TCREUR_Public/120907.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, September 7, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 179



LOCINDUS: Moody's Cuts Standalone Credit Assessment to 'ba3'


CENTROTHERM: Sells Michael Glatt Unit to Avert Insolvency
GUMPERT: German Supercar Maker Files for Insolvency
LANDESBANK BERLIN: Moody's Assigns Rating to Daheim Series Bonds


DECO 17: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'D'
MCCABE BUILDERS: NAMA Appoints Receivers Over EUR200-Mil. Debt
TARGET EXPRESS: High Court OKs Sale of Business


SLS CAPITAL: Proceedings Recognized in the United States


ODEON ABS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes


HYDROBUDOWA POLSKA: May Cut Up to 850 Jobs


NOSTRUM 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'BB'
* PORTUGAL: Moody's Adjusts Country Ceilings for Bonds & Deposits


ASMITA GARDENS: Creditors Back Reorganization Plan


AYT HIPOTECARIO: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Ratings on Two Tranches
BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Cuts Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'D'


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Court to Decide on Couronne Refinery Buyer


* TURKEY: Moody's Rates Upcoming USD-Denominated Sukuk '(P)Ba1'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BMIBABY: To Close After No Buyer Found; 450 Jobs Affected
ENPURE LTD: In Administration After Sustained Creditor Pressure
LONMIN PLC: Enters Into "Peace Accord" with Striking Miners


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 European CDO Tranches
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 European CDO Tranches
* BOOK REVIEW: Corporate Venturing -- Creating New Businesses



LOCINDUS: Moody's Cuts Standalone Credit Assessment to 'ba3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone credit
assessment of Locindus to ba3 from ba1 and assigned a negative
outlook. Locindus's deposit ratings of A2/Prime-1 and its stable
outlook are unaffected by the announcement.

Locindus's standalone credit assessment was lowered because of
(1) the risks stemming from the entity's limited franchise and
inherent concentration risks arising from its exposure to the
commercial real-estate (CRE) sector; (2) the pressure on the
institution's profitability and asset quality resulting from the
weakening macroeconomic environment; and (3) its reliance on its
parent Credit Foncier de France (CFF; A2 deposits, stable; D-/ba3
standalone bank financial strength rating/standalone credit
assessment, negative) for risk management and refinancing.

Moody's employed its Finance Company Global Rating Methodology,
published in March 2012, as the primary methodology to assign the
ba3 standalone credit assessment for Locindus. The previous
standalone credit profile of D+/ba1, placed under review for
downgrade on February 15, 2012, was determined under the
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology, published in June
2012. With the change in primary methodology for Moody's
assessment of Locindus's standalone credit profile, Moody's will
no longer separately disclose a BFSR for this entity.


First Driver for the Standalone Credit Assessment -- Limited
Franchise and High Credit Concentration

As a specialized French credit institution focusing on CRE
leasing, Locindus is a monoline institution. With EUR863 million
in total assets and a property finance lease and loan portfolio
of EUR680 million at end-June 2012, Locindus is a very small
player in the domestic CRE market. Despite its experience and
good brand recognition in its niche market, Locindus's client
base remains limited and is unlikely to expand going forward.
Moreover, its lease portfolio is highly concentrated. As of end-
June 2012, the 25 largest customers formed 58% of total credit
exposures, representing 174% of Locindus's tangible common

Moody's believes that the low granularity of Locindus's client
portfolio, its very high asset concentrations (ca. 42% of the
exposures relate to shopping outlets) and low geographical
diversification (ca. 42% of the exposures originated from the
Paris region at H1 2012), render Locindus vulnerable to the
deteriorating operating environment and to a CRE sector downturn.

Second Driver -- Pressure from the Deterioration of the
Macroeconomic Environment

As a monoline institution, Locindus's profitability is inherently
volatile and reliant on the trends in both the CRE market and the
operating environment. Locindus's recent profitability indicators
were sustained by exceptional items, stemming from the divestment
of its rental portfolio (managed in run-off since 2007) and the
transformation of long-term rental contracts into leasing
contracts. Excluding those exceptional items, Moody's believes
that Locindus's underlying profitability remains weak.

Although asset-quality indicators remain adequate as of Sept. 5,
Moody's believes that Locindus is inherently exposed to a rapid
deterioration of its cost of risk, considering its high borrower
concentrations. In addition, the firm remains vulnerable to a
macro-economic downturn, illustrated at end-2011 when non-
performing loans as a percentage of gross loans suddenly jumped
to 1.5% from 0.1% at year-end 2010, due to a EUR10.2 million
surge in non-performing loans stemming from one deal, which has
since been transferred to CFF.

Moody's anticipates that the French economy, and more generally
most European economies, will continue to register weak
performance for the foreseeable future. For this reason, Moody's
expects Locindus's profitability to remain under pressure in the
quarters to come.

Third Driver -- High Integration and Reliance on Credit Foncier

Since CFF acquired the majority of Locindus in 2007 and the
management agreement was put in place the same year, Locindus is
now highly integrated and reliant on its direct parent CFF,
notably for funding and liquidity but also for sourcing new
business. Moody's believes that there are extensive operational
linkages between Locindus and CFF for the following reasons:

(1) Locindus's commercial strategy is highly integrated with that
of CFF, which uses Locindus's expertise for complex real-estate
leasing operations. While Locindus will continue to complement
CFF's commercial offerings, its loan production is expected to
remain at a modest level. Locindus's rental activity has been in
run-off mode since 2007, whereas CFF has embarked on a selective
deleveraging process focusing mainly on its international

(2) As part of the management agreement between CFF and Locindus,
risk-management, human resources and IT functions are delegated
to CFF, thereby further increasing the level of integration
between the two institutions. In addition, Locindus is fully
reliant on CFF for refinancing and ALM financial risk management.

Although Moody's recognizes the tangible benefits to Locindus's
liquidity profile of the access to CFF funding, Moody's believes
that the credit weaknesses of its parent, notably its wholesale
funding profile, should be appropriately captured in Locindus's
standalone credit assessment. CFF's standalone credit assessment
is D-/ba3 with negative outlook.


The outlook on Locindus's standalone credit assessment is
negative and reflects Moody's view that the firm's financial
strength may come under further pressure in the event of a more
pronounced macro-economic downturn. It also reflects the firm's
high correlation with and liquidity reliance on CFF, deriving
from the strong operational linkages between the two


Locindus's A2 long-term deposit rating with stable outlook, which
is seven notches higher than its standalone credit assessment of
ba3, is unaffected by the Sept. 5 announcement. The high support
uplift results from the firm's affiliation to BPCE (A2
stable/Prime-1; D/ba2 stable) and its inclusion within the group
solidarity mechanism.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on Locindus's standalone credit assessment is
unlikely as it carries a negative outlook. Any upward pressure on
its standalone credit strength is unlikely to trigger an upgrade
of the long-term deposit ratings, given the very high uplift
incorporated into Locindus's deposit rating.

Locindus's standalone credit assessment could be downgraded if
Moody's considers that a macroeconomic slowdown could materially
affect the firm's profitability or asset quality and as such,
challenge the overall viability of the firm's franchise and
business model.

Locindus's A2 long-term deposit rating would likely be downgraded
if Moody's believes that Groupe BPCE's creditworthiness has
deteriorated (BPCE ultimately provides support to Locindus, if
needed, through CFF). Downwards pressure could also develop if
(1) Moody's believes there has been significant deterioration in
the probability of mutualist support from the group, due to a
change in Locindus's affiliation status, and/or a weakening
solidarity mechanism; and (2) Moody's believes there is a lower
probability of systemic support being provided to Groupe BPCE,
and in turn to Locindus.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Company Global Rating Methodology, published on March 2012.


CENTROTHERM: Sells Michael Glatt Unit to Avert Insolvency
Maria Sheahan at Reuters reports that Centrotherm has sold its
subsidiary Michael Glatt Maschinenbau GmbH as it tries to claw
its way out of insolvency for an undisclosed price.

According to Reuters, the company, which filed for protection
from creditors in July, said it sold Michael Glatt to Buechl
Handels- und Beteiligungs-KG.

Centrotherm is a German solar equipment maker.

GUMPERT: German Supercar Maker Files for Insolvency
The Motor Report says German supercar manufacturer Gumpert has
filed for insolvency protection after a gamble on the Chinese
market failed to pay off.

The legal protection afforded under German law means Gumpert will
be able to restructure and rebirth itself, if adequate investor
funding is found, the Motor Report says.

According to Motor Report, lawyer Gorge Scheid, in charge of the
company while it reorganises, said this week that the prospects
for Gumpert are good.

Talks with new investors are expected to start within the week,
the report notes.

Gumpert was formed in Altenburg in 2004 under the direction of
former Audi Sport executive Roland Gumpert. Back then it was
known as GMG Sportwagenmanufaktur Altenburg GmbH

LANDESBANK BERLIN: Moody's Assigns Rating to Daheim Series Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a long-term rating of Aaa
to the Series 1-2012 mortgage covered bonds (the covered bonds)
issued by Landesbank Berlin AG (the issuer or LBB) under its
Daheim program (the program).

Ratings Rationale

A covered bond benefits from (i) the issuer's promise to pay
interest and principal on the bonds; and (ii) if the issuer
defaults, the economic benefit of a collateral pool (the cover
pool). The ratings therefore take into account the following

(1) The credit strength of LBB (A1, deposits; D+/baa3, Prime-1,

(2) The value of the cover pool in the event of issuer default.
    The stressed level of losses modelled in event of issuer
    default (cover pool losses) for this transaction is 28.1% on
    a weighted average basis.

The analysis of the value of the cover pool considered:

(2.1) The credit quality of the assets backing the covered bonds.
      The covered bonds are backed by German residential mortgage
      loans originated by two German Sparkassen. The weighted
      average collateral score of the cover pools is 16.9%.

(2.2) The structure of the program. Notable aspects of the
      structure include a built-in extension to the maturity of
      the notes (thus mitigating refinancing risk) and, the
      matching of the maturities of the pledged secured loan with
      those of the notes (thus mitigating market and refinancing

(2.3) The exposure to interest rate risk.

(3) The over-collateralization levels in the cover pool is
provided on a "committed" basis. The minimum over-
collateralization levels that are consistent with the Aaa rating
are 23.0% and 27.0% respectively, which are provided in a
"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is not relying
on "uncommitted" over-collateralization in its expected loss

The TPI assigned to this transaction is Probable. Moody's TPI
framework does not constrain the rating.

At present, the total value of the assets included in the cover
pool, comprising 1,779 residential mortgage loans is
approximately EUR91 million. The loans have a weighted-average
seasoning of 60 months and a weighted-average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 59.1%.

The rating assigned by Moody's addresses the expected loss posed
to investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to


Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL), which determines expected loss as (i) a function
of the issuer's probability of default (measured by the issuer's
rating); and (ii) the stressed losses on the cover pool assets
following issuer default.

The cover pool losses for the covered bonds are 28.1% on a
weighted average basis. This is an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models if LBB defaults. Cover pool losses can be split
between market risk of 16.8% and collateral risk of 11.3% (both
on a weighted average basis). Market risk measures losses as a
result of refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from
the credit quality of the assets in the cover pool. Collateral
risk is derived from the collateral score, which is currently
16.9% on a weighted average basis.

The minimum over-collateralization levels that are consistent
with the Aaa rating target are 23.0% and 27.0% respectively.
Therefore, Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" over-
collateralization in its expected loss analysis.

For further details on cover pool losses, collateral risk, market
risk, collateral score and TPI Leeway across covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's EMEA Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. All numbers in
this section are based on Moody's most recent modelling (based on
data, as per July 31, 2012).

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which indicates the likelihood that timely payment will be
made to covered bondholders following issuer default. The effect
of the TPI framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a
certain number of notches above the issuer's rating.

Moody's has assigned a TPI of Probable to Daheim Series 2012-1.


The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
issuer's credit strength.

The TPI Leeway measures the number of notches by which the
issuer's rating may be downgraded before the covered bonds are
downgraded under the TPI framework.

Based on the current TPI of Probable the TPI Leeway for Daheim
Series 2012-1 is 2 notches, meaning the covered bonds might be
downgraded as a result of a TPI cap once the issuer rating is
downgraded below A3, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (i) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (ii) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or
(iii) a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of covered bonds
remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the
general economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively impact the ratings of covered
bonds. For more information please refer to the Rating
Implementation Guidance published on 13 February 2012 "How
Sovereign Credit Quality May Affect Other Ratings". Furthermore,
as discussed in Moody's special report "Rating Euro Area
Governments Through Extraordinary Times -- An Updated Summary,"
published in October 2011, Moody's is considering reintroducing
individual country ceilings for some or all euro area members,
which could affect further the maximum structured finance rating
achievable in those countries. Moody's is also continuing to
consider the impact of the deterioration of sovereigns' financial
condition and the resultant asset portfolio deterioration in
covered bond transactions.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in July 2012. Please
see the Credit Policy page on for a copy of this


DECO 17: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'B-
(sf)' its credit rating on DECO 17 - Pan Europe 7 Ltd.'s class F

"The rating action follows continued interest shortfalls on the
class F notes and, more recently, on the class E notes. All notes
in this transaction, except class A, are covered by an available
funds cap (AFC). The cap arises from the potential that interest
receipts from the loans may be insufficient to pay interest on
the notes, due to prepayments and low spread at closing between
the weighted-average coupon and the weighted-average loan
margin," S&P said.

"DECO 17 - Pan Europe 7 is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction arranged by Deutsche Bank AG
(A+/Negative/A-1), which also acts as servicer. It currently
comprises 11 loans, down from 12 at closing in December 2007. One
of the loans (5% of the closing loan pool balance) has prepaid.
The transaction is granular and the largest loan (LWB) accounts
for only 19% of the pool balance. Most of the loans (75% of the
loan pool balance) mature in 2014, six years before the notes
mature in 2020," S&P said.

"All loans are current and we understand that the issuer is not
drawing on the liquidity facility at the moment. The Rockpoint
loan, however is in breach of its interest coverage ratio
covenant, and the Elbblick loan was restructured. This has
triggered a cash trap, where the servicer retains excess rental
income that would otherwise be released to the borrower," S&P

"On the January 2010 interest payment date, the issuer did not
pay full interest on the class B notes and those lower in the
capital structure. At closing, the loan margins to cover the
issuer's margin payments under the notes were relatively low. The
issuer entered into a series of swap transactions that exchange
the loan margin that it receives under the LWB, WGN MF, WBN MF,
AFI, Gabriel, and NILEG MF loans, for higher loan margins (90
basis points). The purpose of this was to increase the amount of
funds that the issuer has available to pay note interest and
senior expenses," S&P said.

"The current shortfall is a result of the January 2010 shortfall,
and therefore not covered by an AFC. We had expected it to repay
but, as prepayments occur and the class A notes are amortized,
available funds to repay this shortfall have decreased. We no
longer expect it to be repaid," S&P said.

"Three loans in this pool (WGN, WBN, and Nileg) were subject to
discretionary margin step-ups in October 2009. Additionally,
these loans were subject to a reducing notional amount, which
would be offset by this margin step-up. The servicer exercised
this step-up on Jan. 23, 2010," S&P said.

"As all of the loans have continued to meet their debt service
obligations in full, the interest shortfalls on the more senior
classes of notes have gradually repaid. However, the unpaid
interest balance has increased in Q1 2012 and Q2 2012. Therefore,
the interest shortfall on the class F notes has increased," S&P

"We have lowered to 'D (sf)' our rating on the class F notes
because they continue to suffer interest shortfalls, which we
consider the issuer unlikely to repay," S&P said.


"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European CMBS. However, these criteria are under review,"
S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice Of Proposed Criteria
Change, our review may result in changes to the methodology and
assumptions we use when rating European CMBS, and consequently,
it may affect both new and outstanding ratings on European CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

"On June 4, 2012, we published a Request For Comment outlining
our proposed criteria changes for CMBS Global Property Evaluation
Methodology . The proposed criteria do not significantly change
Standard & Poor's longstanding approach to deriving property net
cash flow and value. We therefore anticipate limited impact for
European outstanding ratings when the updated CMBS Global
Evaluation Methodology criteria are finalized," S&P said.

"However, because of its global scope, the proposed CMBS Global
Property Evaluation Methodology does not include certain market-
specific adjustments. An application of these criteria to
European transactions will therefore be published when we release
our updated rating criteria," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and monitor these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

MCCABE BUILDERS: NAMA Appoints Receivers Over EUR200-Mil. Debt
Donal O'Donovan at reports that the National Asset
Management Agency has appointed receivers to McCabe Builders
(Dublin) over debts of around EUR200 million.

NAMA appointed Jim Hamilton and David O'Connor of accountants BDO
as receivers of the company on August 31, relates.

The appointment of receivers follows reports last month that the
company was locked in talks with NAMA in relation to an asset
sale strategy, notes.

However, those reports were quickly followed at the start of this
month with an action by recruitment firm MCR Personnel to have
McCabe liquidated over what it claimed was an unpaid debt,
according to

Now NAMA has moved to secure its position ahead of any such
liquidation by having its own receivers appointed,

Last year, McCabe came close to agreeing a rescue deal with
Bahrain-based Western Gulf Advisory (WGA),

WGA was to take a stake in the business by buying some of
McCabe's debt and would then provide EUR50 million in fresh
capital to finish out stalled projects, but the deal was never
completed, discloses.

McCabe Builders (Dublin) is a building firm set up in the 1970s
by husband and wife team John and Mary McCabe.

TARGET EXPRESS: High Court OKs Sale of Business
Mary Carolan and Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times report that
some of the 398 jobs lost as a result of the liquidation of
Target Express could be saved after the High Court approved its
sale to a rival, Masterlink Logistics.

In the High Court Friday, the Irish Times relates, senior counsel
Rossa Fanning, acting for the liquidators, asked for permission
to complete "within hours" the sale of the company to
Blanchardstown-based Masterlink Logistics Ltd.

According to the report, Mr. Fanning said Masterlink had offered
to buy the goodwill, intellectual property rights including the
business name, and the customer list of Target, for an
undisclosed sum.  Its offer was the larger of two made to the
liquidators on Friday, the report notes.

The Irish Times says Masterlink has committed to re-employing as
many staff as possible, but the court heard that depended on how
much of Target's business it could secure.  The more business
Masterlink could get, the more jobs would be saved.

The liquidators believed this deal was the best that could be
secured and that it offered the best prospect of securing the
business and employment, Mr. Fanning, as cited by The Irish
Times, said.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 31,
2012, The Irish Times said Target Express was placed in
liquidation on August 29 as workers continued sit-ins at some of
its depots.  Target ceased trading with the loss of 398 jobs.
Managing director Seamus McBrien claimed the Revenue
Commissioners forced it out of business in a row over EUR175,000,
the Irish Times noted. The High Court appointed Michael McAteer
and Stephen Tennant of Grant Thornton as provisional liquidators
to College Freight, which trades as Target Express.  Jim Hamilton
and Peter Doherty of BDO were appointed liquidators of Asda
Properties, a holding company for the Target group's properties,
the Irish Times disclosed.

Target Express opened in 1988 and is Ireland's largest privately
owned transport and distribution company with 12 operating depots
throughout the 32 counties and 4 within the UK.  It employs 390
staff in Ireland and the UK.


SLS CAPITAL: Proceedings Recognized in the United States
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
entered an order recognizing as "foreign main proceeding" SLS
Capital S.A.'s proceeding pending in Luxembourg pursuant to
Article 203 of the law of 10 August 1915 of Luxembourg, as
subsequently amended.

Maitre Yann Baden is duly appointed as foreign representative of
SLS within the meaning of section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Court also granted SLS all relief afforded to a foreign main
proceeding pursuant to section 1520 of the Bankruptcy Code.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 20, 2012,
the liquidator of Luxembourg-based SLS Capital S.A. filed in
Manhattan a petition under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-12707) on June 25, 2012, to seek
recognition of proceedings in Luxembourg as "foreign main

Maitre Yann Baden, the liquidator and foreign representative,
estimated SLS Capital to have assets and debts of US$100 million
to US$500 million.  The liquidator is represented in the U.S.
case by Carollynn H.G. Callari, Esq., at Venable LLP as counsel.

SLS was a financial services company whose primary business was
the issuance of bonds to persons residing outside the United
States.  In the operation of its business SLS had counterparties
and advisors in the United States and had significant assets held
in custodial asset and cash accounts in New York City. The assets
held in the United States were the primary collateral for the
bonds that SLS issued.

On June 4, 2009, the State Prosecutor in Luxembourg filed an
application in the District Court of and in Luxembourg (Case
Number L-6258/09), to wind up and order the liquidation of SLS, a
Luxembourg joint stock company, pursuant to Article 203 of the
law of August 10, 1915 of Luxembourg, as subsequently amended.

On Oct. 1, 2009, the Luxembourg Court ordered the dissolution of
SLS and placed SLS into liquidation "declar[ing] applicable those
legal provisions pertaining to the liquidation of a bankruptcy"
and "appoint[ing] as magistrate in bankruptcy [Supervising Judge]
Mrs. Carole BESCH, judge with the Luxembourg Court, and
designat[ing] as liquidator Maitre Yann BADEN, lawyer residing in
Luxembourg. . . ."

The liquidator says that there is need for U.S. recognition of
the Luxembourg proceeding.  As part of the process of marshaling
SLS's assets and paying SLS's debts, the SLS Liquidator seeks to
investigate the disappearance of SLS's assets including assets
held in custodial accounts and to pursue such actions as are
appropriate in order to recover SLS's assets and/or seek damages
from culpable third parties.


ODEON ABS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Four Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ODEON ABS 2007-1 B.V.'s notes, as

  -- EUR15.0m Class A-1 (ISIN XS0308505568): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR21.0m Class A-2 (ISIN XS0308507267): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR14.4m Class A-3 (ISIN XS0308534154): affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR15.0m Class B (ISIN XS0308534311): affirmed at 'Csf'

The affirmation reflects the notes' levels of credit enhancement
relative to the portfolio credit quality, which has deteriorated
since the last review in December 2011.  Assets rated 'CCCsf' or
below represent 23.3% of the portfolio, up from 15.1% in December

All over-collateralization (OC) tests have been failing since
2009.  As a consequence of the OC test breach, excess spread has
been used to reduce the senior swap notional.  The class A-2
interest coverage (IC) test is passing with a stable cushion.
The class A-1 and A-2 notes are making timely interest payments
while interest on the class A-3 and B notes is being deferred.

ODEON ABS 2007-1 B.V. is a partially funded synthetic
securitization of primarily mezzanine structured finance assets,
which contains cash flow structural features such as OC and IC
tests.  The reference portfolio replenishment period ended in
August 2012 and the transaction is now static.


HYDROBUDOWA POLSKA: May Cut Up to 850 Jobs
Bastian Krzysztof at Polska Agencja Prasowa reports that
Hydrobudowa's spokesperson Jakub Miller told PAP on Thursday the
company may lay off up to 850 persons.

"Hydrobudowa has currently a limited possibility of realizing
contracts," PAP quotes Mr. Miller as saying.  "The bankruptcy
motion filed in June caused an avalanche of contract
terminations, significantly limiting the means for current
operating activity."

Hydrobudowa Polska secured court bankruptcy protection for debt
restructuring proceedings on June 11, PAP relates.

According to PAP, first half financial statements showed that
Hydrobudowa posted an attributable net loss of PLN787 million in
the first half of 2012 as its business collapsed in the second

Hydrobudowa Polska is a unit of PBG SA, Poland's third largest


NOSTRUM 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB (sf)' from
'BBB- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
rating on Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 PLC's class A notes. "At the
same time, we have affirmed our ratings on the class B and C
notes," S&P said.

"The rating action on the class A notes resolves our Dec. 21,
2011 CreditWatch placement of our rating on these notes, which
resulted from our Dec. 16, 2011 rating actions on Portuguese
banks following our application of our new ratings criteria for
banks. We placed the class A and B notes on CreditWatch negative
as a result of a direct ratings link between our ratings on these
tranches and our rating on Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. (BB-
/Negative/B), as swap and fund account provider," S&P said.

"On March 7, 2012, we lowered our ratings on the class B and C
notes following our revised assessment of Portuguese country
risk. We did not resolve the CreditWatch placement on the class A
note at that time, due to ongoing negotiations between Caixa
Geral de Depositos and potential replacement swap and fund
account providers," S&P said.

"Caixa Geral de Depositos, as fund account provider, breached the
minimum required replacement trigger on March 28, 2011. Under our
2012 counterparty criteria, we require a replacement to be found
within 60 calendar days. In accordance with the fund account
agreement, Caixa Geral de Depositos is posting collateral in an
amount equivalent to the maximum amount credited to the fund
account in the last collection period. This amount is currently
sufficient to cover senior fees and class A interest payments for
18 months, therefore we are excluding the fund account in our
counterparty analysis," S&P said.

"We do not consider the swap agreement to be in line with our
2012 counterparty criteria. Caixa Geral de Depositos, as swap
provider, breached the minimum required replacement trigger on
March 28, 2011, but is posting collateral in accordance with our
counterparty criteria, therefore, under these criteria, the
highest potential rating on the notes in this transaction is
equal to the 'BB-' long-term issuer credit rating on the swap
provider plus one notch," S&P said.

"We have therefore lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A
notes," S&P said.

"We have also carried out a credit and cash flow analysis using
the most recent transaction data. We have determined that the
class B and C notes have sufficient credit enhancement to
maintain their current ratings in our cash flow scenarios.
Therefore, we have affirmed our ratings on the class B and C
notes," S&P said.

Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 is backed by Portuguese residential
mortgages originated by Caixa Geral de Depositos.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class               Rating
            To                  From

Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 PLC
EUR1 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           BB (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

B           B (sf)
C           B- (sf)

* PORTUGAL: Moody's Adjusts Country Ceilings for Bonds & Deposits
Moody's Investors Service has adjusted the country ceilings for
Portugal's local- and foreign-currency bonds and deposits to Baa3
from Aaa. This means that the highest rating that can be assigned
to a domestic issuer in Portugal or to a structured finance
security backed by Portuguese-domiciled receivables has now been
lowered to Baa3. At the same time, Moody's has also adjusted the
short-term foreign-currency debt and deposit ceilings to Prime-3
from Prime-1.

Moody's notes that these changes have no rating implications for
rated issuers in Portugal, as none are currently rated above the
revised ceiling level of Baa3. Moody's is however likely to
downgrade to a maximum of Baa3 all structured finance (SF)
transactions backed by Portuguese receivables currently rated
above Baa3, which are already subject to a maximum SF rating of
Baa1. The same is true of rated covered bond that are backed by
Portuguese receivables whose senior-most tranche ratings that
currently exceed Baa3.


Moody's decision to adjust Portugal's country ceiling is based on
the rating agency's assessment of the risks of economic and
financial instability in the country and the likely impact this
would have on all other borrowers and SF instruments in Portugal,
as income and access to liquidity and funding could be
significantly curtailed under stressed conditions. The ceiling
also reflects the risk of exit and redenomination in the unlikely
event of a default by the sovereign. At the same time, the three-
notch gap between the government debt rating of Ba3 and the
ceiling of Baa3 provides room for higher ratings for some asset
classes with stronger intrinsic credit characteristics and with
the capacity to absorb the economic and financial pressures that
could stem from a sovereign default.

Uncertainty concerning debt market access remains for many
governments in the euro area. While the Portuguese government has
been issuing substantial amounts of Treasury bills up to 18-
months maturity, it is not yet clear whether it will regain
access to the longer-term global capital markets in September
2013 as currently planned. If the government needed to request a
second bailout, official creditors may require Portugal to
implement a debt restructuring with its private sector creditors,
even though official creditors have ruled out any such
restructurings beyond the one completed in Greece as a condition
to that country's second support package.

If the Portuguese government's debt rating were to fall further
from its current Ba3 level, Moody's would likely reassess the
country ceiling at that time. Similarly, Moody's would also
reassess the country ceiling in the event of an upgrade of the
Portuguese government's bond rating.

Moody's country ceilings capture externalities and event risks
that arise unavoidably as a consequence of locating a business in
a particular country and that ultimately constrain domestic
issuers' ability to service their debt obligations. As such, the
ceiling encapsulates elements of economic, financial, political
and legal risks in a country, including political instability,
the risk of government intervention, the risk of systemic
economic disruption, severe financial instability risks, currency
redenomination and natural disasters, among other factors, that
need to be incorporated into the ratings of the strongest
issuers. The ceiling caps the credit rating of all issuers and
transactions with material exposure to those risks -- in other
words, it affects all domestic issuers and transactions other
than those whose assets and revenues are predominantly sourced
from or located outside of the country, or which benefit from an
external credit support.


ASMITA GARDENS: Creditors Back Reorganization Plan
Ioana Tudor at Ziarul Financiar reports that the creditors of
Asmita Gardens have approved its reorganization plan.

According to Ziarul Financiar, under the plan, the main creditor,
Alpha Bank Romania, will recover EUR55 million of a EUR70 million

Asmita Gardens is one of Bucharest's largest residential


AYT HIPOTECARIO: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Ratings on Two Tranches
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AyT Hipotecario BBK (BBK) I and II, a
series of Spanish RMBS transactions.  The agency has also removed
four tranches from Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and revised the
Outlook on two tranches to Negative from Stable.

The removal of the RWN follows the implementation of remedial
actions on ineligible counterparties.  The role of account bank
and paying agent has been transferred from Confederacion Espanola
de Cajas de Ahorros ('BBB'/Stable/'F3') to Barclays Bank Plc
('A'/Stable/'F1') in both deals.

In both transactions, there has been a gradual increase in the
level of arrears as a percentage of current collateral balance.
The portion of borrowers with more than three months of missed
payments in April 2012 has risen to 0.75% and 0.86% for BBK I and
II, respectively, compared with 0.36% and 0.37% in April 2011.

With the arrear levels currently trending upwards and recent
macro economic statistics suggesting a negative outlook for the
Spanish housing market, Fitch believes the credit enhancement
levels for the junior notes are likely to come under pressure.
These concerns are reflected by the Negative Outlook on the class
C notes in both deals.

The rating actions are as follows

AyT Hipotecario BBK I, FTA

  -- Class A notes (ISIN ES0312364005) affirmed at 'AA-sf';
     Outlook Negative; Off RWN
  -- Class B notes (ISIN ES0312364013) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable; Off RWN
  -- Class C notes (ISIN ES0312364021) affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

AyT Hipotecario BBK II, FTA

  -- Class A notes (ISIN ES0312251004) affirmed at 'AA-sf';
     Outlook Negative; Off RWN
  -- Class B notes (ISIN ES0312251012) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable; Off RWN
  -- Class C notes (ISIN ES0312251020) affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Cuts Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its issue ratings to
'C' from 'B-' on the series I/2006 preferred stock issued by
Spain-based Banco de Sabadell S.A. (Sabadell; BB+/Negative/B),
and to 'D' from 'B+' on its series I/2006 and I/2010
nondeferrable subordinated debt.


"The downgrades follow Sabadell's announcement on Sept. 3, 2012,
that it had offered to repurchase part of its outstanding
preferred stock and nondeferrable subordinated debt, including
the abovementioned series. As of , the rated securities subject
to this offer have a nominal value of EUR736 million," S&P said.

"The rating action reflects our view that the offer constitutes a
'distressed exchange' under our criteria. This is because we
believe that investors will receive less value than the promise
of the original securities as the offer will likely imply a
repurchase below par value," S&P said.

"We take into account the fact that the long-term rating is
speculative grade and believe there is a heightened perception on
the part of investors that payments on hybrid instruments and
nondeferrable subordinated debt issued by Spanish banks are
uncertain, particularly after the announcement of the conditions
of the memorandum of understanding governing the planned EUR100
billion bail-out of the wider Spanish banking sector. These
uncertainties make it highly likely, in our view, that investor
acceptance of Sabadell's offer could be driven by a perception
that they might be required to absorb losses in the case of any
recapitalization by the government, even though it remains
unclear at this stage which banks will receive state capital
support under the terms of the bailout," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on the two types of instruments to
different levels, reflecting the different features that we
understand are incorporated in the hybrid capital instruments,
compared with the nondeferrable subordinated instruments. As
explained in our criteria, an exchange offer on an equity hybrid
instrument may reflect the possibility that, absent the exchange
offer taking place, the issuer might exercise the coupon deferral
option, in accordance with the terms of the instrument. In such
instances, the rating on the hybrid would go to 'C', rather than
the 'D' rating used for nondeferrable debt," S&P said.

"These rating actions do not affect our counterparty credit
ratings on Sabadell or any other issue ratings. According to our
criteria, an 'SD' rating is assigned when we believe that the
obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or class of
obligations, excluding those that qualify as regulatory capital.
Since the notes subject to the repurchase offer qualify as
regulatory capital, the downgrade of the preferred stock and
subordinated debt instruments has no implications on our
counterparty credit ratings on Sabadell," S&P said.

"On completion of the tender offer, we will review our ratings on
any untendered preferred stock and nondeferrable subordinated
debt," S&P said.


                                      To          From
Banco de Sabadell S.A.
Preferred Stock
  EUR32.4 mil var rate fxd/fltg
  rate callable perp pfd stk          C           B-

Subordinated Debt
  EUR230.5 mil fltg rate sub
  callable nts due 05/25/2016         D           B+
  EUR473.35 mil 6.25% med-term
  nts due 04/26/2020                  D           B+


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: Court to Decide on Couronne Refinery Buyer
Tara Patel at Bloomberg News reports that a French court will
decide Oct. 2 on a buyer for Petroplus Holdings AG's Petit-
Couronne refinery, one of five European plants affected by the
company's insolvency.

Bloomberg relates that Petroplus said September 4 two offers,
from Netoil Inc. and Alafandi Petroleum Group, are being examined
by the court in Rouen.  The company said that the bidders have
yet to submit proof of their financial and technical eligibility
to run the plant in Normandy, according to Bloomberg.

Bloomberg recalls that Petroplus, once Europe's largest
independent oil refiner, sought buyers for its plants in the
region after filing for insolvency in January.  Three facilities
have been sold to trading companies that will keep the sites
running, while a fourth, at Coryton in the U.K., will be
converted to storage, Bloomberg notes.

                         About Petroplus

Based in Zug, Switzerland, Petroplus Holdings AG is one of
Europe's largest independent oil refiners.

Petroplus was forced to file for insolvency in late January after
struggling for months with weak demand due to the economic
slowdown in Europe and overcapacity amid tighter credit
conditions, high crude prices and competition from Asia and the
Middle East, MarketWatch said in a March 28 report.

According to MarketWatch, Petroplus said in March a local court
granted "ordinary composition proceedings" for a period of six
months. As part of the court process, Petroplus intends to sell
its assets to repay its creditors.

Some of Petroplus' units in countries other than Switzerland have
filed for "different types of proceedings" and are currently
controlled by court-appointed administrators or liquidators,
which started the process to sell assets, including the company's


* TURKEY: Moody's Rates Upcoming USD-Denominated Sukuk '(P)Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional foreign
currency rating of (P)Ba1 to Turkey's proposed US dollar-
denominated sovereign sukuk. The outlook is positive.

Ratings Rationale

In Moody's opinion, the obligations that would be incurred by the
sukuk rank pari passu with other senior, unsecured debt issuances
of the Republic of Turkey and therefore carry the same rating.
Moody's expects to remove the provisional status of the rating
upon the closing of the proposed issuance and a review of its
final terms.

Turkey's government bond rating is Ba1, further to Moody's
upgrade on June 20, 2012. The key drivers for the rating action
were (1) the significant improvement in Turkey's public finances
and the resulting increased shock-absorption capacity of the
government's balance sheet; and (2) policy actions that have the
potential to address external imbalances, such as Turkey's large
current account deficit, which is the largest credit risk facing
the country.

In Moody's rating methodology, Turkey's economic strength is
"moderate to high" in the sovereign rating spectrum. The large
scale of the economy and its diversification, plus its underlying
dynamism, has pushed per capita incomes to levels well above
those of peers. Turkey's increased integration into the global
economy is likely to maintain such growth in the coming years.

Key supports to the government's ratings include its
effectiveness, transparency and rule of law. The latter speaks in
part to a high willingness to repay its debt, as demonstrated
during the severe 2001 financial crisis.

The government's financial strength has been improving steadily
over the past decade, and this improvement can be seen across a
wide range of financial metrics, such as debt/revenue and debt
affordability. In its rating methodology, Moody's now assesses
the government's financial strength as "high". Although the
international economic environment has become more challenging
and Turkish domestic growth is slowing down, the country's
ongoing efforts to reduce its debt burden are unlikely to be
significantly affected. The relatively minor and short-lived
deterioration in Turkey's public finances following the 2008-09
financial crisis gives further cause for optimism.

Moreover, Moody's notes that the deficit reduction and primary
surpluses that the Turkish government has recorded over the past
two years are largely due to expenditure restraint rather than
revenue increases, despite Turkey's booming economic growth in
the past two years. In fact, since 2009, Turkey's general
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen to 37.4%
from 40.1%, whereas general government revenues have risen to
36.1% from 34.2% %. Even in Moody's adverse scenario, which
includes more pessimistic outcomes (relative to the rating
agency's forecasts) for nominal GDP growth, the primary balance
and interest costs, the rating agency would expect a slight
reduction in Turkey's debt burden over a two-year time horizon.
In fact, Turkey's general government debt level in 2011 was much
lower than the Ba1 median of 56.4% and more in line with the Baa3
median of 38.5%.

Turkey's resilience to economic, financial and political
vulnerabilities has strengthened considerably in recent years, as
evidenced by the ability of the country's financial markets to
endure volatile capital inflows and ongoing infighting between
the society's secular and religious elements. Nonetheless, there
are some noteworthy areas of political risk in Turkey, some of
which stem from secular-religious tensions, others from
longstanding regional and ethnic conflicts. Due to the size of
Turkey's external imbalances, Moody's considers the country's
susceptibility to event risk to be high. However, in the first
half of 2012, the government adopted policies, such as an
improved investment incentive scheme and increased incentives for
individuals to pay into individual pensions, that have the
potential to address some of the root causes of Turkey's external

The positive outlook on the Turkish government's ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that both the country's public finances and
resilience to external shocks will continue to improve its fiscal
and macroeconomic resilience.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2008.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BMIBABY: To Close After No Buyer Found; 450 Jobs Affected
Chris Jasper at Irish Examiner reports that BMIbaby is to close
this weekend with the loss of 450 jobs.

British Airways parent company IAG on Wednesday said the discount
arm of the BMI business bought from Lufthansa will close after no
buyer could be found for a unit that doesn't fit its operations,
Irish Examiner relates.

"After a review of options for BMIbaby and following formal
consultation with union and employee representatives, the
business will be closed, with the last flight departing Sept 9,"
Irish Examiner quotes IAG as saying.

IAG bought BMI in April and said in May that talks had begun on
closing BMIbaby at some point this month after no bids for the
unwanted arm were forthcoming, Irish Examiner recounts.

According to Irish Examiner, a BMIbaby spokeswoman said that all
employees who are losing their jobs will be able to apply for any
vacancies at British Airways.

German turnaround specialist Intro Aviation, which had expressed
an interest in BMIbaby, ended talks after Lufthansa rejected a
non-binding offer, managing director Peter Oncken said in April,
Irish Examiner discloses.

British airline BMIbaby operated 14 aircraft, flying more than
700 services a week in the peak season to 23 European

ENPURE LTD: In Administration After Sustained Creditor Pressure
The Construction Index reports that Enpure has been placed in
administration after sustained creditor pressure.

Mark Hopkins, Matthew Hammond and Steve Ellis of
PricewaterhouseCoopers were appointed joint administrators of
Enpure Limited and Enpure Holdings Limited on Sept. 3, 2012.

The administrators said that due to the extensive pressure on
working capital on a small number of large projects, the company
could not continue to trade as a going concern, according to
Construction Index.  The report relates that this culminated in
the directors requesting that its funders place the business into

Company operations are on hold pending discussions with customers
and contractors, and the administrators have entered into a
period of consultation with employees, Construction Index notes.

In the year ended March 31, 2011, turnover fell 34% from GBP72.7
million to GBPP47.9 million while it posted pre-tax loss of
GBP399, 000.

The report discloses that Matthew Hammond, joint administrator
and PwC partner, said: "Our immediate priority is to review the
existing financial position, explore available restructuring
options and develop an effective strategy for the business, with
a view to realising best value for the benefit of creditors.   We
are in discussion with a number of parties who have expressed
interest in certain assets and contracts of the business, but
would encourage any further interested parties to contact us as a
matter of urgency."

Birmingham-based Enpure is a process contractor that specializes
in the water and waste sectors.

LONMIN PLC: Enters Into "Peace Accord" with Striking Miners
Helen Thomas and Andrew England at The Financial Times report
that Lonmin plc has agreed a "peace accord" with striking miners
at its Marikana operations in South Africa, as the London-listed
company tries to draw a line under the violent protests which
killed 44 people and brought production in the country to a

However, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union,
which many believe sparked the initial illegal strike by 3,000
rock drill operators, refused to sign the accord, raising
questions about whether the agreement will succeed in resolving
the situation at Marikana, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Lonmin and its unions said they would invite
the Amcu, which has grown rapidly in South Africa's platinum
sector often by courting frustrated members from the well-
established National Union of Mineworkers, to join negotiations
about amending the existing wage agreement.

Joseph Mathunjwa, president of Amcu, told the FT that the union
would provide details on its position on Friday.

A spokesman for the NUM, as cited by the FT, said it was too
early to say if all the miners would go back to work and added
that the accord was intended to create an environment where those
miners who want to return can do so without facing violence or

Lonmin, which had been seeking an agreement to get its miners
back to work before entering into wage talks, said it remained
"hopeful" that other parties would sign the accord, the FT notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 27,
2012, The Sunday Telegraph related that Lonmin asked its lenders
-- Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC and Standard Chartered -- to waive
a test of banking covenants that it would breach following the
collapse of production at Marikana in the wake of violent clashes
between strikers and the police.  The request was part of broader
negotiations to restructure Lonmin's debt, which, if successful,
could save shareholders from an expensive rescue-rights issue,
The Sunday Telegraph disclosed.

Lonmin Plc is a United Kingdom-based company.  The principal
activities of the Company during the fiscal year ended Sept. 30,
2011 (fiscal 2011) were mining, refining, and marketing of
Platinum Group Metals (PGM).


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 European CDO Tranches
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took credit rating actions on
25 European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO)

Specifically, S&P:

-- Lowered its ratings on six tranches;

-- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    four tranches;

-- Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
    two tranches; and

-- Affirmed our ratings on 13 tranches.

For the full list of rating actions, see "European Synthetic CDO
Rating Actions at August 2012."

"The rating actions are part of our regular monthly review of
European synthetic CDOs. The actions incorporate, among other
things, the effect of recent rating migration within reference
portfolios and recent credit events on corporate entities," S&P

"We have run SROC (synthetic rated overcollateralization; see
'What Is SROC?' below) for the current portfolio and have
projected SROC 90 days into the future, while assuming no asset
rating migration," S&P said.

"We have lowered our ratings to the level at which SROC is above
or equal to 100%. However, if the SROC is below 100% at a certain
rating level but greater than 100% in the projected 90-day run,
we may leave the rating on CreditWatch negative at the revised
rating level," S&P said.

"We have raised our ratings to the level at which SROC exceeds
100% and meets our minimum cushion requirement. For further
details of our upgrade guidelines, see 'Revised Methodologies And
Assumptions For Global Synthetic CDO Surveillance,' published on
Sept. 30, 2010," S&P said.

"We have affirmed our ratings on those tranches for which credit
enhancement is, in our opinion, still at a level commensurate
with their current ratings," S&P said.

"Where losses in a portfolio have already exceeded the available
credit enhancement or where, in our opinion, it is highly likely
that this will occur once final valuations are known, we have
lowered our ratings to 'CC'. We have done so as we consider the
likelihood that the noteholders will not receive their full
principal to be high," S&P said.


"For those transactions where our September 2009 CDO criteria are
not applicable, we have run our analysis on CDO Evaluator models
2.7 and 4.1. For the transactions where our September 2009
criteria are applicable, we have run our analysis on CDO
Evaluator model 6.0, which includes the top obligor and industry
test SROCs," S&P said.

"In addition to the obligor and industry tests, and the Monte
Carlo default simulation results, we may consider certain factors
such as credit stability and rating sensitivity to modeling
parameters when assigning ratings to CDO tranches. We assess
these factors case-by-case and may adjust the ratings to a rating
level that is different to that indicated by the quantitative
results Alone," S&P said.

                          WHAT IS SROC?

"One of the main steps in our rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets. SROC is
one of the tools we use when surveilling our ratings on synthetic
CDO tranches with reference portfolios," S&P said.

"SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement
(or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario. SROC helps capture what we
consider to be the major influences on portfolio performance:
Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and
time to maturity. It is a comparable measure across different
tranches of the same rating," S&P said.

"When SROC is less than 100%, it indicates to us that the current
credit enhancement may not be sufficient to maintain the current
tranche rating. If a tranche's current SROC exceeds 100%, this
indicates to us that the tranche's credit enhancement is greater
than required to maintain the current rating. If our analysis
indicates that the current SROC would be greater than 100% at a
higher rating level than the current rating, we may place the
rating on CreditWatch positive, subject to our September 2012 CDO
criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 European CDO Tranches
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on 11 European collateralized debt obligation (CDO)

Specifically, S&P:

-- Lowered its ratings on five tranches;

-- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    two tranches; and

-- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    four tranches.

For the full list of the rating actions, see "List Of European
Synthetic CDO Rating Actions At Sept. 5, 2012, Following
Dependent Rating Actions."

"The rating actions on these 11 tranches follow our recent rating
actions on the underlying collateral or reference obligation.
Under our criteria applicable to transactions such as these, we
would generally reflect changes to the rating on the collateral
or reference obligation in our rating on the tranche," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

* BOOK REVIEW: Corporate Venturing -- Creating New Businesses
Authors: Zenas Block and Ian C. MacMillan
Publisher: Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2003
(reprint of 1993 book published by the President and Fellows of
Harvard College).
List Price: 371 pages. $34.95 trade paper, ISBN 1-58798-211-0.

Creating new businesses within a firm is a way for a company to
try to tap into its potential while at the same time minimizing
risks.  A new business within a firm is like an entreprenuerial
venture in that it would have greater flexibility to
opportunistically pursue profits apart from the normal corporate
structure and decision-making processes.  Such a business is
different from a true entrepreneurial venture however in that the
business has corporate resources at its disposal.  Such a company
business venture has to answer to the company management too.
Corporate venturing--to use the authors' term--offers innovative
and stimulating business opportunities.  Though venturing is in a
somewhat symbiotic relationship with the parent firm, the venture
would never threaten to ruin the parent firm as a entrepreneur
might be financially devastated by failure.

Block and MacMillan contrast an entreprenuerial enterprise with
their subject of corporate venturing, "When a new entrepreneurial
venture is created outside an existing organization, a wide
variety of environmental factors determine the fledgling
business's survival.  Inside an organization . . . senior
management is the most critical environmental factor."  This
circumstance is the basis for both the strengths and limitations
of a corporate venture.  In their book, the authors discuss how
senior management working with the leadership of a corporate
venture can work in consideration of these strengths and
weaknesses to give the venture the best chances for success.  If
the venture succeeds beyond the prospects and goals going into
its formation, it can always be integrated into the parent
company as a new division or subsidiary modeled after the regular
parts of a company with the open-ended commitment, regular hiring
practices, and reporting and coordination, etc., going with this.
As covered by the authors, done properly with the right
commitment, sense of realism and practicality, and preliminary
research and ongoing analysis, corporate venturing offers a firm
new paths of growth and a way to reach out to new markets, engage
in fruitful business research, and adapt to changing market and
industry conditions. The principle of corporate venturing is the
familiar adage, "nothing ventured, nothing gained."  While it is
improbable that a corporate venture can save a dying firm, a
characteristic of every dying firm is a blindness about
venturing.  Just thinking about corporate ventures alone can
bring to a firm a vibrancy and imagination needed for business

Ideas, insights, and vision are the essence of corporate
venturing.  But these are not enough by themselves. Corporate
venturing is based as much on the right personnel, especially the
top leaders.  The authors advise to select current employees of a
firm to lead a corporate venture whenever feasible because they
already have relationships with senior management who are the
ultimate overseers of a venture and they understand the corporate
culture.  In one of their several references to the corporate
consultant and motivational speaker Peter Drucker, the authors
quote him as identifying only half jokingly the most promising
employees to lead the corporate venture as "the troublemakers."
These are the ones who will be given the "great freedom and a
high level of empowerment" required to make the venture workable
and who also are most suited to "adapt rapidly to new
information." Such employees for top management of a venture are
not entirely on their own.  The other side of this, as Brock and
MacMillan go into, is for such venture management to earn and
hold the trust and confidence of the firm's top management and
work within the framework and follow the guidelines set for the

Corporate venturing is an operation which is a hybrid of the
standard corporate interests and operations and an independent
business with entrepreneurial flexibility mainly from focus on
one product or service or at most a few interrelated ones,
simplified operations, and streamlined decision-making.  From
identifying opportunities and getting starting through the
business plan and corporate politics, Brock and MacMillan guide
the readers into all of the areas of corporate venturing.

Zenas Block is a former adjunct professor with the Executive MBA
Program at the NYU Stern School of Business.  Ian C. MacMillan is
associated with Wharton as a professor and a director of a center
for entrepreneurial studies.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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