/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130114.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, January 14, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 9
Headlines
B O S N I A & H E R Z E G O V I N A
NAFTNI TERMINALI: Faces Bankruptcy; About 80 Jobs Affected
C Y P R U S
ORPHANIDES: Former Supplier Challenges Liquidation Freeze Order
* CYPRUS: Seeks "Urgent" EU Political Agreement on Bailout
* CYPRUS: Moody's Downgrades Government Bond Ratings to 'Caa3'
I C E L A N D
* ICELAND: Working on Bill on Failed Bank Creditor Deals
I T A L Y
MEDIOLEASING FINANCE: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating for Downgrade
SIENA MORTGAGE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'Ba2' Ratings
K A Z A K H S T A N
KAZAKHTELECOM: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
N E T H E R L A N D S
CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Rates New Sub. Tier 2 Securities 'BB-'
HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B2 Notes
P O L A N D
CENTRAL EUROPEAN: To Appeal NASDAQ's Delisting Determination
R O M A N I A
ROMSTRADE: Financial Woes Prompt Blue Air to Cancel Jet Order
R U S S I A
KHIMKI: May Face Bankruptcy Following Financial Woes
T U R K E Y
* TURKEY: Fitch Says Bank Leverage Tool Cuts Loan Growth Risk
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
ASTOR HOTEL: In Administration, Cuts 25 Jobs
BARING INSULATION: Goes Into Liquidation
ENVIROLINK NORTHWEST: Placed Into Liquidation
HMV GROUP: Launches Massive Sale to Boost Revenues
JESSOPS PLC: To Close All 187 Stores; 1,370 Jobs Affected
MONTGOMERY LITHO: In Liquidation; Haddington Plant to Close
YORKSHIRE BUILDING: Fitch Lifts Rating on Tier 2 Notes From 'BB+'
* UK: Moody's Says RPI Credit Positive for Regulated Utilities
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 7 to January 11, 2013
*********
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B O S N I A & H E R Z E G O V I N A
=======================================
NAFTNI TERMINALI: Faces Bankruptcy; About 80 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------------------
Dalje.com reports that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina's
Federation entity on Thursday adopted a decision whereby it
refuses to be a co-debtor of Naftni Terminali FBiH and faces
bankruptcy on January 13 as well as the dismissal of about 80
workers from Croatia who are employed there.
Instead of giving the company additional guarantees, the
Federation government recommended an out-of-court settlement with
the British company Deltagrip Trading, which has requested that
the company's property be seized as compensation for a cancelled
lease contract, Dalje.com says.
Dalje.com relates that the Federation government said in a
statement, the settlement should refer to a five-month delay of
the bankruptcy, during which time the money should be found to
compensate the British company.
The International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce has ruled that Naftni Terminali FBiH has to
pay Deltagrip Trading about EUR7.6 million in damages for
cancelling a contract on the lease of oil tanks in Ploce in 2010,
Dalje.com discloses. Based on this ruling, a court in Sisak,
Croatia delivered a decision on the property seizure because of
which the oil terminals company's account has been blocked for
months, Dalje.com noes.
The Federation government said the attempt to settle out of court
with the British company did not mean that the arbitration
court's decision was being accepted, and ordered Terminali to do
everything to protect Federation property in Ploce, Dalje.com
relates.
Naftni Terminali FBiH is an oil terminals company from the
Federation which is based in the Croatian seaport of Ploce.
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C Y P R U S
===========
ORPHANIDES: Former Supplier Challenges Liquidation Freeze Order
---------------------------------------------------------------
Poly Pantelides at Cyprus Mail reports that Gr. V North Fruit
Ltd., a former supplier of Orphanides, is trying to wind up the
company, arguing that the supermarket chain cannot recover the
millions it owes to its creditors.
According to Cyprus Mail, Gr. V North Fruit, which is in
receivership, is owed almost EUR500,000 by Orphanides and filed
an appeal this week at Larnaca district court, trying to lift a
previous court order that froze its liquidation procedures
against the chain.
The appeal says Orphanides supermarkets had failed to provide any
figures justifying a validation order that has allowed the chain
to continue operating, Cyprus Mail discloses.
The appeal said that to provide a validation order the court
needs to see, among others: a cash flow forecast, a profit-loss
projection, details on payments, or any reports on the company's
ability to continue trading, and pay salaries, Cyprus Mail notes.
The appeal said that Orphanides has failed to show how it can
meet its obligations, and freezing the procedure hurts the
creditor who will not be able to recover the money owed, Cyprus
Mail relates.
Orphanides owes millions to major banks and suppliers but claims
to have real estate worth about EUR340 million although the
lodged appeal claims that its debt outweighs the company's
property assets, Cyprus Mail discloses.
A number of large contractors have stopped supplying the chain,
and in addition to North Fruit, there are reports that more
suppliers plan to sue and launch liquidation procedures, Cyprus
Mail states.
According to Cyprus Mail, Andreas Andronikou of UK auditing firm
UHY Hacker Young whom Orphanides appointed to administer a
restructuring of the chain, said that Orphanides owes the Popular
Bank -- its main creditor -- about EUR104 million, EUR20 million
to the Bank of Cyprus, and almost EUR29 million to other
creditors.
Mr. Andronikou placed the direct loss to the economy in the event
of the chain closing down to some EUR400 million, Cyprus Mail
discloses. The banks have since reportedly rejected the proposal
to appoint Andronikou as administrator, Cyprus Mail recounts.
A group of suppliers led by Cypra Ltd. have recently formed an
entity -- Orphanides New Era -- to try to recover their money by
keeping the business going, Cyprus Mail says. But it is
understood that the banks will not give the go ahead unless they
are convinced that venture is viable, Cyprus Mail notes.
Christos Orphanides, the company's CEO and major shareholder,
asked the court to freeze the liquidation procedure for a period
of two months so a "comprehensive rescue effort and damage
control" could be implemented, Cyprus Mail recounts.
Mr. Orphanides told the court that closing down the company would
endanger the jobs of 1,100 people directly employed by the
company, as well as of some 2,500 others employed by suppliers
and collaborators, Cyprus Mail relates.
* CYPRUS: Seeks "Urgent" EU Political Agreement on Bailout
----------------------------------------------------------
Paul Tugwell at Bloomberg News reports that according to a
presentation by the Nicosia-based finance ministry on Jan. 10, EU
leaders must "urgently" reach a political agreement on a bailout
for Cyprus as the island nation poses a systemic risk to the euro
area.
Bloomberg notes that the presentation said EU-IMF financial
assistance is the "only way" to find a solution, and that if
assistance not granted "Cyprus will effectively declare
bankruptcy".
Bloomberg relates that the ministry said the debt to GDP seen
peaking in 2014 at less than 150%.
Debt restructuring/PSI is not an option for Cyprus as it would
conflict with recap target of Cyprus banks, Bloomberg says.
Cyprus debt sustainability is achievable, Bloomberg states.
According to Bloomberg, the liquidity position of the country's
banking sector is "fragile".
The finance ministry said that with rollover of Treasury bills
Cyprus can meet its financing needs to end-March, Bloomberg
relates.
Cyprus, Bloomberg says, is exploring options for financing needs
for April to May, which poses difficulties.
* CYPRUS: Moody's Downgrades Government Bond Ratings to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Cyprus's government bond
rating to Caa3 from B3, and the outlook on the rating is
negative. The rating action concludes the review for possible
downgrade initiated on 16 November 2012. Cyprus's short-term
government bond rating of Not Prime has been affirmed.
The key driver of the rating action is the anticipated rise in
the Cypriot government's debt burden, driven principally by the
increased recapitalization needs of its banking system following
distressed exchanges on Greek government debt and rising
delinquencies on loans to Greek and Cypriot obligors. Given that
the resulting increase in the debt burden is likely to be
unsustainable, Moody's believes there is a significantly
increased likelihood that the Cypriot government may eventually
default outright or press for a distressed exchange, although
Moody's base case does not assume a default or distressed
exchange in 2013.
The negative outlook assigned to the rating reflects Moody's view
that the situation could significantly deteriorate over the next
12 to 18 months because of three factors: (1) ongoing liquidity
concerns; (2) uncertainty about the exact size of the necessary
bank recapitalizations, which may exceed the rating agency's
current projections; and (3) uncertainty about the upcoming
finalization and signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the
European Central Bank, also collectively known as the Troika.
RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE
The main driver of Moody's three-notch downgrade of Cyprus's
government bond rating is the further increase in the amount of
government support that the rating agency believes Cypriot banks
are likely to require. Previously, Moody's forecasts of bank
recapitalization costs had not included the credit cooperative
sector. However, Moody's updated stress test analysis suggests
that the recapitalization cost for the three largest banks is
higher than originally anticipated which, when combined with the
likely needs of the cooperative sector, translates into a bank
recapitalization cost of about EUR10 billion, which equates to
over 50% of GDP. This estimate is consistent with the Troika's
provisional bank recapitalization estimates. Moody's has
therefore incorporated its higher forecasts for bank
recapitalization costs in its revised projections of the Cypriot
general government debt for 2013. However, the rating agency may,
over time, undertake further upward revisions of these
recapitalization cost estimates given the rapid ongoing
deterioration of the three largest Cypriot banks' asset quality,
as reflected in the rise in non-performing loans to 26% in
September 2012 from 19% in March 2012.
As a result of these changed forecasts and assumptions, Moody's
currently estimates that the capital needs of the Cypriot
financial sector are likely to push the sovereign's debt-to-GDP
ratio to 150% in 2013 -- which would be one of the highest levels
in Moody's rating universe. More importantly, Moody's believes
that these debt levels could continue to rise to above 154% by
2015 in view of the uncertainties regarding the cost of
recapitalizing the banks and the implementation risks facing the
country's fiscal consolidation plan given the uncertain depth and
length of the economic downturn. This upward adjustment in
Moody's forecast for Cyprus's debt levels has in turn led to an
assessment of a heightened probability of default, given that
debt levels of this magnitude are unlikely to be sustainable for
a small country with very weak expected nominal GDP growth.
Moody's recognizes that there is a strong political will among
euro area countries to avoid private sector involvement (PSI)
and/or distressed exchanges for any country in the monetary
union, notwithstanding Greece's default. Moody's also
acknowledges that the Cypriot banking system's exposure to its
own government's debt would limit the debt relief that the
sovereign could obtain from a restructuring. However, even though
a debt restructuring would increase the required bank
recapitalization costs, Cyprus could obtain some debt relief
through a restructuring with a large haircut. Moreover, in
Moody's opinion, there is a probability of around 50% that the
sheer size of Cyprus's anticipated debt load will eventually
compel the authorities to pursue every avenue for debt reduction,
including PSI. Given the very high projected debt burden relative
to the size of the economy, Moody's expects investors to record
large losses in such an event, and that a Caa3 rating is
therefore warranted.
RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK
Moody's has assigned a negative outlook to Cyprus's Caa3
government bond rating because of three significant uncertainties
regarding events that might prompt a rating downgrade and a
possible default over the near term:
1.) Liquidity concerns. Although Moody's base assumption
continues to be that access to short-term funding will remain
sufficient for the Cypriot government to meet its funding needs,
the rating agency notes that, in the absence of a disbursement
from the Troika, the government may face a severe crisis.
2.) Bank recapitalization needs. The government has employed a US
asset manager, Pimco, to estimate the banks' recapitalization
needs. Until its report is finalized later in January, there will
be lingering uncertainty about the amount of support that the
government will need to provide to Cyprus's banking sector in
2013.
3.) Progress of negotiations with the Troika. While Moody's
believes that the current agreement in principle between Cyprus
and the Troika on an MoU represents significant progress, the
rating agency notes that the finalization of an agreement and
disbursement of funds have been delayed and that an assessment of
debt sustainability has also not been completed. Moody's base
assumption continues to be that the Cypriot government will be
able to reach an agreement with the Troika that will result in
the provision of official assistance to the Cypriot government
until at least 2016 -- however, questions about debt
sustainability remain central to Moody's views on the probability
of a default event for Cyprus.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
Moody's considers a material upward movement in Cyprus's
government bond rating to be unlikely as long as debt levels
continue to rise and remain at very high levels. The magnitude of
the government's fiscal challenge is unlikely to change
materially even following an agreement on conditionality because
of the sheer size of the financial support that is needed for the
banking sector.
The rating agency says that further downward movement in Cyprus's
sovereign rating would be likely if the likelihood of default
were to become more certain. Moreover, a downgrade would be
likely if a Greek exit from monetary union were to become more
probable.
COUNTRY CEILINGS
As a consequence of the rating action on the Cypriot sovereign,
Moody's has also lowered the maximum rating that can be assigned
to a domestic issuer in Cyprus, including structured finance
securities backed by Cypriot receivables, by three notches to
Caa1 from B1. The lower ceiling reflects the increased risk of
economic and financial dislocations. The short-term foreign-
currency country and deposit ceilings remain at Not Prime.
Cyprus's adjusted country ceiling reflects Moody's assessment
that the risk of economic and financial instability in the
country has increased. The weakness of the economy and the
sovereign's lack of access to international markets constitutes a
substantial risk factor to other (non-government) issuers in
Cyprus as income and access to liquidity and funding could be
sharply curtailed for all classes of borrowers. Moody's cannot
exclude a further deterioration in the financial sector, which
could lead to potentially severe systemic economic disruption and
reduced access to credit. Finally, the ceiling reflects the risk
of Cyprus's exit from the euro area and a redenomination in the
event of a default by the sovereign. If the Cypriot government's
rating were to fall further from its current Caa3 level, Moody's
might reassess the country ceiling and lower it at that time.
Moody's would also reassess the country ceiling in the event of
an upgrade of the Cypriot government's bond rating.
Moody's country ceilings capture externalities and event risks
that arise unavoidably as a consequence of locating a business in
a particular country and that ultimately constrain domestic
issuers' ability to service their debt obligations. As such, the
ceiling encapsulates elements of economic, financial, political
and legal risks in a country, including political instability,
the risk of government intervention, the risk of systemic
economic disruption, severe financial instability risks, currency
redenomination and natural disasters, among other factors, that
need to be incorporated into the ratings of the strongest
issuers. The ceiling caps the credit rating of all issuers and
transactions with material exposure to those risks -- in other
words, it affects all domestic issuers and transactions other
than those whose assets and revenues are predominantly sourced
from or located outside of the country, or which benefit from an
external credit support.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2008.
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I C E L A N D
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* ICELAND: Working on Bill on Failed Bank Creditor Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
parliament is working on a bill that would require the nation's
central bank to consult with the Finance Ministry on creditor
deals with failed banks.
According to Bloomberg, Gudlaugur Thor Thordarson, a member of
the economy committee, said that the ministry would in turn then
be required to consult with parliament.
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I T A L Y
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MEDIOLEASING FINANCE: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
rating of the Class B notes of Medioleasing Finance S.r.l. This
rating action follows Moody's recent placement of the
transaction's liquidity guarantor, Banca delle Marche S.p.A., on
review for downgrade. Medioleasing Finance S.r.l is an Italian
lease ABS transaction.
EUR105.4 million B Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on May 15, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)
Ratings Rationale
The rating action reflects the placement of Banca delle Marche's
Ba1 long-term debt and deposit ratings on review for downgrade on
November 16, 2012. Banca delle Marche is the liquidity guarantor
for the transaction.
As the payments on the Class B notes benefit from a liquidity
guarantee from Banca delle Marche, as well as from the cash flows
generated by the securitised assets, the rating of the Class B
notes is highly linked to the rating of Banca delle Marche.
Despite the significant level of credit enhancement benefiting
the Class B notes (at 14.9%), Moody's considers that this may be
insufficient to offset the potential downgrade of the guarantor.
Moody's expects to conclude the rating review on Medioleasing
Finance's Class B notes once the bank's rating review has itself
been concluded.
As part of the review process, Moody's will also reassess the
effectiveness of some of the transaction performance triggers
designed to mitigate the potential pool deterioration during the
remaining four years of the revolving period through April 2017.
While one purchase termination event occurred (as a consequence
of the downgrade of Banca delle Marche below Baa2 in May 2012),
the transaction maintained its revolving capacity as, in
accordance with the transaction documentation, a purchase
termination notice shall be served if so requested by the
majority of the noteholders, and such request has not been issued
at the date of this notice. The rating on the Class A notes is
unaffected by the rating action, as its credit enhancement level
of 43.5% offsets the potential downgrade of Banca delle Marche.
The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Multi-Pool Financial Lease-Backed Transactions in Italy"
published in June 2006 and Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of
SMEs in Europe published in February 2007.
Moody's used its excel-based cash flow model, Moody's ABSROM(TM),
as part of its quantitative analysis of the transaction. Moody's
ABSROM(TM) model enables users to model various features of a
standard European ABS transaction including: (1) the specifics of
the default distribution of the assets, their portfolio
amortization profile, yield or recoveries; and (2) the specific
priority of payments, triggers, swaps and reserve funds on the
liability side of the ABS structure. Moody's ABSROM(TM) User
Guide is available on Moody's website and covers the model's
functionality as well as providing a comprehensive index of the
user inputs and outputs.
SIENA MORTGAGE: Amendments No Impact on Moody's 'Ba2' Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service stated that amendments to the Servicer
Agreement between Siena Mortgage 10-7 Srl (the "Issuer") and
Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS; Ba2/Not Prime), and in
particular the lowering of the rating related trigger for the
appointment of the Back Up Servicer ("BUS") will not in and of
itself and at this time result in a reduction or withdrawal of
the current ratings of the notes issued by the Issuer (the
"Notes").
On October 18, 2012, Moody's announced the downgrade of the long
term senior debt rating of MPS to Ba2 (the "Downgrade"), which
triggered the obligation of the Servicer to appoint a BUS.
Following the amendment to the Servicing Agreement, the trigger
level has now been lowered to loss of Ba3 from Baa3.
In determining the impact of these amendments on the current
Moody's ratings of the Notes, Moody's assessed, among other
factors: (i) the highest current rating on the Notes which is A2
(sf); (ii) the credit quality of the Servicer; and (iii) the
degree of compliance with Moody's criteria.
In addition Moody's has been notified that Deutsche Bank SpA (NR)
has been substituted by Deutsche Bank AG (A2/P-1) as Account Bank
and Principal Paying Agent in the transaction upon the terms of
the relevant agreements Moody's noted that on 2 July 2012, it
released a Request for Comments, in which the rating agency has
requested market feedback on potential changes to its rating
implementation guidance for "The Temporary Use of Cash in
Structured Finance Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank
Guidelines". If the revised rating implementation guidance are
implemented as proposed, the rating on the Notes should not be
negatively affected.
On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa
published in June 2012.
No cash flow analysis or stress scenarios have been conducted as
the amendments have not had an impact on the cash flow analysis
conducted at closing
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
KAZAKHTELECOM: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Kazakhtelecom JSC's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to Negative from Stable and
affirmed the IDR at 'BB'.
Kaztel is a strong fixed-line incumbent with a near monopoly
position in the traditional telephony and high broadband market
share operating in a benign regulatory environment. The revision
of the Outlook to Negative is driven by the company's ambitions
to re-enter the mobile segment. Mobile ambitions may dilute
operating strengths and push the gross leverage above the
downgrade threshold identified as 2.5x gross debt/EBITDA.
Strong Incumbent Positions:
Kaztel is likely to maintain its dominant position in the fixed-
line segment, helped by benign regulation and the scarcity of
alternative networks. Kaztel estimated its fixed-line telephony
market share at a high 92% at end-2011. Due to the lack of
unbundling regulation, the company faces only limited facilities-
based competition. Fixed-to-mobile substitution is the key
threat, and this will drive modest fixed-line disconnections and
pricing pressures, in Fitch's view.
Positive Broadband Outlook:
The Kazakh broadband market retains strong growth potential,
driven by relatively low broadband penetration in the country
(estimated by the company at only 15% of households at end-2011).
Faced with only limited alternative infrastructure, Kaztel is
best positioned to benefit from this growth. Its much relied-on
ADSL technology allows it to quickly roll-out broadband service
ahead of its peers. Broadband revenue growth is likely to be less
pronounced compared with subscriber additions as the company's
currently inflated tariffs are likely to remain under regulatory
and competitive pressure in key cities.
Aggressive Mobile Ambitions:
Kaztel's plans to re-enter the mobile market with a greenfield
LTE network may have limited operating success, although the
project will be the key leverage driver in 2013-2015. The Kazakh
mobile market is well penetrated with 3G services and is highly
competitive. Rivalry intensified with the arrival of Tele2, which
has successfully pursued a discounter strategy.
Weak Domestic Banking System:
The Kazakh domestic banking system is weak, implying a lack of
local funding and resultant high FX risks, potentially limited
access to deposits and scarce committed credit facilities. At
end-2011, 92% of the company's debt (excluding leases) was
denominated in or pegged to foreign currencies. This ratio is
unlikely to improve as new funding is likely to be FX
denominated.
Leverage Increase Likely:
High capex on the back of LTE roll-out and fixed-line network
upgrades will push free cash flow deep into negative territory in
2013-2014. This may drive gross leverage to above the downgrade
boundary of 2.5x gross debt/EBITDA.
Weak Parent-Subsidiary Linkage:
Kaztel's ratings reflect its standalone credit profile. Kaztel is
of only limited strategic importance for Kazakhstan while
operating and legal ties with its controlling shareholder,
government-controlled Samruk-Kazyna, are weak. Although indirect
government control is a positive credit factor, it does not
justify any notching up of the rating, in Fitch's view.
Gross Metrics Important:
Kaztel's debt profile is well spread with no medium-term peak
maturities. At end-Q312, more than half of its debt had
maturities of over three years. Kaztel has maintained a
substantial cash cushion on its balance sheet (KZT101.2 billion
as of end-Q312). However, this is placed with low-rated domestic
banks and may not be easily available, in Fitch's view. The
agency therefore primarily focuses its analysis on the company's
gross debt metrics.
Off-Balance Sheet Liability a Concern
Kaztel issued a US$300 million guarantee to China Development
Bank covering a loan to Kazakkmys, its sister company, under an
agreement with its controlling shareholder, Samruk-Kazyna. This
guarantee will be triggered if Samruk-Kazyna defaults on its
payments to China Development Bank. Samruk-Kazyna issued a cross-
guarantee to Kaztel promising to pay it back any amounts that
Kaztel would have to pay to China Development Bank. This cross-
guarantee is from the same entity that benefits from Kaztel's
guarantee and, in Fitch's view, is likely to be of limited value
at a time when Kaztel's guarantee is triggered.
This sizeable guarantee exposes Kaztel to the credit risks of its
sister company. If triggered, the guarantee may result in
liquidity pressure and a substantial debt and leverage increase,
which would likely trigger a negative rating action. Fitch notes
the poor disclosure of this liability, highlighting the inherent
corporate governance and information transparency risks in
Kaztel's credit profile. The arrangements and the guarantee were
disclosed in Kazakhmys's reporting but not in Kaztel's accounts.
Rating Sensitivity Guidance:
Kaztel's operating profile is strong for its rating level but
could be dampened by its mobile strategic ambitions, which could
precipitate a substantial rise in leverage. Positive rating
momentum is unlikely before the company reduces its exposure to
weak domestic banks.
A sustained rise in gross leverage to above 2.5x total
debt/EBITDA, and/or a material increase in refinancing risks may
lead to a negative rating action.
List of Rating Actions
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Local currency Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB, Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'A(kaz)', Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable
Senior Unsecured Debt in foreign currency: affirmed at 'BB'
Senior Unsecured Debt in local currency: affirmed at 'A(kaz)'
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Rates New Sub. Tier 2 Securities 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s upcoming
subordinated Tier 2 debt securities a 'BB-(EXP)' expected rating.
The expected rating is in line with the rating guidelines in
Fitch's criteria 'Assessing and Rating Bank Subordinated and
Hybrid Securities'. The securities are subordinated but have no
coupon flexibility. Their rating is one notch below CEB's
Viability Rating (VR) reflecting one notch for loss severity, but
no notches for incremental non-performance risk relative to the
bank's VR. The securities' rating is sensitive to any change in
CEB's VR.
As currently contemplated, the securities will have a 10-year
maturity and a call option exercisable once at the call date in
January 2018. The bank plans to issue up to US$300 million and
the proceeds will partially be used to refinance existing
subordinated Tier 2 debt securities.
The transaction features statutory loss absorption language in
the 'Risk Factors' section of the bond documentation, which is
cross-referenced in the terms and conditions of the notes, and
the notes are expected to be Basel III compliant. The securities
do not have contractual language for loss absorption at the point
of non-viability. However, the notes would, under the Dutch
jurisdiction, be statutorily subject to some form of loss
absorption in a resolution situation, i.e. if the bank reached
the point of non-viability.
HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V.'s
notes:
Class A1-T (XS0306976266): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A1-VF (NL0006005498): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (XS0306976696): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A3 (XS0306977157): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class A4 (XS0306977314): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class B1 (XS0306978981): affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class B2 (XS0306979955): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class S3 (XS0306981423): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Negative Outlook
Class S4 (XS0306981779): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Negative Outlook
The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance
since the last review. The Fitch weighted average rating factor
has improved to 27.6 as of Dec. 11, 2012, from 30.5 as of 9
December 2011, below its threshold of 30 and is now passing.
Assets rated 'CCC' or below represent 5.67% of the portfolio,
down from 9.84% at the last review. Defaulted assets have
increased to 1.19% from 0% of the total investment amount since
the last review.
The overcollateralization (OC) tests have been passing since
close. The class A2 OC test level is currently at 134.15%, above
its threshold of 121.87%. The class A interest coverage test has
been passing since close and its current level is 1054.42%, above
its threshold of 110%. The increased level of the IC test is due
to the combination of an increasing weighted average spread on
the assets, increasing to 3.75% from 3.28% at the last review,
and a lower cost of the liabilities due to declining interest
rates. The Negative Outlook on the class A3 through S4 Notes
continues to reflect potential sensitivity to the leveraged loan
refinancing wall (for further information see "European Leveraged
Loan Refinancing Wall" dated December 18, 2012 at
www.fitchratings.com.)
As part of its analysis, Fitch considered the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to the transaction's exposure to countries where
Fitch has imposed a country rating cap less than the ratings on
any notes in the transaction. These countries are currently
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, but may include additional
countries if there is sovereign rating migration. Fitch believes
that exposure of up to 15% of the total investment amount to
these countries, under the same average portfolio profile and
assuming the current ratings on the UK and eurozone countries are
stable, would not have a material negative impact on the notes'
ratings.
Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V. is a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in
Europe. In particular, non-euro-denominated assets, other than
hedged collateral obligations, comprise 14.6% of the total
investment amount, as of the latest trustee report. The portfolio
is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe Limited and the
reinvestment period will end in September 2014.
The class A1-T, A1-VF and A2 notes' ratings address the timely
payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by
the stated maturity date as per the governing documents. The
class A3, A4, B1, and B2 notes' ratings address the ultimate
payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by
the stated maturity date as per the governing documents. The
class S3 and S4 ratings address the ultimate receipt of the rated
balance from all funds received on their components, by the legal
final maturity date.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
CENTRAL EUROPEAN: To Appeal NASDAQ's Delisting Determination
------------------------------------------------------------
Central European Distribution Corporation said in a regulatory
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that
it intends to appeal the staff determination to delist the
Company's securities from the NASDAQ Stock Market.
The Company received a letter from the Listing Qualifications
Department of The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC stating that the
Company was not in compliance with Listing Rules 5620(a) and
5620(b) which require the Company to hold its annual general
meeting of shareholders within one year of Dec. 31, 2011, and to
distribute a proxy statement and solicit proxies for that
meeting.
The letter also stated if the Company does not request an appeal
of the staff determination to a Nasdaq Listing Qualification
Panel, trading of the Company's common stock will be suspended at
the opening of business on Jan. 11, 2013, and Nasdaq will file a
Form 25-NSE with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission to remove the Company's securities from listing and
registration on the Nasdaq Stock Market.
Although there can be no assurance that the Panel will grant the
Company's request for continued listing, the appeal will stay the
delisting of the Company's stock from The Nasdaq Global Market
pending the Panel's decision.
About CEDC
Mt. Laurel, New Jersey-based Central European Distribution
Corporation is one of the world's largest vodka producers and
Central and Eastern Europe's largest integrated spirit beverages
business with its primary operations in Poland, Russia and
Hungary.
Ernst & Young Audit sp. z.o.o., in Warsaw, Poland, expressed
substantial doubt about Central European's ability to continue as
a going concern, following the Company's results for the fiscal
year ended Dec. 31, 2011. The independent auditors noted that
certain of the Company's credit and factoring facilities are
coming due in 2012 and will need to be renewed to manage its
working capital needs.
The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2012, showed
US$1.98 billion in total assets, US$1.73 billion in total
liabilities, US$29.44 million in temporary equity, and US$210.78
million in total stockholders' equity.
Liquidity
The Company's Convertible Senior Notes are due on March 15, 2013.
The Company has said its current cash on hand, estimated cash
from operations and available credit facilities will not be
sufficient to make the repayment of principal on the Convertible
Notes and, unless the transaction with Russian Standard
Corporation is completed the Company may default on them. The
Company's cash flow forecasts include the assumption that certain
credit and factoring facilities coming due in 2012 would be
renewed to manage working capital needs. Moreover, the Company
had a net loss and significant impairment charges in 2011 and
current liabilities exceed current assets at June 30, 2012.
These conditions, the Company said, raise substantial doubt about
its ability to continue as a going concern.
* * *
As reported by the TCR on Aug. 10, 2012, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services kept on CreditWatch with negative implications
its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating on U.S.-based
Central European Distribution Corp. (CEDC), the parent company of
Poland-based vodka manufacturer CEDC International sp. z o.o.
"The CreditWatch status reflects our view that uncertainties
remain related to CEDC's ongoing accounting review and that
CEDC's liquidity could further and substantially weaken if there
was a breach of covenants which could lead to the acceleration of
the payment of the 2016 notes, upon receipt of a written notice
of 25% or more of the noteholders," S&P said.
In the Oct. 9, 2012, edition of the TCR, Moody's Investors
Service has downgraded the corporate family rating (CFR) and
probability of default rating (PDR) of Central European
Distribution Corporation (CEDC) to Caa2 from Caa1.
"The downgrade reflects delays in CEDC securing adequate
financing to repay its US$310 million of convertible notes due
March 2013 which are increasing Moody's concerns that the
definitive agreement for a strategic alliance between CEDC and
Russian Standard Corporation (Russian Standard) might not
conclude at the current terms," says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's
Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CEDC.
=============
R O M A N I A
=============
ROMSTRADE: Financial Woes Prompt Blue Air to Cancel Jet Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
Roxana Zega at Bloomberg News reports that Blue Air-
Transport Aerian SA said it scrapped an order for five Boeing
Co. 737 jets with a list price of US$462 million after sister
company and investor Romstrade encountered financial problems.
Blue Air Deputy General Manager Adrian Ionascu told Bloomberg
that the contracts, placed in 2008, were for two 737-800s and
three 737-900ERs for delivery in 2015 and 2016.
"The decision was based on the current financial situation
of Romstrade, part of the same group of companies as Blue Air,
and on Blue Air's incapacity to pay liabilities stipulated in
the contract with Boeing," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Ionascu as saying
in an e-mail.
According to Bloomberg, the court's Web site said that a Romanian
court in the southern town of Giurgiu declared Romstrade
insolvent last month.
Blue Air Marketing Director Mirela Secan said that both companies
are owned by Nelu Iordache, who has been detained in a probe into
the whereabouts of European Union funds, Bloomberg notes.
Romstrade is a Romanian road builder.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
KHIMKI: May Face Bankruptcy Following Financial Woes
----------------------------------------------------
According to RT, Russian media are speculating Khimki could go
bankrupt in the near future.
Khimki has been having financial problems since a change in
ownership in late 2012, RT says.
The team's Russian Internationals Vitaly Fridzon and Sergey Monya
as well as the number of other key players haven't been paid
since last October and are threatening to leave the club if the
problem isn't solved, RT discloses.
Khimki is one of Russia's top basketball club.
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
* TURKEY: Fitch Says Bank Leverage Tool Cuts Loan Growth Risk
-------------------------------------------------------------
The introduction of higher central bank reserve requirements for
Turkish banks that fail to meet set leverage ratios may reduce
somewhat the risk of a return to very rapid loan growth, which is
one of the downside risks for Turkish banks, Fitch Ratings says.
The changes have limited immediate impact for the Turkish banks
we rate. The new policy tool, effective from Q413, will require
banks with leverage ratios below 3.5% to hold additional
reserves, ranging from one to two percentage points. The
threshold will increase up to 4% in Q414 and to 5% in Q415. The
leverage ratios of Fitch-rated banks are mostly in the 7%-9%
range, comfortably above the new requirement.
Although the additional reserve requirements are not to be
implemented until the end of the year, the policy may help to
curb excessive growth appetite that prevailed during 2010 and
2011 when loans grew rapidly at around 30% on average each year.
Credit growth slowed to a more moderate 15% in the first nine
months of 2012 on an annualized basis. We expect nominal loan
growth to be somewhat higher than the official target of 15% in
2013, in part supported by continued inflow of foreign funds, but
not to significantly exceed 20%.
Any deterioration in asset quality arising from the recent brisk
credit growth is likely to be manageable. Risks are mitigated by
some key fundamental strengths. The banks have diversified loan
portfolios, sound credit underwriting, retail lending in only
local currency and close regulatory supervision. Positive
economic growth in Turkey (Fitch forecasts 3.8% real GDP growth
in 2013), together with moderate corporate and household
leverage, also reduce the risks for the banks.
However, our favorable outlook for Turkish banks could be
threatened if credit growth significantly exceeds our 15%-20%
expectation for a sustained period. We believe aggressive
expansion could challenge banks' underwriting capacity and asset
quality. It could also weaken capital and funding ratios. At the
same time, it could stretch corporate and household balance
sheets, widen the current account deficit and threaten
macroeconomic stability. The stricter reserve requirements may
help to prevent such risks from building up in the banking system
and improve liquidity ratios.
Introducing a leverage ratio requirement is sensible as it
prepares the sector for Basel III implementation. This measure is
noteworthy as being the first macro-prudential policy to be
implemented by the Turkish central bank that addresses individual
banks' balance sheet structures. This normally falls under the
responsibility of the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA). The central bank coordinates these measures with
the BRSA through the financial stability committee established in
2011.
On December 26, 2012, Turkey's central bank announced a new
reserve requirement to be calculated based upon the leverage
ratio of banks. Banks will report their leverage ratios starting
in 2013 for monitoring purposes only. The leverage ratio is to be
calculated by dividing each bank's capital by its total
liabilities and off-balance sheet items, which are subject to
certain weightings.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
ASTOR HOTEL: In Administration, Cuts 25 Jobs
--------------------------------------------
William Telford at Plymouth Herald reports that Astor Hotel has
closed with the loss of 25 jobs, but proprietor Joseph Louei is
still hoping to save the business.
The 54-room hotel, on the Hoe, is now in administration,
mothballed and up for sale, according to Plymouth Herald.
The report relates that administrators said the Astor Hotel had
been making a loss for some time, and it would not have been
commercially viable to trade it in administration during the
winter "low season".
The report says Mr. Louei put the blame on the expense of
fighting two high-profile legal cases, one he won, one he lost.
However, the report discloses that the Iranian-born hotelier, one
of the most colorful characters in Plymouth's business community,
said the business had been trading well, with plentiful bookings,
the report discloses. The report relays that Mr. Louei still
hopes to reopen the three-star hotel, honor bookings and re-
employ staff. But he fears the worst: that the Elliot Street
pile will end up as apartments, the report relates.
Administrators from Grant Thornton were appointed at both the
trading company, the Astor Hotel Limited, and also Joseph Louei
and Sons (Holdings) Limited, which owns the site. This came
after what administrators called the recent failure of the Astor
Hotel Limited's Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), which had
commenced on March 2, the report discloses.
CVAs effectively offer to pay back a company's creditors a
percentage of what they are owed, rather than the full amount,
the report notes.
The report adds that Mr. Louie said he blamed being left out of
pocket after two court battles for his woes.
BARING INSULATION: Goes Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------
Building.co.uk reports that insulation delays in the
implementation of the Green Deal have claimed their first
casualty, according to critics, after insulation installer Baring
Insulation went into liquidation.
Building.co.uk relates that more firms are expected to go under
as they feel the squeeze following the end of government
insulation programmes CERT and CESP at the end of 2012, as well
as the wait for the roll-out of the Green Deal and related Energy
Company Obligation (ECO) scheme, which are scheduled to start at
the end of this month.
The industry had expected the Green Deal to begin in October last
year but Green Deal finance -- the unique element of the scheme
-- will not be available until January 28, the report notes.
According to the report, Richard Moores, managing director of
Baring Insulation, said he chose to take the 33-year old firm,
which employed 24 people, into liquidation on Dec. 18, 2012,
because of a sharp drop off in work in November.
ENVIROLINK NORTHWEST: Placed Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
menmedia.co.uk reports that Envirolink Northwest, a not-for-
profit organisation set up to support the growth of the low-
carbon and environmental goods and services sectors in the
region, has been placed in liquidation with the loss of 19 jobs.
According to the report, Envirolink Northwest ran into cash flow
difficulties as a result of funding cuts and the early closure of
projects.
Bev Budsworth, of business recovery firm The Business Debt
Advisor, has been appointed liquidator, menmedia.co.uk discloses.
"For a limited company that helped support so many businesses and
created jobs in the region, it ultimately failed because it
became increasingly difficult to get sign-off and payment on
European-funded projects. Severe funding cuts also drastically
reduced turnover causing cash flow issues," the report quotes Ms.
Budsworth as saying.
"Saving the business just wasn't possible as there were very few
remaining projects and no sustainable business to sell.
"Envirolink has suffered like many others in the 'not for profit'
sector with government cutbacks affecting many worthy projects."
Set up in 1999, at its peak in 2010 Envirolink Northwest employed
90 staff and turned over GBP6 million. It was funded by the
former Northwest Regional Development Agency, the European
Regional Development Fund, local authorities and industry.
HMV GROUP: Launches Massive Sale to Boost Revenues
--------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that HMV Group has
launched a massive sale in a bid to boost revenues.
According to the Telegraph, the company, which has 238 shops and
5,000 staff in the UK, is also in negotiations with its banks
about an expected breach in debt covenants this month and warned
in December that it faced "material uncertainty" about its
future.
A source close to the company claimed that the promotion -- which
will offer 25% off certain products for the next month -- has
"nothing to do" with the debt negotiations and has been produced
by the marketing team, the Telegraph relates. Although HMV did
not conduct the "blue cross sale" last year, it held a similar
promotion in 2011, the Telegraph notes.
United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of
pre-recorded music, video, electronic games and related
entertainment products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the
retailing of books principally under the Waterstone's brand. The
Company operates in four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV
International, HMV Live, and Waterstone's.
JESSOPS PLC: To Close All 187 Stores; 1,370 Jobs Affected
---------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Russell at The Telegraph reports that Jessops plc is to
close all 187 stores just two days after entering administration.
The loss-making chain decided to call time on its operations
after failing to reach a deal with its suppliers and lenders that
could have seen the company trade from administration, the
Telegraph relates.
The decision means all 1,370 staff at the retailer's stores will
lose their jobs with further redundancies expected at the
company's Leicester headquarters, the Telegraph notes.
"Since my appointment, we have reviewed the position of the
business and held extensive discussions with suppliers around
their support for ongoing trading," the Telegraph quotes Rob
Hunt, the PricewaterhouseCoopers administrator, saying.
"It is apparent that we cannot continue to trade and as a result
we have had to make the difficult decision to begin the closure
of all 187 Jessops stores at the close of business [Fri]day."
Headquartered in Leicester, United Kingdom, Jessops plc --
http://www.jessops.com/-- is a holding company of a group of
companies whose principal activity is the retail of photographic
products and services. It operates via the Internet and through
mail order and telesales. Jessops plc sells a range of digital
and analogue cameras, digital and analogue camcorders,
binoculars, digital home print solutions, memory cards, film and
photographic materials, as well as a range of accessories for the
photographic market, including its own brand products. The
Company also provides developing and printing, and digital
imaging services. The Company is engaged in the business of
selling branded photographic equipment. Its subsidiaries include
Camera Bond Limited, Camera Mezz Limited, Camera Equity Limited,
The Jessop Group Limited, Well Hall (Jersey) Limited, Expert
Imaging Limited, MacKinnons of Dyce Limited and Jessops
Photographic (Ireland) Limited.
MONTGOMERY LITHO: In Liquidation; Haddington Plant to Close
-----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Montgomery Litho Limited has gone into
liquidation.
Liquidators Blair Nimmo -- blair.nimmo@kpmg.co.uk -- and Tony
Friar -- tony.friar@kpmg.co.uk -- of KPMG have paid off 148
employees with immediate effect, BBC relates. The Haddington
plant will close, BBC discloses. According to BBC, they said
they intend to run the Glasgow operation on a smaller scale while
looking for a buyer.
"Montgomery Litho Limited had been facing difficulties following
trading losses and increasing cash flow pressures. The loss of a
major customer together with a continuing reduction in order
levels at a time of declining demand within the UK printing
industry have adversely affected the company," BBC quotes Mr.
Nimmo as saying.
"It is regrettable, but unfortunately necessary, to have to close
operations in Haddington and to implement redundancies both there
and in Glasgow.
"However there remains an excellent opportunity to acquire a
well-known business with a strong customer base and we are
hopeful that a buyer can be found."
Montgomery Litho Limited was Scottish printing business employing
233 people. It had a turnover of GBP19 million.
YORKSHIRE BUILDING: Fitch Lifts Rating on Tier 2 Notes From 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Yorkshire Building Society's
GBP100m 13.5% subordinated contingent convertible Tier 2 notes
due April 1, 2025 (XS0498549194) to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.
The upgrade of the outstanding notes reflects a revision of
Fitch's subordinated and hybrid securities rating criteria and is
not linked to YBS's standalone credit profile. YBS has a Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook,
a Short-term IDR of 'F2', a Viability Rating (VR) of 'bbb+', a
Support Rating of '5' and a Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor'.
These ratings are unaffected by this rating action
According to Fitch's subordinated and hybrid securities rating
criteria, Tier 2 instruments with contractual write-off language
or conversion triggers are likely to be notched between once and
four times from the VR. Given the very low automatic conversion
feature of YBS' convertible issue (5% regulatory core Tier 1
capital) compared with the bank's current core Tier 1 ratio
(12.9%), Fitch has therefore revised its view of the non-
performance of the instrument from 'Average' to 'Minimal' and has
reduced the total notching from three to two notches.
Rating Sensitivities
The rating of YBS' subordinated contingent convertible Tier 2
notes is linked to the bank's VR and is mainly sensitive to a
change in the bank's VR.
* UK: Moody's Says RPI Credit Positive for Regulated Utilities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that the recommendation by the
Office for National Statistics (ONS), to leave unchanged the
formulae used in calculating the Retail Prices Index (RPI), is
credit positive for UK regulated utilities. The decision reduces
uncertainty and removes the risk of negative financial
consequences brought about by a change in methodology.
Under the regulatory framework, allowed revenue and the
Regulatory Asset Value (RAV) are both linked to RPI and a lower
calculated value may have likely resulted in weaker financial
ratios for companies, a credit negative, as they are
predominantly financed with fixed-rate debt. UK regulated
utilities are also among the biggest issuers of index-linked
bonds, which could have been affected as clauses that protect
bondholders from adverse changes to an index may have been
activated.
In October 2012, the ONS published a consultation outlining three
possible changes to the calculation of the RPI index, which all
involved the replacement of Carli, an arithmetic approach to
calculating averages. The ONS argued that the use of Carli
resulted in a 50-100bps difference between RPI and the Consumer
Prices Index (CPI), known as the 'formula effect.' On Jan. 10,
the ONS acknowledged that while Carli does not meet current
international standards its properties are well understood and
there is significant value to users in continuing the RPI's long
time series. The ONS did, however, recommend that a new RPI-based
index be developed (called RPIJ), which uses a replacement
formula (Jevons) instead of Carli. Moody's believes that at this
stage it is unclear what practical use this new index will have,
other than for informational purposes. Following the ONS'
announcement, HM Treasury said that index-linked gilt cash flows
will continue to be calculated by reference to the RPI.
While the ONS' decision not to implement any of its proposed
changes is surprising, Moody's views the development as positive
for the sector and reinforces its assessment of the stability and
predictability of the UK regulatory framework, which includes the
political environment in which companies operate.
In December 2012, Moody's published a report entitled "Possible
Change in the Calculation of RPI Would be Credit Negative."
Subscribers can access this report via this link:
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_147542
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 7 to January 11, 2013
----------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *