TCREUR_Public/120809.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, August 9, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 158



RECORD: Declared Bankrupt by Court
UNICREDIT BULBANK: S&P Lowers Stand-alone Credit Profile to 'bb+'


VERTARIS: Placed Into Liquidation; 20 Workers Lose Jobs


BASISBANK JSC: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating


ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS: Banco di Napoli Judgment May Repay Creditors
NUERBURGRING GMBH: Gets $312-Mil. Financing from German State
TITAN EUROPE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR39.7MM Cl. C Notes to 'C'


HELLENIC REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Sovereign Credit Ratings
OMEGA NAVIGATION: Files 'New Value' Chapter 11 Plan


ANDERSON VALLEY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'CC'
CELTIC HELICOPTERS: Liquidator Appointed; Loans Transferred
ELAN CORP: Moody's Says Bapineuzumab Failure Credit Negative
HOUSE OF EUROPE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes


LEOPARD CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes


MATI WORLD: Is Insolvent; To File for Bankruptcy


HC SIBCEM: Files Suit Against Former Execs for Sibirsky Debt

S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

* REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: S&P Cuts Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB-'


NOVA KREDITNA: S&P Affirms 'BBpi' Public Information Rating


BANCO POPULAR: S&P Puts 'BB+' Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DAWSON INT'L: Shares Suspended; Directors Mulls Administration
FASTNET SECURITIES 2: S&P Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to 'B+'
HOLIWAYS FORD: In Administration, Cuts 81 Jobs
IDEAL CONTRACTORS: Goes Into Liquidation
QUINN INSURANCE: Gov't Imposes Insurance Levy to Cover Losses

PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Tal Ben Haim Criticizes Administrators
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Sports Direct to Acquire 10% Stake
* UK: Corporate Insolvency in England & Wales Fall 3.6% in Q2
* UK: High Street Retailers Insolvencies Up 10.3% in April, June


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 13 CDO Tranches to 'D'; Withdraws Ratings
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars



RECORD: Declared Bankrupt by Court
SeeNews reports that Record said on Tuesday that a court in the
north-central town of Gabrovo has declared Record bankrupt.

The decision was taken on July 30 at the company's own request,
Record said in a statement filed with the Sofia bourse, SeeNews

According to SeeNews, the court enacted an insolvency procedure
effective as of October 1, 2007 based on the sharp deterioration
in the company's financial results which started in 2007.

Record's operations have been terminated and its assets have been
seized, SeeNews discloses.

Gabrovo-based Record is Bulgaria's biggest shoes producer.

UNICREDIT BULBANK: S&P Lowers Stand-alone Credit Profile to 'bb+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB/A-3' long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Unicredit Bulbank
AD. The outlook remains stable.

"The affirmation reflects our view that Unicredit Bulbank's direct
parent, Austria-based Unicredit Bank Austria AG (A/Negative/A-1),
would provide extraordinary support in case of need to its almost
fully owned Bulgarian subsidiary. We believe that the
extraordinary support from the Austrian government, which we
factor into the ratings on Unicredit Bank Austria, could be
extended to some extent to its subsidiaries in Central and Eastern
Europe, including Unicredit Bulbank. We consider Unicredit Bulbank
to be a strategically important subsidiary of Unicredit Bank
Austria and our rating on Unicredit Bulbank therefore incorporates
two notches of uplift for group support. We have revised our
assessment of Unicredit Bulbank's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) down to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'," S&P said.

"The revised SACP reflects our updated assessment of Unicredit
Bulbank's capital and earnings. The bank's risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio before adjustments was 8.9% at year-end 2011. The
forecasted RAC ratio for the next 18-24 months is likely to be
lower than we had previously anticipated. This is due to the
protracted economic slowdown in Bulgaria, which in our view has
constrained the bank's internal capital generation capacity
through tightened interest margins and elevated credit costs for
domestic banks, including Unicredit Bulbank. The bank's internal
capital generation could be further undermined by the payment of
dividends," S&P said.

S&P said its forecast for Unicredit Bulbank's projected RAC
includes these assumptions:

-  Slightly lower pre-provision earnings in 2012 and 2013
    compared with 2011;

-  Still-elevated loan impairment charges in 2012, although
    these could start improving from 2013;

-  A dividend payout ratio of 50%; and

-  A moderate increase in the Standard & Poor's risk-weighted
    assets (RWA) ratio in both 2012 and 2013.

"We had previously assumed that our RAC ratio for Unicredit
Bulbank would remain above the 10% threshold that we set for a
'strong' assessment of capital and earnings. We have therefore
revised our assessment of Unicredit Bulbank's capital and earnings
to 'adequate,' as our criteria define these terms," S&P said.

"Our 'adequate' assessment of Unicredit Bulbank's capital and
earnings incorporates our assessment that its projected RAC ratio
before adjustments will reach 8.5%-9.0% in the next 18-24 months.
This should provide the bank with an adequate cushion to absorb
losses resulting from asset quality deterioration. Although
Unicredit Bulbank's credit costs have increased in 2011, we
believe that the bank will maintain adequate internal capital
generation. Following a recommendation by the regulator, Unicredit
Bulbank injected capital that was equivalent to what it paid in
dividends in 2010 and 2011. However, our base-case scenario
assumes a 50% dividend payout in the next two years," S&P said.

"In accordance with our criteria, we now incorporate two notches
for parent support into the long-term counterparty credit rating
on Unicredit Bulbank, compared with one before, which has resulted
in the affirmation of the ratings on the bank," S&P said.

"The ratings on Unicredit Bulbank reflect our view of its 'bb'
anchor, 'strong' business position, 'adequate' capital and
earnings, 'adequate' risk position, 'average' funding, and
'adequate' liquidity, as our criteria define these terms," S&P

"The long-term rating on the bank is two notches higher than the
SACP to reflect the bank's strategic importance to parent
UniCredit Bank Austria and the likelihood of group suppor," S&P

"The stable outlook reflects that on the long-term sovereign
credit rating and our expectation that Unicredit Bulbank's
financial profile will remain relatively unchanged. It also
reflects our view that the bank's capacity to generate capital and
earnings will not be affected by the expected deterioration in
asset quality and that the bank will remain a strategically
important group subsidiary," S&P said.

"The ratings on Unicredit Bulbank are at the same level as the
foreign currency ratings on Bulgaria (BBB/Stable/A-3).
Accordingly, any negative rating action on the foreign currency
ratings on the sovereign would have negative implications for the
ratings on the bank. In addition, in the event of any negative
rating action on the ultimate parent, the UniCredit group, which
we currently rate one notch above Unicredit Bulbank, we would
reassess the potential implications for the ratings on Unicredit
Bulbank. We would notably monitor the SACP of the Bulgarian bank
and whether it would be negatively affected by contagion risks
from the larger group, and if the likelihood of support from its
direct owner, Unicredit Bank Austria, is diminishing," S&P said.

"We could also revise the SACP down further if we were to revise
our assessment of the bank's risk position owing to a
deterioration in problem loans that is worse than we currently
expect or if loan loss reserve coverage fell more sharply than the
current levels. A deterioration in the bank's SACP would not
necessarily result in a lowering of the ratings, however, due to
the three notches of uplift that we could incorporate to reflect
group support. This is based on the assumption that the SACP
remains at 'bb' or above," S&P said.


VERTARIS: Placed Into Liquidation; 20 Workers Lose Jobs
EUWID Pulp and Paper reports that the Commercial Court of Grenoble
orders liquidation of the French recycled pulp manufacturer
Vertaris.  EUWID relates that Vertaris was placed into liquidation
last week.

According to EUWID, the insolvency administrator reported that the
decision to liquidate Vertaris was pronounced by the Commercial
Court of Grenoble on July 24.  Roughly 20 employees are to be
dismissed as a result.  Although unlikely, a takeover by an
investor is still possible in theory.

EUWID notes that Vertaris had been in the observation phase of the
judicial rescue proceedings since October 2011. This phase had
been extended several times.

EUWID says the possibility of resuming production of deinked pulp
with a capacity of 140,000 tpy with new investors had been under
discussion since December last year.  At that time, the report
adds, 98 jobs had already been cut as part of restructuring


BASISBANK JSC: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Basisbank's (BB) Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook, and its
Viability Rating (VR) at 'b-'.


The affirmation reflects BB's generally reasonable financial
metrics, quite conservative management to date and the currently
favorable Georgian operating environment.  However, the ratings
also consider the bank's small size and limited franchise,
significant non-core assets on the balance sheet and uncertainty
resulting from the expected takeover of the bank.

BB's loan quality is currently satisfactory, with exposures in
arrears more than 90 days accounting for 1.8% of end-Q112 gross
loans, and a further 4.1% of loans restructured.  However,
foreclosed assets and investment property at end-2011 were equal
to a sizable 17% of gross loans at end-2011, or about half of
Fitch core capital (FCC).  Capitalization is satisfactory, with
the FCC/risk-weighted assets ratio standing at 16.8% at end-2011,
and local regulatory ratios of 15.3% (Tier 1) and 15% (total) at
end-H112. Performance is supported by a solid margin and improved
scale efficiencies.  Pre-impairment profit was equal to 6.4% of
average gross loans in 2011, indicating significant loss
absorption capacity through the income statement.

The loan/deposits ratio was a low 77% at end-2011, and liquid
assets (including cash, placements with the National Bank of
Georgia, short-term commercial interbank placements and
unencumbered government securities) accounted for 33% of total
assets at end-Q112.  However, the short-term and somewhat
concentrated funding base (the largest 20 deposits accounted for
37% of end-Q112 customer deposits) mean that some liquidity risk

In July 2012, the bank announced that the Chinese Hualing Group
(HG) would acquire a 90% stake in BB from current shareholders.
While the new owner may be more able than the current local
shareholders to provide capital to BB, the change in ownership
gives rise to significant uncertainty in respect to BB's future
strategy, operations and balance sheet structure. HG has
significant current and planned future investments in Georgia
relating to the development of free economic zones, the mining and
timber industries and a major commercial trade
market/hotel/residential development outside of Tbilisi.  HG plans
to partly invest its own funds into these projects and to partly
raise debt.  Positively, Fitch understands that HG may purchase
some of the foreclosed assets from BB's balance sheet.


BB's ratings could be upgraded if the bank's financial metrics and
management remain generally sound following the acquisition,
related party lending continues to be limited, capital is
strengthened (as a result of equity injections or the purchase of
the foreclosed assets) and HG generally demonstrates its
commitment to running BB as a standalone business.

Downside pressure on the ratings could arise if there was a marked
increase in leverage or related party lending following the

Rating and Support Rating Floor

BB's Support Rating has been affirmed at '5' and its Support
Rating Floor at 'No Floor', indicating the agency's view that
support from the Georgian authorities is uncertain, given the
bank's small share of banking system assets (1.2% of end-Q112).
An upgrade of these ratings based on sovereign support would
probably require a marked increase in market shares and systemic

An upgrade of the Support Rating based on possible support from HG
is unlikely, given the group's relatively small size and lack of
track record in the banking sector.

At end-Q112, BB was the 11th-largest bank in Georgia.  The bank is
currently 85% owned by 21 Georgian nationals, including the
Chairman of the Supervisory Board, and the remaining 15% is held
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
In June 2012, BB announced the acquisition of 90% of its shares by
HG.  The EBRD and the Chairman of the Supervisory Board are
expected to retain a stake of 5% each.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'


ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS: Banco di Napoli Judgment May Repay Creditors
Luigi Miragliuolo, the Manager for Enterprise Solutions GmbH,
tells the Troubled Company Reporter Europe that the Court of Santa
Maria Capua Vetere section Aversa, ordered Banco di Napoli SpA to
compensate the company for contractual and tort liability to the
company and said the Bank acted irresponsibly.

The judgment, Mr. Miragliuolo relates, was handed down in late
July 2012, is immediately enforceable, and will compensate all

There is a second civil proceedings pending before the same judge
for the same offense for a claim for damages quantified at
EUR1,011,495.85 and the first judgment has binding legal effect in
the second judgment based on the legal principle of "ne ibis in
idem," Mr. Miragliuolo adds.

Mr. Miragliuolo can be reached at by

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter Europe on Feb. 2,
2007, the District Court of Stuttgart opened bankruptcy
proceedings against Enterprise Solutions GmbH on Jan. 16, 2007,
and Markus Eibofner -- --
serves as the insolvency manager.

NUERBURGRING GMBH: Gets $312-Mil. Financing from German State
The Associated Press reports that a German state is releasing
$312 million to guarantee a loan for the financially troubled
Nuerburgring circuit.

According to the news agency, the budget committee in Rhineland-
Palatinate's state legislature approved the move Wednesday so the
Nuerburgring can service a $406-million loan and stay afloat.

The AP says the circuit, which has hosted Formula One's German
Grand Prix every other year, launched insolvency proceedings last

The news agency states that the Nuerburgring's troubles and the
local government's increasing financial involvement have become a
political headache for state governor Kurt Beck, who backed
efforts to build the circuit into a major tourist attraction.

Mr. Beck had repeatedly assured voters they wouldn't be
financially liable for the redevelopment of the circuit, according
to the AP.

Mr. Beck, of Germany's main opposition Social Democrats, on
Wednesday rejected calls for his resignation, the report adds.

Nuerburgring GmbH, 90% owned by the state, ran into financial
trouble amid a dispute with the track's operator over leasing
fees, and Rhineland-Palatinate has sought to restructure the
company with the help of a bridge financing package, according to

TITAN EUROPE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR39.7MM Cl. C Notes to 'C'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class B and Class C
Notes and confirmed the Class A Notes issued by Titan Europe 2006-
1 p.l.c. (amounts reflect initial outstandings):

    EUR433.76M A Notes, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on
    Feb 24, 2012 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR112.05M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
    Feb 24, 2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR39.76M C Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 5,
    2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The action concludes Moody's review of the Class A Notes, Class B
Notes and Class X Certificates which were placed on review for
possible downgrade on 24 February 2012 due to concerns about the
availability of the Liquidity Facility. The Class X Certificates
remain on review as a result of the rating action taken on 23
February 2012 which followed the introduction of a global
methodology for rating structured finance IO securities.

The Class D and the Class E Notes are not affected by this rating
action. Moody's does not rate the Class F, Class G and the Class H

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the Class B Notes reflects the increased loss
expectation related to the Tiden loan. Additionally, the Class C
Notes will suffer principal losses due to the work-out of the
defaulted Mangusta and the KQ Warehouse loans and is susceptible
to potential further losses stemming from the remaining loans, in
particular the Tiden loan. The significant credit enhancement of
over 81% insulates the Class A Notes from the increased loss

The confirmation of the Class A Notes follows the Issuer's notice
from July 23, 2012 that removed the immediate concern that the
Liquidity Facility would be unavailable to pay interest on the
notes. On February 24, 2012, Moody's placed the Class A Notes, the
Class B Notes and the Class X Certificates on review after an
Issuer notice stated that the Issuer received a letter from the
Facility Provider (HSBC Bank plc) asserting that -- inter alia-
(i) a Liquidity Facility Event of Default is outstanding, (ii) the
facility commitment is cancelled, (iii) no further drawings can be
made under the facility and (iv) the amounts outstanding under the
facility are due and payable. On July 23, 2012, a further notice
was issued. According to the notice, the Issuer, the Liquidity
Facility Provider and some other relevant transaction parties
entered into a memorandum of understanding. In the memorandum the
parties have agreed the interpretation and operation of certain
ambiguous provisions in the Liquidity Facility Agreement, the Cash
Management Agreement and the Servicing Agreement. It also
contained -- inter alia -- a clarification of the repayment
mechanism of the Liquidity Facility and a waiver of the alleged
Liquidity Facility event of default. The execution of the
memorandum removed Moody's immediate concern that the Liquidity
Facility would be unavailable to pay interest on the notes. This
results in a confirmation of the Class A Notes.

Moody's expects that the workout of the Mangusta and the KQ
Warehouse loans will be finalized in the near future. The
remaining workout proceeds will likely result in a repayment of
the current liquidity drawings and some limited note repayments,
depending on the timing of the finalization of the workout. The
other three loans in the pool are the Tiden loan, the
Steigenberger Hotel loan and the Nuremberg Retail Distribution
loan. For these three loans, Moody's weighted average loan to
value ratio (LTV) is 121% on a whole loan basis and 109% on a
securitized loan basis. The Tiden loan, which is the largest of
the three loans, has the highest Moody's LTV with 137% on a whole
loan basis.

Following the exercise of an extension option on the Steigenberger
Hotel loan in the past, the three loans mature in October 2012 and
January 2013. All loans will need Sponsor support to facilitate a
refinancing, and the default risk of the loans range from high to
very high. Moody's considers the refinance prospects of the Tiden
loan to be lower compared to the Steigenberger Hotel and the
Nuremberg Retail Distribution loans.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default probability
of the securitized loans (both during the term and at maturity) as
well as Moody's value assessment for the properties securing these
loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss expectation
for the securitized pool.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as property
value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may indicate
that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker than
Moody's had anticipated when the related securities ratings were
issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance within
expectations preclude such actions. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2013, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) strong
differentiation between prime and secondary properties, with
further value declines expected for non-prime properties, and
(iii) occupational markets will remain under pressure in the short
term and will only slowly recover in the medium term in line with
anticipated economic recovery. Overall, Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario is for a material slowdown in growth in
2012 for most of the world's largest economies fueled by fiscal
consolidation efforts, household and banking sector deleveraging
and persistently high unemployment levels. Moody's expects a mild
recession in the Euro area.

As the Euro area crisis continues, the rating of the structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could negatively
impact the ratings of the notes. Furthermore, as discussed in
Moody's special report "Rating Euro Area Governments Through
Extraordinary Times -- An Updated Summary," published in October
2011, Moody's is considering reintroducing individual country
ceilings for some or all euro area members, which could affect
further the maximum structured finance rating achievable in those

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

As of the July 2012 interest payment date, the transaction's total
pool balance was EUR269 million down by 62.8% since closing due to
repayments, prepayments and allocation of workout proceeds. Only 5
of the original 10 loans remain in the pool. Most of the assets of
the KQ Warehouse loan and the Mangusta loan have been sold and
principal recoveries have been allocated to the Notes. Moody's
expects the remaining recovery proceeds to mainly cover the
currently outstanding liquidity facility drawings, enforcement
cost and some further principal repayment on the Mangusta loan.
The remaining three loans are located in Germany and are secured
by office (Tiden loan), hotel (Steigenberger Hotel loan) and
warehouse properties (Nuremberg Retail Distribution loan).

The Tiden loan failed to pay the full debt service amount due on
the last two interest payment dates. A partial cure of unpaid
amounts were done by the junior lender. The Steigenberger Hotel
loan and the Nuremberg Retail Distribution loan are on the
watchlist due to upcoming maturity in October 2012.

The increased loss expectation on the Tiden loan results from (i)
the non-payments of debt service due under the loan and (ii) a
reduction in the Moody's value of the collateral properties. The
Tiden loan did not pay the full debt service in Q1 and Q2 2012.
This indicates a lower level of Sponsor support, making an
enforcement of the loan security more likely. The vacancy rate for
the properties securing the loan increased to 31.3% per April 2012
investor reporting compared to just 11% in July 2011. Even though
some re-letting occurred compared to the peak vacancy of 44.7%,
Moody's believes that the vacated properties in Mainz will be
challenging to re-let. Additional leases will expire in the near
term with a weighted average lease term of less than three years.
Moody's expects rental income to decline further as a consequence
of tenants vacating or extending at lower rates. A key driver of
the value of the portfolio will be the re-letting success of the
currently vacant space. Given the lower expected cash flows,
Moody's has adjusted its value to EUR63 million, which compares to
an UW valuation of EUR113 million per December 2005.

Moody's has also slightly increased its default risk assumptions
on the Steigenberger Hotel loan and the Nuremberg Retail
Distribution loan given the still challenging financing
conditions. Both loans benefit from long leases with a single
tenant on the properties securing the respective loans.

Moody's expects a very large amount of losses on the securitized
portfolio, with a higher certainty on the losses related to the
Mangusta loan and the KQ Warehouse loan.

Rating Methodology

The methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2012 Central Scenarios published in February 2012.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated February 24, 2012. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on May 18, 2012.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying portfolio
of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio loss
distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated in
MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each loss
scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated taking into account the structural features of
the notes.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.


HELLENIC REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Sovereign Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on the
long-term sovereign credit rating on the Hellenic Republic
(Greece) to negative from stable. "At the same time, we affirmed
the 'CCC/C' long- and short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings," S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects the potential for a downgrade if
shortfalls in Greece's 2012 deficit and arrears targets
established under the current EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF)
program (EU/IMF Program) are not met by new funding or other
relief from members of the Troika (the EU, European Central Bank,
and IMF). We see the likelihood of shortfalls, owing to election-
related delays in the implementation of budgetary consolidation
measures for the current year, as well as the worsening trajectory
of the Greek economy. We project GDP will contract by 10%-11%
cumulatively during 2012-2013, versus the negative 4%-5% assumed
by the EU/IMF Program for 2012-2013," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the deepening contraction in Greek GDP beyond the
EU/IMF Program's assumptions and the related worsening of the
fiscal position imply a high likelihood that Greece will require
additional financing of as much as EUR7 billion (3.7% of GDP) for
2012. This takes into account a fiscal deviation of at least EUR3
billion (1.5% of GDP) and IMF year-end arrears targets, which
imply the need to pay arrears down by about EUR4 billion or 2% of
GDP. Our estimate of additional financing needs could, however, be
reduced if arrears or deficit targets are relaxed," S&P said.

OMEGA NAVIGATION: Files 'New Value' Chapter 11 Plan
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist at Bloomberg News, reports
that Omega Navigation Petroleum tanker owner Omega Navigation
Enterprises Inc. filed a proposed reorganization plan at the end
of last week where the current owner will make a new investment
and share ownership with junior secured lenders, if they too make
new contributions.

According to the report, there will be a hearing on Sept. 4 in
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Houston for approval of the disclosure
statement explaining the Chapter 11 plan.  Omega is tentatively
scheduling an Oct. 15 confirmation hearing for approval of the

The report relates the plan will be funded in part with a new
investment of about $2.5 million by an entity related to George
Kassiotis, the company's chief executive.  In return, his company
will receive all the new stock.  Junior secured lenders, owed some
$36.2 million, may participate in a rights offering to buy one-
third of the new stock at the same cost per share as Mr.
Kassiotis.  The $242.7 million owed to senior secured lenders will
be rolled over into new secured debt maturing in October 2017.
The lenders must also agree to provide $7.5 million in a new
working capital facility.  General unsecured creditors will
receive 10% in three installments over one year.  Unsecured
creditors must vote in favor of the plan as a class and
individually to receive the payment.  Existing stock will be

                      About Omega Navigation

Athens, Greece-based Omega Navigation Enterprises Inc. and
affiliates, owner and operator of tankers carrying refined
petroleum products, filed for Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Lead Case No. 11-35926) on July 8, 2011, in Houston, Texas in
the United States.

Omega is an international provider of marine transportation
services focusing on seaborne transportation of refined petroleum
products.  The Debtors disclosed assets of US$527.6 million and
debt totaling US$359.5 million.  Together, the Debtors wholly own
a fleet of eight high-specification product tankers, with each
vessel owned by a separate debtor entity.

Judge Karen K. Brown presides over the case.  Bracewell &
Giuliani LLP serves as counsel to the Debtors.  Jefferies &
Company, Inc., is the financial advisor and investment banker.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has tapped Winston
& Strawn as local counsel; Jager Smith as lead counsel; and First
International as financial advisor.


ANDERSON VALLEY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'CC'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Anderson Valley II CDO PLC's class S-1 and A-1 notes. "At the same
time, we have affirmed our ratings on the class B-1, C-1, and D-1
notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance since our previous review in October 2010, using
information from the latest trustee report dated June 20, 2012.
They reflect further credit events in the portfolio, which have
reduced the collateral available for repaying the notes," S&P

"Anderson Valley II CDO is a hybrid partially-funded cash flow
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that closed in February 2007,
and is managed by BlackRock Inc. Its notes are denominated in
euros. A related U.S. dollar-denominated transaction, Anderson
Valley I CDO PLC, closed in December 2006. The transactions are
similar in concept and both have diversified credit default swap
(CDS) reference portfolios comprising primarily investment-grade
corporate and sovereign entities," S&P said.

"To limit losses arising from credit events in the reference
portfolio, Anderson Valley II CDO has a net losses event of
default trigger under the terms and conditions of its notes. An
event of default is triggered if net losses, as defined in the
transaction documents, equal or exceed 10%. At present, the CDS
counterparty has the right to enforce security following an event
of default, which would likely lead to the liquidation of the cash
collateral and the termination of all of the CDSs in the
transaction," S&P said.

S&P said that since its previous review:

-  The amount of net losses increased to 9.86% from 9.16%,
    approaching the 10% event of default trigger; and

-  Its estimated amount available to withstand future losses
    and repay noteholders decreased to EUR46.30 million from
    EUR49.12 million (both collateral investments minus
    liquidity facility drawings).

"The class S-1 note balance is currently EUR28 million. We have
lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' our rating on the class S-1
notes, based on our view of the increased likelihood of a net
portfolio losses event of default, decreased credit enhancement,
market value risk on collateral investments and the CDS portfolio,
if the transaction is liquidated," S&P said.

"Our analysis indicates that the available collateral is unlikely
to be sufficient to repay the class A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1 notes.
We have therefore lowered to 'CC (sf)' our rating on the class A-1
notes. At the same time, we have affirmed our 'CC (sf)' ratings on
the class B-1, C-1, and D-1 notes," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:



Class                Rating
              To                From

Anderson Valley II CDO PLC
EUR86.4 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

S-1           B- (sf)           BB- (sf)
A-1           CC (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B-1           CC (sf)
C-1           CC (sf)
D-1           CC (sf)

CELTIC HELICOPTERS: Liquidator Appointed; Loans Transferred
The Irish Times reports that a liquidator has been appointed to
Celtic Helicopters Ltd.

The latest accounts for Celtic Helicopters showed losses at the
company widened to EUR1.78 million in 2010, from EUR1.584 million
the previous year, the Irish Times discloses.

The company was dependent, through Medeva Properties Ltd., on the
continued support of the Irish Banking Resolution Corporation
(IBRC) and the support of other creditors to continue in business,
the Irish Times says, citing the auditors' report.

It is understood that loans to Medeva have been transferred to the
National Asset Management Agency, the Irish Independent notes.

Celtic Helicopters Ltd. is a the helicopter firm set up by Ciaran
Haughey, son of late taoiseach Charles Haughey, and his business
partner, John Barnicle.

ELAN CORP: Moody's Says Bapineuzumab Failure Credit Negative
Moody's Investors Service commented that the decision to
discontinue all phase III trials of the Alzheimer's disease drug
candidate called bapineuzumab is credit negative for Elan
Corporation plc (B1 stable). However, there is currently no effect
on Elan's ratings or stable outlook.

"The failure of late stage pipeline drug bapineuzumab is credit
negative for Elan as it makes the company highly reliant on the
multiple sclerosis product Tysabri," said Michael Levesque,
Moody's Senior Vice President.

The principal methodology used in rating Elan was the Global
Pharmaceuticals Industry Methodology published in October 2009.

HOUSE OF EUROPE: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Eight Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed House of Europe Funding I, Ltd. (HoE1)
and House of Europe Funding III PLC's (HoE3) notes as follows:


  -- EUR335.6m Class A (XS0220241086): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR65m Class B (XS0220241755): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR50m Class C (XS0220242134): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR50m Class C additional interest (interest only): affirmed
     at 'Csf'
  -- EUR5m Certificates: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Negative Outlook


  -- EUR435.5m Class A (XS0202218284): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR60m Class B (XS0202219092): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR57.5m Class C (XS0202219415): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR7.5m Class D (XS0202221072): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR5m Class E (XS0202221155): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Negative

The affirmation of HoE1 and HoE3's notes (except HoE1's
Certificates and HoE3's Class E notes) at 'Csf' reflects the
under-collateralization of the notes.  The class A/B over-
collateralization tests for both transactions have decreased to
74% from 81% and to 77% from 81% for HoE1 and HoE3, respectively.

In addition, both transactions are vulnerable to a non-timely
payment of interest on the senior classes which would trigger an
event of default (EoD).  HoE3 senior notes' interest coverage
ratio continues to be below 100%.  The transaction is relying on
receipt of principal proceeds to maintain timely payment of
interest on the senior notes.  HoE1 senior notes' interest
coverage ratio has improved to 109% from 60% at the last review.
However, Fitch expects the interest coverage of senior notes to be
volatile and under pressure.  As the most senior tranche (class A)
amortizes, the weighted average spread of the senior notes
(tranche A and B) is increasing.

In addition, around 5.3% of the portfolio pays on a semi-annual
basis while the transaction liabilities pay on a quarterly basis.
As a result, interest proceeds will be volatile.  This will be
further exacerbated if assets default (12.1% of portfolio is rated
'CCC' or below) or if assets with high coupon amortize faster than
the rest of the portfolio.

HoE1's certificates and HoE3's class E notes are rated on a
principal-only basis and benefit from the support of zero-coupon
French government bonds (rated 'AAA'/Negative) to repay the notes'

The Negative Outlooks assigned to HoE1's Certificates and HoE3's
Class E notes reflect the Negative Outlook on France's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating and also the operational risks related to
the collateral liquidation process and whether these junior
noteholders would ultimately hold the government bonds if the
transaction noteholders enforce the transaction collateral
following an EoD.


LEOPARD CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has raised its credit ratings
on Leopard CLO II B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, and B notes. "At the same
time, we have affirmed our ratings on the class C and D notes,"
S&P said.

"Leopard CLO II is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction issued on April 7, 2004. It is backed primarily
by leveraged loans to speculative-grade corporate firms. M&G
Investment Management Ltd. manages the transaction, which started
its post-reinvestment period on April 7, 2009," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our credit analysis, considering the
transaction's performance since our previous review on June 29,
2011. We have used data from the trustee report dated June 2012 in
addition to our ratings database and our cash flow analysis, and
considering recent transaction developments. In our review, we
have applied our 2009 cash flow CDO criteria and our 2012
counterparty criteria," S&P said.

"Since our previous review, the capital structure has amortized by
about EUR73.9 million (to EUR145.65 million from EUR219.59
million). The class A-1 notes have paid down by about EUR74.0
million (to EUR54,474,648 from EUR128,493,047), and their
remaining outstanding notional amount now represents 22% of that
at closing," S&P said.

"The class C and D notes' overcollateralization tests do not meet
the minimum levels that the transaction documents require, and
have been deteriorating since our previous review. Moreover, the
balance of deferred interest on the class D notes has increased.
As a result, the amount outstanding on the class D notes has
increased to EUR9,180,081 from EUR9,097,858 at our previous
review," S&P said.

"Nevertheless, the amount outstanding on the rated classes of
notes in the transaction has decreased to EUR145,654,729 from
EUR219,590,905. Additionally, the aggregate collateral balance has
decreased to EUR157.5 million from EUR236.3 million. The
deleveraging of the structure, accelerated by the breaches of the
class C and D notes' overcollateralization tests, has contributed
to increased credit enhancement and improved overcollateralization
tests for the senior classes of notes," S&P said.

"As for portfolio credit quality, the level of assets that we
consider to be rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or
'CCC-') has decreased to 5.89% from 12.44% of the portfolio
balance (excluding cash). On the other hand, the level of assets
that we consider to be rated in the 'BB' category ('BB+', 'BB', or
'BB-') has decreased to 7.46% from 20.01%, and the percentage of
defaulted assets (i.e., debt obligations of obligors rated 'CC',
'SD' [selective default], or 'D') has increased to 5.89% from
3.10%. Additionally, the weighted-average life of the assets in
the portfolio has decreased to 3.74 years from 4.24 years," S&P

"The evolution of those parameters has led to a similar scenario
default rate (SDR) to our previous review, as provided by our CDO
Evaluator (Version 6.0) model. Through a 'Monte Carlo'
methodology, CDO Evaluator evaluates a portfolio's credit quality,
considering the issuer credit rating, size, domicile, and maturity
date of each asset, and the correlation between each pair of
assets. It presents the portfolio's credit quality in terms of a
probability distribution for potential default rates. From this
distribution, it derives a set of SDRs that identify, for each
rating level, the maximum level of portfolio defaults a class of
notes should be able to withstand without defaulting," S&P said.

"Following our credit analysis, we subjected the transaction's
capital structure to a cash flow analysis, to determine the break-
even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at each
rating level. The tranche BDR and the SDR, provided by CDO
Evaluator, are the key parameters in our methodology for the
rating and the surveillance of CDO transactions," S&P said.

"In our cash flow analysis, we used the portfolio balance that we
considered to be performing (EUR157.5 million), the weighted-
average recovery rates that we considered to be appropriate, and
the reported weighted-average spread, which has increased to 3.11%
from 2.98%. That increase has benefited the structure in our cash
flow analysis," S&P said.

"We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using our
standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating
category assumed for each rated class of notes, in conjunction
with different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"We note that non-euro-denominated assets represent about 13% of
the performing asset balance (excluding cash). The resulting
foreign currency risk is hedged via individual asset swaps with
Credit Suisse International (A+/Negative/A-1) as the swap
counterparty," S&P said.

"In our opinion, under our 2012 counterparty criteria, the
replacement language does not support the highest rating
achievable by the notes. In such cases, the maximum achievable
rating level for the notes in a transaction is that of our issuer
credit rating (ICR) plus one notch on the counterparty, unless we
apply additional stresses in our cash flow analysis to capture
that risk," S&P said.

"Therefore, in our cash flow analysis, we have tested additional
scenarios by applying foreign-exchange stresses to the notional
amount of non-euro-denominated assets, thus assuming an unhedged
exposure. We have applied these additional stresses only for notes
that can achieve a higher rating than the ICR plus one notch (here
equal to 'AA-'), i.e., the class A-1 and A-2 notes," S&P said.

"In applying these additional stresses, our analysis shows that
the credit enhancement available to the class A-1 notes (65%
credit enhancement) and the class A-2 notes (37% credit
enhancement) is commensurate with 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA+ (sf)'
ratings. Therefore, we have raised to 'AAA (sf)' and
'AA+ (sf)' our ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes," S&P said.

"We consider that the credit enhancement available to the class D
notes, which are not subject to these additional stresses, is
commensurate with a 'CCC (sf)' rating. Therefore, we have affirmed
our 'CCC (sf)' rating on the class C notes," S&P said.

"The class B and C notes pass our cash flow analysis at the 'A-
(sf)' and 'BB- (sf)' rating levels, respectively. However, our
ratings on these classes of notes have been constrained to 'BBB+
(sf)' and 'B+ (sf)' by the application of our largest obligor
default test--a supplemental stress test in our 2009 cash flow CDO
criteria. Therefore, we have raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' our rating on
the class B notes, and affirmed our 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class
C notes," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:



Class                    Rating
                To                   From

Leopard CLO II B.V.
EUR400 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1             AAA (sf)             AA+ (sf)
A-2             AA+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
B               BBB+ (sf)            BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C               B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
D               CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)


MATI WORLD: Is Insolvent; To File for Bankruptcy
Poland A.M., citing Polish news station TVN 24, reports that The
Mati World Holidays travel agency announced on Tuesday that it was
insolvent and will now file for bankruptcy.

Mati World has asked Silesian local authorities for help in
bringing stranded tourists home from Egypt and Tunisia, Poland
A.M. relates.

Mati World Holidays went on to explained that the company came
into financial problems after the bankruptcy of an airline which
carried its clients and due to failed payments from agents, Poland
A.M. discloses.

The Mati World Holidays travel agency is based in Silesia,
southern Poland.


HC SIBCEM: Files Suit Against Former Execs for Sibirsky Debt
OJSC "HC "Sibcem" notifies its shareholders of legal proceedings,
initiated by the Company against former executives of the company,
who didn't repay the loan to "Sibirskiy Cement" and its
subsidiaries.  The amount, which the holding company and its
subsidiaries want to recover, is equal to almost RUB140 million.
Andrei Muraviev, Andrei Kirikov and Sergei Khrapunov participate
in these proceedings personally or through their subsidiaries.

On March 27, 2011, the Arbitrazh court of Kemerovo oblast
recovered from LLC "Sibirskaya promyshlennaya investicionnaya
companiya" in favor of LLC "Topkinskiy Cement" more than RUB38.5
million  (LLC "SPIC" was established by Andrei Muraviev, the head
of the holding company "Sibirskiy Cement" from 2004 to August
2008, and Andrei Kirikov, a former member of the Board of
Directors of OJSC "HC "Sibcem" (a parent company and managing
company of LLC "Topkinskiy Cement")).

However, the holding company faced several difficulties returning
the debt.  Thus, LLC "SPIC" changed its legal address, and
registered in Krasnodar Krai.  Then Novokubansky District
Bailiffs' Department of the Russian Federal Bailiff Service of
Krasnodar Krai, in the person of a bailiff A. Bochkarev, twice
refused to institute enforcement proceeding by the Arbitrazh Court
decision.  (According to the statement of LLC "Topkinskiy Cement"
the Arbitrazh Court of Krasnodar Krai declared the actions of the
bailiff A. Bochkarev illegal, and his order to refuse to institute
enforcement proceeding - invalid).

At the same time, LLC "SPIC" appealed to the Arbitrazh Court of
Krasnodar Krai with a bankruptcy petition.  At this time a
monitoring procedure is commenced in relation to LLC "SPIC".  LLC
"Topkinskiy Cement" is in the creditor's register of the debtor.

On Aug. 8, 2010, Central District Court of Kemerovo satisfied the
claim of LLC "Topkinskiy Cement" against Sergei Khrapunov, former
Vice-President for Economics and Finance in OJSC "HC "Sibcem", for
the recovery of RUB31.9 million debt, interest and penalty under
loan agreements.  Nikulinsky District Court of Moscow additionally
recovered from him (for the period from May 18, 2010 to April 4,
2011) interest in the amount of more than RUB2.8 million.  The
claim for recovery of interest for the period from March 14, 2011
to the present day is being prepared.

After the Court Decision, the debtor took a series of actions,
which were, under the opinion of OJSC "HC "Sibcem", aimed at
avoidance of enforcement of action.  However, LLC "Topkinskiy
Cement" (a subsidiary of OJSC "HC "Sibcem") intends to take all
legally provided opportunities to recover money from the debtor.

On July 19, 2012, Presninsky District Court of Moscow considered a
case on the claim of OJSC "HC "Sibcem" against Andrei Kirikov, a
former member of the Board of Directors of OJSC "HC "Sibcem".

The holding company claimed the recovery of the loan in the amount
equal to $2 million and loan interest (in total more than RUB70
million), which the respondent obtained from the company in June
2007 without setting the term of the loan.  The representative of
the Respondent confirmed the receipt of money, but insisted that
the funds were transferred to Mr. Kirikov as "expenses of
representation" and they were not supposed to be refunded to the

He also presented a claim for return of money, signed by the Vice-
President for Economics and Finance S. Khrapunov, dated
Feb. 22, 2008, wherefore declared the omission of the limitation

In the result, the court didn't satisfy the claim of the holding
company due to the omission of the limitation period.  OJSC "HC
"Sibcem" now intends to appeal this decision on appeal and because
of their doubts about the existence of the abovementioned demand
at the time before OJSC "HC "Sibcem" referred to the court, will
seek an examination.

OJSC "HC "Sibcem" pursues and will pursue a coherent policy on
detection and restriction of all unfair acts, asserting rights and
legitimate interests of the Company and its shareholders in all
authorities in and outside Russia.

S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

* REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: S&P Cuts Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Serbia by one notch to 'BB-'. The outlook is negative.

"The recovery rating is '4'. We have revised the transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment to 'BB-'," S&P said.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Serbia's new government has
failed to quickly adopt policies that would promote confidence in
its monetary regime and restore post-election fiscal stability. We
believe this is exacerbating the already-significant internal and
external pressures on the economy. Furthermore, recently adopted
legislation will, in our view, weaken the institutional
independence of the National Bank of Serbia (NBS, or the central
bank), which could lead to the politicization of monetary policy.
We expect this legislation will add pressure to both the exchange
rate and Serbia's foreign exchange reserves, with negative second-
round effects on inflation and therefore the bank's price
stability mandate. This comes at a time of considerable external
uncertainty. We are, moreover, becoming increasingly concerned
that the new government may not be prepared -- amid a recession
and very high unemployment -- to prioritize sustainable public
finances and balanced economic growth. As a result, we have
lowered the long-term ratings by one notch," S&P said.

"We expect that another consequence of the new government's policy
choices will be a likely delay in negotiations with the IMF, which
we view as a key provider of policy guidance and liquidity support
to Serbia. In February 2012, the IMF suspended its stand-by
agreement (SBA) with Serbia in response to the previous
government's relaxation of the fiscal stance. The pre-election
fiscal slippage was pronounced on the expenditure side; wage and
pension hikes were up 15% year-on-year, subsidies were up nearly
90%, and interest payments increased 36% year-on-year. We had
previously expected that talks would resume once a new government
was formed and that, regardless of composition, it would
prioritize fiscal consolidation and key structural reforms that
had been committed to under the suspended 2011 SBA with the IMF.
Last week's adoption of amendments to the law on the central bank,
which establishes a parliament-appointed supervisory body, could
also jeopardize EU relations if perceived to be curbing the
independence of the central bank. Serbia received EU candidate
status in March 2012, but a date for accession talks has not yet
been set," S&P said.

"The new government assumed office on July 27, nearly three months
after the May 6 parliamentary elections. The length of time to
form government and initial indications about the timeline for
resuming talks are outside our initial base-case assumptions.
Without the SBA as a policy anchor, we are concerned that the
government will fall short on adopting reforms to improve the
economy's flexibility and reduce already-high current
expenditures, which dominate the budget. In our opinion, a
decision to run a looser fiscal policy would test Serbia's
moderate debt-bearing capacity, and could constrain the
government's access to commercial markets. We estimate that the
budget gap this year will exceed 6% of GDP, and that public debt
will reach 55% of GDP at year-end 2012, from 42% at end-2011, due
in part to the effect of currency depreciation," S&P said.

"Serbia is a highly euroized economy. Foreign currency deposits
make up nearly 80% of total deposits, and an estimated 70% of
lending is in foreign currency. This exposes the economy to
balance of payments pressures, while significantly constraining
monetary flexibility given the weak transmission channel between
domestic interest rates and local credit conditions. We believe
that the liquidity situation could worsen; for 2012 we project the
current account deficit will remain high at 8% of GDP. The current
account widened by more than 30% in the first five months of the
year, but we expect some improvement in the trade balance in the
second half when the production of FIAT SpA (BB-/Stable/B)
automobiles starts. We also believe exchange rate effects and
financing constraints will help narrow the external imbalance,"
S&P said.

"Serbia's external financing needs are relatively high. We
estimate gross external financing needs at about 100% of current
account receipts. Contrary to our previous expectation that
external financing needs would be covered by increasing net
exports and strong FDI (Serbia had one of the highest FDI inflows
in the region in 2011, the key source of its current account
deficit financing), Serbia has experienced a net FDI outflow of
US$200 million in the first five months of 2012. We expect net FDI
for the year at just 1% of GDP," S&P said.

"There are also some indications of capital outflows during first-
half 2012. In particular, in the first five months we saw an
increase in Serbian residents' currency and deposit assets abroad
by an estimated EUR0.6 billion or just over 1.5% of 2012 GDP.
While this partly reflects the NBS' decision (implemented in April
and June) to increase the local currency portion of foreign
exchange required reserves, it also indicates to us the weak
willingness and capacity of parent banks to provide net foreign-
exchange funding to their local subsidiaries. Serbia's private-
sector external assets have been historically quite volatile; the
recent outflow helped see the financial account shift from a
substantial surplus in 2011 to a significant deficit of more than
4% of GDP on an annualized basis for 2012. The outflow of resident
deposits came on top of a slight decline in interbank funding in
the first five months of 2012. As a result, the current account
deficit has largely been financed by drawing down reserves," S&P

"The NBS has sold EUR1.3 billion (11% of reserves) so far this
year to defend the dinar, which has depreciated 16% against the
U.S. dollar from the beginning of the year. We estimate that
current account financing of close to US$3 billion in 2012 will be
funded by a further drawdown in reserves and modest FDI. Gross
financing needs -- including the current account, short-term debt,
and amortization of long-term debt -- is estimated at over $8
billion. We expect commercial banks to rollover short-term debt of
about US$1.6 billion; public sector external financing needs of
close to US$2 billion would likely be financed either by official
funding through an IMF agreement or further declines in reserves,"
S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects our view that the balance of risks
to the ratings on Serbia is to the downside, as Serbia's twin
fiscal and external deficits could lead to increased
vulnerabilities. Serbia's high external financing needs also make
it susceptible to shocks from the eurozone," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if we see continued deterioration of
the fiscal position, or reversals on past commitments to
structural reform in Serbia's labor and product markets that we
believe could enhance growth prospects over the longer term. In
light of the liquidity constraints inherent in a euroized economy
operating sizable external deficits, we view some balance of
payments support as a major policy anchor. For this reason, we
would view the successful negotiation of a new fiscal
consolidation and reform program with the IMF as contributing to
rating stabilizing at the current level," S&P said.


NOVA KREDITNA: S&P Affirms 'BBpi' Public Information Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has affirmed its 'BBpi'
unsolicited public information (pi) rating on Slovenia-based Nova
Kreditna Bank Maribor d.d. (NKBM).

"We do not use outlooks or modifiers (+ or -) for pi ratings.
The affirmation reflects our view that the government of Slovenia
(A/Negative/A-1) would provide extraordinary financial support to
NKBM if needed. This offsets the negative impact on NKBM's
financial profile -- and those of all Slovenian banks -- of
Slovenia's weakening economic resilience and what we see as
accumulated imbalances, reflected in mounting nonperforming loans
(NPLs) and credit losses for the banking sector," S&P said.

"We believe NKBM's financial profile, as well as that of the
Slovenian banking system as a whole, will continue to deteriorate.
As a result, we have revised down our assessment of the bank's
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to the 'b' category from the
'bb' category," S&P said.

"The lowering of the SACP factors in the negative impact of higher
economic risk in Slovenia on our anchor, which is our starting
point for assigning a bank a long-term rating. We have lowered our
anchor for banks operating in Slovenia to 'bb' from 'bb+'. This
reflects our revised Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) for Slovenia, which we lowered to 'group 7' from 'group
6'," S&P said.

"That said, we continue to see NKBM as having "high" systemic
importance and Slovenia as supportive toward its banking sector,
according to our criteria. This is because NKBM is the second-
largest bank in the country, with a market share in loans and
deposits of around 12%. Therefore, as we continue to factor
in our expectation of extraordinary support from the government,
the lowering of NKBM's SACP has not led to a lowering of our
unsolicited pi rating," S&P said.

"NKBM's SACP is affected by weaker asset quality, with rising
nonperforming loans (NPLs, 16.7% in March 2012 compared with 15.7%
in 2011 and 12.8% in 2010), and squeezed margins. As a result,
NKBM can't generate sufficient revenues to cover the losses that
may arise from these NPLs. On March 31, 2012, NKBM's reserving
rate (the proportion of loan loss reserves to NPLs) was 65%, which
is low since we expect NPLs to continue rising to more than 18% by
the end of the year. Like other Slovenian banks, NKBM is exposed
to highly leveraged construction and real-estate companies. These
borrowers' credit quality has rapidly weakened since 2008 after
years of overheating and consequent bankruptcies," S&P said.

"In addition, NKBM has limited capacity to generate capital
internally. Margins are historically lower in Slovenia than in
Central Eastern Europe, partly reflecting the dominance of state-
owned banks, and are not sufficient to create buffers to absorb
credit losses in recessionary times. NKBM was heavily loss making
in 2011 and we expect it to post another loss and at best a
marginal profit in 2013. Even if NKBM's balance sheet--and
therefore its risk-weighted assets--is shrinking, we believe its
capital position will further deteriorate from the current level
in the absence of any capital increase. We still believe our
projected risk-adjusted capital ratio before diversification
should stay at around 5% by the end of 2013, a 'moderate' level
according to our criteria," S&P said.

"The unsolicited pi rating on NKBM reflects the 'bb' anchor for a
bank operating predominately in Slovenia, as well as our view that
its business position, funding, and liquidity are neutral factors
for the rating, while its capital and earnings and risk position,
are negative factors for the rating," S&P said.


BANCO POPULAR: S&P Puts 'BB+' Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch with
negative implications its 'BB+' long-term counterparty credit
rating on Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular). "We also placed on
CreditWatch negative our 'B' issue rating on its nondeferrable
subordinated debt and our 'CCC+' issue rating on its hybrid
debt. We affirmed the 'B' short-term rating on Popular," S&P said.

"We also maintained on CreditWatch with negative implications our
'BB+' long-term rating on Bankia S.A. (Bankia), 'B+' long-term
rating on its parent company Banco Financiero y de Ahorros S.A.
(BFA), and 'BBB-/A-3' long- and short-term ratings on Ibercaja
Banco S.A. (Ibercaja). We affirmed the 'B' short-term ratings on
Bankia and BFA," S&P said.

"We lowered our issue rating on Bankia's nondeferrable
subordinated debt to 'CC' from 'CCC-'," S&P said.

"We maintained on CreditWatch with negative implications our 'B+'
and 'BB+' issue ratings on Ibercaja's preference shares and
nondeferrable subordinated debt," S&P said.

BFA's hybrid ratings are at 'C', reflecting that nonpayment has
already occurred.

"Our rating actions follow the publication of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) signed by Spain that governs the process of
recapitalization and restructuring of Spanish financial
institutions earmarked to receive government support. The MoU
follows Spain's request in June for EU financial assistance and
the ensuing agreement on a EUR100 billion bailout for Spanish
banks. The rating actions thus only affect those institutions for
which we incorporate the potential for short-term extraordinary
government support in our ratings. The ratings on these banks are,
or are likely to be, higher than our assessments of their stand-
alone credit profiles (SACPs) because of this potential for short-
term government support," S&P said.

"We currently incorporate four notches for short-term government
support in our ratings on Bankia and one-notch in Popular's
ratings. We note that Popular has not received or requested
government support, whereas Bankia has. We are not including at
present short-term government support in our ratings on Ibercaja,
but, as reflected in our CreditWatch listing, we will very likely
include it if the three-way merger with Liberbank S.A. and Banco
CajaTres S.A. (both not rated) is completed," S&P said.

"We have not taken any rating actions on other Spanish financial
institutions so far, as we do not yet have enough information to
assess whether they are likely to receive capital support from the
government. Once more information is available, if we estimate
that other Spanish financial institutions are likely to receive
government support, we anticipate there could be similar ratings
implications for these entities as described in this article," S&P

"Furthermore, we expect to review how the Spanish banking system's
funding and liquidity continues to evolve. Earlier this year, we
commented on the impact of the European Central Bank's (ECB,
unsolicited AAA/Stable/A-1+) unprecedented funding operations and
how these had materially reduced the risk of a liability-driven
bank failure. However, we also noted that the ECB's actions did
not address the underlying structural issues in the banking sector
and that we viewed such support as temporary. The Spanish banking
system is a major beneficiary of the ECB actions and as time
progresses we would expect our assessments of individual banks
'funding and liquidity' to be more actively differentiated, and,
where appropriate, to recognize where short-term support is being
provided," S&P said.

"At present, we do not have enough detailed information to assess
the full impact on the business and financial profiles of the
banks affected by the actions as a consequence of receiving
government support, if they were to receive it, and complying with
the conditions required in the MoU. Nevertheless, we see potential
for downward pressure on their SACPs upon the materialization of
the support and, consequently on their counterparty credit
ratings," S&P said.

"We note that the issue ratings on the hybrids and both deferrable
and nondeferrable subordinated debt of these banks are more
vulnerable to multinotch rating downgrades than counterparty
credit ratings and senior debt ratings. This is because, according
to the MoU, holders of these instruments of banks that receive
government support will be asked to share the burden of the
recapitalization. This would most likely take the form of
participation in 'voluntary' and, where necessary, 'mandatory'
subordinated liability exercises (SLEs) that we think we would
likely view as 'distressed exchanges' under our criteria, and thus
tantamount to default," S&P said.

"We think that a restructuring and recapitalization via government
support could potentially affect our assessment of the four key
factors that we assess in determining the banks' stand-alone
credit profiles (SACPs)," S&P said.

"Our assessment of the banks' business positions could be affected
because banks receiving government support will have to present
restructuring plans that assure their long-term viability without
ongoing government support. Restructuring plans will be required
to include, among others, initiatives to downsize businesses,
which we think could potentially have negative implications on
their franchises and business stability, and our view of the
strategic challenges ahead. We believe that undertaking a
restructuring plan under adverse economic and financial conditions
is particularly difficult, and more so if the institutions
involved have not fully completed or are in the early stages of
the merger processes. The magnitude of any restructuring required
will be an important factor in deciding on any potential
reassessment," S&P said.

"Our assessment of banks' capital and earnings could also change
if the amount of capital support to be received, if any, is
different from the assumptions we are incorporating into the
ratings and/or takes a different form (share capital as opposed to
hybrid instruments). Given that the capital shortfall, if any,
that banks will be required to cover will be calculated on the
basis of surviving a scenario of severe economic stress, we think
that the eventual capital support from the state could be higher
than the assumptions we have incorporated into our forecasts.
Whether it is enough and of a quality sufficient to lead to a
different capital and earnings assessment is still unclear,
though," S&P said.

"We also see that the transfer of banks' impaired assets to an
external asset management company, which will be mandatory for
banks receiving government support, could also be positive for our
view of the banks' future capital or risk positions. This is
because in exchange for most of the assets transferred, banks will
likely receive debt issued by the asset management company, but
guaranteed by the government. They will receive only a minor part
in the form of equity in the asset management company. At this
point it is unclear whether the transfer will be limited to
problematic real estate exposures or could include other assets.
In addition, we will take into account the relative size and
pricing of the assets to be transferred in our assessments," S&P

"In addition to monitoring the evolution of trends in the Spanish
banking system funding and liquidity, we will also assess how some
of the measures included in the banks' restructuring plans as a
prerequisite for government support could affect our current
assessment of the banks' funding and liquidity, given that banks
are expected to present plans to rebalance their funding profiles
and reduce reliance on central bank funding. Downsizing could also
have negative implications for the stability of customer deposits.
A transfer of risk assets on the other hand could help to ease
pressure," S&P said.

"We aim to resolve or update the CreditWatch status of our ratings
once more information on the recapitalization and restructuring is
forthcoming. We will assess the implications of, among other
things, the magnitude of the capital shortfalls, if any, that each
financial institution will have to fulfill, whether capital will
be fully or partially provided by the government, and, in turn,
the details of the risk asset transfer mechanism and conditions
imposed on each institution," S&P said.

"We could lower our ratings if we consider that the benefits of
banks' own measures or the government support received in the
short term are not sufficient for us to raise our SACPs on the
banks to the levels we currently envisage. This could happen if
any of the factors we consider in our SACP assessments are revised
downward. Conversely, if our conclusion is that banks' SACPs would
be, following the measures undertaken by banks or reception of
government support, at the level we currently incorporate into the
ratings, the ratings could be affirmed," S&P said.

"We will publish individual research updates on the banks
identified below, including a list of ratings on affiliated
entities, as well as the ratings by debt type -- senior,
subordinated, junior subordinated, and preferred stock," S&P said.


CreditWatch Action
                                          To             From
Banco Popular Espanol S.A.
Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating BB+/Watch Neg  BB+/Negative
Nondeferrable Sub. Debt Rating       B/Watch Neg    B
Preference Shares Rating             CCC+/Watch Neg CCC+

Maintained On CreditWatch

Bankia S.A.
Longterm Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Watch Neg

Banco Financiero y de Ahorros S.A.
Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating  B+/Watch Neg

Ibercaja Banco S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating            BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Nonderrable Subordinated Debt Rating  BB+/Watch Neg
Preferred Stock Rating                B+/Watch Neg


Bankia S.A.
Nondeferrable Sub Debt Rating         CC             CCC-

Ratings Affirmed
Banco Popular Espanol S.A.
Bankia S.A.
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros S.A.
Shortterm Counterparty Credit Rating  B

NB. This list does not include all ratings affected.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DAWSON INT'L: Shares Suspended; Directors Mulls Administration
Peter Ranscombe at The Scotsman reports that shares in Dawson
International were suspended on Wednesday morning as its directors
consider whether they need to appoint administrators for the

The firm revealed last month that 200 jobs are under threat after
talks with the Pension Protection Fund and Pension Regulator to
rescue its pension fund collapsed, the Scotsman relates.

According to the Scotsman, Dawson said: "Following conversations
between the directors and the trustees of the UK defined benefit
pension plans, the actuary of the plans has served notices of a
determination of contribution jointly on the parent company and
its UK trading subsidiary, Dawson International Trading.

"The directors of each company will consider these notices with
their advisors to determine whether these notices are valid and
whether it is necessary to appoint administrators for either or
both companies.

"Pending this decision and therefore pending clarification of the
parent company's financial position, the directors have requested
that the shares in Dawson International be suspended."

Dawson International is a Hawick-based cashmere company.

FASTNET SECURITIES 2: S&P Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Fastnet Securities 2 PLC and Fastnet
Securities 4 Ltd., which are Irish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.

"The rating actions follow our July 19, 2012 downgrade to
B+/Negative/B from BB-/Watch Neg/B of Permanent TSB PLC--the bank
account and interest rate swap provider in both transactions," S&P

"We do not consider the counterparty replacement language in the
transaction documents to be in line with our 2012 counterparty
criteria. Based on the application of these criteria, we have
therefore capped all of our ratings in these two transactions at
our 'B+' long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Permanent TSB,"
S&P said.

"As a result, we have lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' all of
our ratings in Fastnet Securities 2 and Fastnet Securities 4," S&P

"Each of these transactions is backed by a pool of first-lien
residential mortgage loans in the Republic of Ireland, originated
by Permanent TSB PLC," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:



Class                   Rating
              To                     From
Fastnet Securities 2 PLC
EUR2.15 Billion Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Due 2043

A2            B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
B             B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
C             B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
D             B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)

Fastnet Securities 4 Ltd.
EUR6.5 Billion Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Due

A1            B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
A2            B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)
A3            B+ (sf)                BB- (sf)

HOLIWAYS FORD: In Administration, Cuts 81 Jobs
The Northern Echo reports that Holiways Ford has gone into
administration cutting 81 jobs in the process.

Car sales have collapsed in the wake of the recession and, despite
efforts to shore up the business by selling sites in Durham and
Hartlepool, Holiways was unable to carry on, according to The
Northern Echo.

The Northern Echo notes that the firm cut thousands of pounds off
the price of its cars in recent weeks.

However, the report says, administrators said that despite selling
its Durham and Hartlepool dealerships in recent weeks, the company
had incurred significant losses.  The report relates that
administrator KPMG is expected to sell the Ford dealership's
property and other assets as it winds down the business.

Mark Firmin and Howard Smith, of KPMG, have been appointed joint
administrators by FCE Bank, The Northern Echo discloses.

The report relates that although it has been unable to confirm how
many of the firm's 81 jobs are at risk, it said a "high
proportion" will be made redundant in the coming days, with the
rest continuing to assist the administrators in the short term.

HOLIWAYS Ford is a family-run business that became one of the
region's best-known car dealerships.

IDEAL CONTRACTORS: Goes Into Liquidation
---------------------------------------- reports that Ideal Contractors, a Guernsey
building firm that made its staff redundant and then advertised
their jobs a day later, has gone into liquidation. says four of the men from Ideal Contractors filed
unfair dismissal claims and are still waiting to hear whether a
tribunal will take place.

Despite the company being wound up, the union said a process to
realise assets is underway and an award could still be made, adds.

QUINN INSURANCE: Gov't Imposes Insurance Levy to Cover Losses
BBC News reports that people in the Irish Republic will pay extra
on their insurance for many years due to mismanagement at Quinn
Insurance, a Dublin court has heard.

The Irish government has imposed a 2% levy on all insurance
premiums to meet the costs of plugging a financial hole at the
company, BBC discloses.

Expert witnesses were asked why the costs of covering the losses
of Quinn Insurance could rise to EUR1.65 billion, BBC relates.

According to BBC, the court was told it was down to lack of
provision for potential losses.

Quinn Insurance was put into administration in April 2010, BBC

It has since been sold to Liberty, the fifth largest insurance
company in the world, under an agreement that historical
shortfalls would be covered by the new levy, BBC discloses.

The president of the High Court, Nicholas Kearns, asked the expert
witnesses on Tuesday why the costs of covering the losses could
rise to EUR1.65 billion from a previous estimate of EUR738
million, BBC relates.

He was told it was down to under-provisioning for potential losses
in the company before it was sold, BBC notes.

The company had not put enough money aside to cover payouts -- a
fundamental problem for an insurance company, according to BBC.

                      About Quinn Insurance

Quinn Insurance is owned by Sean Quinn, who was once Ireland's
richest man, and his family.  The company has more than 20% of
the motor and health insurance market in Ireland.  Employing
almost 2,800 people in Britain and Ireland, it was founded in
1996 and entered the UK market in 2004.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, The Irish
Times said the Financial Regulator put Quinn Insurance into
administration in March 2010 after his office discovered
guarantees had been provided by the insurer's subsidiaries as far
back as 2005 on Quinn Group debts of more than EUR1.2 billion.
The regulator said the guarantees reduced the amount the firm had
in reserve to protect policyholders against possible claims,
putting 1.3 million customers at risk, according to the Irish

PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Tal Ben Haim Criticizes Administrators
BBC News reports that Portsmouth defender Tal Ben Haim says
administrators PKF will be to blame if the club are liquidated on

According to BBC, administrator Trevor Birch has set a August 10
deadline for all the club's senior players to leave Portsmouth or
reach compromise agreements over wages.

Former owner Balram Chainrai and the Pompey Supporters Trust are
vying for control of the club, but will only bring Portsmouth out
of liquidation via a company voluntary arrangement once the wage
bill is cleared, BBC discloses.

Administrators have set the August 10 deadline for this to happen
but time is now running out and Birch has urged Mr. Ben Haim to
follow the example of his former team-mates and accept a
compromise, BBC notes.

Mr. Ben Haim says he is prepared to come to a compromise, but will
not be bullied into a deal, BBC relates.

Mr. Ben Haim says that despite Pompey's perilous position, only
recently have the administrators started talking to the players,
according to BBC.

                    About Portsmouth Football

Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. --
-- operated Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays
in the English Premier League.  Established in 1898, the club
boasted two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division
championships.  Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park;
the football team is known to supporters as Pompey.  Dubai
businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre
Gaydamak in 2009.  A French businessman of Russian decent,
Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006.

In 2010, the club entered administration as a Premiership club
with UHY Hacker Young partners Andrew Andronikou, Peter Kubik and
Michael Kiely appointed administrators, Accountancy Age noted.
In March 2011, Geoff Carton-Kelly and David Hudson, partners at
Baker Tilly, were appointed liquidators, Accountancy Age related.

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Sports Direct to Acquire 10% Stake
Peter Woodifield at Bloomberg News, citing the Herald newspaper,
reports that Mike Ashley, chairman of Sports Direct International
Plc and owner of Newcastle United Football Club, is in talks to
buy a 10% stake in Rangers Football Club.

Bloomberg relates that the Glasgow-based newspaper said that a
deal between Ashley and Charles Green, who headed the group that
bought the Scottish soccer club's assets from the administrators
in June for GBP5.5 million, is expected to be completed in days.

According to Bloomberg, the Herald said that Mr. Ashley, whose 69%
stake in Sports Direct is valued at GBP1.2 billion, and
Mr. Green are also planning to form a venture to sell the club's
replica kit in Sports Direct stores.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC --
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station,  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.

* UK: Corporate Insolvency in England & Wales Fall 3.6% in Q2
Ainsley Thomson at Dow Jones Newswires reports that fewer
companies in England and Wales became insolvent in the second
quarter, official data showed Friday, despite the U.K. economy
remaining mired in recession.

According to Dow Jones, the government's Insolvency Service said
4,115 firms in England and Wales became insolvent during the
second quarter, a 3.6% decrease on the previous quarter and a 2.4%
decrease compared with the year-earlier period.

The total number of insolvencies in the second quarter is the
lowest since the fourth quarter of 2010 when 3,874 firms became
insolvent, the news agency notes.

Dow Jones discloses that in the first quarter of this year, there
were 4,270 company insolvencies in England and Wales.  By
comparison, at the height of the financial crisis in the second
quarter of 2009, the number of company insolvencies peaked at
5,022, Dow Jones adds.

* UK: High Street Retailers Insolvencies Up 10.3% in April, June
Sky News, citing a report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, reports that
the number of high street retailers suffering financial collapse
rose 10.3% between April and June as the wet weather added to
their woes.

PwC said a total of 426 retailers fell insolvent -- including high
profile victims Clinton Cards and Game -- in the second quarter of
2012, up from 386 last year, according to the report.

Sky News relates that the high street casualties have been
increased year-on-year in each of the past four quarters.

But the wettest April and June on record intensified retailers'
problems by keeping shoppers at home and dampening demand for
summer clothes, says Sky News.

In the wider economy, the picture was brighter with insolvencies
down 3% on 2011, despite the UK now being in the longest double-
dip recession on record, Sky News says relays.

The PwC survey showed that the overall number of insolvencies saw
the biggest increase in North East and Cumbria, up 70% to 277.
The West saw failure levels drop nearly a third to 117, Sky News


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 13 CDO Tranches to 'D'; Withdraws Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
31 European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO)

For the full list of the rating actions, see "List Of European
Synthetic CDO Tranche Rating Withdrawals At Aug. 7, 2012" at S&P's
Web site.

S&P said it has withdrawn its ratings on these tranches for
different reasons, including:

- The issuer has fully repurchased and cancelled the notes,
- The notes have been redeemed earlier,
- The notes have paid down in full, and
- The principal amount of the notes has been reduced due to

"We provide the rating withdrawal reason for each individual
tranche in the separate ratings list," S&P said.

"We have lowered to 'D (sf)' and subsequently withdrawn our
ratings on 13 tranches. 's downgrades to 'D (sf)' follow
confirmation that losses from credit events in the underlying
portfolios exceeded the available credit enhancement levels. This
means that the noteholders did not receive full principal on the
early termination date for these tranches. The ratings lowered to
'D (sf)' will remain at 'D (sf)' for a period of 30 days before
the withdrawals becomes effective," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars

Aug. 2-4, 2012
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

November 1-3, 2012
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

April 10-12, 2013
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

October 3-5, 2013
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *