TCREUR_Public/121018.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, October 18, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 208

                            Headlines



D E N M A R K

FIRST SHIP: Restructuring Deal Won't Affect Fitch's B' LT IDR


F R A N C E

NUMERICABLE FINANCE: Moody's Rates EUR410MM Sr. Secured Notes B2
PEUGEOT SA: Fitch Says Merger Won't Solve Biggest Problems
YPSO FRANCE: S&P Rates EUR210MM Senior Secured Notes 'B'


G E R M A N Y

PREPS 2005-2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B2 Notes to 'Ca'


G R E E C E

EMPORIKI BANK: Credit Agricole Agrees to Sell Bank to Alpha


I C E L A N D

KAUPTHING BANK: UK Fraud Office Ends Probe Into Collapse


I R E L A N D

TREASURY HOLDINGS: Directors May Face Criminal Action


K A Z A K H S T A N

SOUTH OIL: Fitch Raises Nat'l. Senior Unsecured Rating to 'BB+'


L U X E M B O U R G

BANQUE INTERNATIONALE: Moody's Upgrades Standalone BFSR to 'D+'


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC NL: Fitch Confirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
SKELLIG ROCK: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Rating on Class E Notes


P O L A N D

* POLAND: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Negative


R U S S I A

ABSOLUT BANK: Fitch Revises Rating Watch on 'BB+' IDR to Neg.


S P A I N

ALTECO: Spanish Court Accepts Bankruptcy Filing
SANTANDER BANCORP: S&P Cuts Subordinated Debt Ratings to 'BB+'
* SPAIN: Moody's Corrects Oct. 5 Rating Release on Four Banks


S W I T Z E R L A N D

ZURICH BANK: Moody's Lowers Bank Deposit Ratings


T U R K E Y

DENIZBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'D+' BFSR; Outlook Stable
TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' FC Sub. Debt Rating
TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Fitch Rates New USD Subordinated Notes BB(EXP)


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BIG PICTURES: Former Owner Buys Back Firm
CONNAUGHT ASSET: Administrator Under Probe by ACCA
DAWSON INTERNATIONAL: Chanel Buys Cashmere Mills, Saves 176 Jobs
DIVERSE ENERGY: Voluntarily Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer
DRACO PLC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'

GLASGOW OPPORTUNITIES: Set to Go Into Voluntary Liquidation
IPLAS: Goes Into Administration Despite 50% Increase in Sales
OSE EUROPEAN: Goes Into Administration
PALMARIS CAPITAL: May Face Liquidation if No Buyer Found
TRURO CITY: Faces Liquidation, Suspended from Football Conference


X X X X X X X X

* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 6 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


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D E N M A R K
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FIRST SHIP: Restructuring Deal Won't Affect Fitch's B' LT IDR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says Singapore-based First Ship Lease Trust's
(FSLT) rating is not affected by a restructuring agreement of one
of its lessees, Denmark-based TORM A/S, with its banks and
tonnage providers (including FSLT).  FSLT is rated Long-Term
Issuer Default 'B' with Negative Outlook.

Under the agreement TORM will defer a substantial portion of its
bank debt and also avail new liquidity and savings from its
restructured time charter book.  This restructuring would result
in FSLT receiving lower lease rentals from TORM A/S and also a
share of the 17.3% equity stake in TORM's enlarged share capital
held by tonnage providers who have agreed to permanently amend
their charter contracts.

Despite the lower lease rentals Fitch estimates that in the
absence of further defaults or restructuring by TORM, FSLT's
projected operating cash flows and US$30.8 million cash balance
outstanding as of June 30, 2012 would be adequate to meet its
operating expenses and US$44 million annual debt servicing
commitments.

Nevertheless, given the negative outlook for the global shipping
industry, Fitch will closely monitor FSLT's portfolio quality and
its impact on the issuer's credit profile.



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F R A N C E
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NUMERICABLE FINANCE: Moody's Rates EUR410MM Sr. Secured Notes B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 rating to the EUR410
million senior secured notes to be issued by Numericable Finance
& Co. S.C.A in the form of new EUR210 million Senior Secured
Floating Rates Notes ("FRNs") due 2018 and EUR200 million
additional notes ("Additional Fixed Rate Notes") to the EUR360.2
million Senior Secured Notes (the "Original 2019 Notes") issued
in February 2012 and due 2019. The proceeds from the Additional
Fixed Rate Notes and FRNs will be used to prepay part of Ypso
France S.A.S's ("Numericable" or "the company") outstanding bank
debt and pay certain fees and expenses related to the
transaction.

Ratings Rationale

The Notes will be issued by Numericable Finance & Co. S.C.A, an
SPV that will lend the proceeds from the Additional Fixed Rate
Notes and FRNs to Numericable as an Additional C1 Facility and
Additional C2 Facility, respectively, under the terms of the
existing bank agreement. This structure reflects that put in
place in February 2012 when Numericable Finance & Co. S.C.A.
issued the Original 2019 Notes which were lent on the company as
an Additional C Facility. Claims of Additional Fixed Rate Notes
and FRN noteholders will thus be indirect, via security over the
Additional C1 and C2 Facilities. The intercreditor agreement
addresses limitations under French law in terms of sharing
security and guarantees between existing and senior lenders,
equalizing the ranking of the Additional C1 and C2 facilities
with the existing bank loans. The validity of any upstream
guarantees will also be subject to French law regarding financial
assistance and corporate benefit.

The B2 rating of the Additional Fixed Rate Notes and FRNs, at the
same level as the CFR, reflects Moody's view that the notes will
effectively rank pari passu with the bank debt, Revolving Credit
Facility, and Original 2019 Notes following a default.

While neutral in terms of leverage, Moody's considers that the
issuance of the Additional Fixed Rate Notes and FRNs will
positively impact the company's maturity profile. The proceeds
from these notes will be used to prepay part of the existing Term
Loans A, B, and C, as well as the Capex Facility maturing between
2013 and 2015 reducing the level of debt maturing within this
period to approximately EUR400 million from EUR800 million.
Despite the higher interest cost related to these new notes,
Moody's expects Numericable to show EBITDA to Interest expense
coverage above 2.5x and Free Cash Flow at around EUR100 million
per annum going forward.

In the first half ending June 30, 2012, Numericable experienced
an increase in revenues and EBITDA (as adjusted by the company)
by 1.7% and 2.8%, respectively, compared to H1 2011 mainly driven
by the company's White Label and Wholesale segments. The near-
term liquidity profile of the company is expected to remain
satisfactory as Free Cash Flow generation is projected at
approximately EUR100 million on a pro-forma basis (excluding the
additional Capex required for the DSP 92 project in the Ile-de-
France region in 2012). In addition, the company's liquidity is
supported by the EUR65 million Revolving Credit Facility which
was undrawn as of H1 2012. Despite an improvement in the
company's leverage covenant headroom in Q2 2012 to 9.1% compared
to 6.4% in the previous quarter, Moody's considers that the
headroom remains relatively tight and the rating agency will
continue monitoring any deterioration.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that
Numericable's Debt to EBITDA will be maintained below 5.5x and
free cash flow generation remains positive. Moody's does not
expect near-term upward pressure on the ratings, although this
could result if on a sustained basis: (i) the company displays
good execution of its business plan with positive operating
momentum; (ii) leverage were to fall below 5.0x; and (iii) free
cash flow generation improves. Conversely, downward rating
pressure could evolve if on a sustained basis: (i) operating
performance was to materially weaken; (ii) leverage began
trending towards 6.0x; and (iii) free cash flow generation
deteriorated. These metrics incorporate Moody's usual
adjustments.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Numericable is Moody's
Global Cable Television Industry Rating Methodology, published in
July 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.

Numericable, based in Paris, France, is a cable network operator
providing TV, internet and telecommunication services throughout
France. The company's sole operations remain in France following
the disposal of Coditel (its Benelux business) in June 2011. In
the financial year ending December 31, 2011, Numericable
generated on a pro-forma basis (excluding the Coditel operations)
EUR865 million and EUR436 million of revenues and adjusted
EBITDA, respectively, as reported by the company based on IFRS
financial statements.


PEUGEOT SA: Fitch Says Merger Won't Solve Biggest Problems
----------------------------------------------------------
A potential merger between Peugeot SA's (PSA) automotive
operations and General Motors' Opel subsidiary would not
immediately solve PSA's biggest problems, Fitch Ratings says.

"Recent press reports point to different options, but we believe
these scenarios are too uncertain and lack the detail needed at
this stage to assess any potential impact on PSA's ('BB-
'/Negative) and GM's ('BB+'/Stable) ratings.  Scenarios mooted in
the press include combining the companies' automotive operations
in a 50/50 joint venture or the creation of a new structure,
owned 70/30 by PSA/GM, to which GM would also bring US$10
billion," Fitch says.

"We believe the two companies are bound to accelerate and
increase their cooperation, as they both need to bolster their
profitability and stem cash burn.  In particular, PSA needs to
urgently streamline its cost structure, reinvigorate its product
offering and combat fierce competition and aggressive price
pressure in Europe.  However, we believe that a combination --
according to the terms reported in the media -- is unlikely to
help PSA and Opel address the pressing issue of overcapacity or
overcome political and social resistance to restructuring," Fitch
says.

Lengthy anti-competition reviews could also be triggered. At any
rate, any potential benefit would be gradual and could take
several years to accrue to PSA and Opel.  In the meantime,
pressure remains high on PSA's ratings as Fitch expects the
company to burn further cash at least through 2014.

Further analysis on PSA and GM can be found in a report published
on 25 September (Fiat and PSA Compared With Ford and GM in 2005-
2008).  Fitch identified several similarities between PSA since
2006-2007 and the US manufacturers when they were downgraded
gradually to the 'B' category from 'BB+' in 2005-2006 and then to
'CCC' in 2008.

In the report, S&P also assessed some key differences between PSA
and Ford/GM a few years ago -- notably in the magnitude of the
deterioration -- which currently support PSA's ratings in the
'BB' category.  However, a lack of improvement in profitability
and cash generation in 2013 and 2014 leading to further
significant negative free cash flow in 2014 could increase the
similarity with Ford's and GM's cash burn in 2005-2008.  This
could trigger further downgrades to the 'B' rating category.


YPSO FRANCE: S&P Rates EUR210MM Senior Secured Notes 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue ratings
to the proposed EUR210 million senior secured floating-rate notes
(FRNs) and the proposed EUR200 million senior secured notes to be
issued by special-purpose vehicle Numericable Finance & Co.
S.C.A. (not rated). The EUR200 million senior secured notes will
be issued on largely the same terms as the existing senior
secured notes maturing in 2019, albeit with a different coupon.

"We understand that the proceeds of the proposed senior secured
notes and FRNs will be onlent to Ypso France S.A.S. (not rated),
a direct subsidiary of French cable operator Ypso Holding Sarl
(Ypso; B/Negative/--), via back-to-back loans. These loans are
the proposed additional C2 facility loans, tranche A and tranche
B (together, 'the proposed additional facilities'), which will be
issued on the same terms as the EUR200 million senior secured
notes and the FRNs," S&P said.

"We assigned our 'B' issue rating to the proposed additional
facilities, in line with the corporate credit rating on Ypso. At
the same time, we assigned a recovery rating of '3' to the
proposed additional facilities, reflecting our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for lenders in the event of a
payment default," S&P said.

"The issue ratings on the proposed senior secured notes and FRNs
are based on their first-ranking security interest over
Numericable Finance's rights to and benefit in the proposed
additional facilities, as the lender under Ypso's existing senior
secured bank facilities. The ratings are also based on the
direct pass-through of the economic benefit of the proposed
additional facilities to Numericable Finance," S&P said.

"The ratings on the proposed additional facilities are based on
our understanding that they will be part of the existing senior
secured facilities' agreement and will rank pari passu with
Ypso's other senior secured obligations, according to the terms
of the intercreditor agreement. We note, however, that the
security granted to the additional facilities (including an
existing additional C1 facility that has the same terms as the
existing senior secured notes maturing in 2019) will be on a
second- or third-ranking basis. On the other hand, we understand
that, under the intercreditor agreement dated September 2011, the
security would be shared on a pari passu basis. We do not know
how much weight a court might assign to the debt ranking
established by the security pledges themselves, compared with the
provisions in the existing senior secured bank facilities and the
intercreditor agreement. We believe this could create downside
risk for the ultimate recovery prospects for the lenders of the
proposed additional facilities," S&P said.

"Neither Ypso nor any of its subsidiaries will guarantee or
provide any credit support to Numericable Finance, and the
proposed FRNs will not have a direct claim on Ypso's cash flows
or assets," S&P said.

                       RECOVERY ANALYSIS

"Our recovery ratings on the proposed additional C2 facilities
and the existing additional C1 facility are supported by our
valuation of Ypso as a going concern. However, the recovery
ratings also reflect our view of the senior secured facilities'
weak security package, in which no network assets are pledged,
and our assessment of the French insolvency regime as relatively
unfavorable for unsecured lenders," S&P said.

"Under our hypothetical default scenario, default would most
likely occur due to a steady decline in analogue and digital
residential cable subscribers and declining profitability as a
result of increased competition. We believe that this would
result in an inability to refinance debt maturing in 2015, with
EBITDA declining to about EUR340 million, assuming that Ypso
repays the remainder of its term loan A1 and capital expenditures
facility 1 on the path to default," S&P said.

"Our going-concern valuation envisages a stressed enterprise
value of about EUR1.8 billion, equivalent to 5.25x stressed
EBITDA. After deducting enforcement costs of about EUR130
million, we see about EUR1.67 billion of value available for
senior secured lenders. We assume about EUR2.46 million of senior
secured debt
(including six months' prepetition interest) outstanding at the
point of default," S&P said.

"With regard to the pass-through transaction, although we have
not assigned a recovery rating to the proposed senior secured
notes and FRNs, we believe that recovery prospects for these
notes are intrinsically linked to recovery prospects for the
proposed additional facilities. We assign recovery ratings to the
proposed additional facilities because we consider that potential
recovery would rely entirely on the effective operation of the
pass-through
structure between the corporate entities (the Ypso group) and the
issuer (Numericable Finance). In addition, we foresee a risk that
the enforcement costs at the issuer level could create an
additional expense that may slightly reduce the recovery
prospects for holders of the proposed senior secured notes and
FRNs versus the direct recovery prospects for the lender of the
proposed
additional facilities," S&P said.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating

Numericable Finance & Co. S.C.A.
Senior Secured Debt                    B

Ypso France S.A.S.
Senior Secured Debt                    B
  Recovery Rating                       3



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PREPS 2005-2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B2 Notes to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Preps 2005-2 plc:

Issuer: PREPS 2005-2 plc

    EUR217M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
    Nov 29, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

    EUR53M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
    Nov 29, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

    EUR41.5M B1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
    Nov 29, 2010 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

    EUR12.5M B2 Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
    Nov 29, 2010 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Preps 2005-2 plc is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
backed by a static portfolio of German profit participation
agreements ("Genussrechte") which are subordinated loan
agreements. All assets included in the portfolio are loans with
bullet maturities, primarily extended to German small and medium-
sized obligors. Capital Efficiency Group is acting as a financial
advisor and investment services provider and CorpRec Advisory AG
as recovery manager in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are driven by continuing and worse than
expected credit deterioration observed in the underlying pool.
The deterioration is reflected in an increase in the number of
defaults and the resulting decrease in the overcollateralization
levels of the rated classes. The actions also reflect the
anticipated further deterioration suggested by the most recent
information available, as the pool obligors are expected to
refinance their debt in the coming months, specifically by the
transaction scheduled maturity date, 8th December 2012.

Defaults and impairments in the transaction increased to 11
obligors, totalling EUR94 million (approximately 26% of the
initial pool), compared to 8 obligors, totalling EUR66 million
(approximately 18% of the initial pool) at the last rating action
in November 2010. Deterioration in the portfolio is also
indicated by the watchlist reported by the portfolio manager who
monitors the individual issuers in the portfolio. EUR50 million
of the portfolio are currently on this credit watch list, with
further EUR5 million of assets placed in credit event category
due to a missed payment.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analysis:

(1) Assuming all assets in the credit event category defaulted
with no recovery, the overcollateralization ratios for Class A1
and Class A2 (together "Class A") and Class B1 and Class B2
(together "Class B") would be 108% and 74.3%, respectively.

(2) If further defaults on portions of the credit watch list
category with no recovery are assumed, the overcollateralization
ratios for Class A and Class B would be reduced to 88.3% and
60.7% respectively.

The range of the overcollateralization ratios above are in line
with the rating actions.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy, especially as 100% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Germany. Sources of
additional performance uncertainties are described below:

(1) Refinancing risk: In reaching its ratings decisions, Moody's
took into account the elevated potential for refinancing
difficulties likely to be faced by a substantial number of the
weaker obligors over the coming months to scheduled maturity.
This risk has been assessed primarily from qualitative
information on individual obligors provided in the latest
investor report and by the investment services provider and
recovery manager.

(2) Jump to default risk: The non granularity of the portfolio
exposes the transaction to higher jump to default risk. Currently
the seven largest obligors comprises of approximately EUR85
million or 39% of the performing portfolio totalling EUR219
million. After excluding terminated or insolvent obligors, the
total number of portfolio obligors is 42. In order to measure the
risk associated with low granularity, Moody's conducted breakeven
analyses by computing the number of borrower defaults that could
be sustained before hitting a given class of notes.

In its analysis, Moody's applied stresses including an increase
in the default probability of each obligor to reflect cyclical
economic stress and future default expectations based on past
pool performance, name specific forward looking adjustments.
These assumptions reflect Moody's expectations that default rates
for the pool is likely to remain at elevated level given the
general economic outlook. In addition, due to the subordinated
position of the loans in the obligors' capital structure, Moody's
assumes a zero recovery rate upon asset default.

The action relies on financial data received annually for a
majority of obligors in the pool from the end of 2011. This
financial data was used in the RiskCalc model, an econometric
model developed by Moody's KMV in order to assess the credit
quality of obligors in the pool. The results obtained from the
RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating scale and
adjusted by in order to reflect reliance on stale financial data,
poor pool performance and lack of granularity. Moody's also
incorporated information provided by the manager in the latest
investor report to account for more recent information on the
performance of the underlying obligors.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe" published in February 2007, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in June 2011. Other factors used in this rating are
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009.

No additional cash flow analysis or stress scenarios have been
conducted as the decision to downgrade the notes was derived from
the observed credit deterioration of the underlying pool and
resulting reduction in OC levels.

In addition to the quantitative factors, qualitative factors are
part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative
factors include the structural protections in each transaction,
the recent deal performance in the current market environment,
the legal environment, specific documentation features, and the
potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of
credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating
decision.



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EMPORIKI BANK: Credit Agricole Agrees to Sell Bank to Alpha
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fabio Benedetti-Valentini and Elisa Martinuzzi at Bloomberg News
report that Credit Agricole SA, France's third largest bank, is
exiting Greece by agreeing to sell Emporiki Bank to Alpha Bank SA
on terms that will cut net income by about EUR2 billion
(US$2.6 billion) in the third quarter.

According to Bloomberg, Credit Agricole on Wednesday said that is
selling the unit for a token price of EUR1.  It will inject more
funds into Emporiki, bringing the total capital boost since July
to EUR2.85 billion, and buy EUR150 million of convertible bonds
issued by Alpha Bank as part of the deal, Bloomberg discloses.

Credit Agricole, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the boards of
both companies and the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund have
approved the sale, which the banks aim to complete by year-end.

"Greek talks with its creditors could still put a spanner in the
works and the outstanding funding line means that the bank has
downside risk should there be a Greek exit," Bloomberg quotes
Benjie Creelan-Sandford, an analyst at Macquarie Bank in London,
who rates Credit Agricole underperform, as saying.  "Away from
Greece, Credit Agricole still faces peripheral sovereign bond
exposure."

Credit Agricole said that its net funding to Emporiki was EUR2.1
billion at the end of September, and the latest capital injection
and purchase of convertible bonds will "immediately" lower that
by EUR700 million, Bloomberg relates.

Alpha Bank will cover the remaining funding gap in three
installments, with the last payment due by the end of 2014, and
Credit Agricole may also buy assets of Alpha and Emporiki to
reduce the funding gap, Bloomberg discloses.

Headquartered in Athens, Emporiki Bank of Greece S.A. --
http://www.emporiki.gr/-- provides retail and corporate banking,
investment banking, asset management, portfolio management, and
other financial services in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania,
Cyprus, and Great Britain.



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KAUPTHING BANK: UK Fraud Office Ends Probe Into Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------
Stewart Bishop at Bankruptcy Law360 reports that the U.K. Serious
Fraud Office said Monday that it has brought an end to its
investigation surrounding the collapse of Iceland's Kaupthing
Bank HF, which had resulted in the arrests of two property tycoon
brothers, after deciding that there is not enough evidence to
justify the action.

Bankruptcy Law360 relates that the brief announcement by the
agency brings an end to the probe, initially announced in
December 2009, that sought to uncover suspected fraud allegedly
committed within the U.K.'s jurisdiction in connection to the
Icelandic bank before it collapsed.

                       About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations
in more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of
services including retail banking, corporate finance, asset
management, brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private
wealth management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to
the Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the
Icelandic Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the
Bankruptcy Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.



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TREASURY HOLDINGS: Directors May Face Criminal Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Independent.ie reports that property developer
Richard Barrett and the other directors of Treasury Holdings
could face action at the hands of the Director of Corporate
Enforcement or even criminal prosecution if liquidators find a
controversial asset sale was fraudulent, a court was told.

Liquidators were appointed to take control of Treasury Holdings
at the High Court, Dublin, on October 9 following a petition from
KBC Bank, Independent.ie discloses.

Independent.ie relates that Mr. Justice Brian McGovern, presiding
over the case, appointed Paul McCann and Michael McAteer of Grant
Thornton as joint liquidators of Treasury Holdings and 16 related
companies.  The group did not oppose the application, the report
relays.

The judge ordered Treasury Holding's directors to file a
statement of affairs within 21 days for each of the companies
affected, setting out the assets and debts of the businesses
involved, according to Independent.ie.

Treasury Holdings was once valued at billions but liquidation
became inevitable after the company said on Friday that it would
no longer try to block lender KBC Bank's bid to have it
liquidated over EUR70 million of overdue debt, Independent.ie
notes.  The debt is just a fraction of Treasury's total EUR2.7
billion of debt but it has been overdue since 2009,
Independent.ie  says.

Treasury Holdings' biggest lender is the State-controlled
National Asset Management Agency, Independent.ie discloses.
According to Independent.ie , NAMA is owed EUR1.7 billion by
Treasury and on Friday, backed KBC's action to have it shut down.

Liquidation of the Treasury Holdings parent company means its
45 employees will automatically be made redundant, Independent.ie
states.

                      About Treasury Holdings

Treasury Holdings is an Irish property developer.  The company
owns the Westin Hotel in Dublin and the Irish headquarters of
accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers.



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SOUTH OIL: Fitch Raises Nat'l. Senior Unsecured Rating to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Kazakhstan-based South Oil LLP's
National Long-term rating and National senior unsecured rating to
'BB+(kaz)' from 'BB(kaz)'.  The Outlook is Stable.

The upgrade reflects the agency's comfort in South Oil's ability
to implement its production expansion program while maintaining a
strong financial profile.  Since 2007, its crude production has
increased from 4.9 thousand barrels of oil per day (mbbl/day) to
14mbbl/day in 2011, or by CAGR of 30%.  Oil output further
increased to 15mbbl/day in the LTM ended June 31, 2012.  South
Oil continues to be focused on increasing its oil production,
e.g., it plans to spend over 80% of its KZT57bn capex budget in
2012-2015 on exploration and production drilling to increase oil
output.  The agency believes that the execution risks of South
Oil's strategy are well mitigated by its track record of year-on-
year production growth.

South Oil's ratings are constrained by its relatively limited
scale of operations compared to Fitch-rated exploration and
production companies.  Its proved reserves were only 40.8m
barrels of oil equivalent (mmboe) at end-2011 and crude
production from its three oilfields reached 14 mbbl/d, a 25%
increase yoy, in 2011.  In its rating case, Fitch assumes that
the company will post annual production growth of 10% yoy over
the medium term.

The company's operational profile compares well with those of
similarly rated international peers.  In 2011, the company
reported a reserve replacement rate of 152%, a solid but reduced
reserves life of 7.6 years, and manageable production costs of
USD12/bbl, up 50% yoy.  Its finding and development (F&D) costs
nearly doubled in 2011 to USD23.5/bbl, reflecting rising fuel
costs and intensified drilling operations.  Fitch believes that
South Oil's F&D and production costs should stabilize in the
medium term given that the company has entered a steady growth
phase.

The ratings also reflect the company's solid financial
performance.  In 2011, its funds from operations (FFO) adjusted
leverage amounted to 0.5x and FFO interest coverage was at 28.7x,
which compare well with those of similarly rated oil and gas
peers.  Using its updated oil price deck, Fitch forecasts that
South Oil will maintain leverage ratios below 1x and double-digit
coverage ratios over the medium term.  Fitch also forecasts that
the company's large F&D costs to expand upstream operations will
be covered by its cash from operations (CFO) and not from
additional borrowings.

At the same time, Fitch remains concerned about South Oil's low
liquidity - low cash balances and a large portion of short-term
secured loans in its credit portfolio.  Short-term debt accounted
for 76% of total debt at end-H112.  The company's cash position
of KZT1.2 billion at end-H112 was insufficient to cover its
short-term maturities of KZT10.2 billion.  Fitch believes that
the company will refinance its debt portfolio in 2013-2014.

What Could Trigger A Rating Action?

Additional positive rating action is unlikely at this time.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

  -- Larger scale of South Oil's operations, e.g., more
     diversified production base that would lower the company's
     dependence on a few fields, whilst maintaining a strong
     credit profile

  -- An improvement in South Oil's liquidity, e.g. due to
     extension of its debt maturity profile, would be positive
     for its rating

  -- Improved corporate governance

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

  -- Failure to implement the planned growth strategy, aggressive
     capex and/or shareholder-friendly actions resulting in a
     material deterioration of the company's credit profile would
     be negative for the ratings



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


BANQUE INTERNATIONALE: Moody's Upgrades Standalone BFSR to 'D+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Baa1 senior unsecured
debt and deposit ratings of Banque Internationale a Luxembourg
(BIL), with a stable outlook, and the Prime-2 short-term debt and
deposit ratings. At the same time, Moody's upgraded BIL's
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+
(equivalent to a standalone credit assessment of ba1), with a
stable outlook, from D/ba2 on review with direction uncertain.

The upgrade of BIL's standalone BFSR to D+/ba1, stable outlook,
reflects (1) its improved risk profile following its exit from
the Dexia group; (2) the stabilization of BIL's core retail and
commercial franchise in Luxembourg; and (3) its sound post-
closing financial fundamentals. BIL's standalone BFSR is still
constrained by certain challenges including (1) its operational
de-linkage from the Dexia group; (2) the lack of sufficient
hindsight for assessing the stabilization of the bank's
franchises; and (3) challenges surrounding the private-banking
activities.

In addition, the confirmation of BIL's Baa1 long-term debt and
deposit ratings, with a stable outlook, reflects (1) BIL's ba1
standalone credit strength; and (2) Moody's continued assumption
that there is a very high likelihood the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg (Aaa, negative) would provide systemic (government)
support to BIL, in case of need.

BIL's subordinated debt and junior subordinated debt ratings were
upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 and to Ba3(hyb) from B1(hyb),
respectively. Both ratings, which were previously on review with
direction uncertain, were assigned a positive outlook. At the
same time, Moody's confirmed the rating of BIL's non-cumulative
preferred stock at B3(hyb) and revised its outlook to positive
from on review with direction uncertain.

The rating actions conclude Moody's review of BIL's long- and
short-term senior unsecured ratings initiated on October 3, 2011,
and follows the completion of the sale of BIL to Precision
Capital (unrated) on October 5, 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE --- BFSR UPGRADE

FIRST DRIVER --- EXIT FROM THE DEXIA GROUP

The upgrade of BIL's standalone BFSR to D+/ba1 partly reflects
(1) BIL's exit from the Dexia group and sale to the Qatari
investment fund, Precision Capital, effective October 5; and (2)
the bank's limited residual exposures to Dexia group. At the
closing of the transaction, BIL had no senior unsecured exposures
to Dexia's entities and all legacy assets had been transferred to
Dexia Credit Local (DCL; Baa2 deposits, negative; BFSR E/BCA caa1
stable, Prime-2). The residual exposures to Dexia, including
EUR46 million of covered bonds issued by Dexia Municipal Agency
and less than EUR1 billion of mark-to-market exposure to
interest-rate swaps, which are daily cash-collateralized, present
limited credit risk in Moody's opinion (source: company
presentation).

SECOND DRIVER --- PRESERVED CORE FRANCHISE

The standalone BFSR upgrade also reflects the stabilization of
BIL's core retail and commercial franchise in Luxembourg.
Although the situation with Dexia during Q3 2011 weakened BIL's
credit profile, as it experienced large deposit outflows, Moody's
believes that BIL managed to preserve its core franchise. The
deposit outflows were mainly concentrated on large private-
banking customers and institutional clients and have ceased since
the signature of the preliminary agreement of 20 December 2011
between Dexia, the State of Luxembourg and Precision Capital.
BIL's H1 2012 operating performance seemed to confirm a
stabilization of the bank's franchise with growth witnessed in
customer deposits and assets under management. BIL's new
perimeter -- which excludes the former participations in Dexia
Asset Management, RBC Dexia Investor Services, Dexia LDG Banque,
Parfipar and Popular Banca Privada -- leaves the bank with (1)
strong positions in Luxembourg retail and commercial banking,
ranking third in market shares; and (2) an established private-
banking franchise with EUR17 billion of assets under management,
as of year-end 2011.

THIRD DRIVER --- ROBUST CREDIT FUNDAMENTALS

Additionally, Moody's believes that BIL displays sound post-
closing financial fundamentals. BIL's new capitalization appears
adequate, with a Basel-2 core Tier 1 ratio in excess of 15%,
equivalent to 9% under Basel 3, due to a capital injection by the
Dexia group (source: Dexia's press release, October 5, 2012).
Similarly, BIL's liquidity position is strong, as it benefits
from an ample deposit base stemming from its retail and private-
banking franchises. The bank exhibits a level of deposits
structurally in excess of its loan book (Moody's estimates the
pro forma loan-to-deposit ratio at approximately 75%). Recurring
profitability appears strong in the context of the mature
Luxembourg retail and commercial banking market, with expected
net income above 2% of Basel II risk-weighted assets and a
cost/income ratio of around 65% in 2012 on a pro-forma basis, and
should offer a satisfactory level of stability, in Moody's
opinion.

--- BFSR CONSTRAINING FACTORS

Despite these strengths, several challenges constrain BIL's
standalone BFSR, including (1) operational de-linkage from the
Dexia group; (2) the lack of sufficient hindsight for assessing
the stabilization of the bank's franchises after the recent
events; and (3) the current challenges surrounding BIL's private-
banking activities. Moody's believes that BIL's transition to a
standalone bank presents inherent credit risks linked to BIL's
need to create certain functions that were previously centralized
at the group level. Firstly, BIL has had to transition towards
in-house risk-management and liquidity management functions,
requiring certain IT investments and additional staff resources.
Moody's positioning of the standalone credit assessment at ba1
reflects these transition efforts which need to be assessed over
time. The lack of historical data following last year's events
around the Dexia group also provides for a transition period
during which Moody's will assess the sustainability of the
stabilization of BIL's core franchise. Lastly, only 30% of BIL's
private banking clients are Luxembourg residents, suggesting that
it might need to convert clients to on-shore banking rapidly, in
the context of increased regulatory and tax scrutiny. This could
generate additional costs and reveal the bank's lack of critical
mass in this sector, in Moody's opinion.

However, although Moody's has assigned a stable outlook to the D+
BFSR, the rating agency says that there is a degree of upwards
pressure on BIL's standalone credit assessment, reflecting the
stable nature of BIL's core retail and commercial activities, and
Moody's expectations for a successful transition towards a fully
independent bank from a risk-management standpoint. Moody's BFSR
scale is non-linear; as such, a D+ BFSR can be equivalent to a
standalone credit assessment of either ba1 or baa3. Although
these upward pressures might prompt a baa3 standalone credit
assessment at some point in the future, the BFSR would remain at
D+, hence the stable outlook.

SENIOR DEBT RATINGS UNDERPINNED BY HIGH PROBABILITY OF SYSTEMIC
SUPPORT IN CASE OF NEED

The confirmation of BIL's long and short-term debt and deposit
ratings at Baa1/P-2 directly follows the upgrade of the
standalone BFSR. Moody's continues to believe that BIL benefits
from a very high probability of systemic support due to the
combination of the following factors:

(1) The fact that the Luxembourg has previously extended systemic
support to BIL through Dexia during the crisis;

(2) The post-sale 10% state-ownership, advocating further support
in case of need; and

(3) The bank's systemic importance for the domestic economy,
where it holds major positions in retail and commercial banking.

For these reasons, Moody's incorporates three notches of systemic
uplift from the ba1 standalone credit strength into BIL's Baa1
senior debt ratings.

SUBORDINATED AND JUNIOR SUBORDINATED DEBT RATINGS

Moody's has upgraded BIL's subordinated debt and junior
subordinated debt ratings one notch to Ba2 and Ba3(hyb)
respectively, both with a positive outlook. These upgrades mirror
the raising of BIL's adjusted standalone credit assessment to
ba1. BIL's subordinated and junior subordinated debt ratings are
notched off the adjusted standalone credit assessment,
respectively by one and two notches. The adjusted standalone
credit assessment is equal to the standalone credit assessment,
as Moody's does not incorporate parental support uplift from
BIL's new parent, Precision Capital.

Moody's has confirmed BIL's non-cumulative preferred stock at
B3(hyb), now with a positive outlook. BIL's 2011 losses caused a
EUR33 million principal write-down on this instrument, the
indenture of which contains loss-absorbing features. BIL
subsequently skipped three quarterly coupons in 2012. Before
paying dividends, BIL must replenish the instrument's nominal and
pay coupons during two consecutive years, or redeem the security
at par on a quarterly call date. Moody's believes that there is a
high likelihood that BIL will want to be in a position to pay
dividends as soon as possible and therefore that the instrument
will not eventually incur capital losses. The B3(hyb) rating
reflects the current nominal loss that the instrument has
incurred, as well as the non-cumulative nature of its coupons.
The positive outlook reflects the likely replenishment of the
nominal in the near future, in Moody's opinion.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Upwards rating pressure on the bank's standalone BFSR could
develop if (1) BIL successfully manages its operational de-
linkage from the Dexia group and (2) BIL's franchise confirms its
stabilisation over the next 12-18 months.

However, downwards pressure on BIL's standalone BFSR and senior
unsecured ratings might develop if (1) BIL's franchise fails to
stabilise on a longer-term basis; or (2) if its risk profile
increases. This could occur depending on the constitution of its
new investment portfolio, or if BIL engages in overly aggressive
international expansion in private banking.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC NL: Fitch Confirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has confirmed E-MAC NL 2005-I B.V. (E-MAC NL 2005-
I) and E-MAC Program II B.V. Compartment NL 2008-IV (E-MAC NL
2008-IV).

The confirmation comes ahead of the put option in October 2012.
The transactions' noteholders hold a put option to have their
notes redeemed upon exercising their rights on and after the
first put dates.  The agency understands that the mortgage
payment transactions (MPT) provider (CMIS Nederland B.V.) for E-
MAC NL 2005-I and servicing advance optionholder (RBS plc) for E-
MAC NL 2008-IV will not grant servicing advances to the issuers,
which are required in order to redeem the notes.  Fitch also
highlights that none of the issuers have engaged any third party
that would be willing to purchase the mortgage portfolios.  As a
result, none of the notes will be redeemed and the transactions
will continue to operate as before, with the addition of the
extension margins, which rank subordinate to the reserve fund in
the priority of payments.

E-MAC NL 2005-I and E-MAC NL 2008-IV reached their first put
option date in July 2012 and October 2011, respectively.  For E-
MAC NL 2008-IV, the agency has observed that the excess revenue
generated by the mortgage portfolio remains insufficient to cover
the payments due on the extension margins and the interest
deficiency ledger in this transaction is gradually building up.
In Fitch's opinion, failure to pay the extension margin would not
constitute an event of default.  Fitch's rating does not address
the payment of the extension margin.

Other E-MAC NL transactions have also been subject to failed put
option executions.  In some instances, noteholders have adopted
resolutions submitted by the relevant trustees aiming to mitigate
practical implications, for example, through a reduction in the
frequency of the auctioning of the mortgage receivables and put
dates.  Fitch expects that similar actions may be taken on E-MAC
NL 2005-I and E-MAC NL 2008-IV.  On the other hand, the outcome
of some previous noteholders meetings was a decision to initiate
legal proceedings against the MPT provider, which Fitch expects
to be taken on E-MAC NL 2005-I where CMIS is also the servicing
advance provider.  This is less likely to be proposed for E-MAC
NL 2008-IV given the optional nature of that specific servicing
advance.

Fitch conducted a full performance review of both transactions in
September 2012.  Although the performance of E-MAC NL 2005-I has
been better than that of E-MAC NL 2008-IV, the agency found the
level of credit support available to the junior class D notes to
be insufficient to withstand 'BBBsf' stresses, and therefore
downgraded the notes to 'BBB-sf'.  Meanwhile, the performance of
E-MAC 2008-IV has consistently been the worst in the E-MAC NL
series.  The combination of the reduced gross excess spread and
higher losses have caused reserve fund draws and Fitch is
concerned that further reserve fund draws may occur on upcoming
payment dates. The Negative Outlooks on the class B, C and D
notes reflect these concerns.

The rating actions are as follows:

E-MAC NL 2005-I

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0216513118): confirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0216513548): confirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0216513977): confirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0216514199): confirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0216707314): confirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Negative

E-MAC NL 2008-IV

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0355816264): confirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0355816421): confirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0355816694): confirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0355816934): confirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative


SKELLIG ROCK: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Skellig Rock B.V.

    EUR38M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded
    to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 A1 (sf) Placed Under
    Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR34M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Baa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR7M Class Q Combination Notes due 2022 (current rated
    balance EUR 5.2m), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
    Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR8M Class T Combination Notes due 2022 (current rated
    balance EUR 5.8m), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 20,
    2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's confirmed the ratings of the following notes issued by
Skellig Rock B.V.

    EUR27M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Ba2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR13.5M Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's has also withdrawn the rating of the following notes
issued by Skellig Rock B.V.

    EUR8M Class R Combination Notes due 2022, Withdrawn (sf);
    previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

The Class R combination notes split back into its original
components and are no longer outstanding.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class Q,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. For Classes S and T the 'Rated
Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the
Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Skellig Rock B.V., issued in November 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European leveraged loans. The portfolio is
managed by GSO Capital Partners International LLP. This
transaction will be in reinvestment period until 30 November
2012. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2012. The
actions also reflect a correction to the rating model Moody's
used for this transaction. Moody's corrected the rating model and
put the ratings of above tranches on review for upgrade on 10
July, 2012.

In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable
during the amortization period, and therefore the limited ability
to effect significant changes to the current collateral pool,
Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a shorter
amortization profile, higher spread and diversity levels compared
to the levels assumed at the last rating action in October 2011.

Moody's notes that the overcollateralization ratios of the rated
notes have decreased since the rating action in October 2011. The
Class A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 129.27%, 116.27%, 107.67% and 103.83%, respectively,
versus August 2011 levels of 132.41%, 119.10%, 110.29% and
106.36%, respectively. The Class E overcollateralization test is
currently failing. Additionally, securities rated Caa1 or lower
is reported at EUR60.1 million versus EUR30.6 million as time of
the last rating action. The reported WARF has increased slightly
from 2930 to 2998 between August 2011 and August 2012.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR404.68
million, defaulted par of EUR2.39 million, a weighted average
default probability of 18.87% (consistent with a WARF of 2842), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.68% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted
average spread of 3.68%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 91.7% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In the process of determining the final ratings, Moody's took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinance and
sovereign risks -- Approximately 25% of the portfolio are rated
B3 and below and maturing between 2014 and 2016, which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance. Approximately 13% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Italy. Moody's considered a model run where
the base case WARF was increased to be 3441 by forcing ratings on
25% of such exposure to Ca. This run generated model outputs that
were one to two notches lower than the base case results.

(2) Lower Weighted Average Spread and Diversity Score Levels - To
test the deal sensitivity to key parameters, Moody's modelled a
lower weighted average spread of 3.17% as well as a lower
diversity score of 37, which are the midpoints between reported
and covenanted values. This run generated model outputs that were
within one notch off the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below :

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


* POLAND: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Poland's banking system remains negative for the
second consecutive year, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
Banking System Outlook published on Oct. 16. The main drivers of
the outlook are (1) the slowdown in economic growth in Poland;
(2) the consequent asset-quality deterioration and constrained
ability to grow and diversify revenues; and (3) banks' potential
exposure to a significant asset-liability mismatch risk,
particularly in foreign currency. In addition, Moody's expects
that the increasingly volatile and uncertain external environment
and encouragement from West European parents will push Polish
banks to accumulate liquidity and intensify competition for
customer deposits, thus diminishing their interest margins.

The new report is entitled "Banking System Outlook: Poland".

The slowdown in economic growth has placed banks' performance
under pressure by weakening credit demand and reducing "bankable"
lending opportunities in Poland. Moody's says that weak demand is
likely to persist in 2013 as the rating agency expects GDP growth
to remain subdued at 1.7%.

Moody's expects selective weakening in the performance of certain
market segments over the outlook period -- construction, SMEs and
unsecured consumer lending -- although large corporates and
retail mortgages will likely remain more resilient. However, the
hitherto strong quality of foreign-currency retail-mortgage books
could be negatively exposed to the possibility of a sharp and
protracted depreciation in the Polish zloty. In terms of
construction in particular, during H1 2012 several high-profile
defaults affected the largest players in the construction
industry and drove up the provisioning expenses of several
leading Polish banks.

The system appears to be broadly self-funded with limited
reliance on wholesale markets. However, the bulk of customer
deposits have very short-term contractual maturities with a
history of high price volatility, thus exposing banks to a
significant asset-liability mismatch risk.

The absence of diversified and stable long-term funding sources
remains a systemic issue; currently, approximately 75% of
liabilities mature within one year. In addition, a number of
foreign subsidiaries rely on their (largely Western European
Bank) parents for a major portion of foreign-currency funding
needs. This exposes them to the ongoing euro area turmoil and
potential pressure to reduce their intra-group borrowings.

Despite these negative factors, Moody's notes that the Polish
Banking Supervisor's recommendation to retain a greater share of
2011 profits improved leverage ratios and boosted most leading
Polish banks' loss-absorption capacity.

Following this, Moody's believes that the capital resources of
Polish banks will remain solid, with an aggregate capital
adequacy ratio of 13.1% and Tier 1 ratio of 11.7% as of end-2011.
This compares favorably with those of Central European peers but
only partly offsets the aforementioned asset-quality credit
risks.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ABSOLUT BANK: Fitch Revises Rating Watch on 'BB+' IDR to Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Rating Watch on Absolut Bank's
ratings, including its 'BB+' Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR), to Negative from Evolving.

RATIONALE AND DRIVERS - IDRs, NATIONAL AND SUPPORT RATINGS

The revision of the Rating Watch reflects Fitch's opinion that
the sale of Absolut by its parent, Belgium's KBC Bank (KBCB; 'A-
'/Stable), to a less financially strong entity has become more
likely than previously.

Fitch understands that KBCB, which plans to divest Absolut as
part of its restructuring plan agreed with European Commission,
has already started consultations with potential buyers.  Fitch
has not yet been informed of any firm arrangements, but considers
Russian privately-owned entities to be more likely acquirers
given their publicly expressed interest.  If the new owner turns
out to be a Russian privately-owned financial institution or
group, it would have a more limited ability to provide support
than KBCB.

However, in Fitch's view, KBCB would be likely to continue to
support the bank up to the moment of sale.  This is reflected in
Absolut's current IDRs and Support Rating of '3'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, NATIONAL AND SUPPORT RATINGS

Should Absolut be sold to a less financially strong shareholder,
its Long-Term IDR, National Long-term Rating and Support Rating
would likely be downgraded.  The Long-term IDR could potentially
be downgraded by several notches.  However, if Absolut is sold to
a financially stronger and higher rated entity (relative to the
bank's current IDR) the ratings could be affirmed or upgraded.

RATIONALE AND DRIVERS - VIABILITY RATING

Absolut's 'b' Viability Rating (VR) is based on its weak pre-
impairment profitability, high dependence on KBCB for funding,
which may need to be substituted with more expensive local
funding following the expected sale, and potential challenges
arising from adjustment of the bank's business model after the
ownership change.  The VR also considers the bank's recently
improved asset quality, currently sizeable liquidity cushion and
the solid capital buffer.

Absolut's pre-impairment operating profit (only 0.5% of average
total assets in annualized terms in H112) is contained by its low
cost efficiency and the lack of business scale resulting from a
significant asset base contraction over the past few years.

Asset quality has improved as a result of parent-coordinated
efforts to clean up the balance sheet from the non-performing
loans (NPLs; overdue by more than 90 days) and other relatively
high risk (mainly, real estate) exposures, particularly during
2011 and H112.  At end-H112, NPLs stood at a relatively high 11%
of gross corporate loans, but a more moderate 7% of the total
portfolio due to the sound performance of the mortgage book.
Real estate exposures totalled a significant 23% of Fitch core
capital (FCC).

Absolut is dependent on KBCB for funding, with RUB25 billion of
debt (net of receivables) from its parent at end-H112 (28% of
liabilities).  At the same time, available liquidity (net of
placements in KBCB) was RUB29 billion.  Refinancing of KBCB's
debt, which has an effective interest rate of 5.7%, may translate
into higher funding costs and further aggravate already modest
profitability.

Capitalization is solid as evidenced by the FCC/risk-weighted
assets of nearly 18% and fully reserved impaired loans at end-
H112.  Fitch estimates that after the repayment of KBCB's RUB5
billion subordinated debt facility, the bank's capital buffer
could allow it to increase its loan impairment reserves to 20% of
gross loans (from the current 7%) before its regulatory capital
ratio would have decreased to the minimum required 10%.  Fitch
understands that capital is unlikely to be distributed to KBCB
before the sale of the bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

The VR may be reassessed following the sale of the bank and after
Fitch has analyzed the potential benefits and risks of the new
ownership.  An upgrade of the VR is possible if capitalization
remains sound and performance starts to improve.  A downgrade of
the VR is less likely at present, but significant distributions
of capital and/or a higher-risk asset profile could put downward
pressure on the rating.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+'; Rating Watch revised
     to Negative from Evolving
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- National Long-term Rating: 'AA(rus)'; Rating Watch revised
     to Negative from Evolving
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
  -- Support Rating: '3'; Rating Watch revised to Negative from
     Evolving
  -- Senior unsecured debt rating: 'AA(rus)'; Rating Watch
     revised to Negative from Evolving


=========
S P A I N
=========


ALTECO: Spanish Court Accepts Bankruptcy Filing
-----------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that a Spanish court has accepted a filing for
bankruptcy from Alteco and MAG Import, two investment firms that
own 31% of French property company Gecina.

Alteco and MAG Import filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 3 after a bank
refused to refinance a EUR1.6 billion (US$2 billion) loan,
leaving nearly a dozen lenders exposed, Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, two Spanish mercantile courts said in
documents released on Tuesday that Alteco and MAG Import met
conditions for voluntary bankruptcy.

French bank Natixis has the most exposure to the loan, at EUR266
million, Reuters discloses.  Reuters notes that a source said
Royal Bank of Scotland has EUR212 million tied up in the loan.

Alteco and MAG Import said they had kept up to date with payments
on the loan, making this the first bankruptcy filing in Spain in
which parties were up to date with payments, according to
Reuters.


SANTANDER BANCORP: S&P Cuts Subordinated Debt Ratings to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its issuer credit
ratings on Santander BanCorp to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB/A-2'. The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative. "We also lowered the
issue ratings on Santander BanCorp's two subordinated debt issues
to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on Santander BanCorp, which is based in
Puerto Rico, as a result of the downgrade of its parent, Banco
Santander S.A., on Oct. 15," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Robert Hansen. "The downgrade of Banco Santander S.A.
follows our Oct. 10, 2012, downgrade of the Kingdom of Spain to
'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB+/A-2'. "We continue to view wholly owned
Santander BanCorp as moderately strategic to its parent."

"Our stand-alone credit profile (SACP) for Santander BanCorp
remains 'bbb-'. According to our criteria, we don't incorporate
any uplift or support into the issuer credit rating based on the
company's strategic importance to its parent. Under our group
methodology, the indicative long-term issuer credit rating on a
"moderately strategic" subsidiary is generally one notch above
the subsidiary's SACP, subject to a cap of one rating notch below
the group credit profile (GCP)," S&P said.

The negative outlook on Santander BanCorp reflects the outlook on
its parent, Banco Santander S.A., which, in turn, reflects the
outlook on the sovereign ratings on Spain.


* SPAIN: Moody's Corrects Oct. 5 Rating Release on Four Banks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a correction to the Oct. 5
rating release on four Spanish banking groups.

Moody's Investors Service took rating actions on the subordinated
and hybrid ratings of four Spanish banking groups, which are
owned by the government's Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring
(FROB) and subject to restructuring, namely Bankia and its parent
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA), Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco
and Banco de Valencia S.A. (categorized as Group 1 institutions
under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the euro area
members on July 20, 2012). The senior subordinated debt and the
hybrid instruments of all four groups have been downgraded to C
reflecting the very high expected losses, as the government plans
to impose losses on holders of these instruments.

At the same time, Moody's has downgraded the senior debt and
deposit ratings of Banco de Valencia to Caa1 (outlook developing)
from B3 (review for downgrade), to reflect the higher risk for
senior creditors arising from the fact that this entity will go
through an orderly resolution process as expressed in the Royal
Decree 24/2012.

The remaining debt ratings as well as the standalone credit
assessments of Group 1 banks remain on review for downgrade,
aligned with Moody's review for downgrade of Spain's Baa3
government bond rating. In concluding the review of Bankia, BFA,
Catalunya Banc and NCG Banco, Moody's will take into account the
conclusion of the review of Spain's sovereign rating as well as
the impact of the restructuring framework for these banks.

The rating actions are unrelated to the ongoing review of Spain's
sovereign rating by Moody's.

RATINGS RATIONALE

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID RATINGS

Moody's downgrade of the subordinated debt and hybrid instruments
of these four banking groups (which are currently controlled by
the FROB) reflect the fact that losses will be imposed on
subordinated and hybrid creditors of Group 1 banks. The
restructuring framework contemplates that such "burden-sharing"
will be applied to banks that are deemed to require public-sector
capital.

Ratings at C are applied to debt instruments that are typically
in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or
interest. The C rating also reflects an estimated recovery rate
of less than 35%, which is commensurate with the large discount
at which most of these instruments have been trading in the
secondary market.

BANCO DE VALENCIA

The three-notch downgrade of Banco de Valencia's standalone
credit assessment to ca follows the approval of Royal Decree
24/2012 on August 31, 2012, whereby those entities that are
currently subject to a restructuring process governed by article
7 of Royal Decree 9/2009 will be subject to orderly resolution.
Consistent with Moody's definitions, the lower standalone credit
assessments reflect the rating agency's view that Banco de
Valencia has highly speculative intrinsic, or standalone,
financial strength and is expected to avoid default through the
provision of extraordinary support, which the Spanish government
has committed to provide .

The one-notch downgrade of the senior debt and deposit ratings of
Banco de Valencia to Caa1 reflects (1) the further deterioration
of its standalone credit profile, as discussed above; (2)
uncertainty around the timing and process for orderly resolution;
and (3) whether future support will be needed and the
availability and degree of such potential support during the
resolution process. In recent months, Moody's believes that it
has become increasingly clear that the creditors of those Spanish
banks unable to meet the stricter regulatory requirements --
absent extraordinary support -- are exposed to increased
uncertainty and reduced predictability about the recovery of
principal and interest for the bank's outstanding debt.

For the industry-wide Spanish bank restructuring framework, the
above mentioned uncertainties are exacerbated by political
considerations and the involvement of the Eurogroup (comprising
the ECB, EBA, European Commission) and other supra-national
entities. Their involvement bolsters the Spanish sovereign's
otherwise limited ability to support banks, but the associated
terms and conditionality add complexity and uncertainty for
creditors. Whilst the Eurogroup has thus far shown a greater
inclination to share the burden of recapitalization only with
subordinated bondholders, the risk has increased that senior bond
holders of Spanish banks may similarly be subject to "burden-
sharing" if future support is required.

Moody's believes that the above-described uncertainties for Banco
de Valencia's senior creditors are appropriately reflected in
senior debt and deposit ratings in the Caa range.

MOODY'S COMMENTS ON EXISTING REVIEW OF SPANISH BANKS

In concluding the review process initiated on June 25, 2012 of
the debt ratings and standalone credit assessments of those banks
who were not identified as having capital shortfalls in the
evaluation performed by Oliver Wyman (Group 0 banks), Moody's
will take into account i) how the conclusion of the review of the
Spanish government's debt ratings may impact the standalone
credit strength and debt ratings of these banks; and ii) any
other developments that may affect the creditworthiness of these
banks, such as the mergers that are ongoing in a few cases.

Moody's expects to address the standalone credit assessments
along with the senior debt and deposit ratings of Group 1 banks
after Spanish authorities submit restructuring or resolution
plans for these entities to the European Commission. These plans
will allow Moody's to better assess the credit profile of the
banks post capital infusion, and in view of the potential
transfer of toxic assets to the government sponsored bad bank. In
addition, Moody's will take into account the conclusion of the
review of Spain's sovereign rating.

The conclusion of the ratings review of the three rated banks
falling into Groups 2 and 3 (Banco Popular Espanol rated
Ba1/D/ba2/NP, review for downgrade; Ibercaja Banco and Liberbank
both rated Ba2/D-/ba3/NP, review for downgrade), i.e. for whom a
capital shortfall has been identified in last week's publication,
will take into consideration the recapitalization or
restructuring plans that these institutions will need to present
in October. The review conclusion will also incorporate the level
of the sovereign rating and any impact this may have on these
banks' standalone and supported credit profiles. If any of these
three banks are considered unable to meet capital shortfalls from
private means (Group 2) the rating actions would likely be taken
shortly after their placement in this group is confirmed and
restructuring plans are submitted. Moody's would expect
subordinated debt and hybrid ratings of any Group 2 bank to
reflect the very high likelihood that the Spanish government will
impose losses on these instruments, consistent with the actions
on Group 1 banks.

For Group 3 firms, the rating reviews will be concluded later in
2012 or in 2013, after the details of the recapitalization plans
are disclosed. Moody's will examine the prospects for successful
implementation of such plans, the impact on the banks' credit
profile if implemented as planned, the structure and amount of
any external support, as well as the potential crystallization of
losses for shareholders and junior creditors of the bank. Moody's
will assess any "burden-sharing" exercises with regards to
whether they constitute distressed exchanges, and thus default
events, under Moody's definition.

In some instances, the ratings may remain on review where ongoing
merger or restructuring procedures prevent sufficient visibility
to conclude on the final ratings.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The execution of the restructuring or resolution plans will
likely improve the affected banks' standalone credit strength.
The initiatives included in these plans could lead to upgrades of
standalone credit assessments, which could also affect debt and
deposit ratings. Increased clarity about the banks' standalone
strength post-restructuring and/or an increase in the extent,
likelihood or predictability of support could also have positive
rating implications.

Conversely, if any of the four banks enters liquidation with
little prospect for recovery of principal and interest, the
standalone credit assessments will likely fall to 'c' and senior
debt and deposit ratings will decline to Caa or lower.

For Banco de Valencia specifically, the outlook on the senior
debt and deposit ratings is developing, indicating that they
could move in either direction during the resolution. Upwards
pressure on these ratings could develop if Banco de Valencia is
acquired by a stronger peer that assumes the then-outstanding
obligations. However, Moody's says that further downwards
pressure could result if a liquidation of Banco de Valencia was
executed in a manner that reduced the prospects for the recovery
of principal and interest on its outstanding debt.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Research reports:

- Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions, Aug 31, 2012

- Banking System Outlook: Spain, Aug 17, 2012

- Spanish Banks Restructuring Plan Is Credit Negative for Junior
   Bondholders, 16 Jul 2012

- Announcement: Moody's comments on timing for assessing the
   impact of Spain's downgrade on Spanish banks' ratings,
   Jun 19, 2012

- Key Drivers of Spanish Bank Rating Actions, May 17, 2012

- Spain's New Initiative, While Supportive, Leaves Banks
   Vulnerable to Rising Loan Delinquencies, 14 May 2012

Websites:

- Moody's Bank Ratings 2012

- European Credits Under Pressure

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

  Issuer: Bancaja Capital, S.A. Unipersonal

    Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Ca(hyb)

  Issuer: Bancaja Emisiones, S.A. Unipersonal

    Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Caa1(hyb)

  Issuer: Banco De Valencia S.A.

    Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C from Caa2

    Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1, Caa1
    from B3, B3

  Issuer: Banco Financiero y de Ahorros

    Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Ca(hyb)

    Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program (Subordinate),
    Downgraded to (P)C from (P)Caa3

   Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C from Caa3

  Issuer: Bankia

    Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program (Junior
    Subordinate and Subordinate), Downgraded to (P)C from a range
    of (P)Caa1 to (P)B3

  Issuer: Caixa Catalunya Preferential Issuance Ltd.

    Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Caa3(hyb)

  Issuer: Caixa Galicia Preferentes, S.A.

    Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Caa3(hyb)

  Issuer: Caja Madrid Finance Preferred, S.A.

    Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Ca(hyb)

  Issuer: Catalunya Banc SA

    Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program (Subordinate),
    Downgraded to (P)C from (P)B3

    Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C from B3

  Issuer: NCG Banco S.A.

    Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Caa1(hyb)

    Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C from B3

Issuer: BVA Preferentes, S.A.

    Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
    C(hyb) from Ca(hyb)

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


ZURICH BANK: Moody's Lowers Bank Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the backed bank deposit
ratings of Zurich Bank to A3 from Aa3. The backed (P)A1 senior
unsecured debt program rating is affirmed. The bank's BFSR of E+
and its standalone credit assessment of b3 are not affected by
this action. The outlooks on the deposit and senior unsecured
debt ratings, as well as on the BFSR are all stable.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Zurich Bank's deposit ratings follows Moody's
adjustment of Ireland's local and foreign currency bond and
deposit country ceilings to A3 from Aaa.

While Zurich Bank's backed deposit ratings benefit substantially
from a surety bond issued by the Zurich Insurance Company (the
senior unsecured debt of which is rated Al), and thus qualify for
credit substitution, the lower ceiling means that, in principle,
the highest rating that can be assigned to a domestic issuer in
Ireland is now A3. The lower ceiling reflects the risk of exit
and redenomination in the unlikely event of a default by the
sovereign, as well as the generally elevated risk of economic and
financial dislocation in Ireland. The downgrade of the bank's
deposit ratings to A3/P-2 reflects Moody's expectation that they
would be governed and enforced under Irish law and therefore
would highly likely be subject to redenomination and currency
controls.

The affirmation of the backed (P)A1 senior unsecured debt program
rating reflects the terms and conditions of the program,
indicating that debt issued under the program would not be
subject to redenomination or currency controls. These include (i)
any senior unsecured debt issuance by the bank would be governed
by English law in English Courts, (ii) the Euro is defined in the
program documentation as the currency of the European Monetary
Union rather than that of Ireland, and (iii) any counterparty has
the right to claim under the guarantee directly from Zurich
Insurance Company.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Given that the bank is no longer carrying out new lending and
that the property lending portfolio, the primary business of the
bank, is being run down, there is unlikely to be positive
pressure on the standalone credit assessment in the medium-term.
A change in the standalone credit assessment would not by itself
affect the bank's deposit ratings due to the existence of the
surety bond issued by Zurich Insurance Company. A downgrade of
the bank's standalone credit assessment would likely be driven by
a further significant deterioration in asset quality. A downgrade
of the deposit ratings may occur if the country ceiling for
Ireland were to be adjusted downwards, or if the senior unsecured
rating of Zurich Insurance Company were to be downgraded. The
backed (P) Al senior unsecured debt program would be upgraded or
downgraded in the event of an upgrade or downgrade of Zurich
Insurance Company.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in
June 2012.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


DENIZBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'D+' BFSR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Baa3 long-term and
Prime-3 short-term local-currency deposit ratings of Denizbank
A.S. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the bank's D+ bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) equivalent to a ba1 standalone
credit assessment. All ratings carry a stable outlook.

The rating announcements conclude Moody's ratings review
initiated on March 16, 2012 and follow the change of ownership of
Denizbank, effective September 28, 2012, which is now majority
owned by Russian Sberbank (Baa1 deposits stable; BFSR D+/BCA ba1
stable).

Ratings Rationale

The Baa3/Prime-3 local-currency deposit ratings are supported by
Denizbank's ba1 standalone credit strength and a high likelihood
of systemic support from Turkey. Moody's also incorporates a high
likelihood of parental support from Denizbank's new majority
shareholder Sberbank, which acquired approximately 99.85% of
Denizbank's shares from Dexia Participation Belgique SA and Dexia
SA on September 28, 2012.

The D+/ba1 standalone credit strength reflects Denizbank's strong
financial fundamentals and its growing franchise. However, the
assessment is constrained by (1) the bank's low cross-border
diversification; (2) the relatively unseasoned nature of the loan
book following years of strong growth; (3) its evolving risk
culture and risk-management practices, particularly in retail
loans, which forms part of the bank's focused growth and
expansion strategy; and (4) relatively high levels of exposure to
Turkish government securities.

Moody's believes that the benefits of a successful collaboration
between Denizbank and Sberbank -- including synergies that could
reflect positively on Denizbank's franchise in Turkey -- would
only materialise over the medium term.

Moody's assessment of a high probability of parental support is
based on Denizbank's importance to Sberbank, underpinned, amongst
other things, by (1) Sberbank's 99.85% ownership of Denizbank;
(2) Sberbank's dedicated focus to increase its cross-border
expansion, whereby Denizbank provides some diversification
benefits (with total assets representing about 7% of Sberbank's
consolidated assets as per unaudited June 2012 financials); (3)
both banks having commercial consumer-oriented banking
franchises; and (4) Sberbank's supportive track record towards
its subsidiaries.

When assessing the likelihood of parental support for foreign
subsidiaries, Moody's typically uses the parent's unsupported
rating as the anchor rating of the support provider. Moody's
parental support assumptions do not result in any rating uplift
for Denizbank's ratings because Sberbank's unsupported rating of
ba1 is at the same level as Denizbank's unsupported credit
assessment.

Moody's assessment of a high probability of systemic support is
based on Denizbank's importance to the domestic financial system,
given its domestic loan and deposit market shares of
approximately 3%-4%. Moody's assessment is also based on the
government's strong track record of support, and the fact that
the rating agency considers Turkey to be a high support country.
Based on these assumptions, Denizbank's Baa3 long-term local-
currency deposit rating receives one notch of systemic support
uplift.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

There is no upwards pressure on the BFSR and local-currency
deposit ratings in the short term, captured by the current stable
outlook. The ba1 standalone credit assessment is currently
positioned and capped at Turkey's sovereign rating. If the
sovereign rating is upgraded, respective upwards pressure could
develop on the bank's standalone credit strength. This would be
contingent on evidence of an improvement in Denizbank's overall
profitability, contributing positively to the internal capital
generation capacity and capitalization, without compromising risk
appetite and underwriting standards. An upgrade of Sberbank's
standalone credit strength rating could positively influence
Denizbank's adjusted standalone credit assessment; however, it
would be unlikely to lead to an upgrade of Denizbank's local-
currency deposit ratings given the already available rating
uplift from systemic support.

Downwards pressure on the BFSR might develop (1) if significant
changes in Denizbank's strategy or management cause adverse
developments in its performance; and/or (2) if Turkey's credit
profile weakens; and/or (3) if Sberbank's credit profile weakens,
as Moody's believes that subsidiaries are always likely to be
partially affected by changes in parents' creditworthiness.

For the second point immediately above, Moody's believes that the
creditworthiness of financial institutions with low cross-border
operational diversification and/or high balance-sheet exposure to
the debt of their domestic sovereign is closely linked to the
domestic sovereign's credit strength.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank.


TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' FC Sub. Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time provisional
(P)Ba2 foreign-currency subordinated debt rating to the proposed
senior subordinated debt issuance by Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO
(Vakifbank). The proposed debt instrument is expected to be
eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under Turkish law. The
outlook is stable.

Ratings Rationale

Vakifbank's provisional subordinated debt rating is positioned
one notch below the bank's adjusted standalone credit assessment,
and does not incorporate any rating uplift from systemic
(government) support.

Moody's believes that at present, there is a strong prudential
bank-supervisory framework in Turkey. The regulator has extensive
intervention tools available to preserve a bank's solvency and
financial stability within the banking system, although within
Turkey, imposing losses on bank creditors outside of a
liquidation scenario is untested. However, if future regulatory
intervention is required to support Turkish banks, Moody's
believes that the Turkish frameworks for bank resolution could
develop further, similar to the policy initiatives in numerous
banking systems, particularly in Europe.

These frameworks provide for burden sharing of bank bailouts with
bank creditors, in particular affecting junior classes of bank
securities. As a result, Vakifbank's subordinated debt rating
does not incorporate any uplift from systemic support (for more
details, please refer to Moody's special comment entitled
"Supported Bank Debt Ratings at Risk of Downgrade Due to New
Approaches to Bank Resolution", 14 February 2011).

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

The subordinated debt rating is notched off the standalone credit
assessment. Therefore, any upwards or downwards pressure on the
bank's standalone credit profile will result in a similar rating
action on the bank's subordinated debt.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.


TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Fitch Rates New USD Subordinated Notes BB(EXP)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O.'s
upcoming USD issue of subordinated notes an expected 'BB(EXP)'
rating.

Vakifbank is rated Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) 'BB+'/Stable, Short-term Foreign and Local
Currency IDR 'B', Viability Rating 'bb+', Support Rating '3',
Support Rating Floor 'BB+' and National Long-term rating
'AA+(tur)'/Stable.

Vakifbank was the seventh-largest bank in Turkey in total
unconsolidated bank assets at end-H112.  It is 58.5% owned by the
General Directorate of Foundations, which is fully controlled and
managed by the Turkish state, 16.2% by the bank's pension fund.
25.2% of the shares are publicly traded.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BIG PICTURES: Former Owner Buys Back Firm
-----------------------------------------
Ian Burrell at The Independent reports that former owner of Big
Pictures Darryn Lyons has acquired back the company.

Having fled back to Australia and set up a new company called Mr.
Paparazzi Celebrity Deals, Mr. Lyons has established himself as a
shareholder of another firm called BPGG Limited -- which has
promptly bought up the assets of Big Pictures from the
administrators for GBP164,000, according to The Independent.

The Independent notes that while Mr. Lyons returns to business,
British-based photographers have been left with thousands of
pounds of unpaid invoices and have lost access to the negatives
of their work.

"It is understood that the purchaser is an associated company as
the director of the company, Darryn Lyons, is a shareholder of
the purchaser," stunned creditors have been informed in a letter
from RSM Tenon, the administrators of Big Pictures, the report
notes.

The Independent discloses that BPGG outbid another 15 companies
that entered discussions into buying the assets of the agency,
which closed on its 20th anniversary leaving staff unpaid for
their final month of work.

Big Pictures is a British paparazzi agency founded by Darryn
Lyons.


CONNAUGHT ASSET: Administrator Under Probe by ACCA
--------------------------------------------------
Michelle Abrego and Rachael Revesz at Citywire.co.uk report that
Connaught Asset Management administrator Peter Hollis is under
investigation by the Association of Chartered Certified
Accountants (ACCA).

In 2010, it was reported that Mr. Hollis, who was then with FRP
Advisory, was subject to allegations of misconduct over the
company voluntary arrangement for fashion chain Miss Sixty,
Citywire.co.uk relates.

In his role with Connaught, Mr. Hollis, a partner of KPF
Advisory, who was appointed as administrator to Connaught in
September, has been appointed to investigate the role of the
company and directors following its board's decision to put the
company into administration, Citywire.co.uk discloses.

The funds KPF will be investigating are GBP118 million Income
Series 1 and 18 million Income Series 3, both of which provided
funding to subsidiaries of bridging lender Tiuta, which has also
gone into administration, Citywire.co.uk says.

                      About Connaught plc

Connaught plc -- http://www.connaught.plc.uk/-- is a United
Kingdom-based company engaged in the provision of integrated
asset services to the public and private sectors.  The Company
operates in two business segments: social housing and compliance.
Social Housing segment provide social housing landlords
throughout the United Kingdom with a range of planned and
response maintenance services, as well as compliance and estate
management.  The Compliance segment provides safety, health and
risk management solutions.


DAWSON INTERNATIONAL: Chanel Buys Cashmere Mills, Saves 176 Jobs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dailyrecord.co.uk reports that French fashion house Chanel has
saved Barrie Knitwear's cashmere mill in the Scottish Borders
from closure securing 176 jobs.

Channel stepped in after Barrie Knitwear in Hawick went into
administration with a GBP129 million debt, according to
Dailyrecord.co.uk.

The report notes that Dawson International, which ran the mill,
appointed administrators in August after the company was
requested to pay a GBP129 million debt in its pension scheme.

The mill manufactures cashmere clothing for fashion houses and
department stores around the world.


DIVERSE ENERGY: Voluntarily Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Cell Today reports that Diverse Energy has failed a recent
funding round and voluntarily entered into administration.

According to Fuel Cell Today, the administrators are seeking
interested parties to continue the business or acquire its assets
and issued to following statement:

"On Oct. 9, 2012 Matthew Tait and David Gilbert of BDO LLP were
appointed as Joint Administrators of Diverse Energy Limited by
one of its Directors.  Due to funding restraints it was no longer
possible for the Company to continue to trade and operations were
ceased immediately on appointment."

"Joint Administrators are urgently seeking interested parties who
may wish to acquire some or all of the business and assets of the
Company.

"Significant investment has already been made into this
technology, with test sites up and running.  We are hopeful of
finding an interested party to continue the development of the
intellectual property and ultimately the commercialization of the
PowerCube.  We are working with the Directors and our internal
specialists in this sector to maximize realizations," the report
quoted Mr. Tait as saying.

Diverse Energy is a UK-based developer of ammonia-fuelled PEM
fuel cell systems targeting telecommunications applications in
Africa.


DRACO PLC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4) PLC's class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes.
"At the same time, we have removed from CreditWatch negative our
ratings on the class A and B notes," S&P said.

"DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4) is a U.K. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in December 2005. It
was initially secured against five loans, three of which have
repaid in full. The remaining two loans in the pool are secured
by six commercial properties spread across the U.K. The
outstanding note balance has reduced to GBP152.62 million from
GBP284.98 million at closing," S&P said.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the:

  -- Credit quality of the two remaining underlying loans in the
     pool and reflect S&P's view of the effect of losses to the
     junior notes on the credit enhancement available to the
     senior notes.

  -- Available income to service the notes on a timely basis; and

  -- The issuer's counterparty risk.

                          CREDIT REVIEW

    FLINTSTONE PORTFOLIO (94% OF THE SECURITIZED LOAN POOL)

"Flintstone Portfolio is a 10-year interest-only loan of
GBP144.08 million maturing in October 2015. The loan is secured
by a portfolio of five predominantly office properties located in
central London and the southeast of England. The portfolio is
dominated by the UK House, a mixed-use property located on Oxford
Street in London, which produces about 75% of the portfolio
income. The portfolio occupancy rate has increased to 98.56% from
93.22% between issuance and July 2012. The servicer last reported
the weighted-average lease term (to break) at around nine years.
This compares with a loan remaining term of about three years. In
July 2012, the servicer reported a projected interest coverage
ratio of 1.33x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 66.26% (based
on a November 2005 valuation)," S&P said.

"Taking into account our review of the loan, we consider that a
loan refinancing by 2015 may be difficult to achieve if market
conditions continue to be difficult, but we do not currently
anticipate principal losses," S&P said.

         HERBERT HOUSE (6% OF THE SECURITIZED LOAN POOL)

"Herbert House is a nine-year loan maturing in January 2014. The
loan is secured against a refurbished office property located in
the city center of Birmingham, let to a U.K.-based
telecommunications services provider rated 'BB/Stable/B'. The
lease is on a full repairing and insuring basis for 25 years from
July 2000 with a break option in 2015. The loan is partially
amortizing. In July 2012, the servicer reported a projected
interest coverage ratio of 1.78x and a LTV ratio of 75.90% (based
on a September 2005 valuation)," S&P said.

"In order to address inherent credit risk associated with loans
secured by single-tenanted properties that have relatively short
lease profiles, we have assumed in our analysis that the tenant
will exercise its lease break option. We have also considered the
vacant possession value of the property, which is likely to be
less than the outstanding loan balance, in our view. In our base
case scenario, principal losses would be contained within the
class F notes," S&P said.

                         CASH FLOW REVIEW

"Loan paydown of approximately 46% has resulted in a yield
compression between the two remaining loans and the outstanding
notes. As illustrated in the July 2012 cash manager report, the
weighted-average margin on the two remaining loans was not
sufficient to cover issuer expenses and the note interest on the
July 2012 payment date. However the issuer was able to fully
service the most junior class of notes (the class F notes)
through investment earnings. The lack of adequate excess spread
may result in interest shortfalls with respect to the class F
notes, in our opinion," S&P said.

"Given our view on the loans' refinance risk, we believe the two
loans are potential candidates for a transfer into special
servicing at their respective loan maturity date. We believe that
this could exacerbate the risk of interest shortfalls in the
medium term. If low interest rates persist, the class C, D, E,
and F notes may become more vulnerable to interest shortfalls, in
our opinion," S&P said.

                          RATING ACTIONS

Standard & Poor's ratings address timely payment of interest and
payment of principal not later than the legal final maturity
(October 2017).

"Taking into account our review of the two remaining loans, we
consider that the risk of losses in principal and interest has
increased. Consequently, we consider that the notes'
creditworthiness has deteriorated. We believe that the available
credit enhancement to the notes is no longer sufficient to cover
asset-credit and/or liquidity risks at their current levels. As a
consequence, we have lowered our ratings on the class A, B, C, D,
E and F notes," S&P said.

"We have removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on the
class A and B notes. We placed our ratings on these notes on
CreditWatch negative on Jan. 31, 2012. In our view, the
counterparty ratings can support the current ratings," S&P said.

           POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES

"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European CMBS. However, these criteria are under review,"
S&P said.

"As highlighted in our Nov. 8, 2011 Advance Notice Of Proposed
Criteria Change, our review may result in changes to the
methodology and assumptions that we use when rating European
CMBS. Consequently, it may affect both new and outstanding
ratings in European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"On Sept. 5, 2012, we published our updated criteria for CMBS
property evaluation. These criteria do not significantly change
our longstanding approach to deriving property net cash flows and
values in European CMBS transactions. We do not expect any rating
action in Europe as a result of adopting these criteria," S&P
said.

"However, because of its global scope, our criteria for global
CMBS property evaluation do not include certain market-specific
adjustments. We will therefore publish an application of these
criteria to European CMBS transactions along with our updated
criteria for rating European CMBS," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt updated criteria for rating
European CMBS, we will continue to rate and monitor these
transactions using our existing criteria," S&P said.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
            To                   From

DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4) PLC
GBP284.978 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           A (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

C           BBB (sf)             AA- (sf)
D           BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
E           B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
F           CCC (sf)             BB (sf)


GLASGOW OPPORTUNITIES: Set to Go Into Voluntary Liquidation
-----------------------------------------------------------
CreditMan.co.uk reports that accountants and business advisers
PKF is assisting Glasgow Opportunities (the GO group) in moving
toward voluntary liquidation.

CreditMan.co.uk relates that the majority of staff have already
been transferred by TUPE to other employers although 12 staff are
likely to be made redundant due to the voluntary liquidation.
The group is expected to have sufficient cash to ensure that
creditors will either be paid in full or receive a substantial
dividend from the liquidation, the report notes.

"The voluntary liquidation of GO is due to a number of factors
including the loss of some important contracts to in-house
bidders. Key among these was the loss of the contract for Glasgow
Business Gateway which has been taken in-house by Glasgow City
Council," CreditMan.co.uk quotes Bryan Jackson, corporate
recovery partner with PKF, as saying.

"The group has been unable to sublet their commercial premises
and have an onerous lease resulting in a projected shortfall in
cash flow. The directors decided, given the lack of income from
potential future contracts and the continuing underlying costs,
that the best solution was to place the company into voluntary
liquidation."

"Unfortunately, Glasgow Opportunities has fallen victim to
council decisions which has resulted in their long standing
contract flow drying up. The directors should be applauded for
recognising that the business would no longer be viable and
closing it in order to minimise the cost in terms of jobs or to
creditors," Mr. Jackson, as cited by CreditMan.co.uk, concluded.

The GO group (Glasgow Enterprise Trust), was established in 1983,
and is a business support organisation which works in partnership
with public sector bodies focusing on encouraging start-ups and
growing companies.


IPLAS: Goes Into Administration Despite 50% Increase in Sales
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Clark at PRW.com reports that Halifax, United Kingdom-
based Iplas has gone into administration.  Iplas is now in the
hands of administrator Grant Thornton despite reporting a 50%
increase in sales in the 12 months to May.  PRW.com notes that
the company claimed this growth was the result of a major
investment in machinery and tooling funded by a GBP2.5 million
cash injection from green venture capital investor Foresight
Group.  The report discloses that commenting at the time Chief
Executive Grahame Hall said, "The last year has been very
successful for the group and we are confident about the future."


OSE EUROPEAN: Goes Into Administration
--------------------------------------
Park Logistics reports that OSE European has gone into
administration.

OSE European has appointed joint administrators Julie Swan and
Mark Phillips of PC Recoveries to help get the company back on
track, Park Logistics relates.

According to Park Logistics, Ms. Swan told CM that the business
and its assets have been sold, but did not name the buyer.

OSE European provides road haulage throughout the UK and Europe
from its offices in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Veurne, Belgium.


PALMARIS CAPITAL: May Face Liquidation if No Buyer Found
--------------------------------------------------------
Perry Gourley at The Scotsman reports that Palmaris Capital on
Tuesday warned that market conditions for the company remain
difficult and that no buyer had emerged for the business.

Palmaris, which holds 16.1% of the company, on Tuesday provided
further details on plans announced last week to leave Aim to cut
costs, the Scotsman relates.

The company, which has been looking to sell SRG for some time,
said the price of coal had fallen significantly since last
autumn, the Scotsman notes.

"It therefore seems that market conditions may remain difficult
for SRG for the foreseeable future, and that the company may not
realise its investment for some time," the Scotsman quotes the
company as saying in a statement.

The company, as cited by the Scotsman, said it had received no
dividend from its investment in SRG and that the operating costs
of Palmaris have had to be met from its own, existing cash
resources.

According to the Scotsman, Palmaris said that if a buyer did come
forward, it still intended to wind up the company and distribute
any remaining cash to shareholders.

On Monday, ATH Resources, which is Scotland's second largest open
cast miner after SRG, said that it needed a restructuring to
continue operating and may put itself up for sale, the Scotsman
recounts.

Palmaris Capital is the Aim-quoted company whose sole investment
is a stake in Scottish Resources Group.


TRURO CITY: Faces Liquidation, Suspended from Football Conference
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC South West Sport reports that Truro City Football Club face
being suspended from the Football Conference and being liquidated
after a last-ditch bid to save the club failed.

BBC South West relates that the lawyer for the administrator
James Moore said the League rejected a plan to save the club
before their 17:00 BST deadline for a financial bond.

"It looks as if it's heading towards liquidation," Mr. Moore told
BBC South West.

"There were various proposals put forward with guarantee but
nothing was agreed with the Conference."

It comes after initial indications from the Conference that the
club had struck a deal for a bond to cover the travel costs of
teams coming to Treyew Road should the club fold, BBC South West
notes.

The Conference had placed a deadline of 17:00 BST on October 11
but extended that by an hour.

Earlier in the evening the League's spokesman Colin Peake told
the BBC that he expected a deal to be done, subject to money
being put into the Conference's account.

"Unless something dramatically happens in the next few hours, or
early in the morning, I think this will be it," the report quotes
Mr. Moore as saying.

It means Truro's game with Dover Athletic is likely to be called
off and the club thrown out of the league, BBC South West says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 5,
2012, The Packet said Truro City Football Club has filed
administration.  The club, who has suffered financially over the
past 12 months, issued a statement on Aug.24 telling supporters
that they had been left with no option but to file for
administration, according to The Packet.  Long-standing Chairman
Kevin Heaney had stepped down from his role at the club after
being declared bankrupt at Truro Crown Court on Aug. 24, 2012.

Truro City Football Club is a professional football club based in
Truro, Cornwall.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 6 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
six European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
tranches.

For the full list of the rating actions see "List Of European
Synthetic CDO Rating Withdrawals At Oct. 16, 2012."

S&P has withdrawn its ratings on these tranches for different
reasons, including the issuer has fully repurchased and cancelled
the notes and the notes have paid down in full.

"We provide the rating withdrawal reason for each individual
tranche in the separate ratings list," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

             http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com.


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

November 1-3, 2012
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 10-12, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

October 3-5, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *