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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, June 20, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 122

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

CREDIT IMMOBILIER: Banque Postale Among Interested Bidders
NATIXIS: Moody's Cuts Standalone Credit Assessment to 'Ba2'


G E R M A N Y

KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Rates EUR300-Mil. Senior Notes '(P)B1'


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Must Be Allowed to Fall Into Insolvency, Rogers Says


I R E L A N D

ACC BANK: Dutch Parent Injects EUR225MM in 2011 Following Losses
LYNCH FREIGHT: Ordered to Repay Part of Debts


I T A L Y

ATLANTE FINANCE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'BBsf'
IMCO: Declared Bankrupt by Milan Court
PREMAFIN: Inks EUR368-Million Debt Restructuring Deal


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Longterm Issuer Default Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes


P O L A N D

BANK GOSPODARKI: Moody's Retains Stable Outlook on 'D' BFSR
ING BANK: Moody's Retains Stable Outlook on 'D+' BFSR


P O R T U G A L

BANCO COMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Viability Rating to 'cc'


R O M A N I A

HIDROELECTRICA SA: Chair Says Insolvency Won't Lead to Bankruptcy


R U S S I A

CENTROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
METALLOINVEST JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR; Outlook Stable
NATIXIS BANK: Moody's Downgrades Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
ROSAGROLEASING JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Stable
ROSSIYA INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Upgrades LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CONERSTONER TITAN: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on Three Note Classes
DRAGON'S DEN: Enters Into Voluntary Liquidation
* UK: Doubt Raised Over Company Voluntary Arrangements' Efficacy


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Says EMEA Corporates' Liquidity Position Deteriorates


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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CREDIT IMMOBILIER: Banque Postale Among Interested Bidders
----------------------------------------------------------
Scheherazade Daneshkhu at The Financial Times reports that Banque
Postale, the French state-owned postal bank, has emerged as one
of the bidders for the troubled Credit Immobilier de France
(CIF).

HSBC, the FT says, is advising CIF and managing the sale of the
social housing lender after months of talk on whether it would be
nationalized.  The government has been taking an active part in
trying to find a partner, its preferred solution, the FT
discloses.  According to the FT, Banque Postale confirmed on
Monday "it had decided to take part in the process and to examine
the CIF dossier".

The FT relates that last month, Moody's downgraded the financial
strength rating of CIF's standalone bank, saying that the lender
was "no longer viable without ongoing financial support".  The
rating agency, noting that the business was entirely wholesale-
funded, said the group's policy of maintaining a liquidity buffer
of at least six months of financing needs would see it through to
the autumn, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Moody's said CIF's "significant liquidity
risks imply that the group is likely to become wholly reliant on
liquidity support from the French public sector".  The rating
agency, as cited by the FT, said more permanent solutions for CIF
could include "a merger, strategic investment or other joint
venture with a third party facilitated by the government."

Credit Immobilier de France is a mortgage lender.


NATIXIS: Moody's Cuts Standalone Credit Assessment to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) has downgraded to Aa3.ru
from Aa2.ru the National Scale Rating (NSR) of Natixis Bank
(ZAO), the Russian subsidiary of Natixis, the sixth-largest
French banking group.

The downgrade of Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s ratings was prompted by
Moody's rating downgrade of the French parent bank Natixis to A2
deposits; BFSR D/ BCA ba2 from Aa3 deposits; BFSR D+/ BCA baa3,
which, in turn, reflects Moody's assessment of the weakened
capacity of Natixis to provide timely capital and funding support
to the Russian subsidiary, in case of need.

The rating action on Natixis Bank (ZAO) concludes the review that
Moody's Interfax initiated on February 21, 2012, when the ratings
were placed on review for downgrade, following a similar rating
action on Natixis.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s NSR to Aa3.ru from Aa2.ru
was prompted by Moody's downgrade of Natixis' ratings.

Moody's says that the lowering of Natixis's standalone credit
assessment to ba2 from baa3, announced on June 15, 2012, reflects
the bank's vulnerability to the weakening operating environment.
Under Moody's Joint Default Analysis methodology, the long-term
ratings of the Russian subsidiary incorporate uplift from
parental support assumptions; the two-notch lowering of Natixis'
standalone credit assessment therefore has a direct impact on the
ratings of the subsidiary.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Moody's Interfax believes there is little likelihood of any
upward movement in Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s rating in the near-term,
unless there is a material improvement in the operating
environments of the bank's parent group. At the same time,
Moody's Interfax notes that downward pressure could be exerted on
Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s standalone rating by any material adverse
changes in the bank's risk profile, particularly significant
impairment of the bank's liquidity position, capitalization and
by any failure to maintain control over its asset quality. In
addition, further downward pressure on Natixis' ratings could
affect Natixis Bank (ZAO) (Russia)'s NSR.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012, and Mapping
Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale Ratings in March
2011.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Natixis Bank (ZAO) reported
total assets of RUB20.5 billion and shareholders' equity of
RUB2.3 billion, in accordance with Russian GAAP (unaudited), as
at 31 December 2011.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.

About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).



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G E R M A N Y
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KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Rates EUR300-Mil. Senior Notes '(P)B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating
to the EUR300 million senior notes due 2017 to be issued by Kabel
Deutschland Holding AG. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed KDH's
Ba2 Corporate Family Rating ("CFR"), and the Ba2 rating of the
EUR500 million Senior Secured Notes due 2018 issued by KDVS GmbH
("KDVS"), KDH's operating subsidiary. The ratings outlook remains
stable.

KDH will lend on the proceeds from the Notes to KDVS by way of a
subordinated intercompany loan. KDVS may use the net proceeds to
partially finance the purchase price for the Telecolumbus
acquisition and related fees, or for general corporate purposes
if the acquisition does not go through.

Following the issuance of the Notes, KDH's EUR600 million
unsecured bank bridge facility -- put in place to finance the
acquisition -- will be reduced to EUR300 million.

Ratings Rationale

The Notes will be unsecured and will not benefit from any
guarantees from operating companies. The (P)B1 rating on the
Notes, two notches below KDH's CFR, reflects the Notes'
structural and contractual subordination in right of payment to
all debt issued at KDVS.

Payment of principal and interest for the debt at KDH, which is
outside of the opco restricted group, relies on distributions
from KDVS. Assuming no event of default, KDVS has the capacity to
service the debt at KDH through a combination of restricted
payments capacity in the notes and debt service flexibility in
the loan agreement for debt incurred at KDH. Moody's expects that
KDVS will have sufficient headroom to upstream cash to maintain
KDH's dividend program in addition to servicing its debt
obligations.

In FY 2011/12, KDH delivered a solid operating performance -
reporting growth in revenues and adjusted EBITDA of 6.3% and
9.1%, respectively. Going forward, Moody's expects KDH to benefit
from: (i) the good growth potential for its broadband and premium
TV; (ii) investment in the network which should result in
improved service reach and capabilities as well as (iii) the
company's strong operating leverage. As of March 31, 2012, KDH
reported a net debt to EBITDA ratio of 3.4x. The company has
publicly reiterated its commitment to its long-term net leverage
target (as calculated by the company) of 3.0x to 3.5x. Pro-forma
for the acquisition, the company expects to reach its leverage
target within 2 years after closing of the transaction.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to grow its revenue and EBITDA, largely driven by a
steady increase in its internet and telephony subscribers. It
also reflects Moody's assumption that KDH will be able to
integrate Telecolumbus effectively and in a timely manner given
the success of its precedent integration of part of
Telecolumbus's assets in 2008. Upward pressure could be exerted
on KDH's ratings as a result of: (i) continued strong operating
momentum; (ii) adjusted gross debt to EBITDA (as defined by
Moody's) moving towards 4.0x at the level of KDH on a sustained
basis; and (iii) continued solid free cash flow generation (as
defined by Moody's - post capex and dividends). Downward pressure
could arise if the company were to: (i) significantly under-
perform against its publicly stated guidance regarding EBITDA
while registering a substantial increase in capex; and/or (ii)
experience an increase in leverage well above 5.0x gross debt to
EBITDA (as defined by Moody's) on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in rating Kabel Deutschland
Holding AG was the Global Cable Television Industry Methodology
published in July 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, including any possible changes
during the syndication process, Moody's will endeavor to assign a
definitive rating to the facilities. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

KDH is the largest Level 3 cable TV operator in Germany. For FY
March 31, 2012, KDH reported revenues of EUR1.7 billion and
adjusted EBITDA (as calculated by KDH) of EUR795 million.



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G R E E C E
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* GREECE: Must Be Allowed to Fall Into Insolvency, Rogers Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Parkin at Bloomberg News, citing Handelsblatt, reports that
investor Jim Rogers, chairman of Rogers Holdings, said Greece
should be allowed to slip into insolvency to avert the injustice
of the country being propped up by its partners.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Rogers is cited as saying in an
interview "Greece is very plainly bankrupt, denying that is
absurd -- it should in that case be allowed to go bankrupt."

"Why may I ask should hard-working German taxpayers pay money to
let Greeks sit on the beach and drink wine and bankers keep their
Lamborghinis? That's absurd."



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I R E L A N D
=============


ACC BANK: Dutch Parent Injects EUR225MM in 2011 Following Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that ACC Bank's
Dutch parent pumped EUR225 million into the loss-making Irish
unit last year, as it continued its private "bailout" of the
Irish unit for a fourth year.

According to Irish Independent, Irish unit ACC reported after-tax
losses of EUR174 million in 2011, down 19% compared to the
previous year's EUR217 million.

The bank had reported a EUR400 million loss in 2009, Irish
Independent relates.

The loss meant Dutch parent Rabobank had to pump money into the
Irish unit for a fourth year, taking total cost of the rescue to
EUR930 million over the period, Irish Independent notes.

The losses are mainly on loans originally made to property
developers, Irish Independent says.

Last year, the High Court ordered TD Mick Wallace to repay
EUR19.5 million after the bank moved against him, while a number
of other lenders were happy to roll over debts of the
controversial developer-turned-TD's construction company, Irish
Independent recounts.

ACCBank plc is a commercial bank in Ireland that focuses on
agriculture and SME lending.


LYNCH FREIGHT: Ordered to Repay Part of Debts
---------------------------------------------
Nick Rabbitts at Limerick Leader reports that two Kilmallock
companies which went into examinership with debts of more than
EUR2 million have been ordered to repay some of these in part.

Lynch Freight and Kilmallock Transport secured the protection of
the courts in February, Limerick Leader relates.

Peter Russell of Russell and Co chartered accountants in Cork was
appointed by the High Court in February to restructure the
company's debts, Limerick Leader recounts.

Documents just released show the firm has come to a proposed
scheme of repayments with its 40 creditors, mainly local
companies, Limerick Leader notes.

Some 36 people work for the company, Limerick Leader discloses.

According to Limerick Leader, creditors to the two companies have
been divided into three categories -- Super Preferential,
Preferential and Unsecured.

In his report, Mr. Russell stated the "Super Preferential
Creditors" will be paid 100% of the amount due, according to
Limerick Leader.

It has been recommended the firm will also repay a further
EUR137,000 of a EUR220,000 bill it built up in terms of VAT,
commercial rates, and further income tax, Limerick Leader states.

The unsecured creditors will recover 23% of their debts over the
next 36 months by installment, Limerick Leader says.

Companies being owed money include Bank of Ireland, Electric
Ireland, Primeline Express and Corrib Oil, Limerick Leader
discloses.

According to Limerick Leader, in his report, Mr. Russell
expressed confidence the companies will survive.

Mr. Russell recommended the cost-restructuring measures to the
High Court for their approval, Limerick Leader notes.

Lynch Freight is located at Garrynoe, Kilmallock, and Kilmallock
Transport at the IDA Industrial Estate in Bruree Road.



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I T A L Y
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ATLANTE FINANCE: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on Atlante Finance
S.r.l.'s notes as follows:

  -- EUR236,881,437 class A notes (ISIN IT0004069032): affirmed
     at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR28,800,000 class B notes (ISIN IT0004069040): upgraded to
     'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR136,800,000 class C notes (ISIN IT0004069057): upgraded
     to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

The upgrade of the class B and C notes is due to the increased
credit enhancement (CE) which has been supported by structural
de-leveraging of this transaction which is quite seasoned as it
closed in May 2006.

The portfolio has amortized to 40% of the initial portfolio size,
or EUR552 million, from an initial pool of EUR1.4 billion as of
March 2006. Defaulted and 90 days-past-due delinquent loans stand
at 20% of the current portfolio balance.  Defaulted loans and
past-due principal installments of delinquent loans are debited
to the Principal Deficiency Ledger (PDL), the balance of which is
written down by diverting excess spread from the portfolio to
accelerate the pay down of the notes in order of priority.  The
outstanding PDL balance is equal to 12% of the current portfolio
balance, a level which has remained largely stable since March
2011.

In the analysis of the SME pool, which accounts for about 59% of
the overall collateral portfolio, Fitch assumed a probability of
default (PD) transaction benchmark equal to 3.3% on the basis of
the actual historical default performance of this pool and the
Italian SME benchmark of 3.75% disclosed in the SME CDO criteria.
However, where assets were in arrears, adjustments were made to
their PDs in line with Fitch's SME criteria to reflect the
relative increase in risk.  From a recovery perspective, all the
loans in the SME pool are secured by economic first-ranking
mortgages on real estate assets with a weighted average current
loan-to-value (LTV) of 40%.

For the residential pool, which accounts for about 38% of the
overall portfolio, Fitch has estimated a stressed loss as
envisaged in its "EMEA Residential Mortgage Loss Criteria"
report.  This stressed loss reflected among others the
geographical distribution of the pool (with 44% of the pool's
principal outstanding balance consisting of exposures towards
obligors based in northern Italy, 26% in central Italy and 30% in
southern Italy), the presence of self-employed borrowers (25%)
and of second homes (8%) among the properties backing the
residential mortgage loans, and a current LTV of 22%.

Fitch expects structural de-leveraging to continue, which will
further increase credit enhancement available to all rated
classes of notes. The local public entity pool has experienced no
defaults to date, and Fitch expects this positive trend to
continue.  The residential pool has experienced defaults in line
with expectations, and hence this pool is not a source of
performance concern.  A more volatile behavior is to be expected
from the SME pool in light of its high single obligor
concentration risk, with the largest ten obligor groups
accounting for about 53% of the SME pool balance (28% of the
overall collateral pool balance).  However, this is mitigated by
the remarkably high credit enhancement levels of the rated notes,
which currently stand at 58.0%, 52.9% and 28.7% for class A,
class B and class C notes respectively.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization of an initial
EUR1.4bn static pool of commercial mortgage loans granted to
Italian SMEs, residential mortgage loans granted to private
households in Italy and unsecured loans granted to Italian local
public entities.  All these loans were originated and are
serviced by Unipol Banca S.p.A. Atlante Finance S.r.l. is a
limited liability special purpose vehicle incorporated under the
laws of Italy.

Fitch has revised the Issuer Report Grade (IRG) of Atlante
Finance S.r.l.'s servicer and payment reports to One Star (from
Two Stars).  This revision follows the publication of the "EMEA
SC Issuer Report Grades" report in November 2011, which has
tightened the criteria according to which issuer report grades
are assigned by Fitch.  This issuer reports lack, among other
factors, counterparty rating information and portfolio
stratification tables for industry, single obligor and
geographical concentration.  Moreover the delivery of these
reports has not always been timely.


IMCO: Declared Bankrupt by Milan Court
--------------------------------------
Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News, citing news agency Ansa,
reports that a Milan court declared Imco and Sinergia, two of the
holding companies owned by Ligresti family, as bankrupt.


PREMAFIN: Inks EUR368-Million Debt Restructuring Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that Premafin said in a statement on
Thursday that the company signed an agreement to restructure
EU368 million of debt with banks led by UniCredit.

The restructuring plan is conditional on merger among Unipol,
Fondiaria, Milano and Premafin, Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, a new post-merger entity is to issue
EUR201 million 3-year convertible bond subscribed by creditor
banks for EUR134 million and Unipol for EUR67 million.

Banks extended the deadline for EUR330 million of Premafin's debt
to 2018, Bloomberg relates.

Premafin Finanziaria SpA, through its subsidiary, engages in the
insurance operations in Italy and internationally.



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K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Longterm Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakhstan-based Alliance Bank JSC's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' with a Stable
Outlook.  The agency has also affirmed the Long-term IDR of BTA
Bank at 'RD' (Restricted Default).

Alliance's affirmation reflects Fitch's view of the limited
probability of support for the bank from the Kazakh authorities.
Government support would most likely be channelled through the
National Welfare Fund Samruk Kazyna (SK), which became the bank's
majority owner after Alliance's default and debt restructuring in
2009.

In assessing the probability of support for Alliance, Fitch views
favorably its government ownership; actions already taken by SK
and other government bodies to assist the bank; and Alliance's
relatively small size and improved financial position and
performance, which should limit the cost of any support that may
be required.  At the same time, Fitch still views support as
highly uncertain due to the recent repeat default of BTA (another
SK-controlled bank); the recent absence of any equity injections
by SK, meaning that Alliance has still not regained solvency; and
the lack of any clear statements from SK officials that the fund
would provide support, in case of need.

The main tangible recent support provided by SK was the approval
in 2011 of a reduction in the minimum guaranteed dividend on the
bank's preference shares.  This reduced by a large KZT65bn the
liability represented by the shares, resulting in a similar
contraction in the bank's IFRS negative equity (equal to 62% of
the 2011 opening balance).  Alliance also benefits from
significant regulatory forbearance in the form of lower loan
impairment reserves in its statutory accounts (compared to IFRS),
resulting in a positive reported equity position and compliance
with regulatory capital requirements.

In addition, funding from SK and other public sector entities has
remained stable and comprises about 30% of the bank's
liabilities, although the negative carry on some of this funding
(SK bonds held by Alliance carry a lower interest rate than
funding provided to Alliance by SK) weighs on the bank's
performance.

Alliance's IDRs could be downgraded if SK officials give any
indication that the bank's creditors might be asked to
participate in the further restoration of the bank's capital
position.  A curtailment of the regulatory forbearance currently
enjoyed by the bank (at present, the agreement on lower statutory
reserves is in place until end-2013), leading to a breach of
regulatory capital requirements and potentially signalling the
need for further restructuring, could also be negative for the
ratings.  Conversely, a recapitalization of the bank -- not
currently expected by Fitch -- or elimination/reduction of the
negative carry on the SK funding would be viewed positively.

A merger with Temirbank (not rated, also controlled by SK), which
according to Alliance's management is currently being considered
by SK, could also be positive for Alliance's ratings, given
Temir's stronger reported capitalization and performance.
However, Fitch believes that consideration of such a potential
merger is currently at quite an early stage, and would probably
require the approval of Temir's, as well as Alliance's,
creditors.

Alliance's 'cc' Viability Rating (VR) reflects the bank's still
negative core capital and pre-impairment profitability.  However
Fitch views positively the gradual improvement in the bank's
performance and its currently comfortable liquidity position.
The VR could be upgraded if further significant improvements in
the capital position and performance are achieved.

Alliance eliminated its IFRS negative equity position in 2011 as
a result of the restructuring of the preferred shares, a sale of
non-performing loans (NPLs) and recoveries of other impaired
exposures.  However, Fitch core capital remained negative at end-
Q112 (equal to 3% of total assets) due to adjustment for
significant deferred tax assets.  In Fitch's view, further
material improvements in the capital position will be difficult
to achieve without external support given the bank's still weak
core performance and significant challenges with generating
further recoveries from its impaired loan book.

Pre-impairment profit remained marginally negative in Q112,
although slightly improved on 2011, as the bank has expanded its
high-yielding consumer loan book and taken steps to reduce
operating expenses.  However, the high cost of all of the bank's
main sources of funding (customer deposits, SK funding and bonds
outstanding) weighs heavily on performance.  Pre-impairment
results may turn positive before end-2012, but increasing
provisions on consumer loans may keep the bottom line depressed.

NPLs contracted to 55% of the portfolio at end-2011 from 67% at
end-2010 due to some progress with loan work-outs.  Provisions
covered a reasonable 85% of NPLs, although the unreserved part
still accounted for a significant 9% of total assets.  Generation
of further significant recoveries from the NPL portfolio is
likely to be a long-term process, in Fitch's view, although the
fact that most of the largest problem exposures are to
Kazakhstan-based projects is a positive factor.

Following large inflows of retail deposits in 2011, the liquidity
position is currently comfortable, with liquid assets, comprising
mainly unpledged SK bonds, equal to 48% of customer funding
(excluding state-related deposits) at end-Q112.  Debt repayments
are moderate in 2012-2013, but step up to US$182 million in 2014,
US$270 million in 2015 and US$249 million in 2016 (equal to 5%,
7% and 7% of total assets at end-Q112), which will require more
careful liquidity management and make deposit stability more
important.

The affirmation of BTA at 'RD' reflects its ongoing negotiations
with creditors on the terms of the restructuring of its debt.
Fitch expects to reassess the bank after the restructuring has
been completed.

The rating actions were as follows:

Alliance Bank JSC

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed
     at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed
     at 'B'
  -- Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed at
     'B-'; Outlook Stable
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'cc'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B-'
  -- Senior unsecured debt rating: affirmed at 'B-'; Recovery
     Rating at 'RR4'
  -- Subordinated debt rating: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating
     at 'RR6'

BTA Bank

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed
     at 'RD'
  -- Short-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed
     at 'RD'
  -- Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed at
     'RD'
  -- Short-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating: affirmed at
     'RD'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'f'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  -- Senior unsecured debt rating: affirmed at 'C'; Recovery
     Rating at 'RR5'
  -- Subordinated debt rating: affirmed at 'C'; Recovery Rating
     at 'RR6'



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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Brit Insurance Limited's (BIL)
Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating to 'BBB' from 'A'. The
Outlook is Stable.  Brit Insurance Holdings B.V.'s (BIH BV) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) has been affirmed at 'BBB+' with
a Stable Outlook and BIH BV's subordinated notes have been
affirmed at 'BB+'.

The rating actions follow BIH BV's recent announcement,
confirming the sale of the majority of its subsidiary's (BIL) in-
force policies to RiverStone Holdings Limited, a run-off
specialist.  The agency assumes that regulatory approval will be
granted and anticipates that the sale will formally complete in
Q412.  The renewal rights, operations and assets of BIL's UK
regional operations were previously sold to QBE Insurance
(Europe) Limited (QBE) in April 2012.

The decision to downgrade BIL's IFS rating reflects the likely
rating level for the post-sale, run-off phase of BIL's insurance
policies. Fitch believes that the amount of residual capital that
will be retained in BIL, post-sale, to support the run-off
company is likely to be at or just above the required regulatory
minimum.  This action is taken despite the commitment by Brit
Insurance group to maintain BIL's capital to a level commensurate
with the previous 'A' rating level, prior to the completion of
the sale, The agency had previously stated that it would seek to
resolve the Rating Watch Negative on BIL's IFS once the outcome
of the strategic review was known, and would consider the
financial strength of the acquirer in the event of a sale.

The affirmation of BIH BV's IDR reflects the agency's view that
the remaining Brit Insurance group's financial profile has not
materially changed at this time.  While the two-part sale of BIL
reduces the size and diversity of group, Fitch continues to
maintain a positive view of actions taken by management to
streamline existing operations and exit underperforming insurance
classes.  The agency will continue to assess the effect of on-
going management actions on the financial profile of the Brit
group.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


BANK GOSPODARKI: Moody's Retains Stable Outlook on 'D' BFSR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term ratings of
Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej SA (BGZ) to Baa2 from Baa1 and
assigned a stable outlook to the rating. The short-term rating
was confirmed at Prime-2. The standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of BGZ at D (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of ba2) was not affected and the outlook remains
stable.

The downgrade follows a rating action on June 15, 2012 on the
bank's Dutch parent, Rabobank Nederland (Rabobank), whose ratings
were downgraded to Aa2/Prime-1 from Aaa/Prime-1 and its BFSR was
downgraded to B-/a1 from B+/aa2.

The rating action concludes the review initiated on  February 21,
2012, when the ratings were placed on review for downgrade,
following a similar rating action on Rabobank.

Ratings Rationale

The one-notch downgrade of BGZ's long-term rating to Baa2, with a
stable outlook, was prompted by Moody's downgrade on June 15,
2012 of Rabobank's standalone ratings to B-/a1, from which
Moody's imputes rating uplifts for the Polish subsidiary.

However, Moody's still maintains a very high probability of
parental support from the Dutch parent, which reflects Rabobank's
role as a long-term strategic shareholder in BGZ, its record of
providing foreign-currency funding and capital resources to BGZ
and its long-term interest in the Polish agribusiness sector.

Moody's assumption of a very high parental support probability is
also reinforced by Rabobank's tender offer to wholly acquire its
Polish subsidiary in April 2012, of which it currently owns 60%.
Moody's notes, however, that Rabobank's plan to acquire 100%
ownership would require a divestiture of the Polish government's
25% stake in BGZ, thus reducing the incentives of the Polish
authorities to provide additional support in case of need.

Accordingly, the current three notches of uplift in BGZ's long-
term rating of Baa2 -- which remains one of the highest of
Western European bank subsidiaries in the region -- is driven
solely by parental support assumptions.

The stable outlook on BGZ's long-term rating is driven by the
stable outlook on Rabobank's standalone rating.

What Could Drive the Ratings Up/Down

Upwards pressure on BGZ's standalone rating would require a
strengthening of the bank's franchise, as well as a sustainable
improvement in its profitability and efficiency. An upgrade of
BGZ's long-term rating is unlikely in the near future given the
recent downgrade of the parent's rating and a relatively high
notching uplift already incorporated into the rating.

The bank's standalone rating could be downgraded following a
material erosion of its competitive position. A deterioration of
the bank's asset quality could exert downward pressure on its
standalone rating in light of its large exposure to the cyclical
agricultural sector. A further downgrade of the parent's
standalone rating could also exert downward pressure on BGZ's
long-term rating, albeit unlikely given its stable outlook.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

BGZ

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
   downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1, stable outlook

- Short-term local and foreign-currency rating confirmed at
   Prime-2

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2012.


ING BANK: Moody's Retains Stable Outlook on 'D+' BFSR
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
ratings of ING Bank Slaski (Poland) to Baa1, and has assigned a
negative outlook, from A2 and downgraded the long-term deposit
ratings and debt rating of ING Bank Eurasia (Russia) to Baa2,
with a negative outlook, from Baa1.

The downgrade of these two subsidiaries was prompted by Moody's
downgrade on June 15, 2012 of ING BANK N.V.'s standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) to C-/baa1, with negative
outlook, from C+/a2, which indicates a reduced capacity of the
parent bank to provide timely capital and funding support to the
subsidiaries, in case of need.

The standalone BFSR of ING Bank Slaski at D+/baa3 and ING Bank
Eurasia at D/ba2 were not affected and the outlook remains stable
on these ratings.

The rating actions on these subsidiaries conclude the reviews
initiated on February 21, 2012, when the ratings were placed on
review for downgrade, following a similar rating action on ING
Bank N.V.

RATINGS RATIONALE --- ING Bank Slaski (Poland)

The two-notch downgrade on June 15, 2012 of ING Bank N.V.'s
standalone BFSR to C-/baa1 from C+/a2, with a negative outlook,
has a direct impact on the long-term ratings of ING's Polish
subsidiary. As Moody's incorporates a very high probability of
parental support into the Polish subsidiary's ratings, the
parental downgrade resulted in a corresponding two-notch
downgrade for ING Bank Slaski's supported long-term rating to
Baa1, with a negative outlook.

Moody's maintains a very high probability of parental support
assumptions for ING Bank Slaski, which reflects (i) the strategic
75% ownership by the parent; (ii) the close brand association;
and (iii) Moody's view that the Polish market remains strategic
for the Dutch group and provides an opportunity for
diversification.

In addition to parental support from ING Bank N.V., the long-term
ratings of the Polish subsidiary also incorporate a high
probability of systemic support, reflecting ING Bank Slaski's
importance as the fourth-largest bank in Poland with sustained
market shares and a sizeable customer deposit base.

Overall, the combination of parental and systemic support
assumptions result in two notches of rating uplift from the baa3
standalone credit assessment to ING Bank Slaski's long-term
rating of Baa1.

The negative outlook on ING Bank Slaski's long-term rating is in
line with the outlook on the parent's standalone rating.

What Could Drive The Ratings Down/Up

ING Bank Slaski's standalone ratings would likely come under
further downward pressure if its recurring earnings and interest
margins were to deteriorate significantly. Moody's would also
view negatively notable weakening in the quality of its funding
franchise. Furthermore, downgrades of the parent's standalone
rating would also exert downward pressure on the bank's long-term
rating.

An upgrade of the bank's long-term rating is unlikely in the near
future, given the negative outlook. However, upward pressure on
ING Bank Slaski's standalone ratings could develop following a
strengthening of its franchise -- especially in the retail
segment -- as well as significant improvement in recurring
revenues and efficiency.

RATINGS RATIONALE --- ING Bank Eurasia (Russia)

The two-notch downgrade of ING Bank N.V.'s standalone BFSR to C-
/baa1 from C+/a2, with a negative outlook, has a direct impact on
ING Bank Eurasia's long-term ratings. As Moody's incorporates a
very high probability of parental support in the Russian
subsidiary's ratings, the lowering of ING Bank N.V.'s BFSR
resulted in a one-notch downgrade for ING Bank Eurasia's
supported long-term rating to Baa2, with a negative outlook.

Moody's maintains a very high probability of parental support for
ING Bank Eurasia, reflecting the parent's 100% ownership and
Moody's view that the Russian market remains strategic for the
Dutch group. Moody's also takes into account the high degree of
integration of ING Bank Eurasia with ING Bank N.V.'s commercial
banking business and the fact that a significant part of the
revenues originating in Russia are booked at the parent company
level. The negative outlook on ING Bank Eurasia's supported
ratings is in line with the outlook on the parent's standalone
rating.

What Could Drive The Ratings Down/Up

Downward pressure on ING Bank Eurasia's standalone ratings could
develop following deterioration in its asset quality,
capitalization and liquidity position. Other negative rating
drivers would include an increase in credit-risk concentration, a
substantial decrease in market share and weakening of
profitability metrics. Furthermore, downgrades of the parent's
standalone rating would exert downward pressure on the bank's
long-term rating.

Moody's says that the negative outlook on ING Bank Eurasia's
supported long-term ratings captures the limited up-side
potential for these ratings. ING Bank Eurasia's modest franchise,
narrow client base, limited territorial coverage and the volatile
nature of its earnings constrain the upside potential of the
BFSR. Upward pressure on the bank's standalone rating could be
supported by growth in its franchise and higher market shares in
core business segments.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

ING Bank Slaski

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
   downgraded to Baa1 from A2, negative outlook

- Short-term local and foreign-currency rating downgraded to
   Prime-2 from Prime-1

ING Bank Eurasia

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
   downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1, negative outlook

- Short-term local and foreign-currency ratings of Prime-2
   confirmed

- Long-term local-currency debt rating downgraded to Baa2 from
   Baa1, negative outlook

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2012.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO COMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Viability Rating to 'cc'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco Comercial Portugues'
(Millennium bcp) and Banco BPI's Viability Ratings (VR) to 'cc'
from 'b' and Banif - Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A.'s
(Banif) VR to 'cc' from 'b-'.  Fitch has also downgraded Caixa
Geral de Depositos' (CGD) VR to 'b' from 'b+'.

The downgrades reflect Fitch's assessment of Portuguese banks'
recapitalization needs to comply with stricter regulatory capital
requirements and absorb one-off negative capital impacts.  The
banks' support-driven Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
('BB+'/Negative for Millennium bcp, CGD and Banco BPI;
'BB'/Negative for Banif) are unaffected by the VR downgrades.  A
full list of rating actions is at the end of this comment.

The downgrades of Millennium bcp, Banco BPI and Banif to 'cc'
reflect their sizeable capital needs (EUR3 billion at Millennium
bcp and EUR1.5 billion at Banco BPI, in each case accounting for
about 65% of their core capital at end-2011), and the banks'
inability to raise most of this capital by private means in a
difficult operating environment, resulting in them requiring
external assistance from the Portuguese government and/or
international authorities through the EUR12 billion Bank Solvency
Support Facility (BSSF) under the IMF/EU program.

Capital needs at CGD, Banco BPI and Millennium bcp are largely
related to regulatory capital buffers required by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) to address market concerns over sovereign
risks.  The capital requirements also reflect regulatory core
capital deductions, largely relating to investments in insurance
subsidiaries.  Banco BPI and Millennium bcp also have to absorb
losses from the partial transfer of their pension funds to the
social security system, and Millennium bcp also needs to absorb
other one-off losses.  In addition, Millennium bcp has
significant exposure to developments in Greece as a result of the
operations of its Greek subsidiary.

The more moderate downgrade of CGD's VR reflects the fact that
its capital needs (EUR1.65 billion) equate to a much lower 25% of
its end-2011 core capital.  Fitch estimates that the bank's core
capital ratio, after recognition of certain capital shortfalls,
but prior to the recapitalization, would still be approximately
7%. CGD's major shareholder, the Portuguese state, has announced
that it will contribute the required capital.

For Banif, capital needs are centered at the holding level, Banif
SGPS, which did not comply with the Bank of Portugal's minimum
core capital ratio of 9% at end-2011 (6.8% at this date),
highlighting its already weaker capital base than peers and net
losses recorded during the year.  However, at the bank level it
was compliant. Banif's recapitalization plan also includes a
restructuring and simplification of the group, with most of
subsidiaries being placed under Banif.

The rating actions highlight the four banks' capital needs, but
Portuguese banks' Long-term IDRs continue to reflect available
government and international support (IMF/EU/ECB), for both
capital and liquidity.  This has helped to preserve confidence in
the Portuguese banking sector.  Evidence of the latter is the
positive evolution of banks' deposits in 2011 and Q112 -- leading
to improved net loans/deposits ratios -- an increase in liquidity
buffers and relatively stable ECB funding.

As a result of the rating actions, subordinated and hybrid debt
issued by the four banks have been downgraded, reflecting the
increased risk of non-performance.  Under Fitch's criteria,
hybrid non-performance can arise in a number of ways, including
coupon deferral or omission or if a tender or exchange offer is
considered to be a distressed debt exchange.

The ratings actions are as follows:

CGD:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB+'; Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR: unaffected at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'b' from 'b+'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'
  -- Support Rating Floor unaffected at 'BB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt long-term rating unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt short-term rating unaffected at 'B'
  -- Senior unsecured certificate of deposit long-term rating
     unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Senior unsecured certificate of deposit short-term rating
     unaffected at 'B'
  -- Commercial paper program unaffected at 'B'
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt issues downgraded to 'B-'
     from 'B'
  -- Preference shares downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC'
  -- Senior debt guaranteed by the Portuguese state unaffected at
     'BB+'

Caixa -Banco de Investimento:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB+'; Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR unaffected at 'B'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'

CGD North America Finance LLC

  -- Commercial Paper unaffected at 'B'

Millennium bcp:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB+'; Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR unaffected at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'cc' from 'b'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'
  -- Support Rating Floor unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt issues unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt issues downgraded to 'C' from
     'B-'
  -- Commercial paper program unaffected at 'B'
  -- Preference shares downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'
  -- Senior debt guaranteed by the Portuguese state unaffected at
     'BB+'

Banco BPI:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB+'; Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR unaffected at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'cc' from 'b'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'
  -- Support Rating Floor unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt issues unaffected at 'BB+'
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt issues downgraded to 'C' from
     'B-'
  -- Commercial paper program unaffected at 'B'
  -- Preference shares downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'
  -- Emr market linked securities unaffected at 'BB+emr'

Banco Portugues de Investimento:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB+'; Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR unaffected at 'B'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'

Banif - Banco Internacional do Funchal:

  -- Long-term IDR unaffected at 'BB', Negative Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR unaffected at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'cc' from 'b-'
  -- Support Rating unaffected at '3'
  -- Support Rating Floor unaffected at 'BB'
  -- Senior unsecured debt issues unaffected at 'BB'
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt issues downgraded to 'C' from
     CCC
  -- Preference shares affirmed at 'C'



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


HIDROELECTRICA SA: Chair Says Insolvency Won't Lead to Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andra Timu at Bloomberg News reports that Hidroelectrica SA
Chairman Remus Vulpescu said on Tuesday the company's insolvency
won't force the Romanian utility into bankruptcy though its
planned sale of a state is no longer possible this year.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Vulpescu told journalists the
insolvency is meant to help the company's reorganization and
won't lead to cuts in power.

"We didn't eliminate or exclude the possibility of getting money
for Hidroelectrica through a share sale, but it can't be done
this year," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Vulpescu as saying.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 19,
2012, Andra Timu at Bloomberg News reports that Romania's Economy
Ministry said in an e-mailed statement Hidroelectric filed for
insolvency, without mentioning the reason.  The first court
hearing on Hidroelectrica's request was set for June 20, Mediafax
news service, as cited by Bloomberg, said on June 18, citing a
court document.

Hidroelectrica SA is Romania's state-owned hydro-power generator.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CENTROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed CentroCredit Bank's (CCB) ratings,
including its Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' with
Stable Outlook.  At the same time, the agency has withdrawn the
ratings as the bank has chosen to stop participating in the
rating process.  Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient
information to maintain the ratings.  Accordingly, the agency
will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage of CCB.

The affirmation reflects the insignificant changes in the bank's
risk profile recently, which Fitch anticipates is unlikely to
change materially in the foreseeable future.  CCB's ratings are
constrained by its limited franchise and focus on securities
trading business, which drives most assets and liabilities.  As a
result there is a material albeit so far reasonably managed
exposure to market and liquidity risks.

The ratings also reflect the bank's comfortable capitalization,
which is sufficient to completely write off the bank's loan book
and even absorb sizable losses from trading activities.
Profitability is currently solid (3.8% return on average assets
in 2011 according to management accounts), but highly dependent
on the performance of the capital market.  However, the agency is
concerned about the high provisioning rate (above 50% of end-2011
gross loans), which in Fitch's view may be excessive, giving rise
to regulatory risks.

CCB is a small Moscow-based bank focusing on proprietary trading.
It is reportedly owned by the bank's current president, who is
actively involved in its day-to-day management.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
     Stable; withdrawn
  -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; National
  -- Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB(rus)'; Outlook Stable;
     withdrawn
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'; withdrawn
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'; withdrawn
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'; withdrawn


METALLOINVEST JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Holding Company Metalloinvest's
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB-'.  The agency also affirmed its National Long-term rating at
'A+(rus)' and foreign currency senior unsecured rating at 'BB-'.
The Outlook for the Long-term ratings is Stable.

The ratings affirmations reflect Metalloinvest's strong
operational profile including the second-largest iron ore
reserves globally and a first quartile cost position for both
iron ore pellets and Hot Briquetted Iron (HBI).  In 2011 the
company posted a record-high US$9.9 billion of sales and US$3.8
billion of EBITDAR with 38% EBITDAR margin back at pre-crisis
levels.  Nevertheless, a US$2.2 billion investment in a minority
stake in Russian leading nickel producer Norilsk Nickel
('BB+'/Stable) as well as capex and dividends outpaced the robust
US$2.8 billion funds from operations (FFO) resulting in mildly
negative free cash flow (FCF).

Metalloinvest's gross indebtedness increased by US$1.45 billion
in 2011 but credit metrics remained at sound levels for the
rating level.  In June 2011 Metalloinvest used US$2.2 billion out
of its US$3.1 billion Pre-export Finance (PXF) facility to
acquire a 4% stake in Norilsk Nickel.  Fitch considers the
acquisition as a non-operational investment activity with a
negative impact on leverage.

The company improved its liquidity position and maturity profile
in 2011-H112 with a new US$750 million five-year Eurobond issue
in July 2011 and a RUR25 billion 10-year rouble bond issue with a
three-year put option in March 2012.  The robust cash position of
US$1.16 billion as of FYE11, positive FCF and new debt raised in
Q112 allowed the company to invest US$2.5 billion in VTB's
promissory notes in March 2012.  The company's liquidity position
was further supported by US$540 million cash proceeds from the
sale of its transportation company Metalloinvesttrans in Q212.

Metalloinvest converted US$2.5 billion of its liquidity and debt
sources into VTB's discount promissory notes maturing in December
2012.  In Fitch's view, two possible scenarios for the company to
either exchange the notes for the 20% of shares currently owned
by VTB in Metalloinvest, or convert the notes back into cash upon
their maturity.  Fitch treats the first scenario as more likely
because it allows the company to launch an Initial Public
Offering for this stake without diluting the stakes of existing
shareholders.  The first scenario would lead to the temporary
worsening of FFO adjusted leverage in 2012 (FYE11: 1.9x).

Fitch continues to monitor Metalloinvest's intentions regarding
its Udokan copper deposit.  A banking pre-feasibility study for
the project is expected to conclude in 2013.  Non-resource
project funding is a financing option, with Fitch also
considering a partial/full divestment as possible taking into
account the size of the investments and lack of immediate
operational synergies.

Fitch considers that the company's transparency and corporate
governance practices have improved over the past year.  After its
debut US$750 million Eurobonds issue in July 2011 the company
started publishing semi-annual consolidated IFRS accounts,
organizing regular investor calls and established an investor
relations department.  In 2011 the company also increased the
number of independent directors to three from two out of a total
of 12.

For 2012, Fitch expects a moderate 5%-8% price decrease for iron
ore products followed by recovery in 2013. Accordingly, Fitch
expects the company to show a moderate decrease in its revenue
and EBITDAR in 2012 and before increasing again in 2013.
Nevertheless, the agency believes that the company will sustain
robust FFO during 2012-2013 that would translate to an upper
single-digit FCF margin. Deleveraging however may be postponed
until 2013 if the company uses its USD2.5bn promissory notes for
repurchasing its 20% stake from VTB.

An EBITDAR margin below 25% or increase of FFO adjusted leverage
above 3.5x could result in negative rating action.  Further
improvements in corporate governance, deleveraging resulting in
FFO adjusted leverage below 2.5x or improvements in the company's
operational profile could lead to a positive rating action.


NATIXIS BANK: Moody's Downgrades Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Natixis
Bank (ZAO), the Russian subsidiary of Natixis, the sixth-largest
French banking group. The outlook on long-term ratings is stable.

The downgrade of Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s ratings was prompted by
Moody's rating downgrade of the French parent bank Natixis to A2
deposits; BFSR D/ BCA ba2 from Aa3 deposits; BFSR D+/ BCA baa3,
which, in turn, reflects Moody's assessment of the weakened
capacity of Natixis to provide timely capital and funding support
to the Russian subsidiary, in case of need.

The standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of Natixis
Bank (ZAO) was not affected.

The rating action on Natixis Bank (ZAO) concludes the review that
Moody's initiated on 21 February 2012, when the ratings were
placed on review for downgrade, following a similar rating action
on Natixis.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s local and foreign-currency
deposit ratings to Ba3, with a stable outlook, (from Ba2) was
prompted by Moody's downgrade of Natixis' ratings.

Moody's says that the lowering of Natixis's standalone credit
assessment to ba2 from baa3, announced on 15 June 2012, reflects
the bank's vulnerability to the weakening operating environment.
Under Moody's Joint Default Analysis methodology, the long-term
ratings of the Russian subsidiary incorporate uplift from
parental support assumptions; the two-notch lowering of Natixis'
standalone credit assessment therefore has a direct impact on the
ratings of the subsidiary.

Moody's continues to incorporate a parental support assumption in
Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s Ba3 ratings, which results in one-notch of
rating uplift from its b1 standalone credit assessment (mapped
from the E+ standalone BFSR).

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Moody's believes there is little likelihood of any upward
movement in Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s ratings in the near-term, unless
there is a material improvement in the operating environments of
the bank's parent group. At the same time, Moody's notes that
downward pressure could be exerted on Natixis Bank (ZAO)'s
standalone rating by any material adverse changes in the bank's
risk profile, particularly significant impairment of the bank's
liquidity position, capitalisation and by any failure to maintain
control over its asset quality. In addition, further downward
pressure on Natixis' ratings could affect Natixis Bank (ZAO)
(Russia)'s deposit ratings.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012, and Mapping
Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale Ratings in March
2011.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Natixis Bank (ZAO) reported
total assets of RUB20.5 billion and shareholders' equity of
RUB2.3 billion, in accordance with Russian GAAP (unaudited), as
at January 1, 2012.


ROSAGROLEASING JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Rosagroleasing's (RAL) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' with a Stable Outlook, and
removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating actions follow the agency's review of the company's
financial position, based on its long-delayed 2010 IFRS financial
statements issued in late April 2012, as well as the company's
latest (Q112) statutory accounts and management representations.
Fitch understands the delay in the provision of the audited IFRS
statements was due to a restatement of the 2009 accounts, which
now show RUB9.4 billion of impairment losses related to
fraudulent activities of previous management.  Although large,
this loss was comfortably absorbed by the capital cushion, while
the continued provision of equity by the government suggests it
has not reconsidered its support stance for RAL.

RAL's ratings continue to be driven by potential state support.
In assessing the potential for state support, Fitch views
positively RAL's 100% state ownership; the company's very low
leverage, driven by repeated government equity injections; and
(to a limited extent) the company's policy role.  At the same
time, Fitch views support as somewhat uncertain due to weak
oversight of the company and corporate governance, giving rise to
the risk of further asset quality relapses; uncertainty over
long-term strategy; and RAL's limited policy value given the
small size of its balance sheet and the potential for state-owned
banks and their subsidiary leasing companies to provide support
to the agricultural sector.

RAL's role of supporting the agricultural sector (under
government programs) is in provision of leases with a low average
interest rate of 2.5%.  At end-Q112, such 'federal leasing'
comprised 90% of the total lease book and was wholly funded by
equity capital.  The remaining 10% was pure commercial leasing
with market interest rates, financed by local and international
bank borrowings (currently mostly from large state-controlled
banks).  The lease book structure has resulted in low leverage to
date, with a 9% debt-to-equity ratio at end-Q112.

Additionally, Fitch notes that although legally the 'federal' and
'commercial' parts of the business are not separate, there is
some risk that the leasing proceeds from the 'federal' part would
not always be available for 'commercial' debt service.  However,
at the moment, low leverage and the high liquidity cushion
(RUB9.7bn, covering 1.5x of total debt at end-5M12) mitigates the
risk.

The performance of the agriculture industry is generally volatile
due to climate conditions.  In Russia the risks are further
amplified by limited industry regulation, the sector's low
transparency and high corruption levels.  Furthermore, RAL does
not have any branches and operates under agreements with regional
operators (private and state-related companies), which on-lease
assets leased from RAL to end clients.  In Fitch's view, this
structure creates significant risk of corruption and
mismanagement, which are only marginally, in the agency's view,
mitigated by the centralized risk-management and approval
process.

As evidence of such drawbacks, asset quality is very poor. Leases
more than one-year overdue accounted for a high 18% of portfolio
at end-2011, while restructured agreements represented a further
12%.  Additionally, about one-third of advances to customers at
end-2011, a majority of which were fraudulently provided to
related parties under previous management, are now problematic.

At the same time, credit risk currently is fully covered by
equity (0.7x equity-to-asset ratio under RAS at end-Q112; would
be even higher under IFRS), which gives the company adequate
ability to absorb additional losses both on advances and on
leases.

RAL is included in the state privatization program, under which
listed companies are expected to be sold by the government by
end-2016.  However, due to the very high level of bad assets, the
non-profitable nature of the business and high operational risk,
Fitch believes that it would be difficult to attract private
investors.

The ratings could be downgraded if leverage increases
significantly, or if there is further major evidence of asset
quality and corporate governance failings under the company's new
management.  A downgrade of the Russian Federation ('BBB'/Stable)
would also likely lead to a downgrade of RAL, although a
sovereign upgrade would be unlikely to result in positive action
on RAL.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook
     Stable, removed from RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'AA(rus)', Outlook
     Stable, removed from RWN
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB+', removed from RWN


ROSSIYA INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed OJSC Rossiya Insurance Company's
Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) at 'B-' and National IFS ratings
at 'BB-(rus)' and removed them from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
The Outlook for both ratings is Negative.

The rating actions follow the decision by the Federal Service for
Financial Markets (FSFM) to restore Rossiya's compulsory motor
third-party liability (MTPL) insurance license on June 13, 2012,
which was suspended on June 6, 2012.  The reason for the
suspension was Rossiya's failure to fulfil one of FSFM's
prescriptions in a timely manner.

The Negative Outlook reflects the agency's concerns over
Rossiya's liquidity, future financial flexibility and ability to
meet its claims obligations, and increased financial and
reputational risk following the license suspension.  In Fitch's
view, while Rossiya could overcome the negative effects on its
business franchise from the license suspension in the short term,
the agency is concerned about the medium-term negative
implications for Rossiya's ability to write new business premiums
and fund claims payments.

In addition, Fitch notes that Rossiya remains significantly
dependent on support from its shareholder and considers that this
episode may have intensified risks relating to the commitment of
the shareholder to support Rossiya.

The ratings would be downgraded if Fitch believes the risk of an
interruption to Rossiya's payments has materially increased.
This could occur if low volumes of new business premiums were
written or support from the shareholder was reduced.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Upgrades LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ukrainian-based Interpipe Limited's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-'. The company has
been removed from Restricted Default (RD).  Fitch has also
assigned a 'B-' senior secured rating to the company's 2017
Eurobonds (RR4).  The existing senior unsecured rating of 'C' has
been withdrawn.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The rating actions follow the conclusion of restructuring talks
with bank debt and bondholders, which started following the
company's payment default in December 2009.  Fitch assesses
Interpipe as having a viable business profile including a
competitive cost profile and good market positions in its key
segments of seamless pipes and railway wheels.  The wheels
business is a consolidated market which has traditionally offered
higher profit margins, although price competition is rising.  The
company will soon commission its new 1.3 million tonne Electric
Arc Furnace (EAF).  This will resolve the company's key
historical operational weakness, namely its lack of internal
self-sufficiency in steel billets.  Once the EAF is in full
production in 2013, Interpipe will be internally self-sufficient
in billets but will still continue to externally purchase around
200,000 tonnes of hot rolled coil for welded steel pipe
production.

The restructuring agreements provide for an extension and re-
tranching of bank debt.  The US$200 million Eurobonds have also
been extended to August 2017; post the final maturity of bank
debt.  All bank debt and bondholders benefit from a general
security package including guarantees/sureties from key
operating/trading subsidiaries, pledges of PPE (Niko Tube,
Nizhnedneprovskiy Tube Rolling Plant), pledges of inventory, and
assignment of off-take contracts.  Key operating subsidiaries,
Novomoskovskiy Pipe Plant and Dnepro Vtormet do not provide a
pledge of PPE which is reserved for lenders under the US$100
million working capital facility.  Lenders under the SACE
facility benefit from various first-ranking pledges including
over the equipment and shares of Steel One (owner of the EAF) and
assignment of scrap supply contract.  EAF noteholders have a
second-ranking pledge, whilst other bank debt and bondholders
benefit from a third-ranking pledge.

Lenders and bondholders share a comprehensive covenant package
including leverage, debt service cover and balance sheet
restrictions.  Available liquidity consists of on-balance sheet
cash (US$123 million as at March 31, 2012), plus the working
capital facility.

Mandatory debt repayments total US$70 million in 2012, US$206
million in 2013, and then ratchet up to US$307 million in 2014.
Under Fitch's base rating case the repayments due in 2012-13
appear manageable, but have limited allowance for operational
underperformance.  The increased payments in 2014 represent a
higher hurdle, albeit the company's reduced overall debt burden
may allowance a refinancing prior to this date.

Fitch expects Interpipe to record mid single digit revenue growth
in both 2012 and 2013. EBITDAR for 2012 is expected to be in the
range of US$320 million-US$340 million, rising to around US$390
million in 2013.  Fitch expects the company to be marginally free
cash positive in 2012 (post capex), increasing to around US$150
million in 2013.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CONERSTONER TITAN: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on Three Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cornerstone Titan 2006-1 Plc's notes
due 2015, as follows:

  -- GBP259.5m class A (XS0262023459) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP48.3m class B (XS0262023962) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP19.5m class C (XS0262024184) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP24.6m class D (XS0262024424) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP19.9m class E (XS0262025157) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP28.3m class F (XS0262025405) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate (RE) 80%

  -- GBP11.2m class G (XS0262025744) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

  -- GBP0m class H (XS0262026551) affirmed at 'Dsf'

  -- GBP0m class J (XS0262027104) affirmed at 'Dsf'

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the collateral
since Fitch's last rating action in June 2011.  Although the
GBP231 million Woolgate Exchange loan (56% of outstanding loan
portfolio balance, and the senior portion of a GBP269 million
whole loan) and the GBP77.9 million Lloyds Chamber loan (19%, and
a senior portion of a GBP87.2 million whole loan) did not repay
at their maturities in July and October 2011 respectively, this
was factored into Fitch's analysis at its last review.

The Woolgate exchange loan is secured by a high quality office
asset located in the heart of London's financial district and
fully let to West LB AG ('A-'/Rating Watch Positive/'F1') on a
lease expiring in 2020.  A March 2012 valuation recorded a value
of GBP265 million, up from GBP255 million in 2010, but down on a
September 2011 valuation of GBP277 million.  An offer for the
property, purported to be in the region of GBP270 million, fell
through in February 2012, and as a result, the property remains
on the market.  After the loan's payment default, all excess cash
after debt service is being used to repay the loan.  Fitch
expects the securitized loan to repay in full prior to the notes'
legal final maturity in 2015.

The Lloyds Chamber is secured by a secondary quality office
building located on the outskirts of London's financial district,
and fully let to Aon Corporation ('BBB+'/Stable/'F2') until June
2018.  The special servicer is currently exploring its options
with the aim of seeking a consensual sale of the property,
following an unsuccessful marketing campaign by the borrower.
The property was revalued in June 2011, showing a 27% fall in
value since closing.  Given the quality of the asset, its
location, and the likely departure of the tenant at its lease
expiry (the majority of the property is sub-let to third
parties), Fitch expects this loan to make a loss, and estimates
an LTV in excess of 100%.

The remaining four loans have performed steadily since Fitch's
last rating action. The Capital House loan (9% of the pool) and
the Impact Portfolio (3%) are expected to repay in full in July
2012 and January 2013, respectively.  The Argos Distribution
centre (12%) and Craven Hill (1%) loans are both due to mature in
2013, with limited losses.  All loan principal payments are paid
down sequentially to the notes.


DRAGON'S DEN: Enters Into Voluntary Liquidation
------------------------------------------------
Roisin Burke at Belfast Telegraph reports that Dragon's Den has
gone into voluntary liquidation.

"We were supplying some of the largest retailers in the US yet
couldn't get finance from banks.  That's why we're going into
voluntary liquidation," Belfast Telegraph quotes founder Jamie
Jenkinson as saying.  "We're stocked in Bed Bath & Beyond stores
for the fourth year in 600 stores, and the order is there for
next year.  Cush'n Shade was one of the top selling products on
Kmart's website, and we were in talks to do more.

"We were also in discussions with Walgreens, and had
relationships with DRTV shopping channel.

"We had letters of credit from Bed Bath and Beyond, and orders of
over US$100,000 (GBP64,000) but we needed to get the finance to
produce the order.  Everything was going really well but we just
couldn't get credit from Bank of Ireland.

"The only way we could secure the stocking loan was to put a very
sizeable cash amount into an account to act as security.  We
managed to do that, but we knew we wouldn't necessarily be able
to do it for the next order.  Bank of Ireland said if you can't
do that, you can't get a loan."


* UK: Doubt Raised Over Company Voluntary Arrangements' Efficacy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Thompson at The Financial Times reports that after a
series of high-profile retail collapses since the start of the
year, company voluntary arrangements are back in the news.

Yet two recent unsuccessful attempts at CVAs -- a mechanism
whereby struggling companies agree deals with unsecured creditors
to avoid entering administration -- have sparked a renewed debate
over their efficacy, the FT notes.

In May, Clinton Cards plunged into administration after its debt
was acquired by a supplier, but the greetings cards company had
been considering options including a CVA as it sought ways to
reduce its sprawling store estate, the FT recounts.

Last week, a CVA proposed by a prospective buyer of Rangers FC,
the football club, was rejected by the British tax authorities,
the FT relates.

Restructuring specialists say that skepticism now hovers over the
procedure, especially since the CVAs of many high-profile high-
street casualties of the financial crisis did not ultimately
prevent a slide into administration, the FT notes.

"In the absence of new money, a new strategy and without
addressing the operational levers key to success, CVAs are all
too often destined to fail," the FT quotes Alan Hudson, head of
UK restructuring at Ernst & Young, as saying.  "They merely
represent a short-term sticking plaster without genuinely
addressing the fundamentals of what is wrong with the business."

According to the FT, Richard Fleming, UK head of restructuring at
KPMG, agrees that a CVA alone is not a "panacea" for
underperforming businesses, but notes that the benefits can go
beyond simply reducing the cost of having stores.  "A CVA can
often pave the way for more equity to be put into the business,"
he says, citing JJB as an example where shareholders were
encouraged to meet a cash call.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Says EMEA Corporates' Liquidity Position Deteriorates
---------------------------------------------------------------
The robust liquidity position of EMEA corporates has begun to
deteriorate as market conditions have become more challenging,
says Moody's Investors Service in a Special Comment report
published on June 18. While a surge in defaults in the near term
is unlikely, weaker liquidity profiles could result in downgrades
for low-rated companies (B and below).

The new report is entitled "Liquidity of EMEA Corporates Remains
Solid But Has Begun to Deteriorate ".

"Our current expectation is that a deterioration in liquidity
conditions will not trigger a significant surge in the default
rate over the near term," says Jean-Michel Carayon, a Moody's
senior vice president and author of the report. "However, weaker
liquidity profiles may lead to rating downgrades, particularly
for speculative-grade companies with limited flexibility to
conserve cash."

Moody's also expects that potential markets disruptions linked to
the sovereign crisis, including Greece's possible exit from the
euro (which is not currently the rating agency's central
scenario), would be likely to exert further pressure on corporate
liquidity as it would lead to tighter conditions for access to
financing. Corporate liquidity has already deteriorated in the
European periphery countries over the past 12 months.

Moody's report also found that the risk on financial covenants is
currently moderate. However, at the lower end of the rating
scale, headroom has weakened with one in three speculative-grade
issuers having 'tight' or restrictive covenants (less than 20%
headroom) compared to one fifth of speculative-grade issuers in
2010. Moody's anticipates further deterioration as revenues and
cash flow are pressured by macroeconomic weakness and banks
potentially become more cautious in accepting covenant resetting.

In the rating agency's study of 571 rated corporate borrowers,
91% of issuers appear to have sufficient liquidity to cover their
debt maturities over the next 12 months, the same percentage as
in Moody's 2011 study. A total of US$582 billion (EUR437 billion)
of debt will mature by March 2013, mostly concentrated in
utilities (15%), automotive (13%), telecommunications (11%) and
energy (11%) industries.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
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Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *