TCREUR_Public/120719.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, July 19, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 143

                            Headlines



D E N M A R K

TORM A/S: Had US$453 Million Net Loss Last Year


F R A N C E

BANQUE PSA: Moody's Reviews '(P)Ba1' Sub. Rating for Downgrade


G E R M A N Y

ADAM OPEL: GM Appoints Thomas Sedran as Acting Head
CFB-FONDS 130: Commerz Real to Buy Assets to Avert Liquidation


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: Ernst & Young (Hellas) Raises Going Concern Doubt


I T A L Y

CASSA CENTRALE: Moody's Cuts BFSR to 'D+'; Outlook Negative
CASSA CENTRALE: Moody's Lowers BFSR to 'D+'; Outlook Negative
MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
MEDIOCREDITO TRENTINO-ALTO: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Baa2
* SICILY: PM Expresses Concern on Possible Default


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR; Outlook Negative
AVOCA II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'


P O L A N D

AFRICANO TRAVEL: Alba Tour Collapse Prompts Insolvency
PBG SA: Court Supervisor Orders to Retake Energomontaz Shares


R U S S I A

SBERBANK OF RUSSIA: Moody's Alters Outlook on Ba2 Rating to Neg.


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'B1'
* SPAIN: May Opt for Liquidation of Unviable Banks Under Bailout


U K R A I N E

BANK PIVDENNYI: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Finc'l. Strength Rating
PROMINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'B1'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HEALTHCARE NHS TRUST: In Administration on Financial Trouble
LIGHTNING AEROSPACE: In Administration, Cuts 14 Jobs
MAX HOTEL: In Administration, RSM Tenor Seeks New Owner
NORMANDY HOLIDAY: In Administration, 25 Jobs at Risk


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Moody's Says Companies Exposed to Sovereign Crisis
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
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TORM A/S: Had US$453 Million Net Loss Last Year
-----------------------------------------------
Deloitte Statsautoriseret Revisionspartnerselskab, in Copenhagen,
Denmark, expressed substantial doubt about TORM A/S's ability to
continue as a going concern, following the Company's results for
the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2011.  The independent auditors
noted that the Company's current financial position and
continuing low freight rates raise substantial doubt about its
ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company reported a net loss of US$453.01 million on
US$1.305 billion of revenue for 2011, compared with a net loss of
US$135.26 million on US$856.08 million of revenue for 2010.

"Operating loss increased by US$309 million to a loss of
US$389 million in 2011 as compared to a loss of US$80 million in
2010."

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2011, showed
US$2.779 billion in total assets, US$2.135 billion in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of US$643.8 million.

A copy of the Form 20-F is available for free at:

                       http://is.gd/piXXMY

TORM A/S is a Danish shipping company founded in 1889 under the
Danish Companies Act that is engaged primarily in the ownership
and operation of product tankers and dry bulk carriers.  TORM A/S
and subsidiaries owns product tankers that primarily carry
refined products such as naphtha, gasoline, gas oil, jet fuel,
and diesel oil.  TORM's dry bulk vessels carry commodities such
as coal, iron ore and grain.  The vessels trade worldwide.  TORMS
A/S's registered office and principal place of business is at
Tuborg Havnevej 18, DK-2900 Hellerup, Denmark.

The Company provides transportation services by utilizing a fleet
of vessels that it owns, charter in on short and long-term time
charters, or commercially manage as the manager of a pool or
through contracts with third-party owners.  The Company charters
in tankers and bulk vessels as are needed by the pools that it
manages.

As of Dec. 31, 2011, the Company's fleet of owned vessels
consisted of 65.5 product tankers and 2 dry bulk carriers.  The
total tonnage of those vessels is approximately 3,907,803 dwt.
In addition, the Company chartered-in 30 product tankers and 39
dry bulk carriers and commercially managed approximately 22
vessels for third-party owners and charterers.



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F R A N C E
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BANQUE PSA: Moody's Reviews '(P)Ba1' Sub. Rating for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced that Banque PSA Finance
(BPF)'s C- Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR), its Baa2 long-
term debt and deposit ratings and its P-2 short-term debt and
deposit ratings have been placed under review for downgrade. The
bank's (P)Baa3 subordinated and its (P)Ba1 junior subordinated
debt program ratings were also placed under review for downgrade.

Moody's has also placed the Baa2 backed long-term debt ratings of
BPF's subsidiary, Peugeot Finance International N.V. (PFI) under
review for downgrade, as well as the P-2 backed commercial paper
rating of SOFIRA SNC.

Rating Rationale

The review on the ratings of BPF and the aforementioned related
entities follows the review for downgrade on the long-term
ratings of BPF's parent, PSA Peugeot Citro‰n (PSA).

Given the intricate strategic, commercial and financial ties to
its parent, Moody's considers BPF's creditworthiness to be
inherently linked to that of PSA, even though its financial
performance has thus far displayed low correlation with that of
the manufacturer. For this reason, BPF's long-term debt ratings
are unlikely to exceed the long-term rating of PSA by more than
two notches, as outlined in Moody's prior research. Given the
current Ba1 long-term rating on PSA and the Baa2 long-term rating
on BPF, the review for downgrade on PSA has prompted Moody's to
review for downgrade BPF's BFSR and long-term debt and deposit
ratings. During the review, Moody's will consider the impact on
BPF of the potential weakening of its parent in the context of
the current weak economic environment, the extent to which BPF is
exposed to PSA, and thus whether this notching differential
between the bank and the manufacturer remains appropriate.

What Could Change The Rating Up

Moody's believes there is little likelihood of any upward rating
pressure on BPF, given the current review for downgrade on PSA.
Even in the case of an upgrade of PSA's long-term ratings, BPF's
narrow business focus and funding profile would nonetheless
suggest a standalone rating in the Baa category.

What Could Change The Rating Down

A downgrade of PSA's long-term ratings would likely result in a
downgrade of those of BPF, absent any factors which in Moody's
view justify a long-term debt rating for BPF more than two
notches higher than that of PSA. A downgrade could also be driven
by a deterioration in other fundamentals, for example an increase
in expected credit losses, or more difficult refinancing
conditions, for example as a result of market disruption.

The methodology used in these ratings was Moody's Consolidated
Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012.



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G E R M A N Y
=============


ADAM OPEL: GM Appoints Thomas Sedran as Acting Head
---------------------------------------------------
Chris Bryant at The Financial Times reports that General Motors
appointed Thomas Sedran, a former restructuring consultant, as
acting head of its struggling Opel/Vauxhall unit as new sales
data laid bare the full extent of problems facing the carmaker's
loss-making European arm.

Opel's supervisory board appointed Mr. Sedran deputy chief
executive on Tuesday but he will serve as acting chief until a
permanent chief executive is found, the FT notes.

European mass-market carmakers such as Opel and rivals PSA
Peugeot Citroen and Fiat are struggling with a toxic combination
of falling sales and too much production capacity, the FT
discloses.

Steven Girsky, Opel supervisory board chairman and head of GM
Europe, has so far declined to put factories on closedown
immediately or order job cuts, in contrast to Peugeot which last
week said it would close a French plant and axe 6,500 jobs, the
FT states.

"We will continue to implement our business plan as it was
outlined and work to improve it," the FT quotes Mr. Girsky as
saying in a statement.  "We will further reduce bureaucracy and
continue to challenge the corporate culture."

According to the FT, talks with trade unions about delaying the
possible closure of a plant at Bochum until after 2016 in return
for labor concessions are ongoing.

Adam Opel GmbH -- http://www.opel.com/-- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).
Its high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of
Opel models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the
Astra sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside
North America.


CFB-FONDS 130: Commerz Real to Buy Assets to Avert Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Annette Weisbach at Bloomberg News reports that Commerz Real AG
plans to buy the main asset of a fund it created to purchase the
former headquarters of Deutsche Boerse AG, operator of the
Frankfurt exchange, after failing to find a new tenant for the
building.

The German property manager announced the plan in an invitation
to a July 19 shareholder meeting, at which investors will vote on
the proposal, Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, Commerz
Real needs to acquire the assets of CFB-Fonds 130 Deutsche Boerse
to prevent the fund from filing for insolvency by July 23,
according to the invitation.

The assets are valued at about EUR45 million (US$55 million),
Bloomberg discloses.

Commerz Real needs to win 75% of the votes cast at the meeting to
proceed with its plan, Bloomberg notes.



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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: Ernst & Young (Hellas) Raises Going Concern Doubt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified Auditors Accountants S.A., in
Athens, Greece, expressed substantial doubt about FreeSeas Inc.'s
ability to continue as a going concern, following the Company's
results for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2011.  The independent
auditors noted that the Company has incurred recurring operating
losses and has a working capital deficiency.  "In addition, the
Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under
its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants
included in its loan agreements with banks."

FreeSeas Inc. reported a net loss of US$88.20 million on
US$29.54 million of revenues for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31,
2011.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2011, showed
US$134.98 million in total assets, US$99.86 million in total
current liabilities, and stockholders equity of US$35.12 million.

A copy of the Form 20-F is available for free at:

                       http://is.gd/kHVBdT

FreeSeas Inc. is a Marshall Islands corporation with principal
offices in Athens, Greece.  FreeSeas is engaged in the
transportation of drybulk cargoes through the ownership and
operation of drybulk carriers.  Currently, it has a fleet of
Handysize and Handymax vessels.  FreeSeas' common stock trades on
the NASDAQ Global Market under the symbol FREE.



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I T A L Y
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CASSA CENTRALE: Moody's Cuts BFSR to 'D+'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Cassa Centrale
Raiffeisen dell'Alto Adige's (CCR) long- and short-term deposit
ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from A3/Prime 2 and the BFSR to D+
(equivalent to a baa3 standalone credit assessment) from C-/baa1.
The outlook on the ratings is negative.

The downgrade of CCR's standalone ratings reflects its weaker
credit fundamentals and pressures from the weakening macro
environment in Italy. The downgrade of the long and short-term
ratings directly follows the downgrade of the BFSR and also
reflects Moody's lower assessment of the credit strength of CCR's
support provider, the Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs,
unrated).

This rating action concludes the review initiated on April 3,
2012.

CCR is one of the three central institutions of the Italian co-
operative credit banks (or Banche di Credito Cooperativo; BCCs).
CCR is located in Northern Italy, in Bolzano, and operates solely
with the BCCs based in its province.

Ratings Rationale

Downgrade of Standalone Ratings

Moody's says that the downgrade of the standalone rating of CCR
primarily reflects (i) weaker financial fundamentals, (ii) high
loan concentration relative to profitability and capital levels;
and (ii) the pressure from the challenging operating environment
that Moody's expects will impact CCR's and its member BCC's
profitability, asset quality and funding. The rating level also
captures the pressures within the entire Italian banking system,
due to (i) a deteriorating macroeconomic environment; (ii)
deteriorating asset quality; (iii) more restricted and more
expensive wholesale funding; and (iv) pressure on profitability.

CCR's profitability has decreased in the last two years. Pre-
provision income as a percentage of average risk-weighted assets
stood at a modest 0.8%[1] in 2011, down from 1.7% in 2009; net
income as percentage of the bank's average risk-weighted assets
stood at 0.4% in 2011, down from 1.0% in 2009. Problem loans as
percentage of gross loans stood at 3.6% in 2011, down from 3.7%
in 2009. Whilst problem loans increased, this is not reflected in
the problem-loan ratio, as gross loans more than proportionally
increased (+7% in 2011, +17% in 2010 and +10% in 2009, which is
above the Italian system average). Moody's notes that loan growth
has been fairly high, for several years, resulting in a less-
seasoned loan book. This implies a degree of credit risk
associated with the bank's ability to sustain the currently low
problem-loan levels. The Tier 1 ratio was 9.3% in 2011, down from
10.6% in 2009.

Downgrade of Debt and Deposit Ratings

The downgrade of CCR's long and short-term ratings directly
follows the downgrade of the standalone rating. The downgrade
further reflects Moody's lower assessment of the credit strength
of its support provider (the BCC group), given the pressure from
the challenging operating environment. The long and short-term
ratings of CCR do not incorporate ratings uplift from the support
provided by the Italian BCCs. As a result there is no uplift to
the bank's long-term rating from the now lower standalone
ratings.

The negative outlook on all ratings is in line with the outlook
assigned to other Italian bank ratings and reflects Moody's
ongoing concerns regarding the pressure that these banks face,
primarily in their funding structure, but also impact of the
challenging macroeconomic environment on its asset quality and
profitability, and furthermore the ongoing rating pressure on the
sovereign.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Deteriorating asset quality, capitalization, profitability or a
worsening performance of the BCC group could exert downwards
pressure on the bank's BFSR. A downgrade of the BFSR, would
result in a subsequent downgrade of the bank's deposit rating.

Upwards pressure on CCR's standalone ratings could result from a
strengthening of profitability and efficiency, as well as a
reduction of loan concentrations. However, Moody's believes that
positive momentum for these indicators is unlikely at present. A
one-notch upgrade of the bank's BFSR or an improving performance
of the BCC group could trigger an upgrade of the long-term bank
deposit rating.

List of Affected Ratings

The following ratings of CCR were affected:

- BFSR downgraded to D+/baa3 from C-/baa1

- long-term rating downgraded to Baa3 from A3

- short-term rating downgraded to P-3 from P-2

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings are Moody's Consolidated
Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012.

CCR is headquartered in Bolzano, Italy. At December 2011, it had
total assets of EUR2.7 billion.


CASSA CENTRALE: Moody's Lowers BFSR to 'D+'; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Cassa Centrale Banca-
Credito Cooperativo del Nord Est's (CCB) long and short-term
deposit ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from A3/Prime 2 and the
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+
(equivalent to a baa3 standalone credit assessment) from C/a3.
The outlook on the ratings is negative.

The downgrade of CCB's standalone ratings reflects its weaker
credit fundamentals and pressures from the weakening macro
environment in Italy. The downgrade of the long and short-term
ratings directly follows the downgrade of the BFSR and also
reflects Moody's lower assessment of the credit strength of CCB's
support provider, the Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs,
unrated).

This rating action concludes the review initiated on 3 April
2012. A full list of all affected ratings is included at the end
of this press release.

CCB is one of the three central institutions of the Italian co-
operative credit banks (BCCs). CCB is located in Northern Italy,
in Trento, and operates mainly with the BCCs based in its
province.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Downgrade Of Standalone Ratings

Moody's says that the downgrade of the standalone ratings of CCB
primarily reflects (i) weaker financial fundamentals, (ii) high
loan concentrations, relative to profitability and capital
levels; as well as; (iii) pressure from the challenging operating
environment that Moody's expects will impact CCB's and BCC's
profitability, asset quality and funding. The rating level also
captures the pressures within the entire Italian banking system,
due to (i) a deteriorating macroeconomic environment; (ii)
deteriorating asset quality; (iii) more restricted and more
expensive wholesale funding; and (iv) pressure on profitability.

CCB's financial fundamentals have declined in the last two years.
Profitability has decreased, with pre-provision income as a
percentage of average risk-weighted assets falling to 1.1%[1] in
2011, from 2.5% in 2009; net income as percentage of the bank's
average risk-weighted assets stood at 0.6% in 2011, down from
1.4% in 2009, reflecting mainly reduced revenues, especially
lower net interest income (to EUR15 million in 2011 from EUR24
million in 2009). Problem loans as a percentage of gross loans
stood at 4.8% in 2011, up from 3.11% in 2009 and the Tier 1 ratio
was 12.3% in 2011 down from 17.2% in 2009.

Downgrade of Debt and Deposit Ratings

The downgrade of CCB's long and short-term ratings directly
follows the downgrade of its standalone rating. The downgrade
further reflects Moody's lower assessment of the credit strength
of its support provider (the BCC group), given the pressure from
the challenging operating environment on the credit profile of
these banks. The long and short-term ratings of CCB do not
incorporate ratings uplift from the support provided by the
Italian BCCs. As a result there is no uplift to the bank's long-
term rating from the now lower standalone rating.

The negative outlook on all ratings is in line with the outlook
assigned to other Italian bank ratings and reflects Moody's
ongoing concerns regarding the pressure that these banks face,
primarily in their funding structure, but also impact of the
challenging macroeconomic environment on its asset quality and
profitability, and furthermore the ongoing rating pressure on the
sovereign.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Deteriorating asset quality, capitalization, profitability or a
worsening performance of the BCC group could exert downwards
pressure on the bank's BFSR. A downgrade of the BFSR would likely
result in a subsequent downgrade of the bank's deposit rating.

Upwards pressure on CCB's standalone ratings could result from a
strengthening of profitability and efficiency, as well as a
reduction of loan concentrations. However, Moody's believes that
positive momentum for these indicators is unlikely at present. A
one-notch upgrade of the bank's BFSR or an improving performance
of the BCC group could trigger an upgrade of the long-term bank
deposit rating.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following ratings of CCB were affected:

- BFSR downgraded to D+/baa3 from C/a3

- long-term rating downgraded to Baa3 from A3

- short-term rating downgraded to P-3 from P-2

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings are Moody's Consolidated
Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012.

CCB is headquartered in Trento, Italy. As of December 2011, it
had total assets of EUR5.5 billion.


MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch the long
and short-term deposit ratings of Banca del Mezzogiorno -
MedioCredito Centrale SpA (MCC) to Ba1/Not-Prime from Baa3/Prime-
3. MCC's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was not
affected, remaining at D- (equivalent to standalone credit
assessment of ba3). All ratings have a negative outlook.

The rating action was triggered by the downgrade of MCC's parent,
Poste Italiane to Baa2 (negative) from A3 (negative) on July 16,
2012, which, in turn, was prompted by weakening of the Italian
government's creditworthiness, reflected by Moody's downgrade of
Italy to Baa2 from A3 on  July 13, 2012. The downgrade of Poste
Italiane's ratings reflect a reduced capacity to provide capital
and funding support, if needed, to its fully owned subsidiary
MCC. Accordingly, Moody's has reduced the support assumptions
factored into the deposit ratings of MCC, resulting in the one
notch downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The one-notch downgrade of MCC was driven by the weakening credit
profile of its parent Poste Italiane, which implies a reduced
capacity to provide capital and funding support to its
subsidiary, if needed. Therefore the ratings uplift factored into
MCC's deposit ratings due to support assumptions has been
reduced.

Moody's says that the lowering of Poste Italiane's long-term
issuer rating to Baa2 from A3, announced yesterday, reflects the
weakening of the Italian government's creditworthiness. Under
Moody's Joint Default Analysis methodology, the deposit ratings
of MCC incorporates uplift from high parental support
assumptions; the two-notch lowering of Poste Italiane's long-term
issuer rating therefore has a direct impact on the ratings of
MCC.

Rationale for the Negative Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects (i) the negative
outlook on the ratings of Poste Italiane; and (ii) the
uncertainties associated with the successful implementation of
MCC's new activities and to its capacity to provide a sustainable
business model, with an adequate profitability and risk profile,
and sufficient capitalization.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

At this stage, upwards pressure on the ratings is limited, as
indicated by the negative outlook on both the bank's ratings and
its parent's ratings. Nevertheless, over the longer term, MCC's
ability to maintain an adequate risk profile, with relatively
robust capital and liquidity buffers -- coupled with sustainable
profitability -- could result in upwards pressure on MCC's
ratings.

The BFSR and the deposit ratings could be downgraded if there is
a significant increase in MCC's risk profile or a significant
decrease of its capital levels and liquidity. Weak integration
with the parent, a diminishing strategic role within the group
and/or downwards pressure on Poste Italiane's ratings could also
negatively impact MCC's ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following ratings were affected:

  Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings downgraded
  to Ba1 from Baa3, with negative outlook

  Short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings
  downgraded to Not-Prime from Prime-3

The following rating was unaffected:

  BFSR of D-/ba3, with negative outlook

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Rome, Italy, MCC reported total consolidated
assets of EUR887.6 million at December 2011.


MEDIOCREDITO TRENTINO-ALTO: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Baa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Mediocredito Trentino-
Alto Adige SpA's (MTAA) long-term deposit rating by one notch to
Baa2 from Baa1, prompted by the weakening credit profiles of its
support providers, the Autonomous Province of Trento and the
Autonomous Province of Bolzano, and the downgrade of their long-
term issuer ratings to A3 from A1 on July 16, 2012.

The rating action on MTAA's long-term deposit rating reflects the
reduced capacity of the two Provinces to provide support to MTAA
if required, as reflected by the downgrade of their long-term
ratings to A3 on 16 July. MTAA's long-term deposit rating now
benefits from two notches of ratings uplift from its regional
government controlling shareholders, reduced from three notches.

MTAA's D+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR),
mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1, and the short-
term rating at Prime-2 are unaffected. The outlook on all ratings
remains negative.

Ratings Rationale

The Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano -- together with
the Autonomous Region of Trentino Alto Adige (unrated) -- own a
52.5% controlling stake in MTAA. MTAA's ratings benefit from
uplift due to Moody's regional government support from these
entities. Its ratings are therefore sensitive to any change in
the provinces' credit profile and subsequently their ability to
provide support to MTAA, if required.

Rationale for the Negative Outlook

The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the
challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding
future market access for MTAA. The negative outlook on the long-
term ratings reflects the negative outlook on the standalone
BFSR, as well as the negative outlook on the two support
providers, the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Downwards pressure on MTAA's ratings could develop following (i)
evidence of the bank losing its market share in medium-term
lending, whilst exhibiting a worsening risk profile; (ii)
continued restricted market access; (iii) failure to adequately
reduce its funding reliance on the central bank over the near
term; (iv) weaker support from its shareholders; and/or (v) a
deterioration in its financials. A downgrade of the standalone
BFSR or a downgrade of the bank's support providers could lead to
a downgrade of MTAA's deposit ratings.

As indicated by the negative outlook, any upwards pressure is
currently limited. An upgrade of the standalone BFSR could be
triggered by more diversified and stable funding, a more
diversified business profile and/or a significant increase in
profitability. An upgrade of the standalone BFSR or an upgrade of
the bank's support providers could lead to an upgrade of the
deposit ratings.

List of Affected Ratings

  - Long-term bank deposit and issuer rating downgraded to Baa2
    from Baa1

  - Short-term rating affirmed at P-2

  - BFSR affirmed at D+/ba1

Principal Methodologies

The methodology used in these ratings is Moody's Consolidated
Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012.

MTAA is headquartered in Trento, Italy. As of December 2011, it
had total assets of EUR1.6 billion.


* SICILY: PM Expresses Concern on Possible Default
--------------------------------------------------
James Mackenzie and Lisa Jucca at Reuters report that Italian
Prime Minister Mario Monti expressed serious concern on Tuesday
over a possible default by Sicily, an autonomous region long
criticized for its wasteful public administration and bloated
government payroll.

Reuters relates that Mr. Monti said in a statement there were
"grave concerns" that the southern island could default and he
said he had written to the governor Raffaele Lombardo seeking
confirmation that he would resign by the end of the month.

After a decade of steady deterioration in its finances, the
island has some EUR5.3 billion in debt, a record of waste and
inefficiency and an outsized public service that critics say is
used by local politicians to buy votes, Reuters discloses.

Mr. Monti, as cited by Reuters, said that if the government in
Rome is to help bail out Sicily, he would have to take account of
the situation of the regional government.  He is due to meet
Lombardo on July 24, Reuters states.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARDAGH PACKAGING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Ardagh Packaging Group's
corporate family rating at B2. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the
group's instrument ratings, including the Ba3 rating of the
7.375% senior secured notes maturing 2017, that will be increased
by US$700 million, and the B3 rating for the group's 9.125%
senior unsecured notes maturing 2020, that will be increased by
US$220 million. The outlook on all ratings was changed to
negative from stable.

The proceeds from the additional notes will be used to fund the
announced acquisition of Anchor Glass Group (unrated), a US-based
producer of glass containers for the food and beverage industry
for US$880 million plus transaction related fees and expenses.
The enterprise value represents around 6x Anchor's 2011 EBITDA
and is in line with Moody's expectation for transactions in this
industry. The acquisition is subject to customary closing
conditions including approval from regulatory authorities, which
is expected to be obtained by Q3 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The outlook change to negative from stable on the group's ratings
is a reflection of Moody's assessment that the proposed
acquisition is overall credit negative. This assessment is
substantiated by the expected increase in net debt by about
US$920 million as a result of the transaction, underlining
management's aggressive financial policy dedicated to growing the
group. At the same time, Ardagh's existing business lacks
expected improvements in profitability as the sluggish
macroeconomic situation in Europe results in continued volume
weakness, in particular affecting the metal side of Ardagh's
business. Demand for cans used to package products that are more
prone to cyclicality, such as aerosols and paints & coatings, is
weak and, coupled with charges related to a restructuring of the
group's metal operations, will result in lower than expected
profitability for 2012. Moody's therefore cautions that, absent
improvements in the group's existing operations and/or potential
benefits from a targeted IPO, it might be challenging for Ardagh
to bring down its leverage to levels more commensurate with the
B2 rating. As laid out in prior publications, Moody's would
expect leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA of around 6x to maintain
the current rating, compared to pro forma leverage (including the
Anchor transaction) of above 6.5 times as of March 2012.

In terms of business profile, Moody's views the acquisition of
Anchor as positive, considering that it allows Ardagh to obtain a
material share of the US glass container market with estimated
25% market share (including its existing Leone business) and
contributing to increased scale and better diversification of the
business. Anchor will add approximately 20% to Ardagh's existing
group sales and about 40% to its existing glass operations.
Furthermore, the transaction will be margin accretive,
considering that Anchor shows higher profitability margins than
Ardagh's group margin, given the lower overall margin of Ardagh's
metal business. However, Moody's notes that Anchor's EBITDA
margin remains below that of Ardagh's European glass operations.
Synergy potential is only modest in Moody's view, given the
negligible direct overlap and limited ability to integrate the
two businesses on an operational level.

More positively, the affirmation of the group's B2 corporate
family rating reflects (i) Ardagh's solid scale with sales in
excess of EUR4 billion pro forma for the acquisition of Anchor
and good market positions of the combined group in the rather
low-cyclical food and beverage industry, where Ardagh generates
the vast majority of sales; (ii) an improving geographic spread
with the focus of operations still on the European market but
with activities also to include an increased presence in North
America; as well as (iii) a balanced product offering of glass
and metal containers.

These positive rating drivers are balanced by (i) high leverage
following a string of debt financed acquisitions over the past 2
years, resulting in pro forma leverage point in time of 6.7x;
(ii) the exposure to volatile raw material prices, which need to
be passed on to customers in a timely fashion to preserve solid
profitability levels as well as (iii) an aggressive financial
policy as evidenced by full debt financing of recent acquisitions
as well as a debt financed shareholder distribution in 2011.

The ratings could be downgraded should Ardagh (i) not be able to
improve profitability, caused for instance by continued volume
weakness, increasing competition or the inability to manage
volatile raw material costs; (ii) start generating negative free
cash flow or; (iii) should Debt/EBITDA remain sustainably above 6
times and interest coverage in terms of (EBITDA-Capex)/Interest
decline towards 1x.

Although rather unlikely at this juncture, the ratings could be
upgraded should Ardagh be able to reduce leverage in terms of
Debt/EBITDA towards 5 times and keep interest coverage in terms
of (EBITDA-Capex)/Interest around 1.5x by improving its operating
profitability and continued free cash flow generation.

The instrument ratings for the additional notes are based on
indicative terms and conditions received so far according to
which (i) the additional Senior Secured Notes benefit from the
same guarantors and security package as Ardagh's existing Senior
Secured Notes, and (ii) the additional senior unsecured notes
benefit from the same guarantee package as Ardagh's existing
senior unsecured notes. Ardagh's existing senior secured notes
are supported by senior guarantees of subsidiaries representing
at least 85% of consolidated assets and EBITDA and security
interests, which Moody's understands comprise the clear majority
of the guarantors' assets. While Ardagh's senior unsecured debt
is supported by guarantees from the same entities that guarantee
the senior secured debt, it does not benefit from any tangible
collateral.

The two notch uplift of the secured notes compared to the
corporate family rating is driven by limited priority debt
sitting ahead of these notes, which in Moody's view should result
in limited losses to be borne by the secured notes holders in a
default scenario. Priority debt sitting ahead of the secured
notes in Ardagh's capital structure relates to the group's EUR150
million asset-based lending facility that benefits from priority
access to proceeds from certain collateral. Moody's has ranked
trade payables of the group in line with senior secured debt. The
group's senior unsecured notes are rated two notches below the
corporate family rating, reflecting the implemented effective
subordination relative to a sizeable amount of senior secured
debt that ranks ahead in the capital structure with a closer
proximity to operating cash flows and assets.

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: ARD Finance S.A.

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

  Issuer: Ardagh Glass Finance plc

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

  Issuer: Ardagh Packaging Finance plc

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

  Issuer: Ardagh Packaging Group plc

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Packaging
Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers published in
June 2009, and Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Ardagh Glass Group, registered in Luxembourg, is a leading
supplier of glass and metal containers by volume focusing on the
European food and beverage market with some operations also in
North America and Australasia. The company generated pro forma
sales of about EUR3.9 billion in the last twelve months ending
March 2012.


AVOCA II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Avoca II CLO B.V.:

Issuer: Avoca II CLO B.V.

    EUR21 million Class A-2 Senior secured Floating rate Notes
    due 2020 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2,
    2011 Upgraded to Aa1(sf)

    EUR27 million Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2020 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
    Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR15.7 million Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2020 Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
    on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR7.5 million Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
    Notes due 2020 Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
    Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR5 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2020 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
    Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Avoca II CLO B.V., issued in November 2004, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Avoca Capital Holdings Limited. This transaction ended its
reinvestment period on January 15, 2010. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans. The current deal has 40
obligors and a diversity score of 22.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of a credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio, a decrease in the transaction's junior
overcollateralization ratios and a decrease of the diversity
score since the last rating action in September 2011.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 20% or EUR35.9 million since the rating action in
September 2011. As a result of the deleveraging, the Class A
overcollateralization ratio has increased to 134% from 132% since
the rating action in September 2011. The action also reflects the
correction of an input error related to the expected loss for the
Class A-2 notes. The incorrect and lower expected loss was
inadvertently considered at the last rating action in September
2011.

As of the latest trustee report dated April 30, 2012, the Class
B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization have deteriorated to
115.2%, 102.70% and 100.4%, versus September 2011 levels of
116.5%, 105.7% and 103.7%, respectively. Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are currently out of compliance.

Reported WARF has increased to 2940 from 2830 in September 2011.
Securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 10.38% of the
underlying portfolio versus 6.90% in September 2011.
Additionally, defaulted securities total about EUR6.7 million of
the underlying portfolio compared to no defaults in September
2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR221.5 million, defaulted par of EUR6.7 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.78% (consistent with a WARF of
3,502), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.92%
for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 22 and a
weighted average spread of 2.99%. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and
Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that
92.3% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets
would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-
lien loan corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a sensitivity analysis where the WARF was
increased by 350 points, which did not produce a rating impact.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Extending the weighted average life of
the portfolio may positively or negatively impact the ratings of
the notes depending on their seniority with the transactions
structure.

4) Moody's also notes that around 64% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Further information
regarding specific risks and stresses associated with credit
estimates are available in the report titled "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
3.2.1.2 Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


AFRICANO TRAVEL: Alba Tour Collapse Prompts Insolvency
------------------------------------------------------
Poland A.M. reports that Africano Travel has filed for insolvency
on Monday.

It is the third Polish tour operator, after Sky Club and Alba
Tour, to go bankrupt this season, Poland A.M. notes.

Poland A.M., citing the Polish Press Agency, says Africano's
downfall was precipitated by that of Alba Tour, from which
Africano purchased plane tickets.

According to Poland A.M., Tomasz Wiktor, head of the department
of sport and tourism at the Marshal Office of the Wielkopolska
Region in Poznan told PAP "This time the situation looks quite
different and better than for Alba Tour.  Africano Travel owners
came to us on Monday morning and told us about their insolvency.
This firm has also been deceived by Alba Tour."

Africano Travel is a tour operator based in Poznan.


PBG SA: Court Supervisor Orders to Retake Energomontaz Shares
-------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' David McQuaid, PBG SA, which was
granted bankruptcy protection from its creditors, said on Tuesday
that in a disclosure statement its court-appointed supervisor has
directed the company to retake possession of 46 million shares in
its Energomontaz Poludnie SA unit it sold to its Rafako SA
subsidiary on Dec. 20.

PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SBERBANK OF RUSSIA: Moody's Alters Outlook on Ba2 Rating to Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to negative
from stable on the local-currency (LC) debt and deposit ratings
of Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia (Ba2) and First Ukrainian
International Bank (B2). This aligns the banks' outlooks with the
negative outlook on the Government of Ukraine's B2 rating and
reflects the extent to which the banks' creditworthiness is
correlated with that of the country's national government.

Moody's has also downgraded the National Scale Ratings (NSRs) of
First Ukrainian International Bank to A3.ua from A2.ua,
reflecting the bank's weakening position amongst Ukrainian peers
in the context of the outlook change on the bank's Global Scale
Ratings.

The actions on Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia and First
Ukrainian International Bank were primarily driven by a global
reassessment of the linkages between the credit profiles of
sovereigns and financial institutions domiciled within the
country.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the outlook change to negative on Subsidiary
Bank Sberbank of Russia's and First Ukrainian International
Bank's long-term LC ratings principally reflects Moody's view
that the banks' creditworthiness is highly correlated to that of
their respective domestic government (Ukraine). Moody's has thus
aligned the outlooks on the banks' ratings with the outlook on
Ukraine's sovereign rating.

For Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia, the outlook alignment
reflects (i) the bank's sizeable exposure to Ukraine's government
bonds, which accounted for over 50% of the bank's Tier 1 capital,
as of year-end 2011; (ii) significant credit exposure to state-
related entities in the loan book; and (iii) the geographical
concentration of the bank's business in Ukraine's weak and
volatile operating environment.

While Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia's standalone credit
assessment of b2 (mapped from its standalone E+ bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), and unaffected by the actions) is
constrained by the Ukrainian national government's B2 rating due
the correlation factor noted above, the bank's long-term LC debt
and deposit ratings remain above at Ba2 due to Moody's assumption
that the bank's parent would provide support, if needed.
Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia is 100% owned by Sberbank of
Russia (A3, stable; D+/ba1, stable).

For First Ukrainian International Bank, the outlook change to
negative on its B2 debt and deposit ratings reflects a high level
of correlation to the sovereign due to (i) the bank's sizeable
exposure to Ukraine's government bonds, which account for almost
100% of the bank's Tier 1 capital, as of year-end 2011; (ii) the
geographical concentration of the bank's business in Ukraine's
weak and volatile operating environment, and (iii) the extent of
its reliance on market-based funding, which is typically more
confidence-sensitive. This outlook change also led to the
downgrade of First Ukrainian International Bank's National Scale
Ratings (NSRs) to A3.ua from A2.ua.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

The key drivers of the actions for Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of
Russia and First Ukrainian International Bank are mostly
structural in nature. Therefore, Moody's considers that upwards
rating pressure is unlikely over the near term. Over the longer
term, a combination of an improving operating environment,
declining sovereign-risk exposures and increasing cross-border
diversification may exert upwards pressure on the ratings.
Conversely, deterioration in operating environment in Ukraine
and/or a weakening of these banks' standalone financial
fundamentals could exert downward pressure on the ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia

  - BFSR and standalone credit assessment remained unchanged at
    E+/b2 (stable outlook)

  - Local-currency long-term debt and deposit ratings remained
    unchanged at Ba2, outlook changed to negative from stable

  - NSR remained unchanged at Aa1.ua and carries no specific
    outlook

First Ukrainian International Bank

  - BFSR and standalone credit assessment remained unchanged at
    E+/b2 (stable outlook)

  - Local-currency long-term debt and deposit ratings remained
    unchanged at B2, outlook changed to negative from stable

  - NSR downgraded to A3.ua from A2.ua and carries no specific
    outlook

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative
measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within
a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in
that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of
Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt
issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated
by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as
in ".mx" for Mexico.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Abengoa S.A.'s corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to B1
from Ba3. Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded the rating on
the group's senior unsecured notes to B1 from Ba3, with a loss
given default assessment of 3 (LGD3, 47%). The outlook on the
ratings is stable. The action concludes the rating review
initiated by Moody's on June 27, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects that, as a result of Abengoa's heavy
investment program, we no longer expect the group to be able to
reduce its group net leverage, measured as net debt/EBITDA, to
below 6.0x, which was one of the key criteria for the previous
rating, but rather expect that it will increase from the level of
6.2x that was achieved in 2011," says Wolfgang Draack, a Moody's
Senior Vice President and lead analyst for Abengoa.

Abengoa's high leverage and its reliance on Spanish banks make
the group vulnerable to potential constraints in access to bank
or capital market funding. In addition, the group faces
challenges in its operating environment in Spain, which may
extend to some of its other core markets. Such challenges may
include (1) contracting economic activity in the country in light
of the government's austerity measures; (2) tax increases; and,
more importantly for Abengoa, (3) reductions in regulatory
support as currently contemplated for renewable energies in
Spain. In addition, there is an increasing reliance on the
project execution of two large concentrated solar power projects
in the US, with committed investment totaling around EUR2.6
billion and thus accounting for about 30% of Abengoa total
committed capex plan including third party funding.

Abengoa is domiciled in Spain, where it generates approximately
30% of its revenues and constructs and operates around one third
(by investment) of its concessions, which are mostly in the
concentrated solar power (CSP) industry. Apart from bonds issued,
the group is funded primarily by Spanish banks. Abengoa's
business activity in Spain is supported by the 24-month order
backlog of its Engineering and Construction (E&C) segment and by
the group's long-term contracts with the domestic oil companies
for take-up of bioethanol. Moody's notes that all Abengoa's
Spanish concessions are in operation or filed in the Goverment's
pre-registry for new projects, covered by committed feed-in
tariffs, and funded with limited recourse financing. They account
for about 2.5% of revenues currently and an estimated 4.5% once
all have come on-stream. If the Spanish government were to
implement its current plans to levy a substantial tax on
renewable energy generation, the 13 solar projects in operation
or construction in the country, and consequently Abengoa's group
cash flow, would suffer, but with a natural cap due to ring-
fencing of funding.

With regard to financial flexibility, Moody's notes that Abengoa
holds more than EUR2.8 billion in cash and cash equivalents and
another almost EUR800 million in short-term financial investments
on the balance sheet. In addition, the group has recently
extended its syndicated credit facility to 2014-2016 and arranged
committed project financing for all of its concession projects,
but it still faces annual debt refinancing needs of between
EUR600 million and EUR1.2 billion between 2013 and 2016.

Under its committed capital expenditure (capex) plan, Abengoa
expects to invest approximately EUR3.0 billion on a consolidated
basis before the end of 2013. Abengoa will inject equity of
EUR833 million (27%) into these projects, with the remainder to
be funded by committed project finance and equity contributions
from partners. The clear majority will be spent on concentrated
solar power plants and the group's two solar projects in the USA
alone account for more than half of the investment volume. The US
installations are benchmark projects on an unprecedented scale
and complexity for Abengoa. Even if Abengoa's EBITDA continues to
experience double-digit growth in percentage terms, the group's
high capex is likely to push group (including the consolidated
concessions) leverage net of cash well above 6.0x, a level that
is more commensurate with the B1 rating category. This level
already recognizes the limited-recourse nature of more than half
of Abengoa's debt and the contractual nature of cash flows from
its concessions; pure industrial companies would be unlikely to
achieve the B1 rating if they had a similar level of net
leverage.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Abengoa will be able to (1) mitigate any charges imposed on
its concession activities by cutting costs or burden sharing with
lenders; (2) maintain a reported non-concession EBITDA margin in
the double-digit range in percentage terms (12.1% in 2011); and
(3) secure access to funding by exploring additional programmes
of public development banks as well as by extending its committed
credit facilities early, while maintaining comfortable headroom
under its financial covenants.

LIST OF RATINGS AFFECTED

Issuer: Abengoa S.A.

Downgrades:

  - Corporate family rating, downgraded to B1 from Ba3

  - Probability of default rating, downgraded to B1 from Ba3

  - Senior unsecured regular bond/debenture, downgraded to B1
    from Ba3

Outlook Actions:

  - Outlook changed to stable from rating on review

Issuer: Abengoa Finance, S.A.U.,

Downgrades:

  - Senior unsecured regular bond/debenture, downgraded to B1
    from Ba3

Outlook Actions:

  - Outlook changed to stable from rating on review

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's would consider a further rating downgrade if Abengoa's
earnings strength were to deteriorate as a result of poor project
execution or changes in the operating environment, such as
reductions in regulatory support for renewable energies without a
mitigating reduction in Abengoa's debt level. Such a
deterioration would be reflected by (1) an increase in Abengoa's
leverage, leading to reported net debt/EBITDA based on the
corporate debt rising materially above 3.0x, thereby exerting
pressure on the group's ability to comply with covenants; or (2)
Moody's-adjusted net debt/EBITDA moving towards 7.0x for the
group. In such a consideration, Moody's will take account of the
quality of investments, Abengoa's financial strategy and the
state of maturity of the concession portfolio.

Conversely, to consider a rating upgrade, Moody's would require
evidence of (1) resilience to economic pressures and cuts in
regulatory support in its core markets, (2) Moody's-adjusted net
debt/EBITDA falling below 6.0x for the group as a whole, and (3)
the reported net debt/EBITDA of Abengoa's corporate activities
sustained materially below 3.0x

Principal Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global Heavy
Manufacturing Rating Methodology published in November 2009, and
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Abengoa S.A. is a vertically integrated environment and energy
group whose activities range from engineering & construction and
utility-type operation (via concessions) of solar energy plants,
electricity transmission networks and water treatment plants to
industrial production activities such as biofuels and metal
recycling. Headquartered in Seville, Spain, Abengoa generated
EUR7.1 billion in revenues in 2011, of which 73% came from
outside Spain.


* SPAIN: May Opt for Liquidation of Unviable Banks Under Bailout
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Ross-Thomas and Charles Penty at Bloomberg News report that
Bank of Spain Governor Luis Maria Linde said Spain may liquidate
lenders that aren't viable as part of its European-financed
overhaul of the industry.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Linde on Tuesday said in his first
testimony to Parliament that "If an institution doesn't have the
strength to ensure its future, it will have to undergo a process
of orderly resolution or liquidation."

Spain is negotiating the terms of a EUR100 billion (US$123
billion) European bailout for its banks, which are still reeling
from the collapse of the debt-fueled real estate boom in 2008,
Bloomberg notes.

The draft memorandum of understanding, the agreement on the
bailout that Spain is due to sign with other euro-region nations
on July 20, says weak banks may face "restructuring and/or
resolution, " leaving open the possibility of liquidation, even
without specifically mentioning such a move, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Linde, as cited by Bloomberg, said that by liquidation he
didn't mean "just shutting something down," and "letting everyone
fend for themselves."

An "orderly" solution would make sure "depositors don't suffer,
senior creditors don't suffer and that people who shouldn't
suffer don't suffer," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Linde as saying.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK PIVDENNYI: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Finc'l. Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the global scale ratings
of Bank Pivdennyi. Concurrently, the rating agency downgraded the
bank's National Scale Rating (NSR) to A2.ua from A1.ua,
reflecting a reassessment of the bank's positioning amongst
Ukrainian peers owing to some weakening in asset quality and
profitability metrics.

Ratings Rationale

The affirmation of the global scale ratings reflects Bank
Pivdennyi's (i) strong market position in its home region -- the
city of Odessa in the south of Ukraine -- with a combined market
share of up to 30% in corporate and retail segments, (ii) highly
granular retail deposit base and limited dependence on wholesale
funding, with average loans-to-deposit ratio of 95% in 2011;
(iii) strong revenue generation capacity, with stable pre-
provision income underpinned by healthy net interest margin of 4%
in 2011 (2010: 3%), and (v) ample capitalization, with Tier 1
capital adequacy reported at 14.3% as at year-end 2011 (2010:
14.7%).

At the same time, the downgrade of Bank Pivdennyi's NSR A2.ua
from A1.ua reflects a the rating agency's reassessment of the
bank's positioning amongst Ukrainian peers due to (i) some
deterioration in the bank's asset quality and (ii) increased
levels of single-name risk concentrations.

Bank Pivdennyi reported an increase in the volume of individually
impaired loans (which Moody's considers as problem portfolio) to
20.4% of total loans as at year-end 2011 from 18.2% as at year-
end 2010, which led to additional allowance expenditure. These
provisioning charges absorbed almost 80% of pre-provision income
in 2011 compared to 40% in 2010. Moody's does not expect material
improvements in the bank's asset quality and profitability
indicators in 2012-2013 due to challenging credit conditions
currently present in Ukraine.

In addition, the rating agency notes an increase in Bank
Pivdennyi's single-name credit risk concentrations: top-10
borrowers accounted for over 230% of the bank's Tier 1 capital as
at year-end 2011 (year-end 2010: 185%), which is relatively high
compared to its peers.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

  - BFSR and standalone credit assessment affirmed at E+/b2,
    stable outlook

  - Local-currency long-term deposit rating affirmed at B2,
    stable outlook

  - Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating affirmed at B3,
    negative outlook

  - NSR downgraded to A2.ua from A1.ua, carries no specific
    outlook

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Domiciled in Odessa, Ukraine, Bank Pivdennyi reported -- as at
year-end 2011 -- total assets of US$1.6 billion and net income of
US46.6 million, according to audited IFRS financials.

Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative
measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within
a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in
that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of
Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt
issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated
by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as
in ".mx" for Mexico.


PROMINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Prominvestbank's long-
term local currency (LC) debt and deposit ratings to B1, with a
stable outlook, from Ba3, and the National Scale Rating (NSR) to
Aa3.ua from Aa1.ua. At the same time, the rating agency also
lowered the bank's standalone credit assessment to b3 from b2.
The long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B3 (negative
outlook) is affirmed and remain constrained by the country
ceiling on foreign currency deposit ratings. The rating actions
are primarily driven by the bank's high loan-loss provisioning
charges, which negatively impact profitability and capital
adequacy, and risks posed by increasing levels of single-name
credit risk concentrations.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the downgrade of Prominvestbank's long-term
LC deposit and debt ratings to B1 follows the lowering of the
standalone credit assessment to b3 from b2, within the E+ BFSR
category. The lowering of Prominvestbank's standalone credit
profile to b3 reflects losses for four consecutive years (2008-
2011), as the bank's operating income continues to be absorbed by
loan-loss provisioning charges. These losses have led to a
reduction in the bank's capital adequacy levels at a time when
the bank faces heightened risks from increasing levels of single-
name credit risk concentrations.

Due to negative credit conditions in Ukraine, Prominvestbank
continues to report high levels of problem loans, which stood at
24% of the gross loan portfolio as at year-end 2011 (year-end
2010: 31.2%). Moody's observes that the bank also resumed lending
activities in 2010 and increased its loan portfolio by over 20%
(adjusted for write-offs) in 2011, which is significantly above
market average. As both problem loans and the newly originated
loan book required provisioning, the bank recorded high loan-loss
provisioning charges in 2011 and 2010, with loan-loss provisions
exceeding pre-provision income 3x in both years.

Moody's notes that although Prominvestbank received both Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital injections from its ultimate controlling
shareholder -- the Russian State Corporation "Bank for
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs" ("Vnesheconombank",
Baa1/Stable) -- these have not been sufficient to compensate for
several successive years of losses recorded by the bank. The
bank's Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) declined to 5.9% as at
year-end 2011 (year-end 2010: 8.11%, and year-end 2009: 13.6%).

Prominvestbank's weakening capitalisation is further pressured by
the heightened risks from increasing level of single-name credit
risk concentrations: the bank's top-10 borrowers accounted for
over 420% of the bank's Tier 1 capital as at year-end 2011 (year-
end 2010: 250% and year-end 2009: 160%), rendering the bank's
financial results vulnerable to the performance of handful
borrowers.

At the same time, Prominvestbank, which is 97.85% owned by
Vnesheconombank, benefits from access to long-term funding from
the parent (which comprised 40% of total funding), and periodic
capital injections from the parent. These considerations drive
Moody's assumptions of the high probability of parental support.
As a result, Prominvestbank's B1 LC debt and deposit ratings
incorporate two notches of uplift from its standalone credit
assessment of b3.

List of Affected Ratings

  - BFSR affirmed at E+, but now maps to b3 standalone credit
    assessment (formerly b2), stable outlook

  - Local-currency long-term debt and deposit ratings downgraded
    to B1 from Ba3, stable outlook

  - Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating affirmed at B3,
    negative outlook

  - NSR downgraded to Aa3.ua from Aa1.ua, carries no specific
    outlook

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Domiciled in Kyiv, Ukraine, Prominvestbank reported -- as at
year-end 2011 -- total assets of US$4.6 billion and net loss of
US$125 million, according to unaudited IFRS financial statements.

Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative
measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within
a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in
that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of
Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt
issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated
by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as
in ".mx" for Mexico.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HEALTHCARE NHS TRUST: In Administration on Financial Trouble
------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the government said that South London
Healthcare NHS Trust is to be put into administration after it
ran into financial trouble.

Health Secretary Andrew Lansley has appointed a trust special
administrator to go into the trust, according to BBC News.  The
report relates that the trust has run up debts of more than
GBP150 million since being created in 2009.

BBC News notes that the trust was created by merging three
hospitals -- the Princess Royal in Orpington, Queen Mary's in
Sidcup and the Queen Elizabeth in Woolwich -- and serves more
than one million people.

The report recalls that last year, it finished GBP69 million in
deficit on a turnover of GBP424 million.

BBC News notes that as well as struggling financially, the trust
also has some of the longest waiting times for operations and
longer-than-average waits in A&E.  However, it has low infection
and death rates, the report says.

BBC News discloses that if a decision was made to break up the
trust, it would not necessarily mean the closure of all services.
The report relates that another more successful NHS organisation
or private provider could end up taking some on.

But for that to happen, there would need to be a formal process
of review and consultation, the report adds.


LIGHTNING AEROSPACE: In Administration, Cuts 14 Jobs
----------------------------------------------------
Cillian OBrien at Birmingham Post that Lightning Aerospace has
fallen into administration with the loss of 14 jobs.

Matt Ingram and John Whitfield, partners at financial advisory
firm Duff & Phelps, were appointed joint administrators of
Coventry based Lightning Aerospace.

The company continues to trade as a buyer is sought and 19 staff
have been kept on, according to BBC News.

"Like many in the engineering and manufacturing sector, Lightning
Aerospace has experienced difficult trading conditions in the
current economic climate . . . .  The company has suffered from a
recent fall in turnover which, coupled with a high cost base,
made it very difficult for the business to continue in its
current form . . . .  It has unfortunately been necessary to make
a number of redundancies to realign the cost structure of the
business and we are hopeful that in taking these difficult
decisions the business has an opportunity to move forwards. . . .
The customers and the remaining staff are continuing to work with
the administrators, and their support of the company while a
buyer is sought is fantastic," the report quoted Mr. Ingram as
saying.

It has three sites in Coventry and supplies specialist
fabrication and harnesses to the Ministry of Defence.


MAX HOTEL: In Administration, RSM Tenor Seeks New Owner
-------------------------------------------------------
Caterer and Hotelkeeper News reports that Max Hotel has been
placed into administration.

RSM Tenon has been appointed as administrator.

The hotel will remain open while a full financial review is
undertaken and a new owner is found, according to Caterer and
Hotelkeeper News.

The Max Hotel at the Royal York Buildings is one of Brighton's
most prominent boutique hotels.


NORMANDY HOLIDAY: In Administration, 25 Jobs at Risk
----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Normandy Holiday Homes Ltd has been placed
into administration putting 25 jobs at risk.

Normandy Holiday Homes Ltd cut 19 jobs earlier in July as it
tried to address a 40% drop in sales since 2011, according to BBC
News.

The report notes that the administrator, Begbies Traynor, said
further redundancies were inevitable.

The news comes less than a fortnight after Willerby Holiday
Homes, also based in Hull, cut 193 jobs, BBC News relates.

BBC News notes that Andrew Mackenzie, from Begbies Traynor, said
reduced sales due to the impact of the poor weather had been a
major factor in the firm's collapse.  The report relates that Mr.
Mackenzie added that the business had a skilled workforce and a
strong brand and was confident a buyer could be found.

"We are actively marketing the business for sale, however the
reality of the situation is that further redundancies are
inevitable as the business simply can't pay the wages of the
staff at present," the report quoted Mr. Mackenzie as saying.

The report discloses that Willerby Holiday Homes confirmed its
job cut of almost a third of its workforce on 6 July, blaming
what it called the tough economic climate.  BBC News says that
the job losses come despite a government U-turn on introducing a
20% VAT rate on static caravans which manufacturers had claimed
would damage the industry.

In May, the government said instead a 5% VAT rate would be
introduced from April 2013, the report adds.

Normandy Holiday Homes Ltd is a Hull-based static caravan
manufacturer.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Moody's Says Companies Exposed to Sovereign Crisis
------------------------------------------------------------
The credit quality of non-financial companies has been relatively
resilient so far during the sovereign financial crisis in Europe
but the risk of credit deterioration is now increasing, says
Moody's Investors Service in a Special Comment published on
July 17.

The new report is entitled "EU Sovereign Crisis Poses Growing
Risks For Some European Non-Financial Companies", provides an
overview of the key risks for corporates at the current stage of
the sovereign crisis.

"European companies are likely to see financing needs increase
given that the worsening recession is limiting their revenues and
cash flow, with some having already lowered estimates for their
2012 financial performance," says Myriam Durand, Moody's Managing
Director for EMEA Corporate Finance. "At the same time, access to
capital markets has narrowed due to increased risk aversion among
investors, which has particularly affected companies in EU
periphery countries."

Revenues and cash flow are declining severely for some companies
in markets with falling domestic demand, such as Greece and
Portugal and more recently Spain, with increasing risks for
Italy. In particular, government-related issuers, companies
closely linked to sovereigns through ownership or public policy,
are experiencing a larger decline in credit quality as they are
particularly sensitive to the creditworthiness of the sovereign.
Sales are also slowing in international markets that companies
had previously relied on to offset weak domestic activity.

In Moody's view, increased financing needs resulting from slower
growth will add to the already sizeable refinancing burden facing
corporates in the euro area periphery. This additional pressure
comes at a time when the capital markets are unwelcoming for euro
periphery countries, bank lending is being curtailed by funding
and portfolio quality challenges, and cross-border capital flows
are reversing due to fears about the consequences of sovereign
default.

In addition, bond market investors are showing an increased
aversion to issuers that are perceived as higher risk, such as
issuers with weak credit metrics and/or high refinancing needs.
In the current environment, differences in liquidity will be a
more important factor in credit distinctions. Companies with
large refinancing needs and limited market access will be more
vulnerable to rating downgrades and those that cross the
threshold from investment grade to speculative grade may face an
abrupt reduction in market access.

Moody's expects that companies will be more cautious about
capital spending and other cash outlays in order to conserve
liquidity in the face of current economic and financial
uncertainties,. While such financial caution may slow
deterioration in financial ratios, Moody's notes that companies
that further curtail new investments may weaken their competitive
position for the longer term.


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

July 14-17, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 2-4, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

November 1-3, 2012
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 10-12, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

October 3-5, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *