TCREUR_Public/121210.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, December 10, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 245

                            Headlines



A L B A N I A

* ALBANIA: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


C R O A T I A

VJESNIK: Seeks Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Procedure


D E N M A R K

* DENMARK: IMF Backs Plan to Extend Bank Capital Raising Deadline


F R A N C E

GROUPE DOUX: Mulls 89 Jobs Cuts Across Three Sites
FCC MINOTAURE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
SIPA: French Court Orders Liquidation of Text Service


G E R M A N Y

GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: S&P Puts 'B'-Rated Cl. F Notes on Watch Dev.
PRIME 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR15MM B Notes to 'Caa3'
SUEDZUCKER AG: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Down 17% in September


G R E E C E

FAGE INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Rates New Bond Issuance '(P)B3'


H U N G A R Y

E-STAR: Files for Bankruptcy; Gets Temporary Debt Reprieve


I T A L Y

BANCAPULIA SPA: Moody's Reviews 'D+' BFSR for Downgrade
SESTANTE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. B Tranche to 'CCCsf'
* ITALY: Moody's Corrects Nov. 27 Rating Release on RMBS Deals


M A C E D O N I A

* MUNICIPALITY OF GOSTIVAR: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Issuer Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

NXP BV: Moody's Rates New Sr. Secured Term Loan Tranche C 'B2'


N O R W A Y

NORSE ENERGY: US Subsidiary Files Chapter 11 Reorganization


P O L A N D

COGNOR SA: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Caa2' CFR to Negative


P O R T U G A L

BMORE FINANCE 4: Moody's Corrects December 3 Rating Release
* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Portuguese Banks BCP and Banif


R U S S I A

CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Rates US$250MM LPNs 'B1'; Outlook Positive
DELTACREDIT BANK: Moody's Changes 'D' BFSR Outlook to Stable
NK RUSSNEFT: S&P Assigns B+ Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
RUSSNEFT: Moody's Gives 'Ba3' Corp. Family Rating; Outlook Stable


S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

RAZVOJNA BANKA: Seeks Partner to Take Over Assets & Liabilities


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR: S&P Lowers Preferred Stock Rating to 'C'
IM FTPYME: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR11.7-Mil. Bond


T U R K E Y

YASAR HOLDING: Fitch Affirms 'B' Senior Unsecured Rating


U K R A I N E

* CITY OF KYIV: Moody's Lowers Currency Ratings to 'B3'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HEATHROW FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to High-Yield Bond
HEATHROW FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes
HIBU PLC: Majority of Lenders Agree to Partial Loan Repayment
MCGEOCH MARINE: Obtains Approval for CVA; Averts Collapse


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Says Euro Area Crisis Threatens EMEA Corporates
* S&P Puts Ratings on 240 CMBS Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
* BOND PRICING: For the Week December 3 to December 7, 2012


                            *********


==============
A L B A N I A
==============


* ALBANIA: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Republic of Albania at 'B+/B'. The outlook is stable. "Our
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Albania is 'BB-'
and the recovery rating is 4," S&P said.

"The ratings on Albania reflect the sovereign's low per capita
GDP as well as its persistently high government debt compared
with peers. The ratings are constrained by our view of the
country's relatively weak political and institutional
environment, which we believe has contributed to delaying the
reforms that could otherwise help its EU accession. The ratings
are supported by our view of the economy's long-term growth
potential, a legal framework that explicitly prioritizes debt-
service payments, and prospects for further EU integration," S&P
said.

"After posting an average real GDP growth rate of 3.4% during
2009-2011, the economy has slowed significantly in 2012, mainly
on weak domestic demand. Demand has been hampered by low
consumption and credit growth, as well as the challenging
economic environments in Italy and Greece. As a result, we expect
the economy to grow by about 0.6% in 2012 and 1.8% in 2013,
before accelerating thereafter," S&P said.

"Despite the 2012 slowdown, we believe that the economy's long-
term growth potential persists and will likely be strengthened by
ongoing foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI inflows have
remained relatively stable. Moreover, they have mitigated
external vulnerabilities and have financed about three-quarters
of the current account deficit, which we expect to stay around
11.5% of GDP over the medium term," S&P said.

"We believe that a more-cohesive policy agenda has emerged after
the Socialist Party returned to parliament in late 2011,
particularly regarding the EU integration process. The European
Commission recognized this in its October 2012 recommendation for
Albania to become an EU candidate country, conditional on
implementing judicial reforms and fighting organized crime and
corruption. We believe that such measures, including improved
administrative efficiency and the elimination of red tape for
businesses, would support Albania's entry to the EU while also
improving the business environment and increasing the country's
growth potential," S&P said.

"In our view, Albania's public finances remain a key credit
weakness. The ratio of general government interest payments to
general government revenues is high -- at about 13.3% estimated
for 2012-2014 -- as is the net general government debt, which we
expect to reach 57.5% of GDP in 2013. We view the relatively
short average maturity of outstanding government debt as a credit
weakness, as is the relatively large share of outstanding debt
held by the domestic banking sector," S&P said.

"We expect the general government deficit will be slightly above
3% of GDP over 2012-2014, although, in light of the 2013 general
elections, the risk of spending slippages cannot be ignored.
Indeed, we believe that the current slowdown in growth and
pressures related to social security outlays, along with the
government's already-relatively-low revenue intake and the
upcoming general elections, will test its commitment to budgetary
consolidation. In this context, we are unclear as to whether the
proceeds from the ongoing privatization of state assets will used
for government debt reduction or will instead fuel current
government spending," S&P said.

"In our view, general government revenues remain low in the
context of the ongoing economic slowdown, but also a relatively
high debt ratio. We believe that more-rigorous consolidation --
including sustained budgetary efforts on the revenue side and
clearer, tighter fiscal rules and structural measures -- would
prevent the fiscal imbalances that could hamper Albania's
economic development. Such measures would include an overhaul of
the social security system as well as reducing Albania's large
informal economy, leading to a significant improvement in tax
collection," S&P said.

"We project that the financial sector will remain in a small net
external creditor position over the medium term. The banking
system is largely funded by domestic deposits; we estimate loans
to deposits at about 58% currently, and capital adequacy at about
16%. The system has a high percentage of loans and deposits
denominated in foreign currency, which in our view reduces
monetary flexibility," S&P said.

"We also believe foreign banking groups in Albania will remain
cautious in their lending activities, especially given the
already-high level of nonperforming loans (about 24% of total
loans), which could constrain economic growth. While the
subsidiaries of Greek parent banks in Albania appear to be
currently well-capitalized, the ongoing uncertainties in relation
to the Greek economic and financial crisis continue to present a
challenging environment for the Albanian government and monetary
authorities in which to maintain financial stability," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Albania will operate
sound fiscal and economic policies, anchored by efforts toward EU
integration," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if the country's policymakers,
contrary to our current expectations, abandon the EU as a policy
anchor for its institutional structural reforms; if the fiscal
position strays significantly from government targets, especially
in light of the elections in 2013; if net general government debt
increases above 60% of GDP; or if there is an external shock
arising from ongoing eurozone uncertainties," S&P said.

"We could consider an upgrade if the government successfully
addresses institutional challenges regarding EU membership, while
consolidating its budgetary position and reducing its debt-to-GDP
ratio, and if external conditions for the financial system ease.
Political and institutional developments will also influence
future ratings momentum to the extent that these influence the
country's economic prospects," S&P said.



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C R O A T I A
=============


VJESNIK: Seeks Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Procedure
--------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Vjesnik said it has placed a request for the
launch of a pre-bankruptcy settlement procedure.

According to SeeNews, Vjesnik said in a statement posted on the
Web site of the Zagreb Stock Exchange on Tuesday that the request
was placed on October 26.

Vjesnik is a Croatian publishing company.



=============
D E N M A R K
=============


* DENMARK: IMF Backs Plan to Extend Bank Capital Raising Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News reports that the
International Monetary Fund is throwing its weight behind a plan
by Denmark's financial regulator to allow insolvent banks more
time to raise capital before being declared bankrupt.

According to Bloomberg, Thomas Dorsey, the IMF's mission chief to
Denmark, said that a grace period would give banks an opportunity
to increase their regulatory buffers and wind down loans
gradually.  Mr. Dorsey, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the
alternative -- requiring banks to close their portfolios quickly
-- could trigger an economic shock.

"On phasing in of capital requirements, we have urged an orderly
deleveraging to meet new requirements so as to avoid disruption
to the economy," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Dorsey as saying in an
e-mailed response to questions.  "In that regard, a possible
delay of up to three months seems in keeping with what we had in
mind."

Denmark's FSA is now seeking parliamentary approval for its
proposal to give insolvent banks more time to find capital,
Bloomberg discloses.  Lawmakers have tentatively approved the
measure, Bloomberg relates.  Lenders that have failed solvency
tests to date have generally had a weekend to find extra funds,
Bloomberg notes.

Banks in Denmark, where the central bank cut its deposit rate to
minus 0.2% in July to defend the krone's peg to the euro, are
struggling to stay profitable as negative short-term money-market
rates and a faltering economy exacerbate the effects of the burst
property bubble, Bloomberg says.

Ulrik Noedgaard, director general of the FSA, said last month a
"more patient approach" is necessary to avoid closing down
lenders that would probably survive under normal economic
conditions, Bloomberg recounts.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


GROUPE DOUX: Mulls 89 Jobs Cuts Across Three Sites
--------------------------------------------------
Dean Best at Just-Food reports that Groupe Doux has set out plans
to lay off more workers as the company, which is in
administration, reshapes its business.

Doux has outlined plans to lay off 89 staff across three sites,
Just-Food relates.  The affected workers are employed at its
administrative HQ in Chateaulin, a plant in Plugaffan and a
factory for its Pere Dodu brand in Quimper, Just-Food discloses.

According to Just-Food, a spokesperson said the proposals will be
set out at meetings with employee representatives in the next few
weeks.  The latest cuts will mean Doux, which went into
administration in June, will have shed 1,000 jobs as it
restructures its operations, Just-Food notes.

Doux received an extension to its period in administration, which
will now run until February, Just-Food says.

Doux has set out plans to invest EUR35 million (US$45.1 million)
to modernize its plants as it looks to revitalize its business,
Just-Food discloses.  It fell into administration amid EUR430
million in debts, Just-Food recounts.

Since then, the company has sold off or closed its fresh poultry
assets, Just-Food relates.

Groupe Doux is French poultry group.


FCC MINOTAURE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on four French RMBS
transactions originated by Electricite de France (EDF, 'A+'/
'F1') and/or Gaz de France (GDF, not rated) and their
subsidiaries as follows:

Electra 1

  -- EUR63.1m Class A4 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
  -- EUR6.7m Class B notes affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable

Loggias 2001-1

  -- EUR111.6m Class A notes affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
  -- EUR3.8m Class B notes downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf',
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

Loggias 2003-1

  -- EUR134.1m Class A notes affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
  -- EUR4.5m Class B notes affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

FCC Minotaure Compartment 2004-1

  -- EUR148.9m Class A notes affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
  -- EUR7.9m Class B notes downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf',
     Outlook Stable
  -- EUR0.3m Class C notes affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

The rating actions reflect the transactions' ongoing sound
collateral performance and the lack of credit support available
to the class B notes under Loggias 2001-1 and to the class B and
C notes under FCC Minotaure Compartment 2004-1.  While for each
transaction the level of cumulative defaults to date has been
considerably lower than Fitch's original assumptions, the
aforementioned three classes of notes have been affected by a
decrease in the available level of over-collateralization (OC)
during the transactions' normal amortization as a result of the
transactions' structural features.

For all transactions, the issuer purchased the underlying
portfolio at a discount price, thereby providing OC, with a view
to divert excess principal to interest payments during the life
of the transaction.  This was necessary to ensure that the yield
on the loans is sufficient to cover the interest due on the
notes. Under a normal amortization (pro-rata amortization of the
rated notes), on each payment date, a portion of the effective
principal collection amount is diverted as excess spread in such
a way that the actuarial yield of the portfolio (taking into
account the OC) is maintained at a level equal to its initial
level.  Such a mechanism entails that the available level of OC
diminishes over time, with the portfolio remaining life
shortening until the transaction enters into accelerated
amortization (sequential amortization with no excess spread
released out of the structure).

The FCC Minotaure Compartment 2004-1 transaction entered into
accelerated amortization in October 2012.  However, the Loggias
2001-1 transaction is still in its normal amortization phase.
The placement on Negative Outlook of the class B notes of the
Loggias 2001-1 transaction reflects the uncertainty surrounding
the time of entry into accelerated amortization and, therefore,
the potential for a further decrease in the available OC.

Electra 1 (the most seasoned transaction) has shown higher
cumulative defaults to date -- currently standing at 1.4% of its
initial collateral balance -- compared to the other transactions,
with the transaction entering into deferred amortization
(equivalent to accelerated amortization: sequential amortization
with no excess spread released out of the structure) in November
2012.  However, due to different structural mechanisms, Electra 1
benefits from a higher level of OC than the other transactions.

As of latest reporting period, Loggias 2001-1 reported defaults
of 1.3%, while Loggias 2003-1 -- which entered into early
amortization in November 2011 -- has cumulative defaults of 0.9%.
FCC Minotaure 2004-1's performance is in line with that of
Loggias 2003-1, with cumulative defaults of 0.6% as of the same
period.

Electra 1, Loggias 2001-1, Loggias 2003-1 and FCC Minotaure
Compartment 2004-1 were set up to refinance portfolios of
residential loans jointly granted by EDF, GDF and their
subsidiaries to their employees.  The majority of the loans do
not benefit from any security (e.g. neither a mortgage, nor
death/invalidity insurance) but loan installments are deducted
directly from the salaries of employees.  Defaults are recorded
in case of death, temporary or permanent disability of a
borrower, and when over-indebtedness, bereavement and/or change
in family status lead to an early termination.


SIPA: French Court Orders Liquidation of Text Service
-----------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a French court on Thursday
ordered the liquidation of the text service of the Sipa news
agency and placed its photo service in bankruptcy protection.

Sipa announced the decision by the Paris commercial court, the AP
notes.

The French court ordered the liquidation of the two companies
that made up the Sipa text service, created after dapd bought the
French-language service of The Associated Press this year, the AP
relates.  The Sipa text operation employs 50 staff journalists
and about a dozen stringers, the AP discloses.

According to the AP, a bankruptcy administrator will be assigned
to the Sipa photo service, called Sipa Press, to try to find new
investors.

Sipa Press was created in 1973 by photojournalist Goksin
Sipahioglu, and now distributes thousands of photos a day in more
than 40 countries, the AP recounts.



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G E R M A N Y
=============


GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: S&P Puts 'B'-Rated Cl. F Notes on Watch Dev.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch
developing its credit ratings on all tranches in German
Residential Asset Note Distributor PLC following an update to its
criteria for rating European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transactions. The updated criteria became
effective.

"On Nov. 7, 2012, we published an update to our criteria for
rating European CMBS transactions. At the same time, we published
a commentary clarifying how we apply our global property
evaluation methodology to European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"We have placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings on 240
European CMBS tranches where we believe there is at least a one-
in-two chance that ratings on the tranche will be lowered,
following the application of our updated criteria," S&P said.

"We also believe there is at least a one-in-two chance that our
ratings on German Residential Asset Note Distributor's notes will
be lowered, following the application of our updated criteria.
However, the transaction is currently being restructured. Some of
the changes envisaged could mitigate the criteria impact and
could result in us either affirming or raising our existing
ratings in the transaction," S&P said.

"We have therefore placed all of our ratings in German
Residential Asset Note Distributor on CreditWatch developing
pending the criteria resolution and the completion of the
transaction's restructuring. We intend to complete our resolution
of the CreditWatch placements over the next few weeks, once the
transaction's restructuring has been completed," S&P said.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class     Rating                Rating
          To                    From

German Residential Asset Note Distributor PLC
EUR5.815 Billion Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Developing

A         A (sf)/Watch Dev      A (sf)
B         BBB-(sf)/Watch Dev    BBB-(sf)
C         BB+ (sf)/Watch Dev    BB+ (sf)
D         BB (sf)/Watch Dev     BB (sf)
E         BB- (sf)/Watch Dev    BB- (sf)
F         B (sf)/Watch Dev      B (sf)


PRIME 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR15MM B Notes to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Prime 2006-1 Funding Limited
Partnership:

    EUR119.6M (current outstanding amount of EUR 97.1M) A Notes,
    Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

    EUR15M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
    Oct. 11, 2012 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

Prime 2006-1 Funding Limited Partnership is a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation backed by a static portfolio of
German profit participation agreements ("Genussrechte") with or
without loss participations which are subordinated loan
agreements. All assets included in the portfolio are loans with
bullet maturities, extended to German small and medium-sized
companies.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are driven by continuing and worse than
expected credit deterioration observed in the underlying pool.
The deterioration is reflected in an increase in the number of
defaults and the resulting decrease in the overcollateralization
levels of the rated classes. The actions also reflect the loan
refinancing risk as the pool obligors are expected to refinance
their debt by the transaction scheduled maturity date, August 3,
2013.

Portfolio credit deterioration is evidenced by an additional
EUR8 million of principal deficiencies experienced since last
rating action in November 2011, including EUR5 million of early
termination repaid at par. The total principle deficiency ledger
("PDL") in the transaction increased to 12 obligors, totaling
EUR62.5 million (approximately 32% of the initial pool), compared
to 10 obligors, totaling EUR54.5 million (approximately 28% of
the initial pool) at the last rating action in November 2011. The
principal deficiency ledger (PDL) has been paid down to EUR40
million at the last payment date.

According to the latest investor report dated 26th October 2012,
the underlying portfolio of Prime 2006-1 currently totals EUR149
million with exposure to 19 obligors, among which 3 obligors,
total EUR25 million, are still subject to PDL or near default.
The Class A notes have been paid down by EUR3.5 million since
last rating action in November 2011.

The reported credit quality is based on LBBW's and HSH's internal
ratings mapped to Moody's rating scale. In reaching its ratings
decisions, Moody's also incorporated the qualitative information
on individual obligors' performance provided by Altium Mitkap AG
as financial advisor in the latest investor report. In addition,
Moody's applied stressed assumptions as per its standard
methodology. This includes a 30% stress to the probability of
defaults of each obligor, forward looking stresses, as well as an
increased inter-asset correlation of 5% in order to reflect the
borrower concentration in a single country. Moody's also applied
stresses applicable to concentrated pools with non-publicly rated
issuers, as outlined in "Updated approach to the usage of credit
estimates in rated transactions (October 2009)". Due to the
subordinated position of the loans in the obligors' capital
structure, Moody's assumes a zero recovery rate upon asset
default.

As a base case, Moody's took into account the downside risk
related to the concentration of the portfolio. Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par of EUR124
million, a Moody's calculated outstanding PDL of EUR50 million, a
stressed weighted average default probability to legal maturity
(August 2015) of 16.2%, and a weighted average recovery rate of
0. The default probability is derived from the credit quality of
the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life
of the collateral pool. Approximately 32.3% of the collateral
pool was assumed to be Caa1 or below.

The current Moody's calculated overcollateralization ("OC") for
Class A and Class B are 136.5% and 118.3%, respectively. If all
Caa1 or below names were assumed defaulted without recovery, the
resulting OC ratios for Class A and Class B would be 95.3% and
82.6%, respectively.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analysis:

1) Moody's took into consideration that the obligations in this
pool provide for maturity extension and coupon deferral, both
linked to breach of certain loss triggers. On one hand, a
maturity extension would expose the transaction to poorly
performing entities for longer than scheduled. On the other hand,
a maturity extension may allow the borrower to recover during the
extension period. While coupon deferral is cumulative, a default
following deferral would lead to the deferred past coupon
payments to be lost in addition to the principal amount. Moody's
addresses these specific risks by modeling a maturity extension
of up to 2 years for the debt obligations and reducing the coupon
earned from the debt obligations. Both of these adjustments
depend on the current rating level of each obligation. The rating
outputs in such sensitivity runs were consistent with the rating
action.

2) Moody's also notes the high concentration levels of the
portfolio, as the top five obligors represent approximately 60.5%
of the pool, with the lowest credit quality equivalent to Caa2.
In order to measure the risk associated with such low
granularity, Moody's conducted several sensitivity analyses,
including a jump to default analysis. The volatility of the
rating outputs in such sensitivity runs were consistent with the
rating action.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy, especially as 100% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Germany.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) There is the potential for elevated refinancing difficulty
regarding the subordinated debt instruments in this portfolio,
particularly among obligors with weaker credit quality. The
emergence of increased refinancing difficulty at the time of
maturity would negatively impact the notes. This risk has been
assessed primarily from qualitative information on individual
obligors provided in the latest investor report and by the
investment services provider and recovery manager.

2) Low portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to on the credit conditions of a few large obligors that
are rated non-investment grade, especially when they experience
jump to default. Due to the pool's lack of granularity, Moody's
supplement its base case scenario with individual scenario
analysis. The realization of higher than anticipated default rate
due to the weakness of large obligors would negatively impact the
ratings.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe" published in February 2007, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in June 2011.

Other factors used in this rating are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to simulate the
default scenarios for each assets in the portfolio. Losses on the
portfolio derived from those scenarios have then been applied as
an input in the cash flow model to determine the loss for each
tranche. In each scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. By repeating this process and averaging over the
number of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by
the notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors, qualitative factors are
part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative
factors include the structural protections in each transaction,
the recent deal performance in the current market environment,
the legal environment, specific documentation features, and the
potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of
credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating
decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating actions may be negatively affected.


SUEDZUCKER AG: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on German
sugar and related agro products manufacturer Suedzucker AG to
positive from stable. "At the same time, the 'BBB+' long-term and
'A-2' short-term corporate credit ratings were affirmed," S&P
said.

"We also affirmed our 'BBB+' issue rating on Suedzucker's
unsecured notes and our 'BB+' issue rating on the subordinated
notes," S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that the company's debt-
protection metrics are likely to improve faster than we
originally expected. Suedzucker has used equity to repurchase
EUR279 million of its 2016 convertible bonds at a fixed price of
182.5% of their par value. As a result, we anticipate that the
ratio of adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt will exceed
60% by the fiscal year ending Feb. 28, 2013, compared with 53% at
the end of the quarter ended Aug. 31, 2012," S&P said.

"In our view, Suedzucker will continue its strong performance, at
least in fiscal 2013. We anticipate a decline in fiscal 2014 and
thereafter, but we believe the metrics will remain commensurate
with the 'BBB+' rating, with the leverage ratio (debt to EBITDA)
lower than 2.5x and FFO to debt higher than 35%, on a sustainable
basis," S&P said.

"Our base-case scenario incorporates our key assumption that
quota sugar prices in the EU will remain high for the remainder
of the current harvest and production cycle (October 2012 to
September 2013), and at least part of the following cycle. This
should benefit Suedzucker's results, and we anticipate total
revenue growth exceeding 10% in fiscal 2013, resulting in EBITDA
margins improving by more than 150 basis points for the year,"
S&P said.

"However, we expect such elevated prices to soften somewhat in
the next period (2013-2014), particularly because commodity
prices are inherently volatile. Consequently, we forecast revenue
to shrink by mid-single digits and EBITDA margins to decline to
lower than 13% in fiscal 2014," S&P said.

"We also anticipate Suedzucker to supply a lower volume of non-
quota sugar in the EU market in fiscal 2014 because the record
high harvest of 2011 is unlikely to reoccur. We believe the
special products division's contribution to the group's earnings
in fiscal 2013 will remain similar to that of 2012 because of
higher grain prices. We assume meaningful earnings growth in the
ethanol segment next year, supported by higher volumes and
rebounding prices," S&P said.

For its base case, S&P also assumes:

-- Capital expenditures of less than 0.4x EBITDA in fiscal 2013
    and 2014 to account for new capacity, as well as energy- and
    cost-saving measures;

-- Moderate dividends, representing 30%-40% of the company's net
    profit after deducting minority interests;

-- No share buy backs; and

-- Only modest acquisitions in 2013, similar in size to
    Suedzucker's investment of British trading commodity company
    ED&F Man. This incorporates S&P's understanding that the
    group will maintain its prudent financial policy in the
    future.

"Under this scenario, we project that the leverage ratio will be
materially below 2x in fiscal 2013 and fiscal 2014, while the
ratio of adjusted FFO to debt should decline in fiscal 2014 from
the current 53%, but remain higher than 45%," S&P said.

"The positive outlook reflects the potential for an upgrade if
Suedzucker manages to maintain an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio of
more than 50% and an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio closer to
1.5x. This should materialize if the company continues to perform
soundly, generating solid positive free cash flow, despite
negative working capital movements and moderately increasing
capital expenditures. Additionally, we would need more clarity on
the effect of sugar regulation in the EU beyond 2015, which we
expect to be decided in 2013," S&P said.

"Additional positive rating momentum might also result from
Suedzucker's increasing size and diversification, if it caused us
to revise our assessment of the company's business risk profile
to 'strong' from the current 'satisfactory,'" S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook back to stable if the company were
unable to consistently maintain FFO to debt of more than 50%.
Given the predictability of the quota-sugar operations for the
rest of the 2012-2013 marketing year, we believe that for fiscal
2013, downside risk would likely primarily stem from an
unexpected deviation from the current financial policy. This
could happen if the company made a large debt-financed
acquisition that did not lead to a meaningful improvement of
overall business risk. We believe that as of fiscal 2014,
downside risk could also come from a weaker operating
performance. This could result from a softening of sugar prices
that substantially eroded profitability," S&P said.


* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Down 17% in September
-------------------------------------------------------
RTT reports that data from the Federal Statistical Office showed
Friday German corporate insolvencies declined 17% from a year
earlier in September.

According to RTT, district courts in Germany reported 2,057
business insolvencies during the month.  In September, a total of
11,112 bankruptcies were reported of which 7,200 were consumers,
RTT discloses.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


FAGE INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Rates New Bond Issuance '(P)B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B3 senior
unsecured rating to the proposed USD250 million of senior
unsecured notes, maturing in February 2020, to be co-issued by
FAGE International S.A. and FAGE USA Diary Industry, Inc., a
subsidiary of Fage. Fage's corporate family rating (CFR),
probability of default rating (PDR) and the rating of existing
senior unsecured bonds remain unchanged at B3. The outlook on the
ratings is negative.

Fage will use the proceeds of the proposed issuance to refinance
some of its existing debt, finance further US manufacturing
capacity expansion and for general corporate purposes.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the notes. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

"The (P)B3 rating assigned to the new unsecured and
unsubordinated bonds is both in line with Fage's B3 CFR, given
the absence of material secured debt in the company's capital
structure, other than the asset-backed USD50 million revolving
credit facility for Fage USA, and with the company's existing
senior unsecured debt instrument ratings," says Andreas Rands, a
Moody's Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead analyst for
Fage. The senior unsecured notes rank pari passu with other
unsecured debt and are structurally subordinated to the
liabilities of non-guaranteeing subsidiaries. However, there are
only limited liabilities at non-guarantors, offering substantial
protection from subordination to noteholders. As of the 12 months
ended 30 September 2012, the issuers and guarantors represented
approximately 99.3% of Fage's EBITDA and 96.9% of its total
assets (before eliminations).

Furthermore, Moody's notes that Fage is offering the proposed
bonds as additional notes to the existing USD150 million of
senior unsecured notes due 2020, also issued jointly by Fage and
Fage USA. The additional notes benefit from the same terms and
conditions as the existing notes, except that certain clauses
will be amended to (1) restrict the ability for Fage Dairy
Industry S.A., ("Fage Greece"), a subsidiary of Fage, to receive
credit support from Fage; and (2) exclude Fage Greece from
certain material events that may cause a default or event of
default under the indenture. This amendment requires the consent
of the holders of the existing USD150 million of senior unsecured
notes due 2020 and Moody's understands that this process is under
way. However, Moody's understands, that if the required consent
level is not achieved, the company can start an alternative
consent process which is open to all holders of the 2020 notes.
Moody's further understands that under the alternative consent
process, holders of the proposed USD250 million of senior
unsecured notes due 2020 will be deemed to have consented to the
amendments by virtue of acquiring the notes without any further
consent. Moody's understands that holders of the proposed USD250
million of senior unsecured notes would constitute a majority of
the 2020 notes for the proposed alternative consent process. The
documentation of the USD150 million senior unsecured notes
contains limitations to additional indebtedness, restricted
payments and permitted liens, including an incurrence EBITDA
coverage ratio test of 2.0:1.0 and a negative pledge.

Moody's expects that Fage will use the net proceeds of the new
notes issuance (1) to redeem the principal amount outstanding
under its EUR101.5 million of senior unsecured notes due 2015
(approximately USD136 million); (2) to repay other existing
indebtedness -- specifically, amounts outstanding under the
company's USD50 million revolving credit facility (approximately
USD22 million) and EUR12 million of short-term lines in Greece
(approximately USD15 million); and (3) to finance further US
manufacturing capacity expansion and for other general corporate
purposes (approximately USD77.0 million). The short-term lines in
Greece will be cancelled except for a EUR5 million bilateral line
of credit with Alpha Bank. Moody's will withdraw the instrument
rating of the EUR101.5 million senior unsecured notes due 2015
once fully redeemed.

Moody's anticipates that Fage's adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio will
deteriorate and approach 4.5x as a result of the transaction.
Within 12-18 months, however, the rating agency expects this
ratio to trend below 4x (current level is estimated around 3.5x
for the last 12 months to September 30, 2012), as the increased
debt incurred to finance US capital expenditure requirements is
reduced primarily by cash flows generated from continued strong
sales growth in its key US market.

Moody's last rating action on Fage was on October 11, 2012, when
the rating agency assigned a B3 corporate family rating (CFR) to
the new parent company of Fage, FAGE International S.A.,
following a multi-step corporate restructuring by Fage completed
on October 1, 2012. This rating is in line with that for Fage's
former parent company, Fage Dairy Industry S.A., immediately
prior to the restructuring.

DRIVERS OF B3 CFR

Fage's B3 CFR reflects its small size as well as its exposure to
the Greek economy, which led to the company's Greek sales
declining by c. 22.0% for the nine months to September 30, 2012.
More positively, the rating is supported by Fage's strong growth
in international sales, primarily in the US, which is currently
offsetting the revenue decline in Greece. In the financial year
(FY) 2011, Fage's overall sales grew by 13.8%, reflecting growth
of 41.4% in international sales and exports, despite a decline of
9.4% in Greece. Sales trends were similar for the nine months to
30 September 2012, with overall sales up by 11.7% versus the same
period last year. Fage's exports and international sales rose by
38.5%, mitigating the 22.0% decline in Greek sales. Moody's
expects that the key driver of international sales growth, Fage's
US business, will continue to deliver solid results as volumes
with national supermarkets increase. Moody's notes that the
expected solid sales growth outside of Greece has been much more
profitable, with Fage Greece reporting a 29.0% gross margin in
FY2011, relative to 39.7% at the group level.

Moody's further notes a continued deterioration in Fage's Greek
business in light of the worsening macroeconomic environment in
that country. This is due to a combination of customers migrating
to cheaper private-label products, resulting in loss of market
share, and retailers experiencing increased liquidity
constraints, causing the company to cease trading with some
partners. Given the continuation of austerity measures in Greece,
Moody's expects these negative performance trends to worsen
during the coming quarters, thereby increasing Fage's reliance on
its international sales.

Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the significantly negative operating performance trend in
Fage's Greek operations will continue for around 6-12 months.
However, Moody's continues to believe that Fage's US operations
will offset these negative performance trends and that the
company will maintain an adequate liquidity profile, which the
rating agency will closely monitor. The increased likelihood of a
further, disorderly, default by Greece, and possibly even of the
country exiting the euro area, could exert further pressure on
Fage's operating performance and debt-servicing capacity. For the
outlook to be stabilized, Fage would need to maintain an adjusted
gross debt/EBITDA ratio below 4.5x on a sustainable basis. In
addition, Moody's would require evidence of a reduction in the
risk of (1) a further deterioration in Fage's results in Greece;
and (2) Greece's exit from the euro area.

What Could Change The Rating DOWN/UP

Downward pressure on Fage's ratings could develop in the event of
a weakening in its competitive position in Greece or slower
growth in international sales, such that the company exhibits (1)
low-single-digit EBITDA margins; (2) negative free cash flow
generation; (3) a debt/EBITDA ratio above 4.5x on a sustainable
basis; and/or (4) tighter liquidity. Although Greece's exit from
the euro area is not Moody's central scenario, should it occur,
additional negative pressure could be exerted on Fage's ratings
to the extent that its Greek operations and debt-servicing
capacity were significantly impaired.

Although unlikely in the near term, positive pressure on the
ratings would require evidence of continued growth in the
company's export markets, which would offset margin pressure in
Greece and lead to EBITDA margins above 10%, positive free cash
flow generation and debt/EBITDA trending to below 3.5x on a
sustainable basis. To consider a rating upgrade, Moody's would
require evidence of a material reduction in the risk of (1) a
further deterioration in Fage's results in Greece; and (2)
Greece's exit from the euro area. Moody's will also consider the
company's liquidity position as a key driver of a positive
action.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating FAGE International S.A.
was the Global Packaged Goods Industry rating methodology,
published in July 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA, published in June 2009.

FAGE International S.A. manufactures and markets dairy products
in Greece, North America, UK, Italy and Germany. While the
business was founded in Greece in 1926, it has significantly
diversified its revenues into other geographies (notably the US)
over the past 10 years. In Greece, Fage is the market leader for
branded yoghurts and in the US, the company is the fourth-largest
branded yoghurt company. The Filippou family, which founded the
company, still retains full control. Fage reported EUR385.2
million in revenues for the year ended December 2011.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


E-STAR: Files for Bankruptcy; Gets Temporary Debt Reprieve
----------------------------------------------------------
Edith Balazs at Bloomberg News reports that E-Star said in a
statement to Budapest bourse that the company filed for
bankruptcy on inability to meet payment obligations, upon which
situation opens the right of creditors to initiate liquidation
proceedings.

Bloomberg relates that the company said it was granted temporary
payment moratorium.

According to Bloomberg, the company aims to reach an agreement
with creditors under the bankruptcy procedures to ensure future
operation.

E-Star Alternative is a Hungarian energy services company.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCAPULIA SPA: Moody's Reviews 'D+' BFSR for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Bancapulia Spa's Baa3/Prime-3 long- and short-term deposit
ratings and its D+ standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR), equivalent to a ba1 standalone credit assessment.

According to Moody's the decision to review the ratings for
downgrade reflects growing concerns regarding the bank's
deteriorating asset quality and the adequacy of provisioning,
against the backdrop of a very challenging operating environment
in Italy. The concerns are further based on the bank's weak
profitability, which is still influenced negatively by the
restructuring of its consumer finance subsidiary
ApuliaProntoPrestito.

Ratings Rationale

Since 2009, Bancapulia's profitability has been weak, with losses
being incurred in three of the last four years. This has been
affected by the bank's consumer lending subsidiary which has been
suffering from weak operating environment in Italy. Moody's said
that the review will focus on the extent to which profitability
can be restored to a satisfactory level.

BancApulia' asset quality is weak. Problem loans(1) as a
percentage of gross loans were 10.8%(2) at June 2012 (December
2011: 9.2%). Moreover, the coverage of the problem loans by
provisions is low and has been declining. Overall coverage (loan
loss reserves % problem loans) stood at 30% at June 2012, against
37% in 2008, which is significantly below the banking system's
average.

Established in 1924 BancApulia is a small regional retail bank
with total assets of Eur5.5 billion at June 2012. It was formed
through the merger of various local banks and is based in the
Province of Foggia, part of the economically weak region of
Puglia in Southern Italy. In January 2010 the bank merged with
Banca Meridiana, a neighboring local bank. Through the merger of
BancApulia with Banca Meridiana in 2010, Veneto Banca has become
the controlling shareholder of BancApulia. Current shareholders
are: Veneto Banca 70%, Chir• family 27% with the balance held by
private shareholders, mainly local private entrepreneurs.

What Could Change The Rating UP/DOWN

As indicated by the review for downgrade, Moody's currently does
not expect any upward rating pressure.

Downward pressure on the bank's standalone credit assessment
would primarily stem from further asset quality deterioration,
coupled with insufficient profitability to allow for an
improvement in the coverage ratio of its problem loans. The
bank's Baa3/Prime-3 deposit ratings currently incorporate one
notch of uplift due to systemic (government) support and parental
support from Veneto Banca Scpa (unrated), from the bank's
standalone credit strength. Therefore, any change in the BFSR
will likely have an impact on the deposit ratings.

(1) Problem loans include: non-performing loans (sofferenze),
watchlist (incagli - including only those over 90 days overdue),
restructured (ristrutturati) and past due loans (scaduti).

(2) Unless otherwise noted, data source is Moody's Financial
Metrics or Company data.

LIST OF AFFECTED CREDIT RATINGS

Bank Deposits Baa3/P-3 -- on review for downgrade

Bank Financial Strength D+ -- on review for downgrade

Baseline Credit Assessment (ba1) -- on review for downgrade

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (baa3) -- on review for
downgrade

Methodology Used

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Bancapulia SpA is headquartered in San Severo, Italy.  As of June
2012, it had total assets of EUR5.5 billion.


SESTANTE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. B Tranche to 'CCCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed 12 tranches of the
four Italian RMBS from Sestante Finance S.r.l. Fitch has also
revised the Outlook to Negative on one tranche and lowered the
recovery estimates on three junior tranches.

The downgrades of the class A and B notes of Sestante 3 and
Sestante 4 reflect Fitch's concerns over the on-going
deterioration of assets, which resulted in the reduction of
credit support available to withstand the current rating
stresses.  Concerns over further asset deterioration are
reflected in the Negative Outlooks assigned to the notes, as well
as the revision in recovery estimates assigned to tranches rated
'CCCsf' and below.

Despite signs of weak asset performance in Sestante 1 and
Sestante 2, Fitch believes that the portfolios have seen
significant deleveraging with the weighted average loan-to-value
ratio at 59% compared to 70% at transaction close.  The agency is
also of the opinion that the level of credit support that has
built-up over the years is presently sufficient to cover for the
expected losses, thus leading to the affirmation of the ratings.
The agency is however concerned that further asset deterioration
could put pressure on the ratings of the mezzanine and junior
notes, and this is reflected in the Negative Outlooks assigned to
the class B and C notes across the two structures.  Meanwhile,
the Outlooks on the most senior notes are driven by the Outlook
on Italy's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR; 'A-
'/Negative/'F2').

Fitch was informed by Italfondiario ('RPS2'/'RSS1-'), who in May
2011 took over the servicing activity from Meliorbanca (part of
the Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Group, BPER;
'BBB'/'F2'/Negative), that the current state of the Italian
economy combined with lower-than-market-average-income of
borrowers in these pools are the main reasons behind the increase
in the arrears observed over the past 12 months.  The phenomenon
does not seem to be impacted by borrower nationality (around 30%
of the loans were granted to foreigners residing in Italy) but
more by the limited affordability, which in the majority of the
cases the servicer attributes to a job loss.

As of the most recent interest payment dates (IPD) in September
and October 2012, across the four transaction loans in arrears by
more than three months ranged between 4.3% (Sestante 2) and 6.6%
(Sestante 4) of the total pool balance, respectively.

The four structures include a provisioning mechanism, whereby
defaulted loans are allocated to and cleared through a principal
deficiency ledger (PDL).  A loan is classified as defaulted once
it has 12 or more unpaid installments or the servicer has
classified the loan as such in line with the guidelines set out
by the Bank of Italy.

Despite seeing a slowdown in the number of period defaults
following the implementation of Italfondiario's servicing
strategies for non-performing loans, the transactions have seen a
limited inflow of recoveries.  The limited recoveries in
combination with weak performance of pools have resulted in
outstanding PDLs of EUR3.6 million, EUR10.9 million and EUR27.8
million, for Sestante 2, 3 and 4 respectively.  In other words,
the excess revenue generated by these pools has been insufficient
to fully provision for period defaults or to clear the
outstanding PDLs.

In particular, Sestante 4 has reported an increase in the
outstanding PDL compared to a year ago (EUR24.3 million),
reducing the credit support available to the rated notes.  For
this reason, Fitch downgraded the ratings of the Sestante 4's
class A1, A2 and B notes to 'BBBsf' and 'CCCsf', respectively.

Meanwhile, the insufficient excess spread generated by Sestante 1
has resulted in the utilization of the reserve fund for
provisioning purposes.  Fitch believes that the main cause for
the insufficient revenue is the payment due to the class A2
excess spread notes, which ranks senior to the class A1's PDL.
As of the September 2012 IPD Sestante 1's reserve fund stood at
58% of its target amount.  Considering the volume of loans in
arrears in the pipeline, Fitch expects more defaults to occur
over the upcoming quarters and thus further reserve fund draws,
putting pressure on the credit support available to the notes.

In Fitch's view all four transactions remain highly dependent on
future recoveries. Given the lengthy foreclosure timing in Italy,
which in some regions may take up to nine years, the agency
expect the inflow of recoveries to remain limited in upcoming
payment dates.

In May 2011 collection accounts were opened in the name of the
issuer with BPER All collections are deposited into the
transactions' account banks (Bank of New York Mellon, Italian
branch; 'AA-'/'F1+'/Stable) on a daily basis.  The bank was also
appointed as the back-up servicer in all four transactions.
Fitch views such implementations as a positive feature, thus
reducing the risk of a potential payment interruption.

Sestante Finance S.r.l (Sestante 1):

  -- Class A1 (ISIN IT0003604789): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class A2 (ISIN IT0003604813): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003604839): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Class C (ISIN IT0003604854): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
     Negative

Sestante Finance S.r.l - 2(Sestante 2):

  -- Class A (ISIN IT0003760136): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative
  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003760193): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0003760227): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate (RE) of 25%
  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0003760243): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE of 0%

Sestante Finance S.r.l - 3 (Sestante 3):

  -- Class A (ISIN IT0003937452): downgraded to 'AAsf' from
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003937486): downgraded to 'BBsf; from
     'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0003937510): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE of 0%
  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0003937569): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE of 0%

Sestante Finance S.r.l - 4 (Sestante 4):

  -- Class A1 (ISIN IT0004158124): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'AAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class A2 (ISIN IT0004158157): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'AAsf'; Outlook Negative
  -- Class B (ISIN IT0004158165): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; RE of 30%
  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0004158249): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE of 0%
  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0004158264): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE of 0%


* ITALY: Moody's Corrects Nov. 27 Rating Release on RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a correction to the Nov. 27,
2012, rating release on Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.

Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on seven
Italian residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions further to its reassessment of all Moody's-rated
Italian RMBS. The rating agency's reassessment takes into
consideration its updated European RMBS rating methodology,
ongoing collateral performance deterioration as well as the
deterioration of the ratings of the Italian sovereign and the
transactions' counterparties over the last 12 months.

Moody's has commented on these rating drivers, which have
developed in the past 12 months, in its Special Comment,
"European ABS and RMBS: Structured finance ratings in Aaa-
countries ratings are stable; downgrades expected in other
countries" published on 14 November 2012.

Specifically, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of three senior
notes and 10 junior notes, in seven Italian RMBS transactions.
The downgrades are driven primarily by the revision of key
collateral assumptions following Moody's reassessment of the
entire Italian RMBS sector. The downgrades range from 1 to 6
notches with an average of 3 notches. Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF308606for
the list of affected ratings. This list is an integral part of
this press release. For a detailed rationale on each rating
action, please refer to the list of affected credit ratings.

Moody's has also revised key collateral assumptions in 71 other
transactions, which did not result in any rating change due to
sufficient credit enhancement. The list of updated assumptions
for the transactions is available under the following link:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF308609

This reassessment also concludes the review of five tranches in
three Italian RMBS transactions placed on review on June 8, 2012,
following the release of the rating agency's updated methodology
for rating EMEA RMBS transactions.

The ratings downgraded as part of the rating action, as well as
Italian RMBS previously placed on review, remain on review for
downgrade pending the reassessment of (1) credit enhancement
levels required to address the increased country risk exposure
and/or (2) the rating impact resulting from linkage to weaker
counterparties.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is driven by the revision of key collateral
assumptions.

- REVISION OF KEY COLLATERAL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's has revised key collateral assumptions on 78 of the 121
Italian RMBS transactions that it currently rates. Moody's has
revised the portfolio loss assumptions in transactions because of
worse-than-expected collateral performance, which resulted in
higher expected losses. Moody's has also reassessed the credit
quality of the outstanding Italian RMBS portfolios to determine
the credit enhancement (MILAN CE) in line with Moody's updated
methodology for rating EMEA RMBS transactions. The updated
European RMBS rating methodology is described in a report titled
"Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and
Africa", and the "RMBS Rating Methodology Supplement for Italy" 6
June 2012.

- Expected loss (EL)

Italian RMBS collateral performance has deteriorated over the
last 12 months. Delinquencies remain stable while defaults have
increased quite significantly, according to the latest Italian
RMBS indices published by Moody's. Moody's Italian Prime RMBS
index reported 90+ day delinquencies at 1.58% of current balance
in August 2012, which is in line with the 1.64% recorded in
August 2011. The cumulative defaults index increased to 2.99%
over original balance in August 2012 up from 2.28% a year
earlier. The prepayment rate index continued its decline,
standing at 3.3% in August 2012, which represents a 53% drop
compared with the same period in the previous year.

The continued deterioration in cumulative defaults in the Italian
RMBS market translated into higher projected EL assumptions for
certain portfolios. Moody's negative outlook for Italian RMBS is
also reflected in the updated assumptions.

For the overall Italian RMBS market, Moody's is assuming an
average of 3.6% future losses for seasoned transactions with
relatively good asset performance. In the case of less seasoned
transactions showing below average performance, Moody's expects
an average of 4.6% future losses.

- MILAN CE

Moody's has revised its MILAN Credit Enhancement (MILAN CE)
assumptions following publication of the updated methodology used
in its RMBS collateral analysis. MILAN is the scoring model
described in the EMEA RMBS methodology used to assist rating
committees in determining the required credit enhancement for a
pool of residential mortgage-backed loans. The key changes to the
EMEA RMBS methodology include the introduction of a transaction
minimum MILAN CE level and various default and severity setting
adjustments in the scoring model.

The overall MILAN CE is subject to two separate floors, the
Minimum Portfolio MILAN CE and the Minimum Expected Loss
Multiple. The Minimum Portfolio MILAN CE for the best quality
Italian RMBS ranges between 7.5%-10% for tranches rated at
A2(sf), which is the highest achievable rating for Italian
structured finance transactions given the A2 country ceiling for
Italy. The revised MILAN CE assumptions generally reflect a
multiple of 3 times the revised EL assumptions (Minimum Expected
Loss Multiple), but Moody's has used a 2 to 3 multiple for
seasoned transactions with good performance.

- DRIVERS FOR REVIEW PLACEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY RISK
   EXPOSURE AND LINKAGE TO COUNTERPARTIES

All ratings downgraded remain on review for downgrade pending the
reassessment of the impact of country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions and, in some cases, exposure to
counterparties (i.e., servicer, account banks, swap
counterparties and originators). In addition, 50 tranches in 32
Italian RMBS transactions that were not affected by the rating
actions have ratings that remain under review for the same
reasons as those listed above.

- OUTLOOK FOR ITALIAN RMBS

Moody's outlook for Italian RMBS collateral is negative. Moody's
expects a contracting Italian economy and an annual average
unemployment rate of 10.5% in 2012, increasing by a further 0.5%
in 2013.

Moody's expects that Italian house prices will continue to
decline in 2013, increasing losses on foreclosed properties.

- OTHER DEVELOPMENTS MAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE NOTES

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could negatively
affect the ratings of the notes.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a request for comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.

Additional factors that may affect the resolution of these
reviews are described in request for comments titled "The
temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" and "Approach to
Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance
Cashflow Transactions", which were both published on July 2,
2012.

Italy's new country ceiling, as per July 13, 2012 press release,
reflects Moody's assessment that the risk of economic and
financial instability in the country has increased. The weakness
of the economy and the increased vulnerability to a sudden
cessation in funding for the sovereign constitute a substantial
risk factor to other (non-government) issuers in Italy, as income
and access to liquidity and funding could be sharply curtailed
for all classes of borrowers. Further deterioration in the
financial sector cannot be excluded, which could lead to
potentially severe systemic economic disruption and reduced
access to credit. Finally, the country ceiling reflects the risk
of exit and redenomination in the unlikely event of a default by
the sovereign. If the Italian government's rating were to fall
further from its current Baa2 level, the country ceiling would be
reassessed and likely lowered at that time.

Key modeling assumptions, such as expected loss and MILAN CE
assumptions have been updated. Potential sensitivities, cash-flow
analysis and stress scenarios for the affected transactions have
not been updated, as the rating actions have been primarily
driven by (1) the update of the key assumptions; and, as a
consequence, (2) Moody's decision to assess credit enhancement
levels consistent with each structured finance rating category.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa"
published in June 2012.

Other Factors used in these ratings are described in "Local-
Currency Country Risk Ceiling for Bonds and Other Local Currency
Obligations", published in August 2012.

The rating considerations described in this press release
complement the principal rating methodologies applicable to each
of the Italian RMBS transactions affected by the rating action.



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


* MUNICIPALITY OF GOSTIVAR: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B1 global scale
issuer rating with stable outlook of the Municipality of Gostivar
in Republic of Macedonia.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The Municipality of Gostivar is located in the Polog region,
which is in the northwest of the Republic of Macedonia. With its
more than 82.000 inhabitants occupying an area of 519 km2, it
ranks among the biggest Macedonian municipalities.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


NXP BV: Moody's Rates New Sr. Secured Term Loan Tranche C 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 rating with a loss
given default assessment (LGD) of 4, 62% to the new USD500
million senior secured term loan tranche C due 2020 to be issued
by NXP B.V. and NXP Funding LLC.

In addition, the rating agency has affirmed NXP's Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) at B1
and the B2 (LGD4, 62%) ratings on NXP's existing senior secured
notes and term loans. The rating outlook remains stable.

Ratings Rationale

"Moody's assignment of the B2 rating to NXP's USD500 million new
senior secured term loan tranche C reflects that these will rank
pari passu with NXP's existing senior secured debt, but junior to
the group's EUR620 million secured revolving credit facility,"
says Kathrin Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst for NXP. The new
senior secured term loan will be used to redeem USD500 million of
the USD922 million senior secured notes due 2018. The transaction
will lengthen the company's debt maturity profile and will reduce
annual interest costs.

NXP's senior secured term loans and senior secured notes share
the security arrangements with NXP's EUR620 million revolving
credit facility due 2017 but rank behind the revolving credit
facility in a liquidation scenario. NXP's senior secured debt is
secured by first-priority liens on (a) substantially all assets
except cash of the issuer and its guarantor (material wholly
owned subsidiaries); (b) the issuer's equity interests in all
material wholly owned subsidiaries; and (c) any intercompany
loans. Moody's has ranked USD549 million of trade payables as per
30 September 2012 with the revolving credit facility in Moody's
Loss Given Default Assessment.

The B1 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) continues to reflect NXP's
progress in generating material amounts of positive free cash
flow and in sustaining solid levels of operating performance in
the current financial year. Positive free cash flow of USD233
million in the first nine months of 2012 and credit metrics such
as debt/EBITDA of 3.7x and EBIT/interest expense of 2.3x on a
last 12 months (LTM) basis per September 30, 2012 position NXP
solidly in the B1 rating category. NXP has some cushion in the B1
rating category to withstand a degree of earnings volatility
stemming from continued weak semiconductor markets and
macroeconomic uncertainty. In addition, the B1 ratings take
comfort from NXP's solid short-term liquidity profile and
additional steps over the last three quarters to lengthen the
group's debt maturity. The ratings anticipate that management
remains committed to further reduce the company's high gross debt
burden of around USD4.1 billion as adjusted by Moody's at
September 30, 2012.

Other factors considered in the ratings are (1) NXP's established
leadership positions in different markets with different
underlying growth drivers and supported by recent design wins and
broadening range of innovative products. In addition, (2) the
ratings factor in NXP's improved operating flexibility and USD928
million cost reductions achieved through its Redesign
Restructuring program completed in 2011. However, the ratings
remain constrained by (3) the high technology risk inherent to
the semiconductor industry and the customized nature of NXP's
products; (4) a relatively short track record of positive free
cash flow generation and (5) the group's relatively high leverage
compared to other rated semiconductor companies.

The stable rating outlook continues to reflect Moody's
expectation that despite the more challenging market conditions
and macroeconomic weakness in Europe, NXP will maintain a healthy
liquidity profile and generate positive free cash flow through
the cycle which will be applied to debt reduction. This should
enable the company to maintain debt/EBITDA around 3.5x and
EBIT/interest expense above 2.0x through the cycle.

What Could Change The Rating UP/DOWN

Rating upward pressure would require sustained profitable growth
of NXP's major division, its HPMS business, while maintaining or
growing market shares and continued positive free cash flow
generation being applied to debt reduction. The rating could be
upgraded if this leads to debt/EBITDA of around 3.0x through the
cycle and if NXP can maintain an ample liquidity cushion to
weather any deep industry slowdown.

The ratings could be downgraded if NXP experienced sustained
erosion in its revenues, loss of market share as indicated by
revenues growing at a rate less than the industry, and operating
margins for a protracted period, returned to material negative
free cash flow and debt/EBITDA above 4.5x. In addition,
deterioration in liquidity could result in a rating downgrade.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating NXP B.V. was the Global
Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in November 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, NXP Semiconductors is a
leading semiconductor company. Its High Performance Mixed Signal
and Standard Product solutions are used in a wide range of
applications, including automotive, identification, wireless
infrastructure, lighting, industrial, mobile, consumer and
computing. NXP generated revenues of around USD4.2 billion in
twelve month period ending September 2012.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSE ENERGY: US Subsidiary Files Chapter 11 Reorganization
-----------------------------------------------------------
Norse Energy Corp. ASA on Dec. 8 disclosed that its US subsidiary
holding company, Norse Energy Holdings, Inc., has filed a
voluntary petition for Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession ("DIP")
protection and reorganization under the United States Bankruptcy
Code.  Reference is made to the Company's press release dated
December 7, 2012, in which it announced that its other US
subsidiary, Norse Energy Corp. USA, filed for Chapter 11
protection.

The Company advises that these subsidiary Chapter 11 filings will
likely constitute an event of default under the loan agreement in
respect of the NEC convertible callable bond issue 2012/2015
(ISIN NO 001064079 (http://tel:001064079).0). This may result in
the outstanding bonds in the amount of US$21 million at the Norse
Energy Corp. ASA level being declared to be in default and due
for payment, if the bondholders elect to do so.

The Company has a significant land position of 130,000 net acres
in New York State with certified 2C contingent resources of 951
MMBOE as of June 30, 2012.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


COGNOR SA: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Caa2' CFR to Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed its rating outlook for Cognor
S.A. to negative from stable. The company's corporate family and
probability of default ratings remain Caa2, and the rating for
the EUR120 million of senior secured notes due January 2014,
issued by the company's finance subsidiary Zlomrex International
Finance S.A., also was affirmed at Caa2 (LGD4, 53%).

Ratings Rationale

"The negative outlook reflects Cognor's weak operating
performance in the wake of declining steel demand and prices in
Europe but also in Poland, its largest market, and how these
challenging fundamentals may affect the company's ability to
arrange new financing needed to retire its senior secured notes
when they come due on January 2, 2014," said Steven Oman, senior
vice president and lead analyst for the EMEA steel industry at
Moody's.

Steel market fundamentals have steadily worsened in 2012 as
slowing in the Asian and North American economies, on top of the
European recession, has undermined support for steel demand and
prices. In the third quarter of 2012, conditions worsened in
Poland, which unlike Europe as a whole had previously been
experiencing modestly rising steel demand. However, in the third
quarter demand for steel from the construction and automotive
industries slowed for Cognor. In response, the group reduced its
production and eliminated sales of semi-finished products outside
of Poland as export margins were especially pressured. Shipments
and sales in 3Q12 were both down about 22% compared to 3Q11 and
EBITDA was down 70% Y-o-y, to PLN14 million. The company
indicated that 4Q12 could be similar to 3Q12.

In Moody's opinion, today's difficult macroeconomic and steel
market conditions are likely to continue into the first half of
2013. If so, Cognor's credit ratios, not strong to begin with,
would weaken and potentially challenge its access to the debt and
equity capital markets that are crucial to its needs as it seeks
to refinance its EUR120 million of maturing senior secured notes,
which come due on January 2, 2014. This raises the possibility of
a distressed exchange. The 2014 notes represent about PLN490
million, or about 86% of Cognor's debt, while its market cap is
currently about PLN150 million. As of September 30, 2012, Cognor
had very limited net cash of PLN18 million and available credit
facility capacity of PLN6.5 million.

A further development for the company was its announcement on 14
November to invest in a new rolling line for long products, which
will boost production of high alloy large rounds used by the auto
industry. It has opened a tender, started negotiations with
potential machinery suppliers, and plans to conclude the tender
process soon. While the expansion and de-bottlenecking of the
Ferrostal plant should provide good returns with minimal risk, it
will contribute to a significant increase in the company's capex
-- PLN 70 million in 2013, PLN150 million in 2014 and PLN130
million in 2015 -- compared to PLN10 to PLN20 million in the last
two years. The potential rating impact of the expansion will
depend on the economics of the changes to product mix and margins
as well as the terms of the vendor financing associated with the
project.

What Could Change Rating UP/DOWN

Cognor's outlook could be stabilized if it successfully concludes
a refinancing. An upgrade is unlikely until steel market
conditions as they relate to Cognor's markets and margins
improve, leverage is reduced, and financing for the expansion and
upgrade project is arranged on satisfactory terms, in addition to
the refinancing of the 2014 notes. A downgrade is possible in the
second quarter of 2013 if refinancing has not been done and
market conditions have evidenced no sign of material improvement.

The principal methodology used in rating Cognor S.A. and Zlomrex
International Finance S.A. was the Global Steel Industry
Methodology published in October 2012. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Cognor, headquartered in Poraj, Poland, is the largest trader of
steel scrap and one of the leading producers of high grade long
steel products in its domestic market. For the twelve months
ended September 30, 2012, its revenues were PLN1.56 billion.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BMORE FINANCE 4: Moody's Corrects December 3 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a correction to the December 3,
2012 rating release of BMORE Finance No. 4.

Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa3(sf) from B3(sf) the
ratings of the class D notes in BMORE Finance No. 4 originated by
Banif Mais (not rated), as a result of increased loss
expectations at the notes' legal maturity in May 2014. The rating
action concludes the review initiated by Moody's on September 11,
2012, following increasing negative credit enhancement (CE)
level.

Issuer: BMORE Finance No. 4 plc

    EUR12M D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

"The downgrade reflects the build-up of a principal deficiency
ledger (PDL), which is likely to turn into a loss for the class D
notes given the high delinquency levels and the limited expected
recoveries on past defaults," says Sebastian Schranz, a Moody's
analyst and lead analyst for the issuer.

"We downgraded the notes to B3(sf) in March 2012 because of the
expectation of additional defaults not being covered by excess
spread (unpaid PDL). In September 2012, we placed the notes on
review for downgrade due to the increasing negative CE level
compared to levels in other Portuguese ABS transactions," adds
Mr. Schranz.

Despite the write-off of a large stock of long overdue
receivables in May 2012, which triggered an unpaid PDL,
delinquency levels in BMORE Finance No. 4 have remained at very
high levels. The 60+ day delinquency rate on current balance
currently stands at 33.09%, while 90+ day delinquencies stand at
25.93% as of November 2012.

At the same time, incoming recoveries reduced the unpaid PDL
level slightly to EUR0.4 million as of November 2012. Assuming
the unpaid PDL remains constant, the notes may nevertheless
suffer an estimated loss of 22% of the current notes balance.

Some uncertainty stems from the future performance of the pool.
If future delinquencies create further losses, which are not
covered by future recoveries, the rating of the notes can be
negatively affected.

Moody's does not expect a materially high amount of recoveries
for the remaining life of the transaction. However, recoveries
significantly in excess of expectations may reduce the current
PDL level.

BMORE Finance No. 4 is a Portuguese asset-backed securities (ABS)
transaction backed by a portfolio of auto and consumer loans
originated by Banif Mais, a subsidiary of Banif -- Banco
Internacional do Funchal rated B1. The transaction was originated
in May 2004 and currently has a pool factor of 0.5% (outstanding
balance as a proportion of the initial transaction balance). The
most junior class D notes are the only notes still outstanding,
all other notes have been repaid.

Key modelling assumptions, sensitivities, cash-flow analysis and
stress scenarios for the affected transactions have not been
updated, as the rating actions have been primarily driven by the
expected loss on the class D notes based on the current PDL
level.

Principal Methodology

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating European Auto ABS", published in November 2002, and
"Moody's Approach to rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default, published in November 2009.


* Moody's Lowers Ratings on Portuguese Banks BCP and Banif
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken actions on three Portuguese
banks. The debt and deposit ratings of Banco Comercial Portugues
(BCP) were downgraded by one notch to B1 with a negative outlook.
The debt and deposit ratings of Banco Internacional do Funchal
S.A. (Banif) were lowered by one notch to B2 from B1, and placed
on review with direction uncertain. The debt and deposit ratings
of Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) were affirmed at Ba3 with a
negative outlook.

The actions on the banks' debt and deposit ratings were prompted
by Moody's downgrades of their standalone credit assessments
(Baseline Credit Assessments, BCA). Moody's has downgraded by
three notches each the standalone credit assessments of BCP,
Banif and CGD to reflect the expected further deterioration of
the banks' risk absorption capacity given the more negative
outlook for the Portuguese economy, with GDP forecasts having
been revised downwards by Moody's to -3.3% expected for FY2012
and a further contraction of -1.2% for 2013, as opposed to the
August forecasts which expected -3.6% for 2012 and -0.3% for
2013.

Rating Actions Overview

-- Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP): The standalone credit
assessment was downgraded to E/caa2 from E+/b2 and the debt and
deposit ratings were downgraded to B1/Not Prime from at Ba3/Not
Prime. The bank's subordinated debt and preference share ratings
were downgraded to Caa3 and C(hyb) respectively. All ratings have
a negative outlook.

-- Banco Internacional do Funchal (Banif): The standalone credit
assessment was downgraded to E/caa2 from E+/b2 and the debt and
deposit ratings were downgraded to B2/Not Prime from B1/Not
Prime. The bank's subordinated, junior subordinated debt and
preference share ratings were downgraded to Caa3, Ca(hyb) and
C(hyb), from B3, Caa1(hyb) and Caa2(hyb) respectively. All
ratings except the junior instruments are on review with
direction uncertain.

-- Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD): The standalone credit
assessment was downgraded to E/caa1 from E+/b1 and the debt and
deposit ratings were affirmed at Ba3/Not Prime. The bank's
subordinated, junior subordinated debt and preference share
ratings were downgraded to Caa2, Caa3(hyb) and Ca(hyb), from B2,
B3(hyb) and Caa1(hyb) respectively. All ratings have a negative
outlook.

A full list of affected ratings can be found at this link:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_147923

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADES OF STANDALONE CREDIT ASSESSMENTS

Throughout 2012 BCP, Banif and CGD have seen an increased portion
of its pre-provision income absorbed by asset impairments. At the
same time, the capacity of these banks to generate recurring
earnings to offset these rising impairments has been
significantly impacted by (i) higher funding costs (particularly
of retail deposits), (ii) ongoing balance sheet deleveraging and
(iii) increase in non-earning assets. Moody's is concerned that
Portugal's prolonged economic recession will exacerbate the
intense pressure on the already very weak risk absorption
capacity of these three banks.

Moody's acknowledges the improved solvency levels for BCP and CGD
following the recapitalization effort made by the Portuguese
government in June 2012. Moody's also notes that Banif's current
capital shortfall to comply with a regulatory core Tier 1 capital
threshold of 10% will be compensated after the targeted public
recapitalization materializes, which is expected to take place
before year-end 2012. However, the rating agency is concerned
that the very negative economic conditions for the Portuguese
economy may challenge the achievement of the deleveraging goals
contemplated in the recapitalization and funding plans approved
by Bank of Portugal and the Troika for the three banks.
Furthermore, the expected broader deterioration in profitability
and asset quality will pressure the banks' capital base, which
increases the likelihood that additional public support may be
required to offset for the losses embedded in their balance
sheets.

Funding profiles have improved throughout 2012 thanks to
deleveraging efforts and resilient deposit bases. However,
Moody's considers that additional risks pressuring the three
banks' standalone credit assessment is the ongoing lack of access
to long-term wholesale funding sources, which have led them to
display high reliance on European Central Bank (ECB) funding.
Heightened uncertainties on the health of the Portuguese economy
as well as on the creditworthiness of the banking system will
prevent banks to regain normalized access to private markets in
the foreseeable future. In this regard, Moody's expects that BCP,
Banif and CGD will remain reliant on ECB support for some time.

Consistent with Moody's definitions, the lower standalone credit
assessment reflects the rating agency's view that BCP, Banif and
CGD have speculative intrinsic, or standalone, financial strength
and are subject to very high credit risk absent any possibility
of extraordinary support from a third party or the government.

RATIONALE FOR STANDALONE CREDIT ASSESSMENTS BY BANK

BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES (BCP)

BCP's E/caa2 standalone credit assessment, is a reflection of its
very weak risk absorption capacity despite the recent public
recapitalization, evidenced by 1) rapidly deteriorating
profitability ratios, with a sharp decline in net interest income
of 35.6% and a EUR796.3 million net loss reported at end-
September 2012; 2) very high reported NPL ratio (credit at risk
ratio as per Bank of Portugal's definition) of 13.4% (compared to
the system's average of 10%) and 3) Moody's concerns in relation
to BCP's exposure to Greece through its 100%-owned subsidiary
Millennium Bank S.A (unrated).

BCP was required by the European Banking Authority (EBA) to reach
a 9% core tier 1 ratio before end-June 2012. To comply with this
regulatory capital threshold, the Portuguese government provided
EUR3 billion of capital to BCP in the form of hybrid instruments
and the bank made a EUR500 million capital increase subscribed by
private investors. At end-September 2012 BCP reported core Tier I
ratios of 11.9% (according to Bank of Portugal's definition) and
9.4% (as per EBA definition).

Despite the enhanced capital ratios, Moody's downgrade captures
the significant downside risks of BCP's credit fundamentals to
the country's very difficult operating environment. Moody's
expects the bank's activity in Portugal to remain loss-making
during 2013, due to the ongoing increase in non-earning assets
and subdued business volumes. In addition, the rating agency
cautions that BCP's risk absorption capacity could be further
challenged in the event of a more negative scenario for its Greek
operations.

BCP's standalone credit assessment has a negative outlook to
reflect the bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its
credit profile in light of the very negative outlook for the
Portuguese economy.

BANIF

The downgrade of Banif's standalone credit assessment to E/caa2
reflects 1) the bank's rapidly deteriorating financial
fundamentals, namely in terms of profitability and asset quality
(the bank reported a net loss of EUR61 million and a NPL ratio of
13% at end-June 2012); 2) very modest internal capital generation
capacity that has forced them to require public support from the
Bank Solvency Support Facility to recapitalize.

Banif has recently undertaken an organizational restructuring as
part of the required recapitalization plan, entailing the merger
of Banif SGPS -- its former parent -- into Banif, with the latter
now acting as head of the group. Moody's notes, however, that the
merger is still subject to final registration, which is a
prerequisite for Banif to receive public support. In addition,
the bank expects to fulfil a drastic deleveraging of its balance
sheet over the next five years, which is expected to ease funding
requirements and reduce risk weighted assets.

Moody's notes that the review with direction uncertain of Banif's
standalone ratings reflects the need of further clarity about the
recapitalization plan, which will enable to assess the credit
profile of Banif post public capital infusion as well as the
impact of other initiatives that may be included in such plan. In
addition, during the review period Moody's expects to analyze the
impact of the organizational restructuring and also whether
targeted improvements in corporate governance can have a material
- and tangible - impact on the bank's credit profile. Downward
pressure persists on Banif's standalone ratings as the bank will
continue to operate under very challenging operating conditions,
which will make it very difficult for management to achieve the
goals set up in the recapitalization plan.

CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS (CGD)

The downgrade of CGD's standalone credit assessment to E/caa1 has
been prompted by Moody's concerns that the bank's weak credit
fundamentals are likely to be further challenged in 2013 in light
of Moody's expectations of a prolonged economic recession in
Portugal. CGD displays a weak risk absorption capacity
principally due to (i) its very modest profitability indicators
(the bank reported a net loss of EUR102 million and a decline in
net interest income of 15% as of end-September 2012), (ii)
deteriorating asset quality (reported credit at risk ratio of
9.2% at end September 2012) and (iii) high direct exposure to
Portuguese sovereign risk (almost 2.5x Tier 1 capital).

In downgrading the bank's standalone credit assessment, Moody's
has taken into account CGD's recent capital reinforcement in
order to comply with EBA's 9% core Tier I capital requirement by
end-June 2012. The recapitalization was completed with a EUR900
million issue of hybrid financial instruments and a EUR750
million capital increase, both of which were fully subscribed by
the Portuguese State. Despite the benefits of the capital
improvement, Moody's notes that CGD displays significant downside
risks to the country's negative macroeconomic scenario that are
likely to put additional pressure on its capital.

In addition the bank has embarked on a deleveraging plan that
encompasses significant divestments in the domestic market that
could improve its capital position but may have a negative impact
on its already very limited earnings generation capacity.

The outlook on CGD's standalone credit assessment is negative to
reflect the above mentioned risks.

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE OF DEBT RATINGS AND SUPPORT ASSUMPTIONS

The one-notch downgrade of BCP's and Banif's senior debt and
deposit ratings reflect (i) the further deterioration of their
standalone credit profile, as discussed above; and (ii) Moody's
assessment of a very high probability of support by the
Portuguese government for the banks in case of need.

The debt ratings of CGD were affirmed at Ba3, resulting in four
notches of uplift from its standalone credit assessment of caa1,
and based on Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
support from the Portuguese government as CGD's unique
shareholder.

The negative outlook on BCP's and CGD's debt and deposit ratings
reflect both the currently negative outlook on the Portuguese
government's Ba3 bond rating and the negative outlook on the
bank's standalone credit assessment.

The review with direction uncertain of Banif's senior debt and
deposit ratings is commensurate with the review status of the
bank's standalone credit assessment.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID RATINGS

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt and hybrid
ratings of BCP, Banif and CGD in line with the lowering of their
standalone credit assessments. Moody's had previously removed
government support assumptions from its ratings of subordinated
debt and hybrid instruments of Portuguese banks on March 28,
2012.

Moody's review for downgrade on the junior instruments of Banif
reflects the issuer's very weak credit profile and the increased
risk of losses being imposed on these instruments in case of a
broader deterioration of the bank's creditworthiness.

What Could Move The Rating UP/DOWN

Downwards pressure on the banks' ratings might develop if
operating conditions worsen beyond Moody's current expectations,
i.e. a broader economic recession beyond Moody's current GDP
decline forecasts of -3.3% for 2012 and -1.2% for 2013;
especially given that this is likely to result in asset-quality
and profitability deterioration exceeding Moody's current
expectations; and/or if pressures on market-funding intensify.

Upwards pressure on the banks' ratings may arise in case of an
improved credit profile resulting from the work-out of asset
quality challenges, a recovery of profitability indicators and
sustained capitalization levels, as well as normalized access to
wholesale funding markets.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Rates US$250MM LPNs 'B1'; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 long-term foreign
currency subordinated debt rating to the US$250 million loan
participation notes issued by Russian-based Credit Europe Bank
Ltd (Ba3, local-currency deposits, positive; BFSR D-/BCA ba3,
stable). The notes were issued on a limited recourse basis by the
bank's Luxembourg-based special purpose vehicle, CEB Capital
S.A., for the sole purpose of financing a seven-year subordinated
loan to Credit Europe Bank Ltd. The outlook on the subordinated
debt rating is positive.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the B1 rating assigned to Credit Europe Bank
Ltd.'s subordinated notes, which is one notch lower than the
bank's Ba3 senior unsecured debt rating, takes into account (1)
the extent of the notes' subordination against various classes of
debt, and (2) associated differences in expected loss in case of
default.

Key features which drive the rating outcome on Credit Europe Bank
Ltd.'s notes are (1) the maturity of seven years; (2) US$250
million issuance volume; and (3) subordination in liquidation. In
the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of Credit Europe Bank Ltd,
the notes will rank junior to all senior debt; pari passu with
subordinated debt, and senior to holders of common stock. Moody's
expects that the subordinated debt -- to be authorized by the
regulator -- will be included in the issuer's regulatory capital
base.

The outlook on the subordinated debt rating assigned to Credit
Europe Bank Ltd is positive, as Moody's would expect the bank's
debt and deposit ratings to move upward in parallel with the
ratings of its parent, Credit Europe Bank N.V. (Ba2 deposits,
positive; BFSR D/BCA ba2, positive).

What Could Move The Ratings UP/DOWN

According to Moody's, Credit Europe Bank Ltd.'s subordinated debt
ratings could be upgraded if the rating of its parent is upgraded
or if Credit Europe Bank Ltd improves its funding profile, thus
rendering its funding potentially cheaper and less volatile,
i.e., enabling it to withstand any potential growing competitive
pressures over the longer term.

Moody's says that Credit Europe Bank Ltd.'s subordinated debt
ratings might be adversely affected on evidence of deterioration
in its financial metrics triggered either by any deterioration in
the operating environment or by intensified competition that
leads to a narrowing in net interest margin or higher risk
appetite.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in
June 2012.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Credit Europe Bank Ltd. reported
total unaudited IFRS assets of RUB102.4 billion (US$3.1 billion)
and shareholders' equity of RUB16.1 billion (US$491 million) at
end-June 2012. The bank recorded net income of RUB1.3 billion
(US$39 million) for the first six months of 2012, an increase of
3% compared to the same period of 2011.


DELTACREDIT BANK: Moody's Changes 'D' BFSR Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the standalone D bank financial strength rating (BFSR,
equivalent to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) and Baa3
long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of
DeltaCredit Bank. The bank's Prime-3 short-term foreign-currency
deposit rating was affirmed.

At the same time, Moody's affirmed DeltaCredit's Baa2 local-
currency senior secured debt rating (with stable outlook), which
benefits from an explicit and irrevocable guarantee issued by the
bank's ultimate parent, Societe Generale (SocGen, A2 stable; C-
/baa2 stable). SocGen holds an 82.4% stake in Russia-based
Rosbank which, in turn, owns 100% of DeltaCredit.

RATINGS RATIONALE -- Standalone Ratings

Moody's says that the rating action on DeltaCredit reflects some
concerns that this mortgage lender could be increasingly
challenged to maintain its market shares and financial
fundamentals amidst the current volatile operating environment.
Competition in the mortgage market from larger state-owned
Russian banks is intensifying, which could lead to margin erosion
and loss of market share for DeltaCredit. Moody's notes that
DeltaCredit pursues a challenging task of diversifying its
funding base away from parental resources, which could be
difficult and more costly in the current environment. In
addition, the rating agency sees some pressure on DeltaCredit's
capitalization due to potential regular dividend payouts to
Rosbank, DeltaCredit's immediate parent since 2011.

The rating agency noted that in the first nine months of 2012,
the stock of gross mortgage loans on DeltaCredit's consolidated
balance sheet grew by 10%, whereas the growth of the mortgage
market in Russia exceeded 20% over the same period, according to
the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). Moody's believes that this
slowdown is partly because of the need for DeltaCredit to
substitute the previously cheap and readily available financing
from SocGen with market funding sources which are in short supply
and/or more expensive. Due to the gradual diversification away
from parental funding, the share of SocGen/Rosbank funding in
DeltaCredit's total liabilities declined to 60% at September 30,
2012, from 84% as at year-end 2010. However, the cost of the
newly attracted financing is rising, which will likely suppress
the bank's net interest margin in the medium term, despite the
fact that some of the increase in funding costs can be passed
onto borrowers.

Moody's added that the dividend policy pursued by DeltaCredit's
immediate parent, Rosbank, represents another risk because the
latter is likely to withdraw dividends from its mortgage
subsidiary going forward. A recent example is a RUB1 billion
dividend that DeltaCredit paid to Rosbank in mid-2012,
representing 45% of DeltaCredit's net income for 2011. The rating
agency acknowledges that DeltaCredit's capital buffer is
currently high, with the bank reporting a Basel I total capital
adequacy ratio of 29.92% as at September 30, 2012. However, the
bank's lending growth coupled with the regular dividend payouts
may erode this capital cushion over time.

Moody's notes positively the consistently superior quality of
DeltaCredit's mortgage portfolio: loans overdue by more than 90
days accounted for just 0.72% of total gross loans as of 30
September 2012. This is a strong metric compared to the market
average indicators of around 3% (according to the CBR), and this
continues to underpin DeltaCredit's standalone credit profile.

RATINGS RATIONALE -- Supported Ratings

Moody's further explained that DeltaCredit's Baa3 long-term
global local and foreign currency deposit ratings continue to
incorporate an assessment of a high probability of support to
DeltaCredit from its ultimate shareholder, SocGen. This support
assessment results in a two-notch rating uplift from
DeltaCredit's ba2 standalone credit profile. The negative outlook
assigned on DeltaCredit's Baa3 long-term deposit ratings reflects
the negative outlook assigned on its D BFSR.

Deltacredit's Local-Currency Senior Secured Debt

The Baa2 long-term rating (with stable outlook) assigned to
DeltaCredit's local-currency senior secured debt, which benefits
from an explicit and irrevocable guarantee issued by SocGen, is
at the same level and carries the same outlook as the ba2
standalone credit assessment of its guarantor.

What Could Move The Ratings Down/Up

DeltaCredit's ratings are underpinned by the bank's currently
strong capitalisation and profitability, robust asset quality,
and the financial and operational backing from SocGen. At the
same time, the bank's ratings are constrained by its modest
market franchise and the high dependence of its business model on
parental funding. DeltaCredit's standalone ratings might be
downgraded if the bank faces material funding constraints that
potentially impose limits on its business expansion or contribute
to a decline in profitability metrics. A downgrade might also be
caused by deterioration of DeltaCredit's asset quality,
especially if not compensated by adequate capital levels. Any
weakening capacity of SocGen to provide support may exert
downwards pressure on DeltaCredit's debt and deposit ratings, as
could potential shifts in the parent bank's willingness to
provide such support. Upwards pressure on DeltaCredit's ratings
is limited given the negative outlook.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology, published in June
2012.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, DeltaCredit reported -- under
unaudited IFRS -- total assets of US$2.5 billion and total
shareholders' equity of US$374 million as at September 30, 2012.
Net IFRS profits for the first nine months of 2012 stood at
US$46.7 million.


NK RUSSNEFT: S&P Assigns B+ Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' corporate
credit rating to Russian exploration and production company OAO
NK Russneft. The outlook is positive. At the same time, an 'ruA+'
Russia national scale rating was assigned.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment Russneft's financial risk
profile as "aggressive" and its business risk profile as "fair".

"The rating is constrained by Russneft's relatively high debt
level. On June 30, 2012, Russneft's adjusted debt was US$5.3
billion, compared with US$1.6 billion EBITDA generated on a
rolling-12-months basis under a relatively favorable oil price
environment. We view Russneft's liquidity as 'less than adequate'
because of tight covenant headroom, sizable maturities in 2013-
2014, and a concentrated funding structure," S&P said.

"These constraints are partly offset by the adequate
profitability of Russneft's upstream operations and by our
expectation of positive free cash flow. Russneft enjoys an
imperfect natural hedge because the majority of Russneft's taxes
are linked to the Urals price and the Russian ruble negatively
correlates with the oil price. Russneft's assets are fairly
diversified across Russian oil-producing regions. We understand
that capital spending is relatively modest because Russneft's
production growth mainly comes from efficiency gains, as the
company is catching up after the difficult period of 2008-2009
and does not have any large costly new projects," S&P said.

"The positive outlook reflects some upside potential for the
rating if Russneft improves its liquidity by addressing potential
covenant issues, extending its maturity profile, and diversifying
its funding sources. It also reflects our expectation that
Russneft will continue to generate positive FOCF and use it for
deleveraging. We expect Russneft to refrain from any sizable
acquisitions or dividends, at least as long as its adjusted debt
to EBITDA is above 3x. Under our price scenario, we expect
adjusted debt to EBITDA to be about 3.5x-4.5x and FFO to adjusted
debt to be about 15%-20%. In case of any shifts in the
shareholding structure, we will evaluate the impact on the
company's financial policy," S&P said.

"Downside pressure could stem from a further increase in
liquidity pressures. Downside pressure could also materialize if
the company's leverage increased, for instance in case of very
low oil prices, higher-than-expected capital expenditures, or in
case of any unforeseen acquisitions, which are not part of our
base-case scenario," S&P said.


RUSSNEFT: Moody's Gives 'Ba3' Corp. Family Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a corporate family rating
(CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Ba3 to RussNeft,
one of Russia's largest oil and gas exploration and production
companies. The outlook on the ratings is stable. This is the
first time that Moody's has assigned ratings to RussNeft.

The rating action is based on RussNeft's audited financials under
International Accounting Standards for 2011, 2010 and 2009, and
information provided by the company's management.

Moody's Interfax has simultaneously assigned a national scale
rating (NSR) of Aa3.ru to RussNeft.

Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 CFR assigned to RussNeft reflects (1) the considerable
size of the company's reserves and scale of operations by global
standards, mapping to a Baa rating factor on Moody's global
scale; (2) the company's demonstrated track record of improving
operating efficiency and reserves management over the past three
years; and (3) its conservative financial policies and
deleveraging strategy.

However, Moody's also notes RussNeft's (1) complex organizational
structure, whereby significant minority interests (up to 49%) at
the key operating subsidiaries are held by the company's
strategic partner Glencore International AG(Baa2 stable), which
also benefits from exclusive offtake rights on RussNeft's oil
exports; (2) semi-permanent shareholder structure, which is
likely to undergo further changes in the medium term; (3)
geographically dispersed reserves base, consisting of relatively
modest deposits and requiring efficient logistics arrangements;
and (4) weaker financial positioning in the Ba rating category
compared with its Russian oil and gas sector peers, primarily due
to higher-than-sector-average leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA,
of 1.0-1.5x (RussNeft's leverage as adjusted by Moody's was at
3.34x as of year-end 2011). RussNeft's total debt of more than
US$5.0 billion as at year-end 2011 exerts pressure on the
company's interest coverage metrics, and debt covenants constrain
its financial and operating flexibility and limit investment
opportunities.

However, Moody's notes that RussNeft's current debt capital
structure stems from its history of ownership changes in the
period 2002-10 and does not reflect its previous operating
inefficiencies and/or imprudent financial policies. The financing
arrangements between the company's major creditors -- Glencore
and Russia's largest state-owned bank Sberbank (A3 stable) are
long-term and provide for a comfortable debt service schedule
without refinancing peaks.

Provided that global oil prices remain at the levels currently
anticipated by Moody's (the rating agency currently expects that
the Brent crude will be priced at an average of US$100 per barrel
in 2013, US$95 per barrel in 2014, and US$90 per barrel in the
medium term, beyond 2014), Moody's believes that RussNeft will be
able to cover its operating, investment and financing needs
through internally generated cash flows. RussNeft does not have
any large committed investment projects, and would therefore be
able to significantly curtail its capex program to support debt
service, in the event of any significant deterioration in global
oil prices.

Moody's also notes, that third-party senior unsecured debt, if
raised by the company, would be assessed by the agency for its
relative positioning within the company's capital structure and
potential subordination, given the existence of substantial
minority interests at the key operating subsidiary levels.

Moody's says the stable outlook on the ratings assumes that
RussNeft will maintain (1) its conservative financial policy and
leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA, not exceeding 3.5x on a
sustainable basis; and (2) its retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt
above 15%-20%. The ratings do not take into account the
possibility of debt-financed bolt-on acquisitions, which Moody's
would assess separately for their effect on the ratings.

What Could Change The Rating UP/DOWN

RussNeft's ratings are adequately positioned in the current
rating category. Upward pressure would be exerted on the ratings
if the company (1) reduces its leverage to below 2.0x
debt/EBITDA; and (2) sustainably maintains cash flow coverage,
measured by RCF/debt, above 35%. Conversely, downward pressure
would be exerted on the ratings should there be negative
migration of the metrics as a result of internal inefficiencies
and/or unfavorable market conditions, or due to any developments
that negatively affect current creditor/shareholder arrangements
and financial policies.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating RussNeft was the Global
Independent Exploration and Production Industry Methodology
published in December 2011.

Headquartered in Moscow, RussNeft is one of Russia's largest oil
and gas exploration and production companies, with proven and
probable oil and gas reserves of more than 1,751.2 billion
barrels of oil equivalent as per PRMS- SPE classification, and
production of 13.6 million tonnes of oil in 2011. Russneft is 49%
is owned by its founder Mr. Mikhail Gutseriev, 49% by Sistema
Joint Stock Financial Corporation (Ba3 stable), and 2% by
Sberbank of Russia via its subsidiary Sberbank Capital. In the
FY2011 Russneft reported US$5.6 billion in revenue and US$1.68
billion in EBITDA under audited International Accounting
Standards.



=====================================
S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O
=====================================


RAZVOJNA BANKA: Seeks Partner to Take Over Assets & Liabilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gordana Filipovic at Bloomberg News reports that Serbia is
seeking a partner to take over the assets and liabilities of
unprofitable Razvojna Banka Vojvodine AD and sell a five-year
bond to save deposits after losses eroded 40% of its capital.

The bank, 62% owned by Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina,
had RSD7.94 billion (US$90.35 million) in accumulated losses at
the end of September, Bloomberg says.  Its capital, adjusted for
losses, stood at RSD11.3 billion and assets were at RSD37.7
billion, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Serbia said it wants to save almost
EUR110 million (US$142 million) in insured deposits and almost as
much in uninsured deposits at Razvojna, as well as 80,000
depositors.

Bloomberg relates that the government said in a statement on
Thursday that assets and liabilities will be transferred to a
"bank that offers the best transfer conditions."

The transfer is in line with an Oct. 26 law designed to merge
state controlled banks, averting their bankruptcy and maintaining
financial stability, Bloomberg notes.

The effort to save the bank, previously known as Metals Banka AD,
is the second in two years, Bloomberg states.  In late April
2010, Vojvodina added capital to bail it out and renamed it
Razvojna Banka Vojvodine, Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, Serbia and Vojvodina will jointly sell a
five-year bond, equivalent to EUR70 million, to match the size of
uninsured deposits for which Razvojna has no "quality
collaterals" in its portfolio.

The bond, to be tradable in secondary market, will be first
transferred to Serbia's Deposit Insurance Agency and later
transferred to the future bank owner, Bloomberg discloses.

The government, as cited by Bloomberg, said that part of
Razvojna's corporate credit portfolio and its fixed assets will
be transferred to a new Vojvodina that will be "urgently
established" to minimize bailout costs and maintain financial
stability.

Razvojna Banka Vojvodine AD accepts deposits and offers
commercial banking services.  The bank offers credit, foreign-
exchange, securities brokerage, custody bank transactions,
letters of guarantee, payment operations, receivables collection
and broker-dealer services, and sponsors credit cards.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO POPULAR: S&P Lowers Preferred Stock Rating to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its issue ratings on
some of the preferred stock issued by Spain-based Banco Popular
Espanol S.A. (Popular; BB/Negative/B), to 'C' from 'CCC' and on
some of the issue ratings on Popular's non-deferrable
subordinated debt to 'D' from 'B-'.

"This follows Popular's announcement on Nov. 30, 2012, that it
had offered to repurchase, among other securities, some of its
outstanding preferred stock and non-deferrable subordinated debt
placed with wholesale investors with a nominal value outstanding
of EUR702 million," S&P said.

"The offer constitutes a 'distressed exchange' under our
criteria. This is because we believe that investors will receive
less value than the promise of the original securities, as the
offer implies the repurchase below a par value. Additionally, we
think the offer is not purely opportunistic," S&P said.

"While Popular is not included in the group of entities receiving
government support, we take into account that the offer is one of
the initiatives launched by the bank to improve its solvency to
cover the capital shortfall identified in the stress test
exercise recently undertaken by Oliver Wyman. In this context, we
note that under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
signed by Spanish authorities, the outstanding preferred shares
and subordinated debt of banks receiving government support might
be subject to some form of loss absorption. The rating action
also takes into consideration that the long-term rating on
Popular is in the speculative-grade category. We believe these
factors heighten investors' perception that payments on some of
those instruments are increasingly uncertain," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on the two types of instruments to
different levels, reflecting the different features that we
understand are incorporated in the hybrid capital instruments
compared with the nondeferrable subordinated instruments. As
explained in our criteria, an exchange offer on an equity hybrid
instrument may reflect the possibility that, absent the exchange
offer taking place, the issuer might exercise the coupon deferral
option, in accordance with the terms of the instrument. In such
instances, the rating on the hybrid would go to 'C', rather than
to 'D' in the case of nondeferrable debt," S&P said.

"These rating actions do not affect our counterparty credit
ratings on Popular or any other issue ratings," S&P said.

"On completion of the tender offer, we will review our ratings on
any untendered preferred stock and nondeferrable subordinated
debt," S&P said.


IM FTPYME: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR11.7-Mil. Bond
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Baa1(sf) from A3(sf)
the rating of the Series 2 notes issued by IM FTPYME Sabadell 3,
FTA, a Spanish SME ABS transaction originated by Banco Sabadell
S.A. (Ba1/NP). This action was primarily driven by insufficient
levels of credit enhancement. At the same time, Moody's confirmed
the ratings on the Series 1CA and 3 notes at A3(sf) and B3(sf),
respectively. The rating action concludes the review initiated by
Moody's on July 2, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects the insufficient levels of credit
enhancement in the Series 2 notes in light of the deteriorating
credit environment in Spain and the debtor concentration issue in
this transaction," says Anne-Sophie Spirito, a Moody's Assistant
Vice President -- Analyst and lead analyst for the issuer.
"Conversely, we confirmed the ratings of the Series 1CA and 3
notes as a result of their adequate credit enhancement levels,"
adds Ms. Spirito.

Moody's decision follows the placement of these ratings on review
in July 2012, as the rating of the Kingdom of Spain was on review
and because of the need to assess counterparty risk and reassess
required credit enhancement levels.

Performance

Due to the low pool factor in this deal and the debtor
concentrations, recent delinquency levels are very volatile.
However, IM FTPYME Sabadell 3 has historically performed better
than Moody's Spanish SME delinquency index. This also remained
the case over recent periods, during which the index sharply
increased. As of October 2012, 90+ day delinquencies stood at
1.06% of current pool balance, versus the index at 4.9%.

Key Revised Assumptions: Cumulative Default, Volatility and
Recovery

Considering the deteriorating credit environment in Spain, the
rating agency has updated its default assumption to 11% of the
current pool balance (corresponding to 3% of original pool
balance given the low pool factor of 9.7% for this deal).

Moody's has increased volatility levels in its default scenarios.
To reflect the instability and deteriorating situation in Spain,
the rating agency has increased its volatility assumption to
110%.

The assumptions on default and volatility also partially take
into account the debtor concentration issue of the underlying
pool.

Moody's finally decreased its recovery rate assumption to a 55%
fixed recovery rate from 65%. This change reflects the ongoing
and increasing difficulty in liquidating the real estate
collateral of the loans backed by a mortgage guarantee, which
represent 98% of the pool.

Given lower recovery and higher volatility expectations for the
transaction, Moody's downgraded the Series 2 notes as the 18%
credit enhancement level was not sufficient to offset these
negative factors. The Series 2 notes were also affected by the
fact that, given the low pool factor, there are some debtor
concentration issues in this deal. The biggest debtor in the pool
represents 3.5% of the pool balance and the 10 biggest debtors
represent 19.4% of the pool, which exceeds the credit enhancement
level of the Series 2 notes.

Despite the new assumptions, however, Moody's was able to confirm
the ratings of the Series 1CA and Series 3 notes in this deal, as
their credit enhancement levels are sufficient to offset the
negative factors, in light of the rating levels of these notes.

Counterparty Risk

The issuer accounts were transferred to Barclays Bank Plc (A2/P-
1) from Banco Santander S.A. (Baa2/P-2) in October 2012. Banco
Sabadell S.A. (Ba1/NP) has remained the swap counterparty in the
transaction. A weekly valuation of the swap is performed and
collateral is posted when needed. Collateral is posted at Banco
Santander S.A. (Baa2/P-2), which is neutral for the transaction
ratings. The swap provides some support to the notes by
guaranteeing a certain level of excess spread.

Sensitivity Analysis

Moody's analyzed various sensitivities of default rate and
volatility levels to test the robustness of the ratings. In
particular, if the revised levels of volatility were to be
increased to 115%, the ratings of the three series would remain
unchanged. An increase of the default rate to 11.8% of current
balance would also have no impact on the ratings. However, if the
biggest debtor, who currently represents 3.5% of the pool, were
to default, this would have a one notch impact on the Series 2
notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of
stressed scenarios.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action should not be negatively affected.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default
assumptions in the rating analysis of granular Small and Mid-
sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA", published in March 2009,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in
Europe, Middle East and Africa", published in June 2007.

Moody's used its excel-based cash flow model, Moody's ABSROM(TM),
as part of its quantitative analysis of the transaction. Moody's
ABSROM(TM) model enables users to model various features of a
standard European ABS transaction including (1) the specifics of
the default distribution of the assets, their portfolio
amortization profile, yield or recoveries; and (2) the specific
priority of payments, triggers, swaps and reserve funds on the
liability side of the ABS structure. Moody's ABSROM(TM) User
Guide is available on Moody's website and covers the model's
functionality as well as providing a comprehensive index of the
user inputs and outputs.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

Issuer: IM FTPYME SABADELL 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

    EUR124.1M Series 1CA Bond, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously
    on Jul 2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review
    for Possible Downgrade

    EUR23.4M Series 2 Bond, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
    on Jul 2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

    EUR11.7M Series 3 Bond, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
    Jul 2, 2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


YASAR HOLDING: Fitch Affirms 'B' Senior Unsecured Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Rating Outlook of Yasar Holding's
Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to Stable
from Positive.  The agency has simultaneously affirmed the Long-
term foreign currency IDR, and the senior unsecured rating at
'B'.  Fitch has also affirmed the senior unsecured rating of
Yasar's pass through notes issued by the special purpose vehicle
Willow No. 2 (Ireland) PLC at 'B' with a Recovery Rating of
'RR4'.   The National Rating was also affirmed at 'BBB+ (tur)'
and its Outlook revised to Stable from Positive.

The revision of Yasar's Outlook to Stable reflects the weakness
of the company's cash flow generation and higher leverage in 2011
as well as the prospect that over 2012-2014 their recovery will
not be sufficient to express metrics consistent with an upgrade,
as previously expected.  Increasing advertising & promotion
expenditure as well as a demonstrated vulnerability to raw
material price increases, currency movements and any softness of
consumer spending in Turkey will continue driving some volatility
in Yasar's operating results.

Key Drivers

Mixed Operating Performance:
There has been volatility behind a relatively stable headline
operating profit in FY11 and H112.  The currency depreciation and
increase of raw material costs (mainly oil derivatives for
coatings) in 2011 has led to a contraction of 2011 profits for
the coatings division, which was however offset by the food and
beverage and its 'Other' business division.  This was partly
mitigated by a pass through of costs in H112 which led to a
strong recovery of profits in the coatings division despite
weaker profitability in its food and beverage division, as a
result of the increase in input prices, especially raw milk
prices.

Limited FCF:
Free cash flow (FCF), which has been negative or small over the
period 2006-2010, deteriorated to minus TRY70 million in FY11.
Although Yasar enjoys a good level of funds from operations
(FFO), growing revenues absorb high levels of working capital and
capex (on aggregate TRY107 million in FY11).  The dividend
leakage to minorities in the listed subsidiaries further
depresses cash flow by TRY20 million-TRY30 million pa. Fitch
expects FCF to break even in 2012 but expects limited upside in
the period 2013-2014.

High Foreign-Currency Risk:
Yasar had a foreign-currency debt position of TRY664 million at
end-June 2012, while most of its revenue is denominated in
Turkish lira.  Fitch acknowledges that the interest portion of
its foreign currency exposure is largely hedged by swap
contracts.  Some operating costs, especially in coatings, are
denominated in foreign currency, although exports provide some
relief in terms of foreign currency generation; however exports
remain limited, at under 10% of group sales especially
concentrated in dairy products.

Higher Leverage:
In 2011, the negative FCF combined with the adverse effect on
debt from the depreciation of the Turkish lira have caused
Yasar's net lease-adjusted debt/EBITDAR to grow back to its 2008
peak of over 4.0x.  A recovery of EBITDA in 2012 should allow
some de-leveraging.  However, given Fitch's expectations of only
moderate FCF generation over 2012-2014, the agency expects
limited scope for Yasar's leverage to drop below 3.5x over the
period.

Business Diversification:
The ratings continue to reflect Yasar's diverse range of products
in its core segments of food, beverages and coatings, and strong
market shares within particular product categories.  This is
partially offset by the challenges of managing a widely
diversified group of companies, given the lack of synergies
between some of the segments (food and beverage, coatings, tissue
and others) and the recurring outlay of resources required for
maintaining a competitive and growth profile for each of them.

Rating Sensitivity Guidance

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

  -- An operating shortfall that further constrains cash flow
     and/or liquidity;
  -- Adjusted net debt/EBITDAR consistently between 4x-4.5x;
  -- Adjusted net debt/FFO consistently between 5x-5.5x;
  -- FFO fixed charge cover reducing to below 2.0x;
  -- EBITDA margin falling below 8% for more than two financial
     years;
  -- A downgrade could also be triggered by another major
     currency crisis/economic downturn in Turkey or the region.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

  -- Adjusted net debt/EBITDAR consistently between 2.5x-3x;
  -- Adjusted net debt/FFO consistently between 3.5x-4x;
  -- FFO fixed charge cover growing above 3x;
  -- EBITDA margin growing above 13% through commodity and
     economic cycles;
  -- Sustained positive free cash flow and maintenance of longer-
     dated debt profile;
  -- A material reduction of the current debt-cash flow currency
     mis-match.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


* CITY OF KYIV: Moody's Lowers Currency Ratings to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 from B2 the
foreign and local-currency ratings of the Ukrainian cities of
Kyiv and Kharkiv. The outlook on all ratings remains negative.

The actions were prompted by the weakening of the Ukrainian
government's credit profile, as captured by Moody's recent
downgrade of Ukraine's government bond rating to B3/negative
outlook from B2/negative outlook.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Ukraine's government bond rating has direct
implications for the ratings of the cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv
given their institutional, financial and macroeconomic linkages.
Moreover, both cities report weak liquidity positions, rigid
budget structures and high exposures to inter-budgetary
regulation by the national government.

Although Kharkiv's exposure to market volatility is limited, Kyiv
is exposed to refinancing risks and displays limited shock-
absorption capacity. Kyiv's credit profile is also constrained by
the foreign-currency risks arising from the fact that around 36%
of its net direct and indirect debt is in foreign currency. Given
the external liquidity risks at the national level, its
refinancing risks will become an increasingly important factor
when assessing the city's creditworthiness over the next 12-18
months. At the same time, Kyiv's position as the Ukrainian
capital and national economic hub as well as its more flexible
expenditure composition remain mitigating factors for the
aforementioned risks.

What Could Change The Ratings DOWN/UP

Downward pressure could develop on Kyiv and Kharkiv's ratings
following further downgrade of the sovereign rating and/or
material weakening in their standalone fiscal performances. In
contrast, a ratings upgrade and/or stabilization in the rating
outlooks of both cities would be possible in case of a similar
rating action on the sovereign rating.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regional and Local
Governments Outside the US published in May 2008, and The
Application of Joint Default Analysis to Regional and Local
Governments published in December 2008.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HEATHROW FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to High-Yield Bond
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected rating to Heathrow Finance
plc's proposed GBP250 million-GBP325 million high yield bond and,
at the same time, it has affirmed Heathrow Funding Limited's
bonds issued under its debt issuance program and Heathrow Finance
plc's existing high-yield bond, as follows:

  -- Heathrow Funding Limited Class A bonds: affirmed at 'A-',
     Outlook Stable

  -- Heathrow Funding Limited Class B bonds: affirmed at 'BBB',
     Outlook Stable

  -- GBP325 million Heathrow Finance plc high-yield bond maturing
     2017: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable

  -- GBP250 million - GBP325 million Heathrow Finance plc high-
     yield bond maturing 2019-2022: assigned 'BB+(EXP)', Outlook
     Stable

There have been no material changes to the credit profile of
Heathrow (SP) Limited, Heathrow Funding or Heathrow Finance since
last reviewed in August 2012.

On October 15, 2012 BAA (SP) Limited, BAA Funding Limited and BAA
(SH) plc changed their names to Heathrow (SP) Limited, Heathrow
Funding Limited and Heathrow Finance plc.

Fitch has conducted a Rating Assessment Service for Heathrow
Funding Limited and Heathrow Finance plc.


HEATHROW FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors service has assigned a Ba3/LGD5 rating to the
GBP senior secured notes to be issued by Heathrow Finance plc
(the "New HF Notes"). The rating outlook is stable.

Ratings Rationale

The only asset of Heathrow Finance plc ("HF") is its shares in
Heathrow (SP) Limited ("HSP"). HSP is a holding company which
owns the companies that own London Heathrow Airport and London
Stansted Airport. Both Heathrow and Stansted are subject to
economic regulation on the UK regulated price-cap utility model,
with charges set by the UK Civil Aviation Authority. For the year
end Dec 2011, Heathrow accounted for 92% of HSP group EBITDA and
Stansted for 8%. HF is indirectly owned by Heathrow Airport
Holdings Limited, which owns a number of other airports in the
UK.

The HSP group is financed via debt provided through a ring-fenced
secured debt financing structure (the "HSP SDF"). HSP can only
provide cash to service debt at HF if it complies with the
financial terms of the HSP SDF. HF debt holders benefit from a
security interest in HF's shares in HSP. HF is currently financed
by GBP325 million 7.125% Senior Secured Notes due Mar 2017 (the
"Existing HF Notes") and a GBP175 million loan facility due Nov
2015 together with a further GBP77.5 million loan facility due
Dec 2019 (the "HF Loans"). The New HF Notes, the Existing HF
Notes and the HF Loans (together "the HF Debt") rank pari passu
among themselves.

The Ba1 Corporate Family Rating of HF reflects a Probability of
Default Rating of Ba2 and a 35% Family-wide loss given default
assumption. The Corporate Family Rating is an opinion of the HF
group's ability to honor its financial obligations and is
assigned to HF as if it had a single class of debt and a single
consolidated legal structure. The Ba3 / LGD-5 rating of the HF
Debt reflects the structural subordination of the HF debt in the
HF group structure versus the HSP SDF. Following the financial
close of the New HF Notes, total HF debt is not expected to
exceed GBP750 million (equivalent to approximately 5% of the
combined Heathrow and Stansted Regulatory Asset Base).

HF's Ba1 Corporate Family Rating reflects (i) its ownership of
Heathrow, which is one of the world's most important hub airports
and the largest European airport, (ii) the relatively resilient
traffic characteristics of Heathrow which together with the
Stansted traffic profile affords some portfolio benefits, (iii)
the long established framework of economic regulation that
pertains to Heathrow which will evidence some changes but which
is not expected to be fundamentally altered, (iv) the significant
capital expenditure program at Heathrow, (v) the debt levels
carried by the HF group together with the features of the HSP SDF
which puts certain constraints around management activity, and
(vi) the protective features of the HF Debt which effectively
limits HF's activities to its investment in HSP.

Rating Outlook

The rating outlook is stable. This reflects Moody's expectation
that HF's London airports will see low single digit growth
overall in passenger volumes but significant increases in
tariffs, and that the capital expenditure program will continue
to be managed effectively to accommodate the ramp up in work at
LHR over the coming few years, both of which should ensure a
financial profile in line with the current rating category. The
outlook further assumes that HSP will continue to manage its debt
raising program in a way that minimizes refinancing risk and
allows it to comfortably meet new funding requirements.

What Could Move The Rating UP/DOWN

The Corporate Family Rating and rating of the HF Debt could move
up if the HF group were to exhibit a financial profile that
evidenced materially lower leverage than currently expected. This
could be suggested by a Net Debt to RAB ratio likely to be
permanently below 80% and an Adjusted Interest Cover Ratio of
permanently more than 1.2 times.

The Corporate Family Rating and rating of the HF Debt could move
down if the HF group were to exhibit a financial profile that
evidenced materially higher leverage than currently expected.
This could be suggested by a Net Debt to RAB ratio consistently
in the high 80s and an Adjusted Interest Cover Ratio of less than
1.0 times.

A sale of Stansted Airport is not considered likely to cause a
downwards move in the rating.

The methodologies used in this rating were Operational Airports
outside of the United States published in May 2008, and Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


HIBU PLC: Majority of Lenders Agree to Partial Loan Repayment
-------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Kuo at Bloomberg News reports that Hibu Plc, which is
involved in a GBP2.1 billion (US$3.4 billion) restructuring, is
negotiating a partial repayment of a GBP65 million overdue loan.

According to Bloomberg, two people with knowledge of the matter
said that a majority of the holders of the debt, obtained in 2006
and which had been due to repaid in full in October, have agreed
to a payment equivalent to 39% of face value.  The people, as
cited by Bloomberg, said that in exchange, they would agree to
the company's Oct. 25 request to suspend loan payments.

The company said earlier that all lenders to the facility are
needed to back the request and Hibu could opt for a U.K. legal
process known as a scheme of arrangement to force their agreement
to it, Bloomberg notes.  The company said on Oct. 25 that the
payment suspension would help debt talks proceed as it and a
committee of lenders prepare a restructuring proposal, Bloomberg
recounts.

According to The Financial Times' Michael Stothard, Friday's deal
will buy the group time, as its next payments are not officially
due until February and covenant waivers have already been
negotiated with some lenders.  It also reduces the threat of
having to fight liquidation in the courts, the FT says.

However, Hibu still faces the challenge of negotiating a
restructuring of GBP2.2 billion worth of 2009 debt with
bondholders, which include Soros Fund Management, Royal Bank of
Scotland, HSBC, Gruss Asset Management and GE Capital, the FT
ntoes.  Hibu said it was hoping to agree terms with them by
January, the FT relates.

For the 2006 bondholders, the agreement to accept 39p in the
pound represents a compromise, the FT states.  According to the
FT, it is substantially below the 90p in the pound that the debt
was trading at in the market before the suspension of payments
was announced in October, but is above the 20p in the pound that
the debt has been trading at in the weeks since the suspension
was announced.

Earlier this year, Hibu warned that the debt restructuring could
result in little or no value being attributed to its shares, the
FT recounts.

Hibu Plc is a British Yellow Pages publisher.


MCGEOCH MARINE: Obtains Approval for CVA; Averts Collapse
---------------------------------------------------------
Gareth Mackie at The Scotsman reports that about 70 jobs have
been saved after McGeoch Marine agreed a deal with its creditors
to save it from collapse.

According to the Scotsman, the firm went into administration in
October following difficulties at its overseas operations, but
joint administrators Rob Caven -- rob.caven@uk.gt.com -- and
Les Ross -- les.ross@uk.gt.com -- of Grant Thornton have secured
approval for a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) that will see
the firm's creditors receive more than 50p in the pound over a
four-year period.

McGeoch Marine is an engineering firm that makes doors and
accommodation modules for ships and oil rigs.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Says Euro Area Crisis Threatens EMEA Corporates
---------------------------------------------------------
The euro area's continuing sovereign debt crisis and weak or
negative GDP growth will be the main influences on non-financial
corporate credit in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) in
2013, says Moody's Investors Service in a Special Comment report
published on Dec. 6.

The new report, entitled "EMEA Corporates: 2013 Outlook", is now
available on www.moodys.com. Moody's subscribers can access this
report via the link provided at the end of this press release.

"At the issuer level, Moody's expects continued credit weakness
to persist, with the number of downgrades likely to continue
exceeding upgrades in 2013," says Jean-Michel Carayon, a Moody's
Senior Vice President and co-author of the report. The rating
agency expects low growth coupled with ongoing government
austerity measures to have a dampening effect on consumer
spending. This will most affect industries such as
telecommunications service providers, retailers and auto
manufacturers.

As of early December 2012 in EMEA, the number of stable Industry
Sector Outlooks -- Moody's view of the business conditions that
are factored into its corporate ratings -- was only slightly
higher than the number deemed negative. If negative trends
continue, Moody's could change more outlooks to negative during
the course of 2013. The rating agency changed its outlook for
European retailers and EMEA auto parts suppliers to negative in
February, whilst the outlook for North American and EMEA
chemicals was changed to negative in November.

In view of the lack of confidence in an economic recovery,
issuers in cyclical industries such as steel, chemicals and
building materials, have limited headroom left for credit
weakness within current rating categories. Weak levels of demand
will also weigh on earnings in several chemical industry
segments, affecting even larger groups such as Akzo Nobel NV
(Baa1 under review for downgrade) which remains exposed to
underperforming segments. In the building materials sector, less
geographically diversified firms, such as Italcementi SpA (Ba2
negative), are more vulnerable.

The divergence in operating performance between corporates with
large exposure to southern European markets and those with more
exposure to northern Europe remains high, as evidenced in the
results of Fiat SpA (Ba3 negative) or Telefonica SA (Baa2
negative) for example. In addition, Moody's notes that the risk
of economic malaise spreading from southern to northern European
countries is increasing.

Moreover, further credit deterioration that results in the
movement of large companies to speculative grade from investment
grade ("fallen angels") could change the shape of the rated non-
financial corporate universe in Europe and heighten already
volatile capital market conditions.  ArcelorMittal (Ba1 negative)
is EMEA's most recent, highest-profile fallen angel.

Moody's expects that the slower pace of economic growth in
emerging markets, especially China, will also be a major credit
driver in the coming year for cyclical industrials, such as
chemicals companies and steel producers. This could hurt the
revenues of European corporates that have turned to emerging
markets to offset slow growth in their traditional Western
European markets.

Liquidity among corporates remains fairly solid overall but
gradual deterioration is likely in 2013. This will be due to the
sovereign debt crisis and also the result of continued restricted
lending by banks intent on deleveraging and building capital
ratios.


* S&P Puts Ratings on 240 CMBS Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its credit ratings on 240 tranches in 77 European commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions following
an update to its criteria for rating European CMBS transactions.
The updated criteria became effective.

"On Nov. 7, 2012, we published an update to our criteria for
rating European CMBS transactions. At the same time, we published
a commentary clarifying how we apply our global property
evaluation methodology to European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"We have placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings on tranches
where we believe there is at least a one-in-two chance that
ratings on the tranche will be lowered, following the application
of our updated criteria," S&P said.

"The impact on individual ratings would primarily stem from our
calculation of hedge break costs and our analysis of tail periods
under the updated criteria, and from changes in certain
capitalization rates used in our property analysis. In addition,
any rating changes will also reflect our view of a portfolio's
prevailing performance and the anticipated future performance of
the underlying assets, given the continued level of stress that
European CMBS collateral is experiencing," S&P said.

"The affected tranches have a principal balance of about EUR14.67
billion (for euro-denominated transactions) and GBP15.15 billion
(for British pound sterling-denominated transactions). The
CreditWatch placements affect approximately 31% (by number) of
the European CMBS tranches that we currently rate," S&P said.

"The rating actions primarily relate to investment-grade ratings.
Specifically, we have placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings
on 171 investment-grade tranches in 70 European CMBS
transactions. In addition, we have placed on CreditWatch negative
our ratings on 69 speculative-grade tranches in 52 European CMBS
transactions," S&P said.

"We intend to complete our resolution of the CreditWatch
placements over the next six months," S&P said.

               STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

"SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

           http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


* BOND PRICING: For the Week December 3 to December 7, 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


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