TCREUR_Public/121022.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, October 22, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 210



INTER PIPE: Declared Insolvent; Nov. 6 Creditors Meeting Set


DELTA TRADING: EUR6.5-Mil. Debt Written Off in 2006


GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR260MM Sr. Secured Notes 'P(B3)'
HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive
RHEINWEST CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Series 12 Notes


AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Ups Rating on EUR50MM Notes From BB+


BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'D' BFSR
BANCA MONTE: Moody's Cuts LT Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'


PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings


DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR/PDR; Outlook Negative


* MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs; Outlook Stable


AUTOPISTA MADRID: Goes Into Administration
BANKIA SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
CORPORACION DE RESERVAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Rating
TELEFONICA SA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sub. Preferred Stock Ratings
* SPAIN: Sets EUR90-Billion Size Limit for Bad Bank


TURKIYE PETROL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR/PDR; Outlook Stable
YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; On Review for Downgrade

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HONOURS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on GBP12MM Class D Notes
COMET: Opcapita Mulls Sale; Pre-Pack Administration Not Ruled Out
PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Football Fans' Club Named Preferred Bidder
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Whyte Says Duff & Phelps Aware of Ticketus Deal
* UK: 32 Retail Shops Closing Every Day, PwC Research Shows


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 15 to October 19, 2012



INTER PIPE: Declared Insolvent; Nov. 6 Creditors Meeting Set
According to SeeNews, data from the country's commercial register
indicated that a court in the Bulgarian capital Sofia has
declared Inter Pipe insolvent.

The decision was taken on October 1, SeeNews discloses.  SeeNews
relates that the court's decision, published on the register's
Web site, showed a meeting of the company's creditors is
scheduled for November 6.

Inter Pipe's total obligations amounted to BGN43.5 million (US$29
million/EUR22.2 million) at the end of 2011.

Inter Pipe is a Bulgarian steel pipes maker.


DELTA TRADING: EUR6.5-Mil. Debt Written Off in 2006
Cyprus Mail reports that a debt of EUR6.5 million owed by the
AKEL-controlled Delta Trading company was written off by the Bank
of Cyprus in 2006, bringing the total loans the party controlled
firms have not had to repay the bank to EUR9.5 million.

Delta Trading company was set up in 1965 and was part of a
network of AKEL-controlled companies that had business dealings
with the former Soviet Union, which offered the party much needed
financial assistance, Cyprus Mail discloses.  Following the fall
of the regimes in the Eastern Bloc, Delta, as well as most of the
"party" companies begun to accumulate big debts, Cyprus Mail
relates.  Furthermore, they were owed some US$7 million by the
former Soviet Union from the export of products of which US$5.2
million were assigned to the government and the rest were
receivables for the Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Mail states.  Delta
found itself on the brink of bankruptcy, Cyprus Mail notes.

On September 6, 2006, an agreement was made between then Bank of
Cyprus manager (now finance minister) Vassos Shiarly, on behalf
of the bank and Antonis Papanicolaou, director of Delta Trading
Ltd., and AKEL secretariat member in charge of economic affairs,
Venizelos Zanettou, whereby the assets of Delta Trading Ltd. were
transferred to Delta (Distributors) Ltd., Cyprus Mail recounts.
It also provided for the forced sale of a plot of land (owned by
Delta Trading) in Limassol, the writing off of EUR6.5 million
owed to the bank and the subsequent removal of all personal
guarantors from the loan agreement, Cyprus Mail  discloses.

More specifically, it was agreed that Delta Trading Ltd. had
reserves of CYP90,000 and around CYP60,000 receivables, Cyprus
Mail notes.  The bank and Delta appointed the director of Delta
Trading as the liquidator with instructions to sell all
stock/reserves and collect all money owed to the company, Cyprus
Mail relates.

The stock was transferred to the new company Delta (Distributors)
Ltd of which Mr. Papanicolaou was later the sole owner, Cyprus
Mail says.

All this was the result of a decision taken by the board of
directors of the Bank of Cyprus in May 2006 to find a "solution"
for the indebted company, Cyprus Mail notes.


GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR260MM Sr. Secured Notes 'P(B3)'
Moody's Investors Services assigned a P(B3) rating to the new EUR
260 million Senior Secured Second Lien Floating Rate Notes due
2017 to be issued by Grohe Holding GmbH. The notes will benefit
from a similar security package as the existing floating rate
notes due 2017, although on a second priority basis and with
subordinated guarantees. All other ratings of Grohe Holding GmbH
remain unchanged and the outlook remains stable.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's views the transaction as positive because the new notes
will be used to refinance the EUR260 million Senior Notes due
2014. Following the issuance, the next material maturity will be
in March 2016 when the EUR150 million revolving credit facility

The P(B3) rating reflects the second lien nature of the security
package and the subordinated guarantees ranking behind
substantial debt including senior secured term loans, senior
secured floating rate notes and the revolving facility. Moody's
notes that the capital structure remains fully covenant-lite with
only a single financial maintenance covenant of minimum Ebitda in
the revolving credit facility that is set at a very low level. As
a result Moody's maintains its group recovery assumption of 35%
and B1 Probability of Default Rating for Grohe.

Moody's further notes that Grohe continues to remain weakly
positioned in its current B2 rating category. While performance
in the first half of 2012 showed relative resilience with
reported revenue and normalized Ebitda growth of 33.2% (or 2.8%
ex Joyou) and 32.2% (2.9%), Moody's expects the challenging
conditions in some European markets to continue to persist and
notes that margins are likely to be under pressure from cost
inflation such as elevated sourcing and transportation expenses
in the second half of 2012. As a result Moody's does not expect
Grohe to generate meaningful free cash flow over 2012 and
anticipates adjusted Debt / Ebitda on a fully consolidated basis
to be close to 6x (around 7x for the subgroup).

Accordingly, the stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations
that deleveraging from a combination of free cash flow generation
and Ebitda growth will visibly accelerate in 2013. The ratings
also do not incorporate any impact from acquisitions including a
potential increase in Joyou ownership.

Negative ratings pressure could develop if the company fails to
meet the conditions set out for the stable outlook, including
Debt/Ebitda below 6.5x, Ebita/Interest ratio well above 1.5x and
free cash flow/debt of 2%. Although a rating upgrade is unlikely
in the near term given Grohe's high leverage, positive ratings
pressure could develop if there is a continued improvement in the
company's profitability, leading to Ebita/interest increasing
towards 2.5x, Debt/Ebitda approaching 5.0x or free cash flow/debt
at around 6% (all as adjusted by Moody's).

Grohe's near-term liquidity profile is expected to remain
satisfactory. At the end of June 2012, Grohe reported EUR151
million of cash on balance sheet (including EUR16 million of
restricted cash at Joyou; EUR84 million excluding Joyou). In
addition, the company had EUR44 million available under its
EUR150 million revolver.

The principal methodology used in rating Grohe Holding GmbH was
the Global Consumer Durables Industry Methodology published in
October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Dsseldorf, Germany, Grohe Holding GmbH is a
leading single-brand supplier of sanitary fittings for bathrooms
and kitchens. Grohe operates six production facilities, which are
located in Germany, Portugal, Canada and Thailand.

HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 the EUR250
million of senior unsecured notes issued by Hornbach Baumarkt AG
due in November 2014. The revised loss given default (LGD)
assessment on the notes is LGD3, 46%. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed Hornbach's Ba2 corporate family rating (CFR) and
probability of default rating (PDR). The outlook on the ratings
is positive.

Ratings Rationale


"The upgrade of the Hornbach's notes to Ba2 follows the reduction
over time of debt ranking ahead of the notes and the better
position of the notes within the company's capital structure"
says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for Hornbach. This follows the ongoing
reduction in Hornbach's secured debt, which comprises amortizing
mortgage securities that has been replaced, over time, by senior
unsecured debt. Secured debt portion amounted to approximately
10% of Hornbach's total debt as of August 30, 2012 and is
expected to reduce further going forward in line with the
mortgage amortizing schedule. The reduction in the secured debt
portion within Hornbach's capital structure has benefitted senior
unsecured bondholders, removing the pre-existing notching on the
instrument. The rating of the EUR250 million senior unsecured
notes is now in line with company's CFR at Ba2.


The affirmation of Hornbach's CFR and PDR at Ba2 reflects Moody's
ongoing recognition of company's success in weathering difficult
market conditions of recent years and its ability to strengthen
its key credit metrics over time. Moody's notes that company's
performance during the first semester 2012 was slightly below
expectations, but expects Hornbach's full fiscal year 2012-13
metrics not to deviate substantially from those of 2011. First
semester 2012 was negatively affected by (1) the softer-than-
expected consumer spending in some regions (with flat like-for-
like sales growth against 3.8% growth in the first semester
2011); and (2) planned expansionary costs that negatively
affected both the company's revenues by 0.9% and EBIT by 4.8%
compared with the same period in 2011. Furthermore Moody's notes
the strong results reported by the company during 2011 that make
comparison more difficult.

Overall, the current Ba2 CFR primarily reflects (1) the company's
relatively small size compared with other European retailers; (2)
high financial leverage for its Ba2 rating category though
somewhat offset by high cash earmarked to repay the maturing
bond; and (3) the high level of capital expenditure it is
planning in order to expand its network of stores, which limits
its free cash flow generation. However, more positively, the
rating also incorporates Hornbach's (1) strong market position in
its domestic market; (2) the company's growing international
presence; and (3) its good track record in executing its
strategy, reflected by the company's ability to grow more rapidly
than the market through its domestic operations. The rating is
also supported by Hornbach's (1) conservative financial policy;
(2) flexibility in terms of cutting investments in store openings
to adapt to changing market conditions; and (3) solid liquidity
profile. As of August 31, 2012, Hornbach had approximately EUR500
million of cash on the balance sheet and an undrawn EUR250
million five-year credit facility due in December 2016.

The positive outlook on the ratings incorporates Moody's
expectation that, notwithstanding a lower than expected
performance in fiscal year 2012-13, Hornbach's key credit metrics
will strengthen in the medium term and that the company will
continue maintaining a prudent financial policy. In this context
Moody's notes the company's high cash balance of EUR498 million
as at August 2012. The positive outlook also reflects Moody's
expectations that part of this cash will remain available to
repay the existing EUR250 million notes in due course.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on the ratings could result if Hornbach is able
to maintain like-for-like revenue growth in Germany on a
sustainable basis and control the volatility of its Eastern
European operations, such that its adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
trends towards 4.0x and its EBITA/interest expenses ratio remains
above 2.5x.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings as
a result of Hornbach's financial leverage trending towards 5.5x
on the back of declining like-for-like sales and/or margin
pressure due to adverse market conditions.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Hornbach was the Global
Retail Industry Methodology published in June 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Hornbach is the fourth-largest DIY retailer in Germany, with
revenues of approximately EUR3.0 billion as of 31 August 2012 on
a last-12-months basis. As of the same date, the company operated
137 DIY megastores with garden centers in Europe, the majority of
which are located in Germany (91 stores), and benefitted from an
increasing presence in other European countries, such as Austria,
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (the
remaining 46 stores). Hornbach's international sales accounted
for approximately 42% of its total sales as of the six months
ended August 2012.

RHEINWEST CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Series 12 Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch developing its credit ratings in three European
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions. "At
the same time, we have raised and removed from CreditWatch
developing our ratings in one structured investment vehicle
(SIV)," S&P said.

"On July 27, 2012, we placed on CreditWatch developing our
ratings on three European synthetic CDO transactions and one SIV
following the withdrawal of our ratings on Portigon AG, formerly
WestLB," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow the recent transfer of Portigon's
financial obligations to Erste Abwicklungsanstalt (EAA; AA-
/Stable/A-1+) and Landesbank Hessen-Thringen Girozentrale
(Helaba; A/Stable/A-1). More specifically, the collateral for
Rheinwest Credit Management's series 12, 14, and 16 was
transferred to Helaba, and the liquidity line for Harrier Finance
Funding Ltd. was assigned to EAA," S&P said.

"Rheinwest Credit Management's series 12, 14, and 16 are
synthetic CDOs with corporate reference portfolios. Our current
ratings on the notes are weak-linked to the creditworthiness of
the portfolio and the rating on the underlying collateral. This
comprises German covered bonds (pfandbriefe) issued by WestLB,
which have recently migrated to and been underwritten by Helaba.
Following this transfer, we have affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch developing our ratings on Rheinwest Credit
Management's series 12, 14, and 16
Transactions," S&P said.

"Portigon has been the provider of 100% liquidity support to the
Harrier Finance Funding Ltd. senior notesand therefore the issuer
credit rating and senior ratings have not been higher than the
rating level on Portigon. Following the irrevocable transfer of
this obligation to EAA, we have raised and removed from
CreditWatch developing our ratings to levels that are in line
with our ratings on EAA as the liquidity support provider," S&P


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:



Class                Rating
             To                 From

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Developing

Harrier Finance Funding Ltd.

ICR          AA-/Stable/A-1+    BBB+/Watch Dev/A-2
CP           A-1+               A-2/Watch Dev
MTN          AA-                BBB+/Watch Dev

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Developing

Rheinwest Credit Management
EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 12

             CCC+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)/Watch Dev

Rheinwest Credit Management
EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 14

             CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)/Watch Dev

Rheinwest Credit Management
EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 16

             CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)/Watch Dev


AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Ups Rating on EUR50MM Notes From BB+
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating to
'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' on Aquarius + Investments PLC's
series 2010-3 EUR50 million secured floating-rate notes.

"The rating action follows BNP Paribas' (as arranger)
restructuring of the transaction. The restructuring has resulted
in an extension of the scheduled maturity date to Sept. 20, 2019
from June 20, 2017. However, the maturity date of the credit
default swap will remain at June 20, 2017. Additionally, there
were changes to the reference portfolio and the level of credit
enhancement was increased. The repo counterparty agreement was
retired and the proceeds of the issuance of the notes are now
with the deposit provider, BNP Paribas," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the level of credit enhancement is now
sufficient to support a 'BBB- (sf)' rating. We have therefore
raised our rating to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)'. The synthetic
rated overcollateralization (SROC) level achieved at the 'BBB-'
rating level is 100.8149%," S&P said.

Aquarius + Investments' series 2010-3 is a European synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction.

                         WHAT IS SROC?

"One of the main steps in our rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets. SROC is
one of the tools we use when surveilling our ratings on synthetic
CDO tranches with reference portfolios," S&P said.

"SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement
(or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario. SROC helps capture what we
consider to be the major influences on portfolio performance:
Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and
time to maturity," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'D' BFSR
Moody's Investors Service has said that the amendments that Banca
delle Marche (Ba1 deposits, negative; BFSR D/BCA ba2, negative)
has made to its mortgage covered bond program will not, in and of
themselves and at this time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal
of the current A3 ratings of covered bonds issued under the

The amendments are (1) the posting of a EUR25 million commingling
reserve, which covers approximately two months' collections; (2)
the appointment of a back-up-servicer for Banca delle Marche's
mortgage covered bond program; and (3) the posting of a
commingling reserve, which will act as a substitute for (i) the
redirection of payments to an account opened with an eligible
institution; and (ii) the procurement of a guarantee for the
servicer's obligation to transfer collections and for the
collection account, if the servicer's or issuer's rating is
downgraded below Baa3.

Moody's believes that the amendments will not have an adverse
effect on the credit quality of the notes such that the A3
ratings are affected. Moody's does not express an opinion as to
whether the amendment could have other, non-credit-related
effects. Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact of the
proposed action, and does not express any opinion as to whether
the action has, or could have, other non-credit related effects
that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of
noteholders and/or counterparties.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds", published in July 2012.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the issuers' notes may also be found in the
Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings of the transaction.
Any change in the ratings will be publicly disseminated by
Moody's through appropriate media.

This opinion addresses only the credit risks associated with the
transaction, and does not address any other type of risk or
aspect of the proposed change that may be relevant to investors.

Moody's did not receive or take into account a third party
assessment on the due diligence performed regarding the
underlying assets or financial instruments related to the
monitoring of this transaction in the past six months.

BANCA MONTE: Moody's Cuts LT Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term debt and
deposit ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) by two
notches to Ba2 from Baa3, the short-term rating to Not-Prime from
Prime-3 and the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR)
to E, equivalent to a standalone baseline credit assessment of
caa1, from D/ba2. The outlook remains negative.

The lowering of MPS's standalone risk measures reflect Moody's
view that, notwithstanding the prospective EUR1.5 billion capital
injection by the Italian government, there remains a material
probability that the bank will need to seek further external
support over the rating horizon. As a result of the stress test
jointly undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and
the Bank of Italy which directed banks to have a minimum 9% Core
Tier 1 ratio, MPS has not been able to increase its capital base
to the required level and hence elicited government's assistance.
In the event of a further deterioration of its asset quality,
which Moody's considers is likely given the weak growth prospects
for Italy's economy and the EU operating environment, there is a
strong probability that the bank would not be able to generate
sufficient capital internally to maintain regulatory capital

The actions on MPS's deposit ratings reflect the increase in risk
to depositors and other creditors implied by the bank's weak
standalone strength, partially offset by the heightened
likelihood of support evidenced by the government's recent

Ratings Rationale

MPS's asset quality is weak and will, in Moody's view, continue
to deteriorate given the Italian economy's weak growth prospects
during the remainder of 2012 and for 2013. MPS's reported problem
loans have risen to 17% of total loans in June 2012 and are
significantly above the around 13% average of Italian banks rated
by Moody's. Moody's recently-published GDP growth outlook for
Italy estimates a range of -2.5% to -1.5% for 2012, and a range
of -1.0% to 0% for 2013, with significant downside risks to these
forecasts. Asset impairments generally follow economic downturns
with a lag of up to 12-18 months, which would indicate that MPS's
asset quality is likely to continue to deteriorate throughout
2013 and 2014.

Against this negative asset-quality outlook, Moody's notes MPS's
weak internal capital-generation capacity. MPS has not been able
to generate capital internally between 2011 and H1 2012, even
excluding EUR5.8 billion goodwill impairments from the bank's net
result. MPS's weak profitability and fragile asset quality
exacerbate its weak funding position, leaving it unable to access
the capital markets and in consequence making MPS highly reliant
on the European Central Bank for funding (at EUR31.5 billion as
of June 2012). This exposes it to the ECB's decision-making
process, which it cannot fully influence.

Moody's understands that the bank's business plan aims to address
these weaknesses through measures such as deleveraging to reduce
the high consumer and corporate loan-to-deposit ratio to 110% in
turn reducing reliance on central bank funding, and cost-cutting
to improve profitability. However, Moody's believes that the plan
is subject to significant execution risk, given the challenging
operating environment. Worsening macroeconomic and market
conditions compared with the plan's assumptions (a distinct
possibility given that Italy's recent GDP forecasts have already
deteriorated) would constrain the bank's turnaround.

These concerns translate into a standalone credit assessment of
E/caa1, indicating a heightened risk over the medium term that
MPS may require further external support notwithstanding its
ostensibly strong capital position postinjection. In Moody's
view, this is likely to take the form of systemic (government)
support, in view of the past challenges that MPS's shareholders
have faced when attempting to recapitalize MPS. The E/caa1
standalone credit assessment reflects the positive impact of the
planned capital strengthening from the government by year-end
2012, amounting to EUR1.5 billion of capital that the Italian
government has committed to inject , increasing MPS's Core Tier 1
(pro forma for the European Banking Authority's requirements) by
around 156 bps to 9.06%.

Long-Term Debt and Deposit Ratings

MPS's Ba2 debt and deposit ratings balance (1) the risk for
bondholders stemming from MPS's heightened standalone risk
profile against (2) the demonstrated willingness and ability of
the Italian government to support this institution. The bank's
bondholders' position in any potential renewed public
recapitalization would be subject to political decisions not
simply in Italy but potentially to the European Commission's
scrutiny, for example since any further state aid/support would
likely require the approval from the European Commission which
might require burden sharing with creditors and other measures
that may weaken MPS's franchise. Moody's has therefore
incorporated five-notches of uplift of the debt/deposit ratings
from its E/caa1 standalone credit assessment but downgraded the
bank's senior debt ratings to Ba2 with a negative outlook from
Baa3, negative outlook, to reflect this risk.

Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings

Given the heightened risk of burden sharing for junior creditors
should MPS require further external support, subordinated debt
and hybrid ratings are notched off the caa1 standalone baseline
credit assessment, with senior subordinated debt and Tier III
rated Caa2, junior subordinated debt at Caa3 and preferred stock
at Ca.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

At present, there is limited upwards pressure on the debt and
deposit ratings; however, the following factors could merit a
higher standalone credit assessment over the medium term (1) the
successful implementation of the business plan, resulting in
notably improved profitability and internal capital generation;
and (2) significant shareholder's capital injections improving
the resilience against further asset-quality deterioration and
reducing the risk of public recapitalizations with the attached

However, an improvement in the standalone credit assessment would
be unlikely to result in an upgrade of the deposit rating, given
the very high level of systemic support uplift which Moody's
incorporates into the deposit ratings.

Conversely, downwards pressure might develop on the ratings
following (1) challenges in executing the business plan, for
example, because of a more difficult operating environment; or
(2) a weakening of Italy's capacity to extend systemic support.
Equally, if the need for renewed public support becomes more
evident and visible, this might exert pressure on the standalone
ratings, as well as the debt and deposit ratings.


Moody's has downgraded the group's corporate banking subsidiary
MPS Capital Services to Ba2/Not-Prime with a negative outlook,
from Baa3/Prime-3 and its standalone BFSR to E/caa1 from D-/ba3.
The ratings are at the same level of the parent, reflecting the
bank's close integration with its parent.


1. MPS (ratings/outlook, if applicable)

- Senior unsecured debt and EMTN, and bank deposits: Ba2; (P)Ba2

- Short-term debt and deposit: NP

- Subordinate debt and EMTN: Caa2; (P)Caa2 / negative

- Tier III EMTN: (P) Caa2 / negative;

- Junior subordinate and EMTN: Caa3(hyb); (P)Caa3 /negative

- Preferred stock: Ca (hyb) / negative

- Bank Financial Strength Rating: E / stable

- Baseline Credit Assessment: caa1

2. MPS Capital Services

- Bank deposits: Ba2 / negative; NP

- Bank Financial Strength Rating: E / stable

- Baseline Credit Assessment: caa1

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June


PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B3 long-term local
and foreign-currency deposit ratings of PrivatBank AS. The E bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) was also affirmed. The outlook
on all ratings is stable. The bank's Not Prime short-term rating
was unaffected. The rating action concludes the review for
possible downgrade of the bank's long-term deposit ratings,
initiated on March 13, 2012.

Moody's Investors Service will withdraw all ratings of PrivatBank
AS for business reasons.

At the time of withdrawal, PrivatBank AS's ratings are as

  Bank financial strength rating of E with a stable outlook

  Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of B3 with
  a stable outlook

  Short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Not

PrivatBank AS had no outstanding debt rated by Moody's at the
time of the withdrawal.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's will withdraw the ratings for its own business reasons.

The rating action follows the successful LVL16 million capital
raising on August 2, 2012 which increased the bank's share
capital by 40%. This follows a failed capital raising in 2011
when the regulator decided that approval would only be granted
along with additional regulatory requirements which led to
Moody's decision to review the long term ratings in order to
further analyse the potential support from the bank's Ukrainian
parent, Privatbank (B1/B3 negative domestic/foreign deposit
rating, E+/b1 stable standalone bank financial strength
rating/baseline credit assessment).

Moody's most recent rating action on PrivatBank AS was on
March 13, 2012, when the bank's BFSR was downgraded to E with a
stable outlook from E+ and the long term deposit rating was
downgraded to B3 from B2 and placed under review for downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, PrivatBank AS reported total
consolidated assets of around LVL282 million (EUR337 million) at
the end of 2011.


DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR/PDR; Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 Corporate family
rating (CFR) and Probability of default rating (PDR) of Dematic
Holding S.a.rl. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a Caa1 rating
(LGD-5, 85%) to the US$275 million PIK notes due 01 November
2016, which have been issued by a finance vehicle of Dematic
Holding S.a.r.l., Mirror PIK S.A. The ratings on the existing
US$300 million senior secured notes due May 2016 issued by
Dematic S.A., a direct subsidiary of Dematic Holding S.a.r.l,
were upgraded to B1 (LGD-3, 32%) from B2 (LGD-3, 48%). At the
same time, Moody's changed the outlook on the ratings to negative
from stable.

The proposed US$275 million PIK notes will have a coupon of 9%
cash interest (9.5% PIK interest) with a four year maturity and
will be guaranteed by Dematic Holding S.a.r.l. The US$275 million
PIK notes will be general unsecured obligations of the issuer and
will be structurally subordinated to the existing credit
facilities and senior secured notes of Dematic S.A.


  Issuer: Mirror PIK S.A

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Caa1, LGD5,


  Issuer: Dematic S.A.

    Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B1, LGD3,
    32% from B2, LGD3, 48%

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: Dematic Holding S.a.r.l.

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Ratings Rationale

The change in the rating outlook to negative was prompted by the
issuance of US$275 million PIK notes with the proceeds being used
for a special dividend payment to Dematic's owner Triton in the
same amount. The proposed transaction reflects an increasingly
aggressive financial policy. Moody's notes that the proposed
dividend payment is the second special dividend within a
relatively short period of time. In May 2011 Dematic had already
paid a EUR150 million special dividend payment as part of the
US$300 million bond issuance last year. The transaction will also
result in a re-leveraging of the company to approximately 4.6x
adjusted debt/EBITDA pro-forma of the transaction from around
3.0x adjusted debt/EBITDA at June 30, 2012. Given a limited track
record of good operating performance -- Dematic has only started
to generate positive free cash flows and produced a meaningful
EBITDA margin since 2010 -- as well as the inherent cyclicality
of its business, the significant increase in debt comes at a time
when the company's performance is probably at a cyclical peak,
making it vulnerable to a weakening overall economic environment.
This is offset, to some extent, by a strong order book which
provides visibility for the next six to nine months.

In addition, the B2 CFR considers the risk of a further re-
leveraging and redistribution of excess cash flows to
shareholders given the relatively lenient terms of the existing
US$300 million senior secured notes, which allow for a 50%
dividend payout ratio if unadjusted senior leverage does not
exceed 3.25x and fixed charge cover ratio is above 2.0x.
According to the preliminary terms & conditions, the PIK notes
will pay cash interest at a rate of 9% but under certain
conditions the issuer has the option that interest accrues at a
rate of 9.5% instead. The initial interest payment on the PIK
notes will be made in cash. According to Moody's calculation the
additional cash interest will offset roughly all of the free cash
flow that Moody's expects Dematic to generate in the next
financial year. Debt amounts will rise by around EUR 20 million
annually if the interest on the PIK notes is paid in kind, which
will also reduce the ability of Dematic to improve financial
leverage going forward.

The B1 (LGD-3, 32%) ratings on the US$300 million senior secured
notes, one notch above the underlying CFR, recognize the senior
status in the liability waterfall behind the EUR25 million super
senior revolving credit facility as well as the benefits of the
additional US$275 million layer of subordinated PIK notes serving
as a loss absorption cushion in downside scenarios. Both super
senior lenders and senior secured notes holders share the same
collateral pool representing a material portion of the group's
assets. This view takes also into consideration that the PIK
notes can only be served with cash flows from Dematic S.A. and
its subsidiaries, albeit restricted as described above.

The Caa1 (LGD-5, 85%) ratings on the US$275 million (around
EUR211 million equivalent) PIK notes, two notches below the CFR,
reflects its junior ranking to the existing EUR25 million
revolving credit facility, the US$300 million senior secured
notes, trade payables of around EUR110 million as well as pension
and short-term operating leases obligations. In addition, the
ratings on the PIK notes consider that these will not benefit
from any upstream guarantees of any restricted operating
companies in contrast to the EUR25 million revolving credit
facility and the US$300 million senior secured notes.

Other factors considered in Dematic's B2 CFR are the improvements
in operating performance and project execution since rating
assignment in April 2011 evidenced by solid EBITDA margins of
11.6%, and modest free cash flow generation of around EUR21
million in the first nine months of fiscal year 2012 (ending 30
September 2012).

The B2 CFR is also supported by the company's good market
position in the fragmented industry for automated material
handling equipment with (1) a solid regional spread, (2) a
customer base that mainly consists of companies in the less
cyclical retail and food sectors and (3) around one third of
revenues being generated in the service business which tends to
be less volatile and offers higher margins.

However, Dematic remains vulnerable to cyclicality given a
relatively small revenue base and limited product
diversification. Dematic benefits from a good liquidity profile
with sufficient headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant,
which, however, might be at risk under adverse economic
conditions. In addition, despite the improvements over the last
few years, project execution risk continues to be a constraining
factor to the rating because the risk of project cost overruns or
milestones violations could result in a material and sudden drop-
off in profitability and cash flows.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's concern that Dematic has
currently limited headroom following the issuance of the US$275
million PIK notes to withstand any erosion in its current
operating performance and free cash flow generation as a result
of a less benign macroeconomic environment or potential cost

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

A rating upgrade could be considered if Dematic (1) maintained a
conservative financial policy and a healthy short-term liquidity
profile with ample headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant and
if Dematic (2) sustained the recent improvements in its operating
performance also in a lower volume growth environment which
should support debt/EBITDA to remain below 3.5x, EBIT/interest
expense to remain above 2.0x and positive FCF generation.

The ratings could be downgraded in case of erosion in operating
performance or more aggressive financial policy resulting in an
increase in leverage (debt/EBITDA) above 5.0x for a prolonged
period of time, negative free cash flow generation or an erosion
in its liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in rating Dematic was the Global
Manufacturing Industry Methodology published in December 2010.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Dematic is a leading provider of
logistics and materials handling solutions with a strong focus on
food, general merchandise and apparel retail. In the last twelve
months period ending 30 June 2012, the group generated revenues
of EUR926 million. Dematic's fiscal year ends 30 September.
Dematic operates under four business segments: (1) Integrated
Systems (design, delivery and assembly of customized material
handling equipment solutions), (2) Product Solutions
(standardized material handling equipment), (3) Customer Services
and (4) Logistics Operations (installation and operation of
warehouses). Dematic is owned by private equity fund Triton,
which acquired the business from Siemens in 2006.


* MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Macedonia's Long-term foreign currency
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'.  The
Outlook is Stable.  Fitch has simultaneously affirmed Macedonia's
Short-term rating at 'B' and Country Ceiling at 'BBB-'.

The affirmation balances the country's track record of low
inflation and moderate budget deficits, relatively low public
debt level and well capitalized banking system against high
unemployment, limited fiscal financing flexibility, and political

GDP growth forecasts have been revised down through the course of
the year, as Macedonia is an open economy and exports have been
affected by recession in the eurozone, while domestic demand
remains subdued.  Nevertheless, Fitch expects full-year GDP
growth at 0.5%, as multilateral credit lines boost domestic
demand and help offset a contraction of 1.1% in H1.  Increasing
foreign direct investment (FDI) will allow growth to pick up to
2% and 3.5% in 2013 and 2014, respectively.  FDI in sectors such
as automotive holds the potential to reach the twin aims of
reducing a large structural trade deficit and diversifying
Macedonia's economy.

The official unemployment rate is high at 31% in H1, although it
overstates the underlying position. Some FDI projects are labor
intensive, which will help cut the unemployment rate somewhat in

The weak economy has adversely affected the performance of the
budget and revealed some structural weaknesses in the public
finances.  In September 2012 the government disclosed budget
arrears of 2% of GDP. It intends to clear these in two steps by
Q113.  This will raise the cash budget deficit target by one
percentage point of GDP to 3.5% in 2012, above the previous
target of 2.5%, and 3.5% in 2013.  Fitch believes these revised
targets are within reach, given Macedonia's strong fiscal track
record, though the uncertain growth outlook represents a downside

Fitch forecasts that general government debt will increase to
31.3% of GDP at end-2012, from 27.8% at end-2011, owing to weaker
growth and slippage on the budget deficit.  Nevertheless, this
remains below the ten-year 'BB' range median of 40%.

This year the government has increased the share of debt issuance
denominated in Macedonian denar (MKD), helping to deepen the
local capital market.  In 2012 domestic issuance, at both short-
and medium-term maturities, was far larger than initially
projected (an estimated EUR280m against EUR60m).  Larger and more
liquid domestic markets will increase the sovereign's financing

Macedonia decided not to issue a Eurobond this year as originally
indicated. Instead it has secured commercial bank loans and is
planning to obtain a World Bank guaranteed loan, which should
allow it to meet maturing external obligations in 2013 and into
early 2014.  Improvements in the transparency of its debt
management strategy could help to increase confidence in its
financing flexibility.

Overall, the macroeconomic and financial supervision frameworks
are rating strengths.  The MKD's peg to the euro is backed by
adequate foreign-exchange reserves (FXR).  The banking system's
Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was over 14% in Q212.  Non-
performing loans (NPLs) have risen modestly but remain below 10%
of total loans and are fully provisioned against.  Euroisation
has fallen, as confidence in the MKD increased amid the eurozone
debt crisis.

Fitch expects the current account deficit (CAD) to come in around
2%-2.5% of GDP in 2012.  CADs in 2013-14 are forecast at similar
levels as in 2012.  The large trade deficit will be covered
mostly by private transfers, as has been the case in recent
years.  In January-July net private transfer inflows increased by
30% y/y in EUR terms, an indication of increased confidence in
the MKD.  At an estimated 19% of GDP in 2012, net external debt
is higher than the 10-year 'BB' median, although a large share is
comprised of intercompany debt.

Political risks remain a material constraint on Macedonia's
sovereign ratings.  EU accession remains a distant prospect,
despite the progress in several areas noted in the European
Commission's annual Progress Report.  No significant progress was
achieved over the past 12 months in the "name dispute" with
Greece, which will continue to block Macedonia's entry to NATO
and further progress in the EU accession process.  The
government's commitment towards EU integration could weaken the
longer the dispute continues, possibly damaging relations between
the ethnic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority.

In terms of triggers for possible rating actions, a material
overshoot of the 2012-13 budget deficit targets, along with the
failure to present a plan to prevent the re-occurrence of fiscal
arrears could lead to a negative rating action.  Worse than
expected growth outturns in the EU, Macedonia's main trade
partner, or major spillovers from potential increased turmoil in
Greece would also be rating negative.

Conversely, increasing evidence that productive FDI is leading to
the successful diversification of Macedonia's economic structure,
in tandem with a recovery in the growth rate could put upward
pressure on the rating over the medium-term.

Resolution of the name dispute would allow the formal opening of
EU accession negotiations and could support a positive rating
action, if other economic trends were favorable. Conversely, a
material rise in ethnic tensions or other adverse political
shocks could lead to a negative rating action.


AUTOPISTA MADRID: Goes Into Administration
Jesus Aguado at Reuters reports that Autopista Madrid Levante
Concesionaria and Inversora de Autopistas de Levante, whose
shareholders include builders Ferrovial and Sacyr Vallehermoso,
have gone into administration.

Ferrovial and Sacyr said the investments had been written off
their balance sheets, and would not have a significant impact on
their profit and loss accounts, Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, the companies said in a statement on Friday
that lower-than-expected traffic flow, the economic crisis and
increased capacity in alternative routes all make it impossible
to meet its payment commitments with lenders.

Separately, Bloomberg News' Manuel Baigorri and Esteban Duarte
report that Ferrovial holds 55% stake in the two companies.
Sacyr holds 40% stake in the two operators and Kutxa has 5%
stake, Bloomberg discloses.

Autopista Madrid Levante Concesionaria and Inversora de
Autopistas de Levante are two Spanish road maintenance companies.
They managed a toll road built in central region Castilla La
Mancha during Spain's construction boom.

BANKIA SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took credit rating actions on
six Spanish mortgage covered bond programs (cedulas hipotecarias)
and all related issuances.

"The rating actions on five of these mortgage covered bond
programs follow our recent rating actions on Spanish banks," S&P

"We have applied our five-step approach for rating covered bonds,
to evaluate the maximum potential rating uplift for each covered
bond program, based on the combined assessment of its asset-
liability mismatch (ALMM) exposure and categorization," S&P said.

"We segment covered bond programs into three distinct categories,
which consider primarily a program's jurisdiction and its ability
to access external financing or monetize the cover pool. These
categories, along with the ALMM percentage, determine a program's
maximum potential rating uplift over our rating on the issuer,"
S&P said.

"Our ratings on three of these programs are below the maximum
rating achievable under our EMU criteria, which establish a
maximum rating uplift over the sovereign rating (Spain, BBB-
/Negative/A-3) of six notches; therefore, they are not
constrained by these criteria. This is the case for Banco Popular
Espanol S.A. (Popular), Bankia S.A. and Bankinter S.A.," S&P said

"Two of these ratings are currently constrained by our EMU
criteria. This is the case for CaixaBank S.A. and Kutxabank
S.A.," S&P said.

"Specifically, we have taken rating actions on the mortgage
covered bonds," S&P said.


"On Oct. 15, 2012, we lowered our long-term counterparty rating
on Popular and Bankia to 'BB' from 'BB+'," S&P said.

"Popular and Bankia's mortgage covered bonds benefit from a
maximum five-notch uplift and four-notch uplift above the long-
term ratings on the issuers, under our rating approach in line
with our December 2009 ALMM criteria," S&P said.

"As the 'A+' rating on Popular's mortgage covered bonds and the
'A-' rating on Bankia's are at their maximum achievable ratings
uplift, our October 15 downgrade of the sponsor banks by one
notch directly affected our ratings on the mortgage covered
bonds," S&P said.

"Therefore, we are lowering our ratings on Popular's mortgage
covered bonds to 'A' from 'A+', and on Bankia's mortgage covered
bonds to 'BBB+' from 'A-'. We have also kept these ratings on
CreditWatch negative to reflect the CreditWatch negative on the
issuers. Any negative rating action on the issuers would have a
negative effect on the mortgage covered bond ratings, all else
being equal," S&P said.


"On Oct. 15, 2012, we placed our long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Bankinter on CreditWatch with
negative implications," S&P said.

"Bankinter's mortgage covered bonds benefit from a maximum five-
notch uplift above the long-term rating on the issuer, under our
rating approach in line with our December 2009 ALMM criteria,"
S&P said.

"Therefore, we are placing these ratings on CreditWatch negative,
to reflect the CreditWatch negative on the issuer. Any negative
rating action on the issuer would have a negative effect on the
mortgage covered bond ratings, all else being equal," S&P said.


"On Oct. 15, 2012, we lowered our long-term counterparty rating
on CaixaBank to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and placed it on CreditWatch
with negative implications," S&P said.

"CaixaBank's mortgage covered bonds are currently capped six
notches above our long-term rating on Spain, in line with our EMU
criteria. Under our rating approach in line with our December
2009 ALMM criteria, however, these covered bonds would benefit
from a maximum seven-notch uplift above the long-term rating on
CaixaBank," S&P said.

"As the 'AA-' rating on CaixaBank's mortgage covered bonds is not
at the maximum achievable ratings uplift under our ALMM criteria,
owing to the rating cap, our October 15 downgrade of the sponsor
bank by one notch has not affected our ratings on the mortgage
covered bonds," S&P said.

"However, a further downgrade of CaixaBank by more than one notch
will have a direct impact on the ratings on the covered bonds,
all else being equal," S&P said.

"Therefore, we have maintained our 'AA-' ratings on CaixaBank's
mortgage covered bonds and placed them on CreditWatch with
negative implications," S&P said.


"On Oct. 15, 2012, we placed our long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Kutxabank on CreditWatch with
negative implications," S&P said.

"Kutxabank's mortgage covered bonds are currently capped six
notches above our long-term rating on Spain, in line with our EMU
criteria. Under our rating approach in line with our December
2009 ALMM criteria, however, these covered bonds would benefit
from a maximum seven-notch uplift above the long-term rating on
Kutxabank," S&P said.

"However, a further downgrade of Kutxabank by more than one notch
will have a direct impact on the ratings on the covered bonds,
all else being equal," S&P said.

"Therefore, we are placing our 'AA-' ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications," S&P said.


"We are placing our ratings on Catalunya Banc S.A.'s mortgage
covered bonds on CreditWatch with negative implications, to
reflect our view of the change in the issuer's creditworthiness,
which could affect the ratings on the mortgage covered bonds,"
S&P said.


Program/       To                  From
Country: Covered bond type
Spain: Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)


CaixaBank S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)
               AA-/Watch Neg       AA-/Negative

Kutxabank S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)
               AA-/Watch Neg       AA-/Negative

Bankinter S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)
               A/Watch Neg         A/Negative

Catalunya Banc S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)
               BBB+/Watch Neg      BBB+/Watch Dev


Banco Popular Espanol S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas
               A/Watch Neg         A+/Watch Neg

Bankia S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias)
               BBB+/Watch Neg      A-/Watch Neg

CORPORACION DE RESERVAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Rating
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 long-term ratings
of two Spanish government-related issuers (GRIs), Corporacion de
Reservas Estrategicas (CORES) and Administrador de
Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (Adif), following the confirmation
of the Kingdom of Spain's government bond ratings.

Moody's has also confirmed the short-term rating of Adif at Not
Prime. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned negative outlooks on
the ratings, in line with the negative outlook for Spain.

The announcement follows Moody's confirmation of Spain's
government bond ratings at Baa3 with a negative outlook and
concludes the review process on the long-term ratings of CORES
and Adif initiated on June 15, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

Despite the lack of explicit government guarantees, there is a
link between the ratings of these companies and the sovereign's
based on their status as GRIs, their strategic importance to
Spain and the very strong government support that is incorporated
within their ratings. The ratings of CORES and Adif also consider
the entities' standalone credit profiles and legal
characteristics, including their bylaws and/or their public-law
status, as well as Moody's assumption that these entities will
remain key instruments for the Spanish government's public sector
management, its railroad infrastructure policy and its strategic
oil reserves policy.

As a result of Moody's confirmation of the long-term ratings of
CORES and Adif at Ba1, their ratings remain positioned one notch
below that of Spain. Moody's differentiates these ratings from
the sovereign rating partly to reflect the lack of explicit
guarantees from the Spanish government, but also the relative
weakness in their underlying credit profiles compared with the
credit strength of the sovereign.

Moody's applies a credit-substitution approach that considers
both companies' particular funding and business model. Therefore,
the rating agency does not publish a granular analysis of typical
GRI factors for either company (i.e., covering support,
dependence, a baseline credit assessment (BCA) and the sovereign
rating). The one-notch differential between both companies'
ratings and the sovereign rating reflects Moody's view that the
likelihood of timely support, while very high, is insufficient to
justify assigning either company the same rating as the

With regard to CORES's rating, although Moody's remains concerned
about the company's ability to manage its constrained liquidity
in the face of sizeable maturities in the next 12 months, the
rating agency also factors in CORES's solid asset coverage of
debt given the market value of its oil reserves when compared
with its amount of debt outstanding. The company retains
selective access to the bilateral bank market. Also, CORES's
excess inventory is valued at approximately EUR522 million at
current market prices, which exceeds the government's mandatory
minimum level of strategic oil reserves and therefore can be sold
at any time without explicit government authorization to fund any
liquidity shortages.

Rationale For Negative Outlook

Moody's decision to assign negative outlooks on the ratings
follows its assignment of a negative outlook to Spain's sovereign
rating and reflects its view that risks remain regarding the
Spanish government's finances.

What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down

In the absence of a change in the nature and standalone profiles
of these entities, or in the perceived strength of the underlying
sovereign support, Moody's expects the ratings of CORES or Adif
to be primarily driven by Spain's sovereign rating.

Moody's cautions that these entities do not benefit from explicit
guarantees from the Spanish government. Therefore, Moody's could
consider introducing a further degree of notching in the ratings
of these GRIs versus those of the sovereign in response to any
indication of a change in (1) the government's willingness to
intervene in a timely manner to support these GRIs in the event
of need; and/or (2) its propensity to support or encourage a more
selective approach and thereby differentiate the rank order of
support needs among all potential calls on government funding.

Downward pressure on the rating of CORES could also build up if
its liquidity profile deteriorates beyond Moody's expectations,
or if the company's headroom (as reflected in the ratio measuring
asset coverage of debt) weakens materially. Similarly, downward
pressure on the rating of Adif could build up if Moody's becomes
concerned about the company's liquidity risk profile.

In view of the Oct. 18 announcement, and the negative outlook on
Spain's sovereign rating, Moody's does not currently envisage any
positive short-term ratings pressure for CORES or Adif.


Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: Administrador de Infraestruct. Ferroviarias

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

  Issuer: Corp. Reser. Estrategicas Prod. Petroliferos

    Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review


  Issuer: Administrador de Infraestruct. Ferroviarias

     Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1

     Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1

  Issuer: Corp. Reser. Estrategicas Prod. Petroliferos

     Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1

     Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1

     Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

     Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Government-
Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010.

Both companies are headquartered in Madrid, Spain. CORES is the
organization responsible for managing the strategic oil reserves
and controlling compulsory reserves (petroleum products and
natural gas) in Spain. By law, all companies authorized to
distribute oil products in Spain -- both operators and importers
-- must be members of CORES and pay it monthly fees or risk
losing their license.

Adif benefits from a special legal status as an Entidad P£blica
Empresarial, reflecting its 100% state ownership and critical
importance as a major part of the country's transport
infrastructure. Adif exhibits a strong business risk profile,
primarily derived from its natural monopoly position as the
national railway infrastructure manager. As owner of Spain's
railway system, it is responsible for (1) managing the country's
railway infrastructure, including tracks, stations and freight
terminals on behalf of the government; (2) managing rail traffic;
(3) distributing capacity to rail operators; and (4) collecting
fees for infrastructure, station and freight terminal use.

TELEFONICA SA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sub. Preferred Stock Ratings
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Baa2 long-term senior
unsecured ratings and issuer ratings of Telefonica S.A. well as
the ratings of all of its guaranteed subsidiaries, including the
Ba1 subordinated preferred stock ratings. Moody's has assigned
negative outlooks on all of these ratings, in line with the
negative outlook for Spain.

Concurrently, the rating agency has also confirmed Telefonica's
short-term Prime-2 rating. This concludes the review for
downgrade that Moody's had initiated for Telefonica on June 20,

The announcement follows the confirmation of the Kingdom of
Spain's government bond ratings at Baa3 with a negative outlook.

Ratings Rationale

The rating confirmation reflects Moody's expectation that:

(1) management will be able to continue to execute a strategy
     that offsets Spain's challenging macroeconomic environment
     and contraction in consumer spending, which will continue to
     affect Telefonica's domestic revenues;

(2) the group will deliver the financial policy (including cash
     preservation measures and a non-core assets disposal
     that management has publicly committed to, which supports
     deleveraging and financial strengthening strategy; and

(3) Telefonica will maintain its access to the debt capital
     markets and as such retain adequate liquidity, supported by
     recent bond issuances and asset sales that have enabled the
     group to strengthen its liquidity.

"We believe that Telefonica has somewhat improved its credit
metrics over the past few months by reducing shareholder
distributions, selling a number of non-core assets including its
call-centre unit, Atento, and making progress on its IPO of
Telefonica Deutschland Holding AG, which it hopes will raise
approximately EUR1.5 billion," says Carlos Winzer, a Moody's
Senior Vice President and lead analyst for Telefonica. "However
it is still significantly constrained by the difficult operating
conditions in its domestic market, Spain." adds Mr. Winzer.

Moody's notes that although Telefonica has taken decisive
measures to mitigate the effects of the difficult operating
environment in Spain, continued pressure on the group's revenues
and EBITDA will continue to challenge its ability to improve its
credit metrics. In this respect, Moody's now expects flat
revenues with some margin compression at the group level for full
year 2012, with a double-digit decline in Telefonica's domestic
revenues in percentage terms being largely offset by growth in
its international subsidiaries. Moody's also expects that
management will only just fall short of its leverage target of
reported net debt/EBITDA of 2.35x in 2012. The rating agency
forecasts that Telefonica's ratios will be within the stated
guidance for the current rating, including adjusted net
debt/EBITDA comfortably below 3.0x and retained cash flow
(RCF)/adjusted debt above 18%.

From a liquidity perspective, as of June 2012, Telefonica had
around EUR4.0 billion in cash and cash equivalents. In addition
to the issuances by its subsidiaries in South America for a
combined amount of EUR1.7 billion equivalent and new credit
facilities in excess of EUR1.0 billion equivalent, during the
past few months, Telefonica has placed two large bond issues in
the euro market totalling EUR2.2 billion. The group's also has
robust external liquidity sources, with EUR5.3 billion of unused
long-term (maturing after 2013) committed credit lines as of June
2012. Moody's expects that Telefonica will continue to
effectively manage its liquidity risk, including pre-funding its
average annual debt maturities, and will not experience any
refinancing stress in the medium term.

Telefonica's Baa2 rating otherwise reflects (1) the group's large
size and scale; (2) the diversification benefits associated with
its strong positions in many different markets; (3) management's
track record and ability to execute a well-defined and concise
business strategy; and (4) its operating cash flow generation and
management's stated commitment to maintain its reported net
debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.35x.

Rationale For Negative Outlook

Moody's decision to assign a negative outlook on the ratings
reflects its expectation that the group will continue to operate
in a challenging domestic market (Spain). Despite Telefonica's
international diversification enhancing its credit profile, the
group's exposure to the Spanish market puts it at risk given the
weak macroeconomic conditions in Spain, exacerbated by the
contraction in consumer spending resulting from austerity

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

A rating downgrade could result if (1) Telefonica were to deviate
from its financial-strengthening plan, as a result of weaker cash
flow generation or the incurrence or assumption of further
substantial debt in conjunction with the pursuit of acquisitions
or more aggressive shareholder distribution policies; and/or (2)
the group's operating performance in Spain and other key markets
continues to deteriorate and there is no likelihood of an
improvement in underlying trends in the short term. Resulting
metrics would include deviation from management target metrics or
an RCF/net adjusted debt ratio of less than 18% and a net
adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio trending towards 3.0x. In addition, a
rating downgrade could result if Moody's were to downgrade the
sovereign rating.

Although not currently expected in light of the negative outlook,
the weak macroeconomic conditions in Spain and constraints
related to the sovereign rating, Moody's could consider a rating
upgrade to Baa1 if Telefonica's credit metrics were to strengthen
significantly as a result of improvements in its operational cash
flows and a further reduction in debt. Provided sovereign-related
concerns were to abate, the rating could benefit from positive
pressure if it became clear that the group would achieve
sustainable improvements in its debt ratios, such as an adjusted
RCF/net debt ratio above the mid-twenties in percentage terms and
adjusted net debt/EBITDA comfortably below 2.5x.


Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U.

  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Telefonica Europe B.V.

  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Telefonica Finance USA LLC

  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Telefonica S.A.

  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review


Issuer: Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U.

  Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

  Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Shelf, Confirmed at (P)Baa2

Issuer: Telefonica Europe B.V.

  Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

  Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Confirmed at P-2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Shelf, Confirmed at (P)Baa2

Issuer: Telefonica Finance USA LLC

  Pref. Stock Preferred Stock, Confirmed at Ba1

Issuer: Telefonica S.A.

  Commercial Paper, Confirmed at P-2

  Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at Baa2

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

Telefonica S.A. is the leading integrated telecommunications
provider in Spain, delivering a full range of services and
products including telephony, data exchange, interactive content
and information and communications technology solutions.
Telefonica is also one of the world's leading telecommunications
carriers, with some 264.3 million customers worldwide (excluding
Spain). As of June 2012, 75% of group revenues and 77% of group
EBITDA were generated outside Spain. Telefonica's full-year 2011
revenues and EBITDA amounted to EUR62.8 billion and EUR19.4
billion, respectively.

* SPAIN: Sets EUR90-Billion Size Limit for Bad Bank
Jesus Aguado at The Irish Times reports that Spain has set a
EUR90 billion limit for the size of a bad bank created to take
over other financial entities' toxic real estate assets, a
necessary step to obtain European funding for the sector.

The country is preparing to receive the first funds from a
EUR100 billion credit line for its banks agreed with Europe in
June, paving the way for a fuller bailout, the Irish Times

Lenders will transfer foreclosed property and unrecoverable loans
to house builders to the bad bank, to be called Sareb, in a move
aimed at freeing up the flow of credit to families and
businesses, the Irish Times says.

According to the Irish Times, economy ministry sources said on
Wednesday that the final size of Sareb, which is supposed to be
up and running by the end of the year and exist for 15 years, is
likely to be much less than the EUR90-billion limit.

The bad bank's remit could be widened beyond real estate to
include non-performing consumer loans, the sources said, as a
deep-rooted recession causes more Spaniards to default on debt,
the Irish Times relates.

However, this would only be in cases of extremely damaged assets,
the Irish Times notes.


TURKIYE PETROL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR/PDR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 Corporate Family
(CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Turkiye Petrol
Rafinerileri A.S. ("Tupras") and a provisional (P)Ba1 rating to
the proposed USD notes. The outlook assigned to all ratings is
stable. This is the first time that Moody's has assigned a rating
to Tupras.

Ratings Rationale

"The Ba1 ratings primarily reflect Tupras's dominant position in
the Turkish market as well as the execution risks associated with
the company's ongoing capex investment program," says Martin
Kohlhase, a Vice President - Senior Analyst in Moody's Corporate
Finance Group and lead analyst for Tupras.

Moody's decision to position Tupras's ratings at the upper end of
speculative grade is driven by a combination of factors.

On the positive side, the ratings reflect (i) a dominant position
in the domestic market as the sole refiner in Turkey with an
established infrastructure, including storage, pipeline and
terminal facilities; (ii) positive and supportive economic
fundamentals in the domestic market with a strong demand for
transportation fuel; (iii) the ability to achieve higher gross
margins per barrel as compared to its Mediterranean benchmark due
to, amongst other reasons, its refinery capability of processing
heavy and sour crude oil, in combination with opportunistic
procurement of discounted crudes; and (iv) higher expected
operating profit margins from 2015 onwards once the Residuum
Upgrading Project (RUP) is completed.

Tupras's ratings also incorporate challenges including (i)
exposure to cyclical market conditions inherent to the industry
combined with emerging market risk factors (such as public
policy, regulatory, foreign exchange volatility risks); (ii)
negative free cash flow (FCF) until 2014 at the earliest, due to
the combination of a sizable capital expenditure program and high
dividend payouts; (iii) potential for competitive cost
disadvantage and supply/demand imbalance risk over the medium
term stemming from international and local competition; and (iv)
future profitability compression from reduced sourcing of
discounted Iranian crude oil and weaker heavy crude differentials
and from lower inventory gains (which had previously benefited
from rising crude prices in 2011).

In addition, the rating assessment includes Moody's view that the
company's asset base profile is comparable to that of peers in
the Ba rating category, with three medium-complexity refineries,
which are geographically located in a single market, and
dependency on imported crude oil. The majority of Tupras's
operating profit is derived from the refining business, with the
distribution business complementing the former, although it does
not provide a large scale of earnings diversification.

Tupras has adequate liquidity. As of June 2012, the company had
unrestricted cash of TL1.86 billion against TL3.8 billion of
adjusted debt, of which approximately half is short term. Cash
flow from operations before working capital has historically been
healthy, averaging at TL1.2 billion between 2007-11, but
continues to be susceptible to the cyclical and volatile nature
of the industry. Moody's expects Tupras to record negative FCF
until 2014 at the earliest, with substantial cash outflows for
capital expenditure requirements - largely related to its
US$2.4 billion RUP - and returns to shareholders in order to
repay the remaining balance of US$591 million of the US$1.8
billion acquisition loan placed in the EYAS special purpose
vehicle, which was set up specifically during the privatization
of Tupras. Management expects the RUP project to contribute
US$550 million in recurring EBITDA from 2015 onwards, which will
strengthen underlying operating cash flows. Leverage remains
moderate, with adjusted debt/EBITDA of 2.3x as of June 2012, and
Moody's expects adjusted debt/EBITDA to be in excess of 3.5x by
2014 as the RUP-specific bank facilities will be drawn down
before the company begins to de-leverage from 2015 onwards.

Given that only around 20% of its products are currently destined
for export, although this may vary, Tupras is reliant on the
stability of Turkey's domestic demand and economic growth. Any
sustained deterioration of the macroeconomic environment, such as
a material drop in foreign capital inflows and a higher current
account deficit, could lead to a more challenging business and
operating environment for Tupras. However, this risk is mitigated
since Tupras produces dollar-priced commodities which can be
easily exported. Political and regulatory policy changes remain a
risk, such as future environmental regulations which could impact
liquidity and profitability. Moody's has modestly factored
shareholder support from Koc Holding, its main equity investor
into the rating.

Tupras is exposed to international supply/demand market dynamics
for crude oil and has in the past financially benefited from
sourcing discounted heavy crude. International sanctions on
Iranian crude oil imports (which at times were priced at a
significant discount to Ural) will negatively affect Tupras's
profitability going forward to the extent that supply is
restricted, since Iran had been a major supply source. This is
mitigated by the company's ability to opportunistically buy crude
from various other countries including Russia, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. Tupras may also face a more challenging competitive
environment from 2014 onwards when significant new capacity from
the Middle East is expected to enter the market.

The rating outlook is stable and assumes that capex plans remain
on schedule, with no material delays and cost overruns of the RUP
project that may jeopardize the company's financial flexibility.

Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. is the sole refiner in Turkey
with a dominant position in the domestic petroleum product
market. Its two core business segments are refining and
distribution, with the former contributing on average 90% of the
operating profit over the past five years. The refining business
consists of three medium-complexity refineries located in Izmit,
Izmir and Kirikkale and one simple refinery in Batman with a
combined annual crude processing capacity of 28.1 million tonnes.
Other core companies include (i) a 40% effective ownership stake
in Opet, Turkey's second-largest oil products distribution
company as of June 2012, with 1,300 stations operating under the
Opet and Sunpet brands, and (ii) an 80% stake in Ditas, a
shipping company which primarily serves Tupras's logistic needs.

The principal methodology used in rating Tupras was the Global
Refining and Marketing Rating Methodology published in December
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in K”rfez/Turkey, Tupras reported sales of TL45.9
billion (US$25.6 billion) and an operating profit of TL1.5
billion (US$850 million) for the last twelve months ending June

YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; On Review for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 from B2 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating
(PDR) of Yuksel Insaat S.A. Concurrently, Moody's has also
downgraded to B3 from B2 the debt instrument rating on the
US$200 million of notes due 2015 issued by Yuksel. Moody's placed
ratings on review for further downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's downgraded ratings to B3 as Yuksel's liquidity remains
weak and susceptible to uncertainties with regards to the timing
and size of further cash inflows that could significantly bolster
the company's cash position. Despite an additional cash injection
from shareholders amounting to TL12.5 million (ca. US$7 million)
in September 2012, bringing the total amount of shareholder
contributions to TL62.5 million year-to-date, this is in Moody's
view insufficient to markedly shore up liquidity.

In addition, other cash contributions -- such as the planned
disposal of a number of earmarked assets -- have not yet occurred
and the delay in the receipt of proceeds hampers a recovery of
Yuksel's cash position and thereby limits the operating and
financial flexibility. Yuksel's reported cash and cash
equivalents position per June 30, 2012 were TL88.9 million, down
from TL174.9 million per FYE 2011.

Metrics per June 2012 end remained weak and also partially below
thresholds Moody's said could change the ratings down: FFO/Debt -
6.0% (Moody's: below 10% could change the rating down);
EBITA/interest 1.0x (remaining below 1.0x); debt/EBITDA 5.1x (to
move above 5.5x).

Moody's decided to review ratings for further downgrade in order
to assess the (i) progress of further asset disposals, (ii) need,
likelihood and capacity for additional shareholder contributions
and (iii) whether the operating performance improves sufficiently
enough to shore up the company's liquidity profile.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Ratings could be downgraded absent timely and material cash
inflows -- stemming from a mix of disposal proceeds, shareholder
injections and/or operating performance improvements -- to shore
up the company's liquidity profile, currently seen as being weak
given the negative FFO and depleting cash balances in the first
half of 2012. Ratings could also be lowered if limitations on the
company's operational and financial flexibility continue:
leverage remains high at above 5 times debt/EBITDA and the
existence of a debt incurrence covenant set at a maximum of 4
times constrains further debt raising.

Given the downgrade and the review for downgrade an upgrade at
this juncture is unlikely. For the outlook to be kept at the B3
level Moody's expects FFO to turn positive and the company to
regain financial flexibility, e.g. through a combination of
increased capital; lower debt; operating performance improvements
and compliance with the debt incurrence covenant.

The principal methodology used in rating Yuksel Insaat A.S. was
the Global Construction Methodology published in November 2010.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Yuksel Insaat A.S., which has corporate headquarters in Ankara,
Turkey, is among the 10 largest construction companies in the
country. The company was established in 1963 by the Sazak and
Sert families and maintains a visible footprint in Turkey, where
more than half of its revenues are generated, but has expanded
into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as
Central Asia over recent years to diversify its revenue streams.
The company generated revenues of TL1.3 billion (around US$697
million) in its financial year 2011.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HONOURS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on GBP12MM Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Honours Plc's notes and revised the
Outlook on the class A notes to Negative from Stable, as follows:

  -- GBP93.290m Class A1 notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf' Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable

  -- GBP54.2m Class A2 notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook
     to Negative from Stable

  -- GBP33.35m Class B notes: affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable

  -- GBP18.0m Class C notes: affirmed at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable

  -- GBP12.0m Class D notes: affirmed at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable

The revision of the Outlook on the class A notes is due to the
Negative Outlook on the UK sovereign ('AAA/F1+/Negative') and
reflects the transaction's significant reliance on the sovereign
to pay indemnities upon cancellation of loans in deferment

The affirmation of the notes reflects that defaults have been in
line with Fitch's initial expectations, and all note deficiencies
have been cleared with excess collections to date.  As of October
2012, credit enhancement (CE) was 57.6% for the class A1 notes,
32.9% for the class A2 notes, 17.8% for the class B notes, 9.6%
for the class C notes and 4.1% for the class D notes.

In Fitch's view, the current ratings remain compatible with the
significant prevalence of loans in deferment status (83.5% of the
non-defaulted loan portfolio) and the significant level of
delinquent loans in repayment status (4.2%).  The UK sovereign is
essentially committed to indemnify the transaction for any non-
delinquent loan still outstanding 25 years after origination at
the principal outstanding amount and any unpaid interest, even if
the loan is in deferment status.  The transaction also benefits
from significant excess spread as the yield on the loans after
the swap (which in the transaction documentation is referred to
as a subsidy), amounts to 2.69% over Libor, either in the form of
cash collections from repayment loans or capitalization of unpaid
interest on deferred loans.  As a result, under the agency's
analysis an impairment of the class D notes would imply the
default of around one-sixth of those borrowers which from
historical experience may be assumed to become eligible for

Fitch also believes that the current ratings are compatible with
the liquidity tightening that may result from the run-down of the
performing loan portfolio (only 9.5% of the non-defaulted
portfolio as of October 2012).  According to the cash manager,
the average remaining term of the performing loan portfolio as of
March 2012 was falling to around the end of 2014, while
indemnities payable by the UK sovereign as a result of loan
cancellations will remain limited until 2017.  However, under the
agency's cash flow simulations, total collections would still be
sufficient to service the interest on the rated notes in a
scenario of stable inflation.  If the netting payable by the
issuer under the swap with the UK sovereign increases as a result
of rising inflation, collections may fall short of due fees and
notes interest.  Even in this case Fitch considers the GBP20
million liquidity reserve in an account with Deutsche Bank
('A+'/Stable/'F1') as largely sufficient to cover for senior fees
and A and B notes interest.  Fitch also views the current rating
on the class C and D notes as compatible with the risk of a
possible shortfall in interest payment, as in the agency's view
this shortfall would only be temporary.

The transaction is a securitization of UK not-for-profit student
loans originated by the UK government.  The loans were originated
to individuals who commenced higher education courses prior to
September 1998.

COMET: Opcapita Mulls Sale; Pre-Pack Administration Not Ruled Out
Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that OpCapita, the
private equity investor that bought Comet for only GBP2 less than
a year ago, is considering a sale of the company.

According to the FT, people familiar with the situation said
Comet had received unsolicited approaches from store operators in
the UK and abroad.  They could not say how any deal would be
structured, nor rule out a controversial pre-pack administration,
but they said this was "not the direction" being explored, the FT

Comet is a UK electricals chain.

PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Football Fans' Club Named Preferred Bidder
Roger Blitz at The Financial Times reports that Portsmouth
Supporters Trust was named preferred bidder to take over
Portsmouth Football Club.

According to the FT, Trevor Birch of administrator PKF said it
would work with the trust, the Football League and the
Professional Footballers Association to reach a deal "as soon as

Portsmouth has debts of around GBP60 million following an unhappy
ownership saga in the last five years when it passed through a
number of hands, the FT discloses.

PST has raised pledges of GBP2 million from 2,000 fans, and has
cash investments totaling GBP1 million from four local
businessmen, the FT says.  A Hampshire property developer has
offered to pay GBP2.75 million to buy the Fratton Park stadium
and lease it back to PST, the FT relates.

The trust has been competing with former owner Balram Chanrai's
Portpin company to take on the club, which owes the Hong Kong-
based businessman GBP17 million, the FT states.  Mr. Chanrai also
holds the club's assets as security, the FT notes.

The club was placed into administration in February, since when
18 players were moved on, the FT recounts.

                   About Portsmouth Football

Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. --
-- operated Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays
in the English Premier League.  Established in 1898, the club
boasted two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division
championships.  Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park;
the football team is known to supporters as Pompey.  Dubai
businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre
Gaydamak in 2009.  A French businessman of Russian decent,
Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006.

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Whyte Says Duff & Phelps Aware of Ticketus Deal
According to the Scotsman, former Rangers owner Craig Whyte on
Oct. 16 made a series of claims in a BBC Scotland interview which
have angered the Ibrox club's current chief executive and
administrators Duff & Phelps.

Mr. Whyte claimed that Duff & Phelps knew he had used future
season tickets revenue to finance his purchase of the club, and
also claimed that he had been responsible for helping to find
Charles Green's consortium as potential saviors after the club
had been plunged into administration, the Scotsman relates.  Both
claims were immediately refuted in separate statements issued by
Duff & Phelps and by Green, the Scotsman discloses.

Mr. Whyte bought Rangers from Sir David Murray for a token sum of
GBP1, but his purchase came with an undertaking that he would
settle the GBP18 million debt the club had outstanding with
Lloyds Bank, the Scotsman recounts.  It later transpired that
Whyte had cleared the debt using three years of advance season
ticket sales he had accrued from a GBP25 million deal with
Ticketus, the Scotsman states.

In the Oct. 16 BBC interview, Mr. Whyte insisted Duff & Phelps,
who were appointed the club's administrators, had been aware of
the deal with Ticketus, the Scotsman notes.

"The allegations against the administrators, who are officers of
the court, in relation to Ticketus, are false, malicious and
without foundation.  They should not be given any credibility
given the source.  It should be remembered that Mr. Whyte's
takeover of Rangers is now the subject of an ongoing criminal
investigation and we have provided evidence to that inquiry," the
Scotsman quotes Paul Clark, of Duff & Phelps, joint administrator
of Rangers, as saying.

"In addition, as administrators we instigated legal proceedings
against Mr. Whyte's solicitors in the High Court in London and
those proceedings are centered round the very serious allegation
that Mr. Whyte was involved in a conspiracy which deprived
Rangers of many millions of pounds.

"Our conduct of the Rangers administration has been the subject
of intense public scrutiny and we are wholly satisfied it was
carried out the highest professional standards.  We have co-
operated fully with inquiries into our appointment by Lord Hodge
at the Court of Session and the Insolvency Practitioners'

                  About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC --
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station,  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.

* UK: 32 Retail Shops Closing Every Day, PwC Research Shows
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that retail chains in
Britain are closing 32 shops every day across the country as the
economic slowdown ravages the high street.

According to the Telegraph, research by PricewaterhouseCoopers
and the Local Data Company, retailers with more than one store
closed 953 shops in the first half of 2012 in leading town
centers.  This compares to 174 closures in the whole of 2011, the
Telegraph notes.

The number of closures in the first-half represents 20 per day,
the Telegraph discloses.  However, this has accelerated to 32 per
day since the end of June following the demise of JJB Sports and
other retailers, the Telegraph states.

"This rapid increase in the drawdown of the multiple retailers in
the first half of this year is not unexpected," the Telegraph
quotes Matthew Hopkinson, director of the LDC, as saying.

"It also has some way to go as consumer spend remains low and the
omni-channel environment requires fewer but larger and more
'dynamic' stores."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 15 to October 19, 2012

Issuer                    Coupon     Maturity Currency    Price
------                    ------     -------- --------    -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES            8.750   10/27/2014     EUR     25.00
A-TEC INDUSTRIES            2.750    5/10/2014     EUR     25.00
IMMOFINANZ                  4.250     3/8/2018     EUR      4.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK            9.876    1/23/2013     EUR     56.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK            8.907    7/24/2013     EUR     70.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK            9.200    7/24/2013     EUR     68.52
RAIFF CENTROBANK           11.134    7/24/2013     EUR     68.25
RAIFF CENTROBANK            5.097    1/23/2013     EUR     71.65
RAIFF CENTROBANK            7.965    1/23/2013     EUR     57.50
RAIFF CENTROBANK            8.920    1/23/2013     EUR     64.44
RAIFF CENTROBANK            9.304    1/23/2013     EUR     64.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK            9.558    1/23/2013     EUR     72.94
RAIFF CENTROBANK            7.646    1/23/2013     EUR     47.07

ECONOCOM GROUP              4.000     6/1/2016     EUR     23.44

AIR FRANCE-KLM              4.970     4/1/2015     EUR     12.07
ALCATEL-LUCENT              5.000     1/1/2015     EUR      2.58
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG            6.720     1/1/2015     EUR      5.65
ASSYSTEM                    4.000     1/1/2017     EUR     22.73
ATOS ORIGIN SA              2.500     1/1/2016     EUR     58.61
CAP GEMINI SOGET            3.500     1/1/2014     EUR     38.91
CGG VERITAS                 1.750     1/1/2016     EUR     32.49
CLUB MEDITERRANE            6.110    11/1/2015     EUR     18.14
EURAZEO                     6.250    6/10/2014     EUR     53.63
FAURECIA                    4.500     1/1/2015     EUR     19.99
FAURECIA                    3.250     1/1/2018     EUR     18.69
INGENICO                    2.750     1/1/2017     EUR     47.69
MAUREL ET PROM              7.125    7/31/2015     EUR     16.52
MAUREL ET PROM              7.125    7/31/2014     EUR     17.78
NEXANS SA                   4.000     1/1/2016     EUR     57.41
NEXANS SA                   2.500     1/1/2019     EUR     68.64
ORPEA                       3.875     1/1/2016     EUR     47.64
PEUGEOT SA                  4.450     1/1/2016     EUR     24.04
PIERRE VACANCES             4.000    10/1/2015     EUR     73.27
PUBLICIS GROUPE             1.000    1/18/2018     EUR     54.46
SOC AIR FRANCE              2.750     4/1/2020     EUR     21.09
SOITEC                      6.250     9/9/2014     EUR      7.48
TEM                         4.250     1/1/2015     EUR     54.62

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE            9.500   12/31/2012     EUR     68.40
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE           10.500   12/28/2012     EUR     54.46
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE            9.750   12/28/2012     EUR     67.91
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE            7.750   12/31/2012     EUR     51.32
COMMERZBANK AG              8.000    11/5/2012     EUR     58.53
COMMERZBANK AG             14.500    3/21/2013     EUR     64.70
COMMERZBANK AG             16.250    3/21/2013     EUR     66.62
COMMERZBANK AG             18.500    3/21/2013     EUR     60.54
COMMERZBANK AG             20.250    3/21/2013     EUR     62.45
COMMERZBANK AG              8.400   12/30/2013     EUR     14.45
COMMERZBANK AG             12.500    3/21/2013     EUR     73.15
COMMERZBANK AG             10.750    3/21/2013     EUR     69.84
COMMERZBANK AG             16.750     1/3/2013     EUR     73.55
COMMERZBANK AG             15.500   12/31/2012     EUR     74.12
COMMERZBANK AG             13.000   12/28/2012     EUR     62.03
COMMERZBANK AG              8.000   12/27/2012     EUR     46.32
COMMERZBANK AG              7.000   12/27/2012     EUR     64.50
COMMERZBANK AG             18.750   11/22/2012     EUR     72.77
COMMERZBANK AG             11.500    11/5/2012     EUR     69.38
COMMERZBANK AG             10.000    11/5/2012     EUR     55.96
COMMERZBANK AG              9.000   10/29/2012     EUR      5.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            8.000   11/29/2012     EUR     73.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            9.000   11/29/2012     EUR     68.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000   11/29/2012     EUR     67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            8.000   12/20/2012     EUR     64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            8.000   12/20/2012     EUR     39.70
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            9.000   12/20/2012     EUR     73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           10.000   12/20/2012     EUR     74.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000   12/20/2012     EUR     71.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000   12/20/2012     EUR     72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000   12/20/2012     EUR     45.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000   12/20/2012     EUR     66.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           11.000    1/18/2013     EUR     75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     70.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     72.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     72.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     71.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     73.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           15.000    2/20/2013     EUR     74.70
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000    2/28/2013     EUR     74.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           11.000     4/2/2013     EUR     73.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            6.500    6/28/2013     EUR     55.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000     4/2/2013     EUR     74.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG            8.000   10/31/2012     EUR     73.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           10.000   10/31/2012     EUR     70.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG           12.000   10/31/2012     EUR     67.20
DZ BANK AG                 16.500    4/26/2013     EUR     67.88
DZ BANK AG                 15.750    4/26/2013     EUR     48.20
DZ BANK AG                 15.500    1/11/2013     EUR     54.06
DZ BANK AG                  7.750    1/25/2013     EUR     71.99
DZ BANK AG                 12.500    1/25/2013     EUR     51.22
DZ BANK AG                 18.000    1/25/2013     EUR     67.18
DZ BANK AG                 19.000    1/25/2013     EUR     50.00
DZ BANK AG                 10.250     2/8/2013     EUR     73.72
DZ BANK AG                 10.250     2/8/2013     EUR     70.61
DZ BANK AG                 15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     73.37
DZ BANK AG                 15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     74.69
DZ BANK AG                 15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     69.70
DZ BANK AG                 14.500    4/26/2013     EUR     62.74
DZ BANK AG                 15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     72.10
DZ BANK AG                 13.000    3/22/2013     EUR     73.54
DZ BANK AG                 19.000    3/22/2013     EUR     63.21
DZ BANK AG                 12.250    3/22/2013     EUR     74.71
DZ BANK AG                 12.500    3/22/2013     EUR     72.34
DZ BANK AG                 10.000     3/8/2013     EUR     67.41
DZ BANK AG                 13.750     3/8/2013     EUR     54.66
DZ BANK AG                 15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     70.88
DZ BANK AG                  5.000   12/14/2012     EUR     73.72
DZ BANK AG                  9.500     1/2/2013     EUR     72.96
DZ BANK AG                 12.000     1/2/2013     EUR     67.00
DZ BANK AG                 14.000    1/11/2013     EUR     48.66
DZ BANK AG                 18.000    6/28/2013     EUR     74.58
DZ BANK AG                 19.500    4/26/2013     EUR     68.52
DZ BANK AG                 18.500    4/26/2013     EUR     63.63
DZ BANK AG                 17.000    4/26/2013     EUR     25.21
DZ BANK AG                 12.500   10/26/2012     EUR     71.37
DZ BANK AG                 15.000   10/26/2012     EUR     71.38
DZ BANK AG                 16.000   10/26/2012     EUR     64.92
DZ BANK AG                 18.000   10/26/2012     EUR     72.49
DZ BANK AG                 18.250   10/26/2012     EUR     73.59
DZ BANK AG                 19.500   10/26/2012     EUR     70.40
DZ BANK AG                 23.000   10/26/2012     EUR     70.44
DZ BANK AG                 25.000   10/26/2012     EUR     69.11
DZ BANK AG                 16.750   11/23/2012     EUR     69.62
DZ BANK AG                 17.250   11/23/2012     EUR     59.82
DZ BANK AG                 20.000   11/23/2012     EUR     47.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO           13.000   12/27/2013     EUR     72.50
GOLDMAN SACHS CO           14.000     1/2/2013     EUR     69.50
GOLDMAN SACHS CO           14.000   12/28/2012     EUR     72.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO           18.000    3/20/2013     EUR     69.10
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.500    6/28/2013     EUR     72.09
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.500    6/28/2013     EUR     46.74
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.500    6/28/2013     EUR     66.14
HSBC TRINKAUS              15.500    6/28/2013     EUR     69.75
HSBC TRINKAUS              14.000    6/28/2013     EUR     72.10
HSBC TRINKAUS              14.000    6/28/2013     EUR     48.20
HSBC TRINKAUS              13.500    6/28/2013     EUR     68.35
HSBC TRINKAUS              12.500    6/28/2013     EUR     72.59
HSBC TRINKAUS              10.500    6/28/2013     EUR     51.76
HSBC TRINKAUS              10.000    6/28/2013     EUR     74.90
HSBC TRINKAUS              10.000    6/28/2013     EUR     73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS               8.000    6/28/2013     EUR     55.06
HSBC TRINKAUS              27.500    3/22/2013     EUR     45.66
HSBC TRINKAUS               8.000    3/22/2013     EUR     66.45
HSBC TRINKAUS              10.500    3/22/2013     EUR     74.66
HSBC TRINKAUS              10.500    3/22/2013     EUR     50.86
HSBC TRINKAUS              12.000    3/22/2013     EUR     74.71
HSBC TRINKAUS              13.000    3/22/2013     EUR     61.00
HSBC TRINKAUS              13.500    3/22/2013     EUR     67.96
HSBC TRINKAUS              14.000    3/22/2013     EUR     70.85
HSBC TRINKAUS              15.000    3/22/2013     EUR     71.02
HSBC TRINKAUS              15.500    3/22/2013     EUR     46.65
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.000    3/22/2013     EUR     69.49
HSBC TRINKAUS              17.500    3/22/2013     EUR     61.58
HSBC TRINKAUS              17.500    3/22/2013     EUR     68.25
HSBC TRINKAUS              17.500    3/22/2013     EUR     64.99
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.000    3/22/2013     EUR     71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.000    3/22/2013     EUR     73.78
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.500    3/22/2013     EUR     44.56
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.500    3/22/2013     EUR     62.66
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.500    3/22/2013     EUR     71.68
HSBC TRINKAUS              19.500    3/22/2013     EUR     67.26
HSBC TRINKAUS              20.500    3/22/2013     EUR     70.91
HSBC TRINKAUS              21.000    3/22/2013     EUR     55.52
HSBC TRINKAUS              22.000    3/22/2013     EUR     43.18
HSBC TRINKAUS              22.000    3/22/2013     EUR     58.62
HSBC TRINKAUS              23.000    3/22/2013     EUR     58.54
HSBC TRINKAUS              24.000    3/22/2013     EUR     67.20
HSBC TRINKAUS              26.500    3/22/2013     EUR     73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS              19.000    3/22/2013     EUR     61.52
HSBC TRINKAUS              27.000    3/22/2013     EUR     55.47
HSBC TRINKAUS              30.000    6/28/2013     EUR     49.40
HSBC TRINKAUS              26.000    6/28/2013     EUR     51.02
HSBC TRINKAUS              25.500    6/28/2013     EUR     60.19
HSBC TRINKAUS              23.500    6/28/2013     EUR     74.83
HSBC TRINKAUS              22.500    6/28/2013     EUR     62.56
HSBC TRINKAUS              21.000    6/28/2013     EUR     61.25
HSBC TRINKAUS              21.000    6/28/2013     EUR     68.87
HSBC TRINKAUS              19.500    6/28/2013     EUR     73.51
HSBC TRINKAUS              19.500    6/28/2013     EUR     60.50
HSBC TRINKAUS              19.000    6/28/2013     EUR     45.76
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.500    6/28/2013     EUR     63.62
HSBC TRINKAUS              18.000    6/28/2013     EUR     73.06
HSBC TRINKAUS              17.500    6/28/2013     EUR     71.06
HSBC TRINKAUS              17.000    6/28/2013     EUR     64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.500    6/28/2013     EUR     74.69
HSBC TRINKAUS              16.500    6/28/2013     EUR     63.13
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     62.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     65.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     70.72
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     60.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     71.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     22.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    1/25/2013     EUR     74.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    2/22/2013     EUR     66.45
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    2/22/2013     EUR     59.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT            15.000    2/22/2013     EUR     50.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT             8.000    3/22/2013     EUR     68.22
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    3/22/2013     EUR     65.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT            12.000    3/22/2013     EUR     67.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT            15.000    3/22/2013     EUR     60.48
LB BADEN-WUERTT            15.000    3/22/2013     EUR     74.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000    6/28/2013     EUR     71.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.000    6/28/2013     EUR     72.13
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    6/28/2013     EUR     70.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    6/28/2013     EUR     72.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    6/28/2013     EUR     74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT             9.000    6/28/2013     EUR     68.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    6/28/2013     EUR     74.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    6/28/2013     EUR     67.95
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    6/28/2013     EUR     67.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT            11.000    6/28/2013     EUR     67.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT             8.000    7/26/2013     EUR     74.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT             9.000    7/26/2013     EUR     73.24
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.000    8/23/2013     EUR     74.97
LB BADEN-WUERTT             8.000    8/23/2013     EUR     73.72
LB BADEN-WUERTT             9.000    8/23/2013     EUR     72.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000    8/23/2013     EUR     70.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT            12.000    8/23/2013     EUR     68.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT            12.000    8/23/2013     EUR     72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.000    9/27/2013     EUR     72.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     70.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     59.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     16.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000    1/25/2013     EUR     26.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    1/25/2013     EUR     68.71
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    1/25/2013     EUR     70.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    1/25/2013     EUR     70.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500    1/25/2013     EUR     23.97
LB BADEN-WUERTT            11.000    9/27/2013     EUR     69.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT             9.000    9/27/2013     EUR     70.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   10/26/2012     EUR     20.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   10/26/2012     EUR     56.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   10/26/2012     EUR      2.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   10/26/2012     EUR     56.41
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   10/26/2012     EUR     67.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     67.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     56.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     74.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     17.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     49.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR      2.56
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   10/26/2012     EUR     47.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     49.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     44.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     43.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR      2.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     15.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     60.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   10/26/2012     EUR     67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   11/23/2012     EUR     56.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   11/23/2012     EUR     50.26
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   11/23/2012     EUR     19.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000   11/23/2012     EUR     72.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     47.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     71.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     43.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     67.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     17.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     65.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500   11/23/2012     EUR     64.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     67.89
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     42.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     38.86
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     69.95
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     61.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     60.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     15.97
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     59.28
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     57.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000   11/23/2012     EUR     72.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT            15.000   11/23/2012     EUR     49.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     41.30
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     71.89
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     58.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     58.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT             5.000     1/4/2013     EUR     64.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     70.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     35.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     63.05
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     17.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     59.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     55.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT             7.500     1/4/2013     EUR     59.41
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     56.30
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     33.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     60.05
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     69.30
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     64.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     68.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT            10.000     1/4/2013     EUR     51.25
MACQUARIE STRUCT           18.000   12/14/2012     EUR     68.17
MACQUARIE STRUCT           13.250     1/2/2013     EUR     69.10
Q-CELLS                     6.750   10/21/2015     EUR      1.03
QIMONDA FINANCE             6.750    3/22/2013     USD      4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR              1.375    12/6/2012     EUR      0.58
TAG IMMO AG                 6.500   12/10/2015     EUR      9.69
TUI AG                      2.750    3/24/2016     EUR     56.63
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.450   12/31/2012     EUR     73.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.700   12/31/2012     EUR     69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.850   12/31/2012     EUR     65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.950   12/31/2012     EUR     57.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           17.050   12/31/2012     EUR     55.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           17.100   12/31/2012     EUR     52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           17.450   12/31/2012     EUR     72.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           18.050   12/31/2012     EUR     70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           18.850   12/31/2012     EUR     69.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           18.850   12/31/2012     EUR     53.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           18.900   12/31/2012     EUR     52.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           19.300   12/31/2012     EUR     72.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           19.700   12/31/2012     EUR     68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           21.150   12/31/2012     EUR     74.68
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           21.200   12/31/2012     EUR     56.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           22.250   12/31/2012     EUR     72.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           22.700   12/31/2012     EUR     70.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           24.700   12/31/2012     EUR     46.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           24.900   12/31/2012     EUR     54.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           27.600   12/31/2012     EUR     43.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           28.250   12/31/2012     EUR     40.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.650     3/1/2013     EUR     48.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            8.550    3/22/2013     EUR     61.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.350   12/31/2012     EUR     63.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.950    3/22/2013     EUR     71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.300    3/22/2013     EUR     70.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.150   12/31/2012     EUR     72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.750    3/22/2013     EUR     62.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.150    3/22/2013     EUR     70.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.350    3/22/2013     EUR     72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.000    3/22/2013     EUR     67.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           15.900   12/31/2012     EUR     73.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.850    3/22/2013     EUR     56.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           15.250   12/31/2012     EUR     58.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           16.850    3/22/2013     EUR     52.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           18.500    3/22/2013     EUR     51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            4.000    6/28/2013     EUR     49.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            6.000    6/28/2013     EUR     66.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.700    3/22/2013     EUR     57.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            7.389   11/25/2013     EUR     51.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            5.100    4/14/2014     EUR     39.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.200    3/22/2013     EUR     59.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.950   12/31/2012     EUR     72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.600   12/31/2012     EUR     67.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.500   12/31/2012     EUR     65.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.450   12/31/2012     EUR     58.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.300   12/31/2012     EUR     70.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.300   12/31/2012     EUR     48.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.000   12/31/2012     EUR     73.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.600   12/31/2012     EUR     74.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.550   12/31/2012     EUR     57.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.500   12/31/2012     EUR     61.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.150   12/31/2012     EUR     71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           13.050   12/31/2012     EUR     70.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.900   12/31/2012     EUR     64.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.800   12/31/2012     EUR     43.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.650   12/31/2012     EUR     57.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.250   12/31/2012     EUR     70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           12.000   12/31/2012     EUR     65.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.950   12/31/2012     EUR     71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.950   12/31/2012     EUR     71.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.950   12/31/2012     EUR     54.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.900   12/31/2012     EUR     72.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.850   12/31/2012     EUR     73.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.800   12/31/2012     EUR     74.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.750   12/31/2012     EUR     56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.700   12/31/2012     EUR     61.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.450   12/31/2012     EUR     55.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.400   12/31/2012     EUR     63.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.150   12/31/2012     EUR     74.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.000   12/31/2012     EUR     70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           11.000   12/31/2012     EUR     70.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.900   12/31/2012     EUR     68.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.550   12/31/2012     EUR     73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.500   12/31/2012     EUR     43.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           10.050   12/31/2012     EUR     67.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.950   12/31/2012     EUR     67.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.950   12/31/2012     EUR     66.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.900   12/31/2012     EUR     72.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.650   12/31/2012     EUR     70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.600   12/31/2012     EUR     74.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.500   12/31/2012     EUR     75.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.400   12/31/2012     EUR     59.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.350   12/31/2012     EUR     71.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            9.250   12/31/2012     EUR     44.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            8.650   12/31/2012     EUR     72.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            8.400   12/31/2012     EUR     74.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            7.950   12/31/2012     EUR     66.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            7.900   12/31/2012     EUR     73.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            7.400   12/31/2012     EUR     55.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO            7.250   12/31/2012     EUR     67.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           15.250    3/22/2013     EUR     54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.500    3/22/2013     EUR     51.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.300    3/22/2013     EUR     74.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO           14.000    3/22/2013     EUR     63.94
WGZ BANK                    7.000   12/21/2012     EUR     71.11
WGZ BANK                    6.000   12/28/2012     EUR     72.17
WGZ BANK                    8.000   12/28/2012     EUR     63.11
WGZ BANK                    7.000   12/28/2012     EUR     67.32
WGZ BANK                    8.000   12/21/2012     EUR     68.69

BCV GUERNSEY                8.020     3/1/2013     EUR     56.81
BKB FINANCE                11.400    11/8/2012     CHF     57.87
BKB FINANCE                 8.350    1/14/2013     CHF     55.18
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.000   10/19/2012     USD     59.90
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.250   10/24/2012     CHF     48.77
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.750   10/24/2012     USD     69.71
EFG FINANCIAL PR            6.250   10/25/2012     CHF     49.96
EFG FINANCIAL PR           11.250   10/26/2012     CHF     61.93
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.000   10/26/2012     CHF     68.50
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.250   10/26/2012     CHF     62.86
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.250   10/26/2012     EUR     63.13
EFG FINANCIAL PR           16.750   10/26/2012     CHF     24.35
EFG FINANCIAL PR           17.000   10/26/2012     EUR     62.88
EFG FINANCIAL PR           20.000   10/26/2012     CHF     17.17
EFG FINANCIAL PR           20.500   10/26/2012     EUR     17.42
EFG FINANCIAL PR           21.000   10/26/2012     USD     17.67
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.330   10/29/2012     USD     37.90
EFG FINANCIAL PR           11.050    11/8/2012     USD     56.70
EFG FINANCIAL PR            6.000   11/12/2012     EUR     59.84
EFG FINANCIAL PR            6.000   11/12/2012     CHF     58.72
EFG FINANCIAL PR           10.500   11/13/2012     CHF     63.48
EFG FINANCIAL PR           10.500   11/13/2012     CHF     63.59
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.750   11/13/2012     CHF     71.13
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.750   11/13/2012     CHF     22.90
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.000   11/13/2012     CHF     22.52
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.000   11/13/2012     CHF     74.32
EFG FINANCIAL PR           14.000   11/13/2012     USD     23.00
EFG FINANCIAL PR           14.500   11/13/2012     EUR     74.01
EFG FINANCIAL PR           17.000   11/13/2012     EUR     65.03
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.830   11/19/2012     CHF     71.31
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.000   11/20/2012     CHF     62.14
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.300   11/20/2012     CHF     65.21
EFG FINANCIAL PR           11.500   11/20/2012     EUR     56.97
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.250   11/27/2012     CHF     72.34
EFG FINANCIAL PR           11.250   11/27/2012     CHF     65.52
EFG FINANCIAL PR           14.500   11/27/2012     CHF     34.43
EFG FINANCIAL PR           16.000   11/27/2012     EUR     63.91
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.750    12/3/2012     CHF     74.21
EFG FINANCIAL PR           13.750    12/6/2012     CHF     47.33
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.500   12/14/2012     CHF     66.74
EFG FINANCIAL PR           14.250   12/14/2012     EUR     66.54
EFG FINANCIAL PR           17.500   12/14/2012     EUR     67.56
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.300   12/21/2012     CHF     65.64
EFG FINANCIAL PR           10.900   12/21/2012     CHF     65.87
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.600   12/21/2012     CHF     66.25
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.250   12/27/2012     GBP     68.07
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.830   12/28/2012     USD     60.45
EFG FINANCIAL PR           10.000     1/9/2013     EUR     49.54
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.000    1/15/2013     CHF     35.58
EFG FINANCIAL PR           10.250    1/15/2013     CHF     22.87
EFG FINANCIAL PR           11.250    1/15/2013     GBP     74.74
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.500    1/15/2013     CHF     37.13
EFG FINANCIAL PR           16.500    1/18/2013     CHF     51.95
EFG FINANCIAL PR            5.800    1/23/2013     CHF     53.65
EFG FINANCIAL PR           15.000     3/1/2013     CHF     72.40
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.000     4/2/2013     CHF     65.10
EFG FINANCIAL PR           16.000     4/4/2013     CHF     27.09
EFG FINANCIAL PR            7.000    4/19/2013     EUR     60.21
EFG FINANCIAL PR           12.000    4/26/2013     CHF     66.41
EFG FINANCIAL PR            9.500    4/30/2013     EUR     45.90
EFG FINANCIAL PR            6.500    8/27/2013     CHF     51.87
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.400    9/30/2013     CHF     64.22
EFG FINANCIAL PR           19.000    10/3/2013     GBP     72.93
EFG FINANCIAL PR            8.160    4/25/2014     EUR     74.43
EFG FINANCIAL PR            5.850   10/14/2014     CHF     57.50
EFG FINANCIAL PR           14.800   11/20/2012     EUR     68.46
ZURCHER KANT FIN            9.250    11/9/2012     CHF     62.49
ZURCHER KANT FIN            5.330   11/30/2012     CHF     71.50
ZURCHER KANT FIN            9.250    11/9/2012     CHF     66.89
ZURCHER KANT FIN           17.000    2/22/2013     EUR     55.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN            7.340    4/16/2013     CHF     68.10

KAUPTHING                   0.800    2/15/2011     EUR     26.50

ARCELORMITTAL               7.250     4/1/2014     EUR     21.74

BLT FINANCE BV             12.000    2/10/2015     USD     24.88
KPNQWEST NV                10.000    3/15/2012     EUR      0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY            11.000     7/4/2011     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             4.000     1/4/2011     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.000   12/31/2010     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             9.300   12/21/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             9.300   12/21/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            14.900   11/16/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             4.000   10/12/2010     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.500     8/9/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.000    7/28/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             3.000    9/12/2036     JPY      5.75
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.000   10/30/2012     USD      5.75
LEHMAN BROS TSY             2.500    8/23/2012     GBP     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            13.000    7/25/2012     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.600    2/22/2012     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.000    2/15/2012     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.000    2/14/2012     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             2.500   12/15/2011     GBP     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            12.000     7/4/2011     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            11.000     7/4/2011     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             4.000    5/30/2010     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            11.750     3/1/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.000    2/15/2010     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             1.750     2/7/2010     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.800   12/27/2009     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.500    9/13/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.800    8/21/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.000     8/3/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             4.500     8/2/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.500     7/6/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            11.000    6/29/2009     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.000    6/17/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             5.750    6/15/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             5.500    6/15/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             9.000    6/13/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            15.000     6/4/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            17.000     6/2/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            13.500     6/2/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.000    5/22/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.000    5/22/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.000    5/22/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.200    5/14/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             4.000    4/24/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             3.850    4/24/2009     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.000    4/14/2009     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             9.000    3/17/2009     GBP     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            13.000    2/16/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            11.000    2/16/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.000    2/16/2009     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             0.500    2/16/2009     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.750    1/30/2009     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            13.432     1/8/2009     ILS     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.000   12/26/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.000   11/28/2008     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.442   11/22/2008     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            14.100   11/12/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.000    11/9/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            13.150   10/30/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.000   10/28/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.500   10/24/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.000   10/24/2008     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             5.000   10/24/2008     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             8.000   10/23/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            10.000   10/22/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            16.000    10/8/2008     CHF     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.250    10/6/2008     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            18.250    10/2/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             7.375    9/20/2008     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            23.300    9/16/2008     USD     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY            14.900    9/15/2008     EUR     22.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY             6.000    7/28/2010     EUR     22.50
Q-CELLS INTERNAT            1.375    4/30/2012     EUR     24.85
Q-CELLS INTERNAT            5.750    5/26/2014     EUR     24.98
RENEWABLE CORP              6.500     6/4/2014     EUR     68.87

SACYR VALLEHERM             6.500     5/1/2016     EUR     49.50

Rorvik Timber               6.000    6/30/2016     SEK     68.00

BANK JULIUS BAER           13.000    5/31/2013     USD     67.25
BANK JULIUS BAER           12.000     4/9/2013     CHF     56.60
BANK JULIUS BAER           11.500    2/20/2013     CHF     66.70
BANK JULIUS BAER           17.300     2/1/2013     EUR     56.40
BANK JULIUS BAER            8.700     8/5/2013     CHF     68.70
BANK JULIUS BAER           15.000    5/31/2013     USD     66.10
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    6/10/2014     CHF     65.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    6/10/2014     CHF     62.90
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    5/26/2014     CHF     67.84
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    5/13/2014     CHF     65.61
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    2/24/2014     CHF     55.98
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    2/11/2014     CHF     55.12
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000   11/26/2013     CHF     64.85
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    9/23/2013     CHF     50.78
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            3.250    9/16/2013     CHF     49.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            7.000    7/22/2013     CHF     72.88
CLARIDEN LEU NAS           10.000    6/10/2013     CHF     72.67
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    5/31/2013     CHF     62.82
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            6.500    4/26/2013     CHF     58.94
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000   10/15/2014     CHF     57.80
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            4.500    8/13/2014     CHF     49.24
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            5.250     8/6/2014     CHF     52.29
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    3/25/2013     CHF     60.23
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            9.000    2/14/2013     CHF     68.52
CLARIDEN LEU NAS           11.500    2/13/2013     EUR     58.90
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    1/24/2013     CHF     68.84
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            8.750    1/15/2013     CHF     71.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            8.250   12/17/2012     CHF     64.89
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000   12/17/2012     EUR     72.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000   12/14/2012     CHF     45.49
CLARIDEN LEU NAS           12.000   11/23/2012     CHF     66.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            7.125   11/19/2012     CHF     58.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            7.250   11/16/2012     CHF     59.75
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            7.500   11/13/2012     CHF     58.88
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    8/27/2014     CHF     56.01
CLARIDEN LEU NAS            0.000    9/10/2014     CHF     51.80
CREDIT SUISSE LD            8.900    3/25/2013     EUR     61.50
S-AIR GROUP                 0.125     7/7/2005     CHF     10.63
SARASIN CI LTD              8.000    4/27/2015     CHF     69.56
UBS AG                     17.000    9/27/2013     EUR     73.19
UBS AG                     18.500    9/27/2013     EUR     71.70
UBS AG                     20.000    9/27/2013     EUR     70.46
UBS AG                     20.500    9/27/2013     EUR     73.69
UBS AG                     21.750    9/27/2013     EUR     74.87
UBS AG                     22.500    9/27/2013     EUR     72.89
UBS AG                     22.750    9/27/2013     EUR     68.41
UBS AG                     23.250    9/27/2013     EUR     71.16
UBS AG                     23.250    9/27/2013     EUR     68.88
UBS AG                     24.000    9/27/2013     EUR     71.86
UBS AG                     24.750    9/27/2013     EUR     66.39
UBS AG                      8.060    10/3/2013     USD     19.75
UBS AG                     11.020   10/21/2013     USD     54.18
UBS AG                     19.250    6/28/2013     EUR     70.64
UBS AG                      9.260    12/5/2013     USD     22.46
UBS AG                     17.000     1/3/2014     EUR     74.51
UBS AG                     18.250     1/3/2014     EUR     73.45
UBS AG                     20.500     1/3/2014     EUR     71.65
UBS AG                     20.750     1/3/2014     EUR     71.95
UBS AG                     21.000     1/3/2014     EUR     74.61
UBS AG                     23.000     1/3/2014     EUR     73.79
UBS AG                     23.250     1/3/2014     EUR     71.15
UBS AG                     24.250     1/3/2014     EUR     72.45
UBS AG                     24.250     1/3/2014     EUR     69.09
UBS AG                      5.340    1/29/2014     USD     45.55
UBS AG                      3.870    6/17/2014     USD     38.08
UBS AG                      6.040    8/29/2014     USD     35.22
UBS AG                      7.780    8/29/2014     USD     21.41
UBS AG                      0.500    4/27/2015     CHF     53.05
UBS AG                     12.240   10/26/2012     EUR     67.98
UBS AG                     13.570   10/26/2012     EUR     65.95
UBS AG                     16.390   10/26/2012     EUR     62.22
UBS AG                      6.070   11/12/2012     EUR     68.29
UBS AG                      8.370   11/12/2012     EUR     61.59
UBS AG                      8.590   11/12/2012     EUR     57.48
UBS AG                      9.020   11/12/2012     EUR     42.21
UBS AG                      9.650   11/12/2012     EUR     40.55
UBS AG                     10.930   11/12/2012     EUR     67.00
UBS AG                     11.260   11/12/2012     EUR     50.74
UBS AG                     11.660   11/12/2012     EUR     37.10
UBS AG                     13.120   11/12/2012     EUR     66.50
UBS AG                     13.560   11/12/2012     EUR     35.45
UBS AG                     13.600   11/12/2012     EUR     59.56
UBS AG                     13.000   11/23/2012     USD     59.90
UBS AG                      8.150   12/21/2012     EUR     71.00
UBS AG                      8.250   12/21/2012     EUR     74.85
UBS AG                      8.990   12/21/2012     EUR     72.68
UBS AG                      9.000   12/21/2012     EUR     68.12
UBS AG                      9.150   12/21/2012     EUR     73.80
UBS AG                      9.730   12/21/2012     EUR     70.60
UBS AG                      9.890   12/21/2012     EUR     65.49
UBS AG                     10.060   12/21/2012     EUR     71.61
UBS AG                     10.490   12/21/2012     EUR     68.63
UBS AG                     10.690   12/21/2012     EUR     74.48
UBS AG                     10.810   12/21/2012     EUR     63.08
UBS AG                     11.000   12/21/2012     EUR     69.58
UBS AG                     11.260   12/21/2012     EUR     66.75
UBS AG                     11.330   12/21/2012     EUR     73.16
UBS AG                     11.770   12/21/2012     EUR     60.87
UBS AG                     11.970   12/21/2012     EUR     67.68
UBS AG                     11.980   12/21/2012     EUR     71.89
UBS AG                     12.020   12/21/2012     EUR     64.98
UBS AG                     12.200   12/21/2012     EUR     56.90
UBS AG                     12.400   12/21/2012     EUR     72.55
UBS AG                     12.760   12/21/2012     EUR     58.84
UBS AG                     12.800   12/21/2012     EUR     63.30
UBS AG                     12.970   12/21/2012     EUR     65.90
UBS AG                     13.320   12/21/2012     EUR     69.51
UBS AG                     13.560   12/21/2012     EUR     70.14
UBS AG                     13.570   12/21/2012     EUR     61.71
UBS AG                     13.770   12/21/2012     EUR     56.97
UBS AG                     13.980   12/21/2012     EUR     64.24
UBS AG                     14.350   12/21/2012     EUR     60.20
UBS AG                     14.690   12/21/2012     EUR     67.31
UBS AG                     14.740   12/21/2012     EUR     67.90
UBS AG                     14.810   12/21/2012     EUR     55.24
UBS AG                     15.000   12/21/2012     EUR     62.68
UBS AG                     15.130   12/21/2012     EUR     58.78
UBS AG                     15.860   12/21/2012     EUR     53.65
UBS AG                     15.920   12/21/2012     EUR     57.44
UBS AG                     15.930   12/21/2012     EUR     65.83
UBS AG                     16.030   12/21/2012     EUR     61.21
UBS AG                     16.600   12/21/2012     EUR     51.25
UBS AG                     16.710   12/21/2012     EUR     56.16
UBS AG                     16.930   12/21/2012     EUR     52.17
UBS AG                     17.070   12/21/2012     EUR     59.83
UBS AG                     17.500   12/21/2012     EUR     54.96
UBS AG                     18.000   12/21/2012     EUR     50.79
UBS AG                     19.090   12/21/2012     EUR     52.73
UBS AG                     10.380     1/2/2013     USD     31.76
UBS AG                     10.770     1/2/2013     USD     38.33
UBS AG                     15.990     1/4/2013     EUR     74.69
UBS AG                     17.000     1/4/2013     EUR     73.75
UBS AG                     17.150     1/4/2013     EUR     71.77
UBS AG                     18.300     1/4/2013     EUR     69.10
UBS AG                     19.440     1/4/2013     EUR     66.64
UBS AG                     19.750     1/4/2013     EUR     69.94
UBS AG                     20.500     1/4/2013     EUR     70.38
UBS AG                     20.570     1/4/2013     EUR     64.38
UBS AG                     21.700     1/4/2013     EUR     62.31
UBS AG                     21.750     1/4/2013     EUR     72.29
UBS AG                     23.750     1/4/2013     EUR     66.88
UBS AG                     10.390    1/18/2013     USD     36.31
UBS AG                     11.020    1/25/2013     EUR     67.42
UBS AG                     12.010    1/25/2013     EUR     65.87
UBS AG                     14.070    1/25/2013     EUR     63.02
UBS AG                     16.200    1/25/2013     EUR     74.74
UBS AG                      8.980    2/22/2013     EUR     72.47
UBS AG                     10.590    2/22/2013     EUR     69.02
UBS AG                     13.070    2/22/2013     EUR     63.37
UBS AG                     13.660    2/22/2013     EUR     61.96
UBS AG                      9.000    3/22/2013     USD     11.00
UBS AG                      9.850    3/22/2013     USD     19.75
UBS AG                     16.500     4/2/2013     EUR     71.96
UBS AG                     17.250     4/2/2013     EUR     72.30
UBS AG                     19.750     4/2/2013     EUR     69.69
UBS AG                     21.250     4/2/2013     EUR     71.49
UBS AG                     22.250     4/2/2013     EUR     67.47
UBS AG                     22.250     4/2/2013     EUR     71.93
UBS AG                     24.250     4/2/2013     EUR     65.74
UBS AG                     10.860     4/4/2013     USD     37.21
UBS AG                      9.650    4/11/2013     USD     27.17
UBS AG                      9.930    4/11/2013     USD     24.77
UBS AG                     11.250    4/11/2013     USD     24.39
UBS AG                     10.170    4/26/2013     EUR     67.60
UBS AG                     10.970    4/26/2013     EUR     66.45
UBS AG                     12.610    4/26/2013     EUR     64.33
UBS AG                     14.100    4/26/2013     EUR     74.72
UBS AG                      7.900    4/30/2013     USD     33.75
UBS AG                      9.830    5/13/2013     USD     30.07
UBS AG                      8.000    5/24/2013     USD     60.95
UBS AG                     11.670    5/31/2013     USD     35.12
UBS AG                      9.330    6/14/2013     USD     22.00
UBS AG                     11.060    6/14/2013     USD     28.17
UBS AG                      6.770    6/21/2013     USD     10.43
UBS AG                      7.120    6/26/2013     USD     29.83
UBS AG                     15.250    6/28/2013     EUR     74.74
UBS AG                     17.250    6/28/2013     EUR     72.53
UBS AG                     10.960    2/22/2013     EUR     67.55
UBS AG                     19.500    6/28/2013     EUR     72.57
UBS AG                     20.500    6/28/2013     EUR     73.26
UBS AG                     21.000    6/28/2013     EUR     68.89
UBS AG                     22.500    6/28/2013     EUR     67.23
UBS AG                     23.000    6/28/2013     EUR     67.58
UBS AG                     24.000    6/28/2013     EUR     71.49
UBS AG                     11.450     7/1/2013     USD     27.96
UBS AG                      6.100    7/24/2013     USD     30.07
UBS AG                      8.640     8/1/2013     USD     27.87
UBS AG                      8.720     8/2/2013     USD     35.34
UBS AG                     13.120     8/5/2013     USD      4.62
UBS AG                     11.870    8/13/2013     USD      4.68
UBS AG                      9.600    8/26/2013     USD     15.21
UBS AG                     10.200    9/20/2013     EUR     60.74
UBS AG                     12.900    9/20/2013     EUR     58.16
UBS AG                     15.900    9/20/2013     EUR     56.63
UBS AG                     15.500    9/27/2013     EUR     74.95
UBS AG                     13.570   11/21/2013     USD     16.25

BARCLAYS BK PLC             8.000    6/28/2013     EUR     48.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC            10.750    3/22/2013     EUR     42.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC            10.000    3/22/2013     EUR     43.35
BARCLAYS BK PLC             6.000     1/2/2013     EUR     51.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC             7.500   10/30/2012     EUR     62.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC            11.000    6/28/2013     EUR     43.94
ESSAR ENERGY                4.250     2/1/2016     USD     67.66
MAX PETROLEUM               6.750     9/8/2013     USD     41.79


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *