TCREUR_Public/120629.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, June 29, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 129



* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Debt, Notes of Austrian Banks


DEXIA SA: In Final Talks with DAM Unit's Potential Buyers


BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Neg.

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Court Approves Creditor Distribution


FRANCE TELECOM: Bouygues Seeks to Overturn State Aid Ruling


ADAM OPEL: Board Set to Discuss Peugeot Alliance
SMART PFI: Fitch Affirms 'B-(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes


TALISMAN 6: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on EUR15.5MM Class F Notes


BMB MUNAI: Swings to US$139.2 Million Net Loss in Fiscal 2012


DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'B2'; Outlook Stable
SLS CAPITAL: Chapter 15 Case Summary


THINK GLOBAL: Plans to Open Factory in China; Seeks JV Partner


PBG SA: Says Court Bankruptcy Decision Becomes Binding


BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating to 'BB-'
UNIASTRUM BANK: Moody's Reviews 'B2/E+' BFSR for Downgrade


ABENGOA: Moody's Reviews 'B3' CFR/PDR for Downgrade
CASER: Moody's Cuts Insurance Financial Strength Rating to 'Ba2'
* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 33 Spanish Covered Bonds


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: SNDO Will Assume Ownership of Parts

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRADFORD BULLS: In Administration, Seeks to Avoid Liquidation
KEMBREY WIRING: Enters CVA to Avoid Administration
NEW LOOK: Agrees Amendments to GBP1.1-Billion Debt
PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Coryton Closure Blamed on UK Bankruptcy Law
WF UTILITIES: In Administration, Owes GBP400,000 Debt

* UK: More Shops Poised to go Bankrupt, Insolvency Body Warns


* Moody's Says EMEA Auto ABS Performance Improves in April 2012
* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement



* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Debt, Notes of Austrian Banks
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the subordinated debt
and specific hybrid securities of Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG
and Investkredit Bank AG. The downgrades of the specific hybrid
ratings follow the voluntary hybrid Tier 1 public-tender offers
for these instruments by Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG (VBAG)
and Investkredit Bank AG's (Investkredit, both rated Baa2/Prime-
2; E+/b1 all ratings on review for downgrade) announced on 22 May
2012 and 14 June 2012, respectively. Based on Moody's
definitions, the rating agency considers these as distressed
exchanges and has adjusted the ratings accordingly. These ratings
carry a stable outlook.

To reflect the upcoming merger between VBAG and Investkredit --
which Moody's believes is likely to happen in H2 2012 -- Moody's
has also downgraded Investkredit's UT2 junior subordinated notes
and the ratings remain on review for downgrade. VBAG will likely
assume Investkredit's payment obligations after the merger, and
Moody's has thus downgraded the ratings of the UT2 notes which
are now based on an expected loss assumption.

Given the ongoing restructuring of both banks and pending
decision of the European Commission, Moody's has extended the
review for downgrade of the standalone, long and short-term
ratings of VBAG and Investkredit, initiated on February 15, 2012.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt
ratings for VBAG and Investkredit to Ba3 from Baa3 and the
ratings remain on review for downgrade in line with the banks'
stand-alone credit assessments. These downgrades reflect Moody's
removal of its assumption of systemic (government) support for
this debt class.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of VBAG's and Investkredit's hybrid Tier 1
securities was driven by Moody's view that the May and June
tender offers result in impairments to the position of the
holders of the respective securities. The terms of the
transactions reflect the very high probability of durable coupon-
payment omissions on both hybrids, if the investors continue to
hold them. Moody's considers these transactions as distressed
exchanges, as they offer the investor a substantially diminished
financial obligation relative to the original obligations. The
tender offers imply a nominal loss of 60% on both securities,
which is consistent with a rating of Ca. The resulting impairment
had already been reflected to a certain degree in the Caa2 (hyb)
ratings previously assigned on an expected-loss basis for VBAG.
However, for Investkredit, the previous B2 (hyb) rating reflected
the bank's resumed coupon payments in 2011.

Regarding the UT2 notes, previously Moody's rated these
instruments in line with normal notching conventions, after the
bank had resumed coupon payments in 2011. As Moody's expects
coupon deferrals at the level of VBAG to be likely for the coming
years, the Caa2 (hyb) rating is now based on an expected loss
assumption. Given the ongoing restructuring of both banks and
pending decision of the European Commission, the rating remains
on review for downgrade.

The downgrade of both banks' senior subordinated debt ratings to
Ba3 follows the removal of the assumption of systemic support
that Moody's had previously incorporated into ratings of this
debt class. Senior subordinated debt ratings are now notched off
the banks' adjusted standalone credit assessments. This reflects
Moody's view that systemic support for the subordinated debt of
Austrian banks may no longer be sufficiently predictable or
reliable to warrant incorporating uplift into Moody's ratings.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

VBAG and Investkredit's hybrid Tier 1 securities and UT2
instruments could be upgraded if Moody's expected loss assumption
reduces, and/or coupon payments were to be resumed, so that
ratings would return to the normal notching approach. A further
downgrade of these instruments would result from further
deterioration of the credit profile of VBAG and/or Investkredit.

The ratings of the banks' subordinated debt move in tandem with
their adjusted standalone credit assessments. Therefore, a
material improvement in the banks' standalone credit strength
might lead to an upgrade of the subordinated debt ratings,
whereas deterioration might lead to a downgrade of those ratings.


OeVAG Finance (Jersey) Limited

  Perpetual non-cumulative preferred securities downgraded to Ca
  (hyb) from Caa2 (hyb), stable outlook

Investkredit Funding Ltd.

Perpetual non-cumulative Limited Recourse notes downgraded to Ca
(hyb) from B2 (hyb), stable outlook


UT2 junior subordinated notes downgraded to Caa2 (hyb) from B3
(hyb), on review for downgrade

Senior subordinated debt downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3, on review
for downgrade

Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG (VBAG)

Senior subordinated debt downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3, on review
for downgrade

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012. Other
methodology used includes Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank
Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt, published in November

Other factors used in these ratings are described in Moody's
Approach to Evaluating Distressed Exchanges, published in March


DEXIA SA: In Final Talks with DAM Unit's Potential Buyers
Hugh Carnegy at The Financial Times reports that Dexia is in
final talks with three potential buyers of its asset management
arm, the last stage of a break-up of the twice-bailed-out Belgo-
French bank.

The bank also announced the anticipated departure of Jean-Luc
Dehaene, the chairman, and chief executive Pierre Mariani, who
were brought in to rescue Dexia in 2008 after its first bailout,
the FT relates.

However, last October, as financing dried up as a result of the
eurozone crisis, Dexia collapsed for a second time, needing
EUR90 billion in state guarantees from Belgium, France and
Luxembourg to prop it up while it put in place a break-up plan,
the FT recounts.

The Brussels-based bank reported net losses of EUR11.6 billion in
2011, the FT says.

According to the FT, Dexia said on Wednesday it was in
negotiations with three international investors, all understood
to be non-European, for the sale of Dexia Asset Management, with
a deal anticipated in the coming weeks.  DAM has a client base in
25 countries and has EUR80 billion of assets under management,
the FT discloses.

The sale of DAM will be the last of six Dexia units hived off in
a fire sale of assets over the past nine months, valued at a
total of EUR8.7 billion, not including the asset management arm,
the FT says.

The biggest remaining challenge facing Dexia, which will
ultimately be reduced to a rump run-off operation, is to win
approval for its bailout from the European Commission, which has
subjected the deal to intense scrutiny, to the exasperation of
management and the French and Belgian authorities, the FT states.
The Commission has so far only temporarily approved EUR55 billion
of the EUR90 billion state guarantees, the FT notes.

Dexia SA is a Belgian-based bank and insurance carrier that
focuses on Public and Wholesale Banking, providing local public
finance actors with banking and financial solutions, and on
Retail and Commercial Banking in Europe, mainly Belgium, France,
Luxembourg and Turkey.


BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Neg.
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Bank of Cyprus (BOC), Cyprus Popular
Bank (CPB) and Hellenic Bank's (HB) Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) and Support Rating Floors (SRF) to 'BB' from 'BB+'
following the sovereign rating downgrade and removed them from
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).  The Outlook on their Long-term IDR
is Negative in line with that of the sovereign.

At the same time, the Viability Ratings (VR) of BOC and HB have
been downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-' and removed from RWN
reflecting the agency's belief that further capital needs are
likely to be required in view of continued asset quality
pressures in Greece and Cyprus.  CPB's VR of 'f' has been
affirmed to reflect its failure under Fitch's definitions.

All three banks' Short-term IDRs and Support Ratings have been
affirmed and the RWN on the banks' Support Ratings has been
removed from RWN.

The downgrade of BOC, CPB and HB's support-driven Long-term IDRs
reflects Fitch's assessment that the state's ability to support
its major banks has reduced, as reflected in Cyprus' sovereign
downgrade.  The sovereign downgrade was largely based on the
agency's revised baseline assessment of the potential cost of
support the Cypriot banks could need from the state to cope with
asset quality deterioration in Greece and Cyprus and reach a core
capital ratio of 10%.

Fitch estimates that the Cypriot government may need to provide
up to EUR6 billion of bank support (which includes the EUR1.8
billion to restore CPB's capital base).  Fitch acknowledges that
its estimates of the potential losses and capital needs of
Cypriot banks are subject to considerable uncertainty and are

Fitch judges that the scope for further capital-raising from the
private sector is limited and thus assumes that the capital is
highly likely to be provided by the sovereign.  To provide such
support, in Fitch's view, the sovereign will need to be assisted
by international authorities, most likely an EFSF/ESM

The propensity of the sovereign to support the three major
Cypriot banks remains strong in Fitch's view, despite the large
fiscal pressure this would bring to the country.  There are two
important factors that influence Fitch's view in this respect.
Firstly, the banking system is a major part of the Cypriot
economy and secondly there is a modest amount of senior and
subordinated bank debt to absorb losses if the state were to
choose this option.  The Cypriot banks are funded by depositors,
the vast majority of which are from domestic Cypriot or Greek
customers or from non-resident customers.  In Fitch's view, the
Cypriot authorities would have no appetite to force losses on any
of these depositors.

The Negative Outlook indicates that any further downgrade of
Cyprus' sovereign rating and/or any change that reduced the
likelihood of international support could lead to a further
downgrade of the banks' Long-term IDRs and SRFs.

The downgrade of BOC and HB's VRs reflect Fitch's belief that the
bank's capacity for continued unsupported operation is highly
vulnerable to continued adverse conditions in Greece and Cyprus.
In the agency's view this will further affect asset quality and
likely add on capital needs.  Fitch does not disregard the
potential for extraordinary external capital assistance to BOC
and HB given the banks' increasingly limited capacity to generate
capital internally as a result of the difficult operating

CPB is the most exposed to Greek loans (49% of total loans at
end-Q112, including international shipping loans booked in
Greece), followed by BOC (34%) and HB (17%).  Exposure to Greek
government debt has substantially declined after impairments in
2011 and ranged between EUR8 million at HB and EUR360 million at
CPB at end-Q112.

BOC's adjusted core capital ratio was 8.5% at end-Q112 (including
EUR428 million convertible enhanced capital securities) and HB's
was just above the Central Bank of Cyprus' minimum 8% core
capital ratio at 8.3%. BOC is under greater pressure as it also
has to meet EBA's 9% core capital requirement by end-June 2012.
In line with BOC's announcement, the bank does not expect to
fully cover the capital needs estimated by EBA by private means.
To this end, BOC has informed the Central Bank of Cyprus and the
Ministry of Finance that it will apply to the state for temporary
capital support of EUR500 million, which is expected to be in the
form of non-equity capital (eligible as core capital).

Fitch says BOC's VR also reflects its leading domestic franchise
in Cyprus and sound funding structure (gross loans/deposits ratio
of 98% at end-Q112).  HB's VR is supported by its comparatively
lower exposure to Greece and sound funding profile (gross
loans/deposits ratio of 77% at end-2011), although it has a
comparatively weaker asset quality ratios than its peers,
particularly in Greece, and significantly higher reliance on non-
resident deposits.

CPB's VR of 'f' continues to reflect the bank's failure under
Fitch's definitions.  Fitch will maintain CPB's VR at 'f' for a
short period of time, until capital is restored, which is likely
to be primarily sourced from the Cypriot government.  However,
Fitch anticipates that the VR will, at best, remain at a deeply
sub-investment grade rating level to reflect the numerous
challenges the bank is faced with and its substantial weak credit

The ratings actions are as follows:


  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; placed on
     Negative Outlook; removed from RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'; removed from
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'; removed from RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'BB' from 'BB+', removed
     from RWN
  -- Senior notes downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+', removed from RWN
  -- Commercial Paper affirmed at 'B'


  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; placed on
     Negative Outlook; removed from RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'f'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'; removed from RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'BB' from 'BB+', removed
     from RWN
  -- Senior notes downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+', removed from RWN


  -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; placed on
     Negative Outlook; removed from RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'; removed from
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'; removed from RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'BB' from 'BB+', removed
     from RWN

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Court Approves Creditor Distribution
CTK, citing the Insolvency Register, reports that the City Court
in Prague has met the request of Josef Cupka, the insolvency
administrator of bankrupt Sazka, to pay out nearly 20% of claims
to creditors in the first stage.

Based on the court decision, Mr. Cupka will distribute
CZK874 million to creditors, CTK discloses.  According to CTK,
Mr. Cupka's spokeswoman Lenka Ticha said it is the first step in
the entire process.

The remaining money will be distributed to creditors after
hundreds of lawsuits over recognition of their claims are
settled, CTK says.

Sazka was declared bankrupt in May 2011, CTK recounts.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in
the Czech Republic.


FRANCE TELECOM: Bouygues Seeks to Overturn State Aid Ruling
Aoife White and Heather Smith at Bloomberg News report that
Bouygues SA should win a challenge that may require a European
Union tribunal to reexamine France Telecom SA's EUR9 billion
proposed state loan.

Bouygues is seeking to overturn a 2010 court ruling that
said a French government offer of support for France Telecom
when it was near bankruptcy in 2002 wasn't unlawful state aid,
Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Paolo Mengozzi, a legal adviser to the
European Court of Justice, said in a non-binding opinion that the
decision may have been based on an incorrect interpretation of EU
law on the "existence of a link between the advantage resulting
from declarations" by the French government in 2002 and "the
potential engagement of state resources as a result of" the
offered credit line.

The lower EU court ruled in 2010 that while statements by the
French government in 2002 that it would support France Telecom
"conferred a financial advantage," the comments didn't commit any
state resources, Bloomberg notes.  The court said that the French
plan included a EUR9 billion credit line for which the loan
contract was sent to the company in December 2002, Bloomberg

France Telecom is the country's largest phone company.


ADAM OPEL: Board Set to Discuss Peugeot Alliance
John Reed and Chris Bryant at The Financial Times report that
Opel's board was set to meet yesterday to discuss a business plan
designed to insulate it against the deep downturn in Europe's car
market and root out cost savings together with General Motors'
new alliance partner PSA Peugeot Citroen.

With Europe the biggest drag on GM's profitability and share
price, the Detroit carmaker is seeking synergies with Peugeot and
studying ways to build cars more efficiently in a market that
analysts now say may not fully recover in this decade, the FT

However, investors may be disappointed as two people close to GM,
who requested anonymity, said it was unlikely to make public
major initiatives in areas such as job cuts or plant closures,
the FT notes.

GM earlier this month published the broad outlines of its
strategy to fix Opel, including a plan to close its plant in
Bochum, Germany, at end-2016 when production of the Zafira
minivan runs out, the FT recounts.

The closure threat raised the temperature among trade unions but
Opel's management offered workers the carrot of a ban on
compulsory redundancies until 2016, the FT discloses.  Talks with
GM's workforce on the issue are due to continue until October,
the FT says.

According to the FT, people close to the French and US carmakers
said that Opel's board was expected to discuss a draft agreement
that will involve Peugeot's Gefco unit taking over Opel and
Chevrolet's logistics in Europe, including Russia and Turkey.
The deal will then set the scene for Peugeot's planned sale of
control of Gefco to one of several private equity groups angling
to buy the unit, the FT states.

Adam Opel GmbH -- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).
Its high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of
Opel models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the
Astra sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside
North America.

SMART PFI: Fitch Affirms 'B-(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SMART PFI 2007 GmbH, as follows:

  -- GBP0.1m class A+ (ISIN: XS0291523065): affirmed at 'A+sf'/
     Stable Outlook
  -- GBP5m class A (ISIN: XS0291523578): affirmed at
     'BBB+sf'/Stable Outlook
  -- GBP3.25m class B (ISIN: XS0291523735): affirmed at
     'BBBsf'/Stable Outlook
  -- GBP2.55m class C (ISIN: XS0291523818): affirmed at 'BBB-
     sf'/Stable Outlook
  -- GBP4.75m class D (ISIN: XS0291524030): affirmed at
     'BB+sf'/Stable Outlook
  -- GBP5.7m class E (ISIN: XS0291524204): affirmed at 'BB-
     sf'/Stable Outlook
  -- GBP4.3m class F (ISIN: XS0291524386): affirmed at 'B-
     sf'/Stable Outlook

There has been some positive and negative credit migration in the
portfolio since the last rating action.  Speculative grade
reference entities have decreased marginally to 29% of the
portfolio compared to 32% at the last action.  The portfolio
weighted average rating remains 'BBB-*/BB+*'.  The portfolios
notional value is currently EUR349 million versus EUR389 million
as at the last review due to two of the underlying reference
entities making up some EUR40 million of the portfolio having
paid in full.  This has led to an increase in credit enhancement
(CE) but also in concentration.

Analysis for the rating action focused on obligor concentration
and in Fitch's view, the increase in concentration is mitigated
by the portfolio's deleveraging and subsequent increase in CE
levels.  The current portfolio contains 46 loans from 34 obligors
with all projects now in the operational phase.

The affirmations reflect sufficient levels of CE for the ratings.
There have been no defaults to date.  Fitch expects the CE levels
to increase further as the portfolio continues to delever (the
transaction ended its replenishment period in March 2011).
Projected repayment on the underlying portfolio is on average 3%
per annum for the next 10 years.

The ratings of the notes are linked to the credit quality of the
certificates of indebtedness (Schuldscheine) issued by KfW
('AAA'/Stable/'F1+').  Therefore, if KfW was downgraded below
'AAA'/'F1+', any note rated higher than the then-outstanding
rating of KfW would be downgraded accordingly.


TALISMAN 6: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on EUR15.5MM Class F Notes
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Talisman 6 plc's class A and B notes
and affirmed all other classes as follows:

  -- EUR726.6m class A (XS0294187306) downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'Asf'; Outlook Negative
  -- EUR79.9m class B (XS0294187991) downgraded to 'BBsf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- EUR83.3m class C (XS0294188882) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
  -- EUR59.9m class D (XS0294189005) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE35%
  -- EUR12.5m class E (XS0294189427) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE0%
  -- EUR15.5m class F (XS0294189690) affirmed at 'Csf'; RE0%

The downgrades are driven by the agency's view on the growing
difficulty facing the servicer in organizing the repayment of a
substantial note balance before bond maturity in October 2016.
Fitch believes that all the loans are over-leveraged and are
unlikely to refinance without a large equity injection.  As such,
Fitch believes the bulk of the pay down will have to come through
asset sales, which, given limited investor demand, will be

The transaction is backed by eight loans (the EUR14 million Kiwi
loan redeemed in full at the October 2011 interest payment date
(IPD)), of which six are in default: Apple, Mango, and Pineapple
for breaches of loan-to-value (LTV) covenant; Coconut for a
maturity default; and Cherry and Peach on both counts.  The two
loans not in formal default, Orange and Strawberry, both failed
to repay at their original scheduled maturity date but have
subsequently been restructured with rolling 12-month loan
extensions (up to 2014 in the case of Orange) granted to the
borrowers subject to compliance with certain covenants.

As such, six loans (86% of the CMBS balance) have either been
extended or are in standstill, while Pineapple and Mango both
mature in October 2013.  On some loans, the special servicer,
Hatfield Phillips, rated CPS2/CSS2-, has been able to intervene
and implement seemingly viable de-levering strategies combining
scheduled amortization, capture of excess rental income and the
proposed injection of sponsor equity.  Moreover, these credit
events led to the principal waterfall switching to a fully
sequential basis, which boosts the position of senior

Most loans are not experiencing current cash flow difficulties,
and in many instances borrowers have been able to lock in more
favorable hedging on matured loans, typically using interest rate
caps with low strike rates.  Leverage is still a concern, with
Fitch estimating all whole loan LTVs (except Strawberry's) above
100%, and five (some four-fifths of the CMBS balance) whose
senior securitized portion is also over 100%.

The B-Notes related to Apple, Peach and Pineapple no longer
receive interest or principal, and no longer have the right to
appoint a different special servicer.  Orange is the largest loan
in the pool, representing almost 40%.  Besides carrying excess
debt, this borrower has suffered rent reductions at rent review,
with over EUR1m lost this way since the last rating action (July

Fitch will monitor how the pace of redemptions evolves for clues
of trends in performance.  Without some significant disposals
over the coming months, there is risk of further negative rating
action, as signaled by the Negative Outlooks.


BMB MUNAI: Swings to US$139.2 Million Net Loss in Fiscal 2012
BMB Munai, Inc., filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission its annual report on Form 10-K disclosing a net loss
of US$139.21 million on US$0 of revenue for the year ended
March 31, 2012, compared with net income of US$4.88 million on
US$0 of revenue for the year ended March 31, 2011.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed US$41.42
million in total assets, US$20.04 million in total liabilities,
all current, and US$21.37 million in total shareholders' equity.

Hansen, Barnett & Maxwell, P.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah, issued
a "going concern" qualification on the consolidated financial
statements for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2012.  The
independent auditors noted that the Company will have no
continuing operations that result in positive cash flow, which
raises substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going

A copy of the Form 10-K is available for free at:


                         About BMB Munai

Based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, BMB Munai, Inc., is a Nevada
corporation that originally incorporated in the State of Utah in
1981.  Since 2003, its business activities have focused on oil
and natural gas exploration and production in the Republic of
Kazakhstan through its wholly-owned operating subsidiary Emir Oil
LLP.  Emir Oil holds an exploration contract that allows the
Company to conduct exploration drilling and oil production in the
Mangistau Province in the southwestern region of Kazakhstan until
January 2013.  The exploration territory of its contract area is
approximately 850 square kilometers and is comprised of three
areas, referred to herein as the ADE Block, the Southeast Block
and the Northwest Block.


DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'B2'; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B2 from B3 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and the probability of default
rating (PDR) of Dematic Holding S.a.rl. Concurrently, Moody's
upgraded the rating on the company's US$300 million senior
secured notes due 2016, issued by Dematic S.A., to B2 (LGD3, 48%)
from B3 (LGD3, 48%). The outlook on all ratings is stable.


  Issuer: Dematic Holding S.a.r.l.

    Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B2 from B3

    Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B2 from B3

  Issuer: Dematic S.A.

    Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2 from B3

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: Dematic Holding S.a.r.l.

    Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

  Issuer: Dematic S.A.

    Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Ratings Rationale

"The upgrade of Dematic's ratings to B2 was prompted by the
continued improvements in operating and financial performance
since rating assignment in April 2011." says Kathrin Heitmann,
Moody's lead analyst for Dematic. Strong revenue growth and a
continuation of solid EBITDA margins (9.7% per LTM March 2012)
supported a reduction in adjusted debt/EBITDA to 3.6x at 31 March
2012 compared to 4.3x at September 30, 2011 and modest positive
free cash flow generation of EUR9 million in the first half of
fiscal year 2012 (ending September 30, 2012).

While Moody's believes that sustaining profit margins at current
levels could prove to be challenging in light of continued
macroeconomic uncertainty in Europe and potential cost inflation,
Moody's thinks that Dematic will maintain solid credit metrics
and will generate modest amounts of positive FCF going forward
consistent with a well positioned B2 rating. This incorporates
also Moody's increased confidence that the company has made
significant progress in managing project risk compared to the
period 2007-2009 where the company incurred operating losses
largely due to poor project execution.

The B2 CFR is supported by the company's good market position in
the fragmented industry for automated material handling equipment
with (i) a solid regional spread, (ii) a customer base that
mainly consists of companies in the less cyclical retail and food
sectors and (iii) around one third of revenues being generated in
the service business which tends to be less volatile and offers
higher margins. However, Dematic remains vulnerable to
cyclicality given a relatively small revenue base and limited
product diversification. In addition, despite the improvements
over the last few years, project execution risk continues to be a
constraining factor to the rating because the risk of project
cost overruns or milestones violations could result in a material
drop-off in profitability and cash flows.

In terms of financial flexibility, the group benefits from a good
liquidity profile with sufficient headroom under its minimum
EBITDA covenant, which, however, might be at risk under adverse
economic conditions, and with no material short-term debt
maturities until November 2015, when the company's EUR25 million
revolving credit facility and EUR50 million guarantee facility
mature. However, the rating also incorporates the risk of re-
leveraging and redistribution of excess cash flows to
shareholders given the relatively lenient terms of the notes
which allow incremental indebtedness and 50% dividend payout
ratio if unadjusted senior leverage does not exceed 3.25x
(currently below 3.25x) and fixed coverage ratios is above 2.0x.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Dematic will
maintain credit metrics in line with the B2 rating despite some
headwinds from continued macroeconomic uncertainty and that the
company will maintain a healthy liquidity profile with sufficient
headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant.


A rating upgrade could be considered if Dematic (i) maintained a
conservative financial policy and a healthy short-term liquidity
profile with ample headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant and
if Dematic (ii) sustained the recent improvements in its
operating performance also in a lower volume growth environment
which should support debt/EBITDA to remain below 3.5x,
EBIT/interest expense to remain above 2.0x and positive FCF

The ratings could be downgraded in case of erosion in operating
performance or more aggressive financial policy resulting in an
increase in leverage (debt/EBITDA) above 5.0x for a prolonged
period of time, negative free cash flow generation or an erosion
in its liquidity profile.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Manufacturing
Industry Methodology published in December 2010, and Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Dematic is a leading provider of
logistics and materials handling solutions with a strong focus on
food, general merchandise and apparel retail. In the last twelve
months period ending March 31, 2012, the group generated revenues
of EUR881 million. Dematic's fiscal year ends 30 September.
Dematic operates under four business segments: (i) Integrated
Systems (design, delivery and assembly of customized material
handling equipment solutions), (ii) Product Solutions
(standardized material handling equipment), (iii) Customer
Services and (iv) Logistics Operations (installation and
operation of warehouses). Dematic is owned by private equity fund
Triton, which acquired the business from Siemens in 2006.

SLS CAPITAL: Chapter 15 Case Summary
Chapter 15 Petitioner: Yann Baden, as liquidator

Chapter 15 Debtor: SLS Capital S.A.
                  c/o Baden & Baden
                  27, rue J-B. Esch L-1473

Chapter 15 Case No.: 12-12707

Chapter 15 Petition Date: June 25, 2012

Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court
      Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Judge: Shelley C. Chapman

About the Debtor: Liquidators of Luxembourg based SLS Capital
                 filed a petition under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
                 Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-
                 12707) to seek recognition of proceedings in
                 Luxembourg as "foreign main proceeding".

                 SLS was a financial services company whose
                 primary business was the issuance of bonds to
                 persons residing outside the United States.

                 In the operation of its business SLS had
                 counterparties and advisors in the United States
                 and had significant assets held in custodial
                 asset and cash accounts in New York City.

                 As part of the process of marshaling SLS's
                 assets and paying SLS's debts, the SLS
                 Liquidator seeks to investigate the
                 disappearance of SLS's assets including assets
                 held in custodial accounts and to pursue such
                 actions as are appropriate in order to recover
                 SLS's assets and/or seek damages from culpable
                 third parties.

Counsel:          Carollynn H.G. Callari, Esq.
                 VENABLE LLP
                 1270 Avenue of the Americas
                 New York, NY 10020
                 Tel: (212) 370-6267
                 Fax: (212) 307-5598

Estimated Assets: US$100,000,001 to US$500 million

Estimated Debts: US$100,000,001 to US$500 million


THINK GLOBAL: Plans to Open Factory in China; Seeks JV Partner
(see article below)

Anatoly Temkin at Bloomberg News reports that bankrupt Think
Global plans to open a factory in China to supply low-cost cars
to the Asian market.

According to Bloomberg, Boris Zingarevich, the company's biggest
shareholder, said that making cars in northern Europe is
unprofitable because of high operating and labor costs and
falling demand during Europe's economic slump.

Mr. Zingarevich, as cited by Bloomberg, said that Think Global,
which filed for bankruptcy last year, is seeking a Chinese
partner to set up a joint venture to produce automobiles priced
at between US$10,000 and US$15,000, declining to name a potential
partner or the cost of the investment.

Think Global is an Oslo-based producer of electric cars.

Think Global Plans to Open Factory in China, Zingarevich Says

By Anatoly Temkin
     June 27 (Bloomberg) -- Think Global, an Oslo-based bankrupt
producer of electric cars, plans to open a factory in China to
supply low-cost cars to the Asian market, said Boris
Zingarevich, the company's biggest shareholder.
     Making cars in northern Europe is unprofitable because of
high operating and labor costs and falling demand during
Europe's economic slump, Zingarevich said in an interview in St.
Petersburg, Russia's second-largest city.
     Think Global, which filed for bankruptcy last year, is
seeking a Chinese partner to set up a joint venture to produce
automobiles priced at between $10,000 and $15,000, he said,
declining to name a potential partner or the cost of the

Related News and Information:


PBG SA: Says Court Bankruptcy Decision Becomes Binding
(see article below)

Maciej Martewicz at Bloomberg News reports that PBG SA, the
Polish builder that filed for bankruptcy earlier this month, said
that a court's decision to allow it to settle with creditors
became binding on Wednesday.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 15,
2012, Bloomberg News related that a Poznan, western Poland-based
court agreed to declare bankruptcy of PBG aimed at arrangement
with creditors.

PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder.

PBG Says Court Bankruptcy Ruling Becomes Legally Binding

By Maciej Martewicz
     June 27 (Bloomberg) -- PBG SA, the Polish builder that
filed for bankruptcy earlier this month, said that a court's
decision to allow it to settle with creditors became binding


BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating to 'BB-'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Bank of Moscow's (BOM) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'.  The Outlook is
Stable.  Simultaneously Fitch has upgraded the bank's Viability
Rating (VR) to 'bb-' from 'f'.

The upgrade of the IDR reflects Fitch' view of the very high
probability of support from the bank's majority owner state-
controlled JSC VTB Bank ('BBB') and ultimately from the Russian
state ('BBB'). Fitch considers the propensity to support BOM to
be very high as a result of:

  -- VTB's 95% ownership;

  -- VTB's intention to integrate BOM as a core subsidiary
     servicing some of the group's target clients and the already
     high level of management oversight and integration achieved;

  -- The large RUB250bn spent by VTB on BOM's acquisition and
     recapitalization and the RUB295bn placed by the Depositary
     Insurance Agency (DIA) with BOM for 10 years as part of the
     rescue package; and

  -- The still significant share of City of Moscow funding and
     retail deposits held by BOM.

BOM's status as a major subsidiary according to VTB's bond
documentation, implying a cross-default for VTB in case of BOM
defaulting on its obligations also creates a potentially strong
incentive for VTB to support BOM, in case of need.

At the same time Fitch notes that support is less driven by the
value of BOM's franchise, as there is significant overlapping of
corporate clients with VTB, while BOM's retail business is
relatively small and mostly concentrated in Moscow.  Fitch
understands the latter is the main reason why VTB plans to
maintain BOM's brand.  However Fitch expects that BOM will
ultimately be merged with VTB, but this is not currently on the
agenda according to VTB's management.

The upgrade of the VR reflects Fitch's view that the RUB152bn
gain from the fair-value accounting of the 0.5% DIA loan and the
further RUB102bn equity injection by VTB in December 2011 have
allowed BOM to comfortably reserve a large majority of the
RUB264bn of problematic exposures identified by VTB and the
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and still have considerable
additional loss absorption capacity.  The funds received have
also enhanced liquidity.

Although BOM has provided only very limited information about the
problem exposures, Fitch was able to analyze in greater detail
those which are not fully covered by reserves and sees very
limited downside risk in respect to these.  At the same time,
material recoveries and reserve releases in Q411 and Q112 suggest
there may be further positive surprises from the fully reserved
problem loans, although Fitch cannot provide any estimates due to
their limited transparency.

The remaining loan book (aside of the abovementioned problem
exposures and excluding the special government bond purchased
with the DIA funds) of RUB345 billion is of reasonable quality,
dominated by financial industrial groups or companies with some
state backing or city connection.  However, one construction
related exposure for RUB9 billion (reserved by only 6%) is of
weaker quality and has been restructured.  Another large RUB8
billion exposure to a tube producer (reserved by 1%) is also
potentially problematic, as the company has asked for
restructuring, but given its strategic importance to the economy
it may receive some state support.  Not in the top 20 is a
RUB4.5bn exposure to a fruit trading company, which filed for
bankruptcy. The loan was 35% reserved at end-2011, but
subsequently the reserve was increased to 80%.

However, Fitch calculates the bank's Basel capital buffer is
sufficient to write-off all problematic loans and increase
provisioning on the normal book up to 32% from 9%.  Given that
Fitch does not consider additional material losses on the problem
loans to be likely, the bank's loss absorption capacity for the
normal book is even stronger.  Against this, Fitch notes that 93%
of BOM's end-2011 equity consisted of the fair value adjustment
on the DIA loan, and this will only actually be earned on a cash
basis over the next 10 years as the bank earns margin on this

The regulatory total capital ratio (20.8% at end-May 2012) is
also high, albeit due to some CBR forbearance, as Russian
accounting standards do not allow for a one-time recognition of
the gain on DIA loan and therefore the bank has been allowed to
create reserves gradually.

Liquidity is ample with liquid assets net of potential short-term
cash outflows on wholesale funding sufficient to repay some 45%
of customer accounts.

BOM is only modestly profitable on a pre-impairment basis
according to IFRS accounts due to about 40% of the loan book not
generating interest income (problem exposures) or accruing zero
net margin (the government bond purchased with the DIA funds)
because these gains have already been recognized to equity.
Fitch believes profitability should improve gradually as BOM's
loan book grows and with the help of VTB, which due to its
tighter regulatory capitalization (11.8% at end-May 2012) has an
incentive to book transactions in BOM.  Net income may also be
supported by reserve releases, as in 2011.

Fitch expects BOM's stand-alone risk profile to gradually
converge with VTB, which may result in the equalization of their
VRs in the medium term.  Fitch does not expect any significant
negative pressure on the VR, although very rapid growth of
leverage and still weak profitability could give rise to some
downside risk.

The rating actions on BOM are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB' from
     'BBB-', Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- National Long-term rating: upgraded to 'AAA(rus)' from 'AA+
     (rus)'; Outlook Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb-' from 'f'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'BBB'/'AAA(rus)' from
  -- Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'

UNIASTRUM BANK: Moody's Reviews 'B2/E+' BFSR for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Uniastrum Bank's B2 long-term global local and foreign currency
deposit ratings and the E+ BFSR, mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of b2.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on Uniastrum's audited
financial statements for 2011 prepared under IFRS, as well as its
2012 monthly accounting statements prepared under local statutory
accounting rules (local GAAP).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the review for downgrade on Uniastrum
Bank's ratings is based on the review for downgrade on the
ratings of Uniastrum bank's parent Bank of Cyprus (B2/Not
Prime/E+/b3, all ratings on review for downgrade). Moody's says
that there is uncertainty surrounding the financial capacity of
Uniastrum Bank's parent to provide capital and liquidity support
to its Russian subsidiary.

In accordance with Moody's Joint-Default Analysis ("JDA")
Methodology, the standalone credit assessment of the parent is
lower than that of the Russian subsidiary, therefore Uniastrum
Bank's deposit ratings do not benefit from any notches of uplift
from its b2 standalone credit assessment. However, due to
potential reliance on the parent in terms of capital and
liquidity support, further weakening of the parent's financial
standing might negatively affect Uniastrum bank's ratings.

According to Moody's, Uniastrum Bank's statutory capital adequacy
ratio (N1) stood at a modest 13.6% as at 1 April 2012, and
Moody's expects this ratio to remain under pressure due to
potential further provisioning charges, as well as the still
significant (compared to the bank's asset size) administrative
costs relating to Uniastrum's expanded branch network. Due to
Uniastrum Bank's moderate profitability metrics, the bank will
likely not be able to support growth by generating capital
internally. This constraint, in combination with the parent's
weakening capacity to support its Russian subsidiary, is a key
rationale behind placing Uniastrum Bank's ratings under review
for downgrade.

Moody's notes that Uniastrum Bank's asset quality also weighs on
its ratings: as of YE2011 non-performing loans (NPLs, 90+ days
overdue loans plus restructured loans) accounted for 12.4% of the
gross loan book. At the same time, loan loss reserves (LLR) stood
at just at 6.2% of gross loans; thus covering only 50% of NPLs.

Moody's is also concerned about the low share of liquid assets
that amount to just 17.8% of total assets at YE2011 under IFRS.
Moody's understands that Uniastrum bank currently uses interbank
funding from the parent accounting for 20% of total liabilities
according to YE2011 IFRS. The rating agency believes that risks
for Uniastrum bank's funding and liquidity profile are stemming
from the likelihood that the parent's ability to support its
subsidiary deteriorates further. This risk is captured by the
review for downgrade on the parent's ratings.

Moody's expects to conclude the review on Uniastrum Bank's
ratings once the review on the parent ratings is concluded.
During the review process Moody's will assess the subsidiary's
standalone financial strength vis-a-vis its parent, focusing in
particular on the degree of funding and capitalization

Moody's also notes that Uniastrum Bank's ratings are underpinned
by the bank's nationwide franchise with almost 200 branches in 44
regions of the Russian Federation. Moody's also views positively
the bank's low market risk appetite and very low exposure to
related-party risks. When concluding the review, the rating
agency will also consider these credit strengths of Uniastrum

What Can Change The Ratings Up

According to Moody's, the review for downgrade on Uniastrum
Bank's long-term ratings reflects the limited upside rating
potential in the near term. In the longer term, Moody's might
consider an upgrade of Uniastrum's ratings in the event of
sustainable growth of its recurring income and optimization of
business costs as well as improved asset quality and

What Can Change The Ratings Down

A downgrade of the parent -- in particular in the absence of
securing alternative funding and liquidity sources -- might add
to downward pressure on the ratings. Negative rating pressure
could also be exerted on Uniastrum Bank's ratings as a result of
deterioration in asset quality, a significant decline in the
capital buffer and a general weakening of its funding and
liquidity profile. An increase in loan book concentration would
also weigh negatively on the banks ratings as would Uniastrum
Bank's inability to manage fierce competition in its business

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Uniastrum reported -- under
audited IFRS -- total assets of US$2.8 billion as at December 31,
2011 and net profits of US$14.3 million for the year then ended.


ABENGOA: Moody's Reviews 'B3' CFR/PDR for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service placed Abengoa's ratings under review
for downgrade. The ratings affected by this review are the
company's corporate family rating ("CFR", currently Ba3), its
probability of default rating ("PDR", currently Ba3), and the
senior unsecured notes ratings (currently Ba3).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's review of Abengoa's ratings follows the recent downgrades
of Spain's government bond rating (to Baa3 on review from A3), of
the ratings for certain Spanish utilities and of 28 Spanish
banks. While Abengoa's Spanish operations are relatively small in
terms of contribution to the group's revenues, the sovereign
downgrade is a credit-negative development for Abengoa in light
of the multiple channels of contagion that exist between
sovereign and corporate issuers domiciled in that country. These
channels of contagion include contracting economic activity in
light of the government's austerity measures, and more
importantly for Abengoa, possible further cuts to regulatory
support for renewable energies, and liquidity constraints and
higher financing costs resulting from diminished investor
confidence and credit availability. This also takes into account
the company's relatively high leverage -- if measured at group
level including debt and EBITDA from non-recourse projects --
with net debt/EBITDA of 6.2x including Moody's adjustments and at
the company level with net debt/EBITDA of 2.4x as reported. High
leverage in combination with some dependency on the Spanish
markets could lead to a more difficult market access for Abengoa
which may put pressure on the refinancing of its EUR200 million
convertible bonds maturing in July 2014 or the EUR300 million
ordinary bonds due February 2015.

Abengoa is domiciled in Spain, generates about 30% of revenues in
that country, constructs and operates more than one third of its,
mostly solar energy, concessions in Spain and, apart from bonds
issued, Abengoa is funded primarily by Spanish banks. Hence, its
future performance and financial flexibility will be materially
impacted by (i) industrial activity and power consumption in
Spain, (ii) the willingness and capacity of the Spanish state and
national utilities to continue supporting renewable energies of
which concentrated solar power is one of the more expensive
sources, (iii) revisions to the tax regime, as the recent cap to
the tax effectiveness of financing cost at 30% EBITDA, (iv)
continued availability of bank funding for Abengoa's corporate
activities and concession projects, and (v) the development of
advance payments, a funding source that correlates with order
inflow. All its Spanish concessions are in operation or filed in
the pre-registry for new projects and are covered by long term
contracts. In May 2012, Abengoa has extended its EUR1.6 billion
credit facility to mature between 2014 and 2016 and as a point of
strategy, will enter into concession projects only once limited
recourse funding has been secured. Nevertheless, the medium-term
refinancing of such maturities may be less certain and more
expensive than in the past.

Moody's review will thus focus on Abengoa's options to respond to
potential (i) declines in domestic demand, (ii) cuts in feed-in
tariffs or power quotas, (iii) increases in tax rates or
abolishment of exemptions, (iv) constraints in access to bank or
capital market funding, (v) future prospects to reduce leverage,
and (vi) expected development of net working capital and

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

In view of the rating review for possible downgrade, Moody's does
not currently anticipate upward rating pressure. The Ba3 ratings
for Abengoa could be confirmed, if Moody's concluded that (i)
Abengoa's business volumes and profitability should be resilient
to weakness in Spain and to revisions of the regulatory and tax
regime and (ii) its financial flexibility is viewed as robust. A
near-term path to a group net debt/EBITDA level well below
6.0times (6.2times with Moody's adjustments for 2011) should be

A downgrade would be triggered by vulnerability to the
deteriorating economic climate in Spain and/or concerns about
medium-term access to funds for its extensive investments

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Heavy
Manufacturing Rating Methodology published in November 2009.

Abengoa S.A. is a vertically integrated environment and energy
group whose activities span from engineering & construction and
utility type operation (via concessions) of solar energy plants,
electricity transmission networks and water treatment plants to
industrial production activities like biofuels and metal
recycling. Headquartered in Seville, Spain, Abengoa generated
EUR7.1 billion revenues in 2011, out of which 73% came from
outside Spain.

CASER: Moody's Cuts Insurance Financial Strength Rating to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Caser's insurance
financial strength rating (IFSR) to Ba2 from Baa1. The rating
remains on review for further downgrade.

The action follows the weakening of the Spanish government and
the Spanish banks' creditworthiness, as captured by Moody's
downgrade of Spain's government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on
June 13, 2012 and the downgrade on Spanish banks' long-term debt
ratings on June 25, 2012, together with the initiations of
reviews for further downgrades on both the sovereign and on most
of the banks.

Moody's regards Caser's credit quality as being linked to that of
the Spanish sovereign and its economy. Typically, Moody's
considers that an insurer's key credit fundamentals (asset
quality, capitalization, profitability and financial flexibility)
are correlated with -- and thus linked to -- the economic and
market conditions in the countries where they operate.

Caser is the 8th largest Spanish insurance group, owned by 32
Spanish saving banks, which collectively own around 80% of the
company, and by two French mutuals (MMA and MAAF). Caser has a
meaningful indirect and direct exposure to Spanish saving banks,
namely through its ownership, its high reliance on the saving
banks' distribution network to sell insurance products, and a
significant exposure to saving banks' debts and deposits.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Caser mainly reflects its significant investment
exposure to Spanish saving banks, which weighs on its asset
quality and capitalization. Moody's sees Caser's rating as
constrained by the ratings of Spanish saving banks, with the
majority of the saving banks now rated in the Ba range, down from
the Baa range. Furthermore, Moody's also believes that the
ongoing restructuring and consolidation of Spanish saving banks
will likely weaken Caser's long-term franchise given the
company's high reliance on its owner banks for distribution. In
addition, the downgrade reflects Caser's exposure to Spanish
sovereign risk, given that all its business is sourced from Spain
and that the majority of its investments are Spanish, with a
large concentration risk in Spanish government and other

Moody's notes that Caser has delivered a strong track record of
profitability despite the difficult economic environment in Spain
with a return on capital consistently above 9% in recent years
and a low-risk business profile. At year-end 2011, Caser
continued to report strong results, with gross premiums of
EUR2,797 million, up 8% year-on-year, and a net income of EUR116
million, up over 25% year-on-year, reflecting new exclusive
bancassurance agreements and a sound underwriting profitability.
Shareholders' equity rose by around 30% to EUR1,239 million
(year-end 2010: EUR956 million) driven by the strong results and
the EUR50 million right issue subscribed by some of their
shareholders, which more than offset higher unrealized investment
losses. However, this strong profitability is more than offset by
the asset quality, capitalization and distribution pressures
cited above.

Rating Review

Moody's rating review for Caser reflects the similar reviews at
both the owner Spanish savings banks and the Spanish sovereign.
Any downgrade of the owner banks would in particular likely put
further pressure on Caser's rating.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Moody's says that an upgrade of the IFSRs is unlikely at the
moment given the review for downgrade placement.

Downwards pressure on the IFSRs could develop following (i) a
further downgrade of Spanish sovereign bonds or Spanish saving
banks, which would deteriorate the group's asset quality and
capitalization; (ii) material deterioration in the solvency due
to a disruptive event such as a significant decline in investment
markets; and/or (iii) significant deterioration in the group's
operating performance with a combined ratio consistently above
100% and returns on capital below 4%.

Ratings Affected

The following rating was downgraded and remain on review for
further downgrade:

Caser S.A.- insurance financial strength rating to Ba2 from Baa1,
on review for further downgrade.

Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, CASER is the eight largest
insurance group in Spain, with a market share of approximately
4.7% at year-end 2011. It offers an extensive range of life, non-
life and pension products, distributing its products mostly
through Spanish savings banks. CASER reported consolidated gross
premiums written of EUR2,797 million, and Shareholders' Equity
(including minority interests and valuation reserves) of EUR1,239
million at year-end 2011.

Methodologies Used

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Global Rating
Methodology for Property and Casualty Insurers published in May
2010, and Moody's Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers
published in May 2010.

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded certain long-term
supported ratings of Banco Santander S.A.'s (Santander) and Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.'s (BBVA) North American bank
subsidiaries. Following the downgrades, Moody's placed the
subsidiaries' long- and short-term ratings, including their
standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR)/baseline credit
assessments (BCA), on review for downgrade.

The actions follow the downgrades of Santander (standalone
BFSR/BCA to C-/baa2 from C/a3, on review for further downgrade)
and BBVA (standalone BFSR/BCA to D+/baa3 from C/a3, on review for
further downgrade). These actions are discussed in the press
release "Moody's downgrades Spanish banks," dated 25 June 2012
and available on


Subsidiaries of Santander:

- Santander Holdings USA, Inc.: all long- and short-term ratings
(senior at Baa2) placed on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Bank, N.A.: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and
issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; subordinate debt
rating downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1; all long- and short-term
ratings, including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, placed on
review for downgrade

- Sovereign Real Estate Investment Trust: non-cumulative
preferred stock rating downgraded to Ba1 (hyb) from Baa3; placed
on review for further downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust IV: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating
placed on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust V: (P)Ba1 preferred stock rating
placed on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust VI: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating
placed on review for downgrade

- Banco Santander Puerto Rico: long-term bank deposit, senior
debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; all long- and
short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the standalone
BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, which was placed on review for downgrade on
April 10, 2012 because of Puerto Rico's difficult operating
environment, remains on review

Subsidiaries of BBVA:

- BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc.: long-term issuer rating downgraded
to Baa3 from Baa1 and placed on review for further downgrade

- Compass Bank: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer
ratings downgraded to Baa2 from A3; subordinate debt rating
downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings,
including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, placed on review
for downgrade

- Phoenix Loan Holdings: non-cumulative preferred stock rating
downgraded to Ba2 (hyb) from Baa3 and placed on review for
further downgrade

- Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Puerto Rico: long-term bank
deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa2 from
A3; subordinate debt rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all
long- and short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the
standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, which was placed on review for
downgrade on April 10, 2012, remains on review

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades reflect the potential adverse effects of
Santander's and BBVA's lower capacity to support their
subsidiaries in North America, reflected by their lower
standalone ratings. The downgrades of the parents' ratings were
driven by the reduced creditworthiness of the Spanish sovereign,
as captured by Moody's recent three-notch downgrade of Spain's
government bond rating (Baa3, on review for further downgrade),
which implies a weaker credit profile for Spanish banks. This
results from the banks' multiple linkages with the sovereign,
including (i) the impact of the government's financial position
on the domestic economy; and (ii) the large exposures of most
banks to their domestic government and to other counterparties
that depend on the credit strength of the government.

The downgrade of Santander's and BBVA's standalone ratings, which
are now one notch below the respective standalone ratings of
their North American bank subsidiaries, means that the
subsidiaries' ratings will no longer benefit from any uplift from
parental support, with the exception of Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. and its capital trust subsidiaries. Previously, Santander's
North American bank subsidiaries benefited from one notch of
parental support uplift, while BBVA's North American subsidiaries
benefited from two notches of uplift.

The ratings of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. and its capital trust
subsidiaries continue to benefit from one notch of uplift given
the parent's continued capacity to support these subsidiaries.
This is reflected by Santander's higher standalone rating of
baa2, one notch above Santander Holdings USA, Inc.'s intrinsic
financial strength of baa3.

Moody's has also attached a hybrid (hyb) indicator to the non-
cumulative preferred stock ratings of Sovereign Real Estate
Investment Trust & Phoenix Loan Holdings.

Rationale for Reviews for Downgrade

Following the downgrades, all of the North American subsidiaries'
ratings were placed on review for downgrade. The reviews reflect
the potential adverse effects from weakening creditworthiness at
the parent level on the standalone financial strength of their

During its reviews of the bank subsidiaries' standalone ratings,
Moody's will focus on the independence and resilience of the
North American banks' financial strength in the event that the
parents' creditworthiness is further affected and their ratings
lowered. Generally, Moody's is comfortable with subsidiaries'
standalone ratings exceeding those of their parents, but this is
typically limited by linkages between the subsidiary and the
parent bank. The extent to which the regulatory framework in the
US insulates the subsidiaries from potential adverse developments
in Spain will also be factored into Moody's review of the

Rating Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012.

* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 33 Spanish Covered Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 33
Spanish covered bonds. At the same time, Moody's maintains 31
covered bond ratings on review for downgrade and six on review
with direction uncertain.

The actions follow (i) Moody's lowering of the country ceiling in
Spain to A3; and (ii) the downgrade of several Spanish issuers'
unsecured ratings. Moody's says that the announcements are in
addition to those previously announced on 13 June 2012, which
were prompted by the downgrade of Spain's government bond ratings
to Baa3 on review for downgrade from A3.

A list of the Affected Credit Ratings is available at:

Ratings Rationale

Following the downgrade of Spain's sovereign rating to Baa3 on
review for downgrade from A3, Moody's has lowered Spain's country
ceiling to A3. Accordingly, ten covered bond ratings in Spain
have now been lowered in line with this limitation.

In addition, the sovereign downgrade has prompted the downgrade
of several Spanish banks that are issuers of covered bonds.
Moody's has therefore downgraded the covered bonds issued under
23 programs because of the impact of the issuer rating downgrades
under Moody's Timely Payment Indicator (TPI) framework. Moody's
notes that the TPI for both mortgage and public-sector covered
bonds has been maintained at "Improbable".

Moody's has placed or kept on review for downgrade the ratings of
31 covered bonds because their issuers' ratings are on review for
downgrade. Only in a few instances are the covered bonds ratings
on review with direction uncertain, either because (i) the
issuers' ratings are under review with direction uncertain; or
(ii) the entities are in advanced merger processes with stronger
entities that are on review for downgrade.

The sovereign downgrade impacted the covered bond ratings

(1) The Expected Loss

(i) Following Spain's downgrade, the banks that issue covered
bonds have also been downgraded. As the issuer's credit strength
is incorporated into Moody's expected loss methodology, any
downgrade of the issuer's ratings will increase the expected loss
on the covered bonds.

(ii) The increase in refinancing margins observed in Spain. The
weakening economic environment in Spain has resulted in increased
funding costs for both the sovereign and Spanish financial
institutions. Moody's has consequently increased the refinancing
margins assumed in its analysis of Spanish covered bonds.

However, Moody's notes that issuers may be able to offset any
deterioration in the expected loss analysis if sufficient
collateral is held in the cover pool.

During the review process -- and based on its revised credit and
market-risk assumptions -- Moody's will assess the adequacy of
the over-collateralization held by the issuers to sustain the
current covered bond ratings.

(2) The TPI Framework

Moody's Timely Payment Indicator (TPI) framework limits a covered
bond rating to a certain number of rating levels above the issuer
rating of the relevant bank. The amount of uplift will depend on
the TPI assigned; for all Spanish covered bonds, Moody's
currently assigns a TPI of "Improbable". The indicative rating
uplift for covered bonds based on TPIs can be found in Moody's
published TPI table. Therefore, a downgrade of the issuer rating
could limit the maximum covered bond rating uplift.

Based on the current "Improbable" TPI for the Spanish covered
bond programs, the combination of the (i) lower issuer ratings;
(ii) the maximum covered bond rating achievable; and (iii) the
TPIs, constrains the covered bond ratings of ten programs.

However, Moody's notes that there are many factors that might
influence the application of TPIs, in particular for sub-
investment-grade-rated issuers. For these issuers, factors that
influence the maximum rating achievable include (i) the level of
over-collateralization held in the program; and (ii) the degree
of adequate asset-liability matching.

For 20 programs, Moody's downgraded the covered bonds to certain
ratings, which are above the level indicated by the TPI table.
The higher final rating was driven by a number of factors,
including (i) the issuers' ratings, which are at the high end of
the range indicated by the TPI table for a given covered bond
rating; and (ii) high level of over-collateralization.

Moody's has left the TPIs of the mortgage and public-sector
covered bonds unchanged at Improbable, reflecting (i) the
systemic importance of covered bonds for the funding of Spanish
banks, despite the difficulties the sovereign faces; and (ii) the
high level of protection that the Spanish legal framework for
covered bonds provides to covered bond holders.

Unlike in most jurisdictions where the cover pool assets consist
of an earmarked pool, mortgage and public-sector covered bonds in
Spain are secured by the issuer's entire mortgage and public-
sector loan portfolio, respectively. This legal protection
provides a high amount of over-collateralization, given that the
issuer may only issue mortgage covered bonds for up to 80% of
those cover assets qualifying as eligible and public-sector
covered bonds up to 70% of the public-sector cover pool. High
amounts of over-collateralization can compensate for the higher
discount prices, if the insolvency administrator has to sell the
assets to meet payments under the bonds. This is an important
consideration in light of the deterioration of the credit quality
of the cover pool assets, especially the exposures to real-

Therefore, Moody's believes that as long as Spain remains rated
investment-grade, the TPIs can remain at "Improbable". However,
Moody's notes that the TPIs might be lowered further if (i)
Moody's downgrades Spain's sovereign rating; or (ii) the economic
environment within Spain worsens.

(3) Highest rating achievable

As a consequence of Moody's rating action on the sovereign,
Moody's has lowered Spain's country ceiling to A3.

Spain's new country ceiling relates to Moody's assessment of
increased risks for economic and financial instability in the
country. The weakness of the economy and the increased
vulnerability to a sudden stop in funding for the sovereign
constitute a substantial risk factor to other (non-government)
issuers in Spain as income and access to liquidity and funding
could be sharply curtailed for all classes of borrowers. Further
deterioration in the financial sector cannot be excluded, which
could lead to potentially severe systemic economic disruption and
reduced access to credit. Finally, the ceiling reflects the risk
of exit and redenomination in the unlikely event of a default by
the sovereign. If the Spanish government's rating were to fall
further from its current Baa3 level, the country ceiling would
likely be reassessed at that time.

As a result, no Spanish covered bond can be rated above A3.


The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed
to investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors. Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a
two-step process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework

- EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the
expected loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's
Covered Bond Model (COBOL), which determines expected loss as (i)
a function of the issuer's probability of default (measured by
the issuer's rating); and (ii) the stressed losses on the cover
pool assets following issuer default.

- TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a TPI, which indicates the
likelihood that timely payment will be made to covered
bondholders following issuer default. The effect of the TPI
framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain number
of notches above the issuer's rating.


The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
issuer's credit strength.

A multi-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (i) a sovereign downgrade
that negatively affects both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (ii) a multi-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (iii)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of covered bonds
remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the
general economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively impact the ratings of covered
bonds. Furthermore, as discussed in Moody's special report
"Rating Euro Area Governments Through Extraordinary Times -- An
Updated Summary," published in October 2011, Moody's is
considering reintroducing individual country ceilings for some or
all euro area members, which could affect further the maximum
structured finance rating achievable in those countries. Moody's
is also continuing to consider the impact of the deterioration of
sovereigns' financial condition and the resultant asset portfolio
deterioration in covered bond transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds", published in March 2010.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: SNDO Will Assume Ownership of Parts
Thomson Reuters reports that the Swedish National Debt Office
(SNDO) intends to assume ownership of the shares of Saab
Automobile Parts AB according to its contractual rights.  The
company is currently owned by Saab Automobile AB in receivership.

The ownership transfer will be implemented after closing of the
transaction that the receivers in Saab informed about on 13 June,
2012, according to Thomson Reuters.  The report relates that the
transfer is expected to take place in late summer.

The receivers in Saab informed about a sale of the majority of
the assets of Saab Automobile AB, Saab Automobile Tools AB and
Saab Automobile Powertrain AB, the report notes.  Thomson Reuters
says that the purchaser is the National Electric Vehicle Sweden

The report discloses that it will return regarding the SNDO's
interest in the pledged shares of Saab Automobile Tools AB, after
the receivers have reported on the sale of assets in this
company.  The SNDO expects that there will be a surplus in this
estate, the report says.

The surplus will accrue to us as holders of the pledged shares,
after deduction of receivership costs, the report adds.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.  Saab Automobile AB, Saab Automobile Tools AB and Saab
Powertain AB filed for bankruptcy on Dec. 19, 2011, after running
out of cash.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRADFORD BULLS: In Administration, Seeks to Avoid Liquidation
The guardian reports that Bradford Bulls have entered
administration with a grim warning it will be liquidated unless a
white knight comes forward in the next 8 days.

"We now have just [8] working days to save the club from
liquidation because there are no funds to carry on longer.  If
there is anyone interested in buying the Bulls then we need to
hear from them right now because this famous club is now on the
brink of extinction," the guardian quoted Brendan Guilfoyle of
the P&A Partnership, which has been appointed as the
administrator, as saying.

The guardian notes that Chris Caisley, a former chairman, has
been working with the other remaining directors since Peter Hood
resigned as chairman in May, and is understood to have an
agreement for the former coach Brian Noble to return in a
management role, but they have so far failed to raise the seven-
figure sum necessary to secure the club's future.

The report recalls that Bradford Bulls have been here before,
back in 1963 when they went out of business in December in the
middle of a season, and a new club was founded the following year
with Trevor Foster, the Welsh forward who had come north several
decades earlier, playing a role.

This time, however, they have no significant assets other than
the players, after selling Odsal, their crumbling old stadium, to
the Rugby Football League last winter, the report says.  The
guardian relates that they have already thrown themselves on the
mercy of their fans once this year, when an appeal from Hood to
raise 500,000 to secure their short-term future was successful,
to show the continued goodwill that existed for the club in the
city and the wider rugby league community. But that money would
appear to have been swallowed.

Bradford Bulls is one of Super League's most successful clubs.

KEMBREY WIRING: Enters CVA to Avoid Administration
This is Wiltshire reports that Kembrey Wiring Systems, where 50
jobs are to go in a redundancy process, has entered a company
voluntary agreement to repay its creditors.  The CVA, which is
used by companies to avoid going into administration, is part of
what the firm has described as a "reorganization and
restructuring" process, according to This is Wiltshire.

The report notes that a member of staff said that a group of
employees who were being made redundant were the first to be told
the news.

Last month, the report recalls that Kembrey responded to news of
the redundancies by blaming a cut in military spending, among
other problems, for hitting its order book.  The company had
announced last July that it would create jobs as part of an
investment by new owners Arundel Aerospace & Defence Systems, the
report relays.

However, the report discloses that in a statement released on
Kembrey blamed a downturn in the international military aviation
market for its troubles, which have led it to seek the CVA, which
involves a recovery plan being agreed between a company and its

Kembrey Wiring Systems is Swindon aerospace firm.

NEW LOOK: Agrees Amendments to GBP1.1-Billion Debt
Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that New Look said
it plunged to a GBP55 million pre-tax loss last year, as it
amended the deal covering its GBP1.1 billion of net debt.

According to the FT, Alistair McGeorge, executive chairman, said
the so-called amend and extend deal gave New Look "the time and
space to improve the business and to come up with a solution" for
its debt, which includes GBP700 million in payment-in-kind notes.

New Look said it had agreed amendments to its borrowings and
extensions of all maturities on its senior debt to April 2015,
the FT relates.

The company said the deal also earmarked GBP25 million initially,
and subject to meeting certain tests, to buy back the payment-in-
kind debt at a market price, the FT notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 6,
2012, The FT related that New Look was taking the first steps in
an attempted restructuring of its more than GBP1 billion debt
pile.  The FT noted that one person familiar with the situation
said New Look was talking to US investment bank Houlihan Lokey
about advising it on a debt restructuring.

New Look is a privately owned value fashion chain.

PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Coryton Closure Blamed on UK Bankruptcy Law
Simon Falush at Reuters reports that Petroplus Holdings' Coryton
oil refinery is the only one to have closed, doomed by the
priorities of UK bankruptcy law, the British government's laissez
faire approach and strategic calculations by trading houses who
saw more opportunities from other refinery assets.

Workers at the plant in Essex, near London, were furious after
the administrator PricewaterhouseCoopers confirmed it would be
turned into a storage depot in a deal between Royal Dutch Shell,
Vopak and Greenergy, meaning the loss of most of around 900 jobs
at the site, Reuters relates.

A bid from a former Russian energy minister for Coryton was
dismissed by the administrator PwC as not credible, Reuters

A US$150 million pound refit due in September made the plant look
less attractive for investors, and increased the need for at
least short-term government support to ensure a deal, Reuters

But even factoring this in, with a Nelson complexity rating of 12
-- meaning it can produce a high proportion of lighter fuels that
fetch a higher margin -- Coryton was seen as stronger than
numerous plants owned by Petroplus and other companies, Reuters

According to Reuters, Coryton's joint administrator Steven
Pearson of PricewaterhouseCoopers said that it was UK bankruptcy
law's emphasis on the interests of creditors, more than any other
reason, that saw Coryton close.

"The UK is the most un-influenced market in Europe, where
economic logic drives decision making, not politics, so they are
not influenced by politicians, unions, or other non-quantifiable
factors," Reuters quotes Mr. Pearson as saying.

"Statute in this country maximizes the overall dividend that
creditors receive, in France it is to minimize the impact on

PwC's Pearson, as cited by Reuters, said that another feature of
Britain's law was that it gave him, as an insolvency
practitioner, a strong personal incentive to close the plant
rather than keep it open.

Mr. Pearson said he had taken on great personal risks, due to
personal liability rules that do not exist in continental Europe,
Reuters notes.

Mr. Pearson said that added to this, all the oil at the site was
owned by the Petroplus group, rather than the subsidiary company
that owned Coryton, so that there were very few working assets
that could be used to sweeten a deal, Reuters relates.

                         About Petroplus

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is one of
Europe's largest independent oil refiners.

Petroplus was forced to file for insolvency in late January after
struggling for months with weak demand due to the economic
slowdown in Europe and overcapacity amid tighter credit
conditions, high crude prices and competition from Asia and the
Middle East, MarketWatch said in a March 28 report.

According to MarketWatch, Petroplus said in March a local court
granted "ordinary composition proceedings" for a period of six
months. As part of the court process, Petroplus intends to sell
its assets to repay its creditors.

Some of Petroplus' units in countries other than Switzerland have
filed for "different types of proceedings" and are currently
controlled by court-appointed administrators or liquidators,
which started the process to sell assets, including the company's

WF UTILITIES: In Administration, Owes GBP400,000 Debt
WaterWorld News reports that administrators have been called in
to water industry contracting company WF Utilities & Groundworks
after the firm reportedly racked up GBP400,000 of debt.

Established as a specialist contracting company in 2010, WF
Utilities & Groundworks provided utility infrastructure and
construction services for commercial, industrial, defense, local
authority, water and gas utility sectors, according to WaterWorld

The report says that water services provided by the company
included leak location and repair, project management, drainage
and sewers, legionella risk assessments and groundwater

Insolvency practitioners SFP were appointed as administrators.

"Companies in construction and related sectors are having a hard
time of it at the moment, and unfortunately WF Utilities &
Groundworks is yet another company that has struggled to maintain
a healthy cashflow . . . .  After assessing the options
available, I am pleased to confirm that a management buy-out was
completed, which has safeguarded a number of positions within the
firm.  This is a very pleasing outcome and one that has ensured a
continuation of service to clients of the business," the report
quoted Daniel Plant, Group Partner at SFP, as saying.

* UK: More Shops Poised to go Bankrupt, Insolvency Body Warns
The Guardian reports that the figurehead of the UK's insolvency
industry has warned that a new batch of retailers could be forced
into administration as the high street attempts to trade through
one of the most financially stressful weeks of the year.

The forecast by Lee Manning, the president of the insolvency
industry's trade body, R3, comes as shopkeepers attempt to pay
their landlords three months' advance rent on their stores, a
bill that became due in a deadline known as "rent quarter day,"
according to The Guardian.

"Rent quarter day is typically the time when [struggling]
retailers go into administration . . . .  Retailers are committed
to meeting three months of obligations on their stores, while
they often have pressure on cashflow at the end of the month from
the payroll and maybe a VAT bill too," the report quoted Mr.
Manning as saying.

The Guardian notes that Mr. Manning added that creditors usually
prefer a retailer to go into administration when there is stock
in the business that can quickly be converted into cash, meaning
that Christmastime is often the most popular period to call in
insolvency experts, followed by the end of June, when summer
stock needs offloading.

"There are at least a couple [of retailers contemplating
administration that you hear about," Mr. Manning said, the report

The comments come as R3 released new research showing that 26% of
retailers are classified as "caution" or "high risk" in terms of
the likelihood of the company failing in the next 12 months,
according to analysis of Bureau van Dijk's Fame database, the
report discloses.

"Landlords have seen many problems over the past two quarters and
retail continues to be one of the most vulnerable parts of the
economy.  Many retailers are still not being strategic in terms
of how much space they'll need and we often see over expansion
lead to distress . . . . For those that have already taken too
many units they need to be realistic and plan ahead to liaise
with their landlords as early as possible," the report quoted
Mike Jervis, an insolvency partner at accountants
PricewaterhouseCoopers, as saying.

The Guardian says that the physical retailing sector has already
seen 21,000 jobs lost since the beginning of last year because of
the struggling economy and competition from the internet and the
string of collapses includes Clinton Cards, Game and Peacocks.

However, retail sales bounced back in May after a dismal April as
sunnier weather encouraged shoppers to buy clothes and shoes, the
report discloses.


* Moody's Says EMEA Auto ABS Performance Improves in April 2012
The performance of the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA)
auto loan and lease asset-backed securities (ABS) market showed
some improvement over the quarter leading to April 2012,
according to the latest indices published by Moody's Investors

In this month's indices report Moody's included the auto loans
ABS and the auto lease ABS in order to show the entire auto
finance ABS transactions in EMEA and include more markets such as
United Kingdom and Netherlands.

The index sixty plus day delinquencies improved to 0.83% in April
2012 from 1.06% in April 2011. Some markets improved, such as
France (0.48% in April 2012 from 0.56% in April 2011) and
Germany, whereas other markets such as Portugal (8.01% in April
2012 from 6.89% in April 2011), deteriorated. When making
quarter-on-quarter comparisons, however, all markets followed the
same trend with 60+ day delinquencies increasing to 0.83% in
April 2012 from 0.79% in January 2012.

The index on cumulative defaults decreased to 1.81% in April 2012
from 2.02% in April 2011. In Germany, cumulative defaults
improved significantly to 0.66% in April 2012 from 1.62% in April
2011, however this was mainly due to changes in the index
composition. Some older weak performing transactions fully repaid
and left the index in 2011, whereas newer transactions are now
part of the index and perform on average well. For the other
markets, however, cumulative defaults continued to rise.
Portugal, where default rates were already high, saw an increase
to 7.28% in April 2012 from 6.43% in April 2011, remaining the
worst performer of the index.

As most of the British and Dutch transactions were closed over
the last year, they don't show yet a long enough period of data
to compare their performance with past periods.

Moody's outlook for German auto ABS collateral is stable. Moody's
expects the unemployment rate in Germany to fall to 5.5% in 2012
from 5.9% in 2011, as previously announced in "Moody's
Statistical Handbook - Country Credit" (May 2012). Falling
unemployment rates will help keep German auto delinquencies
stable. Portugal, Spain and Italy will remain in economic
recession in 2012. Moody's also expects the unemployment rate to
rise (i) in Portugal, to 15.5% in 2012 from 13.0% in 2011; (ii)
in Spain, to 24.3% in 2012 from 21.7% in 2011; and (iii) in
Italy, to 10.0% in 2012 from 8.5% in 2011, as previously
announced in "Moody's Statistical Handbook - Country Credit" (May
2012). Rising unemployment rates will increase delinquencies in
Portugal, Spain and Italy.

As of April 2012, the total outstanding pool balance for the
index was EUR26,591 million. The outstanding pool balance for
auto loans ABS was EUR20,052 million and the outstanding pool
balance for auto leasing ABS was EUR6,881 million. Moody's rated
six new transactions from March 2012 to May 2012: Red & Black
Auto Germany 1 UG; Swiss Auto Lease 2012-1 GmbH; VCL Multi-
Compartment S.A., Compartment VCL 15; Turbo Finance 2 PLC; Cars
Alliance Auto Loans France Master; and HIGHWAY 2012-I B.V.

* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement
Authors:  Robert J. Buchanan, Ph.D., and James D. Minor, J.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 300 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

With Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement, Buchanan, a
professor in the School of Public Health at Texas A&M, and Minor,
an attorney, have come up with an invaluable resource for lawyers
and anyone else seeking an introduction to the legal and social
issues related to Medicare and Medicaid.  The administrative
costs of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement have been a heated
topic of debate among public officials and administrators of
provider healthcare organizations, especially health maintenance
organizations.  Although inflation and the use of costly medical
technology are key factors in the rise in Medicare and Medicaid
costs, some control can be gained through appropriate compliance,
using more efficient procedures and better detection of fraud.
This work is a major guide on how to go about doing this.
Though mostly a legal treatise, Legal Aspects of Health Care
Reimbursement, first published in 1985, also offers commentary
through legislative and regulatory analyses, thereby explaining
how healthcare reimbursement policies affect the solvency and
effectiveness of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
In discussing how legislation and regulations affect the solvency
and effectiveness of government-provided healthcare, the authors
offer insight into the much-publicized and much-discussed issue
of runaway healthcare costs.  Buchanan and Minor do not deny that
healthcare costs are out of control and are onerous for the
government and ruinous for many individuals.  But healthcare
reimbursement policies are not the cause of this, the authors
argue.  To make their case, they explain how the laws and
regulations in different areas of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs create processes that are largely invisible to the
public, but make the programs difficult to manage financially.
The processes are not well thought out nor subject to much
quality control, with the result that fraud is chronic and

The areas of Medicare covered in the book are inpatient hospital
reimbursement, long-term care, hospice care, and end-stage renal
disease.  The areas of Medicaid covered are inpatient hospital
and long-term care plus abortion and family planning services.
For each of these areas, the authors discuss the conditions for
receiving reimbursement, the legislation and regulations
regarding reimbursement, the procedures for being reimbursed, the
major areas of reimbursement (for example, capital-related costs,
dietetic services, rental expenses); and court cases, including
appeals.  Reimbursement practices of selected states are covered.
For each of the major areas of interest, the chapters are
organized in a manner that is similar to that found in reference
books and professional journals for attorneys and accountants.
Laws and regulations are summarized and occasionally quoted with
expert background and commentary supplied by the authors.  With
regard to court cases and rulings pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid, passages from court papers are quoted, references to
legal records are supplied, and analysis is provided. Though the
text delves into legal issues, it is accessible to administrators
and other lay readers who have an interest in the subject matter.
Clear chapter and subchapter titles, a table of cases following
the text, and a detailed index enable readers to use this work as
a reference.

The value of this book is reflected in the authors' ability to
distill great amounts of data down to one readable text.  It
condenses libraries of government and legal documents into a
single work.  Answers to questions of fundamental importance to
healthcare providers -- those dealing with qualifications,
compliance, reimbursable costs, and appeals -- can be found in
one place. Timely reimbursement depends on proper application of
the rules, which is necessary for a provider's sound financial
standing. But the authors specify other reasons for writing this
book, to wit: "Providers should have a general knowledge of the
law and should not rely on manuals and regulations exclusively."
By summarizing, commenting on, and citing cases relating to
principal provisions of Medicare and Medicaid, the authors
accomplish this objective.

The authors also cover the topic of fraud with respect to both
Medicare and Medicaid, offering both a legal treatment and
commentary.  At the end of each chapter is a section titled
"Outlook," which contains a discussion of government studies,
changes in healthcare policy, or other developments that could
affect reimbursement.  Although this work was published over two
decades ago, much of this discussion is still relevant today.
Finally, the book is a call for change.  The authors remark in
their closing paragraph: "Given the increasing for-profit
orientation of the major segments of the health care industry,
proprietary providers should be particularly responsive to new
efficiency incentives" in reimbursement.  In relation to this,
"policymakers [should] develop reimbursement methods that will
encourage providers to become more efficient."

Robert J. Buchanan is currently a professor in the Department of
Health Policy and Management in the School of Rural Public Health
at the Texas A&M University System Health Sciences Center.  James
D. Minor, a former law professor at the University of
Mississippi, has his own law practice.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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