
stronger forms of capital.

The long-term ratings could be downgraded should the BFSR
materially weaken or should the co-operative sector support for
the bank and/or systemic support for the sector decline.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.


Q-CELLS SE: Several Parties Express Interest
--------------------------------------------
Stefan Nicola at Bloomberg News reports that Q-Cells SE
preliminary insolvency administrator Henning Schorisch said
several parties had shown interest in the company that filed for
insolvency this month.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Schorisch said "interested parties"
including financial and strategic investors in Germany and other
countries contacted him after the April 3 insolvency filing.

"Our aim is to save as much of Q-Cells as possible," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Schorisch as saying on Monday in a statement.  "The
next few weeks will show the extent of investors' interest."

German solar companies have struggled with reduced government aid
and competition from Chinese companies that created a glut of
solar panels, Bloomberg says.

Bloomberg relates that the statement said Mr. Schorisch hired
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd.'s Frankfurt office to search for
investors amid a plan to sell Q-Cells to one or several buyers.
The statement said that the company based in Thalheim, Germany,
has resumed production of cells and modules, Bloomberg notes.

The company has lost 70% of its value this year, Bloomberg
discloses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 9,
2012, the Executive Board of Q-Cells filed a request to open
insolvency proceedings at the competent District Court in Dessau.

Q-Cells SE is a German solar cell and module maker.


Q-CELLS SE: Insolvency Process to Start in July
-----------------------------------------------
pv magazine reports that Q-Cells SE is currently looking for an
investor.

A spokesperson of provisional liquidator Henning Schorisch told
German news agency, dpa, that insolvency proceedings for the
German manufacturer are expected to begin on July 1, discloses pv
magazine.  The spokesperson however did not provide any further
details on the current situation of Q-Cells, or how the search
for investors is proceeding.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 9,
2012, the Executive Board of Q-Cells SE filed a request to open
insolvency proceedings at the competent District Court in Dessau.
The competent Insolvency Court in Dessau has appointed
Mr. Henning Schorisch, hww wienberg wilhelm Insolvenzverwalter,
Halle/Saale, as preliminary insolvency administrator.

Following an intensive review of alternative concepts for the
implementation of the financial restructuring, the Executive
Board has reached the conclusion that a going concern of the
company cannot be restored on a sufficiently secure legal basis.
This was not given any more following the final Ruling of the
Frankfurt Higher Regional Court in the Pfleiderer case on
March 27, 2012.

Q-Cells SE is a German solar cell and module maker.


SPARKASSE KOELNBONN: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on
Sparkasse KoelnBonn and includes certain regulatory disclosures
regarding its ratings. The release does not constitute any change
in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for Sparkasse KoelnBonn.

Moody's current ratings on Sparkasse KoelnBonn are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of A1

Senior Unsecured MTN Program (domestic currency) ratings of (P)A1

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of A1

Bank Financial Strength ratings of D-

Subordinate (domestic currency) ratings of A2/Baa2

Subordinate MTN Program (domestic currency) ratings of (P)Baa2

Commercial Paper (domestic currency) ratings of P-1

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of P-1

Other Short Term (domestic currency) ratings of (P)P-1

Ratings Rationale

Moody's assigns a bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of D- to
SK KoelnBonn, which maps to ba3 in terms of standalone credit
strength.  The rating reflects the bank's mixed track record in
managing its risk exposures, especially with regard to its
investments and equity participations that are largely impaired
and will absorb most of the bank's capital generation in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, Moody's believes that the bank's
declining profitability and efficiency indicators as well as its
weak capital position are major negative rating drivers that
justify a BFSR in the low D category.

However, the BFSR also incorporates the bank's stable and
defendable market share in its core retail banking business,
which includes small and mid-sized corporate customers that
provide stability to its earnings base. Moody's acknowledges the
bank's satisfactory liquidity position, which contributes to a
stabilization at the current rating level.

SK KoelnBonn's long-term global local currency (GLC) deposit
rating is A1, reflecting (i) the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba3; (ii) Moody's assessment of the very high
probability of cross-sector support among the public-sector banks
united in Sparkassen Finanzgruppe (rated Aa2) in Germany, which
takes the adjusted BCA to baa3, and (iii) Moody's assessment of
the very high probability of support from the bank's public-
sector owners and regional governments, the cities of Cologne
(70%) and Bonn (30%); and (iv) systemic support in the event of
need.

Under Moody's Joint Default Analysis (JDA) methodology, Moody's
support assessments as highlighted above give SK KoelnBonn's GLC
deposit rating an eight-notch uplift from its ba3 BCA.

Rating Outlook

The BFSR and long-term ratings of SK KoelnBonn have a stable
outlook.

The stable outlook on the BFSR anticipates that SKKB will be able
to sustain the performance of its core banking business, while
any further deterioration in its investments and equity
participations should be manageable at current capital levels.

The stable outlook on the A1 deposit rating reflects Moody's
expectation of a continuing very high probability of cross-sector
support from public sector banks, its public sector owners (the
cities of Cologne and Bonn) and systemic support. Moody's support
assessment reflects SKKB's importance to the regional economy,
which is reflected in its strong and well-entrenched franchise.
This, coupled with its integration into the public sector support
mechanisms, makes support from the various sources highly likely
in the event of a stress scenario.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

A future upgrade of the bank's BFSR could be warranted over time
if the bank's asset quality and earnings generation capacity is
restored, resulting in a sustainable improvement in the bank's
profitability and capitalization.

Upward pressure on SK KoelnBonn's GLC deposit rating could be
triggered by a positive change in its BFSR, but is otherwise very
limited, considering that Moody's assessment of the probability
of external support - and hence the rating uplift from its ba3
BCA - is already very high.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

An unexpected deterioration in the bank's asset quality would be
the main driver of a further rating downgrade. Under such a
scenario, which would lead to rising credit charges and further
losses on its participations, Moody's would anticipate a higher
likelihood for additional capital support than envisaged
currently to prevent any further decline in the bank's already
weak capitalization. Apart from a downgrade in its BFSR, downward
pressure on SK KoelnBonn's deposit rating could be triggered by
an adverse change in the credit standing of the City of Cologne.
No change in the probability of support from the cross-sector
support mechanisms for public-sector banks in Germany is
currently expected.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


LIGET BIOENERGIA: Economic Crisis Prompts Bankruptcy Filing
-----------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that business portal Gazdasag.hu said on
Monday Liget Bioenergia Muvek, the majority owner of a HUF14
billion biomass-fueled power plant financed by the state-owned
Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) and commercial peer K and H
Bank, has filed for bankruptcy protection.

Liget Bioenergia Muvek inaugurated the plant, financed in equal
part by MFB and K and H Bank, in 2009, MTI-Econews discloses.
The plant's operator, Del-nyiresegi Bioenergia Muvek, is also
majority-owned by Liget Bioenergia Muvek.  Japan's Tohoku Epko is
a minority stakeholder, MTI-Econews states.

The economic crisis as well as the regulatory changes made the
plant unviable and it shut down in 2011, MTI-Econews notes.



=============
I C E L A N D
=============


* ICELAND: Ex-PM Acquitted on Major Charges in Collapse Probe
-------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
former Prime Minister Geir H. Haarde was acquitted on the major
counts in a trial probing his responsibility for the country's
economic collapse in 2008.

The 61-year-old was found guilty of failing to keep his Cabinet
apprised of key developments through formal meetings, Bloomberg
says, citing a ruling on Monday from the Reykjavik-based
Landsdomur court.

Mr. Haarde, who won't be punished, was acquitted on three other
charges, including failing to check the expansion of the
country's banks and neglecting to monitor financial stability,
Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Haarde in September 2010 became the first political leader to
be indicted for economic mismanagement during the global
financial crisis that started in 2007, Bloomberg notes.
Iceland's biggest banks defaulted on US$85 billion in October the
following year, plunging the US$13 billion economy into its worst
recession in more than six decades and sending unemployment
surging nine-fold, Bloomberg recounts.

The court last year also threw out charges that Mr. Haarde
neglected his duties as prime minister and failed to ensure the
government studied the risks facing the banks, Bloomberg relates.

Mr. Haarde, who became prime minister in 2006, was ousted during
public protests in 2009, Bloomberg discloses.  The parliamentary
committee that recommended his indictment in 2010 said his
actions from February 2008 to October that year exacerbated the
island's boom and subsequent bust, Bloomberg states.  The
committee, as cited by Bloomberg, said that Mr. Haarde didn't
exert enough pressure on the banks after they amassed debts
equivalent to 10 times the country's economy.  He was also
faulted for not pressuring Landsbanki Islands hf into
establishing foreign subsidiaries for its U.K. and Dutch Icesave
accounts, Bloomberg discloses.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


PARMALAT SPA: Italian Appeal Court Reduces Tanzi's Jail Sentence
----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Jewkes at Reuters reports that an Italian appeal court
shaved two months from an 18-year jail sentence for disgraced
Parmalat founder Calisto Tanzi for spearheading the EUR14-billion
(US$18.5 billion) collapse of his dairy products empire in a
scandal dubbed "Europe's Enron".

Parmalat, now owned by France's Lactalis, buckled in December
2003 under a massive accounting hole that wiped out the savings
of more than 100,000 small investors in its highly-rated
corporate bonds, Reuters recounts.

Mr. Tanzi, a billionaire who was Parmalat's chief executive at
the time, was found guilty on charges of fraudulent bankruptcy
and criminal conspiracy over what was then Europe's biggest
corporate bankruptcy, Reuters discloses.

He was not in court to hear the appeal court decision reducing
his jail term to 17 years and 10 months from 18 years, Reuters
notes.

"We will appeal the verdict in Italy's highest court,"
Mr. Tanzi's lawyer Fabio Belloni told Reuters.

Prosecutors had pressed for a slight extension of the prison
sentence for the 73-year-old entrepreneur, who is already in
jail, Reuters says.  His lawyer had asked for Mr. Tanzi, who
suffers from serious heart problems, to be acquitted, Reuters
discloses.

The appeal court in Bologna also cut to just below 10 years from
14 years a prison sentence for former Parmalat Chief Financial
Officer Fausto Tonna, a major figure behind the fraud, Reuters
relates.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that
can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about
40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter,
cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable
sauces, soups and juices.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on Dec. 24, 2003.  Dr.
Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in each of
the cases.  The Parma Court declared the units insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi, on behalf of the Italian entities,
sought protection from U.S. creditors by filing a petition under
Sec. 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
04-14268).

Parmalat's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
Feb. 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary Holtzer,
Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal & Manges
LLP, represented the U.S. Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed
for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million
in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Three special-purpose vehicles established by Parmalat S.p.A. --
Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd., and Food
Holdings Ltd. -- commenced separate winding up proceedings before
the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and
James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman) Ltd. were appointed liquidators
in the cases.  On Jan. 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed a Sec. 304
petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-10362).  Gregory M.
Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and Richard
I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon, Herlands Randolph,
represented the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304 case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases and Sec. 304 cases.  In 2007, Parmalat obtained a
permanent injunction in the Sec. 304 cases.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Issues Summary Credit Opinion
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a summary credit opinion on
Investment Trade Bank and includes certain regulatory disclosures
regarding its ratings. The release does not constitute any change
in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for Investment Trade Bank.

Moody's current ratings on Investment Trade Bank are:

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of B2

Long Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of B2

Bank Financial Strength ratings of E+

Short Term Bank Deposits (domestic and foreign currency) ratings
of NP

Rating Rationale

Moody's assigns a standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating
(BFSR) of E+ to Investment Trade Bank (ITB), which maps to b2 on
the long-term scale. The BFSR incorporates the risks associated
with the operating and regulatory environment in Russia and
remains constrained by the bank's (i) industry concentration in
its loan portfolio, (ii) potentially volatile income streams from
investment projects and trading securities, and (iii) reliance on
short-term funding sources. At the same time, the rating is
underpinned by ITB's (i) improving territorial coverage and (ii)
sufficient liquidity buffer; supported by growing customer
funding and high proportion of liquid assets.

The outlook on the BFSR and all long-term ratings is stable.

The bank's B2/Not Prime long and short-term deposit ratings do
not factor in any shareholder support, or any possibility of
systemic support. Thus, ITB's deposit and debt ratings are based
on the bank's BCA of b2 and the seniority of the deposits and
debt.

Rating Outlook

All ITB's long term ratings carry stable outlooks.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Any possible upgrade of ITB's ratings will be contingent on the
bank's ability to materially reduce industry concentrations and
exposure to investment projects, while also demonstrating a
sustained track record of improvement in financial fundamentals.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Downward pressure could be exerted on ITB's ratings by any
material adverse changes in the bank's risk profile, particularly
significant impairment of the bank's liquidity position, and any
failure to maintain control over its asset quality.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.


=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has taken various credit
rating actions in four Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.

Specifically, S&P has:

  * Affirmed its rating on the class A and D notes and raised its
    ratings on the class B and C notes in Fondo de Titulizacion
    de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1;

  * Lowered its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes and
    affirmed its rating on the class F notes in Fondo de
    Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2;

  * Lowered its ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, B, C, D, and E
    notes and affirmed its rating on the class F notes in Fondo
    de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3; and

  * Lowered and kept on CreditWatch negative its rating on the
    class A and B notes and affirmed its ratings on the class C,
    D, E, and F notes in Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
    Santander Hipotecario 6.

"Banco Santander S.A. (A+/Negative/A-1) is the largest Spanish
financial entity, and in our view has a strong business profile.
In particular, this includes a wide geographic diversification, a
solid market share in core markets, a successful and well-
executed strategy, and strong, resilient operating profitability.
It issued the notes for these four transactions in June 2004,
July 2006, April 2007, and May 2010 (Santander Hipotecario 1, 2,
3, and 6). A portfolio of residential mortgage loans secured over
properties in Spain backs each transaction," S&P said.

"These Santander Hipotecario transactions present high loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios which, together with the origination years of
their underlying loans, determine the performance evolution of
each transaction. We rely on the most recent information from the
trustee as of the latest payment dates--January 2012 for
Santander Hipotecario 1, 2, and 3; and February 2012 for
Santander Hipotecario 6," S&P said.

                    SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 1

"Santander Hipotecario 1 has shown strong performance due to its
seasoning. At closing, the weighted-average seasoning of the
loans was 16.40 months; the loans were originated in late 2002 to
early 2003, when the Spanish housing market had not yet
experienced its pricing boom," S&P said.

"There is a current weighted-average LTV ratio of 66.57% and a
pool factor of 34.56%. 90+ day delinquencies have been stable
since closing, and in January 2012 represented 0.32% of the
outstanding balance of the assets (a decrease from a 0.52% a year
earlier). Also, defaults are only 0.30% of the outstanding
balance of the assets in the transaction, and the reserve fund is
at its required level. We have previously raised our ratings in
this transaction in April 2009," S&P said.

"We have affirmed our ratings on the class A and D notes, and
raised our ratings on the class B and C notes. The strong
performance of this transaction and its weighted-average
seasoning of 112.4 months mean that the class B and C notes can
obtain higher ratings. Given that the class A notes are at 28.69%
of their original balance, the class B notes can achieve a 'AAA
(sf)' rating, despite being subordinated to the most senior
notes. Nevertheless, given the margin of the subordinated notes,
the cost of the bonds is increasing as most senior notes
amortize, and this may have a potential impact in the future if
performance worsens," S&P said.

                       SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 2

"In August 2009, we previously lowered our ratings in Santander
Hipotecario 2. Since then, the performance has further
deteriorated and defaults are still appearing--even though, with
a weighted-average seasoning of 87.6 months, we would expect this
figure to have stabilized," S&P said.

"There is a weighted-average LTV ratio of 76.43% and a pool
factor of 50.75%. As of January 2012, 90+ day delinquencies had
increased to 1.63% of the outstanding asset balance, from a 1.33%
a year earlier. Due to the lack of a reserve fund since the April
2009 payment date, defaults have generated undercollateralization
for the most subordinated notes, and a weakening of credit
enhancement levels for all notes. Currently, EUR10.64 million
should have been amortized on the class A notes, but this has not
happened due to a lack of funds, and this amount has been stable
since the January 2010 payment date," S&P said.

"We have lowered our ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E
notes, due to the deterioration of the assets that is weakening
the structure. We have also affirmed our ' D (sf)' rating on the
class F notes, due to their continuous interest shortfall since
the April 2008 interest payment date (IPD)," S&P said.

                   SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 3

"Since its closing date, we have lowered our ratings in Santander
Hipotecario 3 several times, the latest in February 2011. Since
then, the performance has further deteriorated: Defaults
increased to 3.48% of the outstanding asset balance at the
January 2012 IPD, from 2.49% a year earlier," S&P said.

"There is a weighted-average LTV ratio of 82.66% and a pool
factor of 60.12%. As of January 2012, 90+ day delinquencies had
increased to 2.96% of the outstanding asset balance, from a 1.99%
a year earlier. Due to the lack of a reserve fund since the
October 2008 payment date, defaults have generated
undercollateralization for all of the subordinated notes, and a
considerable weakening of credit enhancement levels for all
notes," S&P said.

"Currently, EUR163.35 million should have been amortized on the
class A1, A2, and A3 notes, but this has not happened due to a
lack of funds. This amount has increased to 8.65% of the
outstanding balance of the asset-backed notes at the January 2012
payment date, from 7.69% at the January 2011 payment date.
Moreover, the reliance on the swap is higher in this transaction
than in the other Santander Hipotecario transactions, as the swap
gives more support if the performance of the assets is poor, as
is the case for this transaction," S&P said.

"We have lowered our ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, B, C, D,
and E notes, due to the undercollateralization in the transaction
structure, which has increased to 82.21% of the outstanding
balance of the class B, C, D, and E notes. We have also affirmed
our 'D (sf)' rating on the class F notes, due to their continuous
interest shortfall since the April 2008 IPD," S&P said.

                       SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 6

Santander Hipotecario 6's performance has deteriorated more than
we expected since its closing date in May 2010.

"There is a weighted-average LTV ratio of 89.60%, a weighted-
average seasoning of 48.9 months, and a pool factor of 80.46%. As
of February 2012, 90+ day delinquencies had increased to 5.93% of
the outstanding asset balance, from a 2.93% a year earlier.
Defaults have increased to 1.07% of the outstanding asset balance
as of the February payment date, from 0.01% a year earlier; this
has resulted in the use of the reserve fund for the first time,
which is down to a 95.52% of its required level," S&P said.

"We have lowered our ratings on the class A and B notes, due to
the deterioration of the assets that has affected our cash flow
results. Also, we have kept these ratings on CreditWatch negative
due to the substantial support exposure existing in this
transaction, which only affects the class A and B notes, as their
ratings are above our rating on the guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) provider, Banco Santander," S&P said.

                   COUNTERPARTY CRITERIA APPLICATION

"In June 2011, the transaction parties amended documents in
Santander Hipotecario 1, 2, and 6 to reflect our 2010
counterparty criteria. This was not the case for Santander
Hipotecario 3," S&P said.

"Banco Santander (A+/Negative/A-1) is the only counterparty in
these transactions and no downgrade language trigger has been
breached in the documents, except for the substantial support
exposure in Santander Hipotecario 6," S&P said.

"We expect to resolve these CreditWatch placements following the
publication of our expanded counterparty criteria. Furthermore,
we have affirmed our ratings on the class C, D, and E notes, due
to the strength of their credit enhancement levels, and we have
affirmed our 'D (sf)' rating on the class F notes due to its
continuous interest shortfall since the August 2011 IPD," S&P
said.

             STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating reports are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
           To                       From

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1
EUR1.875 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

RATINGS AFFIRMED

A          AAA (sf)
D          A- (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

B          AAA (sf)                 AA+ (sf)
C          AA (sf)                  AA- (sf)

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2
EUR1.973 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes and an Over-
Issuance of Floating-Rate Notes

RATINGS LOWERED

A          A (sf)                   AA (sf)
B          BB (sf)                  BBB (sf)
C          B (sf)                   BB (sf)
D          B- (sf)                  B (sf)
E          CCC (sf)                 B-(sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

F          D (sf)

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3
EUR2.822 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes and an
Overissuance of Floating-Rate Notes

RATINGS LOWERED

A1         BBB+ (sf)                A (sf)
A2         BBB+ (sf)                A (sf)
A3         BBB+ (sf)                A (sf)
B          B- (sf)                  BB (sf)
C          CCC (sf)                 BB- (sf)
D          CCC (sf)                 B- (sf)
E          CCC (sf)                 CCC+ (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

F          D (sf)

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6
EUR1.26 Billion Mortgage-Backed Notes

RATINGS LOWERED AND KEPT ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE[1]

A          AA (sf)/Watch Neg        AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B          AA-(sf)/Watch Neg        AA (sf)/Watch Neg
[1]These ratings are on CreditWatch negative for counterparty
reasons.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

C          A (sf)
D          BBB (sf)
E          BB (sf)
F          D (sf)


* SPAIN: Banking Consolidation to Affect Insurance Industry
-----------------------------------------------------------
Spain's insurance industry will be affected by the ongoing
restructuring of the Spanish banking system, following the
merging of several savings banks (cajas), due to the major role
that banks play in the distribution of life products, says
Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment published on
April 23.

The new report is entitled "Spanish Insurance: Banking
Consolidation Will Further Advantage the Strongest Insurers".

Moody's report provides three potential scenarios illustrating
the credit effects on insurers of the redistribution of
bancassurance agreements. "We believe that large insurers with a
competitive advantage in their distribution network through
stronger banking groups are the likely candidates to benefit from
the redistribution of insurance market shares," explains Laura
Perez Martinez, a Moody's Analyst and author of the report.

"Nevertheless, we only anticipate significant improvements for
those insurers that are able to differentiate their product
offering successfully from banking products towards non-life or
protection insurance." adds Benjamin Serra, Moody's Assistant
Vice President for European Insurance and co-author of the
report.

Many merged cajas, which now belong to larger banking groups,
have signed exclusive bancassurance agreements or joint ventures
with insurance providers that will now have to be renegotiated or
cancelled, with a royal decree requiring consolidating banks to
select a unique insurance provider by 2014. Although the
significant degree of consolidation between cajas has not yet
triggered a similar consolidation of the insurance industry in
Spain, Moody's believes it will lead to a significant shift of
insurers' market shares over time.

Moody's three potential scenarios for the redistribution of
bancassurance agreements are:

Scenario 1, which describes the current status-quo with no
renegotiation of agreements. This scenario is unlikely to prevail
long-term, but will eventually lead to:

Scenario 2, which is characterized by a more moderate
consolidation process, with different insurers per business line,
or possibly per product. Nevertheless, as stronger, more
creditworthy banks consolidate, the likelihood increases for a
more dramatic change, namely:

Scenario 3, under which each enlarged banking group is aligned
with a single insurer.

Except for the first scenario, these scenarios are credit
negative for profiles of smaller players who distribute their
products through more vulnerable banks. These players are less
likely to be selected as partners by enlarged banking groups than
are their competitors, who often have deeper product and service
capabilities. In addition, there are also some disputes around
exit penalties insurers may be entitled to receive on
cancellation of agreements, which will exacerbate the negative
implications for affected insurers if penalties are eventually
reduced.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


CLARIANT AG: Moody's Rates New CHF285MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Ba1/LGD 4 (65) ratings to
CHF285 million senior unsecured notes issued by Clariant AG.

Ratings Rationale

The Ba1 ratings on the notes reflect the pari passu ranking of
the new instrument with the existing senior unsecured obligations
of the issuer.

The successful placement of CHF285 million in notes follows the
earlier placement of EUR500 million bond in January 2012. These
measures support the refinancing profile of the company in
2012/2013, as it faces CHF250 million bond maturity in April 2012
and a further EUR600 million bond maturity in April 2013.

The Ba1 rating on the notes reflects the improving position of
the senior unsecured debt issued by Clariant AG holding company
in the group's capital structure, given the consistent reduction
in the quantum of the debt obligations maintained at the level of
the operating companies. As a result of the acquisition of Sud-
Chemie AG, the level of loans at the operating subsidiaries has
initially increased to c. CHF806 million at the end of 3Q 2011
(28% of total balance sheet debt). Clariant's trade obligations
are also substantially located at operating level. The company
has confirmed that it is committed to reducing the level of
indebtedness at the operating level in 2012, including through
refinancing and repayment of loans at operating subsidiaries.
After recent repayments, Moody's expects that the loans at the
operating level will be reduced to approximately EUR400 million
(or 14% of total balance sheet debt), in line with Moody's
earlier assumptions.

Clariant maintains a significant cash balance (which at the end
of 2011 stood at CHF1.2 billion) that also supports the liquidity
position during the refinancing period. The company, however,
also uses part of its high cash balances to back up uncommitted
short-term bank facilities that fund its working capital
requirements. The company has confirmed that it is looking to
maintain a liquidity reserve of c. CHF350 million - CHF450
million to support operations.

The principal methodology used in rating Clariant AG was the
Global Chemical Industry Methodology published in December 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Muttenz, Switzerland, Clariant AG is a leading
international chemicals group. In 2011, Clariant reported
revenues of approximately CHF7.4 billion (inclusive of the
contribution by Sud-Chemie AG, that Clariant acquired in
April 2011 and consolidates since May 1, 2011).


SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Swiss telecoms operator Sunrise
Communications Holdings AG (Sunrise) to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The
outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we lowered our issue ratings on Sunrise's
senior secured notes to 'BB-' from 'BB' and on the group's
subordinated notes to 'B-' from 'B'," S&P said.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Sunrise will deleverage
more slowly on a Standard & Poor's-adjusted basis than we
previously assumed. This is due to Sunrise's recent acquisition
of mobile spectrum, together with the reassessment of our
treatment of Sunrise's shareholder loans under our criteria," S&P
said.

"Sunrise recently acquired mobile spectrum for about Swiss franc
CHF482 million. We understand that Sunrise will pay CHF289
million in 2012, and will defer the remainder to 2015 and 2016.
This level of spending is higher than we had previously assumed.
Although we anticipate that the acquisition of mobile spectrum
will support Sunrise's position in the Swiss wireless market and
limit additional competition in the market until 2028, we believe
that it will delay deleveraging," S&P said.

"In addition, we have reassessed Sunrise's shareholder
instruments (specifically, preferred equity certificates [PECs]
and convertible preferred equity certificates [CPECs]) as debt
like in nature and therefore include them in adjusted debt. The
reassessment reflects Sunrise's private equity ownership, and its
track record of partly converting these shareholder instruments
into payment-in-kind (PIK) loans held by third parties. The
review has led us to revise our assessment of Sunrise's financial
risk profile downward to 'highly leveraged' from 'aggressive,'"
S&P said.

"Consequently, although we foresee a possibility of Sunrise
deleveraging on a reported debt basis over the medium term, we
anticipate slow deleveraging in terms of adjusted debt, which
includes accrued interest on the shareholder loans," S&P said.

"At the same time, on the basis of the mobile spectrum
acquisition and a marked improvement in Sunrise's profitability
and mobile market position in 2011, we have revised our
assessment of Sunrise's business risk profile upward to
'satisfactory' from 'fair,'" S&P said.

"In our view, Sunrise's operating performance will continue to
improve, with a reported EBITDA margin remaining in the low 30%
region and limited competitive pressure. We also forecast
continued solid free cash flow generation, excluding spectrum
acquisition payments, which will help Sunrise maintain an
'adequate' liquidity profile," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if we see Sunrise adopt a more
aggressive financial policy, leading to a meaningful increase in
debt. We could also lower the ratings if the group's operating
performance weakens as a result of stiffening competition in
Switzerland, resulting in fully adjusted debt to EBITDA of more
than 8x or more than 5x including the PIK loans but excluding the
PECs and CPECs," S&P said.

"A positive rating action in the short to medium term is unlikely
in our view, because we forecast limited deleveraging on an
adjusted basis during this period," S&P said


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


DENIZBANK: Moody's Retains 'Ba3' Foreign-Currency Deposit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced an extension of the
review for downgrade of Denizbank's C- standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) -- mapping to a baa2 standalone credit
strength -- and the Baa2/P-2 global local-currency (GLC) deposit
ratings. The announcement follows Moody's recent downgrade of the
BFSR of Dexia Credit Local (DCL) to E, mapping to a caa1
standalone credit strength.

The focus of the review will comprise (i) Moody's globally
revised assessment of the linkage between the credit profiles of
sovereigns and financial institutions; and (ii) any potential
adverse consequences from the weak creditworthiness of DCL for
Denizbank, as a Dexia Group non-core subsidiary which is up for
sale.

Moody's expects to conclude the review of Denizbank, together
with the rating reviews of other Turkish banks. The reviews were
initiated on March 16, 2012.

The Ba3 foreign-currency deposit rating with its positive outlook
is unaffected by the announcement.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's initiated the rating review of Denizbank in March 2012 in
the context of a range of rating actions relating to a number of
Turkish financial institutions whose standalone credit
assessments are currently positioned above the sovereign debt
rating, which in the case of Turkey is Ba2, with a positive
outlook.

The announcement of the extension of the review follows the
recent downgrade of DCL's BFSR and reflects Moody's assumption
that subsidiaries are always likely to be partially affected by
changes in parents' creditworthiness and that the credit quality
of parent groups and their subsidiaries are typically
interlinked. The rating review will therefore also focus on any
potential adverse consequences for Denizbank from the weak
creditworthiness of DCL (Baa2/P-2 negative; E/caa1 stable). The
review will therefore assess the relationship between the two.
Moody's recognises the independence of Denizbank from the group;
as per audited consolidated 2011 BRSA financials, Denizbank has a
low dependence on funding from Dexia Group comprising 82 basis
points (bps) of its consolidated balance sheet in the form of
Tier 2 capital, down from 210 bps following the sale of Dexia
Bank Belgium SA (D/ba2, A3 review direction uncertain; P-1 review
for downgrade) by Dexia Group to the government of Belgium in
October 2011. Moody's also notes that Dexia has publicly stated
to target a sale of its majority stake in Denizbank.

Moody's review of Denizbank's BFSR will continue to focus on the
following main areas:

(i) The linkage between the credit profile of the bank and the
Turkish sovereign, thereby particularly taking into account (a)
the extent to which the entity's business depends on the domestic
macroeconomic and financial environment; (b) the degree of
reliance on market funding (which is typically more confidence-
sensitive); and (c) direct or indirect exposures to domestic
sovereign debt.

(ii) The positioning of Denizbank's standalone credit assessment
relative to DCL's standalone profile taking into account (a) the
degree of interlinkages between Denizbank and Dexia Group; (b)
the extent to which a possible default of DCL might have credit-
negative implications for Denizbank's credit profile and
franchise; and (c) regulatory barriers in Turkey that restrict
Dexia Group from using -- at its discretion -- Denizbank's
resources.

Finally, the review will encompass Moody's assumptions for
systemic support from Turkey as a potential source for rating
uplift from the standalone credit profile, which is likely to be
positioned at or below the sovereign rating at the conclusion of
the review. Denizbank's ratings currently do not incorporate
rating uplift from parental support.

WHAT COULD MOVE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Moody's believes there is little likelihood of any upward rating
pressure on the BFSR and the GLC deposit ratings, captured by
their review for downgrade placements.

The most important rating drivers are: (i) the level of cross-
border diversification of Denizbank's operations; (ii) the level
of balance-sheet exposure to domestic sovereign debt, compared
with the bank's capital base; (iii) franchise resilience and
intrinsic strength within the operating environment of Turkey;
(iv) a re-assessment of how the weakened financial strength of
DCL and Dexia Group may affect the subsidiary's standalone credit
profile; and (iv) the assumptions for parental or systemic
support available in case of need.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BEAUMONT VINTNERS: Goes Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------
Jim Budd at Decanter.com reports that wine investment company
Beaumont Vintners went into liquidation earlier this month.

The deficiency is understood to be GBP1.5 million and there are
apparently few assets, the report says.

According to the report, Beaumont Vintners customers placed
orders for GBP600,000 to GBP700,000 for 2009 Bordeaux en primeur.
The company, however, only ordered and paid for between GBP30,000
to GBP40,000 of wine.

Decanter.com understands from one of the liquidators, Nedim
Ailyan of Abbott Fielding, that these are currently thought to be
Beaumont's sole assets.

Accountancy firm Grant Thornton will be leading the investigative
side of the liquidation, looking into the conduct of the
company's management and attempting to follow the money trail,
says Decanter.com.

The report notes that creditors' claims amount to between
GBP8 million and GBP10 million, while assets consist of between
GBP300,000 and GBP400,000 worth of stock in bond, plus œ2m of
Bordeaux 2009 bought en primeur.

Creditors, many of them elderly, are likely to get 30 pence per
pound, Decanter.com adds.


FITNESS FIRST: Gets Temporary Debt Reprieve
-------------------------------------------
Harry Wallop at The Telegraph reports that Fitness First has
struck a deal with its lenders to wipe out all of its debt.

However, the deal is likely to see shareholders left with no
money and job losses in the UK, the Telegraph says.

The company was set to announce yesterday that its new chief
executive, Chris Stone, has signed a three-month waiver agreement
with Fitness First's main creditors, the Telegraph discloses.
This will immediately save it from having to pay its GBP18
million quarterly interest bill, the Telegraph notes.  But it is
understood that the deal is more substantial than just a
temporary reprieve and will see the equity of its main
shareholder, BC Partners, nearly wiped out, the Telegraph states.
The company, the Telegraph says, will end up with zero debt on
its balance sheet and controlled by its lenders.

In recent months so-called vulture funds, which specialize in
buying up distressed debt, have been circling Fitness First,
which has GBP560 million of debt. Oaktree and Marathon have
acquired 77% of the company's debt for an estimated 55p in the
pound, the Telegraph discloses.

The two funds have agreed to cancel the debt and inject GBP100
million into the business, putting the company back on its feet,
it is understood, the Telegraph relates.  However, it is likely
that Oaktree and Marathon, in return for restoring the health of
the balance sheet, would insist on a fairly radical restructuring
at the company, which in Britain has been hit hard by consumers'
disposable income being squeezed, the Telegraph states.

An estimated third of the company's gyms in the UK, where it has
142 outlets, are unprofitable, the Telegraph discloses.  If the
company cannot renegotiate a lower rent with its landlords it is
likely the company will have to close gyms, the Telegraph says.
A company voluntary arrangement, which could wipe out its rental
bills, has not been ruled out, the Telegraph notes.

Fitness First is a gym chain.  The company has 430 clubs and 1.2
million members worldwide.  It employs more that 13,000 people.


MARBLE ARCH NO. 4: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has taken various credit
rating actions on all classes of notes in Marble Arch Residential
Securitisation No. 4 PLC.

  * "We have raised and removed from CreditWatch negative our
    ratings on the class D1a and D1c notes," S&P said.

  * "We have affirmed our ratings on the class E1c notes," S&P
    said.

  * "Our ratings on the class A3c, B1a, B1b, B1c, C1a, and C1c
    notes are unchanged following our credit review, but these
    notes remain on CreditWatch negative for counterparty
    reasons," S&P said.

"On Dec. 12, 2011, we placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings
on the class A3c to D1c notes for credit reasons. These rating
actions followed the implementation of our updated U.K.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria," S&P
said.

"Since our previous review, the transaction has benefited from
deleveraging, increasing credit enhancement for all classes of
notes, and top-ups of the reserve fund (currently funded to
81.24% of the amount required by the transaction documents)," S&P
said.

"The reserve fund has been topping up on each IPD since mid-2010.
It has yet to reach its required level. However, we consider
that, provided the underlying performance continues as observed,
this will occur within the next year," S&P said.

"Total arrears and severe delinquencies have been stable.
Although absolute levels are high, they are lower than average
arrears levels observed in all of the Marble Arch series (the
shelf). Losses have been high and are substantially higher than
the shelf, which is currently at 3.81%. This can be attributed to
the transaction's underlying collateral, which contains a
proportion of second-lien loans that are unlike the other
portfolios in the
shelf," S&P said.

"When applying our 2011 U.K. RMBS criteria, our credit analysis
results show an increase in the weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) for each rating level, due to an increase in
total arrears and the effect of our originator adjustment since
June 2009. The weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each
rating level has increased, due to the application of our market-
value decline assumptions. The combined result is an increase in
the credit coverage required to achieve each rating level," S&P
said.

"Despite worsening credit coverage, credit enhancement has
increased. As such, we have raised by one notch and removed from
CreditWatch negative our ratings of the class D notes.
Additionally, we have affirmed our rating on the class E notes,"
S&P said.

"Following our credit analysis, our ratings on Marble Arch
Residential Securitisation No. 4's class A to C notes are
unchanged. They are therefore no longer on CreditWatch negative
for credit reasons, but remain on CreditWatch negative for
counterparty reasons," S&P said.

"This reflects our short-term issuer credit rating (ICR), on
Barclays Bank PLC (A+/Stable/A-1), which has been below 'A-1+'
since Nov. 29, 2011, and therefore in breach of rating triggers
under the guaranteed investment contract and transaction account
agreements. We have received a plan indicating that the
transaction documents may be amended. We aim to resolve these
CreditWatch placements within three months of the Feb. 21, 2012
CreditWatch placement. Should the documents not be amended, our
analysis indicates that the highest possible rating on the notes
would be linked to our ICR on Barclays Bank," S&P said.

"Marble Arch Residential Securitisation No. 4 is a RMBS
transaction, backed by nonconforming U.K. residential mortgages
originated by Matlock Bank Ltd., Southern Pacific Mortgage Ltd.,
and Southern Pacific Personal Loans Ltd.," S&P said

"Our credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that we would expect at each rating level
for time horizons of one year and three years, under moderate
stress conditions, are in line with our Credit Stability
Criteria," S&P said.

               STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class         Rating
         To            From

Marble Arch Residential Securitisation No. 4 PLC
EUR100.55 Million, GBP532.9 Million, and GBP479 Million Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes, An Overissuance of Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes, and Mortgage-Backed Deferrable-Interest
Notes

Ratings Raised and Removed from CreditWatch Negative

D1a      BB (sf)       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D1c      BB (sf)       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

E1c      B- (sf)

Ratings Remaining on CreditWatch Negative

A3c      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B1a      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B1b      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B1c      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
C1a      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
C1c      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Gets Yearlong Embargo on Signing New Players
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dex McLuskey at Bloomberg News reports that Rangers owner Craig
Whyte was banned for life from involvement in Scottish soccer and
the club he placed in bankruptcy protection two months ago was
given a yearlong embargo on signing new players.

Glasgow-based Rangers also was fined GBP160,000 (US$258,000), the
Scottish Football Association, as cited by Bloomberg, said in a
statement on Monday night, and Mr. Whyte was ordered to pay
200,000 pounds within 30 days -- which he indicated he won't do
in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp.

Mr. Whyte took control of the record 54-time Scottish champion
last May with money he borrowed against future season-ticket
sales, Bloomberg recounts.  On Feb. 14 he placed the club in
administration, a form of bankruptcy, as HM Revenue & Customs
pursued it for unpaid taxes, Bloomberg relates.

The administrators, Duff & Phelps, have said the liability to
U.K. tax authorities may reach GBP75 million, with total
potential debts of GBP134 million, Bloomberg discloses.

The SFA sanctions were issued after Mr. Whyte was declared an
unfit person to run a soccer club by the governing body, which
also accused the owner and the club of bringing the game into
disrepute, Bloomberg relates.

Duff & Phelps are considering two bids for Rangers, from a group
led by former club director Paul Murray, and from Bill Miller, a
U.S.-based businessman, Bloomberg says.

"All of us working on behalf of the club are utterly shocked and
dismayed by the draconian sanctions imposed on Rangers,"
Bloomberg quotes the administrators as saying in a statement on
Monday night.

During the transfer ban, Rangers only can sign players 18 years
old or younger, Bloomberg states.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


TRITON NO. 26: S&P Put 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes on Watch Dev.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch
developing its credit ratings on Triton (European Loan Conduit
No. 26) PLC's class B, C, D, E, and F notes. "At the same time,
we lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on
the class A1 and A2 notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our review of the credit quality of
the three remaining loans in the pool. While we observe some
minor credit deterioration among the loans, one event in
particular could alter the credit quality of the pool completely:
the sale of the asset backing the Devonshire Square loan (this
loan has been for sale since late 2011). The sequential repayment
of this loan followed by an asset sale could result in upgrades
to our ratings on all classes of notes in the transaction. The
ratings on the top two classes, on the other hand, are
constrained by the rating on their counterparty. We have lowered
our ratings on these classes to reflect the downgrade of the
counterparty in November 2011," S&P said.

                DEVONSHIRE SQUARE LOAN (60% OF THE POOL)

"The largest loan in the transaction represents 60% of the
portfolio by balance and is secured by an estate of office,
retail, and residential properties in the City of London. This
fixed-rate loan matured in October 2011. The whole-loan balance
at cutoff was GBP340 million and is currently GBP336 million; the
senior securitized balance is GBP288.75 million, and there is a
subordinated B-note of GBP51.25 million. There is a GBP20.0
million capital expenditure (capex) facility which was put in
place for the development of the site, of which GBP17.3 million
ranks pari passu. The loan defaulted in October 2011 and has been
in special servicing since then. Media reports have recently
stated that these London offices may soon be sold to Blackstone
for approximately GBP330 million, although nothing is yet
formally under offer," S&P said.

"The properties backing the loan comprise 12 buildings around a
central courtyard. The estate is located just off Bishopsgate in
Central London, offering 647,406 sq ft of office, retail, and
residential space. There are also 146 car-parking spaces. All of
the buildings are Grade II-listed, with the exception of 6, 7,
and 8 Devonshire Square and East India House. There are ongoing
plans to refurbish a considerable amount of the office space,
redevelop the retail space, and convert part of the estate into a
block of residential apartments," S&P said.

"Aon Corp. (BBB+/Stable/A-2) provides about 43% of the annual
rent roll, worth GBP10.7 million per year. It is the main tenant
in the Devonshire Square estate, plans to move its U.K.
headquarters to the 'Cheese Grater' tower (122 Leadenhall Street)
in 2015, and to move its world headquarters to London from
Chicago. Aon also has offices at 55 Bishopsgate and 6 More London
Place. The property generates a total gross revenue of GBP24.8
million, which equates to GBP38.30 per sq ft (or a net rent of
GBP34 per sq ft). This is significantly below the current prime
City office market rent of GBP55 per sq ft.," S&P said.

During servicing, the loan was restructured. The terms included:

  * The implementation of a business plan aimed at the re-gearing
    of major leases and the injection of sponsor equity. As part
    of the agreement with Morgan Stanley Mortgage Servicing, the
    servicer;

  * The injection by the sponsor of GBP3 million in equity; and

  * The use of interest payments to the subordinated A and B
    loans to be used either to fund capex requirements or to
    repay the senior loans, and interest payments on the loan to
    be subject to a new interest rate cap.

S&P does not expect any losses on this loan.

                  ACCESS PORTFOLIO (34% OF THE POOL)

"The second-largest loan in the transaction represents 34% of the
pool and is secured by a portfolio of self-storage properties
located throughout the U.K. This is a fixed-rate loan of GBP158.4
million, originated in January 2007 and maturing in October 2013.
The whole loan was split into a senior portion of GBP158.4
million and a B-note of GBP25.0 million. Only the senior portion
was securitized. The whole loan is interest-only during its
term," S&P said.

"We consider these properties to be stabilized assets, as they
have been open for more than eight years and have demonstrated
income stability. The rental income, however, is exposed to a
relatively immature sector and is subject to strong competition.
However, there are barriers to entry into the self-storage market
(such as site locations and planning constraints). In certain
cases, an alternative use of the properties is possible," S&P
said.

"Access, the tenant, operates across the U.K. It is one of the
largest brands in the self-storage sector in the U.K., along with
Safestore and Big Yellow. Most of the assets in the portfolio are
in what we consider to be good locations; 23 of the 30 assets are
in Greater London, within the M25 area. Ideal locations are
usually densely populated, with high concentrations of flats and
terraced houses and a high proportion of upwardly mobile
residents; hence the concentration in the southeast. Each store
has a loading area, customer reception, customer meeting room,
retail area, and customer parking area. The stores range in size
from approximately 18,000 sq ft to 111,000 sq ft of rentable
space (the average size is 51,000 sq ft), and are capable of
accommodating, on average, 550 customers," S&P said.

"If the Devonshire Square loan repays, the Access loan will be
the largest loan in the pool, with about 85% of the pool balance.
The credit quality of this loan will largely drive the ratings in
this transaction post-repayment," S&P said.

"Although we do not expect any losses given the stability of
income generated by the portfolio, our view of the recoverable
proceeds from the assets has declined significantly since cutoff,
primarily as a result of the shift in capitalization rates in the
U.K.," S&P said

                   NEXTRA PORTFOLIO (6% OF THE POOL)

The third remaining loan comprises 6% of the pool balance and is
currently secured by two office buildings let to single tenants.
They are both located in Greater London. This is a floating-rate
loan of GBP26.8 million, originated in December 2006 and maturing
in October 2013, with a three-year extension option.

"The largest property is in Rickmansworth, near junction 19 of
the M25, and offers 93,719 sq ft of office accommodation.
Completed in 2000, the building has a ground floor and two upper
floors. There is a three-storey car park containing 387 spaces.
The property is entirely let to Skanska Construction Ltd. until
April 2023, without any break option, for a rent of GBP24.54 per
sq ft. The properties were valued at GBP64 million at cutoff,
representing an implied net initial yield of 5.0%," S&P said.

"While capitalization rates have shifted upward since
origination, and therefore reduced the expected recoverable
proceeds, we do not expect any losses on this loan," S&P said.

                       COUNTERPARTY RISK

"On Jan. 31, 2012, we placed our 'A+ (sf)' ratings on the class
A1 and A2 notes on CreditWatch negative for counterparty reasons,
associated with our downgrade of the backup advance provider
guarantor of the servicer advance facility, Morgan Stanley & Co.
International PLC (A/Negative/A1). (The guaranteed entity, Morgan
Stanley Principal Funding, Inc., is not rated.) Because the
replacement timeframe in the advance facility does not comply
with our current criteria, the maximum rating achievable in this
transaction is linked to our long-term rating on this entity,
Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC (A/Negative/A-1)," S&P
said.

"We also note from the documents that the advance guarantor is
required to replace itself on loss of an 'A-1+' rating; this has
not occurred. The fact that they have not replaced themselves
would be sufficient, in and of itself, for us to weak-link the
ratings to the issuer credit rating on this entity," S&P said.

                          RATING ACTIONS

"We do not expect any losses on these three loans, but our view
of recoverable proceeds for each of the loans has decreased. The
rating actions also takes into account the possibility that the
largest loan may be sequentially repaid. We note that the cash
manager on the January interest payment date applied principal
proceeds sequentially, therefore interpreting the Devonshire
Square loan default and the subsequent restructuring as a trigger
to begin sequential repayment of the notes," S&P said.

S&P has considered two possible scenarios, one in which the
Devonshire Square loan repays in the near term, and one in which
it does not:

  * "In our analysis, a large portion of the speculative-grade
    proceeds arise from this loan. If the Devonshire Square loan
    fully repays in the near term, we would expect the proceeds
    to be applied sequentially in the transaction and pro rata
    between the class A1 and A2 notes, reducing the balance of
    these classes materially. In this scenario, the ratings on
    the A1 and A2 notes would be unlikely to change, as they are
    constrained by the rating on the counterparty. We would
    likely raise the ratings on the remaining classes of notes in
    this scenario," S&P said.

  * "If the Devonshire Square loan does not repay in the near
    term, we would likely downgrade the ratings on the class B
    through F notes, to reflect the credit quality of the pool,"
    S&P said.

"Accordingly, we have placed on CreditWatch developing our
ratings on the class B through F notes, to reflect that our
ratings could move up or down depending on the Devonshire Square
loan," S&P said.

"Triton (European Loan Conduit No. 26) closed in April 2007. The
collateral comprises U.K.-based mixed real estate loans that were
originated by Morgan Stanley Bank International Ltd. At cutoff,
the loan pool consisted of four loans, ranging from GBP26.8
million to GBP288 million. Three loans remain and the largest one
(Devonshire Square Estate, 60% of the remaining pool balance) may
be repaid soon, as the asset backing this loan is in the process
of being sold. This transaction uses a servicer liquidity advance
mechanism, where liquidity available to the issuer is advanced by
an affiliate of the servicer," S&P said.

          POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES

"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).
However, these criteria are under review," S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice Of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result in
changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.

RATINGS LIST

Class                   Rating
             To                       From

Triton (European Loan Conduit No. 26) PLC
GBP556.65 Million, US$87.309 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Developing

B            A (sf)/Watch Dev         A (sf)
C            BBB (sf)/Watch Dev       BBB (sf)
D            BBB- (sf)/Watch Dev      BBB- (sf)
E            BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev       BB+ (sf)
F            BB (sf)/Watch Dev        BB (sf)

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1           A (sf)                   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A2           A (sf)                   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg


* UK: Fine Wine Investors Have Lost GBP100-Mil. Over 4 Years
------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Lechmere at Decanter.com reports that senior accountant
Nedim Ailyan has estimated that fine wine investors have lost
GBP100 million over four years by entrusting their savings to
failed wine companies.

Decanter.com relates that Mr. Ailyan, a director at insolvency
firm Abbott Fielding, which is handling two high-profile wine
investment company bankruptcies, told the BBC that some 50 such
companies have failed in the last four years, costing investors
up to GBP100 million.

The latest bankruptcies include Beaumont Vintners and Bordeaux
UK, both of which Mr. Ailyan is liquidating.  They have collapsed
owing creditors an estimated GBP1.5 million and GBP10 million
respectively, the report discloses.

Decanter.com notes that investors are expected to recoup a
fraction of that sum -- around 20 pence in the pound in the case
of Bordeaux UK.  Their investments are not covered under any
financial compensation scheme.


* UK: Insolvencies in Education Sector Rise 44% in 2011
-------------------------------------------------------
The number of businesses going bust in the education sector has
soared by 44% in the last year, according to research by
accountancy firm Wilkins Kennedy.

Wilkins Kennedy says that 169 educational institutions became
insolvent in 2011, up from 117 in 2010.  In comparison, corporate
insolvencies as a whole have risen by just 3% over the same
period.

Wilkins Kennedy says that this is due to stricter immigration
rules for foreign students, which has slashed the income of UK
educational institutions and driven many of them into insolvency.
The sector has also been hit by the Government's austerity
program.

In November 2011, 450 colleges were also banned from taking new
non-EU students as they failed to meet the Government's new rules
for inspection of the sector.

Keith Stevens -- keith.stevens@wilkinskennedy.com -- Partner at
Wilkins Kennedy, commented : "2011 was a difficult year for the
private education sector and there is likely to be further pain
still to come. The Government's introduction of stricter
immigration rules for foreign students has seen the number of
foreign students fall substantially, putting many colleges and
groups of colleges out of business."

"The British higher education sector has a world class reputation
that has attracted a high volume of students from around the
world. Over the years many institutions have grown to become
heavily dependent on foreign students for funding."

9.6% of the higher education sector's income in 2009-10 came from
fees paid by non-EU students, according to the Higher Education
Funding Council for England (hefce).  Wilkins Kennedy says that
for some institutions the figure can be close to 100%.

In one instance encountered by Wilkins Kennedy, the number of
foreign students of a college slumped by 75% from 1,200 in 2010
to 300 at the end of 2011.

Wilkins Kennedy says that these Government initiatives, in force
since July 4 2011, have curbed the number of foreign students:

   * Restriction of the work a foreign student can do while
     studying - only students sponsored by higher education
     institutions (HEIs) and publicly funded further education
     colleges are able to work part-time during term time and
     full-time during vacations;

   * Only the dependents of students sponsored by HEIs on
     postgraduate courses lasting 12 months or longer, and of
     government-sponsored students on courses lasting longer
     than 6 months can have a visa sponsorship;

   * Educational institutions have to confirm that courses
     represent genuine academic progression from any previous
     courses studied by the student in the UK.

Wilkins Kennedy says the fact that, in the meantime, countries,
such as the USA, Germany and Australia had become laxer with
their student immigration policies, has diverted foreign students
away from studying in the UK.

"Overall, the UK is now a much less attractive place for foreign
students. The dramatic fall in the inflow of foreign students has
hit the revenue of colleges very badly," Mr. Stevens added.

Wilkins Kennedy says that a final tightening of the student visa
rules were implemented on April 6 2012, including:

   * Every institution that wants to sponsor students will
     have to be qualified as 'highly trusted sponsors' and
     become accredited by statutory education inspection
     bodies by the end of 2012. 450 colleges failed to meet
     these criteria in November 2011.

   * Foreign students who want to stay in the UK after they
     have graduated will need to earn at least GBP20,000 a
     year and work for companies that are approved by the
     Home Office.

   * There will also be limits on the time that can be spent
     studying at degree level, as well as restriction on work
     placements.

Mr. Stevens commented: "This will make it much harder for
international students to stay in the UK after graduation and
will strongly deter them from coming to the UK to study in the
first place."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *