TCREUR_Public/121109.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, November 9, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 224

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: France & Belgium Agrees to Inject EUR5.5 Billion


D E N M A R K

VESTAS WIND: May Need to Raise Capital Quickly


G E R M A N Y

CB MEZZCAP: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR137.8MM A Notes to 'Caa2'
CENTAURUS PLC: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes


I T A L Y

BERICA 5: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
EUROHOME MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Lacks Adequate Level of Control, Audit Shows


N E T H E R L A N D S

F. VAN LANSCHOT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Securities
JUBILEE CDO V: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class Y Notes to 'B1'
NXP BV: Moody's Upgrades CFR/PDR to 'B1'; Outlook Stable


S L O V A K I A

DELPHI SLOVENSKO: To Lay Off 500 Employees Thru June 2014


S P A I N

BBVA 4: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Junior Notes to 'Caa1'


T U R K E Y

TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Subordinated Debt Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

MATRIX GROUP: In Administration, Business Liquidated
PATTON: In Administration, Continues to Trade
TERRAPIN LIMITED: In Administration, 30 Jobs in Limbo
ROADCHEF FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class B Notes
* BDO & PKF in Advanced Merger Discussions


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Fuel Price Hikes Hit Autopart Suppliers' Revenues
* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement


                            *********


=============
B E L G I U M
=============


DEXIA SA: France & Belgium Agrees to Inject EUR5.5 Billion
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that France and Belgium have agreed to pump a
further EUR5.5 billion (US$7 billion; GBP4.4 billion) into
struggling bank Dexia, after it reported another large loss.

The bank, which was bailed out by France and Belgium last year,
posted a third-quarter net loss of EUR1.23 billion, BBC relates.

According to BBC, under the terms of the aid for Dexia, Belgium
will inject 53% of the funding, with France providing the rest.

Dexia's latest loss brought the total loss for the first nine
months of the year to EUR2.4 billion, BBC discloses.

Part of the reason for the loss in the third quarter was a loss
of EUR599 million after Dexia sold its Turkish business
DenizBank, BBC notes.

Dexia SA is a Belgium-based banking group with activities
principally in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Turkey in the
fields of retail and commercial banking, public and wholesale
banking, asset management and investor services.  In France,
Dexia Bank focuses on funding public sector bodies and providing
financial services to local government.  In Luxembourg, Dexia
operates in two main areas: commercial banking (for personal and
professional customers) and private banking (for international
investors).  In Turkey, Dexia is involved in retail and
commercial banking and offers services to ordinary account
holders, business and local public sector customers and
institutional clients. The Company operates through its
subsidiaries, such as Dexia Credit Local, DenizBank, Dexia
Credicop, Dexia Sabadell, Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland, Dexia
Asset Management, among others.



=============
D E N M A R K
=============


VESTAS WIND: May Need to Raise Capital Quickly
----------------------------------------------
Richard Milne at The Financial Times reports that Vestas Wind
Systems A/S will need to raise capital, and quickly.

"You can see that the cash flow has been quite negative for 2012.
I believe that sooner or later they will have to do something,"
says the FT quotes Klaus Kehl, analyst at Nykredit, as saying
pointing to the need for a possible share issue or convertible
bond issue.

The company reported its lowest quarterly order intake since
2006, worse than at the height of the financial crisis, the FT
notes.

Worryingly, analysts say the Danish group is suffering from more
than merely a poor market for wind turbines as governments slash
subsidies and cash-strapped utilities defer orders, the FT
states.

Moreover, the company is attempting what many analysts see as a
long overdue restructuring at the same time as it is facing a
cash squeeze and struggling to meet its financial covenants, the
FT discloses.

The need could be high, the FT says.  Vestas has a market
capitalization of about EUR740 million, the FT states.  Mr.
Prozesky estimates it could need EUR300 million to EUR600 million
in fresh capital, according to the FT.

Cash management is also an issue, the FT notes.  The company has
so far burnt through EUR775 million of cash in the first nine
months of the year, though it still has EUR474 million of cash on
the balance sheet, the FT discloses.

Vestas Wind Systems A/S is the world's biggest maker of wind
turbines.  The company is based in Aarhus, Denmark.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


CB MEZZCAP: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR137.8MM A Notes to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by CB MezzCAP Limited Partnership:

Issuer: CB MezzCAP Limited Partnership

    EUR137.8M (current outstanding amount EUR106.3M) A Notes,
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011
    Downgraded to B3 (sf)

CB MezzCAP is a German SME CLO referencing a static portfolio of
German profit participations ("Genussrechte"). The scheduled
maturity falls in January 2013. Some of the 'Genussrechte'
obligations in the portfolio have certain features of equity
(type A obligations). These include potential deferral of
interest and principal payments subject to financial performance
of the obligor. Such obligations can also be written down and may
extend redemption beyond the legal final maturity of the
transaction (October 2036). These obligations make up 52% of the
performing pool. Type A obligations which have not redeemed par
plus accrued interest by the legal maturity of the CDO
transaction will expire and lead to a loss for CB MezzCAP Limited
Partnership.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are driven by continuing and worse than
expected credit deterioration observed in the underlying pool.

The deterioration is reflected in an increase in the number of
defaults and the resulting decrease in the overcollateralization
levels ("OC levels") of the rated classes. The actions also
reflect the anticipated further deterioration suggested by the
most recent information available, as the pool obligors are
expected to refinance their debt in the coming months,
specifically by the transaction scheduled maturity date, 25th
January 2013.

Defaults and impairments in the transaction increased to 14
obligors, totalling EUR89 million (approximately 44.6% of the
initial pool), compared to 12 obligors, totalling EUR75 million
(approximately 37.6% of the initial pool) at the last rating
action in February 2011. Deterioration in the portfolio is also
indicated by the comments reported in the Investment Report,
dated 25 Oct 2012, by the portfolio manager who monitors the
individual issuers in the portfolio. It is noted that one company
with a loan value of EUR5 million is going through restructuring,
with further two companies with total loans value of EUR11.5
million have notified the issuer that they will not be able to
repay in full at the scheduled repayment in 2013.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analysis:

(1) Assuming all 3 assets in the credit event category defaulted
with no recovery, the overcollateralization ratios for Class A
would be 85.6%.

The overcollateralization ratio above is consistent with the
rating action.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy, especially as 100% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Germany. Sources of
additional performance uncertainties are described below:

(1) Refinancing risk: In reaching its ratings decisions, Moody's
took into account the elevated potential for refinancing
difficulties likely to be faced by a substantial number of the
weaker obligors over the coming months to scheduled maturity.
This risk has been assessed primarily from qualitative
information on individual obligors provided in the latest
investor report and by the investment services provider and
recovery manager.

(2) Jump to default risk: The non granularity of the portfolio
exposes the transaction to higher jump to default risk. Currently
the five largest obligors, excluding 3 assets in the credit event
and watch list category, comprise approximately EUR39.5 million
or 43.4% of the performing portfolio totalling EUR91 million.
After excluding terminated or insolvent obligors, the total
number of portfolio obligors is 20. In order to measure the risk
associated with low granularity, Moody's conducted breakeven
analyses by computing the number of borrower defaults that could
be sustained before hitting a given class of notes.

In its analysis, Moody's applied stresses including an increase
in the default probability of each obligor to reflect cyclical
economic stress and future default expectations based on past
pool performance, name specific forward looking adjustments.
These assumptions reflect Moody's expectations that default rates
for the pool is likely to remain at elevated level given the
general economic outlook. In addition, due to the subordinated
position of the loans in the obligors' capital structure, Moody's
assumes a zero recovery rate upon asset default.

The action relies on financial data received annually for a
majority of obligors in the pool from the end of 2011. This
financial data was used in the RiskCalc model, an econometric
model developed by Moody's KMV in order to assess the credit
quality of obligors in the pool. The results obtained from the
RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating scale and
adjusted by in order to reflect reliance on stale financial data,
poor pool performance and lack of granularity. Moody's also
incorporated information provided by the manager in the latest
investor report to account for more recent information on the
performance of the underlying obligors.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe" published in February 2007, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in June 2011.

Other factors used in this rating are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

No additional cash flow analysis or stress scenarios have been
conducted as the decision to downgrade the notes was derived from
the observed credit deterioration of the underlying pool and
resulting reduction in OC levels.

In addition to the quantitative factors, qualitative factors are
part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative
factors include the structural protections in each transaction,
the recent deal performance in the current market environment,
the legal environment, specific documentation features, and the
potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of
credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating
decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.


CENTAURUS PLC: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has withdrawn its credit
ratings on Centaurus (Eclipse 2005-3) PLC's class A, B, C, D, and
E notes.

The withdrawals follow the cash manager's confirmation that all
of the notes in the transaction prepaid in full on the October
2012 interest payment date.

"Centaurus (Eclipse 2005-3) was a commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in December 2005. The
notes were secured by five German multifamily loans (maturing in
September 2012), all provided to the same sponsor. The sponsor
refinanced the outstanding balances. The refinancing proceeds
were applied towards repayment of the notes on the October 2012
note payment date," S&P said.

               STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
             To              From

Ratings Withdrawn

Centaurus (Eclipse 2005-3) PLC
EUR651.636 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A           NR               A (sf)
B           NR               BBB+ (sf)
C           NR               BB+ (sf)
D           NR               B (sf)
E           NR               B- (sf)

NR - Not rated.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BERICA 5: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has taken various credit
rating actions in three Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.

In Berica 5 Residential MBS S.r.l., S&P:

-- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    the class A and B notes; and

-- Lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on the class
    C notes.

In Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l., S&P:

-- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
    the class A2 and B notes;

-- Affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class C notes; and

-- Raised to 'B+ (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its rating on the class D
    notes.

In Berica Residential MBS 1 S.r.l., S&P:

-- Affirmed at 'AA+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative
    its rating on the class A notes;

-- Placed on CreditWatch positive its 'A (sf)' rating on the
    class B notes; and

-- Affirmed its 'BBB (sf)' rating on the class C notes.

"On July 20, 2012, we placed the class A and B notes in Berica 5
Residential MBS and Berica Residential MBS 1, and the class A2
and B notes in Berica 6 Residential MBS on CreditWatch negative.
This followed the expiry of remedy periods related to the
replacement of the Italian account bank provider, which is no
longer considered eligible to act as bank account provider for
these Transactions," S&P said.

"The rating actions resolve these CreditWatch placements and
follow the replacement of the Italian account bank provider with
Deutsche Bank AG (A+/Negative/A-1), as well as our credit and
cash flow analysis of the transactions," S&P said.

                    BERICA 5 RESIDENTIAL MBS

"Based on our credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction,
we note that although delinquencies have been decreasing in terms
of absolute value since the beginning of 2009, they have
increased in relative terms as the size of the reference pool has
decreased," S&P said.

"We deem the current level of arrears to be significantly higher
than the average in the Italian RMBS market. Mortgage loans in
arrears for more than 90 days comprised 8.3% of the performing
pool as of the latest payment date in July 2012--a slight
increase from 8.1% in January 2012. As of July 2012, cumulative
gross defaults were equal to 4.8% of the initial balance, up from
4.3% in January 2012," S&P said.

"The cash reserve is currently at EUR3.6 million (1.54% of the
rated notes). This is below the transaction's target balance
because it has been drawn on several payment dates. Consequently,
the transaction is not releasing any excess spread," S&P said.

"We have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative our 'AA+
(sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings on the class A and B notes following
the appointment of Deutsche Bank AG as the account bank
provider," S&P said.

"Due to the transaction's worsening performance--signaled by the
large share of loans in arrears in the pool--we have lowered our
rating on the class C notes to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)'," S&P
said.

"Berica 5 Residential MBS is an Italian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in December
2004. Banca Popolare di Vicenza ScpA (BB+/Negative/B), a midsized
bank, originated the underlying mortgage loans," S&P said.

                    BERICA 6 RESIDENTIAL MBS

"Delinquencies in the underlying portfolio have been fairly high
during the life of the transaction, in both absolute and relative
terms. As of the latest payment date in October 2012, mortgage
loans in arrears for more than 90 days were 3.7% of the
performing pool, which represents a slight decline on July 2012.
As of October 2012, cumulative gross defaults represented 7.53%
of the initial balance, up from 7.26% in July 2012," S&P said.

"Following the appointment of Deutsche Bank AG as the account
bank provider, we have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch
negative our 'AA+ (sf)' and 'A+ (sf)' ratings on the class A2 and
B notes, and we have affirmed our 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on class C
notes," S&P said.

"On the October 2011 interest payment date, the accrued but
unpaid interest for the class D notes was paid out, due to the
large amount of funds from the originator's repurchase of
defaulted loans and thus entering the interest priority of
payments. Following our credit and cash flow analysis and because
the unpaid interest for this class of notes remains at zero, we
have raised our rating on the class D notes to 'B+ (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)'," S&P said.

"Berica 6 Residential MBS is an Italian RMBS transaction, which
closed in February 2006. Banca Popolare di Vicenza, a midsized
bank, originated the underlying mortgage loans," S&P said.

                  BERICA RESIDENTIAL MBS 1

Absolute delinquencies in the transaction have been decreasing
steadily since the beginning of 2010, while remaining in the 7%-
8% range in relative terms.

"Following the appointment of Deutsche Bank AG as the account
bank provider, we have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch
negative our 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class A notes, and removed
from CreditWatch negative our 'A (sf)' rating on class B notes,"
S&P said.

"We note that there has been a material increase in the class B
notes' credit enhancement since closing (11.3%, compared with
3.5%). Therefore, we have placed the class B notes on CreditWatch
positive to reflect the fact that we are likely to raise the
rating on the notes if these levels of credit enhancement and
performance are maintained over the next six months," S&P said.

"Based on our credit and cash flow analysis, the credit
enhancement available to the class C notes is in our view
consistent with the rating. Therefore, we affirmed our 'BBB (sf)'
rating on the class C notes," S&P said.

"Berica Residential MBS 1 is an Italian RMBS transaction, which
closed in March 2004. Banca Popolare di Vicenza, a midsized bank,
originated the underlying mortgage loans," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                  Rating
                 To               From

Berica 5 Residential MBS S.r.l.
EUR675.878 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

C                BB+ (sf)         BBB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A                AA+ (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                A (sf)           A (sf)/Watch Neg

Berica 6 Residential MBS S.r.l.
EUR1.441 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
(Plus An Over-Issuance of EUR8.565 Million
Mortgage-Backed Deferrable-Interest Class D Notes)

Rating Raised

D                B+ (sf)          CC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2               AA+ (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                A+ (sf)          A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

C                BBB+ (sf)

Berica Residential MBS 1 S.r.l.
EUR588.483 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A                AA+ (sf)          AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

C                BBB (sf)          BBB (sf)

Rating Placed On CreditWatch Positive

B                A (sf)/Watch Pos  A (sf)/Watch Neg


EUROHOME MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages S.r.l.'s class B and C notes. "At the
same time, we have affirmed our ratings on the class A and D
notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our review of the transaction, which
shows that the performance of the underlying collateral has
continued to deteriorate, in our opinion, in the past 18 months
since our previous review on April 11, 2011," S&P said.

"Total arrears have increased to 24.92% of the collateral
portfolio balance on the most recent interest payment date (IPD)
in November 2012, from 20.39% in April 2011. Moreover, 90+ days
arrears have increased to 14.29%, from 8.83% in April 2011," S&P
said.

"Cumulative defaults have also continued to increase, and were at
19.46% in November 2012--close to the class C note interest-
deferral trigger, which is 19.50% in the transaction documents.
In our opinion, it is likely that the trigger will be breached
within the next IPD, and that the class C notes will stop
receiving interest. As such, we have lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'B
(sf)' our rating on the class C notes," S&P said.

"The high level of defaults has led to a considerable principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) balance, in our opinion. The aggregate
amount in the PDLs was EUR31,859,816 in November 2012--an
increase of EUR6,145,679 in the past year. The class E, D, and C
note PDLs are full (i.e., they have reached the levels of nominal
notes outstanding), and there was EUR2,945,291 allocated to the
class B note PDL on the November 2012 IPD. The interest-deferral
trigger for the class B notes is 23.75%, and we consider that the
likelihood of cumulative defaults reaching that level has
continued to increase. Thus, we have lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'A
(sf)' our rating on the class B notes," S&P said.

"Based on the outcome of our cash flow model and our analysis, we
have affirmed our 'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A notes. At our
April 2011 review, we did not consider the transaction documents
relating to the interest rate swap provider--Deutsche Bank AG
(A+/Negative/A-1)--to be in line with our counterparty criteria,
which we updated on May 31, 2012. Therefore, in our cash flow
analysis, we have tested additional scenarios where we give no
benefit to the interest rate swap. The class A notes did not pass
the stress test," S&P said.

"Under our 2012 and 2010 (superseded) counterparty criteria, if a
swap agreement reflects replacement language that is in line with
any of our previous counterparty criteria, we allow the
counterparty to support tranches rated not higher than our long-
term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the counterparty plus one
notch. Under our criteria, we thus deem our rating on the class A
notes to be weak-linked to our long-term ICR on the interest rate
swap counterparty," S&P said.

"We have also affirmed our 'D (sf)' rating on the class D notes,
due to their continuous interest shortfall since the May 2011
IPD," S&P said.

Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages is an Italian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction with loans originated by
Deutsche Bank Mutui SpA. It closed in December 2007.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages S.r.l.
EUR260.85 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class              Rating
          To                       From

Ratings Lowered

B         BB (sf)                  A (sf)
C         CC (sf)                  B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A         AA- (sf)
D         D (sf)



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Lacks Adequate Level of Control, Audit Shows
------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News, citing a Kazakh government
audit, reports that BTA Bank exercised insufficient control and
arranged payments to creditors in violation of a moratorium
during its debt restructuring two years ago.

According to Bloomberg, the central bank's financial oversight
committee said in the document that the inspection, completed in
February, found that the Almaty-based lender was breaching
national legislation and bank regulations, a sign of an
"inadequate level of control" on the part of BTA executives.

The regulator said that the bank also arranged repayments that
bypassed BTA itself, Bloomberg relates.  In violation of a plan
approved in September 2010, BTA failed to create a development
strategy for 2011 through 2015, Bloomberg says, citing the audit.

The audit suggests bungled oversight by the state-appointed bank
officials and their failure to steady BTA (BTAS), which has
blamed its previous management for the implosion that preceded
the government takeover three years ago, Bloomberg discloses.

BTA's international creditors had their investments slashed by
almost 56% after the biggest Kazakh lender at the time defaulted
on US$12 billion of debt in 2009, Bloomberg notes.

BTA, which also failed to make an interest payment on its
July 2018 dollar bonds in January, said on Oct. 3 it reached a
non-binding agreement with creditors on restructuring US$11.2
billion of liabilities, Bloomberg recounts.  The bank won 92%
creditor approval for a restructuring plan in May 2010 paying
cash and issuing new debt, Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, the document said that the central bank's
other complaints about BTA included lack of "managerial or any
other reporting" to the board of directors by the division
managing distressed loans.

BTA declined to comment on details of the audit, citing the
confidentiality of its results in a statement e-mailed Nov. 5,
Bloomberg notes.  It said the last audit was carried out using
data as of Nov. 1, 2011, and referred questions about the
assessment of the bank's management to the regulator, Bloomberg
relates.

                          About BTA Bank

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO --
http://bta.kz/-- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.

The BTA Group is one of the leading banking groups in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks in
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkey.  In addition, the Bank maintains representative offices
in Russia, Ukraine, China, the United Arab Emirates and the
United Kingdom.  The Bank has no branch or agency in the United
States, and its primary assets in the United States consist of
balances in accounts with correspondent banks in New York City.

As of November 30, 2009, the Bank employed 5,043 people inside
and 4 people outside Kazakhstan.  It has no employees in the
United States.  Most of the Bank's assets, and nearly all its
tangible assets, are located in Kazakhstan.

JSC BTA Bank, also known as BTA Bank of Kazakhstan, commenced
insolvency proceedings in the Specialized Financial Court of
Almaty City, Republic of Kazakhstan.  Anvar Galimullaevich
Saidenov, the Chairman of the Management Board of BTA Bank, then
filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-10638)
on Feb. 4, 2010, estimating more than US$1 billion in assets and
debts.

On March 9, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that JSC BTA Bank was granted relief in the U.S. under Chapter 15
when the bankruptcy judge in New York recognized the Kazakh
proceeding as the "foreign main proceeding."  Consequently,
creditor actions in the U.S. were permanently halted, forcing
creditors to prosecute their claims and receive distributions
in Kazakhstan.

In the U.S., the Foreign Representative is represented by Evan C.
Hollander, Esq., Douglas P. Baumstein, Esq., and Richard A.
Graham, Esq. -- rgraham@whitecase.com -- at White & Case LLP in
New York City.

The Specialized Financial Court of Almaty approved BTA Bank's
debt restructuring on Aug. 31, 2010, trimming its obligations
from US$16.7 billion to US$4.2 billion, and extending its longest
maturity dates to 20 year from eight.  Creditors who hold 92
percent of BTA's debt approved the restructuring plan in May.
BTA reportedly distributed US$945 million in cash to creditors
and new debt securities including US$5.2 billion of recovery
units (representing an 18.5% equity stake) and US$2.3 billion of
senior notes on Sept. 1, 2010.  BTA forecasts profit of slightly
more than US$100 million in 2011, Chief Executive Officer Anvar
Saidenov told reporters in Almaty.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


F. VAN LANSCHOT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed F. Van Lanschot Bankiers N.V.'s (Van
Lanschot) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A-' and its
Viability Rating (VR) at 'a-'.  The agency has revised the
Outlook on the Long-term IDR to Negative from Stable.

Rating Action Rationale

The affirmation of Van Lanschot's VR and IDRs reflects the bank's
continued established Dutch franchise, moderate risk appetite and
good liquidity and capitalization.  The revision of the Outlook
on the Long-term IDR to Negative from Stable is driven by
significant profitability challenges, caused by a high cost base
and pressures on income generation, as well as the potential for
higher loan impairment charges as a result of a weakened domestic
economic environment.  Fitch also has some concerns that strong
competition might threaten the stabilization of the deposit base.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Van Lanschot's IDRs and senior debt rating are driven by the
bank's intrinsic creditworthiness.

A key driver of Van Lanschot's ratings is its franchise, with a
focus on private banking within the Netherlands and neighboring
Belgium.  Loans are extended to high net worth individuals, and
entrepreneurs and their related companies, to support a current
or a potential private banking relationship.

Van Lanschot's ratings are sensitive to an improvement in its
income generation and a reduction in its cost base, which would
increase its ability to absorb higher than expected loan
impairment charges.  Management has implemented measures to
reduce costs and improve income generation, but the effects of
these efforts are currently offset by deleveraging and weak
economic conditions in the Netherlands.  The ratings could be
downgraded if underlying profitability remains weak and is
accompanied by higher loan impairment charges.

Overall, Van Lanschot's asset quality has remained satisfactory.
However, given the group's exposure to the Dutch market, both in
the form of residential mortgage loans and SME lending, Van
Lanschot's VR continues to be sensitive to changes in Fitch's
assumptions around key economic and market variables for the
country.

The ratings are also sensitive to the highly competitive
environment for customer deposits.  In addition, any
deterioration in the solid capitalization and liquidity levels
and balanced funding profile would also put pressure on the
bank's VR.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect
Fitch's expectation that there is a limited probability that the
Dutch state ('AAA'/Stable) would support Van Lanschot, if
required.  This opinion derives from Van Lanschot's small
franchise in comparison with the four largest Dutch banks, all of
which have been classified as systemically important banks by the
Dutch authorities.  Nevertheless, Fitch's view of potential
support takes into account Van Lanschot's regional franchise and
SME financing.

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are potentially
sensitive to any change in Fitch's assumptions about the ability
(as reflected in its ratings) or willingness of the Dutch state
to provide timely support to the bank, if required.  They are
also sensitive to a change in Fitch's assumptions around the
availability of sovereign support for banks more generally.  In
this context, Fitch is paying close attention to on-going policy
discussions around bank support and 'bail in', especially in
Europe.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and hybrid securities issued by Van Lanschot
are notched off Van Lanschot's VR.  Therefore, their respective
ratings have been affirmed and are sensitive to any change in Van
Lanschot's VR.

In accordance with Fitch's criteria 'Rating Bank Regulatory
Capital and Similar Securities', subordinated (lower Tier 2) debt
is rated one notch below the VR to reflect the below average loss
severity of this type of debt compared with average recoveries.

Van Lanschot's innovative Tier 1 securities are rated four
notches below its VR to reflect the higher loss severity risk of
these securities compared with average recoveries (two notches
from the VR) as well as high risk of non-performance (an
additional two notches).

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B+'
  -- Senior debt affirmed at 'A-'/'F2'
  -- Dated subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'
  -- Innovative Tier 1 securities (NL0000117745): affirmed at
     'BB+'


JUBILEE CDO V: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class Y Notes to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Jubilee CDO V B.V.:

    EUR28.9M Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
    Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR155.55M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
    Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR45.8M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded
    to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under
    Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR46.8M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Ba2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR8.475M Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR12.725M Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
    Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR4M Class V Combination Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
    previously on Sep 21, 2011 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

    EUR11.325M Class W Combination Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
    previously on Sep 21, 2011 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

    EUR11.725M Class Y Combination Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
    previously on Sep 21, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
V, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal
amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the
Rated Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the
Rated Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate
of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. For Class W and Class Y,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Jubilee CDO V B.V., issued in June 2005, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Ltd. The
reinvestment period ended on August 21, 2011. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of resilient performance since the last rating action in
September 2011 in conjunction with a correction to the rating
model Moody's used for this transaction. Moody's corrected the
rating model and put the ratings of the above tranches on review
for upgrade on July 10, 2012.

Moody's notes that the reported overcollateralization ("OC")
ratios of the rated notes have increased since the rating action
in September 2011. The Class A/B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 127.02%, 111.97% and
106.27%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 124.38%,
111.30% and 106.23% respectively. All coverage tests are
currently in compliance. Moody's computed OC levels have
improved, especially for the class A/B due to the amortization of
the notes since last action.

Whilst the weighted average spread increased from 3.32% to3.94%,
the reported WARF has deteriorated from 3046 to 3172 between
August 2011 and September 2012. In addition, securities rated Caa
or lower raise substantially from 11.42% of the underlying
portfolio in August 2011 to 18.18% in September 2012.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR458 million,
defaulted par of EUR7.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 26.13% (consistent with a WARF of 3733), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.20% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted
average spread of 4.0%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 78% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In the process of determining the final ratings, Moody's took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Deterioration of assets credit quality to address the loan
refinancing and sovereign risks specific to some assets in the
portfolio -- 20% of the obligors in the portfolio have a credit
quality consistent with B3 rating or below with their loan
maturing between 2014 and 2016, which may create challenges for
those obligors to refinance. 10% of the portfolio is also exposed
to obligors located in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and
Italy. Moody's considered a scenario where the WARF was increased
to 4229 by forcing the credit quality on 25% of such exposures to
Ca. This scenario generated model outputs that were within one to
two notches lower than the base case results across all classes
of notes, except for the class A1-A notes.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Amortization: Pace of amortization could vary significantly
subject to market conditions and this may have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could
accelerate as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the
loan market or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be
delayed by rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast
amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the senior
notes.

2) Moody's also notes that around 59% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional volatility. Moody's analyzed recoveries
on defaulted assets assuming the lower of the market price and
the Moody's recovery rate assumptions in order to account for
potential volatility in recovery on defaulted assets.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.


NXP BV: Moody's Upgrades CFR/PDR to 'B1'; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B1 from B2 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating
(PDR) of NXP B.V. At the same time, Moody's upgraded NXP's senior
secured debt ratings to B2 (with a loss given default assessment
(LGD) of 4, 62%) from B3 (LGD4, 63%). The rating outlook is
stable.

Upgrades:

  Issuer: NXP B.V.

     Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B1 from B2

     Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B1 from B2

     Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to a range of
     B2, LGD4, 62 % from a range of B3, LGD4, 63 %

     Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to a range
     of B2, LGD4, 62 % from a range of B3, LGD4, 63 %

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: NXP B.V.

    Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Ratings Rationale

"The ratings upgrade reflects NXP's progress in generating
material amounts of positive free cash flow and in sustaining
solid levels of operating performance in the current financial
year", says Kathrin Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst for NXP. The
rating upgrade incorporates Moody's expectation that NXP has some
cushion in the B1 rating category to withstand a degree of
earnings volatility stemming from continued weak semiconductor
markets and macroeconomic uncertainty. Positive free cash flow of
US$233 million in the first nine months of 2012 and credit
metrics such as debt/EBITDA of 3.7x and EBIT/interest expense of
2.3x on a last 12 months (LTM) basis per September 30, 2012
position NXP solidly in the B1 rating category.

In addition, the B1 ratings take comfort from NXP's solid short-
term liquidity profile and additional steps over the last three
quarters to lengthen the group's debt maturity profile with the
issuance of new term loans and early redemption of super priority
notes. These efforts have reduced the 2013 debt maturities to
around US$242 million at October 24, 2012 from US$507 million at
end of first quarter of 2012, which are expected to be repaid by
future free cash flow generation. Current cash balances of US$702
million and access to a EUR620 million super senior revolving
credit facility due March 2017, which does not contain any
financial covenants, provide NXP with sufficient liquidity
cushion to weather the next industry downturn.

The ratings anticipate that management remains committed to
further reduce the company's high gross debt burden of around
US$4.1 billion as adjusted by Moody's at September 30, 2012.

Other factors considered in the ratings are (1) NXP's established
leadership positions in different markets with different
underlying growth drivers and supported by recent design wins and
broadening range of innovative products. These leadership
positions are underpinned by substantial barriers to entry,
customer loyalty and a diversified customer base in the
identification, automotive and consumer electronics industries.
In addition, (2) the ratings factor in NXP's improved operating
flexibility and US$928 million cost reductions achieved through
its Redesign Restructuring program completed in 2011. However,
the ratings remain constrained by (3) the high technology risk
inherent to the semiconductor industry and the customized nature
of NXP's products; (4) the company's significant cash burn and
volatile performance in the years 2007-2009 and (5) the group's
relatively high leverage compared to other rated semiconductor
companies.

NXP's senior secured term loans and senior secured notes are
rated B2 (LGD4, 62%). The one notch lower rating compared to the
B1 CFR reflects that NXP's senior secured term loans and senior
secured notes share the security arrangements with NXP's EUR620
million revolving credit facility due 2017 but rank behind the
revolving credit facility in a liquidation scenario. NXP's senior
secured debt is secured by first-priority liens on (a)
substantially all assets except cash of the issuer and its
guarantor (material wholly owned subsidiaries); (b) the issuer's
equity interests in all material wholly owned subsidiaries; and
(c) any intercompany loans. Moody's has ranked US$549 million of
trade payables as per September 30, 2012 with the revolving
credit facility in Moody's Loss Given Default Assessment.

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that
despite the more challenging market conditions and macroeconomic
weakness in Europe, NXP will maintain a healthy liquidity profile
and generate positive free cash flow through the cycle which will
be applied to debt reduction. This should enable the company to
maintain debt/EBITDA around 3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above
2.0x through the cycle.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Rating upward pressure would require sustained profitable growth
of NXP's major division, its HPMS business, while maintaining or
growing market shares and continued positive free cash flow
generation being applied to debt reduction. The rating could be
upgraded if this leads to debt/EBITDA of around 3.0x through the
cycle and if NXP can maintain an ample liquidity cushion to
weather any deep industry slowdown.

The ratings could be downgraded if NXP experienced sustained
erosion in its revenues, loss of market share as indicated by
revenues growing at a rate less than the industry, and erosion in
its operating margins for a protracted period, returned to
material negative free cash flow and debt/EBITDA above 4.5x. In
addition, deterioration in liquidity could result in a rating
downgrade.

Prinicipal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating NXP B.V. was the Global
Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in November 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, NXP Semiconductors is a
leading semiconductor company. Its High Performance Mixed Signal
and Standard Product solutions are used in a wide range of
applications, including automotive, identification, wireless
infrastructure, lighting, industrial, mobile, consumer and
computing. NXP generated revenues of US$4.2 billion in 2011.



===============
S L O V A K I A
===============


DELPHI SLOVENSKO: To Lay Off 500 Employees Thru June 2014
---------------------------------------------------------
The Slovak Spectator reports that trade unionists from Delphi
Slovensko protested on October 24, 2012, against the Company's
planned layoff of more than 500 employees, and sought higher
severance pay for those affected.

Union leaders expressed dismay that the labor office has
consented to mass layoffs via a fast-tracked procedure, the
Slovak Spectator relates.

The employees to be terminated are to receive severance pay worth
three to five month's salary, but the union wants at least 14
months, The Slovak Spectator cites.

Delphi Slovensko manufactures cable-bundles for the automobile
industry.  The lay-offs will be carried out in four stages, with
the first 85 employees to lose their jobs by the end of the year
and the rest by June 2014, the report specifies.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA 4: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Junior Notes to 'Caa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1(sf) from Ba1(sf)
the ratings of the junior notes in BBVA 4 Pyme, FTA, due to
insufficient credit enhancement. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed the A3(sf) ratings of the senior and mezzanine notes in
the transaction. The rating actions conclude the review for
downgrade initiated by Moody's on July 2, 2012. BBVA 4 is an
asset-backed security (ABS) transaction backed by loans to
Spanish SMEs.

Ratings Rationale

"The downgrade was prompted by the lack of credit enhancement to
protect the junior notes from their exposure to a significant
build up in borrower concentration, resulting from the
amortization of the transaction," says Ariel Weil, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst.

"Conversely, the rating confirmation for the senior and mezzanine
notes reflects the steep build up in credit enhancement and
limited exposure to counterparty risks, which allows these
classes of notes to reach the highest achievable rating for
Spanish structured finance transactions of A3" adds Mr. Weil. The
confirmation also reflects the fact that the Spanish country
ceiling of A3 remained unchanged following the confirmation of
Spain's government ratings on October 16, 2012.

-- Rating downgrade for junior notes

Given the low credit enhancement that the reserve fund provides
to the Class C notes, Moody's central scenario is that these
notes will experience a default. Moody's assumes a default
probability of 6.1% and a recovery rate of 40% for the
outstanding pool, translating into an expected loss of 3.7%,
which is higher than the size of the credit enhancement for Class
C (1.9% of the outstanding notes' balance as of September 30,
2012).

Credit enhancement beneath the Class C notes is also insufficient
to protect the notes from experiencing a default if any of the
five largest obligors in the pool were to default under their
payment obligations. As Moody's relies on statistical data rather
than on an individual rating or credit estimate for each
underlying loan obligation supporting the notes, it expects the
notes' ratings to resist a stressed assessment for any given
obligor in the pool. In particular, Moody's expects that a rating
in the Ba category will be insulated from the default of any
particular obligor in the pool.

More generally, for each obligor contributing more than 3% of the
outstanding balance of the pool, Moody's has assumed a default
risk commensurate with a Caa3 rating. As the size of the largest
obligor exposure in the pool (3.7% of the pool balance as of 30
September 2012) exceeds that of the credit enhancement for the
Class C notes, Moody's also assumes the default probability for
the Class C notes to be consistent with a Caa3 rating. However,
the credit enhancement and large size of the Class C notes (41.0%
of the outstanding notes' balance as of September 30, 2012) would
mitigate the severity of a default, supporting a higher expected
loss rating. Moody's has reflected the benefit of this size
effect in a rating at the higher end of the Caa-rating category
for the Class C notes.

-- Rating confirmation for senior and mezzanine notes

The senior and mezzanine, Class A2 and B notes benefit from a
large amount of credit enhancement (respectively 71.1% and 43.0%
of the outstanding notes' balance as of September 30, 2012),
which protects them against both (1) Moody's expected losses on
the pool and (2) a default by as many as the largest 20 obligors
in the transaction (37.3% of the outstanding pool balance as of
30 September 2012).

The main transaction counterparty, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (Baa3, P-3) plays a number of roles in the
transaction, including those of issuer account bank and swap
counterparty. Since 7 August 2012, however, the issuer has
benefited from a guarantee on the issuer account from the Spanish
branch of Societe Generale (A2, P- 1). In addition, since
September 20, 2012, an account has been established with the same
bank to receive periodic collateral postings under the swap
agreement.

As a result, the credit risk of the Class A2 and B notes is
commensurate with the highest rating achievable for Spanish
structured finance transactions, which corresponds to the Spanish
country ceiling. Following Moody's confirmation of the Spanish
government's Baa3 rating on October 16, 2012, the country ceiling
has remained unchanged at A3.

-- List of Affected Ratings for Issuer: BBVA 4 PYME Fondo de
    Titulizacion de Activos

- Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1(sf); previously on July 2,
   2012, Ba1(sf) Placed on Review for Downgrade

- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3(sf); previously on July 2,
   2012, Downgraded to A3(sf) and Placed on Review for Downgrade

- Class B Notes, Confirmed at A3(sf); previously on July 2,
   2012, Downgraded to A3(sf) and Placed on Review for Downgrade

Rating Methodologies

The considerations described in this press release complement the
principal rating methodology for this transaction. The principal
methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to Rating
CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007.

Key Assumptions and Ratings Sensitivity

Moody's update of its key modelling assumptions is described in
this press release. While Moody's has not updated its cash flow
analysis, it has taken into account the transaction payment
structure in assessing the impact of its rating scenarios,
including a stress on the default probability of the largest
obligors in the transaction. As the senior and mezzanine notes
are rated at the Spanish country ceiling, any change to this
ceiling would have a strong incidence on the ratings of these
securities.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action should not negatively affected.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKIYE VAKIFLAR: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Subordinated Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time Ba2 foreign-
currency subordinated debt rating to the subordinated debt
issuance by Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO (Vakifbank). The debt
instrument is expected to be eligible for Tier 2 capital
treatment under Turkish law. The outlook is stable.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating for this debt obligation confirms the
provisional rating assigned on October 16, 2012. In Moodys's
view, per the terms and conditions of the notes, the notes will
be unconditional, subordinated and unsecured obligations and will
rank pari passu with all Vakifbank's other subordinated unsecured
obligations. The rating of the notes is in line with Vakifbank's
subordinated unsecured foreign-currency debt rating.

Vakifbank's subordinated debt rating is positioned one notch
below the bank's adjusted standalone credit assessment, and does
not incorporate any rating uplift from systemic (government)
support.

Moody's believes that at present, there is a strong prudential
bank-supervisory framework in Turkey. The regulator has extensive
intervention tools available to preserve a bank's solvency and
financial stability within the banking system, although within
Turkey, imposing losses on bank creditors outside of a
liquidation scenario is untested. However, if future regulatory
intervention is required to support Turkish banks, Moody's
believes that the Turkish frameworks for bank resolution could
develop further, similar to the policy initiatives in numerous
banking systems, particularly in Europe.

These frameworks provide for burden sharing of bank bailouts with
bank creditors, in particular affecting the most junior classes
of bank securities. As a result, Vakifbank's subordinated debt
rating does not incorporate any uplift from systemic support (For
more detail, please refer to Moody's special comment entitled
"Supported Bank Debt Ratings at Risk of Downgrade Due to New
Approaches to Bank Resolution", February 14, 2011).

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

The subordinated debt rating is notched off the standalone credit
assessment. Therefore, any upwards or downwards pressure on the
bank's standalone credit profile will result in a similar rating
action on the bank's subordinated debt.

Principal Methodolgies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


MATRIX GROUP: In Administration, Business Liquidated
-----------------------------------------------------
Investment Week reports that Matrix Group has been placed into
administration, and parts of the business are already in the
process of being liquidated.

In a statement, the firm said both Matrix Group Limited and
Matrix Securities Limited had been placed into administration,
according to Investment Week.

The report notes that divisions within the company including
Matrix Money Management and Maxtrix Corporate Capital are in the
process of being wound up.

However, the report relates that the distribution and fund
management team of Matrix Asset Management have affected a buyout
from the parent company.

The teams will continue to be responsible for the distribution
and management of Matrix funds, including the fund of funds range
and the Ascension fund, the report notes.

The report discloses that the current Matrix fund structures will
remain in place.  The funds are segregated, operated by an
independent board with independent service providers and will
continue to operate as normal, the report relays.

Meanwhile Matrix Property Fund Management LLP will soon become a
separate group, the report says.

"Both the distribution and fund management teams have been
profitable divisions within Matrix Asset Management for many
years, with a strong history of raising assets for a range of
funds across our diverse client base.  We are excited by this
opportunity and our growth prospects for the future," the report
quoted Luke Reeves, head of business development for Matrix Asset
Management, as saying.


PATTON: In Administration, Continues to Trade
---------------------------------------------
Construction Inquirer reports that Patton is in administration.

The business will continue to trade while administrator Tom
Keenan of Keenan CF explores all possible options for the future,
including sale of all or parts of the company, according to
Construction Inquirer.

Neil Patton, Chairman of the business, said: " . . . . the
company has suffered from the widespread downturn impacting the
construction industry and, as a result, has experienced a decline
in trading performance. . . . The financial position facing the
business was such that administration was the last remaining
option available to the Directors."

The report notes that news of Patton's troubles came as latest
figures from the Insolvency Service showed a sharp drop in
construction failures.  The report relates that experts warned
that falling workloads mean the pace of failures could pick up
again.

Northern-Ireland based contractor Patton firm has offices in
London and Milton Keynes and works on projects across the UK.
The firm, which has traded for around 100 years, has a total
turnover of GBP140 million and employs around 320 staff.


TERRAPIN LIMITED: In Administration, 30 Jobs in Limbo
-----------------------------------------------------
Milton Keys News reports that Terrapin Limited, by then known as
Building Hire and Leasing Limited, went into administration
putting 30 jobs in limbo.

The Open Corporates posted in its Web site that Terrapin Limited
has been liquidated, while one company it spawned, Terrapin
Construction Limited, was dissolved in May 2012, according to
Milton Keys News.

The report relates that open Corporates also confirms that
Building Hire and Leasing Limited was formerly known as Terrapin
Limited and is currently in administration.  But a new company,
Terrapin Hire Limited, remains active, the report notes.

In a letter dated August 31, the director of that company, Steven
Dale, said HJS Recovery wrongly believed employees of Building
Hire and Leasing had been transferred over to another company,
the report notes.

Mr. Dale, who according to Open Companies was a director at
Building Hire and Leasing until January - the same month Terrapin
Hire was incorporated, wrote: "Unfortunately due to a miss
communication HJS Recovery are of the belief that you, as an
employee of Building Hire and Leasing are to be transferred over
to an alternative company. . . . As you are aware salaries and
wages have been settled by other business and directors as way of
a loan to Building Hire and Leasing for a substantial period as
an investment to keep the company in operation. . . . At no stage
has this constituted a TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
of Employment) Regulations) of employment and as such you remain
employed by Building Hire and Leasing Limited".

But a separate letter from HJS joint administrator Stephen
Powell, written on September 19, insisted employees had been
transferred to another company, namely Terrapin Hire Limited, the
report adds.


ROADCHEF FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to stable from
negative its outlook on the ratings on the class A2 and B notes
issued by Roadchef Finance Ltd. "At the same time, we affirmed
our credit ratings on these notes," S&P said.

"The outlook revision follows our review of the performance of
Roadchef Finance's securitized estate of U.K. motorway service
areas in the three quarters to July 3, 2012. While we continue to
assess the business risk profile as 'weak,' the company's
investment in new facilities and offerings has started to filter
through to the operating performance, which improved beyond our
previous forecasts in the period," S&P said.

"In each of the past three quarters to July 3, 2012, rolling-12-
month turnover and rolling-12-month gross profit improved on the
previous year. Similarly, after negative rolling-12-month EBITDA
in both the second and third quarters of 2011, the securitized
business' rolling-12-month EBITDA rose 2.5% in January 2012, 5.8%
in April, and 7.1% in July. As a result, the 12-month EBITDA debt
service coverage ratio over the past three quarters, as
calculated by the company, returned to a level that is compliant
with the covenant in the debt documentation without the need for
an equity injection. As of July 3, 2012, the reported 12-month
EBITDA debt service coverage ratio for the securitized business
was 1.26x before the equity injections. Adjusted by Standard &
Poor's, the same ratio was 1.22x however, and the Standard &
Poor's-adjusted 12-month free cash flow debt service coverage
ratio was 0.81x. The improvement in EBITDA has been mainly driven
by the improved operating performance of the sites where the
company has invested in new McDonald's units and refurbished
Costa Coffee outlets, whereas turnover from undeveloped sites has
remained flat," S&P said.

"However, the company's cash flow generation remains insufficient
to support the development plan at the same time as servicing
debt without continued external support. An additional restraint
is the company's liquidity position, which we continue to assess
as 'less than adequate' as defined in our criteria. Based on
available financial reports, we understand that Roadchef's
development group injected GBP3.6 million in October 2011, and
GBP1.416 million in July 2012, in addition to the investments in
the company's facilities that are partially financed through
partner funding agreements. Furthermore, to our knowledge, the
GBP12.7 million short-term bank facility -- which has increased
by GBP1.5 since February 2012, and effectively ranks senior to
the rated notes -- remains almost entirely drawn," S&P said.

"Roadchef is in our opinion still dependent on partner funding
agreements and on its parent's willingness and ability to provide
support in order to meet the company's capital investment needs,
if not its debt service needs. Therefore, in our view, the
company remains vulnerable to one-off operating shocks that could
be compounded by the business' seasonality," S&P said.

"We have been informed by the company that interest and principal
payments were met on the Oct. 31, 2012 payment date without using
the liquidity facility available at the issuer level. The next
payment date is Oct. 31, 2013," S&P said.

"We provide no benefit for external sources of financial support
in our analysis of corporate securitizations. Therefore, until
there is a sustainable and long-term improvement in operating
performance such that we can meaningfully assess the standalone
free cash flow generation ability of the securitized business, we
will not apply any stresses to test the robustness of the
transaction beyond our base-case forecasts. Consequently, as of ,
our ratings continue to reflect our view of the company's 'weak'
business risk profile, highly leveraged financial structure,
'less than adequate; liquidity, recovery prospects for each
tranche of debt, and limited structural benefits compared with
peer transactions," S&P said.

"The stable outlook on Roadchef follows our observation that the
company has realized some benefits from its investments, and
reflects our view that the planned expenditure in additional
sites will likely result in them performing in line with the
recently developed service areas. This should help to stabilize
the securitized business' financial performance," S&P said.

"We could raise the ratings if we observed a self-supported,
sustained improvement in the EBITDA debt service coverage ratio,
as calculated by the company and by Standard & Poor's, to well
above 1.25x. At the same time, the Standard & Poor's-adjusted
free cash flow debt service coverage ratio would need to exceed
1.1x. We could also take a positive rating action if our
assessment of the business risk profile improves," S&P said.

"The ratings would be exposed to downward pressure if the
company's operating performance is not sustained at the current
improved level in the long term, which could cause us to revise
downward our assessment of the business risk profile," S&P said.

Roadchef Finance is a corporate securitization of 16 motorway
service areas owned by Roadchef Ltd. The transaction closed in
December 1998.

"The collateral backing the notes comprises loans made to three
entities owned by Roadchef. These are Roadchef Motorways Ltd.,
Take A Break Motorway Services Ltd., and Blue Boar Motorways Ltd.
Each loan is secured on interests in 16 motorway service areas
across the U.K. Roadchef, including the development group outside
the securitization, currently has approximately a 21% market
share and attracts about 60 million visitors per year," S&P said.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating                   Rating
            To                       From

Roadchef Finance Ltd.
GBP210 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action

A2          B- (sf)/Stable           B- (sf)/Negative
B           CCC+ (sf)/Stable         CCC+ (sf)/Negative


* BDO & PKF in Advanced Merger Discussions
------------------------------------------
BDO LLP and PKF (UK) LLP announced that they are in advanced
discussions to merge in the early part of 2013.  The merger will
create a leading accountancy and advisory firm, with some 3,500
people working in the UK generating revenues approaching
GBP400 million.

This will be the first proactive strategic merger in the UK
accountancy market for 15 years and reflects both firms'
sustained commitment to growth in their mid-market heartland.
The merged firm will be uniquely placed to offer greater choice
and quality and demonstrates an appetite to invest.

The merged firm will be a financially strong business with
significant sector and geographical coverage across the UK, and
will be a member of BDO International, the number one mid-market
international network with revenues of over US$5.7 billion
operating in 135 countries world-wide.

Simon Michaels, Managing Partner of BDO LLP, commented: "Our two
firms share a closely-aligned vision to lead in the mid-market,
as well as similar cultures and a commitment to deliver
exceptional client service.  The merged firm will have a strong
balance sheet, as well as unrivalled sector and geographic
strength in many areas.

"The PKF team will enhance and complement our offerings to
clients, bringing consulting expertise along with wide experience
across audit, tax and advisory arenas.  This exciting development
demonstrates that both firms are ambitious for growth."

Martin Goodchild, Managing Partner at PKF (UK) LLP, added: "This
is a good strategic decision for both firms who have a desire to
lead, from a position of strength, the inevitable consolidation
of the mid-tier which is long overdue. PKF has built a strong
national business dealing with a wide range of clients,
particularly entrepreneurs and listed companies but including
other markets such as public sector and not for profit.  This
combination will ensure a strong profitable business, creating
opportunities for all of our people and our clients, as it will
enable them to benefit from new expertise and increased global
reach."

BDO LLP, a UK limited liability partnership registered in England
and Wales under number OC305127, is a member of BDO International
Limited, a UK company limited by guarantee, and forms part of the
international BDO network of independent member firms.  A list of
members' names is open to inspection at our registered office, 55
Baker Street, London W1U 7EU.  BDO LLP is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority to conduct
investment business.

The combined fee income of all the BDO Member Firms, including
the members of their exclusive alliances, was EUR5.68 billion in
2011. The global network provides business advisory services in
135 countries, with more than 48,900 people working out of 1,118
offices, worldwide.

BDO is the brand name for the BDO International network and for
each of the BDO Member Firms.  BDO Northern Ireland, a
partnership formed in and under the laws of Northern Ireland, is
licensed to operate within the international BDO network of
independent member firms.

PKF (UK) LLP is a firm of accountants and business advisers with
more than 1,200 partners and staff operating in 20 offices in the
UK mainland firm, incorporating a wholly-owned financial planning
company and associated offshore practices.  The firm specializes
in advising growing and entrepreneurial/owner-managed businesses,
AIM and fully listed companies, and also has extensive experience
in the public and not-for-profit sectors. Principal services
include assurance and advisory; taxation; consultancy; corporate
recovery and insolvency; corporate finance and forensic.  The
firm has particular expertise in advising sectors such as hotels
and leisure; mining and resource; public sector; real estate and
construction; professional practices; not-for-profit; and
medical.

PKF (UK) LLP is a member firm of the PKF International Limited
(PKFI) network of legally independent member firms.  The PKFI
member firms have around 2,200 partners and more than 21,400
staff in around 125 countries.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Fuel Price Hikes Hit Autopart Suppliers' Revenues
-----------------------------------------------------------
The steep rise in European fuel prices could hit the revenues of
suppliers of brakes, tyres and other spare parts in the short
term as consumers adopt more energy-efficient driving behavior to
keep their fuel costs down, says Moody's Investors Service in a
Special Comment published on Nov. 7. The potential loss of
revenue is credit negative for rated automotive spare parts
suppliers.

Moody's expects that higher fuel prices could also affect
suppliers that focus on automotive manufacturers.

The new report is entitled "European Auto Suppliers: Record Fuel
Prices Could Hit Spare Parts Revenues".

"We expect motorists in Europe to increasingly adopt more energy-
efficient driving behavior or avoid using their cars to keep
their fuel spending under control," says Rainer Neidnig, a Vice
President - Senior Analyst in Moody's Corporate Finance Group and
co-author of the report. "As this behavior reduces wear and tear,
we could see demand for replacement car equipment such as tyres
and brakes to decline, at least temporarily, thereby affecting
auto suppliers' aftermarket revenues."

European auto suppliers with substantial aftermarket exposure
will probably experience a decline in revenues and earnings in
the short term. Among its rated issuers, Moody's expects TMD
Friction Group SA (B2 stable) will be the most vulnerable and
lower aftermarket sales may exert pressure on its ratings.
Michelin (Baa1/Prime-2 stable), Continental AG (Ba2 positive) and
Hella KGaA Hueck & Co. (Baa2 stable) might also experience a
decline in revenues, but should be able to offset this.

Moody's expects that higher fuel prices will have only a minor
effect on Sch„effler AG (B1 positive), Valeo SA (Baa3 stable) and
Rheinmetall AG (Baa3 stable), given that aftermarket revenues
make up a relatively small proportion of their overall revenues.
GKN Holdings plc (Ba1 positive), Autoliv ASP Inc (Prime-2 stable)
and Faurecia SA (Ba3 negative) will not be affected by an
aftermarket contraction, because they have virtually no
aftermarket business.

High fuel costs will probably also affect demand patterns for new
cars in the medium term and this could affect suppliers who
supply car manufacturers, or original equipment manufacturers.
However, the effect will be less clear: drivers may delay new car
purchases or choose smaller cars, which will harm suppliers'
revenues. On the other hand, higher fuel prices will probably
accelerate demand for more fuel-efficient cars, which will help
suppliers that can provide fuel-saving technology to
manufacturers.


* BOOK REVIEW: Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement
---------------------------------------------------------
Authors:  Robert J. Buchanan, Ph.D., and James D. Minor, J.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 300 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

With Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement, Buchanan, a
professor in the School of Public Health at Texas A&M, and Minor,
an attorney, have come up with an invaluable resource for lawyers
and anyone else seeking an introduction to the legal and social
issues related to Medicare and Medicaid.  The administrative
costs of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement have been a heated
topic of debate among public officials and administrators of
provider healthcare organizations, especially health maintenance
organizations.  Although inflation and the use of costly medical
technology are key factors in the rise in Medicare and Medicaid
costs, some control can be gained through appropriate compliance,
using more efficient procedures and better detection of fraud.
This work is a major guide on how to go about doing this.
Though mostly a legal treatise, Legal Aspects of Health Care
Reimbursement, first published in 1985, also offers commentary
through legislative and regulatory analyses, thereby explaining
how healthcare reimbursement policies affect the solvency and
effectiveness of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
In discussing how legislation and regulations affect the solvency
and effectiveness of government-provided healthcare, the authors
offer insight into the much-publicized and much-discussed issue
of runaway healthcare costs.  Buchanan and Minor do not deny that
healthcare costs are out of control and are onerous for the
government and ruinous for many individuals.  But healthcare
reimbursement policies are not the cause of this, the authors
argue.  To make their case, they explain how the laws and
regulations in different areas of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs create processes that are largely invisible to the
public, but make the programs difficult to manage financially.
The processes are not well thought out nor subject to much
quality control, with the result that fraud is chronic and
considerable.

The areas of Medicare covered in the book are inpatient hospital
reimbursement, long-term care, hospice care, and end-stage renal
disease.  The areas of Medicaid covered are inpatient hospital
and long-term care plus abortion and family planning services.
For each of these areas, the authors discuss the conditions for
receiving reimbursement, the legislation and regulations
regarding reimbursement, the procedures for being reimbursed, the
major areas of reimbursement (for example, capital-related costs,
dietetic services, rental expenses); and court cases, including
appeals.  Reimbursement practices of selected states are covered.
For each of the major areas of interest, the chapters are
organized in a manner that is similar to that found in reference
books and professional journals for attorneys and accountants.
Laws and regulations are summarized and occasionally quoted with
expert background and commentary supplied by the authors.  With
regard to court cases and rulings pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid, passages from court papers are quoted, references to
legal records are supplied, and analysis is provided. Though the
text delves into legal issues, it is accessible to administrators
and other lay readers who have an interest in the subject matter.
Clear chapter and subchapter titles, a table of cases following
the text, and a detailed index enable readers to use this work as
a reference.

The value of this book is reflected in the authors' ability to
distill great amounts of data down to one readable text.  It
condenses libraries of government and legal documents into a
single work.  Answers to questions of fundamental importance to
healthcare providers -- those dealing with qualifications,
compliance, reimbursable costs, and appeals -- can be found in
one place. Timely reimbursement depends on proper application of
the rules, which is necessary for a provider's sound financial
standing. But the authors specify other reasons for writing this
book, to wit: "Providers should have a general knowledge of the
law and should not rely on manuals and regulations exclusively."
By summarizing, commenting on, and citing cases relating to
principal provisions of Medicare and Medicaid, the authors
accomplish this objective.

The authors also cover the topic of fraud with respect to both
Medicare and Medicaid, offering both a legal treatment and
commentary.  At the end of each chapter is a section titled
"Outlook," which contains a discussion of government studies,
changes in healthcare policy, or other developments that could
affect reimbursement.  Although this work was published over two
decades ago, much of this discussion is still relevant today.
Finally, the book is a call for change.  The authors remark in
their closing paragraph: "Given the increasing for-profit
orientation of the major segments of the health care industry,
proprietary providers should be particularly responsive to new
efficiency incentives" in reimbursement.  In relation to this,
"policymakers [should] develop reimbursement methods that will
encourage providers to become more efficient."

Robert J. Buchanan is currently a professor in the Department of
Health Policy and Management in the School of Rural Public Health
at the Texas A&M University System Health Sciences Center.  James
D. Minor, a former law professor at the University of
Mississippi, has his own law practice.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *