/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/121022.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Monday, October 22, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 210 Headlines B U L G A R I A INTER PIPE: Declared Insolvent; Nov. 6 Creditors Meeting Set C Y P R U S DELTA TRADING: EUR6.5-Mil. Debt Written Off in 2006 G E R M A N Y GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR260MM Sr. Secured Notes 'P(B3)' HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive RHEINWEST CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Series 12 Notes I R E L A N D AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Ups Rating on EUR50MM Notes From BB+ I T A L Y BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'D' BFSR BANCA MONTE: Moody's Cuts LT Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2' L A T V I A PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings L U X E M B O U R G DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR/PDR; Outlook Negative M A C E D O N I A * MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs; Outlook Stable S P A I N AUTOPISTA MADRID: Goes Into Administration BANKIA SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB' CORPORACION DE RESERVAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Rating TELEFONICA SA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sub. Preferred Stock Ratings * SPAIN: Sets EUR90-Billion Size Limit for Bad Bank T U R K E Y TURKIYE PETROL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR/PDR; Outlook Stable YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; On Review for Downgrade U N I T E D K I N G D O M HONOURS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on GBP12MM Class D Notes COMET: Opcapita Mulls Sale; Pre-Pack Administration Not Ruled Out PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Football Fans' Club Named Preferred Bidder RANGERS FOOTBALL: Whyte Says Duff & Phelps Aware of Ticketus Deal * UK: 32 Retail Shops Closing Every Day, PwC Research Shows X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week October 15 to October 19, 2012 ********* =============== B U L G A R I A =============== INTER PIPE: Declared Insolvent; Nov. 6 Creditors Meeting Set ------------------------------------------------------------ According to SeeNews, data from the country's commercial register indicated that a court in the Bulgarian capital Sofia has declared Inter Pipe insolvent. The decision was taken on October 1, SeeNews discloses. SeeNews relates that the court's decision, published on the register's Web site, showed a meeting of the company's creditors is scheduled for November 6. Inter Pipe's total obligations amounted to BGN43.5 million (US$29 million/EUR22.2 million) at the end of 2011. Inter Pipe is a Bulgarian steel pipes maker. =========== C Y P R U S =========== DELTA TRADING: EUR6.5-Mil. Debt Written Off in 2006 --------------------------------------------------- Cyprus Mail reports that a debt of EUR6.5 million owed by the AKEL-controlled Delta Trading company was written off by the Bank of Cyprus in 2006, bringing the total loans the party controlled firms have not had to repay the bank to EUR9.5 million. Delta Trading company was set up in 1965 and was part of a network of AKEL-controlled companies that had business dealings with the former Soviet Union, which offered the party much needed financial assistance, Cyprus Mail discloses. Following the fall of the regimes in the Eastern Bloc, Delta, as well as most of the "party" companies begun to accumulate big debts, Cyprus Mail relates. Furthermore, they were owed some US$7 million by the former Soviet Union from the export of products of which US$5.2 million were assigned to the government and the rest were receivables for the Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Mail states. Delta found itself on the brink of bankruptcy, Cyprus Mail notes. On September 6, 2006, an agreement was made between then Bank of Cyprus manager (now finance minister) Vassos Shiarly, on behalf of the bank and Antonis Papanicolaou, director of Delta Trading Ltd., and AKEL secretariat member in charge of economic affairs, Venizelos Zanettou, whereby the assets of Delta Trading Ltd. were transferred to Delta (Distributors) Ltd., Cyprus Mail recounts. It also provided for the forced sale of a plot of land (owned by Delta Trading) in Limassol, the writing off of EUR6.5 million owed to the bank and the subsequent removal of all personal guarantors from the loan agreement, Cyprus Mail discloses. More specifically, it was agreed that Delta Trading Ltd. had reserves of CYP90,000 and around CYP60,000 receivables, Cyprus Mail notes. The bank and Delta appointed the director of Delta Trading as the liquidator with instructions to sell all stock/reserves and collect all money owed to the company, Cyprus Mail relates. The stock was transferred to the new company Delta (Distributors) Ltd of which Mr. Papanicolaou was later the sole owner, Cyprus Mail says. All this was the result of a decision taken by the board of directors of the Bank of Cyprus in May 2006 to find a "solution" for the indebted company, Cyprus Mail notes. ============= G E R M A N Y ============= GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR260MM Sr. Secured Notes 'P(B3)' --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Services assigned a P(B3) rating to the new EUR 260 million Senior Secured Second Lien Floating Rate Notes due 2017 to be issued by Grohe Holding GmbH. The notes will benefit from a similar security package as the existing floating rate notes due 2017, although on a second priority basis and with subordinated guarantees. All other ratings of Grohe Holding GmbH remain unchanged and the outlook remains stable. Ratings Rationale Moody's views the transaction as positive because the new notes will be used to refinance the EUR260 million Senior Notes due 2014. Following the issuance, the next material maturity will be in March 2016 when the EUR150 million revolving credit facility matures. The P(B3) rating reflects the second lien nature of the security package and the subordinated guarantees ranking behind substantial debt including senior secured term loans, senior secured floating rate notes and the revolving facility. Moody's notes that the capital structure remains fully covenant-lite with only a single financial maintenance covenant of minimum Ebitda in the revolving credit facility that is set at a very low level. As a result Moody's maintains its group recovery assumption of 35% and B1 Probability of Default Rating for Grohe. Moody's further notes that Grohe continues to remain weakly positioned in its current B2 rating category. While performance in the first half of 2012 showed relative resilience with reported revenue and normalized Ebitda growth of 33.2% (or 2.8% ex Joyou) and 32.2% (2.9%), Moody's expects the challenging conditions in some European markets to continue to persist and notes that margins are likely to be under pressure from cost inflation such as elevated sourcing and transportation expenses in the second half of 2012. As a result Moody's does not expect Grohe to generate meaningful free cash flow over 2012 and anticipates adjusted Debt / Ebitda on a fully consolidated basis to be close to 6x (around 7x for the subgroup). Accordingly, the stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that deleveraging from a combination of free cash flow generation and Ebitda growth will visibly accelerate in 2013. The ratings also do not incorporate any impact from acquisitions including a potential increase in Joyou ownership. Negative ratings pressure could develop if the company fails to meet the conditions set out for the stable outlook, including Debt/Ebitda below 6.5x, Ebita/Interest ratio well above 1.5x and free cash flow/debt of 2%. Although a rating upgrade is unlikely in the near term given Grohe's high leverage, positive ratings pressure could develop if there is a continued improvement in the company's profitability, leading to Ebita/interest increasing towards 2.5x, Debt/Ebitda approaching 5.0x or free cash flow/debt at around 6% (all as adjusted by Moody's). Grohe's near-term liquidity profile is expected to remain satisfactory. At the end of June 2012, Grohe reported EUR151 million of cash on balance sheet (including EUR16 million of restricted cash at Joyou; EUR84 million excluding Joyou). In addition, the company had EUR44 million available under its EUR150 million revolver. The principal methodology used in rating Grohe Holding GmbH was the Global Consumer Durables Industry Methodology published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Headquartered in D《seldorf, Germany, Grohe Holding GmbH is a leading single-brand supplier of sanitary fittings for bathrooms and kitchens. Grohe operates six production facilities, which are located in Germany, Portugal, Canada and Thailand. HORNBACH BAUMARKT: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 the EUR250 million of senior unsecured notes issued by Hornbach Baumarkt AG due in November 2014. The revised loss given default (LGD) assessment on the notes is LGD3, 46%. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Hornbach's Ba2 corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR). The outlook on the ratings is positive. Ratings Rationale - RATIONALE FOR UPGRADE "The upgrade of the Hornbach's notes to Ba2 follows the reduction over time of debt ranking ahead of the notes and the better position of the notes within the company's capital structure" says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Hornbach. This follows the ongoing reduction in Hornbach's secured debt, which comprises amortizing mortgage securities that has been replaced, over time, by senior unsecured debt. Secured debt portion amounted to approximately 10% of Hornbach's total debt as of August 30, 2012 and is expected to reduce further going forward in line with the mortgage amortizing schedule. The reduction in the secured debt portion within Hornbach's capital structure has benefitted senior unsecured bondholders, removing the pre-existing notching on the instrument. The rating of the EUR250 million senior unsecured notes is now in line with company's CFR at Ba2. - RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION The affirmation of Hornbach's CFR and PDR at Ba2 reflects Moody's ongoing recognition of company's success in weathering difficult market conditions of recent years and its ability to strengthen its key credit metrics over time. Moody's notes that company's performance during the first semester 2012 was slightly below expectations, but expects Hornbach's full fiscal year 2012-13 metrics not to deviate substantially from those of 2011. First semester 2012 was negatively affected by (1) the softer-than- expected consumer spending in some regions (with flat like-for- like sales growth against 3.8% growth in the first semester 2011); and (2) planned expansionary costs that negatively affected both the company's revenues by 0.9% and EBIT by 4.8% compared with the same period in 2011. Furthermore Moody's notes the strong results reported by the company during 2011 that make comparison more difficult. Overall, the current Ba2 CFR primarily reflects (1) the company's relatively small size compared with other European retailers; (2) high financial leverage for its Ba2 rating category though somewhat offset by high cash earmarked to repay the maturing bond; and (3) the high level of capital expenditure it is planning in order to expand its network of stores, which limits its free cash flow generation. However, more positively, the rating also incorporates Hornbach's (1) strong market position in its domestic market; (2) the company's growing international presence; and (3) its good track record in executing its strategy, reflected by the company's ability to grow more rapidly than the market through its domestic operations. The rating is also supported by Hornbach's (1) conservative financial policy; (2) flexibility in terms of cutting investments in store openings to adapt to changing market conditions; and (3) solid liquidity profile. As of August 31, 2012, Hornbach had approximately EUR500 million of cash on the balance sheet and an undrawn EUR250 million five-year credit facility due in December 2016. The positive outlook on the ratings incorporates Moody's expectation that, notwithstanding a lower than expected performance in fiscal year 2012-13, Hornbach's key credit metrics will strengthen in the medium term and that the company will continue maintaining a prudent financial policy. In this context Moody's notes the company's high cash balance of EUR498 million as at August 2012. The positive outlook also reflects Moody's expectations that part of this cash will remain available to repay the existing EUR250 million notes in due course. What Could Change The Rating Up/Down Upward pressure on the ratings could result if Hornbach is able to maintain like-for-like revenue growth in Germany on a sustainable basis and control the volatility of its Eastern European operations, such that its adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio trends towards 4.0x and its EBITA/interest expenses ratio remains above 2.5x. Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings as a result of Hornbach's financial leverage trending towards 5.5x on the back of declining like-for-like sales and/or margin pressure due to adverse market conditions. Principal Methodology The principal methodology used in rating Hornbach was the Global Retail Industry Methodology published in June 2011. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative- Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Hornbach is the fourth-largest DIY retailer in Germany, with revenues of approximately EUR3.0 billion as of 31 August 2012 on a last-12-months basis. As of the same date, the company operated 137 DIY megastores with garden centers in Europe, the majority of which are located in Germany (91 stores), and benefitted from an increasing presence in other European countries, such as Austria, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (the remaining 46 stores). Hornbach's international sales accounted for approximately 42% of its total sales as of the six months ended August 2012. RHEINWEST CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Series 12 Notes -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from CreditWatch developing its credit ratings in three European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions. "At the same time, we have raised and removed from CreditWatch developing our ratings in one structured investment vehicle (SIV)," S&P said. "On July 27, 2012, we placed on CreditWatch developing our ratings on three European synthetic CDO transactions and one SIV following the withdrawal of our ratings on Portigon AG, formerly WestLB," S&P said. "The rating actions follow the recent transfer of Portigon's financial obligations to Erste Abwicklungsanstalt (EAA; AA- /Stable/A-1+) and Landesbank Hessen-Th〉ingen Girozentrale (Helaba; A/Stable/A-1). More specifically, the collateral for Rheinwest Credit Management's series 12, 14, and 16 was transferred to Helaba, and the liquidity line for Harrier Finance Funding Ltd. was assigned to EAA," S&P said. "Rheinwest Credit Management's series 12, 14, and 16 are synthetic CDOs with corporate reference portfolios. Our current ratings on the notes are weak-linked to the creditworthiness of the portfolio and the rating on the underlying collateral. This comprises German covered bonds (pfandbriefe) issued by WestLB, which have recently migrated to and been underwritten by Helaba. Following this transfer, we have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch developing our ratings on Rheinwest Credit Management's series 12, 14, and 16 Transactions," S&P said. "Portigon has been the provider of 100% liquidity support to the Harrier Finance Funding Ltd. senior notesand therefore the issuer credit rating and senior ratings have not been higher than the rating level on Portigon. Following the irrevocable transfer of this obligation to EAA, we have raised and removed from CreditWatch developing our ratings to levels that are in line with our ratings on EAA as the liquidity support provider," S&P said. STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how they differ from the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011. If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports included in this credit rating report are available at: http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com RATINGS LIST Class Rating To From Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Developing Harrier Finance Funding Ltd. ICR AA-/Stable/A-1+ BBB+/Watch Dev/A-2 CP A-1+ A-2/Watch Dev MTN AA- BBB+/Watch Dev Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Developing Rheinwest Credit Management EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 12 CCC+ (sf) CCC+ (sf)/Watch Dev Rheinwest Credit Management EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 14 CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Dev Rheinwest Credit Management EUR15 Million Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes Series 16 CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Dev ============= I R E L A N D ============= AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Ups Rating on EUR50MM Notes From BB+ ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' on Aquarius + Investments PLC's series 2010-3 EUR50 million secured floating-rate notes. "The rating action follows BNP Paribas' (as arranger) restructuring of the transaction. The restructuring has resulted in an extension of the scheduled maturity date to Sept. 20, 2019 from June 20, 2017. However, the maturity date of the credit default swap will remain at June 20, 2017. Additionally, there were changes to the reference portfolio and the level of credit enhancement was increased. The repo counterparty agreement was retired and the proceeds of the issuance of the notes are now with the deposit provider, BNP Paribas," S&P said. "In our opinion, the level of credit enhancement is now sufficient to support a 'BBB- (sf)' rating. We have therefore raised our rating to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)'. The synthetic rated overcollateralization (SROC) level achieved at the 'BBB-' rating level is 100.8149%," S&P said. Aquarius + Investments' series 2010-3 is a European synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction. WHAT IS SROC? "One of the main steps in our rating analysis is the review of the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets. SROC is one of the tools we use when surveilling our ratings on synthetic CDO tranches with reference portfolios," S&P said. "SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement (or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate assumed for a given rating scenario. SROC helps capture what we consider to be the major influences on portfolio performance: Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and time to maturity," S&P said. STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how they differ from the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011. If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this credit rating report is available at: http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com ========= I T A L Y ========= BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'D' BFSR ------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service has said that the amendments that Banca delle Marche (Ba1 deposits, negative; BFSR D/BCA ba2, negative) has made to its mortgage covered bond program will not, in and of themselves and at this time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current A3 ratings of covered bonds issued under the program. The amendments are (1) the posting of a EUR25 million commingling reserve, which covers approximately two months' collections; (2) the appointment of a back-up-servicer for Banca delle Marche's mortgage covered bond program; and (3) the posting of a commingling reserve, which will act as a substitute for (i) the redirection of payments to an account opened with an eligible institution; and (ii) the procurement of a guarantee for the servicer's obligation to transfer collections and for the collection account, if the servicer's or issuer's rating is downgraded below Baa3. Moody's believes that the amendments will not have an adverse effect on the credit quality of the notes such that the A3 ratings are affected. Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the amendment could have other, non-credit-related effects. Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact of the proposed action, and does not express any opinion as to whether the action has, or could have, other non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of noteholders and/or counterparties. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Covered Bonds", published in July 2012. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating the issuers' notes may also be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website. Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings of the transaction. Any change in the ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through appropriate media. This opinion addresses only the credit risks associated with the transaction, and does not address any other type of risk or aspect of the proposed change that may be relevant to investors. Moody's did not receive or take into account a third party assessment on the due diligence performed regarding the underlying assets or financial instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past six months. BANCA MONTE: Moody's Cuts LT Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2' ------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term debt and deposit ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) by two notches to Ba2 from Baa3, the short-term rating to Not-Prime from Prime-3 and the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E, equivalent to a standalone baseline credit assessment of caa1, from D/ba2. The outlook remains negative. The lowering of MPS's standalone risk measures reflect Moody's view that, notwithstanding the prospective EUR1.5 billion capital injection by the Italian government, there remains a material probability that the bank will need to seek further external support over the rating horizon. As a result of the stress test jointly undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the Bank of Italy which directed banks to have a minimum 9% Core Tier 1 ratio, MPS has not been able to increase its capital base to the required level and hence elicited government's assistance. In the event of a further deterioration of its asset quality, which Moody's considers is likely given the weak growth prospects for Italy's economy and the EU operating environment, there is a strong probability that the bank would not be able to generate sufficient capital internally to maintain regulatory capital levels. The actions on MPS's deposit ratings reflect the increase in risk to depositors and other creditors implied by the bank's weak standalone strength, partially offset by the heightened likelihood of support evidenced by the government's recent actions. Ratings Rationale MPS's asset quality is weak and will, in Moody's view, continue to deteriorate given the Italian economy's weak growth prospects during the remainder of 2012 and for 2013. MPS's reported problem loans have risen to 17% of total loans in June 2012 and are significantly above the around 13% average of Italian banks rated by Moody's. Moody's recently-published GDP growth outlook for Italy estimates a range of -2.5% to -1.5% for 2012, and a range of -1.0% to 0% for 2013, with significant downside risks to these forecasts. Asset impairments generally follow economic downturns with a lag of up to 12-18 months, which would indicate that MPS's asset quality is likely to continue to deteriorate throughout 2013 and 2014. Against this negative asset-quality outlook, Moody's notes MPS's weak internal capital-generation capacity. MPS has not been able to generate capital internally between 2011 and H1 2012, even excluding EUR5.8 billion goodwill impairments from the bank's net result. MPS's weak profitability and fragile asset quality exacerbate its weak funding position, leaving it unable to access the capital markets and in consequence making MPS highly reliant on the European Central Bank for funding (at EUR31.5 billion as of June 2012). This exposes it to the ECB's decision-making process, which it cannot fully influence. Moody's understands that the bank's business plan aims to address these weaknesses through measures such as deleveraging to reduce the high consumer and corporate loan-to-deposit ratio to 110% in turn reducing reliance on central bank funding, and cost-cutting to improve profitability. However, Moody's believes that the plan is subject to significant execution risk, given the challenging operating environment. Worsening macroeconomic and market conditions compared with the plan's assumptions (a distinct possibility given that Italy's recent GDP forecasts have already deteriorated) would constrain the bank's turnaround. These concerns translate into a standalone credit assessment of E/caa1, indicating a heightened risk over the medium term that MPS may require further external support notwithstanding its ostensibly strong capital position postinjection. In Moody's view, this is likely to take the form of systemic (government) support, in view of the past challenges that MPS's shareholders have faced when attempting to recapitalize MPS. The E/caa1 standalone credit assessment reflects the positive impact of the planned capital strengthening from the government by year-end 2012, amounting to EUR1.5 billion of capital that the Italian government has committed to inject , increasing MPS's Core Tier 1 (pro forma for the European Banking Authority's requirements) by around 156 bps to 9.06%. Long-Term Debt and Deposit Ratings MPS's Ba2 debt and deposit ratings balance (1) the risk for bondholders stemming from MPS's heightened standalone risk profile against (2) the demonstrated willingness and ability of the Italian government to support this institution. The bank's bondholders' position in any potential renewed public recapitalization would be subject to political decisions not simply in Italy but potentially to the European Commission's scrutiny, for example since any further state aid/support would likely require the approval from the European Commission which might require burden sharing with creditors and other measures that may weaken MPS's franchise. Moody's has therefore incorporated five-notches of uplift of the debt/deposit ratings from its E/caa1 standalone credit assessment but downgraded the bank's senior debt ratings to Ba2 with a negative outlook from Baa3, negative outlook, to reflect this risk. Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings Given the heightened risk of burden sharing for junior creditors should MPS require further external support, subordinated debt and hybrid ratings are notched off the caa1 standalone baseline credit assessment, with senior subordinated debt and Tier III rated Caa2, junior subordinated debt at Caa3 and preferred stock at Ca. What Could Move The Rating Up/Down At present, there is limited upwards pressure on the debt and deposit ratings; however, the following factors could merit a higher standalone credit assessment over the medium term (1) the successful implementation of the business plan, resulting in notably improved profitability and internal capital generation; and (2) significant shareholder's capital injections improving the resilience against further asset-quality deterioration and reducing the risk of public recapitalizations with the attached uncertainties. However, an improvement in the standalone credit assessment would be unlikely to result in an upgrade of the deposit rating, given the very high level of systemic support uplift which Moody's incorporates into the deposit ratings. Conversely, downwards pressure might develop on the ratings following (1) challenges in executing the business plan, for example, because of a more difficult operating environment; or (2) a weakening of Italy's capacity to extend systemic support. Equally, if the need for renewed public support becomes more evident and visible, this might exert pressure on the standalone ratings, as well as the debt and deposit ratings. MPS CAPITAL SERVICES Moody's has downgraded the group's corporate banking subsidiary MPS Capital Services to Ba2/Not-Prime with a negative outlook, from Baa3/Prime-3 and its standalone BFSR to E/caa1 from D-/ba3. The ratings are at the same level of the parent, reflecting the bank's close integration with its parent. RATING OVERVIEW 1. MPS (ratings/outlook, if applicable) - Senior unsecured debt and EMTN, and bank deposits: Ba2; (P)Ba2 /negative - Short-term debt and deposit: NP - Subordinate debt and EMTN: Caa2; (P)Caa2 / negative - Tier III EMTN: (P) Caa2 / negative; - Junior subordinate and EMTN: Caa3(hyb); (P)Caa3 /negative - Preferred stock: Ca (hyb) / negative - Bank Financial Strength Rating: E / stable - Baseline Credit Assessment: caa1 2. MPS Capital Services - Bank deposits: Ba2 / negative; NP - Bank Financial Strength Rating: E / stable - Baseline Credit Assessment: caa1 The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012. =========== L A T V I A =========== PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B3 long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of PrivatBank AS. The E bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was also affirmed. The outlook on all ratings is stable. The bank's Not Prime short-term rating was unaffected. The rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade of the bank's long-term deposit ratings, initiated on March 13, 2012. Moody's Investors Service will withdraw all ratings of PrivatBank AS for business reasons. At the time of withdrawal, PrivatBank AS's ratings are as follows: Bank financial strength rating of E with a stable outlook Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of B3 with a stable outlook Short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Not Prime PrivatBank AS had no outstanding debt rated by Moody's at the time of the withdrawal. Ratings Rationale Moody's will withdraw the ratings for its own business reasons. The rating action follows the successful LVL16 million capital raising on August 2, 2012 which increased the bank's share capital by 40%. This follows a failed capital raising in 2011 when the regulator decided that approval would only be granted along with additional regulatory requirements which led to Moody's decision to review the long term ratings in order to further analyse the potential support from the bank's Ukrainian parent, Privatbank (B1/B3 negative domestic/foreign deposit rating, E+/b1 stable standalone bank financial strength rating/baseline credit assessment). Moody's most recent rating action on PrivatBank AS was on March 13, 2012, when the bank's BFSR was downgraded to E with a stable outlook from E+ and the long term deposit rating was downgraded to B3 from B2 and placed under review for downgrade. The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012. Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, PrivatBank AS reported total consolidated assets of around LVL282 million (EUR337 million) at the end of 2011. =================== L U X E M B O U R G =================== DEMATIC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B2' CFR/PDR; Outlook Negative --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 Corporate family rating (CFR) and Probability of default rating (PDR) of Dematic Holding S.a.rl. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a Caa1 rating (LGD-5, 85%) to the US$275 million PIK notes due 01 November 2016, which have been issued by a finance vehicle of Dematic Holding S.a.r.l., Mirror PIK S.A. The ratings on the existing US$300 million senior secured notes due May 2016 issued by Dematic S.A., a direct subsidiary of Dematic Holding S.a.r.l, were upgraded to B1 (LGD-3, 32%) from B2 (LGD-3, 48%). At the same time, Moody's changed the outlook on the ratings to negative from stable. The proposed US$275 million PIK notes will have a coupon of 9% cash interest (9.5% PIK interest) with a four year maturity and will be guaranteed by Dematic Holding S.a.r.l. The US$275 million PIK notes will be general unsecured obligations of the issuer and will be structurally subordinated to the existing credit facilities and senior secured notes of Dematic S.A. Assignments: Issuer: Mirror PIK S.A Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Caa1, LGD5, 85% Upgrades: Issuer: Dematic S.A. Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B1, LGD3, 32% from B2, LGD3, 48% Outlook Actions: Issuer: Dematic Holding S.a.r.l. Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable Ratings Rationale The change in the rating outlook to negative was prompted by the issuance of US$275 million PIK notes with the proceeds being used for a special dividend payment to Dematic's owner Triton in the same amount. The proposed transaction reflects an increasingly aggressive financial policy. Moody's notes that the proposed dividend payment is the second special dividend within a relatively short period of time. In May 2011 Dematic had already paid a EUR150 million special dividend payment as part of the US$300 million bond issuance last year. The transaction will also result in a re-leveraging of the company to approximately 4.6x adjusted debt/EBITDA pro-forma of the transaction from around 3.0x adjusted debt/EBITDA at June 30, 2012. Given a limited track record of good operating performance -- Dematic has only started to generate positive free cash flows and produced a meaningful EBITDA margin since 2010 -- as well as the inherent cyclicality of its business, the significant increase in debt comes at a time when the company's performance is probably at a cyclical peak, making it vulnerable to a weakening overall economic environment. This is offset, to some extent, by a strong order book which provides visibility for the next six to nine months. In addition, the B2 CFR considers the risk of a further re- leveraging and redistribution of excess cash flows to shareholders given the relatively lenient terms of the existing US$300 million senior secured notes, which allow for a 50% dividend payout ratio if unadjusted senior leverage does not exceed 3.25x and fixed charge cover ratio is above 2.0x. According to the preliminary terms & conditions, the PIK notes will pay cash interest at a rate of 9% but under certain conditions the issuer has the option that interest accrues at a rate of 9.5% instead. The initial interest payment on the PIK notes will be made in cash. According to Moody's calculation the additional cash interest will offset roughly all of the free cash flow that Moody's expects Dematic to generate in the next financial year. Debt amounts will rise by around EUR 20 million annually if the interest on the PIK notes is paid in kind, which will also reduce the ability of Dematic to improve financial leverage going forward. The B1 (LGD-3, 32%) ratings on the US$300 million senior secured notes, one notch above the underlying CFR, recognize the senior status in the liability waterfall behind the EUR25 million super senior revolving credit facility as well as the benefits of the additional US$275 million layer of subordinated PIK notes serving as a loss absorption cushion in downside scenarios. Both super senior lenders and senior secured notes holders share the same collateral pool representing a material portion of the group's assets. This view takes also into consideration that the PIK notes can only be served with cash flows from Dematic S.A. and its subsidiaries, albeit restricted as described above. The Caa1 (LGD-5, 85%) ratings on the US$275 million (around EUR211 million equivalent) PIK notes, two notches below the CFR, reflects its junior ranking to the existing EUR25 million revolving credit facility, the US$300 million senior secured notes, trade payables of around EUR110 million as well as pension and short-term operating leases obligations. In addition, the ratings on the PIK notes consider that these will not benefit from any upstream guarantees of any restricted operating companies in contrast to the EUR25 million revolving credit facility and the US$300 million senior secured notes. Other factors considered in Dematic's B2 CFR are the improvements in operating performance and project execution since rating assignment in April 2011 evidenced by solid EBITDA margins of 11.6%, and modest free cash flow generation of around EUR21 million in the first nine months of fiscal year 2012 (ending 30 September 2012). The B2 CFR is also supported by the company's good market position in the fragmented industry for automated material handling equipment with (1) a solid regional spread, (2) a customer base that mainly consists of companies in the less cyclical retail and food sectors and (3) around one third of revenues being generated in the service business which tends to be less volatile and offers higher margins. However, Dematic remains vulnerable to cyclicality given a relatively small revenue base and limited product diversification. Dematic benefits from a good liquidity profile with sufficient headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant, which, however, might be at risk under adverse economic conditions. In addition, despite the improvements over the last few years, project execution risk continues to be a constraining factor to the rating because the risk of project cost overruns or milestones violations could result in a material and sudden drop- off in profitability and cash flows. The negative outlook reflects Moody's concern that Dematic has currently limited headroom following the issuance of the US$275 million PIK notes to withstand any erosion in its current operating performance and free cash flow generation as a result of a less benign macroeconomic environment or potential cost inflation. What Could Change The Rating Up/Down A rating upgrade could be considered if Dematic (1) maintained a conservative financial policy and a healthy short-term liquidity profile with ample headroom under its minimum EBITDA covenant and if Dematic (2) sustained the recent improvements in its operating performance also in a lower volume growth environment which should support debt/EBITDA to remain below 3.5x, EBIT/interest expense to remain above 2.0x and positive FCF generation. The ratings could be downgraded in case of erosion in operating performance or more aggressive financial policy resulting in an increase in leverage (debt/EBITDA) above 5.0x for a prolonged period of time, negative free cash flow generation or an erosion in its liquidity profile. The principal methodology used in rating Dematic was the Global Manufacturing Industry Methodology published in December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Headquartered in Luxembourg, Dematic is a leading provider of logistics and materials handling solutions with a strong focus on food, general merchandise and apparel retail. In the last twelve months period ending 30 June 2012, the group generated revenues of EUR926 million. Dematic's fiscal year ends 30 September. Dematic operates under four business segments: (1) Integrated Systems (design, delivery and assembly of customized material handling equipment solutions), (2) Product Solutions (standardized material handling equipment), (3) Customer Services and (4) Logistics Operations (installation and operation of warehouses). Dematic is owned by private equity fund Triton, which acquired the business from Siemens in 2006. ================= M A C E D O N I A ================= * MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs; Outlook Stable --------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Macedonia's Long-term foreign currency and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable. Fitch has simultaneously affirmed Macedonia's Short-term rating at 'B' and Country Ceiling at 'BBB-'. The affirmation balances the country's track record of low inflation and moderate budget deficits, relatively low public debt level and well capitalized banking system against high unemployment, limited fiscal financing flexibility, and political risks. GDP growth forecasts have been revised down through the course of the year, as Macedonia is an open economy and exports have been affected by recession in the eurozone, while domestic demand remains subdued. Nevertheless, Fitch expects full-year GDP growth at 0.5%, as multilateral credit lines boost domestic demand and help offset a contraction of 1.1% in H1. Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) will allow growth to pick up to 2% and 3.5% in 2013 and 2014, respectively. FDI in sectors such as automotive holds the potential to reach the twin aims of reducing a large structural trade deficit and diversifying Macedonia's economy. The official unemployment rate is high at 31% in H1, although it overstates the underlying position. Some FDI projects are labor intensive, which will help cut the unemployment rate somewhat in 2013-14. The weak economy has adversely affected the performance of the budget and revealed some structural weaknesses in the public finances. In September 2012 the government disclosed budget arrears of 2% of GDP. It intends to clear these in two steps by Q113. This will raise the cash budget deficit target by one percentage point of GDP to 3.5% in 2012, above the previous target of 2.5%, and 3.5% in 2013. Fitch believes these revised targets are within reach, given Macedonia's strong fiscal track record, though the uncertain growth outlook represents a downside risk. Fitch forecasts that general government debt will increase to 31.3% of GDP at end-2012, from 27.8% at end-2011, owing to weaker growth and slippage on the budget deficit. Nevertheless, this remains below the ten-year 'BB' range median of 40%. This year the government has increased the share of debt issuance denominated in Macedonian denar (MKD), helping to deepen the local capital market. In 2012 domestic issuance, at both short- and medium-term maturities, was far larger than initially projected (an estimated EUR280m against EUR60m). Larger and more liquid domestic markets will increase the sovereign's financing flexibility. Macedonia decided not to issue a Eurobond this year as originally indicated. Instead it has secured commercial bank loans and is planning to obtain a World Bank guaranteed loan, which should allow it to meet maturing external obligations in 2013 and into early 2014. Improvements in the transparency of its debt management strategy could help to increase confidence in its financing flexibility. Overall, the macroeconomic and financial supervision frameworks are rating strengths. The MKD's peg to the euro is backed by adequate foreign-exchange reserves (FXR). The banking system's Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was over 14% in Q212. Non- performing loans (NPLs) have risen modestly but remain below 10% of total loans and are fully provisioned against. Euroisation has fallen, as confidence in the MKD increased amid the eurozone debt crisis. Fitch expects the current account deficit (CAD) to come in around 2%-2.5% of GDP in 2012. CADs in 2013-14 are forecast at similar levels as in 2012. The large trade deficit will be covered mostly by private transfers, as has been the case in recent years. In January-July net private transfer inflows increased by 30% y/y in EUR terms, an indication of increased confidence in the MKD. At an estimated 19% of GDP in 2012, net external debt is higher than the 10-year 'BB' median, although a large share is comprised of intercompany debt. Political risks remain a material constraint on Macedonia's sovereign ratings. EU accession remains a distant prospect, despite the progress in several areas noted in the European Commission's annual Progress Report. No significant progress was achieved over the past 12 months in the "name dispute" with Greece, which will continue to block Macedonia's entry to NATO and further progress in the EU accession process. The government's commitment towards EU integration could weaken the longer the dispute continues, possibly damaging relations between the ethnic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority. In terms of triggers for possible rating actions, a material overshoot of the 2012-13 budget deficit targets, along with the failure to present a plan to prevent the re-occurrence of fiscal arrears could lead to a negative rating action. Worse than expected growth outturns in the EU, Macedonia's main trade partner, or major spillovers from potential increased turmoil in Greece would also be rating negative. Conversely, increasing evidence that productive FDI is leading to the successful diversification of Macedonia's economic structure, in tandem with a recovery in the growth rate could put upward pressure on the rating over the medium-term. Resolution of the name dispute would allow the formal opening of EU accession negotiations and could support a positive rating action, if other economic trends were favorable. Conversely, a material rise in ethnic tensions or other adverse political shocks could lead to a negative rating action. ========= S P A I N ========= AUTOPISTA MADRID: Goes Into Administration ------------------------------------------ Jesus Aguado at Reuters reports that Autopista Madrid Levante Concesionaria and Inversora de Autopistas de Levante, whose shareholders include builders Ferrovial and Sacyr Vallehermoso, have gone into administration. Ferrovial and Sacyr said the investments had been written off their balance sheets, and would not have a significant impact on their profit and loss accounts, Reuters relates. According to Reuters, the companies said in a statement on Friday that lower-than-expected traffic flow, the economic crisis and increased capacity in alternative routes all make it impossible to meet its payment commitments with lenders. Separately, Bloomberg News' Manuel Baigorri and Esteban Duarte report that Ferrovial holds 55% stake in the two companies. Sacyr holds 40% stake in the two operators and Kutxa has 5% stake, Bloomberg discloses. Autopista Madrid Levante Concesionaria and Inversora de Autopistas de Levante are two Spanish road maintenance companies. They managed a toll road built in central region Castilla La Mancha during Spain's construction boom. BANKIA SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB' ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took credit rating actions on six Spanish mortgage covered bond programs (cedulas hipotecarias) and all related issuances. "The rating actions on five of these mortgage covered bond programs follow our recent rating actions on Spanish banks," S&P said. "We have applied our five-step approach for rating covered bonds, to evaluate the maximum potential rating uplift for each covered bond program, based on the combined assessment of its asset- liability mismatch (ALMM) exposure and categorization," S&P said. "We segment covered bond programs into three distinct categories, which consider primarily a program's jurisdiction and its ability to access external financing or monetize the cover pool. These categories, along with the ALMM percentage, determine a program's maximum potential rating uplift over our rating on the issuer," S&P said. "Our ratings on three of these programs are below the maximum rating achievable under our EMU criteria, which establish a maximum rating uplift over the sovereign rating (Spain, BBB- /Negative/A-3) of six notches; therefore, they are not constrained by these criteria. This is the case for Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular), Bankia S.A. and Bankinter S.A.," S&P said "Two of these ratings are currently constrained by our EMU criteria. This is the case for CaixaBank S.A. and Kutxabank S.A.," S&P said. "Specifically, we have taken rating actions on the mortgage covered bonds," S&P said. BANCO POPULAR AND BANKIA'S MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS "On Oct. 15, 2012, we lowered our long-term counterparty rating on Popular and Bankia to 'BB' from 'BB+'," S&P said. "Popular and Bankia's mortgage covered bonds benefit from a maximum five-notch uplift and four-notch uplift above the long- term ratings on the issuers, under our rating approach in line with our December 2009 ALMM criteria," S&P said. "As the 'A+' rating on Popular's mortgage covered bonds and the 'A-' rating on Bankia's are at their maximum achievable ratings uplift, our October 15 downgrade of the sponsor banks by one notch directly affected our ratings on the mortgage covered bonds," S&P said. "Therefore, we are lowering our ratings on Popular's mortgage covered bonds to 'A' from 'A+', and on Bankia's mortgage covered bonds to 'BBB+' from 'A-'. We have also kept these ratings on CreditWatch negative to reflect the CreditWatch negative on the issuers. Any negative rating action on the issuers would have a negative effect on the mortgage covered bond ratings, all else being equal," S&P said. BANKINTER's MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS "On Oct. 15, 2012, we placed our long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Bankinter on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said. "Bankinter's mortgage covered bonds benefit from a maximum five- notch uplift above the long-term rating on the issuer, under our rating approach in line with our December 2009 ALMM criteria," S&P said. "Therefore, we are placing these ratings on CreditWatch negative, to reflect the CreditWatch negative on the issuer. Any negative rating action on the issuer would have a negative effect on the mortgage covered bond ratings, all else being equal," S&P said. CAIXABANK's MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS "On Oct. 15, 2012, we lowered our long-term counterparty rating on CaixaBank to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and placed it on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said. "CaixaBank's mortgage covered bonds are currently capped six notches above our long-term rating on Spain, in line with our EMU criteria. Under our rating approach in line with our December 2009 ALMM criteria, however, these covered bonds would benefit from a maximum seven-notch uplift above the long-term rating on CaixaBank," S&P said. "As the 'AA-' rating on CaixaBank's mortgage covered bonds is not at the maximum achievable ratings uplift under our ALMM criteria, owing to the rating cap, our October 15 downgrade of the sponsor bank by one notch has not affected our ratings on the mortgage covered bonds," S&P said. "However, a further downgrade of CaixaBank by more than one notch will have a direct impact on the ratings on the covered bonds, all else being equal," S&P said. "Therefore, we have maintained our 'AA-' ratings on CaixaBank's mortgage covered bonds and placed them on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said. KUTXABANK's MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS "On Oct. 15, 2012, we placed our long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Kutxabank on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said. "Kutxabank's mortgage covered bonds are currently capped six notches above our long-term rating on Spain, in line with our EMU criteria. Under our rating approach in line with our December 2009 ALMM criteria, however, these covered bonds would benefit from a maximum seven-notch uplift above the long-term rating on Kutxabank," S&P said. "However, a further downgrade of Kutxabank by more than one notch will have a direct impact on the ratings on the covered bonds, all else being equal," S&P said. "Therefore, we are placing our 'AA-' ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said. CATALUNYA BANC's MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS "We are placing our ratings on Catalunya Banc S.A.'s mortgage covered bonds on CreditWatch with negative implications, to reflect our view of the change in the issuer's creditworthiness, which could affect the ratings on the mortgage covered bonds," S&P said. RATINGS LIST Rating Program/ To From Country: Covered bond type Spain: Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE CaixaBank S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) AA-/Watch Neg AA-/Negative Kutxabank S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) AA-/Watch Neg AA-/Negative Bankinter S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) A/Watch Neg A/Negative Catalunya Banc S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) BBB+/Watch Neg BBB+/Watch Dev RATINGS LOWERED; REMAIN ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE Banco Popular Espanol S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) A/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg Bankia S.A. Mortgage Covered Bonds (cedulas hipotecarias) BBB+/Watch Neg A-/Watch Neg CORPORACION DE RESERVAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Rating ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 long-term ratings of two Spanish government-related issuers (GRIs), Corporacion de Reservas Estrategicas (CORES) and Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (Adif), following the confirmation of the Kingdom of Spain's government bond ratings. Moody's has also confirmed the short-term rating of Adif at Not Prime. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned negative outlooks on the ratings, in line with the negative outlook for Spain. The announcement follows Moody's confirmation of Spain's government bond ratings at Baa3 with a negative outlook and concludes the review process on the long-term ratings of CORES and Adif initiated on June 15, 2012. Ratings Rationale Despite the lack of explicit government guarantees, there is a link between the ratings of these companies and the sovereign's based on their status as GRIs, their strategic importance to Spain and the very strong government support that is incorporated within their ratings. The ratings of CORES and Adif also consider the entities' standalone credit profiles and legal characteristics, including their bylaws and/or their public-law status, as well as Moody's assumption that these entities will remain key instruments for the Spanish government's public sector management, its railroad infrastructure policy and its strategic oil reserves policy. As a result of Moody's confirmation of the long-term ratings of CORES and Adif at Ba1, their ratings remain positioned one notch below that of Spain. Moody's differentiates these ratings from the sovereign rating partly to reflect the lack of explicit guarantees from the Spanish government, but also the relative weakness in their underlying credit profiles compared with the credit strength of the sovereign. Moody's applies a credit-substitution approach that considers both companies' particular funding and business model. Therefore, the rating agency does not publish a granular analysis of typical GRI factors for either company (i.e., covering support, dependence, a baseline credit assessment (BCA) and the sovereign rating). The one-notch differential between both companies' ratings and the sovereign rating reflects Moody's view that the likelihood of timely support, while very high, is insufficient to justify assigning either company the same rating as the sovereign. With regard to CORES's rating, although Moody's remains concerned about the company's ability to manage its constrained liquidity in the face of sizeable maturities in the next 12 months, the rating agency also factors in CORES's solid asset coverage of debt given the market value of its oil reserves when compared with its amount of debt outstanding. The company retains selective access to the bilateral bank market. Also, CORES's excess inventory is valued at approximately EUR522 million at current market prices, which exceeds the government's mandatory minimum level of strategic oil reserves and therefore can be sold at any time without explicit government authorization to fund any liquidity shortages. Rationale For Negative Outlook Moody's decision to assign negative outlooks on the ratings follows its assignment of a negative outlook to Spain's sovereign rating and reflects its view that risks remain regarding the Spanish government's finances. What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down In the absence of a change in the nature and standalone profiles of these entities, or in the perceived strength of the underlying sovereign support, Moody's expects the ratings of CORES or Adif to be primarily driven by Spain's sovereign rating. Moody's cautions that these entities do not benefit from explicit guarantees from the Spanish government. Therefore, Moody's could consider introducing a further degree of notching in the ratings of these GRIs versus those of the sovereign in response to any indication of a change in (1) the government's willingness to intervene in a timely manner to support these GRIs in the event of need; and/or (2) its propensity to support or encourage a more selective approach and thereby differentiate the rank order of support needs among all potential calls on government funding. Downward pressure on the rating of CORES could also build up if its liquidity profile deteriorates beyond Moody's expectations, or if the company's headroom (as reflected in the ratio measuring asset coverage of debt) weakens materially. Similarly, downward pressure on the rating of Adif could build up if Moody's becomes concerned about the company's liquidity risk profile. In view of the Oct. 18 announcement, and the negative outlook on Spain's sovereign rating, Moody's does not currently envisage any positive short-term ratings pressure for CORES or Adif. LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS Outlook Actions: Issuer: Administrador de Infraestruct. Ferroviarias Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Issuer: Corp. Reser. Estrategicas Prod. Petroliferos Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Confirmations: Issuer: Administrador de Infraestruct. Ferroviarias Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1 Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1 Issuer: Corp. Reser. Estrategicas Prod. Petroliferos Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1 Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1 Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Ba1 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1 Principal Methodology The principal methodology used in these ratings was Government- Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010. Both companies are headquartered in Madrid, Spain. CORES is the organization responsible for managing the strategic oil reserves and controlling compulsory reserves (petroleum products and natural gas) in Spain. By law, all companies authorized to distribute oil products in Spain -- both operators and importers -- must be members of CORES and pay it monthly fees or risk losing their license. Adif benefits from a special legal status as an Entidad P｣blica Empresarial, reflecting its 100% state ownership and critical importance as a major part of the country's transport infrastructure. Adif exhibits a strong business risk profile, primarily derived from its natural monopoly position as the national railway infrastructure manager. As owner of Spain's railway system, it is responsible for (1) managing the country's railway infrastructure, including tracks, stations and freight terminals on behalf of the government; (2) managing rail traffic; (3) distributing capacity to rail operators; and (4) collecting fees for infrastructure, station and freight terminal use. TELEFONICA SA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sub. Preferred Stock Ratings ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Baa2 long-term senior unsecured ratings and issuer ratings of Telefonica S.A. well as the ratings of all of its guaranteed subsidiaries, including the Ba1 subordinated preferred stock ratings. Moody's has assigned negative outlooks on all of these ratings, in line with the negative outlook for Spain. Concurrently, the rating agency has also confirmed Telefonica's short-term Prime-2 rating. This concludes the review for downgrade that Moody's had initiated for Telefonica on June 20, 2012. The announcement follows the confirmation of the Kingdom of Spain's government bond ratings at Baa3 with a negative outlook. Ratings Rationale The rating confirmation reflects Moody's expectation that: (1) management will be able to continue to execute a strategy that offsets Spain's challenging macroeconomic environment and contraction in consumer spending, which will continue to affect Telefonica's domestic revenues; (2) the group will deliver the financial policy (including cash preservation measures and a non-core assets disposal program) that management has publicly committed to, which supports its deleveraging and financial strengthening strategy; and (3) Telefonica will maintain its access to the debt capital markets and as such retain adequate liquidity, supported by recent bond issuances and asset sales that have enabled the group to strengthen its liquidity. "We believe that Telefonica has somewhat improved its credit metrics over the past few months by reducing shareholder distributions, selling a number of non-core assets including its call-centre unit, Atento, and making progress on its IPO of Telefonica Deutschland Holding AG, which it hopes will raise approximately EUR1.5 billion," says Carlos Winzer, a Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for Telefonica. "However it is still significantly constrained by the difficult operating conditions in its domestic market, Spain." adds Mr. Winzer. Moody's notes that although Telefonica has taken decisive measures to mitigate the effects of the difficult operating environment in Spain, continued pressure on the group's revenues and EBITDA will continue to challenge its ability to improve its credit metrics. In this respect, Moody's now expects flat revenues with some margin compression at the group level for full year 2012, with a double-digit decline in Telefonica's domestic revenues in percentage terms being largely offset by growth in its international subsidiaries. Moody's also expects that management will only just fall short of its leverage target of reported net debt/EBITDA of 2.35x in 2012. The rating agency forecasts that Telefonica's ratios will be within the stated guidance for the current rating, including adjusted net debt/EBITDA comfortably below 3.0x and retained cash flow (RCF)/adjusted debt above 18%. From a liquidity perspective, as of June 2012, Telefonica had around EUR4.0 billion in cash and cash equivalents. In addition to the issuances by its subsidiaries in South America for a combined amount of EUR1.7 billion equivalent and new credit facilities in excess of EUR1.0 billion equivalent, during the past few months, Telefonica has placed two large bond issues in the euro market totalling EUR2.2 billion. The group's also has robust external liquidity sources, with EUR5.3 billion of unused long-term (maturing after 2013) committed credit lines as of June 2012. Moody's expects that Telefonica will continue to effectively manage its liquidity risk, including pre-funding its average annual debt maturities, and will not experience any refinancing stress in the medium term. Telefonica's Baa2 rating otherwise reflects (1) the group's large size and scale; (2) the diversification benefits associated with its strong positions in many different markets; (3) management's track record and ability to execute a well-defined and concise business strategy; and (4) its operating cash flow generation and management's stated commitment to maintain its reported net debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.35x. Rationale For Negative Outlook Moody's decision to assign a negative outlook on the ratings reflects its expectation that the group will continue to operate in a challenging domestic market (Spain). Despite Telefonica's international diversification enhancing its credit profile, the group's exposure to the Spanish market puts it at risk given the weak macroeconomic conditions in Spain, exacerbated by the contraction in consumer spending resulting from austerity measures. What Could Change The Rating Up/Down A rating downgrade could result if (1) Telefonica were to deviate from its financial-strengthening plan, as a result of weaker cash flow generation or the incurrence or assumption of further substantial debt in conjunction with the pursuit of acquisitions or more aggressive shareholder distribution policies; and/or (2) the group's operating performance in Spain and other key markets continues to deteriorate and there is no likelihood of an improvement in underlying trends in the short term. Resulting metrics would include deviation from management target metrics or an RCF/net adjusted debt ratio of less than 18% and a net adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio trending towards 3.0x. In addition, a rating downgrade could result if Moody's were to downgrade the sovereign rating. Although not currently expected in light of the negative outlook, the weak macroeconomic conditions in Spain and constraints related to the sovereign rating, Moody's could consider a rating upgrade to Baa1 if Telefonica's credit metrics were to strengthen significantly as a result of improvements in its operational cash flows and a further reduction in debt. Provided sovereign-related concerns were to abate, the rating could benefit from positive pressure if it became clear that the group would achieve sustainable improvements in its debt ratios, such as an adjusted RCF/net debt ratio above the mid-twenties in percentage terms and adjusted net debt/EBITDA comfortably below 2.5x. LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS Outlook Actions: Issuer: Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U. Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Issuer: Telefonica Europe B.V. Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Issuer: Telefonica Finance USA LLC Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Issuer: Telefonica S.A. Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review Confirmations: Issuer: Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U. Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Baa2 Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Baa2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Shelf, Confirmed at (P)Baa2 Issuer: Telefonica Europe B.V. Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Baa2 Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Confirmed at P-2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Shelf, Confirmed at (P)Baa2 Issuer: Telefonica Finance USA LLC Pref. Stock Preferred Stock, Confirmed at Ba1 Issuer: Telefonica S.A. Commercial Paper, Confirmed at P-2 Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at Baa2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2 Principal Methodology The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010. Telefonica S.A. is the leading integrated telecommunications provider in Spain, delivering a full range of services and products including telephony, data exchange, interactive content and information and communications technology solutions. Telefonica is also one of the world's leading telecommunications carriers, with some 264.3 million customers worldwide (excluding Spain). As of June 2012, 75% of group revenues and 77% of group EBITDA were generated outside Spain. Telefonica's full-year 2011 revenues and EBITDA amounted to EUR62.8 billion and EUR19.4 billion, respectively. * SPAIN: Sets EUR90-Billion Size Limit for Bad Bank --------------------------------------------------- Jesus Aguado at The Irish Times reports that Spain has set a EUR90 billion limit for the size of a bad bank created to take over other financial entities' toxic real estate assets, a necessary step to obtain European funding for the sector. The country is preparing to receive the first funds from a EUR100 billion credit line for its banks agreed with Europe in June, paving the way for a fuller bailout, the Irish Times discloses. Lenders will transfer foreclosed property and unrecoverable loans to house builders to the bad bank, to be called Sareb, in a move aimed at freeing up the flow of credit to families and businesses, the Irish Times says. According to the Irish Times, economy ministry sources said on Wednesday that the final size of Sareb, which is supposed to be up and running by the end of the year and exist for 15 years, is likely to be much less than the EUR90-billion limit. The bad bank's remit could be widened beyond real estate to include non-performing consumer loans, the sources said, as a deep-rooted recession causes more Spaniards to default on debt, the Irish Times relates. However, this would only be in cases of extremely damaged assets, the Irish Times notes. =========== T U R K E Y =========== TURKIYE PETROL: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR/PDR; Outlook Stable ------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 Corporate Family (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. ("Tupras") and a provisional (P)Ba1 rating to the proposed USD notes. The outlook assigned to all ratings is stable. This is the first time that Moody's has assigned a rating to Tupras. Ratings Rationale "The Ba1 ratings primarily reflect Tupras's dominant position in the Turkish market as well as the execution risks associated with the company's ongoing capex investment program," says Martin Kohlhase, a Vice President - Senior Analyst in Moody's Corporate Finance Group and lead analyst for Tupras. Moody's decision to position Tupras's ratings at the upper end of speculative grade is driven by a combination of factors. On the positive side, the ratings reflect (i) a dominant position in the domestic market as the sole refiner in Turkey with an established infrastructure, including storage, pipeline and terminal facilities; (ii) positive and supportive economic fundamentals in the domestic market with a strong demand for transportation fuel; (iii) the ability to achieve higher gross margins per barrel as compared to its Mediterranean benchmark due to, amongst other reasons, its refinery capability of processing heavy and sour crude oil, in combination with opportunistic procurement of discounted crudes; and (iv) higher expected operating profit margins from 2015 onwards once the Residuum Upgrading Project (RUP) is completed. Tupras's ratings also incorporate challenges including (i) exposure to cyclical market conditions inherent to the industry combined with emerging market risk factors (such as public policy, regulatory, foreign exchange volatility risks); (ii) negative free cash flow (FCF) until 2014 at the earliest, due to the combination of a sizable capital expenditure program and high dividend payouts; (iii) potential for competitive cost disadvantage and supply/demand imbalance risk over the medium term stemming from international and local competition; and (iv) future profitability compression from reduced sourcing of discounted Iranian crude oil and weaker heavy crude differentials and from lower inventory gains (which had previously benefited from rising crude prices in 2011). In addition, the rating assessment includes Moody's view that the company's asset base profile is comparable to that of peers in the Ba rating category, with three medium-complexity refineries, which are geographically located in a single market, and dependency on imported crude oil. The majority of Tupras's operating profit is derived from the refining business, with the distribution business complementing the former, although it does not provide a large scale of earnings diversification. Tupras has adequate liquidity. As of June 2012, the company had unrestricted cash of TL1.86 billion against TL3.8 billion of adjusted debt, of which approximately half is short term. Cash flow from operations before working capital has historically been healthy, averaging at TL1.2 billion between 2007-11, but continues to be susceptible to the cyclical and volatile nature of the industry. Moody's expects Tupras to record negative FCF until 2014 at the earliest, with substantial cash outflows for capital expenditure requirements - largely related to its US$2.4 billion RUP - and returns to shareholders in order to repay the remaining balance of US$591 million of the US$1.8 billion acquisition loan placed in the EYAS special purpose vehicle, which was set up specifically during the privatization of Tupras. Management expects the RUP project to contribute US$550 million in recurring EBITDA from 2015 onwards, which will strengthen underlying operating cash flows. Leverage remains moderate, with adjusted debt/EBITDA of 2.3x as of June 2012, and Moody's expects adjusted debt/EBITDA to be in excess of 3.5x by 2014 as the RUP-specific bank facilities will be drawn down before the company begins to de-leverage from 2015 onwards. Given that only around 20% of its products are currently destined for export, although this may vary, Tupras is reliant on the stability of Turkey's domestic demand and economic growth. Any sustained deterioration of the macroeconomic environment, such as a material drop in foreign capital inflows and a higher current account deficit, could lead to a more challenging business and operating environment for Tupras. However, this risk is mitigated since Tupras produces dollar-priced commodities which can be easily exported. Political and regulatory policy changes remain a risk, such as future environmental regulations which could impact liquidity and profitability. Moody's has modestly factored shareholder support from Koc Holding, its main equity investor into the rating. Tupras is exposed to international supply/demand market dynamics for crude oil and has in the past financially benefited from sourcing discounted heavy crude. International sanctions on Iranian crude oil imports (which at times were priced at a significant discount to Ural) will negatively affect Tupras's profitability going forward to the extent that supply is restricted, since Iran had been a major supply source. This is mitigated by the company's ability to opportunistically buy crude from various other countries including Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Tupras may also face a more challenging competitive environment from 2014 onwards when significant new capacity from the Middle East is expected to enter the market. The rating outlook is stable and assumes that capex plans remain on schedule, with no material delays and cost overruns of the RUP project that may jeopardize the company's financial flexibility. Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. is the sole refiner in Turkey with a dominant position in the domestic petroleum product market. Its two core business segments are refining and distribution, with the former contributing on average 90% of the operating profit over the past five years. The refining business consists of three medium-complexity refineries located in Izmit, Izmir and Kirikkale and one simple refinery in Batman with a combined annual crude processing capacity of 28.1 million tonnes. Other core companies include (i) a 40% effective ownership stake in Opet, Turkey's second-largest oil products distribution company as of June 2012, with 1,300 stations operating under the Opet and Sunpet brands, and (ii) an 80% stake in Ditas, a shipping company which primarily serves Tupras's logistic needs. The principal methodology used in rating Tupras was the Global Refining and Marketing Rating Methodology published in December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Headquartered in K排fez/Turkey, Tupras reported sales of TL45.9 billion (US$25.6 billion) and an operating profit of TL1.5 billion (US$850 million) for the last twelve months ending June 2012. YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; On Review for Downgrade ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 from B2 the corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Yuksel Insaat S.A. Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded to B3 from B2 the debt instrument rating on the US$200 million of notes due 2015 issued by Yuksel. Moody's placed ratings on review for further downgrade. Ratings Rationale Moody's downgraded ratings to B3 as Yuksel's liquidity remains weak and susceptible to uncertainties with regards to the timing and size of further cash inflows that could significantly bolster the company's cash position. Despite an additional cash injection from shareholders amounting to TL12.5 million (ca. US$7 million) in September 2012, bringing the total amount of shareholder contributions to TL62.5 million year-to-date, this is in Moody's view insufficient to markedly shore up liquidity. In addition, other cash contributions -- such as the planned disposal of a number of earmarked assets -- have not yet occurred and the delay in the receipt of proceeds hampers a recovery of Yuksel's cash position and thereby limits the operating and financial flexibility. Yuksel's reported cash and cash equivalents position per June 30, 2012 were TL88.9 million, down from TL174.9 million per FYE 2011. Metrics per June 2012 end remained weak and also partially below thresholds Moody's said could change the ratings down: FFO/Debt - 6.0% (Moody's: below 10% could change the rating down); EBITA/interest 1.0x (remaining below 1.0x); debt/EBITDA 5.1x (to move above 5.5x). Moody's decided to review ratings for further downgrade in order to assess the (i) progress of further asset disposals, (ii) need, likelihood and capacity for additional shareholder contributions and (iii) whether the operating performance improves sufficiently enough to shore up the company's liquidity profile. What Could Change The Rating Up/Down Ratings could be downgraded absent timely and material cash inflows -- stemming from a mix of disposal proceeds, shareholder injections and/or operating performance improvements -- to shore up the company's liquidity profile, currently seen as being weak given the negative FFO and depleting cash balances in the first half of 2012. Ratings could also be lowered if limitations on the company's operational and financial flexibility continue: leverage remains high at above 5 times debt/EBITDA and the existence of a debt incurrence covenant set at a maximum of 4 times constrains further debt raising. Given the downgrade and the review for downgrade an upgrade at this juncture is unlikely. For the outlook to be kept at the B3 level Moody's expects FFO to turn positive and the company to regain financial flexibility, e.g. through a combination of increased capital; lower debt; operating performance improvements and compliance with the debt incurrence covenant. The principal methodology used in rating Yuksel Insaat A.S. was the Global Construction Methodology published in November 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Yuksel Insaat A.S., which has corporate headquarters in Ankara, Turkey, is among the 10 largest construction companies in the country. The company was established in 1963 by the Sazak and Sert families and maintains a visible footprint in Turkey, where more than half of its revenues are generated, but has expanded into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as Central Asia over recent years to diversify its revenue streams. The company generated revenues of TL1.3 billion (around US$697 million) in its financial year 2011. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== HONOURS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on GBP12MM Class D Notes ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Honours Plc's notes and revised the Outlook on the class A notes to Negative from Stable, as follows: -- GBP93.290m Class A1 notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf' Outlook revised to Negative from Stable -- GBP54.2m Class A2 notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook revised to Negative from Stable -- GBP33.35m Class B notes: affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable -- GBP18.0m Class C notes: affirmed at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable -- GBP12.0m Class D notes: affirmed at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable The revision of the Outlook on the class A notes is due to the Negative Outlook on the UK sovereign ('AAA/F1+/Negative') and reflects the transaction's significant reliance on the sovereign to pay indemnities upon cancellation of loans in deferment status. The affirmation of the notes reflects that defaults have been in line with Fitch's initial expectations, and all note deficiencies have been cleared with excess collections to date. As of October 2012, credit enhancement (CE) was 57.6% for the class A1 notes, 32.9% for the class A2 notes, 17.8% for the class B notes, 9.6% for the class C notes and 4.1% for the class D notes. In Fitch's view, the current ratings remain compatible with the significant prevalence of loans in deferment status (83.5% of the non-defaulted loan portfolio) and the significant level of delinquent loans in repayment status (4.2%). The UK sovereign is essentially committed to indemnify the transaction for any non- delinquent loan still outstanding 25 years after origination at the principal outstanding amount and any unpaid interest, even if the loan is in deferment status. The transaction also benefits from significant excess spread as the yield on the loans after the swap (which in the transaction documentation is referred to as a subsidy), amounts to 2.69% over Libor, either in the form of cash collections from repayment loans or capitalization of unpaid interest on deferred loans. As a result, under the agency's analysis an impairment of the class D notes would imply the default of around one-sixth of those borrowers which from historical experience may be assumed to become eligible for repayment. Fitch also believes that the current ratings are compatible with the liquidity tightening that may result from the run-down of the performing loan portfolio (only 9.5% of the non-defaulted portfolio as of October 2012). According to the cash manager, the average remaining term of the performing loan portfolio as of March 2012 was falling to around the end of 2014, while indemnities payable by the UK sovereign as a result of loan cancellations will remain limited until 2017. However, under the agency's cash flow simulations, total collections would still be sufficient to service the interest on the rated notes in a scenario of stable inflation. If the netting payable by the issuer under the swap with the UK sovereign increases as a result of rising inflation, collections may fall short of due fees and notes interest. Even in this case Fitch considers the GBP20 million liquidity reserve in an account with Deutsche Bank ('A+'/Stable/'F1') as largely sufficient to cover for senior fees and A and B notes interest. Fitch also views the current rating on the class C and D notes as compatible with the risk of a possible shortfall in interest payment, as in the agency's view this shortfall would only be temporary. The transaction is a securitization of UK not-for-profit student loans originated by the UK government. The loans were originated to individuals who commenced higher education courses prior to September 1998. COMET: Opcapita Mulls Sale; Pre-Pack Administration Not Ruled Out ----------------------------------------------------------------- Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that OpCapita, the private equity investor that bought Comet for only GBP2 less than a year ago, is considering a sale of the company. According to the FT, people familiar with the situation said Comet had received unsolicited approaches from store operators in the UK and abroad. They could not say how any deal would be structured, nor rule out a controversial pre-pack administration, but they said this was "not the direction" being explored, the FT notes. Comet is a UK electricals chain. PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Football Fans' Club Named Preferred Bidder --------------------------------------------------------------- Roger Blitz at The Financial Times reports that Portsmouth Supporters Trust was named preferred bidder to take over Portsmouth Football Club. According to the FT, Trevor Birch of administrator PKF said it would work with the trust, the Football League and the Professional Footballers Association to reach a deal "as soon as possible". Portsmouth has debts of around GBP60 million following an unhappy ownership saga in the last five years when it passed through a number of hands, the FT discloses. PST has raised pledges of GBP2 million from 2,000 fans, and has cash investments totaling GBP1 million from four local businessmen, the FT says. A Hampshire property developer has offered to pay GBP2.75 million to buy the Fratton Park stadium and lease it back to PST, the FT relates. The trust has been competing with former owner Balram Chanrai's Portpin company to take on the club, which owes the Hong Kong- based businessman GBP17 million, the FT states. Mr. Chanrai also holds the club's assets as security, the FT notes. The club was placed into administration in February, since when 18 players were moved on, the FT recounts. About Portsmouth Football Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. -- http://www.portsmouthfc.co.uk/ -- operated Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays in the English Premier League. Established in 1898, the club boasted two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division championships. Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park; the football team is known to supporters as Pompey. Dubai businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre Gaydamak in 2009. A French businessman of Russian decent, Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006. RANGERS FOOTBALL: Whyte Says Duff & Phelps Aware of Ticketus Deal ---------------------------------------------------------------- According to the Scotsman, former Rangers owner Craig Whyte on Oct. 16 made a series of claims in a BBC Scotland interview which have angered the Ibrox club's current chief executive and administrators Duff & Phelps. Mr. Whyte claimed that Duff & Phelps knew he had used future season tickets revenue to finance his purchase of the club, and also claimed that he had been responsible for helping to find Charles Green's consortium as potential saviors after the club had been plunged into administration, the Scotsman relates. Both claims were immediately refuted in separate statements issued by Duff & Phelps and by Green, the Scotsman discloses. Mr. Whyte bought Rangers from Sir David Murray for a token sum of GBP1, but his purchase came with an undertaking that he would settle the GBP18 million debt the club had outstanding with Lloyds Bank, the Scotsman recounts. It later transpired that Whyte had cleared the debt using three years of advance season ticket sales he had accrued from a GBP25 million deal with Ticketus, the Scotsman states. In the Oct. 16 BBC interview, Mr. Whyte insisted Duff & Phelps, who were appointed the club's administrators, had been aware of the deal with Ticketus, the Scotsman notes. "The allegations against the administrators, who are officers of the court, in relation to Ticketus, are false, malicious and without foundation. They should not be given any credibility given the source. It should be remembered that Mr. Whyte's takeover of Rangers is now the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation and we have provided evidence to that inquiry," the Scotsman quotes Paul Clark, of Duff & Phelps, joint administrator of Rangers, as saying. "In addition, as administrators we instigated legal proceedings against Mr. Whyte's solicitors in the High Court in London and those proceedings are centered round the very serious allegation that Mr. Whyte was involved in a conspiracy which deprived Rangers of many millions of pounds. "Our conduct of the Rangers administration has been the subject of intense public scrutiny and we are wholly satisfied it was carried out the highest professional standards. We have co- operated fully with inquiries into our appointment by Lord Hodge at the Court of Session and the Insolvency Practitioners' Association." About Rangers Football Club Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/ -- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of a professional football club. The Company has launched its own Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv. The station combines the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional Web-based services. Services offered include the streaming of home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post- match commentary. The Company will produce dedicated news magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League (SPL) action. Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to produce content for distribution on all media platforms. * UK: 32 Retail Shops Closing Every Day, PwC Research Shows ----------------------------------------------------------- Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that retail chains in Britain are closing 32 shops every day across the country as the economic slowdown ravages the high street. According to the Telegraph, research by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Local Data Company, retailers with more than one store closed 953 shops in the first half of 2012 in leading town centers. This compares to 174 closures in the whole of 2011, the Telegraph notes. The number of closures in the first-half represents 20 per day, the Telegraph discloses. However, this has accelerated to 32 per day since the end of June following the demise of JJB Sports and other retailers, the Telegraph states. "This rapid increase in the drawdown of the multiple retailers in the first half of this year is not unexpected," the Telegraph quotes Matthew Hopkinson, director of the LDC, as saying. "It also has some way to go as consumer spend remains low and the omni-channel environment requires fewer but larger and more 'dynamic' stores." =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOND PRICING: For the Week October 15 to October 19, 2012 ---------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- AUSTRIA ------- A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 25.00 A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 25.00 IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.24 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 56.53 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 70.49 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 68.52 RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 68.25 RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 71.65 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 57.50 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 64.44 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 64.29 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 72.94 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 47.07 BELGIUM ------- ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 23.44 FRANCE ------ AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.07 ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.58 ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.65 ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 22.73 ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.61 CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.91 CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 32.49 CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 18.14 EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 53.63 FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.99 FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 18.69 INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 47.69 MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 16.52 MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 17.78 NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 57.41 NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 68.64 ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.64 PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 24.04 PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.27 PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.46 SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.09 SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.48 TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.62 GERMANY ------- BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 68.40 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 54.46 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 67.91 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 51.32 COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 11/5/2012 EUR 58.53 COMMERZBANK AG 14.500 3/21/2013 EUR 64.70 COMMERZBANK AG 16.250 3/21/2013 EUR 66.62 COMMERZBANK AG 18.500 3/21/2013 EUR 60.54 COMMERZBANK AG 20.250 3/21/2013 EUR 62.45 COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 14.45 COMMERZBANK AG 12.500 3/21/2013 EUR 73.15 COMMERZBANK AG 10.750 3/21/2013 EUR 69.84 COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.55 COMMERZBANK AG 15.500 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12 COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 62.03 COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 46.32 COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 64.50 COMMERZBANK AG 18.750 11/22/2012 EUR 72.77 COMMERZBANK AG 11.500 11/5/2012 EUR 69.38 COMMERZBANK AG 10.000 11/5/2012 EUR 55.96 COMMERZBANK AG 9.000 10/29/2012 EUR 5.60 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 73.30 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 68.80 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 64.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 39.70 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.80 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.00 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 71.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 45.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 75.00 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.60 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 73.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.70 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 74.60 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.30 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 55.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 10/31/2012 EUR 73.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 10/31/2012 EUR 70.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 10/31/2012 EUR 67.20 DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 67.88 DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 48.20 DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 54.06 DZ BANK AG 7.750 1/25/2013 EUR 71.99 DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 51.22 DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 67.18 DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 50.00 DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 73.72 DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 70.61 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.37 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.69 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.70 DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 62.74 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.10 DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54 DZ BANK AG 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.21 DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.71 DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.34 DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 67.41 DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.66 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.88 DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 73.72 DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 72.96 DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 67.00 DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.66 DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.58 DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 68.52 DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 63.63 DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 25.21 DZ BANK AG 12.500 10/26/2012 EUR 71.37 DZ BANK AG 15.000 10/26/2012 EUR 71.38 DZ BANK AG 16.000 10/26/2012 EUR 64.92 DZ BANK AG 18.000 10/26/2012 EUR 72.49 DZ BANK AG 18.250 10/26/2012 EUR 73.59 DZ BANK AG 19.500 10/26/2012 EUR 70.40 DZ BANK AG 23.000 10/26/2012 EUR 70.44 DZ BANK AG 25.000 10/26/2012 EUR 69.11 DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 69.62 DZ BANK AG 17.250 11/23/2012 EUR 59.82 DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 47.30 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.50 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 1/2/2013 EUR 69.50 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.30 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.09 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.74 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.14 HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.75 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.10 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.20 HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.35 HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 51.76 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 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USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.50 LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.50 Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 24.85 Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 24.98 RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 68.87 SPAIN ----- SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 49.50 SWEDEN ------ Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 68.00 SWITZERLAND ----------- BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 67.25 BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.60 BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 66.70 BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 56.40 BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 68.70 BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 66.10 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 65.64 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.90 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 67.84 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 65.61 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.98 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 55.12 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.85 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.78 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.70 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.88 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 72.67 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 62.82 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.94 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.80 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 49.24 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 52.29 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 60.23 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 68.52 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 58.90 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 68.84 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 71.30 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 64.89 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 72.16 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 45.49 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 66.05 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.96 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 59.75 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.88 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 56.01 CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.80 CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 61.50 S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63 SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 69.56 UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19 UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.70 UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.46 UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 73.69 UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87 UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 72.89 UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 68.41 UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 71.16 UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.88 UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.86 UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 66.39 UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75 UBS AG 11.020 10/21/2013 USD 54.18 UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.64 UBS AG 9.260 12/5/2013 USD 22.46 UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.51 UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.45 UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.65 UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.95 UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.61 UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 73.79 UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 71.15 UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 72.45 UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 69.09 UBS AG 5.340 1/29/2014 USD 45.55 UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08 UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22 UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 21.41 UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 53.05 UBS AG 12.240 10/26/2012 EUR 67.98 UBS AG 13.570 10/26/2012 EUR 65.95 UBS AG 16.390 10/26/2012 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 68.29 UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 61.59 UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 57.48 UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 42.21 UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 40.55 UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 67.00 UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 50.74 UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 37.10 UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 66.50 UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 35.45 UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 59.56 UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 59.90 UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.00 UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.85 UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.68 UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12 UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 73.80 UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.60 UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 65.49 UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 71.61 UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.63 UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 74.48 UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.08 UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.58 UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.75 UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 73.16 UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 60.87 UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 67.68 UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 71.89 UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.98 UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.90 UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 72.55 UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 58.84 UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 63.30 UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.90 UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 69.51 UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 70.14 UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 61.71 UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 56.97 UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 64.24 UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 60.20 UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 67.31 UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 67.90 UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.24 UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 62.68 UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 58.78 UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.65 UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 57.44 UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 65.83 UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 61.21 UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 51.25 UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 56.16 UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.17 UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 59.83 UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 54.96 UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.79 UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 52.73 UBS AG 10.380 1/2/2013 USD 31.76 UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33 UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 74.69 UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.75 UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 71.77 UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 69.10 UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 66.64 UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.94 UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.38 UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 64.38 UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 62.31 UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 72.29 UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.88 UBS AG 10.390 1/18/2013 USD 36.31 UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.42 UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.87 UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 63.02 UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.74 UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.47 UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.02 UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.37 UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.96 UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.00 UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75 UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 71.96 UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.30 UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.69 UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 71.49 UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.47 UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 71.93 UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.74 UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21 UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17 UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77 UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39 UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.60 UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.45 UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.33 UBS AG 14.100 4/26/2013 EUR 74.72 UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75 UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07 UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 60.95 UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12 UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00 UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17 UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43 UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83 UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.74 UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.53 UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.55 UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.57 UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.26 UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.89 UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.23 UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.58 UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.49 UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96 UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07 UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87 UBS AG 8.720 8/2/2013 USD 35.34 UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62 UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68 UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21 UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 60.74 UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 58.16 UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 56.63 UBS AG 15.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.95 UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25 UNITED KINGDOM -------------- BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.08 BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 42.05 BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 43.35 BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 51.11 BARCLAYS BK PLC 7.500 10/30/2012 EUR 62.00 BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.94 ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 67.66 MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 41.79 ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2012. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300. * * * End of Transmission * * *