TCREUR_Public/120906.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, September 6, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 178



* AUSTRIA: Euler Hermes Expects Corporate Bankruptcies to Rise


ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on Watch
HANSEATISCHE INVESTMENT: To Wind-Up German Open-Ended Fund
P+S WERFTEN: Abu Dhabi Mar Keen on Acquiring Shipyards


LANSDOWNE NO. 1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC'
REAL ESTATE: Ceases Trading; No Cash to Fund Liquidation
WYG GROUP: Court Placed Irish Unit in Provisional Liquidation


MATTERHORN MOBILE: Moody's Rates CHF180MM Sr. Sec. Notes '(P)B1'
MATTERHORN MOBILE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating


PBG SA: Seeks PLN200 Million Loan From ARP
* POLAND: January-August Corporate Bankruptcies Up 23%


TRANSGAZ MEDIAS: S&P Cuts LT Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB'


RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' CFR; Outlook Stable
RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL POINTS NORTH: In Administration, Tenants Unaffected
ENPURE HOLDINGS: In Administration, 160 Jobs at Risk
FAB UK 2004-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
GOODWOOD GOLD: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes to 'Ba2'
MELTON BLINDS: More Customers Fight to Get Repayment

MILLERS AT MIDMAR: Enters Liquidation; 40 Workers Lose Jobs
PERSEUS PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
TRAVELODGE: 96% of Landlords Approve Rent Reductions Under CVA


* Moody's Maintains Stable Outlook on Global Reinsurance Sector
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars



* AUSTRIA: Euler Hermes Expects Corporate Bankruptcies to Rise
Xinhua, citing a Euler Hermes study, reports that slowed economic
growth as a result of the European debt crises would drive up the
number of bankruptcies in Austria in 2012.

According to Xinhua, the APA reported that the credit insurance
company forecasts a 3.8% rise in corporate bankruptcies for the
year to 6,090 on the back of modest GDP growth of 0.7%.


ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on Watch
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-headquartered provider of
enterprise communications-related technology and solutions
Enterprise Networks Holdings B.V. (ENH) on CreditWatch with
negative implications, along with its 'B-' issue rating on the
senior secured debt issued by EN Germany Holdings B.V.

"This reflects our opinion that ENH's liquidity profile weakened
significantly as a result of weaker-than-expected operating
results and free cash flow generation in the first nine months of
its fiscal year 2012 (year ends Sept. 30). This is due to
currently subdued industry demand, higher-than-expected pressure
on gross margins, and significant restructuring cash outflows. In
our base-case assessment, we forecast negative free operating
cash flow (FOCF; defined as cash flow from operations after
capital expenditures and interest paid) of about EUR120 million
to EUR130 million in fiscal 2012, down from EUR113 million in
fiscal 2011. We also assume improving, but still materially
negative FOCF in fiscal 2013, absent significant cost savings and
gross margin improvement initiatives and improving industry
demand," S&P said.

"We revised our assessment of ENH's liquidity to 'weak' from
'adequate' to reflect our expectation of continued negative free
cash flow generation and a potential covenant breach in fiscal
2013 in the absence of further efficiency measures and support
from the group's owners. ENH is a joint venture between the
former enterprise communications business of Siemens AG
(A+/Positive/A-1+; 49% ownership) and assets from private equity
investor The Gores Group (not rated; 51%). At this stage, we have
not factored in any shareholder support into our liquidity
assessment and ratings," S&P said.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three
months, after discussing with ENH's management how the company is
planning to address the currently weaker-than-expected operating
performance, including cost savings and gross margin improvement
initiatives as well as potential funding requirements, and to
meet its covenants," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings to the 'CCC' or 'CC' category in the
next three months if we perceive that ENH is unable to
demonstrate a credible plan as to how it intends to improve its
cash flow generation and liquidity profile and avoid a potential
covenant breach in fiscal 2013. In addition, continued top-line
and gross profit pressures amid subdued industry demand, as well
as expectations of continued negative FOCF generation, could put
pressure on the ratings. Furthermore, although not expected at
this stage, we could lower the ratings if we perceived an
increased likelihood that ENH and its owners might consider
capital transactions that would qualify as a distressed debt-
exchange offer under our criteria," S&P said.

"We could affirm the ratings if ENH's owners provide the group
with significant additional funding and if it is able to amend
its covenant schedule, with prospective covenant headroom of at
least 15% in fiscal 2013. Furthermore, prospects of about
breakeven FOCF generation could stabilize the ratings," S&P said.

HANSEATISCHE INVESTMENT: To Wind-Up German Open-Ended Fund
PropertyEU reports that fund manager Hanseatische Investment has
announced it is liquidating a German open-ended real estate fund
(GOEF) by April next year.

Hansaimmobilia was launched in 1988 for both institutional and
retail clients.  According to the report, the fund focused on
acquiring existing office, retail and logistics assets and
projects in Germany and Europe.  Rising capital outflows and high
vacancy rates have reduced the value of the fund to EUR268
million in August this year, the report notes.

PropertyEU relates that Hansainvest said the uncertain regulatory
environment for GOEFS and closure of several other funds had
'corrupted the image of the asset class'. An orderly liquidation,
according to the company, was the best way to protect investors
from a 'foreseeable deterioration in the fund's performance'.

Hansainvest, according to PropertyEU, has formulated an
'investor-friendly' way to dissolve the fund.  Sales of fund
units have been halted and existing investors will have until
October 2 to redeem their equity in the normal way, the report
notes. Investors who choose to stay in the fund will receive a
pay-out based on valuations at April 5, 2013.  PropertyEU says
properties not sold by that date will be transferred internally
within Hansainvest to avoid the need to sell at a hefty discount.
Remaining investors will also receive sales warrants giving them
rights to proceeds of future sales in order to compensate them
for devaluations, the report adds.

Hansainvest said it will in future focus on institutional

P+S WERFTEN: Abu Dhabi Mar Keen on Acquiring Shipyards
Deutsche Welle, citing German business daily Handelsblatt,
reports that the Arab shipbuilding company Abu Dhabi Mar (ADM)
voiced its interest in taking over the insolvent eastern German
shipyards P+S Werften.

"We have established contact to P+S and policy makers," the
report quotes said Susanne Wiegand, the chief executive of the
Nobiskrug shipyard belonging to ADM, as saying.

"For us, the acquisition of both locations in the German towns of
Wolgast and Stralsund makes perfect sense, and wed aim to
safeguard as many jobs as possible."  At Wolgast, military and
government vessels are constructed and repaired.

Deutsche Welle relates that the Handelsblatt said another
investor, the Bremen-based Friedrich Lurseen Shipyard, was also
interested in buying P+S, but said the company had set its sights
on the Wolgast facility only.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 30,
2012, Deutsche Welle said P+S has said that it needs to file
for bankruptcy protection after talks with creditors have
remained inconclusive.  P+S said it had run into liquidity
problems after talks with creditors and suppliers failed earlier
last month.  According to Deutsche Welle, the insolvency court in
Stralsund said that P+S Chief Executive Ruediger Fuchs had filed
for a planned insolvency, meaning that the CEO was seeking to
remain in the post to engineer procedures in collaboration with a
court administrator.

P+S Werften is a German shipbuilder. P+S operates two of the
Germany's biggest shipyards, Volkswerft Stralsund and Peene-Werft
Wolgast. The company currently employs 1,771 people.


LANSDOWNE NO. 1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered all of its credit
ratings in Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1 PLC (Lansdowne 1)
and Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 2 PLC (Lansdowne 2).

"The rating actions reflect continued increases in severe
arrears, in the 180-plus day buckets, since our previous full
review of the transactions in January 2011," S&P said.

"Lender forbearance measures and existing legal and regulatory
frameworks in Ireland have kept repossessions low, with little
realized losses to date. We have addressed these risks through
assuming that all loans greater than nine monthly payments in
arrears are in default and will result in losses. This is
consistent with recent collection rates (interest
received/interest expected) for these transactions. This has led
us conclude that certain classes of notes are effectively
undercollateralized," S&P said.

"In analyzing these transactions, we have applied our general
criteria for assigning and monitoring ratings," S&P said.

"We have analyzed the credit quality of the assets in these
transactions through conducting loan-level analyses of the
mortgage pools. For each loan in the pools, our analyses
estimated the foreclosure frequency and the loss severity and, by
multiplying the foreclosure frequency by the loss severity, the
potential loss associated with each loan. To quantify the
potential losses associated with the entire pool, we calculated a
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and a weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) at each rating level. The product of
these two variables estimates the required loss protection,
absent any additional factors. We assume the probability of
foreclosure to be a function of both borrower and loan
characteristics, and to
become more likely (and the realized loss on a loan more severe)
as the economic environment deteriorates," S&P said.

In performing its credit analyses of these pools, S&P adopted the
methodology and assumptions described in the sections entitled
'Foreclosure Frequency Assumptions' and 'Loss Severity
Assumptions' in our Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) criteria, with these adjustments for this

    'AA' base foreclosure frequency: 9%;
    'A' base foreclosure frequency: 7%;
    'BBB' base foreclosure frequency: 5%;
    'AA' market value decline: 40%;
    'A' market value decline: 35%;
    'BBB' market value decline: 30%;
    'BB' market value decline: 25%;
    Jumbo loan penalty: EUR500,000 in Dublin;
    Jumbo valuation penalty: EUR625,000 in Dublin;
    First-time buyer penalty: 10% addition to adjusted base
     foreclosure frequency;
    Income multiple penalty: 20% addition to adjusted base
     foreclosure frequency;
    Self-certified penalty: 25% addition to adjusted base
     foreclosure frequency;
    No adjustment is made for loans with loan-to-value (LTV)
     ratios of less than 50%;
    Geographic concentration penalty: 1% addition to adjusted
     base foreclosure frequency for all loans if the
     concentration is greater than 60% in Dublin and greater than
     20% in any other county;
    The fixed costs of foreclosure are assumed to be 4% of the
     loan balance; and
    The foreclosure period is assumed to be 48 months for the
     reasons set out.

"The criteria applicable to the cash flow analyses for these
transactions are primarily our 'Cash Flow Criteria For European
RMBS Transactions,' published on Nov. 20, 2003, and 'Update To
The Cash Flow Criteria For European RMBS Transactions,' published
on Jan. 6, 2009," S&P said.

"Due to current forbearance measures and the legal uncertainty
regarding the foreclosure process, repossessions have generally
been limited in the Irish residential mortgage market. To address
this risk, we increased the foreclosure period in our analysis to
48 months. Additionally, we assumed that all loans with arrears
greater than nine monthly payments default on day 1 in our cash
flow analysis, with recoveries realized at the end of the 48-
month foreclosure period," S&P said.

"In Lansdowne 1, 180-plus day arrears have reached 57%--an 18%
increase from January 2011. Similarly, 180-plus day arrears in
Lansdowne 2 have increased by more than 20%, to 61%. The
continued decline in Irish house prices has led to increased
weighted-average LTV ratios in both pools," S&P said.

"Consequently, these factors have resulted in an overall increase
in our WAFF and WALS estimates in both transactions. With less
seasoning in Lansdowne 2, the deterioration in WAFF and WALS in
this transaction has been more severe than in Lansdowne 1," S&P

"Both transactions are currently paying sequentially. Each
transaction also has a nonamortizing reserve fund. Lansdowne 1
drew EUR275,000 from its reserve fund on the June 2012 interest
payment date, due to realized losses of EUR700,000 passing
through the structure. The reserve fund is currently at 92.6% of
the level required by the transaction documents," S&P said.

"Currently, our ratings in both transactions are capped under our
2012 counterparty criteria by our rating on the bank account and
GIC provider--Allied Irish Banks PLC (BB/Negative/B)," S&P said.

Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1 and Lansdowne Mortgage
Securities No. 2 are Irish nonconforming RMBS transactions with
loans originated by Start Mortgages Ltd.

                       LANSDOWNE 1 DOWNGRADES

"We have lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our rating on
Lansdowne 1's class A2 notes. Although we have modeled the
transaction as undercollateralized (based on loans of nine months
or more in arrears assumed to have defaulted), our analysis has
given benefit to some recoveries (50%). Under these assumptions,
and the current reserve fund level, our analysis shows that the
class A2 notes would be fully collateralized. Furthermore, there
are no restrictions on the use of the liquidity facility for the
class A2 notes," S&P said.

"We have also lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our ratings on
the class M1 and M2 notes, to reflect our view on credit
enhancement erosion due to assumed undercollateralization, even
when considering recoveries," S&P said.

"Similarly, we consider that the class B1 and B2 notes are
severely undercollateralized, despite an assumed recovery rate of
50%. We do not anticipate any interest shortfalls within the next
12 months because we expect that realized losses will remain low
during this period, given current levels of repossessions. The
presence of a reserve fund and the availability of a liquidity
facility should be sufficient to mitigate the reduction in
interest available, due to realized losses during the next 12
months. However, we consider there to be a high likelihood of
default at some point in the future. Therefore, we have lowered
to 'CCC (sf)' our ratings on these notes," S&P said.

                     LANSDOWNE 2 DOWNGRADES

"We have lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our rating on the
class A2 notes, to reflect our view on credit enhancement erosion
due to assumed undercollateralization, even when considering
recoveries (assumed at 50%) and the available reserve fund
level," S&P said.

"We have also lowered to 'CCC (sf)' our ratings on the class M1,
M2, and B notes. We consider these notes to be severely
undercollateralized, despite our recovery assumption of 50%.
Although we do not anticipate any interest shortfalls within the
next 12 months, we consider eventual default to be likely," S&P


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class                        Rating
                    To                    From

Ratings Lowered

Lansdowne Mortgages Securities No. 1 PLC
EUR370.05 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Fixed- and
Floating-Rate Notes

A2                  B (sf)                BB (sf)
M1                  B- (sf)               BB (sf)
M2                  B- (sf)               BB (sf)
B1                  CCC (sf)              BB (sf)
B2                  CCC (sf)              B (sf)

Lansdowne Mortgages Securities No. 2 PLC
EUR525.05 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Fixed- and
Floating-Rate Notes

A2                  B- (sf)               BB (sf)
M1                  CCC (sf)              BB (sf)
M2                  CCC (sf)              BB (sf)
B                   CCC (sf)              B (sf)

REAL ESTATE: Ceases Trading; No Cash to Fund Liquidation
Donal O'Donovan at reports that Treasury-Holdings
controlled Real Estate Opportunities PLC (REO) has ceased
trading, without even enough cash to appoint a liquidator.

According to, a notice circulated to investors
says the business was forced to cease trading on August 21.

In its final notice to investors, REO said it was shutting down
with immediate effect, unable even to appoint a liquidator to
oversee the wind up of the business, relates.

"The company does not at present have sufficient funds available
to it to fund a liquidation, but the directors will keep this and
other options open and under constant review,"
quotes the REO board as saying in its last communication to
investors. notes that a source close to the company said REO
had no assets left when the plug was pulled on August 21.

The listed venture has been in crisis since at least January this
year when REO issued a stock exchange announcement to say nine
companies owned by the investment vehicle had gone into
receivership after the National Asset Management Agency moved
against the wider treasury Holdings group, notes.

Shares that had been trading in London were suspended after that
January announcement; the company quietly announced in June that
shares would be delisted in July, recounts.

In its final statement to investors, the board of REO said it
took the decision to pull the plug after the High Court in Dublin
said last month that those receiverships should stay in place,
according to

Treasury has vowed to challenge the findings of that Judicial
Review at the Supreme Court, but REO has folded,

WYG GROUP: Court Placed Irish Unit in Provisional Liquidation
The Irish Times reports that provisional liquidators have been
appointed by the High Court to the WYG Group of companies in

The report relates that Barrister Kelley Smith told Mr. Justice
Gerard Hogan that the parent -- WYG Ireland Holding Company Ltd
-- had funded the companies to the tune of EUR70 million over
recent years.

The parent company was the main creditor to WYG Engineering
Ireland, WYG Environmental and Planning Ireland and WYG Nolan
Ryan Tweeds, all registered in Ireland, according to The Irish

The Irish Times says the companies sought the appointment of Paul
McCann and Stephen Tennant of Grant Thornton as joint provisional

Ms. Smith told Mr. Justice Hogan there were companies in the
North that were not affected by her application, the report adds.

WYG Plc provides management and technical consulting services for
built, natural, and social environments.


MATTERHORN MOBILE: Moody's Rates CHF180MM Sr. Sec. Notes '(P)B1'
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating
to the proposed offering of CHF180 million of senior secured
floating-rate notes (FRNs) issued by Matterhorn Mobile S.A., the
holding company of Orange Communications S.A. ("Orange
Switzerland" or "OCH"). Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded to
B1 from Ba3 the ratings on the existing senior secured debt
issued by Matterhorn Mobile, comprising:

- EUR330 million (CHF400 million equivalent) senior secured FRNs
   due 2019

- CHF450 million of senior secured fixed-rate notes due 2019

- CHF225 million senior secured Term Loan A

The new notes will have the same terms and conditions and will
benefit from the same guarantees and security package as the
existing senior secured notes. OCH will use the net proceeds from
the offering, together with CHF20 million of cash on balance
sheet, to repay Term Loan A and pay an extraordinary distribution
to the shareholders worth CHF90 million. Moody's expects to
withdraw the ratings on Term Loan A upon its repayment.

Finally, Moody's has upgraded Matterhorn Mobile Holdings S.A.'s
probability of default rating (PDR) to Ba3 from B1, following the
change in the group's family recovery rate to 35% from 50%.

The following ratings remain unchanged:

- Corporate family rating (CFR) of Matterhorn Mobile Holdings
   S.A.: B1

- CHF272 million (equivalent) of senior notes due 2020, issued
   by Matterhorn Mobile Holdings S.A.: B3/loss-given-default
   (LGD) of LGD6

The outlook for all the ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the group's proposed
tap offering. The definitive ratings may differ from the
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

The assignment of a (P)B1 rating to the proposed notes offering
and the downgrade of Matterhorn Mobile's existing senior secured
debt to B1 from Ba3 reflects the presence of priority debt in the
capital structure in the form of a CHF100 million super-senior
revolving credit facility. As part of the transaction, OCH will
be refinancing its existing revolving facility -- which ranked
pari passu with the rest of secured debt -- and replacing it with
a new facility that has priority over the proceeds in case of
enforcement. Therefore, the secured notes will be effectively
junior to the new facility, reducing the potential recovery
prospects for noteholders. The new super-senior facility will
only have one maintenance covenant and the headroom under it will
be considerable; this makes the covenant less restrictive than
the incurrence tests of the notes.

The upgrade of the PDR to Ba3 reflects Moody's adjustment to the
group's family recovery rate to 35% from 50%. This is because OCH
has used bonds to refinance all the existing bank debt and the
super-senior revolver is covenant-lite, which effectively
transforms the capital structure into an "all-bond" structure.
Under an "all-bond" structure, recoveries for noteholders in the
event of a default are typically lower than in a "bank/bond"
structure. The refinancing with bonds will allow OCH to extend
its debt maturity profile, as all term-debt amortizations will be
removed until 2019.

Despite the debt issuance, the transaction does not negatively
affect OCH's credit metrics given that the extra amount raised to
pay the distribution to shareholders is broadly offset by OCH's
better-than-expected EBITDA performance on a last 12-months
basis. OCH's EBITDA generation has primarily benefited from the
sustained increase in the subscriber base and the favorable
quarterly comparison resulting from the change in interval effect
implemented in August 2011.

Moody's estimates that pro forma for this transaction and as a
result of the improved EBITDA, Debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by
Moody's) will improve by around 0.3x to circa 3.9x. Nevertheless,
Moody's also notes that OCH's decision to make an extraordinary
distribution to the sponsors only six months after the LBO
closure signals a more aggressive financial strategy than the
rating agency initially expected.

Moody's notes that OCH's cash position as of Q2 2012 is higher
than expected because OCH has been allowed to defer 40% of the
total payment for spectrum of CHF155 million, of which CHF34
million will be paid in June 2015 and CHF35 million in December
2016. Moody's will make an adjustment to OCH's debt figure to
capture this deferred consideration.

OCH's B1 CFR continues to reflect both a relatively weak business
risk profile and a relatively stronger financial profile compared
with similarly rated peers such as Sunrise, Polkomtel or Wind
Telecomunicazioni. Specifically, the rating reflects OCH's
leveraged capital structure following its acquisition by
Matterhorn, a company indirectly owned by funds advised by Apax
Partners LLP. OCH's high business risk reflects its small size,
lack of fixed-line business, weak technological positioning and
the strategic challenges ahead linked to the company's separation
from its previous owner, the France Telecom group.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that OCH will
deliver on its business plan and that OCH's credit metrics will
gradually improve over time (with leverage below 4.0x and a
retained cash flow (RCF)/adjusted debt ratio between 15% and
20%), with no major competitive, macro or regulatory pressures
envisaged over the near to medium term.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if OCH's management
team delivers on its business plan, such that the company's (1)
adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio decreases to 3.5x or below; and (2)
RCF/adjusted debt ratio increases to 20% or above.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
OCH's operating performance weakens such that it does not
deleverage from current levels. Ratios that could be indicative
of downward pressure on the rating are adjusted debt/EBITDA above
4.0x and RCF/adjusted debt below 15% on a sustained basis. Any
emerging concerns over liquidity -- including, but not limited
to, reducing covenant headroom -- could also exert downward
pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in rating Matterhorn Mobile
Holdings S.A. and Matterhorn Mobile S.A. was the Global
Telecommunications Industry Methodology published in December
2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Orange Communications S.A. ("OCH") is the number three mobile
network operator in Switzerland with a reported mobile revenue
market share of around 20% and a subscriber market share of
around 17% for the six months ended June 2012. The company has
more than 1.6 million customers. For the 12 months ended June
2012, the group reported revenues of CHF1.3 billion (EUR1.06
billion) and adjusted EBITDA of CHF372.5 million (EUR310

MATTERHORN MOBILE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-based Matterhorn Mobile
Holdings S.A., the ultimate holding company of Orange
Communications S.A., the third-largest wireless network operator
in Switzerland. The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we assigned our recovery rating of '2' and
issue rating of 'BB-' to the proposed Swiss franc (CHF)180
million (EUR150 million) senior secured notes maturing 2019, to
be issued by Matterhorn Mobile S.A., a subsidiary of Matterhorn
Mobile Holdings S.A. We also assigned our recovery rating of '1'
and issue rating of 'BB' to the proposed CHF100 million super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF) to be borrowed by
Matterhorn Mobile S.A., Orange Communications S.A., and Orange
Network S.A.," S&P said.

"Our recovery ratings on existing senior secured and unsecured
notes are unchanged at '2' and '6', and we are affirming our
issue ratings of 'BB-' and 'B-' on them," S&P said.

"Our ratings are subject to our satisfactory review of the final
documentation," S&P said.

"The ratings reflect our understanding that the proceeds of the
note issuance, along with cash, will be used to repay CHF102
million in existing bank debt and distribute a CHF90 million
dividend to Orange Switzerland's shareholders," S&P said.

"We think the recapitalization initiative only months after the
leveraged buyout of the company from France Telecom S.A. (A-
/Negative/A-2) demonstrates the aggressive nature of Matterhorn
Mobile Holdings' financial policy, as set by its controlling
equity sponsor. That said, we think the negative impact on credit
metrics of the shareholder reward is within the headroom that
existed previously," S&P said.

"We think the refinancing initiative could translate into future
higher interest charges, and weaken the company's EBITDA interest
coverage from our previous projection of more than 3.5x down to a
still-adequate level of just above 3x," S&P said.

"The ratings on Matterhorn Mobile Holdings are constrained by
Matterhorn Mobile S.A.'s 'aggressive' financial risk profile, and
supported by our assessment of its 'fair' business risk profile,
as our criteria define the terms," S&P said.

"The financial risk profile reflects our view of an aggressive
financial policy, given the company's private equity ownership,
and our expectation of modest free cash flow generation and
meaningful debt leverage. Our Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratio of
debt to EBITDA is likely to be around 4.5x in 2012-2013,
including the CHF69 million portion of the recent CHF155 million
spectrum investment that will be paid in two installments in 2015
and 2016," S&P said.

"In our assessment, Matterhorn Mobile Holding's business risk
profile is constrained by the company's lack of scale and
diversity, owing to its narrow business and geographic focus,
considerable competition from the dominant market player, and
some execution risk as the company rolls out its strategy as a
stand-alone company," S&P said.

"We view the company's business profile as weaker than that of
its two main competitors, Swisscom AG (A/Stable/--) and Sunrise
Communications Holdings S.A. (B+/Stable/--. It is focused on
mobile telecommunications while both its competitors are
integrated into fixed network services; it also has lower EBITDA
margins than most rated European peers, given its smaller scale
and challenger position compared with Swisscom's strong position
in the domestic market," S&P said.

"These business weaknesses are balanced by the company's well-
established high-end wireless position, a broadly satisfactory
and nearly completely revamped network, a wealthy and stable
domestic economy, and our expectation that the competitive
environment will not change significantly, given high entry
barriers and more favorable regulation than in other European
markets," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that the company's
financial risk profile will remain in line with the rating. We
have factored into our base case revenues and EBITDA  growing
slightly this year, likely benefiting from supportive local
economic and industry conditions, the execution of the company's
recent strategic projects, and active cost optimization," S&P

"We might lower the ratings if leverage shot up toward 5.5x, but
we consider this to be a remote possibility. We believe this
would likely occur if the business risk profile weakened
significantly or as a result of a recapitalization," S&P said.

Rating upside potential is remote as long as the company remains
majority controlled by private equity shareholders.


PBG SA: Seeks PLN200 Million Loan From ARP
Adrian Krajewski at Reuters reports that PBG SA chief executive
said the company is seeking a PLN200 million (US$60 million) loan
from state-controlled industry development agency ARP, as the
company battles to stay in business.

PBG is the biggest Polish builder to run into financial trouble
in the wake of Poland's EUR20 billion spending spree to upgrade
its infrastructure ahead of the Euro 2012 soccer tournament, a
program that featured fierce competition for contracts between
local and foreign builders, Reuters discloses.

PBG, in bankruptcy protection since June, posted a PLN1.7-billion
net loss for the first half of the year, after huge writedowns
took their toll in the sector, hitting also PBG's top rivals
Polimex and Budimex, Reuters relates.

PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder.

* POLAND: January-August Corporate Bankruptcies Up 23%
Warsaw Business Journal, citing data from Euler Hermes, reports
that the number of firms registered in Poland that went bankrupt
from January to August this year rose by 23% year-on-year.

In August alone, 76 firms announced bankruptcy compared to 56 in
August of last year, WBJ relates.  Meanwhile, since the beginning
of the year, 623 Polish firms have gone bankrupt compared to 507
in the same period of 2011, WBJ notes.

According to WBJ, due to bankruptcies in July and August, over
10,000 have lost their jobs, although analysts at Euler Hermes
told Rzeczpospolita that the number of jobs lost might be even
bigger since employment data is not revised as often as other
financial data.


TRANSGAZ MEDIAS: S&P Cuts LT Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency corporate credit ratings on Romanian natural
gas transmission system operator S.N.T.G.N. Transgaz S.A. Medias
(Transgaz) to 'BB' from 'BB+'. "At the same time, the ratings
were removed from CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative
implications on June 11, 2012. The outlook is negative," S&P

"The downgrade reflects our opinion that the diminished
supportiveness of the regulatory framework for gas transmission
in Romania weighs on Transgaz's competitive position. This led us
to revise our assessment of the group's business risk profile to
'weak' from 'fair' previously," S&P said.

"We understand that the Romanian regulator, ANRE, failed to
complete the revision of the existing tariff-setting mechanism by
July 2012, which marks the beginning of the third five-year
regulatory period. Under our previous base-case scenario, we
assumed that we would have visibility on both the recoverability
of lost revenues -- owing to lower-than-expected gas volumes
shipped in recent years -- and the new tariff methodology ahead
of the start of the third regulatory period in July 2012.
Instead, we understand that the regulator announced its regulated
revenues for the period from July 2012 to June 2013, but not the
new tariff or the amount and timing of lost revenue recovery. As
a result, Transgaz is applying tariffs that are unchanged since
2009 and we believe that the prospects and timing of a tariff
recovery remain highly uncertain. We do not consider this to be
consistent with our previous assessment of the relative
supportiveness of the Romanian regulatory environment.
Furthermore, it highlights key regulatory risks in a jurisdiction
where regulatory determinations are, in our view, not independent
of the government," S&P said.

"We expect Transgaz's adjusted debt, which stood at Romanian Lei
(RON)146.5 million (EUR32 million) at year-end 2011, to fall in
2012 and 2013. This is despite our projections that Transgaz will
post negative discretionary cash flows, as we anticipate the
group will utilize its significant cash holding to cover any cash
flow shortfall and for debt amortization. However, we expect
Transgaz to resume normalized investment levels by no later than
2014, which, coupled with ongoing high dividend payments, is
likely to lead to a gradual deterioration in financial credit
metrics over the long term," S&P said.

"We do not factor into our base-case scenario the financial
impact of Transgaz's participation in the large-scale Nabucco
pipeline project, given the continuing uncertainties we see
regarding gas supply sources and the financing structure of the
project. We consider Transgaz's potential participation in
Nabucco as an additional material risk for its financial risk
profile, albeit currently remote," S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects our view that ongoing
uncertainties in the regulatory framework for gas transmission
activities in Romania could weaken the group's financial risk
profile," S&P said.

"We could lower our ratings on Transgaz by one notch if we were
of the opinion that the new regulatory framework would
significantly weaken the group's cash flow generation," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we were convinced that
the changing regulatory framework would provide sufficient
visibility, predictability, and credit support to Transgaz's
earnings. This would also be contingent on an assessment that the
regulatory remuneration remained sufficiently shielded from
negative political intervention linked to changes in the national
macroeconomic or fiscal environment," S&P said.

"In our opinion the likelihood of an upgrade is remote at this
stage as it would depend on an upgrade of Romania by at least two
notches, provided our assessment of Transgaz's SACP remained
unchanged," S&P said.


RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to Russian
Helicopters JSC. The outlook on the ratings is stable. This is
the first time Moody's has assigned a rating to Russian

Ratings Rationale

As Russian Helicopters is fully owned by the state-controlled
Corporation Oboronprom, Moody's applies its rating methodology
for government-related issuers (GRIs) in determining the
company's CFR. According to this methodology, the rating is
driven by a combination of (1) Russian Helicopters' baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of b2; (2) the Baa1 local currency rating
of the Russian government; (3) the very high default dependence
between the company and the government; and (4) the strong
probability of state support in the event of financial distress.

Moody's assesses the default dependence between the Russian
government and Russian Helicopters as very high given (1) that
nearly a half of Russian Helicopters' revenues are derived from
domestic sales to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) as part
of state orders; and (2) the company's dependence on state
funding for its regular operations.

The rating agency assesses the probability of support from the
government as strong due to (1) Russian Helicopters' importance
to state security; (2) the fact that the government guarantees
Russian Helicopters' debt procured from the state banks to
finance production of helicopters for the Russian MoD; (3) the
absence of domestic competitors and the relatively small presence
of foreign manufacturers in the domestic market; and (4) the
state subsidizing the company's research and development (R&D)
expenses and the partial reimbursement of interest expenses under
certain types of loans.

Russian Helicopters' BCA reflects (1) the company's relatively
high leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA, of 5.4x as of end-2011,
1.9x of which relates to state-guaranteed loans provided by
state-owned Russian banks, and which Russian Helicopters uses to
finance its long-term contracts with the Russian MoD for the
supply of helicopters; (2) weak liquidity, with internal sources
being insufficient to cover Russian Helicopters' significant
working capital needs along with debt repayments (as of June
2012), leading to strong reliance on continuing external funding;
(3) significant customer concentration, with nearly half of the
company's 2011 revenues derived from state orders, which,
however, provides for some revenue stability; (4) a weaker global
service network and aftermarket business segment compared with
that of competitors; (5) uncertainty related to potential changes
in the shareholder structure, as the company may conduct an
initial public offering (IPO) over the next few years; and (6)
the company's overall exposure to an emerging market operating
environment characterized by a less developed regulatory,
political and legal framework.

At the same time, the BCA factors in (1) Russian Helicopters'
leading competitive position in the core Russian market and
strong positions in India and China, based on the company's
offerings in the medium segment (Mi-8/17) and attack segment (Mi-
24/35, Mi-28, Ka-52); (2) that the company has the widest product
range among its global competitors, comprising all types of
military and civil helicopters, including the ultra-heavy-lift
type (Mi-26); (3) its solid order book, based on long-term
contracts with the Russian MoD along with commercial and military
export orders; and (4) its potential for growth due to the
development of new and upgraded helicopter models on the back of
increasing global demand.

The stable outlook on Russian Helicopters' ratings incorporates
Moody's expectation that (1) the Russian government will continue
to support Russian Helicopters; (2) domestic and global demand
for the company's helicopters will remain stable; and (3) the
company will maintain its total debt/EBITDA and RCF/debt ratios
sustainably below 8.0x and above 10% (calculated including the
state-guaranteed loans which Moody's recognizes as debt
obligations), respectively, while maintaining debt/EBITDA
adjusted for the state-guaranteed loans of less than 4.0x. The
stable outlook also assumes Russian Helicopters' liquidity -- in
the form of cash flow generation and available committed undrawn
long-term credit lines for the next 12 months -- will be
sufficient to cover the company's operational needs, planned
capital expenditure and short-term debt maturities.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's does not envisage any positive pressure on Russian
Helicopters' rating over the next 12-18 months. However, Moody's
could raise Russian Helicopters' BCA by one notch if the
company's debt/EBITDA ratio were to remain below 6.0x (calculated
including state-guaranteed loans) and decline below 2.5x
(adjusted for the state-guaranteed loans) on a sustainable basis,
while at the same time the company improves its liquidity

Negative pressure could be exerted on the rating if Russian
Helicopters' debt/EBITDA ratio were to exceed 8.0x (calculated
including state-guaranteed loans) and 4.0x (adjusted for the
state-guaranteed loans) on a sustainable basis, or in the event
of a material deterioration in the company's liquidity. A one-
notch downgrade of the sovereign rating would not in itself
trigger a downgrade of Russian Helicopters' rating, provided that
all the other GRI inputs remain unchanged.

The principal methodology used in rating Russian Helicopters JSC
was the Global Aerospace and Defense Industry Methodology
published in June 2010. Other methodologies used include the
Government-Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July

Russian Helicopters JSC is the sole Russian designer and
manufacturer of helicopters and one of the few companies
worldwide with the capability to design, manufacture, service and
test modern civilian and military helicopters. Russian
Helicopters is a vertically integrated holding company comprising
five helicopter assembly plants, two design bureaus, two
components production plants, one overhaul plant and one
helicopter service company providing aftermarket services in
Russia and abroad. In 2011, Russian Helicopters generated
revenues of RUR104 billion (US$3.5 billion).

RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russian-based Russian Helicopters JSC
a Long-term local and foreign currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'BB+' and a Short-term IDR of 'B'.  The Outlook is
Stable.  Fitch has also assigned it a Long-term National Rating
of 'AA(rus)' with a Stable Outlook and a Short-term National
Rating of 'F1+(rus)'.

Fitch has not assigned senior unsecured ratings at this time but
will publish one in the event that Russian Helicopters issues a
senior unsecured debt instrument.  Given the high level of debt
the company has at present which is either secured by its assets
or guaranteed by its parent company, Oboronprom JSC, such a
rating may be lower than that of the group's IDR, depending on
the structure of the debt issue.

The ratings reflect a stand-alone credit profile of 'BB' and, in
line with Fitch's parent subsidiary linkage methodology,
incorporates a one notch uplift for support for the company from
the ultimate parent, the Russian Federation ('BBB'/Stable).
The ratings are supported by Russian Helicopters' solid market
position as one of the leading manufacturers of helicopters in
the world, a large backlog which provides revenue transparency
and a long history of technological innovation.

The ratings are also underpinned by industry-leading earnings
margins and core cash generation, as measured by the EBITDAR
margin and funds from operation (FFO) margin.  As a consequence
of the group's solid cost position, these ratios have been in
excess of 15% and 11%, respectively, in each of the past three
years, a level Fitch considers strong for the aerospace and
defense industry.  Furthermore, Fitch believes that these ratios
are sustainable.

The ratings are constrained by a moderate geographic, product and
customer diversification, as well as certain weak credit metrics,
notably high leverage, poor free cash flow (FCF) generation and
limited financial flexibility.

The company's strength lies in relatively low volume, albeit
lucrative niche helicopters, primarily in the military sector.
While Fitch views positively the presence of the Russian Ministry
of Defence (MoD) as the group's largest customer, the number of
helicopters in the backlog earmarked for the Russian MoD means
that the group is reliant on this customer for a significant
portion of its business.  Furthermore, the company's portion of
revenue derived from service activities, at under 20%, is
materially lower than most of its competitors and points to a
lumpier and less predictable revenue profile, more reliant on
product deliveries.

Adjusting for the accelerated working capital advances from state
controlled banks under the State Arms Procurement (SAP)
Programme, which Fitch excludes from the financial debt for
leverage calculations, the group's key leverage indicator, lease
adjusted gross debt to FFO, was between 3.5x and 4x in each of
the past three years, a level appropriate to the low end of the
'BB' category.  Whilst Fitch expects this ratio to improve
slightly in the short to medium term to between 2.5x and 3.2x,
this is chiefly the function of a higher expected FFO level
rather than any meaningful debt reduction.

As a result of the consistently negative FCF, historical and
expected, the company has limited flexibility to reduce its debt
levels, a high portion of which are of a short term nature.
Fitch believes that Russian Helicopters will continue to be
reliant to a large degree on state controlled banks for liquidity
support in the medium term.

Russian Helicopters has consistently generated negative FCF in
its recent past, as a result of large working capital outflows
and significant investment requirements.  Fitch believes that,
despite considerable working capital inflows from state
controlled banks under the SAP program, both these factors will
continue to be a source of material cash drain in the short to
medium term, and FCF is not expected to be sustainably positive
in the medium term.

The one notch uplift to the stand alone rating comes from Fitch's
assessment of the state support the company derives in various
guises including (i) loans from state owned banks, (ii) R&D
funding support, (iii) interest rate subsidies on investment
loans, (iv) significant order flow direction from the Russian MoD
under the SAP program, (v) as well as the formalization of the
strategic importance of the company to the country's industrial
ambition as exhibited by the consolidation of the helicopter
industry in Russia under the Russian Helicopters umbrella.

The uplift given to the stand alone rating is consistent with
Fitch's approach to other Russian companies with linkages to the
state.  The uplift is reflective of the strategic importance
Fitch believes the company has for the Russian state but is
restricted to one notch given the absence of written guarantees
from the state for the company's non-SAP related debt.

Russian Helicopters JSC is the industrial holding company
combining the principal helicopter activities in the Russian
Federation.  In 2011, the group generated sales of RUB104 billion
(EUR2.5 billion) and EBITDAR of RUB17.8 billion (EUR424 million)
giving it a margin of 17.2%.  2011 revenues stemmed primarily
from the delivery of 262 helicopters, ranking the company fourth
in global helicopter deliveries and fifth in terms of revenues.
At end-2011, Russian Helicopters had a backlog of RUB330 billion
or 859 units, representing in excess of three years' worth of

What Could Trigger A Rating Action?

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

  -- evidence of a greater level of state support, for example
     with the provision of state guarantees for external debt
     issued by non-state controlled banks
  -- the group's FFO margin remaining above 12%
  -- a FCF margin over 3% on a sustained basis
  -- FFO adjusted gross leverage improving to below 2.5x.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

  -- a visible reduction in, or elimination of, state support to
     Russian Helicopters
  -- the FFO margin declining below 10% on a sustained basis
  -- FFO adjusted leverage deteriorating above 3.5x.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL POINTS NORTH: In Administration, Tenants Unaffected
Northwest Evening Mail reports that All Points North, a Cumbrian
property group, has gone into administration but tenants at its
buildings around Cumbria, including in Barrow, have been
reassured that their businesses will not be affected.

All Points North has struggled to stay afloat this year and was
thrown a lifeline in May when its bank, the Clydesdale, agreed to
extend funding until September 30 to give it time to sell off
properties, according to Northwest Evening Mail.

The report relates that the bank decided to withdraw its support
and administrators have been called in.

All Points North is listed on the stock exchange under the
Alternative Investment Market and administrators hope this may
prove attractive to possible buyers, but admit that if the
company cannot be saved its properties will be sold off,
Northwest Evening Mail says.

The report notes that Paul Stanley of the accountacy firm Begbies
Traynor which has been appointed as administrators to the
business said that whatever happened to All Points North the
leases held by tenants would not be affected.

ENPURE HOLDINGS: In Administration, 160 Jobs at Risk
Edward Devlin, at Insider Media Limited reports that Enpure
Holdings has fallen into administration after trading conditions
failed to pick up in 2012 and the company experienced
"significant" creditor pressure.

The business recorded a 34% drop in turnover in 2011 from GBP72.7
million to GBP47.9 million, but its chief executive told Insider
Media Limited relates at the time (February 2012) it was set to
bounce back.

The report notes that the company's 160 employees now face the
possibility of redundancy.

Mark Hopkins, Matthew Hammond and Steve Ellis of
PricewaterhouseCoopers were appointed joint administrators of
Enpure Ltd and Enpure Holdings Ltd on Sept. 3, 2012.

It has been placed into administration following a "challenging
period" of trading in 2012, PwC said, the report relays.

The report discloses that as a result of the extensive pressure
on working capital on a small number of large projects, the
company could not continue to trade as a going concern, the
accountancy firm added.

The report says that this culminated in the directors requesting
its funders place the business into administration.  Company
operations are on hold pending discussions with customers and
contractors, and the administrators have entered into a period of
consultation with employees, the report adds.

Birmingham-headquartered Enpure Holdings designs and installs
water and waste treatment plants.

FAB UK 2004-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on all classes of notes
in FAB UK 2004-1 Ltd.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance since our previous review on Feb 8, 2011, and the
application of our updated criteria for collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) of pooled structured finance (SF) assets," S&P

"We have performed our credit and cash flow analysis using the
latest available data at the time of analysis (from the monthly
trustee report dated May.31, 2012 and May 22, 2012 payment date
report). We have also applied our 2012 counterparty criteria,"
S&P said.

"On March 19, 2012, we placed on CreditWatch negative all of our
ratings on the notes in this transaction following our update to
the criteria and assumptions we use to rate CDOs of SF assets,
which became effective on March 19, 2012," S&P said.

"Since our last review, we have observed an increase to 8.72%
from 5.92% in the proportion of assets that we consider to be
rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-'). We have
also noted a considerable increase to more than 10.00% from 1.38%
in the proportion of defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD'
[selective default], or 'D') in the collateral pool. In addition,
we have observed fewer investment-grade assets in the collateral
pool compared with our last analysis," S&P said.

"While we have noted further deleveraging of the class A-1E and
class A-1F notes since our previous review, the rise in defaults
in the underlying pool with zero market value recoveries (based
on data from the trustee report) has resulted in a fall in the
aggregate performing balance of the collateral pool. This has
reduced the level of credit enhancement available for all classes
of notes. The credit enhancement for the class BE notes has
reduced further--compared to other classes of notes in the
capital structure--due to capitalization of interest on these
notes," S&P said.

"The portfolio is concentrated among six industries and only two
countries. The class A and B overcollateralization tests continue
to breach the required triggers under the transaction documents,
resulting in no interest being made on the class BE notes (as of
the latest payment date report). The transaction is in its
amortization phase and the weighted-average maturity of the pool
has reduced further since our last analysis," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis,
based on the methodology and assumptions outlined in our CDO of
SF assets criteria and our criteria for corporate cash flow CDOs,
to determine the break-even default rate (BDR). We used the
reported portfolio balance that we considered to be performing,
the principal cash balance, the current weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using various default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"In applying our revised criteria, we note that the weighted-
average recovery rates (at each rating category) modeled in our
cash flow analysis have significantly reduced. For example, the
weighted-average recovery rate calculated at the 'AAA' rating
level reduces to 5.50% from 38.78%. This, combined with various
default patterns (based on our criteria), which in certain
scenarios, compress all of the defaults within three years and
relatively low weighted-average spread to cover payments on the
capital structure which addresses timely payment of interest
(exception class BE notes) has led to a reduction in the level of
defaults that all classes of notes can withstand, thus resulting
in a fall in BDRs," S&P said.

"We also determined the scenario default rate (SDR) for each
rated class of notes, which uses our CDO Evaluator 6.0.1 model to
determine the default rate expected on the underlying portfolio
at each rating level. The SDRs at the 'AAA' rating level have
tripled since our last review, based on our updated assumptions
contained in our CDO of SF assets criteria and negative rating
migration of the pool," S&P said.

"As part of our analysis, we tested the capital structure by
applying the largest obligor default test and industry test as
outlined in our criteria. Our evaluation of the results indicates
that none of the rating actions on the notes are affected by our
supplemental stress tests," S&P said.

"In our view, the impact of our revised criteria, combined with
the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, has meant that the level of credit enhancement
available to all classes of notes are no longer commensurate with
their current rating levels. We have therefore lowered and
removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on all classes of
notes in FAB UK 2004-1," S&P said.

"We have analyzed the counterparties' exposure to the
transaction, and concluded that the counterparty exposure is
currently sufficiently limited, so as not to affect the ratings
that we have assigned," S&P said.

FAB UK 2004-1 is a cash flow mezzanine SF CDO transaction that
closed in April 2004.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class                 Rating
               To                From

FAB UK 2004-1 Ltd.
GBP214.5 Million Fixed-, Floating-, and Zero-Coupon Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A-1E           BB+ (sf)          AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1F           BB+ (sf)          AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2E           B+ (sf)           AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3E           CCC- (sf)         BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3F           CCC- (sf)         BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
BE             CCC- (sf)         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
S1             BB+ (sf)          AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

GOODWOOD GOLD: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 4 notes
and one Credit Default Swap (CDS) and confirmed the ratings of 6
notes and 3 CDSs in Goodwood Gold Ltd. This synthetic ABS
transaction issued in 2007 is backed by a granular portfolio of
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) located across
the UK that were originated by Lloyds TSB Bank plc (A2/P-1). The
rating action concludes the review that Moody's initiated on 16
November 2011 due to worse than expected collateral performance.

The rating confirmations reflect Moody's conclusion that negative
collateral performance has recently and marginally improved and
that, for all except Class D, it has been offset by the benefits
of a strong excess spread mechanism and improving credit
enhancement levels. The downgrades of the GBP-denominated
certificates reflects their increased linkage to the rating of
Lloyds TSB (A2/P1) in its capacity as collateral deposit bank,
following a recent transaction amendment that removed the
obligation to maintain a P-1 rating for the entity performing
this role.


Issuer: Goodwood Gold Limited

    GBP76M A1 Certificate, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP55M B1 Certificate, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP11M D CDS Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
    on Nov 16, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP14M D1 Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR19.6M D2 Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
    on Nov 16, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR28M A2 Certificate, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP25M B CDS Certificate, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR16.1M B2 Certificate, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP25M C CDS Certificate, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously
    on Nov 16, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP33M C1 Certificate, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR42.7M C2 Certificate, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously
    on Nov 16, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP15.5M E CDS Certificate, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously
    on Nov 16, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    GBP19.5M E1 Certificate, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

    EUR26.6M E2 Certificate, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on
    Nov 16, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

Ratings Rationale

The rating confirmations reflect Moody's conclusion that negative
collateral performance has recently and marginally improved and
that, for all securities except Class D, it has been offset by
the benefits of a strong excess spread mechanism and improving
credit enhancement levels. Moody's review specifically considered
positively: (1) the strength of the annually replenishing
synthetic credit enhancement, whose size is larger than that on
similarly rated securities in peer transactions, (2) the stable
levels of credit enhancement provided by subordination, which
result from the absence of any loss allocation to any of the
rated notes to date, although credit enhancement is lower than
peers as the transaction is still in its pro-rata amortization
phase, (3) the existence of a trigger to switch to a sequential
amortization phase as soon as defaults exceed 70% of the annual
threshold available, (4) the recently upward trending cumulative
recovery rates, although these remain lower than originally
expected, and (5) the recently improving trends of the internal
average Basel II default probability and -- except for Class D --
the increase in the total credit enhancement adjusted for future
expected defaults.

The downgrade of Class D securities resulted from the decreasing
of its credit enhancement after accounting for future losses on
the performing pool. For this class only, positive credit trends
were not able to offset the main credit weaknesses that Moody's
has assessed for the transaction as a whole: (1) the high balance
of outstanding defaults and assets which are reported to have a
Basel II default probability of 100%, (2) the slower than
expected amortization of the portfolio, and (3) the lower than
expected recovery rates.

The downgrade of the ratings of the certificates denominated in
GBP was prompted by the downgrade of Lloyds TSB Bank plc's
ratings to A2/P-1 on 21 June 2012 and the subsequent amendment of
the transaction documentation that removed the requirement to
replace the GBP deposit bank following the loss of its A1/P-1
rating on 3 May 2012. That resulted in increased rating linkage
between the GBP certificates and Lloyds because the amendment of
the transaction documentation links the creditworthiness of the
GBP deposit that serves to repay the certificates to that of the
deposit bank. In consequence, any further deterioration of the
ratings of the deposit bank may further negatively impact the
ratings of the GBP certificates. However, the replacement trigger
for the EUR deposit remains in effect following the amendment, so
there was no negative action on certificates denominated in that
currency. The GBP-denominated CDSs are unfunded and therefore
were not affected either by the amendment.


The cumulative default rate in this transaction is higher than
previously expected and substantially higher than that observed
on other SME ABS transaction backed by assets from the same
originator. According to the investor report dated 20 July 2012,
cumulative defaults since closing amount to 9.2% of the original
pool balance excluding replenishments (6.3% if considering the
original balance plus replenishments), which correspond to a Ba2
rating proxy for the creditworthiness of the collateral. The
historical recovery rate amounts to approximately 66% of the
defaulted loan balances, according to the same report. The
transaction has been amortizing since the end of the
replenishment period in January 2010, at which point
approximately 1.4bn of replenishments had occurred since closing.
Since the beginning of the amortization period, the portfolio has
amortized to 62% of its initial size.

The transaction benefits from an excess spread mechanism which is
relatively stronger than that of other UK SME transactions from
the same originator. The synthetic excess spread is used to
replenish - up to 1.5% of the outstanding pool balance - a first
loss piece that is available to absorb losses on the portfolio.
Due to the amount of available excess spread, the rated notes
have not been allocated any losses to date despite the elevated
default rates observed in the pool. The efficiency of the
synthetic excess spread mechanism in absorbing losses to date has
also benefited from the relatively even distribution of defaults
over time. As a result, no more than 70% of the first loss piece
has ever been absorbed by pool credit events in any given year
and therefore the transaction has never breached the trigger that
would make it switch to a sequential amortization. The
transaction is amortizing on a pro rata basis but will switch to
sequential amortization if more than 70% of the yearly synthetic
excess spread is absorbed or once the portfolio has amortized to
50% of its original amount.


Moody's has updated its default collateral performance
expectation and, in its base case, now assumes a mean default
rate of 9.7% over a 4 year expected weighted average life for the
performing part of the portfolio, which corresponds to a Ba3
default rating proxy. This assumption reflects the collateral
performance to date and the expected future performance of the
pool in the current cycle in light of Moody's macroeconomic
outlook for the UK and the recently improving average internal
Basel II default probability of the portfolio. The rating agency
took into account the pools' composition, making positive
adjustments for the transaction's exposure to the countercyclical
Beverage, Food & Tobacco as well as Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals
sectors (about 52% of the performing pool balance) and negative
adjustments for the concentration of around 17% of in the highly
cyclical Construction & Building sector. Moody's has further made
negative adjustments to account for 100% of the portfolio being
micro SMEs, which exhibit higher default rates than larger SMEs
on average.

After taking into account the credit event definition and the non
performing part of the portfolio, Moody's expects an overall
cumulative default rate of 15.2% of the total pool that
corresponds to a B1 rating proxy for the collateral. This revised
expectation is broadly in line with the assumed default rate at
the time of the previous rating review in November 2009. The
assumption reflects a stress of 5% applied to the default rate
for the performing pool (about 93% of the total pool) to account
for restructuring being included in the credit event definition
of this transaction. In addition, 4.9% of the total pool have
been reported to be outstanding defaults and 2.4% of the
portfolio to be currently performing but with 100% Basel II
default probability. Moody's has compared historical Basel II
default rates in the portfolio with actual default rates and
observed that at most one-third of defaults have actually become
credit events, due in part to the 180 day overdue credit event
definition specific to this transaction. Accordingly, Moody's has
assumed that 0.8% of the portfolio will default with certainty,
which corresponds to a default rate of about 33% on the assets
with 100% Basel II default probability.

In the absence of valid maturity or average life data for the
portfolio, Moody's has assumed a weighted average life of
approximately 4 years for the current portfolio. This assumptions
is based on the portfolio's amortization to date, its comprising
of about 40% of loans with bullet maturities, and the
transaction's legal final maturity of January 2025, before which
Moody's expects the portfolio to have fully amortized.

Moody's combined a normal-inverse default distribution with
stochastic recovery rate scenarios to determine the losses in
each of the scenarios on the notes. Based on the performing
portfolio composition, Moody's has determined a standard
deviation of 5.3% for its default distribution, which in light of
the distribution's mean assumption translates to a coefficient of
variation of about 35%. While the pool is highly granular in
terms of average borrower size, with an effective number of 3,600
and about 18,500 reference entities, the portfolio granularity
has reduced due to amortization and the pairwise asset
correlation has been increased to 8%.

Moody's has lowered it expected mean recovery to 65% from 70% due
to lower than expected observed recoveries. Moody's recovery rate
volatility assumption is 20%. In the base case, Moody's assumes
the timing of defaults to occur at a constant quarterly rate over
6 years.


Extended periods of elevated default rates and low recoveries
would adversely impact the transaction, as the credit enhancement
provided by synthetic excess spread would be more heavily
absorbed in such scenarios and losses might then be allocated to
the notes. Moody's has tested the impact of increased default
rates and alternative default timings, including scenarios with
default spikes in early periods as well as constant default rates
over two and four years to test their effect on the benefit of
excess spread. While Moody's ratings reflects stresses on each of
these dimensions, the rated notes would suffer losses consistent
with lower ratings if default rates, recovery rates and the
timing of default together turned out to be worse than
historically observed for a sustained period.


The methodologies used in assigning and monitoring these ratings
were "Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"
published in February 2007, "Refining the ABS SME Approach:
Moody's Probability of Default assumptions in the rating analysis
of granular Small and Mid-sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA"
published in March 2009, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Granular
SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa" published in
June 2007.

Moody's used its excel-based cash flow model, Moody's ABSROM(TM),
as part of its quantitative analysis of the transaction. Moody's
ABSROM(TM) model enables users to model various features of a
standard European ABS transaction including: (i) the specifics of
the default distribution of the assets, their portfolio
amortization profile and recoveries; and (ii) triggers such as a
switch from pro-rata to sequential in the loss allocation and
amortization priority and credit enhancements such as
subordination and synthetic excess spread on the liability side
of the ABS structure. Moody's ABSROM(TM) User Guide is available
on Moody's website and covers the model's functionality as well
as providing a comprehensive index of the user inputs and
outputs. MOODY'S CDOROMv2.8(TM) was used to estimate the standard
deviation of the normal-inverse default distribution.

MELTON BLINDS: More Customers Fight to Get Repayment
Lynn News reports that more people owed money by West Norfolk
family business Melton Blinds, which has gone into liquidation,
have struggled to get their money back.

And the Insolvency Service has said that the company was ordered
into compulsory liquidation on Jan. 27, 2010, on a petition
presented by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, according to Lynn

Michael, Carole and Richard Melton were the company's directors
at the time of the winding-up order -- but they are not
disqualified at this time despite the liquidation, Lynn News

Since last week's report on deposits running into hundreds of
pounds paid to the business for work that was not carried out or
completed, further unhappy customers have told Lynn News they are
in the same situation and being thwarted in their attempts to get
their money returned.

MILLERS AT MIDMAR: Enters Liquidation; 40 Workers Lose Jobs
Scott McCulloch at reports that Millers at Midmar
has gone into liquidation with the loss of 40 jobs.

According to the report, appointed liquidator Johnston Carmichael
said Millers at Midmar, which has been in business for 25 years,
had suffered a downturn in trade and had been unable to attract
new investment or a buyer to save the business.

The business launched a closing down sale on August 30, the
report says. relates that property agent Ryden had been
marketing the 23,000 sq. ft. property, including retail space, a
restaurant and warehouse, since July.

"A downturn in trading and unsuccessful attempts to find
additional investors or a buyer for the company, Muiryhall
Limited which trades as Millers Restaurant and Visitors Centre,
has resulted in the decision to shortly close the business,
resulting in over 40 redundancies," the report quotes appointed
provisional liquidator, Gordon MacLure, as saying.

"All stock remaining at Millers will be sold at discounted prices
during the company's closing down sale which will start on
Thursday, August 30."

Millers at Midmar operates a farm shop and visitor centre in

PERSEUS PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit rating on
Perseus (European Loan Conduit No. 22) PLC's class C notes to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'. "At the same time, we have affirmed our
'D (sf)' rating on the class D notes," S&P said.

The rating actions follow an interest shortfall on the class C

"The special servicer, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Servicing Ltd.,
has sold the assets securing the Major Belle loan, which has been
in special servicing since it failed to repay at maturity in
October 2010. The asset sale was insufficient to pay the
outstanding loan amount," S&P said.

"The issuer has applied a non-accruing interest (NAI) amount of
GBP4.69 million on the class D notes and GBP248,031 on the class
C notes on the April 2012 interest payment date (IPD). Therefore,
the principal balance used for calculating interest accrued on
these classes of notes has reduced," S&P said.

The latest cash manager report declares that, as a result, the
issuer paid reduced interest to the class C noteholders on the
July 2012 IPD.

"To reflect this interest shortfall, we have lowered our rating
on the class C notes to 'D (sf)'. We have affirmed our rating on
the class D notes, which has been at 'D (sf)' since May 29, 2012.
The class A2, A3, and B notes are unaffected by 's rating
actions," S&P said.

Perseus (European Loan Conduit No. 22) is a true-sale commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in
December 2005. The transaction is currently backed by three loans
secured on properties in the U.K. The outstanding principal
balance of the transaction is GBP102.1 million. Morgan Stanley
Bank International Ltd. (A/Negative/A-1) originated all of the
underlying loans between December 2004 and December 2005.


"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European CMBS. However, these criteria are under review,"
S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice Of Proposed Criteria
Change, our review may result in changes to the methodology and
assumptions we use when rating European CMBS, and consequently,
it may affect both new and outstanding ratings on European CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

"On June 4, 2012, we published a Request For Comment outlining
our proposed criteria changes for CMBS Global Property Evaluation
Methodology. The proposed criteria do not significantly change
Standard & Poor's longstanding approach to deriving property net
cash flow and value. We therefore anticipate limited impact for
European outstanding ratings when the updated CMBS Global
Property Evaluation Methodology criteria are finalized," S&P

"However, because of its global scope, the proposed CMBS Global
Property Evaluation Methodology does not include certain market-
specific adjustments. An application of these criteria to
European transactions will therefore be published when we release
our updated rating criteria," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and monitor these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class                           Rating
                    To                        From

Perseus (European Loan Conduit No. 22) PLC
GBP514.538 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

C                   D (sf)                    CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D                   D (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A2                  A (sf)
A3                  A (sf)
B                   BBB (sf)

TRAVELODGE: 96% of Landlords Approve Rent Reductions Under CVA
Christopher Thompson at The Financial Times reports that
Travelodge has agreed to rent reductions with landlords at more
than a fifth of its 500-strong estate in the wake of a financial

According to the FT, the company said 96% of landlords had agreed
to a company voluntary arrangement that would see rents reduced
by a quarter at 109 hotels while a further 49 hotels would be
transferred to new operators over the next six months.

Last month, Travelodge agreed to be taken over by its creditors
-- Goldman Sachs and two New York hedge funds -- as part of a
debt restructuring deal to save it from formal administration,
the FT relates.

In return for full control, the three creditors agreed to write
off GBP235 million in bank debt, cancel a GBP482 million eurobond
and inject GBP75 million of new capital into the group, the FT

Under the deal, Travelodge -- which battled to cope with GBP635
million bank debt and about GBP100 million per year in associated
interest payments -- would see its bank debt nearly halved to
GBP329 million, the FT states.

The deal meant losses for Dubai International Capital, an
investment arm of the emirate, which bought the hotel chain in
2006 for GBP675 million in a highly leveraged deal that included
about GBP475 million of debt financing, the FT notes.

Travelodge is a British budget hotelier.


* Moody's Maintains Stable Outlook on Global Reinsurance Sector
The outlook for the global reinsurance industry remains stable,
says Moody's Investor Services in a new Industry Outlook
published on Sept. 4. The stable outlook expresses Moody's
expectations for the fundamental credit conditions in the
industry over the next 12 to 18 months. The outlook factors in
the industry's resilience as well as improvements in underwriting
and risk management, augmented by a possible pickup in demand due
to tougher, impending regulations and rate hardening in some
primary insurance markets.

The new report is entitled, "Global Reinsurance Outlook".

"Reinsurers have already emerged from the second worst year for
insured disaster losses with more capital than they had at the
start of 2011," said Kevin Lee, senior credit officer at Moody's.
They also emerged with tighter underwriting and better risk
management. At the same time, long-awaited hardening in some
primary insurance lines is laying the foundation for reinsurance
rate stability. However, Moody's notes that a large disaster,
faltering primary rates or worsening of the global economy could
place downward pressure on the industry's stability.

Over time, a key challenge for the industry is competitive
convergence, which is making it harder for reinsurers to create
distinct strategies. Dwindling prospects in casualty and life
reinsurance and low interest rates are steering reinsurers and
new capital toward catastrophe (cat) risk. Meanwhile, the ongoing
shift from direct distribution to broker intermediation is making
it easier for new entrants to compete.

Cyclical and secular factors are also driving a new wave of
capital into reinsurance and cat risk. Despite ample capacity in
the industry, around US$6 billion of new capital in various
formats has entered the sector since 2011, raising the amount of
alternative capital in the industry to US$34 billion. Overall,
Moody's finds this new capital to be credit negative for
incumbent reinsurers, particularly when the industry has adequate
capital as it does today, as excess capital tends to drive down
revenues and margins.

On the upside, this new capital shows investors are still
interested in reinsurance even though they may not be interested
in reinsurance stocks, which for the most part have traded below
book value for nearly four years. In a stress scenario, new
capital, no matter what form it takes, can be a saving grace for
wounded reinsurers. Reinsurers who find it hard to recapitalize
in equity markets may still be able to find partners for
sidecars, which will allow them to keep writing business and
maintain a franchise.

* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars

November 1-3, 2012
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800;

April 10-12, 2013
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

October 3-5, 2013
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *