TCREUR_Public/121203.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, December 3, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 240



AZERBAIJAN INT'L BANK: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'


ING VERZEKERINGEN: Fitch Upgrades Hybrid Debt Rating From 'BB+'


* CYPRUS: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Negative


* DENMARK: FSA May Extend Deadline for Bank Capital Injections


COMPAGNIE GENERALE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating


118000 AG: Files for Insolvency
HYPO TIROL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BFSR to E+; Outlook Negative
LANTIQ DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Lifts CFR to Caa1; Outlook Developing
PFLEIDERER AG: Completes Financial Restructuring
* GERMANY: Corporate Bankruptcies Likely to Soar in 2013


KAUPTHING BANK: Winding-Up Board No Date Yet for Repayment Plan
LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Estimated Value of Assets Increases


CAPPOQUIN POULTRY: High Court Approves Rescue Scheme
FEDERAL GRID: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'bb+'
IRISH BANK: Takes Legal Action Against Ernst & Young Over Audit
RMF EURO IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class V Notes to 'B+'
TITAN EUROPE 2006-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes

TITAN EUROPE 2006-5: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on 4 Note Classes


WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'


MESDAG BV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'


POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL: Board Approves Standstill Deal Financing Terms
* POLAND: WSE Corporate Bankruptcies Hit Record High


ATOMENERGOPROM: S&P Assesses Stand-alone Credit Profile at 'bb'
EUROCHEM MINERAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
IDGC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Developing

* KRASNODAR KRAI: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Rating to RUB12BB Bonds
* TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Currency Ratings
* UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Currency Ratings


AUTO ABS 2012-3: DBRS Rates Class B Fixed-Rates Notes 'CCC(sf)'
CAJA DE AHORROS: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
IM BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
IM CITI TARJETAS: DBRS Assigns 'Csf' Rating to Class B Notes
TDA 26: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes


* DONETSK REGION: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Long-Term Currency Ratings

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARCK LIMITED: Serious Fraud Office Investigates Collapse
BIFFA: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Deal with Lenders
INSPIRED EDUCATION: S&P Raises Rating on GBP352MM Debt From 'BB+'
INVESTEC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Debt
MPG: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement Deal with Creditors

NORTHERN ROCK: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Sub. Debt Securities
TITAN EUROPE 2007-3: Moody's Comments on Performance of CMBS Pool


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 26 to November 30, 2012



AZERBAIJAN INT'L BANK: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the following global
scale ratings of International Bank of Azerbaijan: long-term
local currency deposit rating to Ba3 from Ba1, long-term foreign
currency deposit rating to Ba3 from Ba2, long-term foreign
currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba3 from Ba1, and long-
term foreign currency subordinated debt rating to B1 from Ba2.
Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the bank's standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+, which is equivalent to a
standalone credit assessment of b3. The outlook on long-term
ratings and the BFSR is negative.

Moody's rating action is largely based on International Bank of
Azerbaijan's audited financial statements for 2011 and the first
six month of 2012, prepared under IFRS.


The downgrade of International Bank of Azerbaijan's supported
ratings to Ba3 is driven by Moody's assessment of a reduced
probability of systemic support for the bank to "high" from "very
high". According to the rating agency, the track record of
support from the government to International Bank of Azerbaijan -
- which is the largest bank in the country and is currently 50.2%
owned by the government -- has thus far fallen short of providing
appropriate and timely support to strengthen the bank's capital
base, which materially eroded in 2010. The recent capital
injections from the government and the Central Bank of Azerbaijan
were significantly delayed and only marginally improved the
bank's capital levels (as discussed below). In addition, given
the Azerbaijan government's plan to privatize the bank in the
medium to long term, Moody's considers that the likelihood of
systemic support for the bank has decreased, in favor of support
from private shareholders.


Moody's says that International Bank of Azerbaijan still benefits
from a high probability of systemic support, based on its 50.2%
government ownership, large market shares and systemic importance
for Azerbaijan's economy. As a result, in accordance with Moody's
Join Default Analysis (JDA) methodology for banks, International
Bank of Azerbaijan's deposit ratings of Ba3 benefit from a three-
notch uplift from its b3 standalone credit strength.


The negative outlook on International Bank of Azerbaijan's
supported ratings is driven by the negative outlook on the bank's
standalone BFSR -- which reflects the negative pressure on the
bank's financial fundamentals due to (1) low capitalization
which, together with its low pre-provision profit, leads to a
weak loss absorption capacity; and (2) weak asset quality which
could potentially result in higher loan loss reserves, thus
exerting further pressure on the bank's capital.

As a result of recent capital injections in Q1 2012 comprising
AZN50 million (Tier 1 capital) from the Ministry of Finance and
AZN150 million (Tier 2 capital) subordinated loan from the
Central Bank of Azerbaijan, International Bank of Azerbaijan's
Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratios (under Basel I) improved to 6.03%
and 10.78%, respectively, as at 30 June 2012, from 4.95% and 7.6%
at year-end 2011. According to local GAAP, International Bank of
Azerbaijan reported a regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of
10.06% at end-September 2012, which is below the regulatory
minimum of 12%; Moody's notes that the bank benefits from
regulatory forbearance from the Central Bank of Azerbaijan.

In 2011 the bank was in breached of covenants on capital that
related to funding operations carried out in the capital markets
and returned to compliance in H12012 as reported in the audited
IFRS as at June 30, 2012. Moody's believes that International
Bank of Azerbaijan may breach these capital covenants again, as
the rating agency views the recent capital increases (including
an additional AZN50 million from International Bank of
Azerbaijan's private shareholders which the bank expects to be
allocated by Q1 2013) as insufficient in light of the current
high level of problem loans, the 20% lending growth expected by
the bank in 2012 and its weak internal capital generation

The rating agency notes that International Bank of Azerbaijan has
a weak asset quality. Loans overdue by more than 90 days
increased in absolute terms and accounted for 12% of gross loans
outstanding; moreover, the level of loans overdue less than 90
days and renegotiated loans increased to 17% and 18% of gross
loans outstanding, respectively, at year-end 2011 (2010: 15% and
13%, respectively). As some of those loans will likely become
non-performing in 2012 and 2013, Moody's expects International
Bank of Azerbaijan will have to increase provisions going forward
given the currently low provisioning coverage. During H1 2012,
International Bank of Azerbaijan did not increase loan loss
reserves, which accounted for 13.2% of gross loans as of 30 June
2012 and, in Moody's view, the bank's loan portfolio remains

For the first six month of 2012, International Bank of Azerbaijan
reported net profit of AZN23 million, up from AZN6.3 million
reported in H1 2011, which translated into a weak return on
average assets (RoAA) of 0.9% (annualized), up from 0.4% in 2011.
Moody's notes that modest improvement of the bank's financial
results was due to lower loan loss provisions, while its pre-
provision profitability has been decreasing since 2008 due to
shrinking interest margin (1.9% at mid-2012). The rating agency
believes that International Bank of Azerbaijan's bottom-line
results will likely be pressured by higher loan loss provisions
in the next 12-18 months.


Considering the negative outlook on International Bank of
Azerbaijan's long-term ratings, any upgrades are unlikely in the
medium term; however, the outlook could be changed to stable from
negative if the bank would benefit from a material capital
injection that would be considered by Moody's as sufficient to
offset asset quality pressure.

At the same time, Moody's notes that negative pressure could be
exerted on International Bank of Azerbaijan's ratings due to any
material adverse changes in the bank's risk profile, particularly
significant weakening of the bank's capitalization, asset quality
and liquidity position.


The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012 .

Headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan, International Bank of
Azerbaijan reported consolidated total assets of AZN5.46 billion
and total equity of AZN350.5 million under audited IFRS as H1


ING VERZEKERINGEN: Fitch Upgrades Hybrid Debt Rating From 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ING Verzekeringen N.V.'s Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) and senior debt ratings at 'A-' and 'BBB+'
respectively.  All ratings are removed from Rating Watch Negative
where they were placed on 27 October 2009.  The rating of ING
Verzekeringen's hybrid debt has been upgraded to 'BBB-' from

ING Verzekeringen and its subsidiaries' Negative Outlook
continues to reflect the uncertainty on its prospective structure
following ING Group's revised announcement that it intends to
fully dispose of its insurance operations by end-2018. The
Negative Outlook also reflects the uncertainties that the sale
will generate with respect to ING's insurance operations'
franchise and business position.  Following the sale, the
insurance operations will no longer benefit from being part of a
large bank-insurance organisation and will see reduced
diversification of risk and business as well as less financial

Nonetheless, ING Verzekeringen's ratings continue to reflect its
solid business positions and geographical diversification.
Capital adequacy is in line with the current ratings and Fitch
expects debt leverage to reduce, mostly due to the proceeds from
the disposal of insurance operations, including several Asian
subsidiaries expected to close in Q113.

Factors that could lead to a rating downgrade for ING
Verzekeringen include a weakening of the group's franchise or
capital position, and absence of a recovery in profitability.
This would include a sustained drop in regulatory capital to
below 200% of regulatory minimum, and repeated earnings
volatility in the next few years.  In addition, the ratings could
be downgraded if financial leverage calculated by Fitch increases
above 28%, material investment losses develop or there is a
weakening in the group's reserve strength


* CYPRUS: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Remains Negative
The outlook for Cyprus's banking system remains negative, says
Moody's Investors Service in a new Banking System Outlook
published on Nov. 29. The outlook reflects (1) the likelihood of
severe capital shortfalls, as the highly adverse operating
environments in Cyprus and Greece, the banks' primary markets,
will continue to drive a sharp deterioration in asset quality;
and (2) further weakening of funding and liquidity, as evidenced
by continued, significant deposit outflows in Greece and Cyprus.
In Moody's view, ongoing funding and capital support from the
local and euro area authorities will be necessary to avoid severe
financial disruptions in Cyprus's banking system.

The new report is entitled "Banking System Outlook: Cyprus".

Over the 12-18 month outlook period, Moody's expects the Cypriot
banks to face substantial recapitalization needs as a result of
acute asset-quality pressure. The rating agency estimates that
the cost of recapitalizing the three largest banks to a 10% core
Tier 1 will exceed EUR8 billion (around 47% of GDP). Although the
two largest banks -- Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited and
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd (both rated Caa1 deposits, on
review for downgrade; BFSR E/BCA caa3) - continue to seek
private-sector solutions, Moody's believes that the bulk of the
recapitalization will have to come from official support.

The Cypriot banks are facing highly adverse operating conditions
in both Cyprus and Greece, which is causing the system to
deleverage rapidly. In Cyprus, Moody's expects real GDP to
contract by 4% in 2013 (Source: Moody's Sovereign Risk Group),
following a 2.3% contraction in 2012, due to (1) the steep
correction in real-estate prices and the continued retrenchment
of the real-estate sector; (2) declining activity in the services
sector; and (3) Moody's expectation that austerity measures will
further suppress domestic consumption. In Greece, following a
7.1% decline in real GDP in 2011, Moody's expects real GDP to
contract by 6.9% in 2012 and 4.2% in 2013, bringing the
cumulative contraction to 25% since 2008.

Deposit outflows in Greece and Cyprus will exacerbate existing
funding and liquidity pressures, triggering increased reliance on
central bank funding. Deposits in Greece declined by 38% in the
December 2010-June 2012 period, whilst Moody's estimates that
non-resident, international business unit deposits in Cyprus
declined by 22% over the same period. This exhausted certain
banks' liquidity buffers and increased their use of central bank
funding. Although the Cypriot banks remain primarily deposit
funded with deposits at 70% of assets as of June 2012 (Source:
Banks' financial statements), Moody's considers that a high
portion of the deposits are confidence sensitive, rendering the
banks' funding base vulnerable to further shocks.


* DENMARK: FSA May Extend Deadline for Bank Capital Injections
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark's
financial regulator is looking into extending a deadline for
banks that fail solvency tests to give them more time to find
fresh capital and escape bankruptcy.

Banks, which now have 48 hours to come up with new capital if
they fail an inspection by the Financial Supervisory Authority,
could be given a grace period of up to three months if they
commit to selling assets, issuing capital, restructuring their
business or changing management, Bloomberg quotes Ulrik
Noedgaard, the Copenhagen-based FSA's general director, as

"We'll have a more patient approach," Mr. Noedgaard, as cited by
Bloomberg, said in an interview in Copenhagen.  "If the board is
ahead of the curve, we would clearly just stay away and, if
nothing happens, then we would get closer to the process and
potentially issue orders."

According to Bloomberg, a softer approach from Denmark's
financial watchdog reflects concern globally that banks may need
more time to comply with tougher rules as much of Europe sinks
into a recession.

The Danish FSA's proposal to give banks more time to raise
capital is under consideration in parliament, along with a more
stringent method for calculating solvency requirements, Bloomberg

Denmark last year became the first country in Europe to enforce
bail-in legislation, leading to senior creditor losses after the
FSA declared Amagerbanken A/S and Fjordbank Mors A/S insolvent,
Bloomberg recounts.

Continued failures have revived concerns among investors that
Denmark's banking crisis is far from over, Bloomberg says.

Mr. Noedgaard said the FSA wants to preserve its right to
intervene and even shut down a bank if it fails to show it's
making appropriate efforts to turn around its business, Bloomberg


COMPAGNIE GENERALE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit and issue ratings on seismic operator Compagnie
Generale de Geophysique - Veritas (CGGV). "At the same time, the
ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on Sept. 25, 2012. The outlook is
stable," S&P said.

"The affirmation reflects our opinion that execution risks
related to the Fugro acquisition have significantly reduced. We
base this view on CGGV's secured financing of the planned
acquisition, which includes the completion of a EUR414 million
share capital increase on Oct. 23, 2012, and the issuance of a
EUR360 million convertible bond on Nov. 15," S&P said.

"In this way, CGGV is able to finance one-third of the total
transaction price with equity. We believe that this should enable
the consolidated entity to achieve funds from operations (FFO) to
debt of 20%-25% and debt to Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA of
about 3.5x in 2013, which we deem commensurate with the current
rating," S&P said.

"We also take comfort from the fact that the terms and features
of the financing do not differ materially from those the company
had expected," S&P said.

"In our current base-case forecast we assume that fully adjusted
EBITDA (adjusted for capitalized multi-client spending) will
improve to almost US$700 million in 2012 and that the
consolidated entity will achieve US$900 million in revenue in
2013. We also anticipate an increase in the EBITDA margin due to
a cost-reduction program taking full effect and modest synergies
from the
acquisition. We expect that debt will remain elevated in 2013 at
around US$2.8 billion (fully adjusted) and anticipate that free
operating cash flow (FOCF) will remain modestly positive," S&P

"We note that CGGV's current credit metrics are weak for the
rating. However, we forecast an improvement in the company's
credit metrics on the back of our assumption that industry
conditions will also improve in the next few quarters," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that, after the Fugro
acquisition, credit metrics will be consistent with our guidance
for the ratings. It also assumes that liquidity will be at least
'adequate', although the acquisition will somewhat reduce
liquidity leeway and covenant headroom," S&P said.

"We believe CGGV's operating performance and credit ratios will
continue to improve slightly in the last quarter of 2012, given
our assessment that near- to medium-term market prospects will
become more favorable," S&P said.

"The rating factors in our anticipation that the group will
achieve adjusted FFO to debt above 20% in our base-case scenario
and moderate FOCF by mid-year 2013. We note, however, that
current credit metrics are below our guideline levels for the
rating. We will be monitoring CGGV's performance over the next
few quarters," S&P said.

"The rating could come under pressure if credit metrics do not
improve from current weak levels and/or if FOCF turns negative.
This could come from unfavorable developments in the seismic
market or operational issues, for example. We could lower the
rating if CGGV's already substantial debt increased further, say
as a result of substantial new vessel orders," S&P said.

"Rating upside appears remote, as it would require material debt
reduction and improved FOCF, which we do not anticipate in our
base-case scenario," S&P said.


118000 AG: Files for Insolvency
The Management Board of 118000 AG on Nov. 29 resolved to file for
insolvency with the competent insolvency courts with regard to
the assets of 118000 AG and its material subsidiaries, especially
118000 Innovations GmbH, 118000 Telefonvermittlungs GmbH and GD

HYPO TIROL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BFSR to E+; Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Hypo Tirol Bank AG's
long-term debt and deposit ratings to Baa2 from A2 and its
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E+ from D,
equivalent to a standalone credit assessment of b1 from ba2
previously, reflecting the continuous challenges the bank is
facing in restoring its risk profile as well as its vulnerability
to a more adverse economic environment. Concurrently, Hypo
Tirol's short-term ratings were downgraded to Prime-2 from Prime-
1. Further, the bank's subordinated MTN program was downgraded to
(P)B2 from (P)A3, reflecting the lowering of Hypo Tirol's BFSR
and the removal of regional government and systemic support
uplift from the rating of this debt class. All ratings carry a
negative outlook.

The rating actions conclude Moody's review, initiated on 9
December 2011 and extended on June 6, 2012, that was triggered by
very large impairment charges at the bank's Italian subsidiary
which resulted in a capital injection from its sole owner, the
Austrian Federal State of Tyrol (unrated) and the recent approval
by the European Commission (EC) of a restructuring plan as a
prerequisite for compensation for state aid.



The decision to lower Hypo Tirol's standalone credit assessment
to E+/b1 reflects Moody's view that the bank continues to display
weak financial fundamentals and heightened vulnerability to a
more adverse economic environment despite the recent
recapitalization measure and in view of the EC's imposed
restructuring plan which
-- once executed -- will leave the bank with a much more
constrained regional footprint and franchise with little
potential for sufficient future earnings generation capacity, in
Moody's view.

On October 4, 2012, the EC approved the restructuring plan for
Hypo Tirol and also confirmed that the EUR220 million capital
injection from the State of Tyrol was in line with EU state aid
rules. The key components of the restructuring plan are a
balance-sheet reduction of around 30% of the bank's total assets
to EUR8 billion by 2015 from EUR11 billion as per unaudited,
interim June 30, 2012 financials and the discontinuation of
lending activities in Germany and Italy (except in South Tyrol).
Following the capital injection, Moody's expects a year-end 2012
Tier 1 capital ratio of 9.5% -- from 6.1% as per audited year-end
2011 financials -- which is in the middle of the range of 9%-10%,
which has been agreed with the EC as part of Hypo Tirol's
restructuring plan.

Furthermore, Hypo Tirol carries a very large portfolio of problem
loans. The bank's non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was 11.7% at
year-end 2011, driven by a high amount of NPLs in its Italian
loan portfolio that includes significant exposures to commercial
real estate (CRE) loans. The credit quality of Hypo Tirol's
domestic loan book is similar to its Austrian peers, however, it
exhibits concentration risks from relatively large single-ticket
exposures. Against this background and in light of the continued
difficult operating conditions for banks in Italy, Moody's
remains concerned that the total coverage ratio for problem loans
-- which was around 41% as of year-end 2011 -- may prove
insufficient to compensate for crystallizing losses during the
anticipated extended work-out period, and even more so under a
more adverse economic scenario, thereby potentially eroding the
bank's capital base.

At the same time, Moody's believes that the bank's earnings-
generation capacity will remain weak. The anticipated balance
sheet reduction and the retrenchment of business activities to
Hypo Tirol's core regions, which are characterized by high
competition and generally low profitability -- reasons that led
the bank to expand to Germany and Italy years ago -- are likely
to expose Hypo Tirol to reduced revenue prospects, while its
ability to reduce operating cost will be limited due to a lack of
scale. Hypo Tirol reported a net profit of EUR7 million through
the first six months of 2012.

Over the medium term, Moody's considers Hypo Tirol's liquidity
and funding position to be comfortable, as the bank continues to
benefit from sizeable guaranteed debt (a deficiency guarantee
provided by the State of Tyrol) and also manages a large
unencumbered, central-bank eligible securities portfolio.
However, Hypo Tirol faces a considerable funding gap in 2016 and
2017, when the majority of grandfathered debt matures. As a
result, Moody's expects that the bank will strive to pre-fund a
material share of these looming funding needs in the next few
years in order to keep the balance sheet at the expected EUR8
billion level from 2015 onwards.

As a result, and given the bank's weak earnings capacity, the
downgrade to a standalone credit assessment of E+/b1 with
negative outlook indicates heightened risk over the medium term
that Hypo Tirol may require further capital support as problem
loans remain large compared to the bank's overall loss absorption
capacity including its capital buffers and loan loss reserves.


The downgrade of Hypo Tirol's long-term debt and deposit ratings
follows the lowering of the bank's standalone credit assessment
and reflects Moody's assumption of very high probability of
external support, which implies that Hypo Tirol would likely
benefit from multiple sources of support (in particular from the
State of Tyrol, its sole owner, and systemic support). In Moody's
opinion, these levels of support are closely interlinked for
public sector banks and the unified approach of applying support
uplift from multiple sources anticipates concerted support
solutions in case of need. These support assumptions reflect the
track record of assistance from the State of Tyrol -- as again
demonstrated by the recent capital injection -- and are further
underpinned by the fact that the State continues to guarantee
large portions of the bank's liabilities, with major maturities
not before 2016. Moody's support assessments give Hypo Tirol's
debt and deposit ratings a five-notch uplift from its b1
standalone credit assessment. The negative outlook on the long-
term ratings follows the negative outlook on the bank's BFSR.


Hypo Tirol's provisional subordinated medium-term note (MTN)
program was downgraded to (P)B2 from (P)A3 which is one notch
below the bank's b1 adjusted standalone credit assessment, and
excludes external support factors like regional government or
systemic support. Please refer to Moody's press release from
June 6, 2012, when the rating agency downgraded senior
subordinated debt for Austrian banks, following the removal of
assumption of government (or systemic) support for this debt

Senior subordinated debt ratings are notched off the banks'
adjusted standalone credit profile. This reflects Moody's view
that regional government and systemic support for the
subordinated debt of Austrian banks may no longer be sufficiently
predictable or reliable to warrant incorporating uplift into
Moody's ratings.


Currently, there is no upwards rating pressure as indicated by
the negative outlook on Hypo Tirol's ratings. In the longer term,
upwards pressure on Hypo Tirol's standalone credit strength and
deposit rating could arise from (1) a reduction of its balance
sheet as mandated by the EC restructuring plan without impairing
the bank's locally focused franchise; (2) running-down the
Italian loan portfolio without requiring additional capital
support; and (3) over the medium term, improving the bank's
underlying risk-adjusted profitability allowing for higher
internal capital generation to improve the bank's loss-absorption

Downwards pressure could develop on Hypo Tirol's standalone
credit profile if further asset-quality deterioration, in
particular as a result of the bank's elevated stock of problem
loans compared to its provisioning and capital levels, triggers
additional capital support. In Moody's view, this is likely to
take the form of regional local government support, in view of
the State's ownership of the bank, its historical track record to
support the bank and continued high willingness and ability to
provide support to Hypo Tirol, in case of need.

In addition, downward pressure on the bank's long-term ratings
could result from pressure on Hypo Tirol's standalone credit
profile, a change in its ownership structure, a deterioration in
the implied creditworthiness of the State of Tyrol, and/or a
weakening of Moody's systemic support assumptions.


The following ratings of Hypo Tirol were downgraded:

- Standalone BFSR at E+, mapping to a standalone credit
   assessment of b1;

- Bank debt and deposits rating at Baa2;

- Subordinated MTN program (LT2) at (P)B2;

- Short-term ratings at Prime-2.

All the above ratings carry negative outlooks.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June

LANTIQ DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Lifts CFR to Caa1; Outlook Developing
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Lantiq Deutschland GmbH's
corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa1 from Caa2 and its
probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa2 from Caa3.
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded the company's amended
syndicated secured term loan to Caa1 with a loss given default
assessment of 3 (LGD3, 31%) from Caa2 (LGD3, 33%). This concludes
the rating review for downgrade initiated by Moody's on 3
September 2012. The outlook on all ratings is developing.

The rating action follows the company's announcement that it has
reached agreement with its lenders on a second amendment to its
senior secured credit agreement, which became effective on 16
November 2012.

Key terms of the amendment include (1) Lantiq's reduction of the
face value of its syndicated secured term loan to US$55.75
million, from an outstanding amount of US$110.75 million at the
time of signing of the amendment, by way of a mandatory
prepayment, using proceeds from a capital increase provided by
the company's sponsor; (2) the resetting of financial covenants;
and (3) the elimination of the quarterly debt amortization, with
the outstanding amount of US$55.75 million due only at maturity.
The final maturity remains unchanged (November 16, 2015).


  Issuer: Lantiq Deutschland GmbH

     Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Caa2 from Caa3

     Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Caa1 from Caa2

     Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to Caa1, LGD3,
     31% from Caa2, LGD3, 33%

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: Lantiq Deutschland GmbH

    Outlook, Changed To Developing From Rating Under Review

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects that under the second amendment to
its senior secured credit agreement, Lantiq has reduced its debt
significantly and its financial covenants have been reset," says
Kathrin Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst for Lantiq. "This
agreement has eliminated the imminent risk of a default under the
original credit agreement, eased near-term pressure on Lantiq's
liquidity profile and provided the company with more flexibility
to restructure the business and turn around its poor operating

The upgrade also reflects the continued liquidity support
provided by Lantiq's major shareholder, which has also improved
Lantiq's cash position with US$26 million available cash for
working capital purposes under the second amendment. However,
Moody's recognizes that there is no legal obligation on the
sponsor to support Lantiq's liquidity requirements and,
therefore, it may not provide tangible support in future.

Lantiq's revenues and earnings fell significantly short of
expectations in the current fiscal year as a result of (1)
reduced investment spending by telecom carriers in a muted
macroeconomic environment; (2) lower-than-expected revenues
generated by new product launches; and (3) lower demand for
older-generation products. An improvement in Lantiq's earnings
and cash flow generation is very much dependent on telecom
carriers' future investments in applications and on increasing
market acceptance of new product launches. A significant delay in
halting the cash burn from its operations would likely require
Lantiq to take additional restructuring measures and could cast
doubt on the long-term viability of the business.

The one-notch differential between the PDR and the CFR reflects
the company's all bank debt structure. In Moody's experience,
such debt structures have historically resulted in lower-than-
average LGD rates.

In line with its LGD approach, Moody's groups Lantiq's debt into
two classes of creditor protection: (1) the Us$55.75 million
worth of senior secured term loans and around US$63 million trade
payables per June 30, 2012 at LGD3; and (2) approximately US$16
million worth of pension obligations and short-term lease
rejection claims ranked LGD5. The term loans benefit from
guarantees by Lantiq HoldCo S.a.r.l. and other intermediate
holding companies, as well as from security interests in
substantially all of the assets of the major operating
subsidiaries of the group.

Other factors considered in Lantiq's ratings are (1) the
company's small scale, concentrated customer base and narrow
product range directed at a segment of the communications
equipment market with limited growth potential; (2) the company's
exposure to a technology transition with slower-than-expected
take-up; and (3) the benefits from operating as a fabless design
house, which increases operating flexibility and reduces capex
requirements but also increases dependency on a few large
semiconductor foundries and requires a stringent management of
the supply chain.

The developing rating outlook on the ratings reflects the
uncertainty about when Lantiq will be able to once again achieve
profitability and positive cash flow generation.


Upward rating pressure is currently limited but sustained
improvements in Lantiq's liquidity profile, supported by solid
free cash flow generation and positive operating margins, could
result in a positive rating action.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if there is
ongoing erosion of Lantiq's operating performance and the company
continues to generate negative free cash flows, resulting in
stress on its liquidity profile and increasing the risk of a
near-term default. Rating pressure would also arise if Lantiq's
sponsor ceased to provide support to the company.


The principal methodology used in rating Lantiq Deutschland GmbH
was Global Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in
November 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Lantiq Deutschland GmbH, headquartered in Neubiberg (Munich,
Germany), is a leading designer of communications semiconductors
deployed by major carriers in traditional voice and broadband
access networks around the world. Lantiq generated revenues of
around US$260 million in the first nine months of fiscal year
ended September 30, 2012.

PFLEIDERER AG: Completes Financial Restructuring
The restructuring of Pfleiderer AG has been brought to a
successful conclusion.  After the insolvency plan took legal
effect, the Local Court in Duesseldorf acted on Nov. 27 to enter
the capital measures approved by the creditors' meeting on
September 12, 2012, the reduction of equity capital of Pfleiderer
AG to zero and the subsequent capital increase with the complete
exclusion of subscription rights among former shareholders, into
the Commercial Register of the Regional Court of Duesseldorf.  As
a result of this action, Atlantik S.A., Luxemburg, is now the new
and sole shareholder.  In light of the reduction in the company's
capital to zero, the shares held by former shareholders ceased to
exist.  Stock exchange trading will be discontinued.

As part of the steps agreed upon in the insolvency plan, nearly
EUR900 million in liabilities held by Pfleiderer AG will be
forgone.  Given the restored earnings power of the Pfleiderer
Group, the approximately EUR310 million in financial liabilities
on the company's books will correspond to debt levels typically
seen in the market.  At the same time, the company will have
adequate equity of about EUR165 million, representing a solid
foundation for the company to finance itself on a sustainable,
independent basis.

In addition to the financial restructuring action, the company
has carried out a sweeping reorganization of its business
activities since the end of 2010.  As part of this process, the
money-losing businesses in the United States and Canada as well
as operations in Europe and activities in Russia were sold.  All
sales were successfully completed within the allotted time
period, a move that played a major role in the decision by the
companies' creditors to forgo the debts of the Pfleiderer Group
on this scale.

Following the restructuring, the Pfleiderer Group consists of the
profitable Business Center Western Europe, particularly the
production and sales companies active in Germany, and continues
to hold a majority stake in Pfleiderer Grajewo S.A., which has a
strong market position in Poland's engineered-wood market.

As part of the insolvency plan, the headquarters of Pfleiderer AG
was relocated from Neumarkt/Upper Palatinate to Dsseldorf.
Pfleiderer Holzwerkstoffe GmbH, under whose umbrella all
activities in the German market are placed, will remain in

The driving forces behind the success of the reorganization and
the Pfleiderer Group's continued business operations were the
contributions that all sides made to the restructuring effort.
As a result, it was possible to prevent the assets of the
operating business from becoming part of an insolvency proceeding
and to carry out a professional reorganization of Pfleiderer AG
as a holding company without negatively impacting the operating
business.  As a result, all 3,600 jobs were saved.

Hans-Joachim Ziems, Executive Board member of Pfleiderer AG,
said: "The registration of the capital measures has brought a
successful conclusion to a nearly two-year, extremely complicated
restructuring process.  I am delighted that it was possible to
turn Pfleiderer into a healthy and powerful company in the
engineered-wood industry and save about 3,600 jobs.  The
execution of the insolvency process under self-administration
according to the German Act to Facilitate Company Reorganization
proved extremely helpful."

The formal conclusion of the insolvency process is expected in
the coming few days.


On March 28, 2012, the Executive Board of Pfleiderer AG submitted
a request for the insolvency process to begin.  The aim was to
reorganize the company as part of an insolvency proceeding
administered by the company itself.  This became necessary after
a restructuring concept that was supported by an overwhelming
majority of creditors and shareholders and that was agreed
upon by the company and its main creditors on May 12, 2011, in an
out-of-court process was unable to be carried out due to legal
challenges individual holders of a hybrid bond and several
shareholders filed against the restructuring effort.  Finally, on
September 12, 2012, the insolvency plan was approved during a
discussion and coordination meeting by the company's shareholders
and creditors with majorities of more than 99% each.

The Pfleiderer AG -- is a producer
of engineered wood.  The company employs approximately 4,900
people and operates 16 locations in North America, Western and
Eastern Europe producing engineered wood, surface finished
products and laminate flooring.

* GERMANY: Corporate Bankruptcies Likely to Soar in 2013
Deutsche Welle reports that while the number of insolvencies in
Germany has been declining this year, experts have said
bankruptcies will occur more often in 2013.

Both the corporate sector and private households will be
affected, DW states.

Germany's credit reporting agency Creditreform on Thursday warned
the number of insolvencies in the country would rise again in
2013, following an expected decline this year, DW relates.

It said there would be about 30,500 corporate bankruptcies across
Germany next year, some 1,000 more than in 2012 when insolvencies
were forecast to log the lowest level since 2007, which is the
year before the global financial crisis set in, DW discloses.

The agency pointed out creditors had not got back EUR38.5 billion
(US$50 billion) as insolvencies affected also a number of really
big companies, DW states.

Helmut Roedl, Creditreform's board member, said in a statement
that he expected about 350,000 people to lose their jobs this
year and next year again as a direct result of bankruptcies, DW

According to DW, Creditreform stated the retail sector had become
much more stable despite some spectacular insolvencies this year,
affecting drugstore chain Schlecker and mail-order giant
Neckermann.  The agency, as cited by DW, said that most
vulnerable were courier services, discotheques and pubs.


KAUPTHING BANK: Winding-Up Board No Date Yet for Repayment Plan
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that the board
that's winding up failed Icelandic lender Kaupthing Bank hf will
be unable to provide creditors with a date for when it
plans to present a repayment plan amid reports the central bank
may block such a move.

"Due to uncertainties on the timing of any formal response from
the central bank of Iceland, it's currently not possible to
provide a revised target launch date for a potential composition
proposal," Bloomberg quotes the bank as saying on Friday in an
e-mailed statement.  The bank continues "to move forward with
preparations for a composition proposal and is prepared to work
closely with the central bank of Iceland to address any concerns
or questions that may arise."

Morgunbladid reported earlier this month, without saying where it
got the information, that the Reykjavik-based central bank
opposes composition agreements with the creditors of Kaupthing,
Glitnir Bank hf and Landsbanki Islands hf, which could lead to
bankruptcy proceedings, Bloomberg recounts.

                      About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland Kaupthing Bank -- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations
in more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of
services including retail banking, corporate finance, asset
management, brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private
wealth management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to
the Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the
Icelandic Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the
Bankruptcy Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Estimated Value of Assets Increases
The Winding-up Board of Landsbanki Islands hf. (LBI) presented
updated information to creditors on the estimated value of the
bank's asset portfolio, based on its situation as of November 30,
2012.  The bank has achieved considerable success in achieving
recoveries, resulting in a real increase in the estimated value
of assets over the previous quarter of almost ISK11 billion.  The
total increase, taking into consideration ISK exchange rate
movements against major currencies, amounted to ISK21 billion.

The estimated value of LBI's assets has been steadily increasing
since the bank's winding-up proceedings commenced.  Based on the
ISK exchange rate as of April 22, 2009 against those foreign
currencies which comprise the bank's asset portfolio, the
estimated value of the asset portfolio, including three partial
payments to priority creditors, rose from ISK1,104 billion as of
April 30, 2009 to ISK1,517 billion as of September 30, 2012, a
total increase of ISK403 billion or 36%.  The estimated value of
LBI's assets is therefore about 200 bn higher than estimated
priority claims.

                  Partial Payments to Creditors

The Winding-up Board made partial payments to priority creditors
in the winding-up proceedings for the third time on October 5
2012.  In this instance, total payments were equivalent to around
ISK82 billion.  The Winding-up Board has therefore paid over
ISK660 billion on aggregate in three partial payments, or around
50% of claims of priority creditors in accordance with Art.112 of
Bankruptcy Act no. 21/1991.  Further information on the partial
payments and the bank's operations are available on the bank's
Web site.


CAPPOQUIN POULTRY: High Court Approves Rescue Scheme
Donal O'Donovan and Colm Kelpie at reports that
the High Court has approved a rescue scheme for Cappoquin

The agreement sees local poultry producers co-operative Cappoquin
Poultry Co-Op buy the company for EUR650,000 and take it out of
examinership, discloses.

The court approved the deal earlier last week,
relates.  It is effective from Monday, Nov. 26,

Michael McAteer, of accountants Grant Thornton, was appointed to
both Cappoquin Poultry and a related company, Cappoquin Poultry
Holdings, in August after being informed the business had debts
of EUR6 million, including EUR3.9 million owed to its largest
unsecured creditor, Henry Good, a supplier of chicken feed, recounts.

Henry Good Ltd. petitioned the court for Mr. McAteer's
appointment on a number of grounds, including that Cappoquin
Poultry was insolvent and to prevent the chicken processor's
assets from being stripped, discloses.

The money will go to pay fully all preferred creditors, including
any tax bills, plus debts owed to secured creditors, says.

Unsecured creditors will be paid just 2.5 cent in the euro, states.

Cappoquin Poultry is a Co Waterford chicken processing company.

FEDERAL GRID: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'bb+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BBB' issue
rating to the proposed limited-recourse senior unsecured notes to
be issued by special-purpose vehicle (SPV) Federal Grid Finance
Ltd. (not rated). "We have also assigned our 'BBB' issue rating
to a proposed back-to-back loan by Federal Grid Finance to
Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System (FGC; BBB/Stable/--
, Russia national scale 'ruAAA')," S&P said.

The notes are issued for the sole purpose of funding the back-to-
back loan, which FGC will use for general corporate purposes and,
in particular, to finance its investment program.

"Subject to the terms of the trust deed, noteholders cannot
enforce any provision of the loan agreement or have direct
recourse to FGC as borrower except through an action by the
trustee," S&P said.

"Federal Grid Finance is incorporated as a private limited
company under Irish law. We have not assigned a corporate credit
rating to Federal Grid Finance. The company is an orphan SPV,
whose activity is limited only to the issue of the notes and the
onlending of the proceeds to FGC. These features offset the fact
that neither FGC nor any of its subsidiaries guarantee or provide
credit support to Federal Grid Finance, and that the noteholders
do not have a direct claim on the FGC's cash flow and assets,"
S&P said.

"We have equalized the issue rating on the notes with the issuer
credit rating on FGC because, in our view, the structure allows
the noteholders to ultimately rely on FGC to service and repay
the debt in full and on a timely basis. We also factored in
Federal Grid Finance's limited object and our view that it
generally complies with our bankruptcy remoteness criteria. The
issue rating also reflects the benefits we see from gross-up
clauses, which enable Federal Grid Finance to pass-through its
ongoing, financial, and tax expenses to FGC, including if it were
subject to Russia's withholding tax should the relief under the
'Double Taxation Treaty Between Russia And Ireland'  signed on
April 4, 2004, not be available," S&P said.

"Any change to the preliminary documentation related to the pass-
through features and other legal aspects of the transaction could
have a material effect on the issue rating on the notes," S&P

"The ratings on FGC, which is 79.55% state-owned, reflect our
opinion that there is a 'very high' likelihood that the Russian
government will provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to the company in the event of financial distress. We
assess FGC's stand-alone credit profile at 'bb+'," S&P said.

IRISH BANK: Takes Legal Action Against Ernst & Young Over Audit
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that former Anglo Irish
Bank has taken legal action against Ernst & Young, auditors to
the bank before the financial crisis and until the lender was
taken it into state ownership in 2009.

The state-owned bank, now called Irish Bank Resolution
Corporation, said the case relates to the firm's role as auditors
before the bank's nationalization but it would not elaborate on
the details of the action, the Irish Times notes.

The bank issued the legal proceedings on Tuesday, the Irish Times
says, citing High Court records.

Ernst & Young confirmed it was aware of the legal proceedings but
could not comment as it had not received the details of IBRC's
proceedings, the Irish Times notes.

The timing of the action is thought to be aimed at beating a
six-year legal time limit that would have blocked the action, the
Irish Times states.

According to the Irish Times, Ernst & Young signed off the bank's
accounts for the year to the end of September 2006 on December 5,
2006.  These accounts are believed to be crucial to the bank's
legal action, the Irish Times states.

Proceedings had to be issued against the firm before December 5
as the law bars civil cases being taken after six years, the
Irish Times discloses.

Ernst & Young has been criticized for failing to spot the full
extent of the borrowings of Anglo chairman Sean FitzPatrick,
which had been concealed by the bank for eight years, the Irish
Times relates.

The concealment of the loans hastened the demise of Anglo when
the issue came to public light in December 2008, the Irish

IBRC, as cited by the Irish Times, said the action was part of
its continuing work to wind down the former Anglo and Irish
Nationwide, and deal with "legacy issues across every area of
those institutions" before and after their nationalization.

Law firm McCann FitzGerald is representing the bank, the Irish
Times discloses.

Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited provides business
banking, treasury, and wealth management services to personal,
corporate, and institutional customers primarily in Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.  The company was formerly
known as Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited and changed its
name to Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited in October
2011.  Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited is headquartered
in Dublin, Ireland.

RMF EURO IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class V Notes to 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed our ratings on the
class I, II, III, IVA, and IVB notes issued by RMF Euro CDO IV
PLC. "At the same time, we lowered our rating on the class V
Notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report,
dated Oct. 8, 2012," S&P said.

"RMF Euro CDO IV has been amortizing since the end of its
reinvestment period in May 2012. Since the last rating action we
took in the transaction, on Oct. 18, 2011, the aggregate
collateral balance has decreased by 4.26% to EUR414.5 million
from EUR433.0 million," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class at
each rating level. In our analysis, we used the reported
portfolio balance that we consider to be performing
(EUR410,692,289), the current weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered appropriate.
We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using
alternative default patterns, and levels, in conjunction with
different interest and currency stress scenarios," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have observed that EUR9.3 million of the
class I notes have paid down since our last rating action. We
have also observed that overcollateralization test results, the
credit quality of the pool, and credit enhancement remained
stable since our October 2011 rating action. We have also noted
an increase in the weighted-average spread to 402 basis points
(bps) from 345 bps over the same period," S&P said.

"During our review, we observed that non-euro-denominated assets
made up 2.80% of the aggregate collateral balance. These assets
are hedged under a cross-currency swap agreement. In our cash
flow analysis, we considered scenarios where the hedging
counterparty does not perform and where the transaction is
therefore exposed to changes in currency rates," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the credit enhancement available to the class I
and II notes is consistent with their current ratings, taking
into account the results of our credit and cash flow analysis and
the application of our 2012 counterparty criteria," S&P said. "We
have therefore affirmed our ratings on the class I and II notes."

"Our ratings on the class III, IVA, and IVB notes are lower than
the ratings on any of the counterparties in the transaction.
Therefore, applying our 2012 counterparty criteria would not
constrain these ratings. We have affirmed our ratings on the
class III, IVA, and IVB notes because our analysis indicates that
the credit enhancement available to these notes is consistent
with the ratings currently assigned."

"We have lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our rating on the
class V notes because our rating is constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test. This is a
supplemental stress test that we introduced in our 2009 criteria
update for corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The
results of our stress test showed that the level of credit
enhancement available to the class V notes would be limited if
the largest obligor were to default, when we assumed a recovery
rate of 5%," S&P said.

RMF Euro CDO IV PLC is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms. The transaction closed in May 2006 and is
managed by Pemba Credit Advisers.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class              Rating
             To              From

EUR444 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

V            B+ (sf)         BB (sf)

Rating Affirmed

I            AA+ (sf)
II           A+ (sf)
III          BBB+ (sf)
IVA          BB+ (sf)
IVB          BB+ (sf)

TITAN EUROPE 2006-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on various classes of
notes in Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC, Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC, and
Titan Europe 2006-3 PLC.

"On March 2, 2012 and May 17, 2012, we placed on CreditWatch
negative certain ratings in Titan Europe 2006-1, 2006-2, and
2006-3 following notification that HSBC Bank PLC (AA-/Negative/A-
1+) had declared a liquidity facility event of default in Titan
Europe 2006-1 and Titan Europe 2006-2. This event occurred
because principal repayments had been applied to repay
noteholders, rather
than to repay the liquidity facility and HSBC Bank therefore
cancelled its commitment as liquidity facility provider in these
transactions," S&P said.

On July 23, 2012, the Titan Europe 2006-1 and 2006-2 issuers
published notices stating that:

    Following communication between the issuer, the cash manager,
    the servicer, the special servicer, the liquidity facility
    provider, and the note trustee, they have agreed the
    interpretation and operation of certain ambiguous provisions
    of the liquidity facility agreement, the cash management
    agreement, and the servicing agreement.

    In addition, they have determined that a proportion of
    principal repayments made to class A noteholders should have
    been used to repay the liquidity facility provider for
    liquidity drawings.

    It is intended that this misallocation will be corrected by
    debiting the noteholders' accounts and crediting the
    liquidity facility provider's accounts.

    In light of the above, HSBC Bank has agreed to waive the
    alleged liquidity facility event of default and agreed to
    extend the liquidity facility term dates.

"Following the clarification of the interpretation and operation
of certain provisions in the transaction documents in Titan
Europe 2006-1 and 2006-2 we no longer consider Titan Europe 2006-
3 to be exposed to the risk of cancellation of the liquidity
facility," S&P said.

"We have therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
all affected ratings in Titan Europe 2006-1, 2006-2, and 2006-3,"
S&P said.


"On Nov. 7, 2012, we published our updated criteria for rating
European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). The
criteria update refines the approach to rating European CMBS
transactions, and provides a more transparent framework for
analyzing the commercial real estate assets and transaction
structures commonly associated with European CMBS. We expect that
the criteria update will have a moderate impact on outstanding
ratings on European CMBS, based on a sample of transactions we
tested. The impact on investment-grade ratings is likely to be
greater than that on speculative-grade ratings," S&P said.

"These criteria will be effective for all in-scope ratings from
Dec. 6, 2012, at which time we expect to place all the ratings
likely to be affected on CreditWatch. We expect to resolve any
rating changes within six months of the effective date of the
criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class                   Rating
            To                        From

Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC
EUR723.303 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate and
Variable-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           AA- (sf)                  AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
X           AA- (sf)                  AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB (sf)                   BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC
EUR862.169 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           A- (sf)                   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB+ (sf)                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BB- (sf)                  BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D           B (sf)                    B (sf)/Watch Neg
E           B- (sf)                   B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Titan Europe 2006-3 PLC
EUR943.751 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           BB+ (sf)                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

TITAN EUROPE 2006-5: S&P Affirms 'D' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on the class A1, X, A2,
A3, and B notes in Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC. "Our ratings on the
class C, D, E, and F notes remain unaffected by the rating
actions," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our view that the notes have become more
vulnerable to further cash flow disruptions. We have also removed
these notes from CreditWatch negative following the resolution of
a declaration made by the liquidity facility provider, HSBC Bank
PLC (AA-/Negative/A-1+), that a liquidity facility event of
default had occurred," S&P said.

"At the same time, we have withdrawn our rating on the class X
notes in line with our criteria for rating interest-only
securities," S&P said.

"We have also affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C, D, E,
and F notes, which have already experienced interest shortfalls
on previous payment dates," S&P said.

Titan 2006-5 is a European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction that closed in December 2006.

                      INTEREST SHORTFALL

"According to the October 2012 cash manager report, the class A2,
A3, B, C, D, E, and F notes experienced interest shortfalls.
Although the existing interest shortfall on the class A2, A3, and
B notes is, in our view, minor, we believe that the risk of
additional interest shortfalls on these classes, and the class A1
notes, has increased. In our opinion, the issuer's ability to
service the senior classes of notes will likely deteriorate,
given the transaction's cash flow mechanics. In light of these
factors, we believe that the senior classes of notes have become
more vulnerable to future cash flow disruptions," S&P said.

"We understand that the excess spread, which is distributed to
the class X notes, is not available to mitigate interest
shortfalls. The issuer relies on the liquidity facility to
address timely payment of interest on the notes. However, the
transaction documents indicate to us that the liquidity facility
is not available to cover interest shortfalls under the notes, if
such shortfalls have resulted from periodic fees or special
servicing fees," S&P said.

"We have therefore lowered our ratings on the class A1, X, A2,
A3, and B notes," S&P said.

"At the same time, we have also withdrawn our rating on the class
X notes in line with our criteria for rating interest-only
securities. For interest-only securities that reference either
the entire asset pool of a transaction or an amortization
schedule or formula, we maintain their current ratings until all
principal- and interest-paying classes rated 'AA-' or higher have
been retired or downgraded below that rating level--at which time
we will withdraw these interest-only ratings," S&P said.

                         LIQUIDITY FACILITY

"On May 17, 2012, we placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings
on the class A1, X, A2, A3, and B notes in Titan Europe 2006-5
following notification that HSBC had declared a liquidity
facility event of default in Titan Europe 2006-1 and Titan Europe
2006-2. The liquidity facility event of default occurred because
principal repayments had been applied to repay noteholders rather
than to repay the liquidity facility and HSBC therefore cancelled
its commitment as liquidity facility provider in these
transactions. HSBC Bank is also the liquidity facility provider
in Titan Europe 2006-5; therefore the transaction was exposed to
similar risks, in our opinion," S&P said.

On July 23, 2012 the issuers of Titan Europe 2006-1 and Titan
Europe 2006-2 published notices stating that:

    Following communication between the issuer, the cash manager,
    the servicer, the special servicer, the liquidity facility
    provider and the note trustee, they have agreed the
    interpretation and operation of certain ambiguous provisions
    of the liquidity facility agreement, the cash management
    agreement, and the servicing agreement.

    In addition, they have determined that a proportion of
    principal repayments made to class A noteholders should have
    been used to repay the liquidity facility provider for
    liquidity drawings.

    It is intended that this misallocation will be corrected by
    debiting the noteholders' accounts and crediting the
    liquidity facility provider's accounts.

    In light of the above, HSBC has agreed to waive the alleged
    liquidity facility event of default and agreed to extend the
    liquidity facility term dates.

"Following the clarification of the interpretation and operation
of certain ambiguous provisions in the transaction documents in
Titan Europe 2006-1 and Titan Europe 2006-2 we no longer consider
Titan Europe 2006-5 to be exposed to the risk of cancellation of
the liquidity facility," S&P said.

"We have therefore removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings
on Titan Europe 2006-5's class A1, X, A2, A3, and B notes," S&P


"On Nov. 7, 2012, we published our updated criteria for rating
European CMBS. The criteria update refines the approach to rating
European CMBS transactions, and provides a more transparent
framework for analyzing the commercial real estate assets and
transaction structures commonly associated with European CMBS. We
expect that the criteria update will have a moderate impact on
outstanding ratings on European CMBS, based on a sample of
transactions we tested. The impact on investment-grade ratings is
likely to be greater than that on speculative-grade ratings," S&P

"These criteria will be effective for all in-scope ratings from
Dec. 6, 2012, at which time we expect to place all the ratings
likely to be affected on CreditWatch. We expect to resolve any
rating changes within six months of the effective date of the
criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


Class       Rating                    Rating
            To                        From

Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC
EUR660.97 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1          A- (sf)                   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
X           A- (sf)                   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A2          BB+ (sf)                  A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A3          BB- (sf)                  A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           CCC- (sf)                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Withdrawn

X           NR (sf)                   A- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C           D (sf)
D           D (sf)
E           D (sf)
F           D (sf)

NR - Not rated


WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'B+' from 'BB-' its
corporate credit rating on Wind Telecomunuicazioni SpA (Wind),
Italy's second-largest integrated alternative telecommunications

"At the same time, we lowered our issue rating on Wind's senior
secured facilities and notes to 'BB-' from 'BB'; our issue
ratings on Wind's third-lien (high-yield) notes to 'B+' from 'BB-
'; and our issue ratings on the subordinated payment-in-kind
(PIK) notes to 'B-' from 'B'," S&P said.

All ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed on Oct 22, 2012.

"The downgrade results from our forecast of no meaningful
improvement in Wind's capital structure over the medium term. We
expect the competitive market, the impact of regulatory actions,
and high interest and tax payments to combine to limit free cash
flow generation and EBITDA growth over the next couple of years,
which would stall the company's efforts to reduce debt," S&P

"Our base-case credit scenario assumes that the tougher
macroeconomy, competition, and impact of the mobile termination
rates (MTR) cut will mean that average revenue per user could
fall further at Wind's core mobile segment. We therefore forecast
a decline of 2%-5% in Wind's mobile revenues in 2013, despite
continued, but slowing, subscriber growth. We also assume that
revenue from Wind's fixed-line segment will decline by around 5%
as the number of fixed-line wholesale subscribers falls, in line
with Wind's strategy to focus on its higher- margin local loop
unbundling (LLU) segment. That said, we assume that an increase
in LLU subscribers and a reduction in marketing costs will mean
that the company's EBITDA margin will improve marginally in 2013
to 38%-39%. We therefore forecast an additional EBITDA decline of
around 3% in 2013, similar to our base-case scenario for 2012,"
S&P said.

"As a result, we anticipate that Wind's Standard & Poor's-
adjusted leverage will reach about 5.4x in 2013. We see no
deleveraging prospects below 5.0x over the medium term without
some form of refinancing at the parent company level, which we do
not factor into our base-case credit scenario for Wind. The lack
of deleveraging partly reflects our inclusion of rapidly accruing
PIK notes in our adjusted debt calculations. We also don't
anticipate any improvement in free cash flow generation at Wind
over the medium term given the high interest burden and higher
tax payments. Finally we view Wind's adjusted cash interest cover
as relatively weak and forecast that it will be about 2.5x in
2013. We have, therefore, revised our assessment of Wind's
financial risk profile to 'highly leveraged,'" S&P said.

"Wind is fully owned by VimpelCom Ltd. (BB/Stable/--). Although
Wind's shareholders may step in to partially refinance some of
Wind's debt, thereby improving the group's cash flows, we have
not yet seen any evidence of this happening. We therefore do not
factor such a scenario into Wind's corporate credit rating," S&P

"That said, we do view Wind's business risk profile as
'satisfactory,' given that it is still improving its market
position in the Italian mobile market and maintaining high
profitability, despite the difficult market conditions," S&P

"We view Wind's liquidity as 'adequate' under our criteria,
despite our projection that headroom under Wind's amended
maintenance covenants for its senior secured facilities will fall
to lower than 15%, which we consider less than adequate under our
criteria," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Wind's liquidity as 'adequate' partly relies
on our expectation of some sort of support from its parent
company, VimpelCom, in the case of a liquidity gap," S&P said.

"We expect the ratio of liquidity sources to uses to exceed 1.2x
in 2013, mainly due to limited debt amortization. Given that we
expect cash balances to be low and free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation to be limited, liquidity will depend heavily on
the availability of credit under Wind's revolving credit facility
(RFC) or the company's ability to refinance debt over the next
couple of years," S&P said.

S&P projects these sources of liquidity for Dec. 31, 2012:

    Minimal cash balances at year end after repaying the
    remaining EUR250 million on its bridge loan.

    Undrawn revolving credit facility of EUR315 million, maturing
    in 2016.

    Funds from operations of EUR900 million-EUR950 million in

S&P projects these uses of liquidity for Dec. 31, 2012:

    Minimal working capital requirements.

    Capital expenditures of about EUR900 million.
    Annual debt maturities of EUR81 million.

"We forecast that covenant headroom under Wind's new total
leverage ratio could fall below 15% in 2013," S&P said.

"The issue ratings of 'BB-' on Wind's EUR3.33 billion senior
secured credit facilities (of which EUR400 million is an RCF) and
EUR3.2 billion-equivalent senior secured notes are one notch
higher than the corporate credit rating on Wind. The recovery
rating on the senior secured bank facilities and the notes is
'2', indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery
for senior secured lenders in an event of a payment default," S&P

"The issue rating on Wind Acquisition Finance S.A. (WAF)'s high-
yield notes, guaranteed by Wind, is 'B+', equal to the corporate
credit rating on Wind. The recovery rating on this debt is '4',
indicating our expectation of average 30%-50%) recovery for
noteholders in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"The issue rating on Wind's EUR750 million-equivalent PIK debt,
guaranteed by Wind Acquisition Holding Finance SpA (WAHF), is 'B-
', two notches below the corporate credit rating on Wind. The
recovery rating on the PIK debt is '6', indicating our
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery for noteholders in an
event of a payment default," S&P said.

'Recovery prospects are supported by our view that Wind would be
reorganized as a going concern in the event of a payment default.
Furthermore, our recovery expectations are supported by a fairly
comprehensive security package. The insolvency regime of Italy,
which we consider to be relatively unfavorable for creditors, is
a constraint on the recovery rating on the senior secured debt,"
S&P said.

"To determine recoveries, we simulate a default scenario. Under
this scenario, we assume operational underperformance and
significant leverage leading to an inability to refinance
maturities in 2016. We estimate EBITDA at our hypothetical point
of default to be about EUR1.58 billion," S&P said.

"We value the business as a going concern, given what we consider
to be Wind's good market position in Italy, established network
assets, and valuable customer base. In determining our default
scenario and stressed enterprise value, we assume that Wind's
parent, VimpelCom, would not provide additional support to Wind
on the path to default. At the hypothetical point of default, we
value the company at about EUR7.9 billion, using a 5.0x stressed
valuation multiple. We have slightly revised the multiple
downward, to reflect the macroeconomic environment in Italy," S&P

"After deducting enforcement costs of about EUR550 million, this
leaves around EUR7.4 billion of value available for secured
creditors. Recovery prospects for Wind's senior secured bank debt
and WAF's senior secured notes reflect our view of the estimated
value available and accessible to their respective creditors.
They also reflect the likelihood of insolvency proceedings being
impeded because Wind's main center of operations is in Italy. In
addition, the recovery ratings take into account our view of the
fairly comprehensive security package, guarantees from the main
holding and operating companies, and share pledges from material
group operating companies. The recovery ratings on the existing
senior and PIK debt also factor in our view of their contractual
and structural subordination," S&P said.

"Coverage for the high-yield notes is highly sensitive to changes
in valuation and priority debt assumptions, in our opinion. Given
the limited documentary protection and significant amount of
prior-ranking debt, recovery expectations might be vulnerable to
potential downside," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our base-case assumption that Wind
will maintain its market position in the Italian telecoms market.
We also assume that revenue will continue to grow steadily,
excluding the impact of regulatory actions, and that EBITDA
margins will be solid at around 38%. These factors will support
the maintenance of Wind's 'satisfactory' business risk profile,"
S&P said.

"We could raise the rating if Wind was to reduce its debt much
more quickly than anticipated in our base-case scenario. In
particular, we would look to see adjusted debt to EBITDA dropping
comfortably below 5.0x, and FOCF to debt sustainably increasing
to about 5%. This could happen if Wind's shareholders refinanced
a meaningful part of the group's high-interest-bearing debt," S&P

"We currently see a downgrade as unlikely, but could lower the
rating if our assessment of Wind's liquidity deteriorates, if
leverage rises to above 6x with no immediate deleveraging
prospects; or if our assessment of Wind's business risk profile
changes to 'fair' following significant deterioration in Wind's
operating performance, including a drop in profitability to
around 30%," S&P said.


MESDAG BV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
MESDAG (Charlie) B.V.'s class C and D notes. "At the same time,
we have affirmed our 'D (sf)' rating on the class E notes. The
class A and B notes remain unaffected by the rating actions," S&P

"Our ratings address timely payment of interest and payment of
principal not later than the legal final maturity date in October
2019. The rating actions have not resulted from a change in our
opinion on the default probability and likely recovery associated
with the remaining pool of loans backing the transaction," S&P

"As indicated in the October 2012 investor report, the class D
and E notes have experienced interest shortfalls. On Oct. 15,
2012, the TOR loan was partially repaid after the sale of 82
predominantly residential properties situated throughout
Germany," S&P said.

"On the October 2012 interest payment date (IPD), the recovery
proceeds received under the loan were allocated to the class A
notes, while a loss of EUR38.8 million was allocated to the class
D and E principal deficiency ledgers. We understand that the
interest calculation for the class D and E notes is now based on
the net amount of the balance of the notes and the principal
deficiency ledgers balance. Consequently, this resulted in
interest shortfalls for these classes of notes. We have therefore
lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'B (sf)' our rating on the class D notes
and have affirmed our 'D (sf)' rating on the class E notes," S&P

"As a result of the principal losses affecting the class D and E
notes, the available credit enhancement for the class C notes has
now fallen significantly to 1.53% from almost 10% at closing.
Based on the latest reported loan-to-value ratios for the Dutch
Office I and II loans, we believe that the class C notes are now
exposed to possible principal losses in the near future. We have
therefore lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our rating on the
class C notes to reflect our opinion that they have become more
vulnerable to any future principal losses," S&P said.

MESDAG (Charlie) is a European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in April 2007. It is
currently backed by six loans, down from nine at closing, secured
against residential and mixed-use commercial properties in
Germany and The Netherlands. The legal final maturity of the
notes is in October 2019.


"On Nov. 7, 2012, we published our updated criteria for rating
European CMBS. The criteria update refines the approach to rating
European CMBS transactions, and provides a more transparent
framework for analyzing the commercial real estate assets and
transaction structures commonly associated with European CMBS. We
expect that the criteria update will have a moderate impact on
outstanding ratings on European CMBS, based on a sample of
transactions we tested. The impact on investment-grade ratings is
likely to be greater than that on speculative-grade ratings," S&P

"These criteria will be effective for all in-scope ratings from
Dec. 6, 2012, at which time we expect to place all the ratings
likely to be affected on CreditWatch. We expect to resolve any
rating changes within six months of the effective date of the
criteria," S&P said.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:


MESDAG (Charlie) B.V.
EUR493.65 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Variable- and
Floating-Rate Notes

Class               Rating
          To                   From

Ratings Lowered

C         B (sf)               BB (sf)
D         D (sf)               B- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E         D (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A         A (sf)
B         A (sf)


POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL: Board Approves Standstill Deal Financing Terms
On November 23, the Board of Polimex-Mostostal agreed the content
of the preliminary agreement on the essential terms of the
Company's financing (term sheet) with financial creditors who
signed a standstill agreement with the Company in July this year.
This agreement is a binding agreement for the future specifying
the conditions of financing for the Company's creditors.

Key terms of the future agreement referred to in the agreed term
sheet assume:

-- increasing the share capital of the Company;

-- operational restructuring of the Company; and

-- changing the terms of loans, warranties, and other claims of
    the bondholders

"As a result of intensive work, just over four months after the
standstill agreement signed with financing institutions in July
an agreement that brings us closer to the final agreement of
restructuring was signed," Robert Oppenheim says, the acting
Chairman of the Board of Polimex-Mostostal.

"The negotiations including all relevant institutions required
strong commitment and mobilization of all the participants of the
talks.  This was the only way to reach the agreement.  I render
special thanks for their constructive cooperation allowing the
identification of important elements of the future binding
agreement setting out the terms of Polimex-Mostostal financing,"
Oppenheim stresses.

In the agreement it has been stated among others to keep current
financing for the Company, deferred repayment terms of loans and
prove opportunities for obtaining a new warranty line.

"Following the signing of the final agreement with creditors
further stabilization of our financial situation will be possible
and we will gain the possibility to continue uninterrupted
operations in the sectors we've found to be most promising and
profitable," Robert Bednarski, the Vice President, Chief
Financial Officer, added.

At the same time Polimex-Mostostal is continuing to implement
cost-cutting program and the sale of assets not related to the
main activities of the Company.  Through the restructuring
program by the end of 2015 operating costs will be reduced by up
PLN300 million.  During the same period, the Company will receive
the proceeds from the sale of assets of PLN600 million.

On November 20 Polimex-Mostostal acquired an advanced payment
bank guarantee of PKO Bank SA.  The capital of the payment will
be placed on deposit accounts, and will be used solely for
payments related to the implementation of the contract for the
construction of the power unit in Kozienice.  The first release
of funds by the bank will take place after the conclusion of the
Polimex-Mostostal final financial agreement with creditors.

Obtaining bank warranties was the basis for the payment of the
advance and the start of construction work.  The value of
warranties granted by the PKO BP Bank, is PLN268.14 million, and
its validity expires on August 21, 2017.

"The granting of advanced payment bank guarantee by PKO BP Bank
means that we can safely start the contracted work. Please note
that the funds will be allocated to the implementation of the
contract in Kozienice, rather than debt reduction of the company
or earlier repayment of our obligations," Mr. Bednarski.

Polimex-Mostostal -- -- is an
engineering and construction company that has been on the market
since 1945.  The Company is distinguished by a wide range of
services provided on general contractorship basis for the
chemical as well as refinery and petrochemical industries, power
engineering, environmental protection, industrial and general
construction.  The Company also operates in the field of road and
railway construction as well as municipal infrastructure.
Polimex-Mostostal is the largest manufacturer and exporter of
steel products, including platform gratings, in Poland.

* POLAND: WSE Corporate Bankruptcies Hit Record High
Poland A.M. reports that a record 20 companies listed on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange or NewConnect have filed for bankruptcy
this year.

According to Poland A.M., entering bankruptcy proceedings does
not mean that investors shy away from the given company's stocks.
On the contrary, they try to make money on risky speculations,
Poland A.M. states.

The Warsaw Stock Exchange is not an exception when it comes to
bankruptcies, Poland A.M. notes.  In Q3 alone a total of 200
companies in Poland filed for bankruptcy -- 20% more than in the
same period last year, Poland A.M. relates.  Coface Poland
estimates that in the whole of 2012 close to 900 companies will
have gone bankrupt, Poland A.M. discloses.


ATOMENERGOPROM: S&P Assesses Stand-alone Credit Profile at 'bb'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB/A-2' long-
and short-term issuer credit ratings and 'ruAAA' Russia national
scale rating on Russian state-owned nuclear vertically integrated
civil monopoly Atomic Energy Power Corp. (JSC) (AtomEnergoProm).
The outlook is stable.

"The ratings on AtomEnergoProm reflect our expectation that
there's a 'very high' likelihood that the Russian government
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to
AtomEnergoProm in the event of financial distress. The ratings
also take into account our assessment of AtomEnergoProm's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bb'," S&P said.

"We consider that the company benefits from a vertically
integrated business model and a secure monopoly over the civil
nuclear segment in the Russian Federation (foreign currency
BBB/Stable/A-2; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2; Russia national
scale 'ruAAA'). AtomEnergoProm is a holding company and 100%
subsidiary of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom;
not rated)," S&P said.

"We consider AtomEnergoProm to be a government-related entity
(GRE) under our criteria. In accordance with our criteria for
rating GREs, our view of the 'very high' likelihood of
extraordinary government support is based on our assessment of
AtomEnergoProm's: 'Very important' role for the government. Given
that it manages the country's civil nuclear industry assets,
including nuclear power station construction and operations that
provide 16.6% of all electricity output in Russia, AtomEnergoProm
is very important to the Russian economy. It also manages uranium
extraction (9%-12% of the global market according to different
estimates) and enrichment, as well as fuel production (17%
globally) across the full cycle. AtomEnergoProm employs about
138,000 people. 'Very strong' link with the Russian government.
As specified in legislation, the Russian government wholly owns
AtomEnergoProm through Rosatom, a state corporation. The
privatization of major nuclear assets is not on the agenda,
and such a move would require legislative amendments. The
company's activities are closely monitored by the government,"
S&P said.

"The stable outlook on AtomEnergoProm reflects the outlook on the
Russian Federation, as well as our expectations that the Russian
government will continue to provide substantial ongoing support
to AtomEnergoProm. We don't anticipate any pressure from RosAtom
on AtomEnergoProm to redistribute its resources to other RosAtom
entities. Furthermore, we don't expect to see any changes in
policy or the regulatory framework that would alter our
expectation of a 'very high' likelihood of government support to
AtomEnergoProm, if needed, either currently or over the next
couple of years," S&P said.

"We could raise the long-term rating if we upgraded the sovereign
and if AtomEnergoProm implemented moderate financial policies
over the longer run, achieving adjusted debt to EBITDA below
2.0x, and it maintained what we view as adequate maturity and
liquidity profiles," S&P said.

"We could revise down the SACP, and in turn lower the long-term
rating on AtomEnergoProm if its stand-alone liquidity position
deteriorated to below adequate, according to our criteria, or if
it accumulated debt more aggressively than we currently expect. A
change in our view of the likelihood of extraordinary government
support for AtomEnergoProm--including but not limited to
decisions that diminish the company's importance and role for the
government--could also put downward pressure on the ratings
provided that our assessment of the SACP is unchanged," S&P said.

A negative rating action on the sovereign would also result in a
similar action on AtomEnergoProm.

EUROCHEM MINERAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based OJSC EuroChem Mineral and
Chemical Company's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB'
with a Stable Outlook.  The agency has simultaneously assigned
EuroChem Global Investments Limited's proposed issue of loan
participation notes (the Notes) an expected foreign currency
senior unsecured rating of 'BB(EXP)'.

The final rating of the Notes is contingent on the receipt of
final documentation conforming to information already received
and further details regarding the amount and tenor of the Notes.


  -- Eurochem Borrower/Guarantor of the Notes

The transaction is structured in the form of a loan from the
issuer, EuroChem Global Investments Limited, an Ireland-based
private limited liability company established for this sole
purpose, to the borrower, Eurochem, pursuant to the terms of a
loan agreement.  The Notes are limited recourse obligations of
the issuer under a trust deed.  They are secured by a first-fixed
charge with full title guarantee in favor of the trustee for the
benefit of itself and the noteholders of certain of its rights
and interests under the loan agreement.

  -- Potential Reorganization and Borrower Substitution

The documentation contains provisions for a potential future
corporate reorganization whereby the full ownership of Eurochem
and certain of its assets and liabilities (including the Notes)
will be transferred to a new offshore holding company, the new
parent.  The new parent will accede to the loan agreement as a
guarantor prior to the reorganization, and will replace Eurochem
as a borrower post reorganization, provided that at least 70% of
Eurochem's outstanding debt has been novated to it.  Fitch notes
that the structural subordination concerns arising from the
existence of outstanding debt at Eurochem's level would be
addressed through a full and unconditional guarantee from
Eurochem to the new parent.

  -- Senior Unsecured Obligations of Eurochem

Proceeds will be used for refinancing and general corporate
purposes.  The Notes constitute direct, general, unconditional,
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of Eurochem and will
rank pari passu with all its other unsecured and unsubordinated
indebtedness.  Other covenants include a negative pledge (with
permitted liens), limitation on indebtedness with a total debt-
to-consolidated EBITDA ceiling of 3.5:1 and limitation on
restrictions on distributions from subsidiaries.  Events of
defaults include cross default to any debt of the borrower, the
guarantor and their respective subsidiaries with a USD50m
threshold.  The documentation does not include a change of
control clause.

  -- Subordination Not a Concern

Post issuance and refinancing, Fitch estimates that the pre-
export credit facility (PXF) of RUB39.6 billion (US$1.3 billion)
and collateralized margin loans of RUB0.8 billion (EUR15 million)
will represent around 40% of consolidated borrowings.  While not
immaterial, this is strongly mitigated by the fact that under the
base rating case, the secured debt to EBITDA ratio stands at 0.8x
at end-2012 and reduces rapidly once the PXF loan starts to
amortize in August 2013.

Fitch also notes that existing borrowings all benefit from
sureties from some of the group's Russian subsidiaries.  However,
the resulting prior-ranking status is weakened by limitations in
the enforceability of these sureties under the Russian legal

Concerns about Eurochem or the new parent's ability to upstream
cash to service the Notes are also addressed by a covenant which
precludes restrictions of distributions (dividends, loans or
assets) from the borrower/guarantor's subsidiaries.

  -- IDR Support

The affirmation reflects EuroChem's sound performance and cash
flow generation.  This continues to underpin the group's capacity
to support ongoing sizeable expansion projects.  The ratings also
factor in EuroChem's ability to access long-term funding for its
refinancing and investment needs, as demonstrated by the various
credit facilities raised by the group in 2011 and 2012.

  -- Ratings Constrained by Shareholder Distributions

Extra financial flexibility is required under Fitch's forecasts
to support unforeseen distributions to the shareholders, such as
the RUB29.7 billion share buy-backs of 2011.  For the purpose of
calculating free cash flow and in the absence of dividends, Fitch
will deduct share buy-backs from cash flow from operations along
with capex.  The agency notes that Eurochem remains constrained
by the 3.0x net debt/EBITDA covenant on its PXF loan.

  -- Outlook Factors in Margin Pressure

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that Eurochem's credit
metrics and expansion plans have sufficient flexibility to
withstand expected pricing pressure and demand volatility.  The
base rating case assumes revenue growth in excess of 20% in 2012,
in line with 9M12 trends and including the contribution of the
newly acquired assets, and a low single digit drop in sales in
2013 on lower prices, particularly in the phosphate segment.
EBITDA margin is forecast to contract due to rising input costs
in Russia and the lower-margin European assets.

  -- Debt Plateaus under Base Case

In 2011-2012, Eurochem funded the acquisitions of Russian gas
supplier Severneft-Urengoy LLC, BASF SE's ('A+'/Stable)
fertilizer assets and K+S nitrogen fertilizer distribution
business, large share buy-backs and record expansionary capex
with a combination of operating cash flow, new debt and proceeds
from the sale of the K+S stock.  Gross debt levels, which have
more than doubled since end-2010, are forecast to peak at about
RUB100 billion at end-2012 and decline marginally over the next
three years.

  -- High Capex Sustained

The bulk of Eurochem's capex is earmarked for the development of
the Gremyachinskoe and Verkhnekamskoe potash mining deposits.
Fitch's base case assumes that capex levels will remain high at
RUB25 billion-RUB30 billion, with flexibility to scale down or
temporarily delay some of the investments to reflect any pressure
on operating cash flows and maintain net debt to EBITDA below the
internal 2.5x guideline.  On this basis, FFO net adjusted
leverage is expected to remain around 2.0x in the next three

  -- Sound Liquidity

Liquidity remains adequate with cash positions of RUB18.8 billion
at end-Q312 and RUB6.4 billion in fixed-term deposits.  This
compares with short-term debt of RUB12.8 billion, part of which
is expected to be refinanced from the group's new LPNs.  During
9M12, the group redeemed its US$290 million US-denominated bonds
(RUB8.5 billion) and secured new facilities of US$258 million in
aggregate (RUB8.3 billion) with maturities of two to three years.


Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

  -- Completion of one of the potash projects, combined with a
     conservative financial profile.

An upgrade is currently considered unlikely due to the group's
large investment program and the shareholder's opportunistic

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

  -- Shareholders distributions or shareholder-friendly actions
     detrimental to debt creditors or resulting in sustained
     increase in FFO net leverage above 2.5x.
  -- Sharp deterioration in fertilizer prices or demand with
     EBITDA margin sustained below 20%.


OJSC EuroChem Mineral and Chemical Company:

  -- Foreign currency Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
  -- Local currency Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
  -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'; Outlook
  -- Foreign currency Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B';
  -- Local currency senior unsecured rating (domestic bonds):
     affirmed at 'BB'
  -- National Long-term unsecured rating (domestic bonds):
     affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'

EuroChem Global Investments Limited:

  -- Expected foreign currency senior unsecured rating on the
     proposed Loan Participation Notes: 'BB(EXP)'

IDGC HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Developing
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family
rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of JSC IDGC
Holding (IDGC Holding), the holding company for a few major
interregional and regional distribution grid businesses in
Russia, with a developing outlook. This follows the publication
of a Decree on OJSC Russian Grids (Russian Grids) from the
president of Russia on November 22, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action considers the new restructuring plan for the
Russian grid sector, which was initiated by Presidential Decree
and may entail a range of potential outcomes and ramifications
for IDGC Holding's creditworthiness. The outlook also factors in
significant execution risks associated with the plan.

Given the government's 54.52% stake in IDGC Holding, Moody's
considers it a government-related issuer (GRI) under its rating
methodology for GRIs. IDGC Holding's CFR continues to incorporate
a two-notch uplift to the company's baseline credit assessment
(BCA) -- a measure of its standalone credit quality -- of ba3,
given Moody's current assessment of "high" default dependence
between the company and the Russian government and "strong"
probability of extraordinary state support for the company in a
distress situation. The rating also incorporates the Baa1 local-
currency rating of the Russian government.

In May 2012, Moody's affirmed the company's Ba1 ratings and
changed the rating outlook to developing from stable, following
the announcement of a plan to transfer the powers of the sole
executive body of IDGC Holding to FGC UES (FGC), the Russian
transmission grid business. The developing outlook reflected
uncertainty surrounding the government's strategy for the
development of the grid sector in Russia, particularly the
strategic direction of IDGC Holding. Moody's noted that there was
limited information on the impact that the transfer of IDGC
Holding's executive powers to FGC would have on IDGC Holding. The
transfer was executed in June 2012.

In accordance with the recently published Presidential Decree,
the grid sector is now to be consolidated on the basis of IDGC
Holding. The government will transform IDGC Holding, which will
be renamed Russian Grids, into a management company for
distribution grid businesses and FGC's transmission grid
business. The management company will direct the development of
the domestic grid sector to increase the quality and reliability
of services, control costs and interlink investments in
transmission and distribution grids. The government will exchange
its stake in FGC with the management company for newly issued
shares. The government's direct ownership of FGC will be replaced
by an indirect ownership structure, with effective control of at
least 50% plus one share required. Moody's regards this action as
the government distancing itself from FGC and has downgraded
FGC's issuer rating to Baa3 from Baa2; the outlook is stable.
Moody's expects that the implementation of these corporate
changes is likely to result in the government's ownership of IDGC
Holding, or Russian Grids, of more than 75%.


Positive momentum for IDGC Holding's Ba1 CFR could emerge if
there were clear signs that, under the new restructuring plan,
the expected increase of the government's ownership of IDGC
Holding would translate into the latter's increasing
responsibilities over the whole grid sector's management
accompanied by a strengthening business and financial profile for
its group and increasing access to the state's support.

Conversely, downward rating pressure could develop if there were
(1) uncertainties regarding, or clear limitations to, the
holding's new role and responsibilities as the management company
for the whole grid sector; (2) signs of weakening support from
the government for the holding, with major support allocated to
FGC and privatization plans on stronger distribution grid
subsidiaries adopted; (3) a negative shift in the developing
regulatory regime for electric utilities in Russia; or (4)
deterioration in the company's financial performance, evidenced,
for example, by a funds from operations (FFO)/interest coverage
ratio and FFO/net debt ratio trending below 3.0x and 20%,
respectively. In addition, IDGC Holding's inability to address
refinancing issues and/or challenged covenants in a timely manner
could negatively affect its ratings.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Regulated Electric and
Gas Networks published in August 2009, and Government-Related
Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010.

Headquartered in the city of Moscow, IDGC Holding is the holding
company for 14 core operating subsidiaries, which are regulated
monopoly distribution grid businesses operating in 69 regions of
Russia. In 2011, the group's consolidated revenue amounted to
RUB634.6 billion (US$21.6 billion). A 54.52% stake in IDGC
Holding is owned by the Russian government.

* KRASNODAR KRAI: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Rating to RUB12BB Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 global scale local-
currency rating to Krasnodar Krai's ruble-denominated bond
issuance (RU34004KND0), totaling RUB12 billion. The rating on the
bond is derived from Krasnodar's issuer rating.

The senior unsecured bond has three-month coupon payments with
fixed rates and is due in 2017.

Ratings Rationale

Krasnodar Krai's Ba1 issuer rating (with stable outlook) is
supported by the region's stable budgetary performances, which
have proven to be resilient to economic stress, its moderate debt
burden and low interest costs, as well as the relative
diversification of the economy. The rating also takes into
account the substantial improvements in the local infrastructure
in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics, which will be hosted
by the City of Sochi, located within the region. At same time,
the ratings are constrained by rigidity of the region's own-
source revenue, its dependence on federal equalization transfers,
as well as its relatively low liquidity position and still high
capital requirements.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Regional and Local
Governments Outside the US published in May 2008, and The
Application of Joint-Default Analysis to Regional and Local
Governments published in December 2008.

The Krai of Krasnodar is located in the South of Russia,
encompassing part of Russia's North Caucasus, the Black Sea and
the Sea of Azov coasts. The region is Russia's third most
populous region, with 5.2 million inhabitants, or 3.7% of the
country's overall population. Its economy is sufficiently
diversified, although less developed relative to the national
average with gross regional product per capita accounting for
only around 70% of the per capita national GDP.

* TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Currency Ratings
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Russia's Tula Region to
Positive from Stable and affirmed its Long-term foreign and local
currency ratings at 'BB-'.  The agency has also affirmed the
region's National Long-term rating at 'A+(rus)' and Short-term
foreign currency rating at 'B'.

Fitch has simultaneously withdrawn all of the region's ratings as
the issuer has chosen to stop participating in the rating
process. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for the Tula Region.

The Positive Outlook reflects the region's improved budgetary
performance in 2011 and Fitch's expectations of its consolidation
in 2012-2014.  Based on the region's actual budget execution
during January-September 2012 and its updated three-year
financial plans, Fitch forecasts Tula's operating margin will
stabilize at 8% in 2012-2014.

The data on the region's budget execution for M912 is available
on the Federal Treasury of Russia's website.  Every month,
regions in Russia have to file the execution to the Ministry of
Finance of Russian, and generally Fitch considers that Russian
regions are tightly controlled by the Russian federation.

The Outlook also factors in the region's improved debt metrics.
The region's direct risk decreased to 17% of current revenue in
2011 from 28% of current revenue in 2010.  Fitch forecasts the
direct risk below 15% of current revenue in 2012-2104.  The
maturity profile of the debt improved as well as the region
substituted most of the short-term bank loans with RUB5 billion
domestic bond due 2015 issued in September 2012.  The bond has an
amortizing structure, which decreases refinancing risk for the
region, which used to be high in the previous years.

The region has a well-diversified local economy.  It benefits
from proximity to Moscow, the capital of the Russian Federation.
During the past five years, the region has had stable economic
growth outpacing the national average, but the size of its
economy is still below the average.  Although its population
accounts for about 1.1% of the national total, the region
produces only 0.7% of total value added production.

* UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Currency Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia's Republic of Udmurtia Long-
term foreign and local currency ratings at 'BB+', Short-term
foreign currency rating at 'B', and National Long-term rating at
'AA(rus)'.  The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are Stable.
The rating action also affects Udmurtia's outstanding RUB5
billion domestic bonds.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's expectation of the Republic of
Udmurtia's operating performance stabilization, moderate direct
risk and decreasing deficit.  The ratings also factor in
Udmurtia's rising refinancing risk and high tax concentration in
the primary sector.

Fitch notes that inability to reduce high annual refinancing
needs accompanied with deterioration of debt coverage ratios
above Fitch's projections would lead to a downgrade.  Conversely,
strong budgetary performance, with operating margins at above 15%
for two consecutive years coupled with a significant reduction of
refinancing risks would lead to positive rating action.

The agency considers the region's refinancing needs in 2012-2013
as substantial.  It has to redeem about RUB4.7 billion in Q412
and RUB6.1 billion in 2013.  Strong cash reserves and RUB4
billion unutilized credit lines mitigated refinancing risks in
2012.  Fitch believes the region will not face difficulties in
attracting more loans in 2013.  However, should the situation in
financial markets worsen, debt servicing costs may increase
substantially, putting additional pressure on the region's

Fitch expects Udmurtia to demonstrate a stable budgetary
performance with margins at about 6%-7% in 2012-2014.  The
operating revenue growth will be driven by strong growth in the
region's tax base.  The region's operating margin in 2011 (6.8%)
was slightly better than that of in 2010 (5.2%).  This was
despite pressure on operating expenditure during the election

Capex will fall to about 15% of total expenditure in 2012-2014.
As a result, the deficit before debt variation will be limited at
4% of total revenue in 2012-2014.  Capex accounted for an average
27% of total expenditure during 2005-2010.  However it declined
to less than 20% in 2011.

Growth of direct risk slowed down in 2011 (up by 13% yoy) from
that of 2010, when direct risk almost doubled.  The debt burden
is moderate by international standards, with direct risk at below
35% of current revenue at end-2011.  Fitch expects Udmurtia's
direct risk to stabilize at this level in 2012-2014.  Debt
coverage (direct risk/current balance) will account for seven
years, which is above the region's debt maturity profile.

The republic has a strong industrial sector, which is dominated
by oil extraction, metallurgy and machine building.  Udmurtia's
gross regional product (GRP) expanded 7.5% in 2011 (2010: 4.7%).
The republic's administration expects stable figures in oil
extraction and growth of processing industry with GRP growth of
about 2.5% in 2012-2014.

Udmurtia is located in the east of the European part of Russia.
The republic accounted for 0.7% of national GDP in 2010 and for
1.1% of the population.


AUTO ABS 2012-3: DBRS Rates Class B Fixed-Rates Notes 'CCC(sf)'
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings of AA (low)
(sf) to Class A fixed rate notes issued by ABS 2012-3, F.T.A.
(the "Class A Notes") and provisional rating of CCC (sf) to Class
B fixed rate notes issued by ABS 2012-3, F.T.A. (the "Class B
Notes" and together with Class A Notes the "Notes").  The Notes
are backed by a pool of receivables which consists of loans
related to new and used motor vehicles originated in Spain by
Banque PSA Finance S.A., Spanish branch ("BPF").

The above mentioned ratings are provisional.  Final ratings will
be issued upon receipt of execution version of the governing
transaction documents.  To the extent that the documents and
information provided by Banque PSA Finance SA, Spanish branch,
Titulizaci˘n de Activos, S.G.F.T., Santander Global Banking &
Markets and Cr‚dit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank to DBRS
as of this date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS may assign different final ratings to
the Notes or may avoid assigning final ratings to the Notes

The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

* Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
   available credit enhancement.

* Relevant credit enhancement in the form of a cash reserve
   account and subordination.  Credit enhancement levels are
   sufficient to support DBRS projected expected cumulative net
   loss (CNL) assumption under various stress scenarios at a
   'AA(low) (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)' standard respectively.

* The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
   assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in
   which they have invested.

* The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
   originations, underwriting, servicing, and financial strength.

* The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
   Servicer to manage collections activities on the collateral.

* The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
   the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the consistency
   with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance

CAJA DE AHORROS: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB-/A-3' long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Spain's CaixaBank
S.A. and its 'BB/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on its parent company Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de
Barcelona (la Caixa). The outlooks remain negative.

"The rating actions follow Caixabank's announcement that the
governing committee of the Fondo de Reestructuraci˘n Ordenada
Bancaria (FROB) has accepted its offer to acquire all of the
shares the FROB holds in Banco de Valencia (BdV) for a total
consideration of EUR1," S&P said.

"The affirmation reflects our view that the acquisition will have
a limited impact on Caixabank's financial profile. This is thanks
to the terms of the agreement reached by Caixabank with the
Spanish authorities, which include BdV's EUR4.5 billion
recapitalization before the acquisition, the transfer of riskier
real estate-related assets to SAREB, and an asset protection
scheme on part of BdV's loan book. Specifically, the scheme would
cover up to 72.5% of any losses on BdV's small and midsize
enterprise (SME) portfolio and contingent risk portfolio
(guarantees), once any existing provisions covering these assets
have been applied. We also note that the acquired entity is
small, as prior to the transfer of riskier assets, BdV's loan
portfolio accounts for about 7% of Caixabank's consolidated loan
book," S&P said.

"In our view, the terms of the agreement substantially mitigate
the risk of any potential losses resulting from the acquired
assets. Consequently, the agreement should help protect
Caixabank's solvency and asset quality. In this context, we
anticipate that the acquisition will not significantly affect
Caixabank's capital position. This is also because we believe
that the potential losses that might arise from the remaining
portfolio not covered by an asset protection scheme would likely
be covered by BdV's capital once it is enhanced by FROB's capital
injection," S&P said.

"We also think that the impact of the acquisition on Caixabank's
funding profile will be manageable, as we estimate that,
following the asset transfer to SAREB, BdV's deposits will almost
cover its loans," S&P said.

"In our view, the transaction will not have any significant
impact on Caixabank's business position. We also think that the
integration of BdV and the completion of the restructuring to
which the entity is committed will not represent a significant
managerial challenge for Caixabank owing to BdV's relatively
small size," S&P said.

"The negative outlook on Caixabank primarily mirrors that on the
long-term rating on Spain. A downgrade of the sovereign would
very likely trigger a similar action on Caixabank as we rarely
rate financial institutions above our long-term sovereign rating
on their countries of domicile due to the strong connection
between banks' creditworthiness and that of their country of
domicile," S&P said.

"The negative outlook also reflects the possibility that we could
revise downward Caixabank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)--
and hence lower the rating--if the operating environment in Spain
became even more difficult than we currently forecast. We might
also consider lowering Caixabank's SACP if the bank's asset
quality deteriorated faster than we currently anticipate and at
levels closer to the domestic banking sector average. We could
also lower our assessment of Caixabank's SACP if credit losses
exceeded the bank's capacity to absorb losses and impaired its
solvency position, triggering a lowering of its risk-adjusted
capital ratio to a weaker level than we currently incorporate in
the ratings," S&P said.

"We currently view an outlook revision to stable as unlikely in
the next 12-18 months. We could revise the outlook to stable if
we revised our outlook on Spain to stable, if economic and
operating conditions in Spain improved, and if Caixabank
preserved its financial profile through the downturn," S&P said.

"The negative outlook on the long-term rating on la Caixa mirrors
that on the group's core operating entity, Caixabank. A downgrade
of Caixabank would trigger a similar action on la Caixa," S&P

IM BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
Fitch Ratings has downgraded IM Banco Popular FTPYME 1, F.T.A.'s
class A(G) and B notes, as follows:

  -- EUR102.4m Class A(G) (ISIN ES0347847016): downgraded to
     from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR34.6m Class B (ISIN ES0347847024): downgraded to 'Asf'
     from 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR44.6m Class C (ISIN ES0347847032): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     Recovery Estimate (RE) 90%

The downgrades are due to the transaction's exposure to payment
interruption risk. Upon a default of the servicer, Banco Popular
Espanol ('BB+'/Stable/'B'), borrowers will be required to make
payments directly into the accounts of the transactions.  Fitch
estimates that the process of redirecting borrowers' payments can
last up to six months in Spain.  During this time, the
transaction would receive no collections from the portfolio and
would be unable to make timely payments of senior fees, swap
liabilities, and rated note interest.

Fitch does not view payment interruption risk as remote given the
low rating of the servicer and a lack of a dedicated liquidity
facility.  To assess the impact of this risk, Fitch modelled the
transaction assuming no proceeds from the portfolio are received
during six months in a stressed environment.  The agency found
that the current reserve fund balance (EUR5.0 million) is
insufficient to mitigate payment interruption risk.  Fitch has
therefore capped the highest achievable note rating in this
transaction at 'Asf', consistent with its 'Criteria for Rating
Caps in Global Structured Finance Transactions', dated 2 August

Fitch notes that the interest rate swap in the transaction allows
the issuer to defer a payment to the counterparty without
triggering a default under the swap documentation.  Deferral is
possible if the issuer's available funds are insufficient to
cover the entire amount owed to the swap counterparty.  However,
deferral for more than one payment period is an event of default
and gives the swap counterparty the option of terminating the
contract.  If the termination option is exercised while the swap
is in the money for the counterparty, the issuer will have to pay
a potentially large termination amount from a senior position in
the waterfall.

The affirmation of the class C notes reflects the stable
portfolio performance.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears
represent 1.5% of the portfolio, down from 2.0% in October 2011.
The class C notes have benefited from a slight increase in credit
enhancement due to the deleveraging of the portfolio.

IM Banco Popular FTPYME, F.T.A., (the issuer) is a static cash
flow SME CLO originated by Banco Popular Espanol.  At closing,
the issuer used the note proceeds to purchase a EUR2.0 billion
portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted to Spanish small
and medium enterprises and self-employed individuals.

IM CITI TARJETAS: DBRS Assigns 'Csf' Rating to Class B Notes
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned a provisional rating of A (sf)
to the Class A Notes, and C (sf) to the Class B Notes issued by
IM Citi Tarjetas 1, FTA (the "Notes").

The Notes are backed by a portfolio of receivables arising from
drawings made on revolving credit card agreements originated in
Spain by Citibank Espa¤a S.A.

The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

* The transaction's capital structure and the form and
   sufficiency of available credit enhancement in the form of
   subordination and excess spread.

* The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
   assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of the
   transaction documents.

* The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
   originations, underwriting, servicing, and financial strength.

* The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
   Servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral.

* The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
   the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the consistency
   with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance

TDA 26: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed TDA 26 Mixto Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos and removed the class 1-A2, 1-B and 2-A notes from Rating
Watch Negative (RWN), as follows:

  -- Class 1-A2 (ISIN ES0377953015): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Off
     RWN; Outlook Negative
  -- Class 1-B (ISIN ES0377953023): affirmed at 'Asf'; Off RWN;
     Outlook Negative
  -- Class 1-C (ISIN ES0377953031): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  -- Class 1-D (ISIN ES0377953049): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate (RE) of 80%
  -- Class 2-A (ISIN ES0377953056): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Off RWN;
     Outlook Negative
  -- Class 2-B (ISIN ES0377953064): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Class 2-C (ISIN ES0377953072): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE of

Fitch placed the class 1-A2, 1-B, and 2-A notes on RWN on
16 July 2012 following the downgrade of Banco Santander to
'BBB+'/Negative/'F2', which acted as the account bank in the
transaction.  Fitch has been informed that on August 2, 2012, the
account bank was transferred to Barclays Bank plc
('A'/Stable/'F1'), which is deemed eligible under Fitch's
criteria to perform such duties and for this reason the agency
removed the RWN.

TDA 26 Mixto's notes were issued in 2006 and are backed by
mortgage loans originated and serviced by Banco Guipuzcoano
('BB+'/Stable/'B') and Banca March (not rated).  The transaction
comprises two groups of notes.  The Group 1 notes are backed by
mortgage loans with loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) below 80%.  The
Group 2 notes are backed by mortgage loans with LTVs over 80%.

For Group 1, the affirmation reflects the sufficient build-up in
credit enhancement available to the notes, driven by the
deleveraging of the pool since close (weighted average seasoning
of 99 months), and the performance of the transaction, which is
in line with Fitch's expectation.  As of September 2012, three-
months plus arrears stood at 1.8% of the current portfolio.  The
rise in late-stage arrears has translated into an increase in the
volume of defaults recognized in the period, which exceeded the
excess spread amount generated by the transaction, causing
further reserve fund draws.  As of September 2012, the reserve
fund was EUR1.5 million below target.  Given the pipeline of late
stage arrears, Fitch does not expect the reserve fund to be
replenished in the next 18 months, and for this reason the agency
has assigned a Negative Outlook to the class 1-B notes and
maintained it on the class 1-C notes.

For Group 2, the affirmation reflects the stable performance of
the loans in the pool.  As of September 2012, three-months plus
arrears stood at 1.2% of the current portfolio, with gross
cumulative defaults (defined as loans in arrears by more than 12
months) amounting to just 0.5% of initial pool balance.  More
recently, the transaction made a reserve fund draw, following the
recognition of two defaulted loans in January 2012 and March
2012.  As a result, the reserve fund is currently at 96% of its
target amount.  Given the low pipeline of late-stage arrears,
Fitch expects the reserve fund to be replenished over the next 18
months.  However, given the low granularity (only 375 loans) of
the portfolio, the agency remains cautious about the impact of
future defaults on the reserve fund.  For this reason the Outlook
on the class 2-B has been revised to Negative.

Banca March is not a Fitch-rated entity while Banco Guipuzcoano
('BB+'/Stable/'B') is rated below investment grade and for this
reason the agency has assessed the transaction's exposure to
payment interruption in case of default of the banks.  The
structure does not include a commingling reserve or back-up
servicer arrangements.  In its analysis, Fitch applied an
expected loss to the portfolio and used the remaining reserve
fund amount to assess the liquidity that would be available to
the structure in the event of insolvency of Banca March and Banco
Guipuzcoano.  The agency found that the funds expected to be
available to the structure were sufficient to cover for base case
losses and liquidity shortfalls, which is why the notes have been


* DONETSK REGION: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Long-Term Currency Ratings
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Donetsk Region's Long-term foreign
and local currency ratings of 'B'/Stable, Short-term foreign
currency rating of 'B' and National Long-term rating of
The ratings have been withdrawn as the issuer has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.  The agency has no
information of region's budgetary performance in 2012.  Fitch
will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for the
Donetsk Region.

Donetsk region has a strong economy, primarily focused on
metallurgy and coal extraction.  With a population of 9.7% of
Ukraine's it produces 11.4% of national gross domestic product.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARCK LIMITED: Serious Fraud Office Investigates Collapse
Caroline Binham at The Financial Times reports that GBP60 million
collapse of Arck Limited Liability Partnership, which went into
liquidation, is being investigated by the Serious Fraud Office.

According to the FT, the SFO "is investigating the activities of
Arck and associated companies in connection with various
investment products.  Nottinghamshire Police is assisting the SFO
investigation," the FT quotes the fraud office as saying in an
update on its Web site on Friday.

The SFO probe, codenamed Project Bijou, follows two arrests in
March by Nottinghamshire police, the FT relates.  There have also
been inquiries by the UK Financial Services Authority, the FT

Arck Limited Liability Partnership was a property investment

BIFFA: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Deal with Lenders
Claire Ruckin at Reuters reports that lenders to Biffa will take
the keys from its private equity owners in a restructuring that
will cut its GBP1.1 billion (US$1.8 billion) debt pile by 55%.

According to Reuters, Biffa on Thursday said that as part of the
restructuring, Biffa's existing debt will be reduced to
GBP520 million.

Biffa's new shareholders -- Angelo Gordon & Co, Avenue Capital
Group, Babson Capital Europe and Sankaty Advisors -- will inject
GBP75 million of super senior debt into the company, Reuters
discloses.  Once the restructuring is complete, the new
shareholders will become the majority shareholders, Reuters

Reuters relates that sources said as part of the restructuring,
mezzanine lenders will see their GBP280 million of debt in Biffa
wiped out through a scheme of arrangement in the UK courts, which
will be launched at the end of the year and completed by early

Meanwhile, senior lenders to Biffa, which have GBP820 million of
debt invested in the company, will write off GBP300 million of it
in a debt-for-equity swap, Reuters states.

Montagu and GIP bought Biffa before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and the ensuing credit crisis, Reuters recounts.  But as
with many businesses reliant on British public sector contracts,
what was meant to be a resilient source of long-term business
became a handicap as government and local authorities reined in
spending, according to Reuters.

Biffa, Reuters says, is also heavily exposed to industrial
contracts, which have shrunk as businesses have produced less

Biffa is a UK waste management firm.

INSPIRED EDUCATION: S&P Raises Rating on GBP352MM Debt From 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term issue
rating on the GBP352.25 million senior secured debt issued by the
U.K.-based special-purpose vehicle InspirED Education (South
Lanarkshire) PLC (ProjectCo) to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The outlook is

The bonds maintain the unconditional and irrevocable payment
guarantee of scheduled interest and principal provided by Syncora
Gurantee Ltd. (not rated).

"The rating action reflects the sustained improvement in
ProjectCo's operational performance over the last few years. In
addition to handing over the final remaining elements under
construction, the project has continued to deliver solid
operational performance and minimal deductions," S&P said.

"Positively, the hard facilities management (FM) contractor, Spie
Matthew Hall has improved its lifecycle planning processes and
reactive maintenance, and refresh-painting costs are expected to
remain close to or below the relevant caps. We understand that
the council remains satisfied with the quality of the buildings
and the standards of service provision," S&P said.

"Financial performance has also remained in line with our
expectations, and in our view, at a level commensurate with the
'BBB-' rating. Based on our definition of the annual debt service
coverage ratio (ADSCR), which excludes interest income, the
project anticipates a minimum DSCR of 1.11x, between March 2029
to September 2030, and an average of 1.20x over the remaining
life of the project. The project continues to rely on its change
in law and debt service reserve accounts to meet its final debt
payment in 2038," S&P said.

"The 'BBB-' debt rating reflects the following credit strengths:
no construction risk, solid operational performance, a relatively
benign payment mechanism and a strong and highly creditworthy
revenue counterparty in South Lanarkshire Council. These
strengths are partly offset by an aggressive financial risk
profile, and reliance on releases from the debt service and
change in law reserve accounts to meet the final debt service
payment in 2038.

ProjectCo also runs the risk of exposure to the uncertainty of 30
years of capital-replacement costs," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that ProjectCo will
maintain stable operational performance and manage reactive
maintenance costs within budget. We also expect that the project
will continue to deliver financial performance in line with
current forecasts," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating if ProjectCo's financial profile or
operating performance weaken to below our current forecasts. This
could materialize, for example, as a result of deteriorating
relationships between Projectco and South Lanarkshire Council or
reactive maintenance costs rising above budget," S&P said.

"In view of ProjectCo's reliance on its reserve accounts to meet
the final debt service payment in 2038, we consider that an
upgrade is unlikely absent a material improvement in its
financial profile," S&P said.

INVESTEC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Debt
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Investec Bank Plc's (IBP) Long-term
IDR at 'BBB-' and Viability Rating (VR) at 'bbb-'.  The Outlook
on the Long-term IDR is Negative.


The affirmation of the IDRs and VR is underpinned by IBP's
healthy liquidity and acceptable capital which partially mitigate
the risks inherent in its property-concentrated loan book.  The
Negative Outlook reflects IBP's weak profitability and concerns
around the bank's concentrated exposure to the commercial
property market.

The agency acknowledges the recent improvement in asset quality
indicators following a substantial clean-up in FY11, FY12 and
H113.  However, the concentrated nature of the remaining risks
could have a material effect on IBP's financial performance and
position in a challenging operating environment.

IBP's Fitch-calculated NPL ratio improved to 4.5% at FYE12
(FYE11: 6%) following aggressive selling of its Australian
portfolio and other property-related exposures.  Loan loss
reserve coverage was moderate at 41.3% with specific provisions
and collateral covering NPLs by 106% at FYE12, down from 119% at

Liquidity is a key rating strength for IBP at a 'bbb-' VR level,
with 22% of assets held in liquid instruments at FYE12.  Fitch
core capital (FCC) remained acceptable at 11.1% at end-H113
(FYE12: 11.3%).


The bank's IDRs and VR are driven by the bank's intrinsic
strength and are supported by strong liquidity and acceptable
capitalization which serve to mitigate substantial (45.9% of
gross loans) concentration to property-related lending.  These
ratings would be sensitive to reduced liquidity or a weakening of
IBP's FCC ratio or if asset quality deteriorated materially.  The
latter could give rise to significantly higher levels of
impairment charges, which Fitch considers could affect the long-
term sustainability and creditworthiness of IBP.

A revision of the Outlook to Stable could follow a track record
of improving earnings which would be driven by increased
efficiencies within the acquired wealth management businesses and
stabilized asset quality manifesting in lower impairment charges
than experienced over the last three years.

Upward rating pressure is limited due to IBP's concentrated
credit risk and a challenging operating environment.


The bank's Support Rating of '5'and Support Rating Floor of 'NF'
do not take into account external support.  While support from
the UK authorities is possible, it has not been relied on.
Similarly, support from dual-listed sister company, Investec
Limited ('BBB'/Negative) has also not been relied upon due to the
ring-fencing of creditors in these entities.

The ratings of the UK guaranteed EMTN program are equalized with
the ratings of the UK sovereign.  The final debt outstanding
under this program was repaid in April 2012 and there will be no
further issuance out of this program.  The ratings on the UK
government guaranteed EMTN program are therefore withdrawn.

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by IBP are all
notched down from the 'bbb-' VR in accordance with Fitch's
assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance and
relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.
Their ratings are primarily sensitive to any change in IBP's VR
(see 'Rating Bank Regulatory Capital and Similar Securities',
dated 15 December 2011).

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F3'
  -- VR affirmed at 'bbb-'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'
  -- Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' is affirmed
  -- Junior subordinated debt affirmed at 'BB-'
  -- Senior unsecured certificates of deposit affirmed at Long-
     term 'BBB-' and Short-term 'F3'
  -- Senior unsecured EMTN Programme affirmed at Long-term 'BBB-'
     and Short-term 'F3'
  -- Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BB+'
  -- Guaranteed EMTN Programme Long- and Short-term ratings have
     been withdrawn

MPG: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement Deal with Creditors
Grant Prior at Construction Enquirer reports that MPG, a leading
subcontractor on the Olympic Athletes' village, is trying to
thrash out a deal with its creditors in a bid to avoid

According to Construction Enquirer, accountants working with MPG
will hold a meeting with companies owed cash this week in a bid
to implement a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA).

Documents lodged with the High Court blame MPG's financial
troubles on a pay dispute on the 2012 site where it claims a GBP2
million payment has been withheld, Construction Enquirer notes.

The company owes GBP6.6 million to more than 1,500 creditors,
Construction Enquirer discloses.

Cash flow problems have forced MPG to cut costs by a third while
turnover dropped from GBP30 million to GBP10 million, according
to Construction Enquirer.

The document warns that if a CVA is not agreed to then
outstanding legal action to recover cash from Galliford Try, the
main contractor on the athletes village block where MPG carried
out drylining work, could be terminated if the company goes into
administration, Construction Enquirer states.

Rejecting a CVA would also put the jobs of 50 MPG workers in
jeopardy, Construction Enquirer says.

NORTHERN ROCK: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Sub. Debt Securities
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Northern Rock Asset Management (NRAM)
and Bradford & Bingley's (B&B) senior unsecured debt at 'AAA'.
The agency has also affirmed and withdrawn NRAM's and B&B's
outstanding subordinated debt and Tier 1 debt securities as the
ratings are no longer considered by Fitch to be analytically


The affirmation of NRAM's and B&B's senior unsecured debt at
'AAA' reflects Fitch's view that the default risk on these
securities is materially the same as the UK sovereign risk
('AAA'/Negative/'F1+'), given that they are guaranteed by the UK
government until maturity.  These liabilities are guaranteed
under public law rather than private law.  As such, NRAM's and
B&B's senior unsecured debt ratings are in line with the UK
sovereign rating.


NRAM's and B&B's outstanding subordinated debt and Tier 1 debt
securities have been affirmed in accordance with Fitch's criteria
for regulatory capital securities to reflect the higher risk of


The banks' senior unsecured debt is sensitive to any change in
the UK sovereign rating, or to any material changes to the
conditions of the guarantee granted by the UK government to NRAM
and B&B.

The rating actions are as follows:


  -- Senior unsecured debt securities (guaranteed) affirmed at
  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt securities affirmed at 'C'
     and withdrawn
  -- Tier 1 subordinated debt securities (RCIs XS0117031194)
     affirmed at 'C' and withdrawn
  -- Tier 1 subordinated debt securities (TONs XS0152710439)
     affirmed at 'CC' and withdrawn


  -- Senior unsecured debt securities (guaranteed) affirmed at
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt securities affirmed at 'C'
     and withdrawn
  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt securities affirmed at 'C'
     and withdrawn

TITAN EUROPE 2007-3: Moody's Comments on Performance of CMBS Pool
Moody's Investors Service concluded that the pool's performance
is in line with expectations following a review of the

The Baa3 (sf) rating of the Class A1 reflects its 52% credit
enhancement and moderate 58% Moody's note-to-value that offsets
uncertainty surrounding ultimate recoveries for the highly
leveraged underlying loans. Moody's expects Class A1's credit
metrics to improve as it continues to benefit from sequential
allocation of repayment proceeds.

The ratings of the Class A2, B, C and D Notes reflect the limited
prospects for recovery of principal or interest.

Portfolio Analysis

Titan Europe 2007-3 Limited closed in August 2007 and represents
the securitization of 11 loans (19 at closing) secured by mostly
office properties with a 67% concentration in Greater London and
the South East.

Aggregated loan balance for the 11 loans was GBP455.8 million as
per the October 2012 reporting, down by 41% since closing. In its
analysis, Moody's assumed a GBP38.8 million write-off against the
Class D principal representing the combined balance of the Metro
and Princes loans, for which no remaining material recoveries are
expected. All metrics cited in this press release exclude the two
written-off loans.

The Moody's weighted average securitized loan-to-value ("LTV") is
around 140%. Three loans (20% of pool) are currently in special
servicing, while the remaining six loans (80% of pool) all mature
within the next year. Moody's expects 100% of the pool to be in
special servicing in one year as the loans that do not refinance
enter the relatively short work-out tail period until legal final
of the Notes in October 2016.

The transaction is heavily exposed to single tenanted properties,
with eight loans (92% of pool) secured by single properties let
to single tenants. The mostly investment-grade covenant of these
single-tenants mitigates the risk of much reduced recoveries if
the tenant defaults forcing reliance on the much lower vacant
possession value for an empty property. The default risk for the
pool is therefore driven by the high refinancing risk due to the
pool's elevated Moody's LTV ratio and the constrained lending

Regulator is the largest loan representing 42% of the pool, and
is secured against an office property in Canary Wharf. The
building is fully let to the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
until 2018 for GBP13 million per annum. Plans were announced in
June 2010 to abolish the FSA and separate its responsibilities
between a number of new agencies and the Bank of England ("BoE").
Moody's understands that the BoE is planning to move at least
some of the FSA's staff nearer to its City headquarters. It is
unclear how much space, if any, the FSA's successor entities will
ultimately retain. Moody's assumed that the building will be
vacant in 2018 when arriving at its estimated securitized LTV of
110%, which excludes any potential swap liabilities.

As highlighted in the Offering Circular, the borrower under the
Regulator Loan granted the Hedge Provider an extension option for
a further interest rate swap coinciding with the loan maturity in
October 2013 to July 2018 on the same terms as the preceding swap
(Notional amount of GBP205.75 million fixed at 4.981%). If the
Hedge Provider exercises the option, the Borrower is obliged to
pay an amount equal to the termination payment that would have
been due had a physical interest rate swap been entered into
under the same terms. Moody's was not provided with any current
or projected valuation for the extension option, but estimates
the potential liability at roughly GBP36 million in October 2013.
Furthermore (and based on current swap curves), Moody's projects
the potential swap liability at GBP27 million, GBP19 million, and
GBP11 million in October 2014, October 2015, and October 2016
respectively. In its analysis, Moody's assumed that around GBP 20
million will ultimately be paid in potential prior ranking swap

Portfolio Loss Exposure: Moody's expects a large amount of losses
on the securitized portfolio, stemming mainly from the high
leverage of the underlying loans and some exposure to the UK non-
prime property market. The expected losses are likely to
crystallize only towards the end of the legal final maturity.


Notes issued by Titan Europe 2007-3 Limited (amounts reflect
initial outstandings):

GBP463.04M Class A1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) on Feb 17,

GBP115.76M Class A2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) on Feb 17,

GBP54.39M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) on Feb 17, 2011

GBP52.79M Class C Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf) on Feb 17, 2011

GBP53.19M Class D Notes, Affirmed at C (sf) on Feb 17, 2011

Moody's does not rate the Class E, Class F, Class G, Class V and
Class X Notes


The methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2012 Central Scenarios published in February 2012.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated February 17, 2011. The last Performance Overview
for this transaction was published on the August 13, 2012.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 26 to November 30, 2012

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.

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