TCREUR_Public/130204.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, February 4, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 24

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings on EUR425MM Bonds


B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: Seeks ECB Financing Exit; Mulls EUR40-Bil. Loan


C Y P R U S

BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
* CYPRUS: Sr. Creditors Won't Bear Losses Under Bank Rescue Plan


G E R M A N Y

TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
WILBERT TOWER: Goes Into Administration


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on EUR21MM Cl. E Notes
B&Q: Puts Irish Operations Into Administration
SIBUR SECURITIES: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Sr. Unsec. Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Feb. 20 Hearing Set for Consob's Rescue Challenge
BANCA MONTE: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
CLASSIFIED DIRECTORIES: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
GRUPPO RIVA: Mulls Recapitalization to Prop Up Ilva Steel Plant


N E T H E R L A N D S

AVOCA CLO II: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
HARBOURMASTER CLO 7: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B2 Notes
NXP BV: Moody's Rates Proposed Sr. Unsecured Notes Offering 'B3'
NORD ANGLIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'

SNS BANK: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'E'
SNS REAAL: Real Estate Losses Prompt EUR3.7-Bil. Nationalization
STORM 2013-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes


P O L A N D

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Defends Revised Deal, Blasts Kaufman Suit


R U S S I A

HMS HYDRAULIC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term corp. Credit Rating
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: Moody's Withdraws 'E' Standalone BFSR


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR: Fitch Places 'B-' Pref. Share Rating on Watch Pos.
NARA CABLE: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR250MM Sr. Secured Notes
REPSOL INT'L: Fitch Affirms BB- Hybrid Capital Instrument Rating


S W E D E N

VERISURE HOLDING: S&P Rates New EUR100MM Tap on Secured Notes 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

2E2: Daisy Group Among Potential Bidders for Businesses
BAGGALEY CONSTRUCTION: Goes Into Administration
BLOCKBUSTER: Administrator Fights to Save Jobs at Stores
GLOBAL ENDURO: In Administration on Current Economic Climate
HMV GROUP: Up to 100 Shops Face Closure This Week

JESSOPS PLC: WM Morrison Buys Seven Stores From Administrators
MANGANESE BRONZE: Geely Acquires Business for GBP11 Million
NORD ANGLIA: Moody's Rates New US$150-Mil. Notes '(P)Caa2'
NORD ANGLIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


X X X X X X X X

* Global Housing Markets Face Different Outlooks, FitchVoice Says
* Fitch Says Foreign Bank Rules May Cut Growth of Global Banks
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 28 to February 1, 2013


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
=============


EUROPEAN INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings on EUR425MM Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term
issue ratings on EUR425 million in floating-rate senior secured
bonds due 2039 and a EUR350 million floating-rate senior secured
loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) due 2038.
Luxembourg-registered Ostregion Investmentgesellschaft Nr. 1 S.A.
(Ostregion), a special-purpose vehicle for the financing of an
Austrian road project, is the issuer.  At the same time, S&P
removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with
negative implications on Aug. 8, 2012.  The outlook is negative.

The '2' recovery rating, indicating S&P's expectation of
substantial recovery (70%-90%) in a default scenario, is not
affected.

The bonds and the loan benefit from an unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee of payment of scheduled interest and
principal from Ambac Assurance U.K. Ltd. (Ambac; not rated).

Under Standard & Poor's criteria, a rating on monoline-insured
debt reflects the higher of the rating on the monoline insurer,
if any, or Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR) on the
debt.  Therefore, the current rating on the bonds and the loan
reflects the SPUR.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, although the project is
unlikely to benefit from Austrian Roads Agency Autobahnen- und
Schnellstrassen-Finanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft's (ASFINAG)
minimum-traffic guarantee as a result of the recently reached
agreements, the full exposure to volume risk is partly offset by
the project's strong liquidity retention owing to the deferral of
mezzanine debt service under weak operating performance.  This,
in S&P's opinion, makes Ostregion's credit quality comparable
with peers rated at the same level.  The affirmation also
reflects the relatively healthy traffic growth in 2012 (5% year
on year), which is above S&P's initial expectations, although
total traffic remains considerably below the sponsor's original
expectations to which the debt was sized.

The proceeds of the bonds and loan are being used to finance the
Ostregion Package, a 33-year public-private partnership
concession to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain a 52-
kilometer stretch of motorway to the north of the City of Vienna.
The proceeds were lent to Bonaventura, the project
concessionaire.  The concession grantor and offtaker is ASFINAG.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that, absent top-up
payments from ASFINAG and the road's relatively weak traffic
performance and prospects, the debt service coverage ratio may
fall below 1.05x in certain years, leaving the project reliant on
the lenders' willingness to waive the contractual default.  S&P
could lower the rating by one or more notches if it sees
increasing risk of the above happening on the back of subdued
traffic growth and capture from feeder roads, high performance
penalties, or cost slippage.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it expects the traffic
to remain at a level that allows for debt service coverage ratios
slightly above 1.05x.



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B E L G I U M
=============


DEXIA SA: Seeks ECB Financing Exit; Mulls EUR40-Bil. Loan
---------------------------------------------------------
James Fontanella-Khan at The Financial Times reports that Dexia
SA is trying to borrow EUR40 billion from global investment banks
as the thrice bailed-out Franco-Belgian lender seeks to cut its
dependency on the European Central Bank's financial support.

The FT relates that Dexia Chief Executive Karel De Boeck said in
an interview with a Belgian newspaper on Thursday that the
stricken lender wanted to return to the market and gradually stop
receiving "Eurosystem" financing.

According to the FT, Mr. De Boeck told the French-language L'Echo
that "[t]he exercise will be to see how Dexia can issue EUR40
billion in the markets at a lower price."

Dexia, as cited by the FT, said that the process would take
several years and that the new private sector loans would not
start trickling in before the end of this year.

Dexia, once the world's largest municipal lender, has been one of
the European banks worst affected by the US subprime mortgages
meltdown and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the FT
discloses.

France and Belgium agreed in November to bail out Dexia for the
third time in four years, injecting EUR5.5 billion of fresh
capital into the bank, the FT recounts.

Analysts said that once Dexia kicked off its global roadshow in
the spring it would have a good chance of attracting fresh
private sector backing as up to EUR85 billion of its loans are
guaranteed by France, Belgium and Luxembourg, which has a smaller
stake in the bank, the FT notes.

"They have good chances of raising money because they have
guarantees from the French, Belgian and Luxembourgish governments
-- all these countries have good ratings so the risk is on the
sovereign not on the private sector banks," the FT quotes
Matthias De Wit, analyst at Petercam, as saying.

"Dexia is a systemic bank. As the crisis has shown, whenever the
bank has been in trouble it has been helped.  They will never let
it default due to the systemic implications that its collapse
would have on the broader economy."

Dexia SA is a Belgium-based banking group with activities
principally in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Turkey in the
fields of retail and commercial banking, public and wholesale
banking, asset management and investor services.  In France,
Dexia Bank focuses on funding public sector bodies and providing
financial services to local government.  In Luxembourg, Dexia
operates in two main areas: commercial banking (for personal and
professional customers) and private banking (for international
investors).  In Turkey, Dexia is involved in retail and
commercial banking and offers services to ordinary account
holders, business and local public sector customers and
institutional clients. The Company operates through its
subsidiaries, such as Dexia Credit Local, DenizBank, Dexia
Credicop, Dexia Sabadell, Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland, Dexia
Asset Management, among others.



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Bank of Cyprus', Cyprus Popular
Bank's and Hellenic Bank's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRS) and Support Rating Floors (SRFS) to 'B' from 'BB-' and
Support Ratings to '4' from '3' following the downgrade of
Cyprus' sovereign rating. The Outlooks on the banks' Long-term
IDRs are Negative in line with that of the sovereign. Fitch has
affirmed all three banks' Short-term IDRs at 'B'.

The three banks' Viability Ratings (VR), which are at very low
levels primarily due to asset quality-driven capitalization
concerns, are unaffected by the sovereign rating action.

In line with Fitch's criteria, Recovery Ratings (RR) have been
assigned to banks' senior debt issues. The RR on senior notes is
'RR4'.

SENSITIVITIES/RATING DRIVERS:
IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATINGS AND SRFs

The downgrade of BOC, CPB and HB's Long-term IDRs, which remain
at their SRFs, and of their senior debt and Support Ratings is a
consequence of the downgrade of Cyprus' sovereign rating. The
sovereign downgrade indicates a weakening of the sovereign's
ability to provide extraordinary support to its banks.

In the near term, lingering uncertainty exists over the timing
and details of an official financing program for Cyprus,
including in respect of banking sector support/recapitalization
costs. However, Fitch expects such a program will be agreed
before June 3 and that it will provide financing for the
recapitalization of the banking system. This recapitalization
cost could be up to EUR10 billion, although Fitch anticipates
that this figure may include a degree of headroom. Fitch will re-
assess the major Cypriot banks' VRs, including in relation to the
current level of their IDRs, after recapitalization.

Fitch currently considers sovereign and bank risks as being
closely interconnected in Cyprus. A lack of progress in
negotiations with Troika would put the receipt of a support
program to address Cypriot banks' recapitalization needs at risk.

Fitch incorporates in its assessment of support propensity for
the three rated Cypriot banks i) their systemic importance in the
domestic economy; ii) the limited amount of bail-inable senior
debt compared to potential recapitalization needs; and iii) the
precedent of support for senior bank creditors in other Eurozone
bank bail-outs during this crisis. Fitch does not rate any of the
banks' junior liabilities.

The Negative Outlooks indicate that any further downgrade of
Cyprus's sovereign rating would be likely to lead to a further
downgrade of the banks' Long-term IDRs, senior debt ratings and
SRFs. In addition, any development that reduced the likelihood of
international support for bank senior creditors would be likely
to lead to a further downgrade of these ratings.

Fitch revised upwards potential losses and capital needs for the
three largest Cypriot banks by stressing further some of the
variables. In addition to the EUR1.8 billion injection into CPB
by the government in July 2012, Fitch assesses that the three
major Cypriot banks are likely to need further capital injections
of at least EUR4.8 billion under a base case scenario (which
requires a Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio of 9%) and EUR6.6
billion in the adverse case (which requires a FCC of 6%). These
amounts are, however, within the EUR10bn capital backstop
facility, leaving some buffer to support the cooperative banks.
Fitch acknowledges that its estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty and are sensitive to changes in assumptions.

SENSITIVITIES/RATING DRIVERS:
RECOVERY RATINGS

A 'RR4' has been assigned to BOC's and CPB's senior debt issues,
which reflects average recovery prospects. RRs are sensitive to
various factors, most importantly valuation and availability of
free assets and the mix of unsecured and secured liabilities.

The ratings actions are:

BOC
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'BB-'; Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating unaffected at 'c'
Support Rating downgraded to '4' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised to 'B' from 'BB-'
Senior notes downgraded to 'B'/RR4 from 'BB-'
Commercial paper affirmed at 'B'

CPB
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'BB-'; Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating unaffected at 'c'
Support Rating downgraded to '4' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised to 'B' from 'BB-'
Senior notes downgraded to 'B'/RR4 from 'BB-'

HB
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'BB-'; Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating unaffected at 'cc'
Support Rating downgraded to '4' from '3'
Support Rating Floor revised to 'B' from 'BB-'

The rating impact, if any, from the above rating actions on the
banks' covered bonds will be detailed in a separate comment.


* CYPRUS: Sr. Creditors Won't Bear Losses Under Bank Rescue Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Corina Ruhe at Bloomberg News reports that Cypriot Finance
Minister Vassos Shiarly said senior creditors won't be forced to
take losses in a proposed rescue of Cyprus' banks.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Shiarly said in an interview with The
Hague late on Thursday that only junior bondholders will face
losses in the bailout of Cyprus's lenders, which may need about
EUR10 billion (US$13.7 billion) of fresh capital.  He said that
senior creditors and depositors won't be touched, Bloomberg
relates.

"The recapitalization of the banks includes the bailing-in of
bondholders," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Shiarly as saying.  The terms
of the bank rescue are under consideration as authorities await a
final report from Pacific Investment Management Co. on Cypriot
lenders' capital needs, Bloomberg discloses.  "But I think it
concluded as a matter of principle the bailing-in of junior
bondholders," Mr. Shiarly, as cited by Bloomberg, said.

Cyprus is negotiating with the European Commission, European
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund over the size and
terms of a rescue for the government and lenders weakened by
their exposure to the Greek economy, Bloomberg discloses.
Cypriot financial institutions such as Bank of Cyprus Plc and
Cyprus Popular Bank Plc lost more than EUR4 billion in a debt
restructuring that was part of a second rescue of Greece,
Bloomberg states.

Mr. Shiarly said that most junior bondholders are individuals in
Cyprus, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Shiarly said that the Pimco report
was expected to be ready as soon as Feb. 1 and an aid package may
be concluded in March.  Cyprus's bailout may amount to EUR17.5
billion, of which the government would get as much as EUR7
billion to pay its bills and refinance debt, Bloomberg says.

Mr. Shiarly reiterated Cyprus's hope that its banks will
eventually qualify retroactively for direct aid from the European
Stability Mechanism, the euro area's permanent rescue fund,
allowing the loans to be moved from the sovereign balance sheet
to the banks, Bloomberg relates.

Cypriot President Demetris Christofias appealed for retroactive
direct bank aid in a Jan. 11 letter to European Commission
President Jose Barroso, Bloomberg recounts.

Mr. Shiarly said so-called private-sector involvement has been
ruled out on Cypriot government debt in bailout talks with the
euro area and IMF, Bloomberg notes.



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G E R M A N Y
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TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Taurus CMBS Germany (2006-1) plc's
class A and B notes, as:

  EUR204.5m class A (XS0257712579) downgraded to 'BBsf' from
  'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR29.9m class B (XS0257714435) downgraded to 'CCCsf' assigned
  Recovery Estimate 'RE'75% from 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

  EUR18.8m class C (XS0257715242) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RE0%'

  EUR16.6m class D (XS0257715838) affirmed at 'Csf'; 'RE0%'

The downgrades are primarily due to Fitch's negative view of the
recovery prospects of the EUR44.1 million Norman (Bremen) and the
EUR119.7 million Bewag loans which account for 60.7% of the pool.

The Bewag loan is secured by a single let office building located
in Berlin, Germany. Due to the collateral's secondary location
and quality, the loan is highly exposed to occupational risk,
with Vattenfall AB ('A-'/Stable) the sole occupier on a lease
expiring in October 2017. Additionally, the property suffers from
a high level of over-rentedness with the current rental income
representing 137% of the estimated rental value. Fitch believes
this asset is unlikely to attract investors' interest, as
reflected in the agency's estimated loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of
115.4% for the securitized portion and 143.6% for the entire
financing. Fitch expects the loan to suffer significant losses.

The Norman (Bremen) loan is secured by a shopping center in
Vegesack, near Bremen, Germany. Since the last review, the
borrower has filed for insolvency as the B-note lenders did not
agree to the terms of a loan extension. Therefore, the servicer
has opted to market the property for sale. The collateral was
revalued at EUR40.4 million as of October 2012, down from the
EUR47.4 million appraisal in June 2010. This decline in value can
largely be attributed to the high level of structural vacancy
along with further expected lease terminations, which is likely
to increase the vacancy ratio to 20.3% from 13.3% over the next
three months. The deteriorating income profile, in absence of
strong retail space demand for secondary German locations, acts
to suppress market value and limit future recoveries. Fitch
market value remains more conservative than the reported market
value (A-note Fitch LTV is 124.0%, whilst reported is 109.2%).

In addition, the Walzmuhle loan defaulted at maturity in January
2013 and was transferred to special servicing. The loan's
collateral comprises a two-storey multi-let shopping center
located in Ludwigshafen. The shopping center is anchored by Metro
AG ('BBB'/Negative) which provides 80% of the income on a lease
expiring in December 2019. Fitch A-note LTV stands at 97.9% and
the agency believes that an orderly refinancing will be
challenging.

In Fitch's opinion, a sale of the Bremen and the Bewag properties
would most likely see the complete write-down of the class C and
D notes and a partial write down of the class B notes. Whilst
principal on the notes is currently distributed on a modified
pro-rata basis, a default of the Bewag loan at maturity, or loss
allocation on other facilities currently in workout, will trigger
a switch to sequential pay-down.

Taurus CMBS Germany (2006-1) plc is a securitization of five
(originally nine) commercial mortgage loans secured by 14
commercial properties (originally 35) located throughout Germany.
Four loans were originated by Merrill Lynch International Bank
Limited and Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Bank Limited, and five
by Capmark Bank Europe plc. The aggregate note balance is
EUR269.9 million versus EUR571.1 million at closing.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the
transaction.


WILBERT TOWER: Goes Into Administration
---------------------------------------
Alex Dahm at khl.com reports that Wilbert Tower Cranes GmbH in
Waldlaubersheim has gone into administration with the
implementation of insolvency proceedings.

Insolvency lawyer Martin Lambrecht will continue to operate the
company with all 129 employees, a statement read, according to
khl.com.

The report relates that unaffected by the bankruptcy proceedings
are the separate companies Wilbert Crane Service GmbH in
Stromberg and Wilbert Montage GmbH in Warmsroth, Germany.

Lambrecht, from the law firm Leonhardt of Dsseldorf, said, "For
customers and suppliers, it is important that the operation
continues undisturbed.  Also, I want to emphasize that neither
Wilbert Crane Service GmbH nor for the Wilbert assembly GmbH are
involved in a bankruptcy application," the report notes.

Wilbert Crane Service GmbH is a tower crane manufacturer Wilbert.



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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on EUR21MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avoca CLO VIII Ltd as:

  EUR295.9m class A1 (ISIN XS0312372112): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR52.6m class A2 (ISIN XS0312377772): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR34.0m class B (ISIN XS0312378747): affirmed at 'AAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR30.0m class C (ISIN XS0312379984): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
  Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR21.5m class D (ISIN XS0312380305): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR21.5m class E (ISIN XS0312380727): affirmed at 'Bsf';
  Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR4.0m class U (ISIN 0312381451): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
  revised to Stable from Negative

The affirmations reflect the stable performance and quality of
the underlying portfolio since last review in February 2012, and
the credit enhancement available for the notes commensurate with
the present rating levels.

95.5% of the portfolio is comprised of senior secured loans. The
pool experienced a positive rating migration since the last
review with a smaller 'CCC+' and below bucket and the pool's
Fitch weighted average rating improved to 35.91 from 34.18 last
year. The largest industry represented in the pool is currently
Business Services with 12.3% of the total outstanding balance.

The notes' Outlook for classes C, D, E and U have been revised to
Stable from Negative to reflect the favorable maturity profile of
the pool with no significant concentration in assets maturing in
2013 and 2014, totaling 0.31% and 8.6% respectively, and the
positive cushions of available credit enhancement at the current
rating stresses.

The affirmation of the rating on class U combination notes
reflects the affirmation of the ratings of its components,
classes D and E.

In the analysis of the transaction, the agency considered the
sensitivity of the notes' ratings to the exposure to countries
where Fitch has imposed a country rating cap lower than the
ratings on any notes in the transaction. These countries are
currently Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, but may include
additional countries in case of sovereigns rating migration. As
per the result of this analysis, Fitch believes that the current
notes' ratings will not face a material negative impact in case
of an exposure of up to 15%, under the same average portfolio
profile and assuming that the current ratings on the UK and
eurozone are stable.

Avoca CLO VIII is a securitization of primarily senior secured
loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine loans and high yield bonds,
actively managed by Avoca Capital Holdings. The transaction is
under its reinvestment period until October 2014.


B&Q: Puts Irish Operations Into Administration
----------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Irish operations of home improvements
retailer B&Q said it was granted court protection to allow for a
restructuring aimed at stemming "unsustainable losses."

B&Q, a subsidiary of Europe's biggest home improvements retailer
Kingfisher, was placed into examinership, a process akin to
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States and
administration in Britain, it said in a statement, according to
Reuters.

The report relates the company said that the chain will continue
to operate its nine stores and its suppliers and 690 employees
will continue to be paid.  It said at least two stores will
likely close, Reuters notes.

"Losses in the Irish market can no longer be sustained by the
company, and it is hoped that a restructuring via examinership
will provide for the potential for survival of some part of the
business," the statement said, the report discloses.

B&Q's Irish rival Atlantic Home Care, a subsidiary of Grafton
Group, entered examinership last year after the collapse of the
country's housing boom caused its revenue to fall by almost half,
the report adds.


SIBUR SECURITIES: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Sr. Unsec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned SIBUR Securities Limited's issue of
guaranteed 3.914% notes due 2018 for the aggregate amount of
US$1,000 million a final senior unsecured 'BB+' rating. The Notes
are unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by JSC SIBUR
Holding (OAO SIBUR Holding, SIBUR, 'BB+'/Stable).

The rating action follows a review of the final documentation
materially conforming to the draft documentation reviewed when
Fitch assigned the expected 'BB+(EXP)' rating on Jan. 17, 2013.

KEY DRIVERS:

- SIBUR Borrower/Guarantor of the Notes

SIBUR Securities Limited (the Issuer), the issuer of the bonds,
is an Ireland-based private limited liability company established
for this sole purpose. The notes will benefit from an
unconditional and irrevocable guarantee from OAO SIBUR Holding
(the Guarantor). The guarantee will be a senior unsecured
obligation of OAO SIBUR Holding and will rank equally in right of
payment with all its existing and future senior unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations.

- SIBUR's Senior Unsecured Notes

Proceeds will be used for short-term debt refinancing and general
corporate purposes. Covenants apply to the issuer, the Guarantor
and certain subsidiaries and include a negative pledge (with
permitted liens) and limitation on incurrence of indebtedness
with a total proforma debt-to-consolidated EBITDA ceiling of
3.5:1. Events of defaults include cross default or cross
acceleration to the debt of the Issuer, the Guarantor or any
material subsidiary with a US$50 million threshold.

- 2012 in line with Base Case

SIBUR's results for 9M12 are roughly in line with Fitch's base
rating case with top line growth of 9.6%, reflecting single digit
volumes growth, softer demand growth across product portfolio and
the sale of the non-core businesses in late 2011. Profitability
was aided by the latter and margin erosion was limited with
EBITDA margin at 31.8% (Fitch calculation), from 35.8% in 9M11.
Under the base case, high capex and dividend levels translate
into negative free cash flow (FCF). The completion of the Tobolsk
Polymer project is expected in 2013. The 500,000 tonnes of
polypropylene capacity will add value to the group's existing
propane production.

- Adequate Liquidity

Liquidity was adequate at end-Q312 with cash balances of RUR9.2
billion and undrawn committed general corporate purpose
facilities of RUR24.2 billion against maturing short-term debt of
RUB37 billion. At end-Q312 gross debt was broadly flat at RUR81
billion (FYE11: RUR83 billion). Fitch expects net funds from
operations (FFO) leverage to peak in 2012 at 1.5x with a gradual
decrease from 2013 onwards.

- Peak Capex

Fitch's base rating case assumes peak capex spending in 2012 with
funds earmarked for the completion of the Tobolsk complex, the
transhipment facility at Ust-Luga, feedstock infrastructure
projects and the group's contribution towards various joint
ventures. 9M12 capex was RUB48 billion, up from RUB33 billion a
year ago. Other cash requirements in 2012 include dividend
distributions of RUR22 billion for FYE11 and RUR7 billion for
H112, in line with the group's policy (25% of net income). FCF is
expected to be negative in 2012 due to the high investment
levels. The ratings assume that OAO SIBUR Holding will continue
to access long-term funding to refinance upcoming maturity and
finance its expansion plans.

- Non-Core Assets Sold

Cash flow generation benefited from the disposal of the non-core
fertilizer and tyre businesses in December 2011 for RUB47 billion
in aggregate. These accounted for 28% and 13% of revenues and
EBITDA in 2011 (14% margin), respectively, and their sale should
translate into higher margins for SIBUR's continuing operations.

- Competitive Cost Advantage

SIBUR's ratings are supported by its leading position in the
Russian petrochemicals sector, diversified portfolio and access
to associated petroleum gas (APG) which ensures low costs versus
most international peers and underpins its strong operational
cash flow generation over the cycle.

- Industry and Country Risks

SIBUR is exposed to the inherent risks of the petrochemical
industry - price volatility and demand cyclicality. The ratings
are also constrained by the legal and regulatory risks associated
with Russia, where its key assets are located.

RATING SENSITIVITY GUIDANCE:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- Further operational improvements and capacity expansion
   resulting in enhanced scale and product diversification
   and/or portfolio mix

- FFO net adjusted leverage at, or below 1.5x through the cycle

- Sustained positive FCF generation

- Established corporate governance track record from the new
   shareholders

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Material deterioration in the company's cost position or
access
   to low-cost associated petroleum gas

- Sustained negative FCF generation

- Aggressive financial strategy resulting in an increased
   financial burden and FFO adjusted net leverage sustained
   above 2.0x



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Feb. 20 Hearing Set for Consob's Rescue Challenge
--------------------------------------------------------------
Francesca Cinelli and Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News report
that the administrative court for the region of Lazio will hold a
new hearing on a challenge by a consumer group to block
government plans to lend EUR3.9 billion (US$5.3 billion) to Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA.

According to Bloomberg, Pietro Valentini, a lawyer for consumer
association Codacons, on Saturday said that the Bank of Italy
didn't submit its board's opinion on the bank's rescue, adding
the new hearing will be held on Feb. 20.  Mr. Valentini, as cited
by Bloomberg, said that Judge Franco Bianchi will decide today or
tomorrow how to get Bank of Italy's Jan. 26 opinion.

Earlier last week, Codacons filed a claim to the Rome-based court
seeking damages from the central bank and other institutions for
not adequately monitoring Monte Paschi's activities, Bloomberg
relates.

On Saturday, the Bank of Italy said in a statement that it asked
Codacons's request be rejected as "inadmissible and unfounded"
and Codacons to pay damages as they started litigation as a
pretext, Bloomberg notes.  According to Bloomberg, the Bank of
Italy said in the statement that it is available to submit its
opinion to the judge with respect of protection of sensitive
information.

In a separate case, prosecutors in Siena are probing Monte
Paschi's past management for alleged market manipulation, false
accounting, obstructing regulators and fraud related to
structured-financing deals, Bloomberg discloses.

The court also asked officials for the lender and market watchdog
Consob to testify, Bloomberg notes.

Monte Paschi, Bloomberg says, is seeking state aid to bolster its
balance sheet after the bank failed to meet the capital
requirements set by the European Banking Authority.  The lender
is also selling assets and reducing risk and costs in a three-
year plan to restore liquidity, Bloomberg discloses.  According
to Bloomberg, under the government's rescue plan, Monte Paschi
will sell securities, dubbed "Monti bonds" after Prime Minister
Mario Monti, to the government with a 9% coupon that may rise to
as much as 15%.

Monte Paschi Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola said on
Jan. 28 the bank's board will complete the bailout request by
early February, and the Italian Treasury will conclude the
transaction by the end of the month, Bloomberg recounts.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


BANCA MONTE: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'BB' from 'BB+'.

S&P also lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated
notes to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  These ratings remain on CreditWatch,
where S&P originally placed them with negative implications on
Dec. 5, 2012.

S&P lowered the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt to 'CCC'
from 'CCC+' and on its preferred stock to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'.  S&P
also placed these ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term counterparty credit rating on the
bank.

The downgrade follows MPS' recent announcement related to the
investigation of potential losses on three structured
transactions.  S&P has also taken into consideration its review
of the terms and conditions announced on Jan. 22, 2013, for the
EUR3.9 billion of hybrid securities, the so-called Nuovi
Strumenti Finanziarito (NSF) to be issued by MPS and subscribed
by the Italian government by March 1, 2013.

"We believe the above-mentioned investigation could identify
losses larger than originally anticipated.  In our opinion, the
uncertainties related to the magnitude of these potential losses,
and the weaknesses we believe they evidence in MPS' risk
management, are accentuating pressure stemming from the bank's
ongoing financial deterioration, and may negatively affect MPS'
franchise.  We have therefore revised our assessment of MPS'
business position to "moderate" from "adequate," as our criteria
define these terms," S&P said.

"We have reviewed the characteristics of the NFS hybrid debt
instrument that the Italian government (Republic of Italy,
unsolicited BBB+/Negative/A-2) will subscribe with the aim of
supporting MPS' compliance with the European Banking Authority's
capital requirement of a stressed Core Tier 1 ratio of 9%.  We
have assigned these hybrid instruments "intermediate equity
content," as our criteria define the term, taking into account,
among other things, the government-owned nature of these
instruments as well as their loss absorption and permanency
characteristics.  We have, therefore, taken into account these
instruments in our forecast of our risk-adjusted capital (RAC)
ratio for MPS, including an amount of NFS and other eligible
hybrids equivalent to 33% of MPS' adjusted common equity," S&P
added.

"We have incorporated into our assessment of MPS' capital the
expectation of potential meaningful losses related to the three
structured transactions, which could exceed the amounts initially
anticipated.  We have also taken into account the likely impact
of the run-off of MPS' leasing operations, whereas we had
previously factored in a disposal of this business.  In its Jan.
23, 2013, statement, MPS indicated that the EUR500 million of NSF
requested in November 2012 in addition to the EUR3.4 billion of
NFS originally requested in June 2012 would be sufficient to
absorb the negative impact on its regulatory capital ratios
arising from financial, accounting, or operational decisions made
in connection with the three transactions.  Nevertheless, despite
partly incorporating the NFS in our RAC ratio forecast, the
potential and currently uncertain extent of these losses make it
unlikely that our forecast of MPS' RAC ratio would be above the
range between 4% and 5% at year-end 2014," S&P noted.

Therefore, including the impact of the NFS, S&P continues to view
MPS' capital and earnings as "weak" under its criteria.  As a
result, S&P no longer include any uplift for short-term
government support in our assessment of MPS' capital and
earnings.

"Our revised assessment of MPS' business position has led us to
lower our assessment of MPS' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to
'b' from 'b+'.  Our SACP continues to reflect the anchor of 'bbb'
we assign to commercial banks operating in Italy (which is our
starting point for assigning a bank a long-term rating), as well
as our view of MPS' "weak" capital and earnings and risk
position, "below average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity, as
our
criteria define these terms.  The ratings on MPS benefit from a
one-notch uplift over our SACP assessment to recognize that MPS'
ongoing access to European Central Bank funding facilities,
particularly the long-term refinancing operations, should in our
view create time for it to implement plans to rebalance its
funding profile to a more sustainable position," S&P said.

In addition, MPS' ratings also incorporate two notches of
extraordinary government support to reflect our view of the
"moderately high" likelihood that MPS would receive extraordinary
financial support from the Italian government if needed.  This is
because of S&P's view of MPS' "high" systemic importance in
Italy, which S&P classify as "supportive" toward its banking
sector.

According to S&P's methodology, it rates MPS' nondeferrable
subordinated debt two notches below the SACP.  As such, S&P
lowered its rating on MPS' subordinated debt to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.

S&P's lowered its ratings on MPS' Upper Tier 2 debt to 'CCC' from
'CCC+' and on MPS' hybrid Tier 1 securities to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'-
-three and four notches below MPS' SACP respectively--to reflect
S&P's view of the risk of partial or untimely payment.  The 'CCC'
rating on MPS' Upper Tier 2 debt is one notch higher than that on
the hybrid Tier 1 securities because of the lower level of
regulatory capital, which would trigger the principal write-down
for the Upper Tier 2 instruments.  S&P understands that the
activation of principal write-down for Upper Tier 2 issues can
only occur when capital has gone below the minimum level required
by law.

The CreditWatch mainly reflects S&P's view of the potential
negative impact on MPS' financial profile of possible higher
losses on the above-mentioned structured transactions.  Given the
risk management weaknesses that they reveal in S&P's view, the
CreditWatch also reflects the possibility S&P sees that other
sources of risk could be identified by the current investigation.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement when it believes
it has sufficient visibility on the impact of the three
transactions on MPS' financials and on any additional sources of
risk that could significantly affect the bank's financial
profile.  S&P will also monitor MPS' ability to preserve the
stability of its funding and liquidity position under current
market conditions.

S&P could lower the long-term rating on MPS in particular if
additional losses arise resulting in S&P's lowering of MPS'
forecast RAC ratio to below 4%, or if S&P saw that other
meaningful risks that could contribute to further deterioration
in MPS' financial position emerged following the investigation.

The CreditWatch on MPS' subordinated debt reflects the
possibility that S&P could lower the SACP.  In addition to this
factor, the CreditWatch on MPS' on junior subordinated debt and
preferred stock also reflects the possibility that European
authorities and the Italian regulator might impose restrictions
on coupon payments in the context of the approval of the plan for
banks receiving state aid.

S&P could affirm the ratings and remove them from CreditWatch if,
all else being equal, S&P believed that MPS were able to absorb
the potential losses that could be identified in the
investigation currently underway without triggering further
weakening of S&P's assessment of its capitalization.  An
affirmation would also hinge on S&P's views that the bank's risk
profile was not likely to be further negatively affected by other
significant risks.


CLASSIFIED DIRECTORIES: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CC' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Italy-based classified directories publisher SEAT
PagineGialle SpA (SEAT).

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'D' (default) from 'CC' its
issue rating on SEAT's EUR750 million senior secured notes and
EUR65 million new senior secured notes, both due in 2017.  The
recovery ratings on these instruments remain unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'CC' issue rating on SEAT's
EUR686 million new senior secured facilities (including a new
EUR90 million revolving credit facility).  The recovery rating on
the senior secured facilities remains unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in
the case of a default.

The downgrade follows SEAT's nonpayment of the EUR42.3 million of
interest on its 2017 senior secured bonds.  The payment was due
on Jan. 31, 2013.  Furthermore, S&P do not believe that the group
will make the payment within the next five business days, because
S&P understands that it is evaluating the sustainability of its
capital structure as a result of a reassessment of the business.

Under S&P's criteria, it considers the extension of a due payment
of interest or principal as tantamount to a default if the
payment falls later than five business days after the scheduled
due date.  This is irrespective of any grace period stipulated in
the debt documentation.

"It is our understanding that SEAT is still up-to-date with its
payments on its senior secured bank facilities.  The next payment
on these facilities is due on Feb. 6, 2013.  We could lower the
rating on SEAT to 'D' (default) if it fails to pay substantially
all of its financial obligations on its outstanding debt when
these fall due," S&P said.

"SEAT announced its decision to suspend its interest payments on
the senior secured bonds on Jan. 28, 2013.  The timing of SEAT's
decision was unexpected.  We believe that SEAT had sufficient
liquidity to make the interest payment on its 2017 bonds on the
due date with reported balance-sheet cash of approximately
EUR200 million on Dec. 31, 2012. (More than EUR90 million of this
cash is at SEAT's subsidiary Telegate AG and not immediately
available for debt service).  Nevertheless, we take a strict view
of any payment deferral.  We consider an extension of a due
payment of interest or principal as equivalent to a debt
restructuring below par by a distressed issuer, and therefore as
tantamount to a default," S&P added.


GRUPPO RIVA: Mulls Recapitalization to Prop Up Ilva Steel Plant
---------------------------------------------------------------
Chiara Remondini at Bloomberg News reports that Gruppo Riva
Chairman Bruno Ferrante said the company may seek new investors
and raise capital at its Ilva steel plant, which was partially
shut by prosecutors probing environmental violations.

Mr. Ferrante, who met with government officials on Thursday
night, said in an e-mailed statement that the company is "working
on a financial-sustainability plan" that would allow it to carry
out environmental improvements at the site, Bloomberg relates.
According to Bloomberg, he said that to implement the plan, Ilva
needs "a certain regulatory framework," which is currently
unclear due to the action of the judiciary.

Prosecutors in July ordered the seizure of about US$2 billion of
Ilva assets and demanded the arrest of some top executives on
suspicion they knowingly neglected environmental controls at the
plant in Taranto, Italy, contributing to high cancer rates in the
area, Bloomberg recounts.  Milan-based Riva denies responsibility
for health issues in the region, Bloomberg states.  Mr. Ferrante
asked prosecutors last month to release the steel stocks so the
company can pay workers and make environmental improvements,
Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Ferrante said in Thursday's statement the company has the
resources to pay January wages, Bloomberg notes.  Previously Ilva
officials had said it could pay salaries only if assets were
released, Bloomberg recounts.  The company was set to meet labor
unions in Taranto last Friday, Bloomberg discloses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 22,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Prime Minister Mario Monti's
government issued a decree in December reopening the Ilva
steelworks plant.  The prosecutors have appealed to the country's
Constitutional Court, Bloomberg disclosed.  A Riva official, who
declined to be identified because the company's finances are
private, said the company, which has been paying its 12,000
workers since production ceased, is now running out of cash.  It
may be forced to close the plant if it can't reach an agreement
with its labor unions, Bloomberg noted.  The Riva fortune first
came under threat in July, when Patrizia Todisco, a judge in
Taranto, accused the family of not installing filters and other
safety measures that would have prevented the release of toxins
that induced some kinds of cancer into the air, Bloomberg
recounted.  In court documents, Judge Todisco, as cited by
Bloomberg, said the company had not lived up to earlier promises
to clean up its operations.  She shut down the plant, Bloomberg
related.  Judge Todisco has asked the company to pay EUR3 billion
to clean up the Taranto air, Bloomberg disclosed.  A Riva
official said that the company, which is fighting the charges,
has made a counter offer to the court for the environmental clean
up, Bloomberg noted.  The closing of the plant, which supplies a
third of the country's steel, has set off a conflict in the city
of 190,000 between the unions, who are worried about job losses,
and the community groups, who are concerned about public health,
Bloomberg noted.  It also ignited a fight between Mr. Monti and
Italian prosecutors, who want to keep the plant closed, Bloomberg
said.

Gruppo Riva SpA is Italy's largest steel producer.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AVOCA CLO II: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all classes of Avoca CLO II B.V.'s notes.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised our rating on the class A-1 notes;

   -- Lowered our ratings on the class B, C-1, and C-2 notes;

   -- Affirmed our ratings on the class A-2 and D notes, and on
      the class P, R, and T combination notes; and

   -- Withdrawn our rating on the class S combination notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance based on the trustee payment date report (dated Jan.
3, 2013), S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, and recent
transaction developments.  S&P has applied its 2012 counterparty
criteria and 2009 cash flow criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Jan. 5, 2012,
it has observed an increase in the weighted-average spread earned
on the collateral pool to 3.47% from 2.99%.  The transaction's
weighted-average life has reduced to 3.69 years from 4.27 years,
over the same period.

S&P has also observed an increase in credit enhancement for the
class A-1, A-2, and B notes, due to the principal paydown of the
senior notes since the end of the reinvestment period on Jan. 15,
2010.

The proportion of assets that S&P considers to be rated in the
'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has increased in
percentage terms mainly due to the amortization of the pool.
Additionally, assets that S&P considers to be defaulted (assets
rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], and 'D') has increased
since its previous review, both in notional and percentage terms.
This has resulted in decreasing available credit enhancement for
the junior classes of notes (C-1, C-2, and D).

S&P also notes that obligor concentration in the pool has
increased, which is mainly due to the deleveraging of the
transaction.  Additionally, the par value tests for the class D
notes do not comply with the required trigger under the
transaction documents, but the par value tests for all other
classes of notes comply with the required triggers, which is
unchanged since S&P's previous review.

Avoca CLO II is in its post-reinvestment period, since the
reinvestment period ended in January 2010.  S&P has subjected the
capital structure to our cash flow analysis, based on its 2009
cash flow CDO criteria, to determine the break-even default rate
(BDR) at each rating level.  S&P used the reported portfolio
balance that it considered to be performing, the principal cash
balance, the weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.  To help assess the collateral pool's credit
risk, S&P used CDO Evaluator 6.0.1 to generate scenario default
rates (SDRs) at each rating level.  S&P then compared these SDRs
with their respective BDRs.

Taking into account the observations outlined above, S&P
considers that the level of credit enhancement available to the
class A-1 notes (the most senior class in the capital structure)
now supports a higher rating than previously assigned.  S&P has
therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' its rating on
the class A-1 notes.

Although the results of S&P's cash flow analysis suggest higher
ratings for the class A-2, B, C-1, C-2, and D notes, S&P has
lowered its ratings on the class B notes to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BBB
(sf)', and on the class C-1 and C-2 notes to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)'.  In addition, S&P has affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating
on the class A-2 notes and its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class D
notes.  S&P has done so based on the maximum ratings achievable
under the largest obligor test.

The largest obligor test is a supplemental stress test that S&P
introduced in its 2009 cash flow CDO criteria.  This test
addresses event and model risk that might be present in the
transaction and assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (not including excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets, with a flat recovery of 5%.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class P, R,
and T combination notes.  S&P considers that the credit
enhancement levels available to the class P, R, and T combination
notes are commensurate with their current ratings.  The class P
and R combination notes have classes C-2 and D, respectively, as
their components, along with equity as another component.  The
class T combination notes have classes C-1 and D, and equity as
their components.

Based on S&P's counterparty analysis, it has concluded that the
transaction documents for the derivative counterparties--Credit
Suisse International (A+/Negative/A-1), Citibank N.A.
(A/Negative/A-1), and JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (A+/Negative/A-
1)--do not comply with our 2012 counterparty criteria.  S&P has
analyzed the transaction's exposure to the derivative
counterparties and concluded that the derivative exposure is
currently sufficiently limited, so as not to affect the ratings
that S&P has assigned.

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Jan. 5, 2012,
the class S combination notes have decoupled into their component
parts on Oct. 1, 2012.  Therefore, S&P has withdrawn its 'B-
(sf)' rating on the class S combination notes.

Avoca CLO II is a cash flow corporate loan collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                       Rating
                 To                      From

Avoca CLO II B.V.
EUR368.2 Million Floating- and Fixed-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A-1              AAA (sf)                AA+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B                BBB- (sf)               BBB (sf)
C-1              CCC- (sf)               CCC+ (sf)
C-2              CCC- (sf)               CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-2              A+ (sf)
D                CCC- (sf)
P Combo          B- (sf)
R Combo          CCC (sf)
T Combo          CCC+ (sf)

Rating Withdrawn

S Combo          NR                      B- (sf)

Combo--Combination.
NR--Not rated.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 7: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V.'s notes, as:

Class A1 (XS0273833516): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class A2 (XS0273887363): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class A3 (XS0273889229): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

Class A4 (XS0273890664): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class B1 (XS0273891639): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class B2 (XS0273893502): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

Class S2 Combo (XS0273896273): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Negative

Class S4 Combo (XS0273897917): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Negative

Class S5 Combo (XS0273900992): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Negative

The affirmation reflects levels of credit enhancement
commensurate with the ratings and the transaction's stable
performance since the last review in February 2012. The class S2,
S4 and S5 combination notes' ratings have been affirmed in line
with the affirmations of their respective rated component notes.

The credit enhancement on the notes continues to increase due to
structural deleveraging following the end of the re-investment
period in December 2011. The transaction allows for reinvestment
of unscheduled principal proceeds until December 2013 subject to
certain conditions, which are not currently met.

The Fitch weighted average rating factor has improved to 28.8 as
of 31 December 2012 from 29.80 as of the last review, below its
threshold of 30. Assets rated 'CCC' or below are reported at
9.59% of the portfolio, down from 9.78% at the last review.
Currently there are no defaulted assets in the portfolio. The
weighted average life of the portfolio stands at 3.92 years and
there are no long dated assets in the portfolio. All the
overcollateralization tests and the interest coverage test are
passing above their required thresholds with increased cushions.
The weighted average spread on the portfolio continues to
increase reflecting amend and extend activity on the underlying
loans.

The Negative Outlooks on the mezzanine and junior notes reflect
their vulnerability to a clustering of defaults and negative
rating migration in the European leveraged loan market due to the
potential sensitivity to the leveraged loan refinancing wall.

As part of its analysis, Fitch considered the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to the transaction's exposure to countries where
Fitch has imposed a country rating cap less than the ratings on
any notes in the transaction. These countries are currently
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, but may include additional
countries if there is sovereign rating migration. Fitch believes
that exposure of up to 15% of the total investment amount to
these countries, under the same average portfolio profile and
assuming the current ratings on the UK and eurozone countries are
stable, would not have a material negative impact on the notes'
ratings.

Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V. is a securitization of mainly European
senior secured loans with the total note issuance of EUR925
million invested in a target portfolio of EUR900 million. The
portfolio is actively managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe
and advised by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe
Limited.


NXP BV: Moody's Rates Proposed Sr. Unsecured Notes Offering 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 rating with a loss given
default assessment of LGD6 (93%) to NXP B.V.'s proposed senior
unsecured notes offering.

Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded the ratings on NXP's existing
senior secured notes and term loans to B1 (LGD4, 57%) from B2
(LGD4, 62%). In addition, the rating agency has affirmed the
company's corporate family rating (CFR) at B1 and probability of
default rating (PDR) at B1-PD. The outlook on all ratings remains
stable.

The new notes will be issued by NXP B.V. and NXP Funding LLC. NXP
will use the proceeds of the new notes to refinance existing
senior secured term loans. The transaction will lengthen NXP's
debt maturity profile, while the company's total reported debt of
approximately $3.5 billion will remain unchanged following the
refinancing.

Upgrades:

Issuer: NXP B.V.

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to B1 from B2

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Upgraded to a range of LGD4,
57 % from a range of LGD4, 62 %

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B1 from B2

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to a range of
LGD4, 57 % from a range of LGD4, 62 %

Assignments:

Issuer: NXP B.V.

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned B3

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range of
LGD6, 93 %

Affirmations:

Issuer: NXP B.V.

Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

Ratings Rationale:

"Moody's assignment of the B3 rating to NXP's proposed senior
unsecured notes offering reflects that these will rank junior to
the company's existing senior secured debt and its EUR620 million
secured revolving credit facility due March 2017," says Kathrin
Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst for NXP.

The upgrade of the ratings on NXP's existing senior secured notes
and term loans to B1 (LGD4, 57%) reflects the reallocation of
debt in NXP's capital structure. The additional layer of
unsecured debt increases the unsecured debt loss absorption and
the cushion supporting the ratings for secured debt in Moody's
LGD assessment for NXP. As a consequence, NXP's senior secured
instrument ratings are now rated at the same level as the CFR.
NXP's senior secured term loans and senior secured notes share
the security arrangements with NXP's EUR620 million revolving
credit facility due 2017, but rank behind the revolving credit
facility in a liquidation scenario.

NXP's senior secured debt is secured by first-priority liens on
(1) substantially all assets except cash of the issuer and its
guarantor (material wholly owned subsidiaries); (2) the issuer's
equity interests in all material wholly owned subsidiaries; and
(3) any intercompany loans. In its LGD assessment, Moody's has
ranked US$549 million of trade payables as per September 30, 2012
pari passu with the revolving credit facility.

The B1 CFR continues to reflect (1) the high technology risk
inherent to the semiconductor industry and the customized nature
of NXP's products; (2) NXP's fairly short track record of
positive free cash flow generation; and (3) the company's
relatively high leverage compared with other rated semiconductor
companies, as evidenced by adjusted gross debt/EBITDA of 3.9x at
September 30, 2012.

However, more positively, the B1 CFR also factors in NXP's
progress in generating material amounts of positive free cash
flow and in sustaining solid levels of operating performance over
recent quarters. NXP has some cushion in the B1 rating category
to withstand a degree of earnings volatility stemming from
continued weakness in the semiconductor markets and macroeconomic
uncertainty. In addition, the B1 rating positively reflects NXP's
solid short-term liquidity profile. The rating assumes that
management remains committed to further reduce the company's high
gross debt burden of around US$4.1 billion as adjusted by Moody's
at September 30, 2012.

Moreover, the B1 ratings also positively reflect (1) NXP's
established leadership positions in different markets with
different underlying growth drivers, supported by recent design
wins and broadening range of innovative products; and (2) the
company's improved operating flexibility and the US$928 million
in cost reductions achieved through its Redesign Restructuring
program, completed in 2011.

The stable outlook on the ratings continues to reflect Moody's
expectation that despite the more challenging market conditions
and macroeconomic weakness in Europe, NXP will maintain a healthy
liquidity profile and generate positive free cash flow through
the cycle, which the company will apply to debt reduction. This
should enable the company to maintain debt/EBITDA around 3.5x and
EBIT/interest expense above 2.0x through the cycle.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward rating pressure would require (1) sustained profitable
growth at NXP's major division, its HPMS business; and (2) NXP to
maintain or grow market shares and continue to apply positive
free cash flow generation to debt reduction. The rating could be
upgraded if this leads to debt/EBITDA of around 3.0x through the
cycle and if NXP can maintain an ample liquidity cushion to
weather any prolonged industry slowdown.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if (1) NXP
experienced sustained erosion in its revenues; (2) the company
lost market share, as indicated by revenues growing at a lower
rate than both the industry average and its operating margins for
a protracted period; and (3) the company returned to material
negative free cash flow and debt/EBITDA above 4.5x. In addition,
a deterioration in liquidity could result in a rating downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in December 2012.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, NXP B.V.'s High
Performance Mixed Signal and Standard Product solutions are used
in a wide range of applications, including automotive,
identification, wireless infrastructure, lighting, industrial,
mobile, consumer and computing. NXP generated revenues of around
US$4.2 billion in the 12-month period ended September 30, 2012.


NORD ANGLIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Nord Anglia Education
(UK) Holdings PLC (Nord Anglia Education UK).  At the same time
S&P assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Nord
Anglia Education UK's parent, Cayman Islands-based Nord Anglia
Education Inc.  The outlook on both companies is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'CCC+' long-term debt rating to Nord Anglia
Education Inc.'s proposed US$150 million senior payment-in-kind
toggle notes issue with an expected tenor of five years.  S&P has
assigned a recovery rating of '6' to the notes issue, indicating
S&P's expectation of "negligible" (0%-10%) recovery for holders
of the proposed notes in the event of a payment default.

S&P understands that the proposed notes are not underwritten by
the arranger.  The ratings on the pending notes issue are subject
to the successful issuance of this instrument and S&P's review of
the final documentation.  Any change in the amount, terms, or
conditions of the notes issue would have to be reviewed by
Standard & Poor's and could affect the current ratings on the
proposed notes.

"Pro forma the proposed notes issuance, we expect Standard &
Poor's-adjusted EBITDA interest cover of 1.1x and fully adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 10x.  Excluding the remaining $225
million preference shares, we expect these ratios to improve to
1.7x and 6.0x by the fiscal year-end, Aug. 31, 2013.  The
calculation of the interest cover ratios includes the coupon
payments on the proposed notes because we understand that it is
the company's intention to service the interest in cash.  While
we consider this transaction to be aggressive from a creditor's
perspective, given that it is expected to reduce Nord Anglia
Education UK's capacity to generate free cash flow, we think that
the impact on the capital structure and on the corporate credit
rating is limited.  This is also because we expect that the
company will sustain positive free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation, even in a less benign economic environment," S&P
said.

Nord Anglia Education Inc. intends to use the proceeds of the
proposed US$150 million notes to repay US$141 million of the
preference shares issued by the same entity (the remaining
US$9 million being expensed on transaction fees).  As of Nov. 30,
2012, Nord Anglia Education Inc. had about $366 million of
preference shares outstanding when including accrued interest of
12% per year.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that Nord Anglia
Education Inc. will have enough funds to service the proposed
notes in cash.  S&P would also expect the company to switch to
payment-in-kind interest on the proposed notes in case free cash
flow were to fall below zero.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Nord Anglia
Education UK will continue to generate positive organic top-line
growth and a reported EBITDA margin in excess of 25%.  This is
based on positive dynamics for private schools in the premium
segment in general, and on the continued growth of expatriates
increasing demand for private schools in Nord Anglia Education
UK's key markets, particularly in China.  Moreover, S&P forecasts
that the company will sustain positive FOCF generation even in a
less benign economic environment.

S&P might lower the ratings if large and aggressively priced
mergers and acquisitions transactions or unexpected operating
setbacks caused earnings to decline to the extent that FOCF
generation turned negative.  S&P could also lower the ratings if
adjusted EBITDA interest coverage fell below about 1x, or to
about 1.5x, excluding the noncash interest element from the
preference
shares.

A positive rating action would depend on sustainable deleveraging
to less than 6x on a fully adjusted basis, and the company's
ability to consistently generate positive discretionary cash
flow.  Given the company's highly leveraged capital structure,
S&P considers a near-term positive rating action to be unlikely
under its base case.


SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CC' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Italy-based classified directories publisher SEAT
PagineGialle SpA (SEAT).

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'D' (default) from 'CC' its
issue rating on SEAT's EUR750 million senior secured notes and
EUR65 million new senior secured notes, both due in 2017.  The
recovery ratings on these instruments remain unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'CC' issue rating on SEAT's
EUR686 million new senior secured facilities (including a new
EUR90 million revolving credit facility).  The recovery rating on
the senior secured facilities remains unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in
the case of a default.

The downgrade follows SEAT's nonpayment of the EUR42.3 million of
interest on its 2017 senior secured bonds.  The payment was due
on Jan. 31, 2013.  Furthermore, S&P do not believe that the group
will make the payment within the next five business days, because
S&P understands that it is evaluating the sustainability of its
capital structure as a result of a reassessment of the business.

Under S&P's criteria, it considers the extension of a due payment
of interest or principal as tantamount to a default if the
payment falls later than five business days after the scheduled
due date.  This is irrespective of any grace period stipulated in
the debt documentation.

"It is our understanding that SEAT is still up-to-date with its
payments on its senior secured bank facilities.  The next payment
on these facilities is due on Feb. 6, 2013.  We could lower the
rating on SEAT to 'D' (default) if it fails to pay substantially
all of its financial obligations on its outstanding debt when
these fall due," S&P said.

"SEAT announced its decision to suspend its interest payments on
the senior secured bonds on Jan. 28, 2013.  The timing of SEAT's
decision was unexpected.  We believe that SEAT had sufficient
liquidity to make the interest payment on its 2017 bonds on the
due date with reported balance-sheet cash of approximately
EUR200 million on Dec. 31, 2012. (More than EUR90 million of this
cash is at SEAT's subsidiary Telegate AG and not immediately
available for debt service).  Nevertheless, we take a strict view
of any payment deferral.  We consider an extension of a due
payment of interest or principal as equivalent to a debt
restructuring below par by a distressed issuer, and therefore as
tantamount to a default," S&P added.


SNS BANK: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'E'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded SNS Bank's Bank Financial
Strength Rating to E from E+, now equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment of ca (b3 previously). Concurrently, Moody's has also
downgraded to Baa3/Prime-3, from Baa2/Prime-2, and maintained on
review for further downgrade, SNS Bank's senior unsecured and
deposit ratings.

SNS Bank's dated subordinated debt rating was downgraded to Caa3
(from Caa1) on review with direction uncertain and SNS Bank's
EUR200 million Tier 1 security was downgraded to Ca(hyb) from
Caa3(hyb). SNS Bank's EUR320 million Tier 1 security was
confirmed at Ca(hyb).

The Insurance Financial Strength Ratings (IFSRs) of SRLEV and
REAAL Schadeverzekeringen were also downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1
and were maintained on review for further downgrade. SRLEV's
subordinated instruments were downgraded to B1(hyb) from Ba1(hyb)
and placed on review with direction uncertain.

As a result of the action on the operational entities of the
group, the rating agency has also downgraded to Ba2/(P)Not-Prime,
from Baa3/(P)Prime-3, and placed on review for downgrade SNS
REAAL's senior unsecured ratings. Concurrently, SNS REAAL's
subordinated debt rating was downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1, and
placed on review with direction uncertain, while its Tier 1
securities rating was downgraded to Ca(hyb), from Caa2(hyb).

Ratings Rationale:

SNS Bank's Standalone Financial Strength

The action on SNS Bank's BFSR concludes the review initiated on
November 2012, and reflects Moody's assessment of a very high
likelihood that extraordinary public support will be needed to
achieve a solution which will address the very serious problems
posed by the weak and deteriorating asset quality of the bank's
Property Finance division, in order to allow SNS Bank to remain a
going concern over the rating horizon. While receipt of
extraordinary support would likely strengthen the bank's
financial position going forward, its baseline credit assessment
has, for now, been moved to 'ca' to reflect Moody's expectation
that extraordinary support will be needed.

The SNS REAAL group is continuing to explore scenarios aimed at
addressing the threats posed to its capitalization and
profitability by the risks relating to commercial real estate
exposures in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe incurred in
its Property Finance division. For now, SNS REAAL's efforts
appear to be focused on a scenario that would involve the
participation of private investors in a significant share issue,
supported by some form of liability management exercise. However,
notwithstanding the possible involvement of private sector
investors in such a solution, Moody's considers it is very likely
that some form of extraordinary support by the Dutch authorities
will be needed to complement any such scenario. In addition,
Moody's considers the failure to reach an agreement with private
investors would likely result in the Dutch government extending
extraordinary support by more direct means at some point over the
rating horizon, most likely in the coming months. Therefore,
Moody's now considers that SNS Bank will very probably require
some extraordinary support to remain a going concern over the
rating horizon, consistent with a E/ca standalone financial
strength rating.

SNS Bank's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings

The downgrade to Baa3/Prime-3 of SNS Bank's debt and deposit
ratings was triggered by the action on SNS Bank's standalone
BFSR. The bank's debt and deposit ratings now include 10 notches
of uplift from the BCA, reflecting the very high probability of
support by the Dutch government.

As one of the four largest domestic banks with a domestic-retail
deposit market share of around 11%, Moody's regards SNS Bank as a
systemically important institution in the Netherlands. In
addition, the strong creditworthiness of the government of the
Netherlands (Aaa, negative) provides it with the capacity to
support its banking system, in Moody's view. As such, the rating
agency considers that there is a high likelihood that support
would be forthcoming, which is consistent with SNS Bank's deposit
rating remaining in the investment grade category.

Notwithstanding this, SNS Bank's senior unsecured and deposit
ratings are on review for further downgrade. In Moody's view, the
risk of burden sharing among senior creditors would increase were
multiple rounds of support to be required. The agency notes that,
following the introduction of the Dutch Intervention Act in June
2012, the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Dutch Central Bank
now have a range of options for dealing with troubled financial
institutions, including the transfer of assets and liabilities to
"bridge banks". The review will therefore assess the extent to
which the discussions currently under way within the group result
in a solution which, by providing the bank with the additional
capital required to remove the threat posed by its commercial
real estate portfolio, minimizes the likelihood of further rounds
of support being required. In the event that Moody's concludes
that the solution may not fully resolve the bank's current
challenges, the agency will assess whether it would be
appropriate to move the bank's debt and deposit ratings into
speculative grade.

Insurance Financial Strength Ratings

The downgrade of REAAL Schadeverzekeringen and SRLEV's IFSRs to
Baa2 from Baa1 reflects the weakening credit profile of SNS Bank
and the significant contagion risks between the insurance and the
banking operations of the SNS REAAL group, notably with respect
to its capital, franchise and financial flexibility.

Moody's says that its review of the IFSRs will focus on the risks
to the insurance operations' market position, profitability,
capitalization and access to capital markets, in the context of
the bank's standalone credit profile and the expected role of the
insurance operations within the SNS REAAL group. Moody's says
that a potential decision by SNS REAAL to divest the insurance
operations may limit the risks of contagion from the bank, while
a decision to retain these operations could potentially lead to
further significant downward pressures on the IFSRs, due to the
potential for ongoing contagion for the insurance operations in
that scenario.

SNS REAAL holding company senior debt and short-term debt rating

The downgrade of SNS REAAL's senior and short-term debt ratings
reflect the downgrade of both SNS Bank's senior debt rating and
of the insurance operations' IFSRs, as well as the increasing
risk that holding company creditors may be exposed to any burden
sharing as part of any restructuring.

Moody's review on the senior debt rating of SNS REAAL will focus
on the extent to which systemic support that would be available
to the banking units would benefit the holding company.

Subordinated Debt Ratings

The downgrade of SNS Bank's dated subordinated debt to Caa3 from
Caa1 reflects the high risk posed to holders of these instruments
by the bank's need to obtain additional capital, and the
likelihood of burden sharing that it entails. For example, these
instruments may well be subject to a liability management
exercise as part of the scenarios currently under discussion,
with bondholders being asked to consent to a loss of principal
that would be considered a distressed exchange by Moody's.
Moody's rating also reflects the risk that the instruments may be
transferred to a bridge bank and be subject to credit losses in
the event of direct state intervention.

The rating is on review with direction uncertain, reflecting
Moody's view that a restructuring plan involving private
investors could limit or reduce the risks of burden sharing. On
the downside, the failure to conclude such a plan could lead to
scenarios where these securities may be exposed to higher losses,
potentially through a state-imposed restructuring, as discussed
above.

The downgrade of SNS REAAL's subordinated debt rating to Caa3
from Caa1 mirrors the rating action on SNS Bank's dated
subordinated debt rating. This reflects Moody's opinion that in
any restructuring scenario where burden sharing would be imposed
on the group's creditors or where the group would undertake a
liability management exercise, there would likely be little
differentiation between the treatment of the bank's issued
subordinated debt and that issued by the holding company.

Hybrid Instruments

SNS Bank's EUR200 million Tier 1 notes (ISIN XS0172565482) and
EUR320 million Tier 1 notes (ISIN XS0468954523) are rated
Ca(hyb), consistent with Moody's view of a very high probability
that the instruments will suffer losses as part of any potential
transactions on outstanding instruments announced by the SNS
REAAL group, or in the event that the Dutch state would provide
direct support for the bank and/or the European Commission
imposes burden sharing measures.

The downgrade of SNS REAAL's Capital Securities to Ca(hyb) from
Caa2(hyb) reflects the similar action taken on SNS Bank's hybrid
debt ratings. This also reflects Moody's expectation of minimal
differentiation between the treatment of the bank's hybrid debts
and those issued by the holding company.

The downgrade of the ratings on the hybrid debts issued by SRLEV
to B1(hyb) from Ba1(hyb) reflects the increasing risk that these
hybrids may be included in any burden sharing scenario.
Nonetheless, Moody's continues to view the risk on these
securities as lower than the risk on the hybrids issued by SNS
Bank or by SNS REAAL. The ratings are on review with direction
uncertain, reflecting the uncertainties around the future role of
the insurance operations within the SNS REAAL group. A potential
decision by SNS REAAL to divest the insurance operations may
limit or reduce the risks for SRLEV's hybrid bondholders. On the
downside, a decision to retain these operations could potentially
lead to a downgrade of SRLEV's hybrid debt ratings. The failure
of SNS REAAL to conclude a restructuring plan involving private
investors may also expose these securities to higher losses
through a higher risk of burden sharing.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

SNS Bank:

SNS Bank's standalone credit assessment may benefit from the
finalization of a restructuring plan, provided that Moody's
considers that the measures would effectively (1) restore the
capital of the various group entities and/or immunize the group
against future losses in SNS Bank's legacy Property Finance
portfolio, (2) dissipate the uncertainty on the future of the
group and reduce risks of a potential shift in depositor
confidence, and (3) does not result in the imposition of material
restrictions from the European Commission.

Should Moody's conclude that the restructuring plan to be
announced does not fully address the challenges facing the bank,
and therefore do not fully mitigate the risk of further rounds of
support, the agency will assess whether it would be appropriate
to move the bank's debt and deposit ratings into speculative
grade.

Insurance Entities:

According to Moody's, the IFSRs of the insurance companies could
potentially be further downgraded if the companies' operations
remain within the SNS REAAL group. However, the IFSRs might also
be downgraded if SNS REAAL decides to sell these operations, but
Moody's believes that the sale process would not be executed in a
reasonable short period. In particular, the IFSRs could be
downgraded if Moody's believes that the insurance operations are
likely to be damaged, via a depletion of their capital or through
increased risk taken on their balance sheet, as part of a
restructuring plan. In these scenarios, the ultimate IFSRs of the
insurance operations would become more closely linked to SNS
Bank's standalone credit assessment, leading to a potential
multi-notch downgrade. Conversely, the ratings could be confirmed
if the group expedites a rapid divestment of its insurance
operations.

Holding Company:

The rating agency says that a downgrade of the bank's long-term
ratings or of the insurance entities' IFSRs would likely result
in a downgrade of the holding company's senior debt rating. SNS
REAAL's senior debt rating would also be downgraded if Moody's
concludes that the likelihood of imposition of burden sharing to
holding company senior creditors increases.

Subordinated and hybrid debt instruments:

The ratings on SNS Bank and SNS REAAL's dated subordinated debts
could be upgraded if the SNS REAAL group implements a
restructuring plan involving private investors which would limit
the risks of state intervention and the risks of distressed
exchanges for such instruments. Conversely, the ratings could be
downgraded if Moody's were to consider that the risk of
distressed exchanges has increased, notably if the group fails to
reach an agreement with private investors and needs to resort to
the Dutch state for support.

A downgrade of SRLEV's IFSR would lead to a downgrade of hybrid
debt instruments issued by this entity. Moreover, the hybrid debt
ratings of SRLEV could be downgraded if Moody's believes that the
probability of a coupon deferral or other types of burden sharing
has increased for those instruments.

The following ratings were downgraded and placed on review
direction uncertain:

SNS Bank N.V. -- dated subordinated debt rating to Caa3 from
Caa2;

SNS Bank N.V. -- dated subordinate MTN rating to (P)Caa3 from
(P)Caa2;

SRLEV N.V. -- dated subordinated debt rating to B1(hyb) from
Ba1(hyb);

SRLEV N.V. -- perpetual junior subordinated debt rating to
B1(hyb) from Ba1(hyb);

SNS REAAL N.V. -- subordinated debt rating to Caa3 from Caa1;

SNS REAAL N.V. -- subordinated MTN rating to (P)Caa3 from
(P)Caa1.

The following ratings were downgraded and maintained on review
for further downgrade:

SNS Bank N.V. -- senior unsecured debt rating and long term bank
deposit rating to Baa3 from Baa2;

SNS Bank N.V. -- short-term bank deposit rating and other short-
term ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2;

SRLEV N.V. -- insurance financial strength rating to Baa2 from
Baa1;

REAAL Schadeverzekeringen N.V. -- insurance financial strength
rating to Baa2 from Baa1;

SNS REAAL N.V. -- senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from Baa3;

SNS REAAL N.V. -- senior unsecured MTN rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3;

The following ratings were downgraded and no outlook was
assigned:

SNS Bank N.V. -- bank financial strength rating to E (mapping to
ca) from E+ (mapping to b3);

SNS Bank N.V. -- EUR200 million Tier 1 securities (ISIN
XS0172565482) rating to Ca(hyb) from Caa3(hyb);

SNS REAAL N.V. -- Tier 1 securities rating to Ca(hyb) from
Caa2(hyb);

SNS REAAL N.V. -- short term rating to (P)Not-Prime from (P)P-3.

The following rating was confirmed with no outlook:

SNS Bank N.V. -- EUR320 million Tier 1 securities (ISIN
XS0468954523) rating, at Ca(hyb).

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating SNS Bank N.V. was
Moody's Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in
June 2012.

The principal methodologies used in rating SNS Reaal NV, REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen NV and SRLEV NV were Moody's Global Rating
Methodology for Property and Casualty Insurers Published in May
2010, Moody's Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers
published in May 2010, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating
Insurance Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt Published in
January 2010.


SNS REAAL: Real Estate Losses Prompt EUR3.7-Bil. Nationalization
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maud van Gaal and Martijn van der Starre at Bloomberg News report
that Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said the EUR3.7 billion
(US$5 billion) nationalization of SNS Reaal NV was the only way
to protect savers and the banking system.

"The collapse of SNS would have put both in danger," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Rutte as saying in The Hague on Friday.  "We needed to
intervene."

According to Bloomberg, SNS, which acquired ABN Amro Holding NV's
property-finance unit in 2006, has been hurt by losses on real
estate loans that left it struggling to repay a government
bailout before next year's deadline and bolster capital.  The
finance ministry said that the nationalization affects issued
shares, core Tier 1 capital securities and subordinated bonds,
Bloomberg notes.

SNS shares were suspended in Amsterdam, Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg relates that Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem on
Friday said that while the government will "expropriate" SNS
equity and subordinated debt, senior bondholders won't be
affected.  Senior bonds were quoted higher, Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, Martijn Pols, a spokesman for financial
markets regulator AFM in Amsterdam, on Friday said that trading
in all securities is suspended on regulated markets.  Mr. Pols,
as cited by Bloomberg, said that trading in securities that
weren't expropriated is expected to resume on today, Feb. 4,
adding investors will be notified in an official statement.

The state will inject EUR2.2 billion of capital into SNS Reaal,
write down EUR800 million on its earlier aid package and use
EUR700 million to put the real estate portfolio at arm's length,
Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg notes that the finance ministry said the company's real
estate investments had a book value of 8.55 billion euros at the
end of June.  That compares with SNS Bank's balance sheet of
EUR82.3 billion, Bloomberg states.

SNS said in a separate statement that SNS Chief Executive Officer
Ronald Latenstein, Chief Financial Officer Ference Lamp and
supervisory board Chairman Rob Zwartendijk stepped down,
Bloomberg relates.

The "reason for this decision is that they don't want to and
can't take responsibility for the nationalization scenario,"
Bloomberg quotes SNS as saying.

SNS said that Achmea BV CFO Gerard van Olphen will succeed Mr.
Latenstein immediately, Bloomberg notes.

SNS REAAL NV -- http://www.snsreaal.nl-- is a Netherlands-based
financial services provider engaged in banking and insurance.
The Company's activities are divided into five segments: SNS
Bank, providing banking services both for the retail and small
and medium enterprises, such as mortgages, asset growth and asset
protection, insurance, payments, savings and financing; Property
Finance; Zwitserleven, providing pension insurance services,
mortgages and investment products; REAAL providing life and non-
life insurances; and Group activities.  As of December 31, 2011,
the Company operated through 16 wholly owned subsidiaries, such
as SNS Bank NV, REAAL NV, SNS REAAL Invest NV and SNS Asset
Management NV, among others.


STORM 2013-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Storm 2013-1 B.V.'s RMBS notes final
ratings, as:

EUR150,000,000 Class A1: assigned 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
EUR550,000,000 Class A2: assigned 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable
EUR17,100,000 Class B: assigned 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable
EUR13,100,000 Class C: assigned 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable
EUR14,500,000 Class D: assigned 'BBsf', Outlook Stable
EUR7,500,000 Class E: assigned 'BBsf', Outlook Stable

The final ratings are based on Fitch's assessment of the
underlying collateral, available credit enhancement, the
origination and underwriting procedures used by the seller and
the servicer and the transaction's sound legal structure.

This transaction is a true sale securitization of Dutch
residential mortgage loans, originated and sold by Obvion N.V.
(not rated).  Since May 10, 2012, Obvion is 100% owned by
Rabobank Group ('AA'/Stable/'F1+') and has an established track
record as a mortgage lender and issuer of securitizations in the
Netherlands. This is the 23rd transaction issued under the STORM
series since 2003.

Credit enhancement for the class A notes is 7%, which is provided
by subordination and a non-amortizing reserve fund equal to 1% at
closing. The transaction benefits from an amortizing liquidity
facility of 2% at closing, a build-up of the reserve fund to 1.3%
and an interest rate swap providing an excess margin of 50 basis
points.

The transaction is backed by a three-and-a-quarter-year seasoned
non-revolving portfolio consisting of prime residential mortgage
loans with a weighted-average (WA) original loan-to-market-value
(OLTMV) of 85.8% and a WA debt-to-income ratio (DTI) of 30.8%,
both of which are typical for Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS
transactions. The pool composition is similar to the previous
STORM transactions. The purchase of further advances into the
pool is allowed after closing subject to stringent conditions.

Both the STORM series as well as Obvion's loan book have shown
stable performance in terms of arrears and losses. The 90+ days
arrears of the previous Fitch-rated transactions have been mostly
lower than the Dutch Index throughout the life of the deals.

Rabobank fulfills a number of roles, including collection account
provider, issuer account provider, cash advance facility provider
and commingling guarantor and therefore this transaction relies
strongly on the creditworthiness of Rabobank. In addition
Rabobank acts as back-up swap counterparty through its London
branch. Fitch considers that the swap provides a certain degree
of liquidity and credit support in this transaction and the
replacement of the swap would likely be at a high cost, due to
the nature of the swap structure, which in turn may affect the
interest waterfall.

Although the notification trigger is set below the 'A' level, the
agency did not consider the risk of a loss of funds due to
commingling or disruption of payments in the cash flow analysis,
as Fitch considers that this risk is mitigated by means of a
commingling guarantee provided by Rabobank. In addition the
transaction is not exposed to the risk of deposit set-off or
other claims.

Fitch judges further set-off risks in this transaction to be
minimal due to the structural mitigants in place in relation to
construction deposit, savings and investment set-off as well as
the limited proportion of insurance loans included in the
portfolio. For the 5.6% insurance loans included in the pool
Fitch did incorporate in its analysis the risk that borrowers
might exercise set-off following the failure of insurance
providers.

Obvion provided Fitch with loan-by-loan information on the
portfolio as of January 1, 2013. All of the data fields included
in the pool cut were of solid quality and Obvion provided
additional information for mortgage loans based on the income of
two borrowers.

Fitch reviewed an Agreed Upon Procedures (AUP) report regarding
the data provided by the arranger. The agency believes the sample
size, the relevance of the tested fields, and the limited number
of material error findings suggests the originator provided an
acceptable quality of data. In addition, Fitch relied on its own
file review undertaken for a prior transaction (STORM 2012-IV) on
July 25, 2012, which consisted of 15 loans selected from the
portfolio. This was considered a very good proxy for STORM 2013-
I, given the similar asset characteristics and recent timing. The
agency discovered no errors or unexpected results. Based on the
received repossession data, analysis showed that the performance
was in line with Fitch's standard Dutch RMBS assumptions;
therefore, Fitch did not adjust its quick sale, market value
decline or foreclosure timing assumptions.

To analyze the CE levels, Fitch evaluated the collateral using
its default model, details of which can be found in the reports
entitled 'EMEA Residential Mortgage Loss Criteria', dated
June 7, 2012, 'EMEA RMBS Criteria Addendum - Netherlands', dated
June 14, 2012, available at www.fitchratings.com. The agency
assessed the transaction cash flows using default and Loss
Severity assumptions under various structural stresses including
prepayment speeds and interest rate scenarios. The cash flow
tests showed that each class of notes could withstand loan losses
at a level corresponding to the related stress scenario without
incurring any principal loss or interest shortfall and can retire
principal by the legal final maturity.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Defends Revised Deal, Blasts Kaufman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Board of Directors of Central European Distribution
Corporation sent a letter to Mark Kaufman in response to his
letters to the CEDC Board of Directors and other investors in
CEDC dated Jan. 16, 2013, and Jan. 25, 2013.  Mr. Kaufman and W &
L Enterprises Ltd. together beneficially own 7,417,549 shares of
the Company's common stock, representing approximately 9.4% of
the Company's common shares.

In the Jan. 16, 2013 Letter, Mr. Kaufman indicated his withdrawal
of support from CEDC's revised deal with Roust Trading Ltd.
saying that the terms of the amended transaction no longer
deliver a clear and definitive path to resolving CEDC's immediate
liquidity crisis.  In a subsequent message, Mr. Kaufman stated
his intention to file a complaint with the Delaware Court of
Chancery to compel CEDC to hold an Annual General Meeting at the
earliest possible date, which complaint was formally filed on
January 28.

In its January 29 letter, the Board defended the Revised Deal
with RTL stating that the "deal enables CEDC to carry on its
operations during the critical Winter months while, at the same
time, providing CEDC with an opportunity to work with its
advisors and RTL to identify an appropriate restructuring path to
address CEDC's critical financial challenges."

"The December deal is aimed at ensuring that shareholder
democracy prevails," the letter adds.  "The agreement with RTL is
simply that shareholders be given a choice between a Board that
continues to be led by non-RTL directors and a Board led by
directors nominated by RTL.  The choice is entirely for the
shareholders to make, which is evidence that the directors are
not entrenched at all, but simply recognize their duty to see the
successful restructuring of CEDC through."

CEDC and Russian Standard are currently preparing to call an
Annual Meeting of CEDC shareholders as soon as practicable and
expect to do so in the coming weeks.

"The Board is disappointed that you feel it necessary to force
CEDC to incur the unnecessary additional expense of responding to
a suit to force the calling of an Annual Meeting that will
ultimately prove unnecessary," the Board concludes.

A copy of the letter is available at http://is.gd/RBf60V

                            About CEDC

Mt. Laurel, New Jersey-based Central European Distribution
Corporation is one of the world's largest vodka producers and
Central and Eastern Europe's largest integrated spirit beverages
business with its primary operations in Poland, Russia and
Hungary.

Ernst & Young Audit sp. z.o.o., in Warsaw, Poland, expressed
substantial doubt about Central European's ability to continue as
a going concern, following the Company's results for the fiscal
year ended Dec. 31, 2011.  The independent auditors noted that
certain of the Company's credit and factoring facilities are
coming due in 2012 and will need to be renewed to manage its
working capital needs.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2012, showed
US$1.98 billion in total assets, US$1.73 billion in total
liabilities, US$29.44 million in temporary equity, and US$210.78
million in total stockholders' equity.

                             Liquidity

The Company's Convertible Senior Notes are due on March 15, 2013.
The Company has said its current cash on hand, estimated cash
from operations and available credit facilities will not be
sufficient to make the repayment of principal on the Convertible
Notes and, unless the transaction with Russian Standard
Corporation is completed the Company may default on them.  The
Company's cash flow forecasts include the assumption that certain
credit and factoring facilities coming due in 2012 would be
renewed to manage working capital needs.  Moreover, the Company
had a net loss and significant impairment charges in 2011 and
current liabilities exceed current assets at June 30, 2012.
These conditions, the Company said, raise substantial doubt about
its ability to continue as a going concern.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the TCR on Aug. 10, 2012, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services kept on CreditWatch with negative implications
its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating on U.S.-based
Central European Distribution Corp. (CEDC), the parent company of
Poland-based vodka manufacturer CEDC International sp. z o.o.

"The CreditWatch status reflects our view that uncertainties
remain related to CEDC's ongoing accounting review and that
CEDC's liquidity could further and substantially weaken if there
was a breach of covenants which could lead to the acceleration of
the payment of the 2016 notes, upon receipt of a written notice
of 25% or more of the noteholders," S&P said.

As reported by the TCR on Jan. 16, 2013, Moody's Investors
Service has downgraded the corporate family rating (CFR) and
probability of default rating (PDR) of Central European
Distribution Corporation (CEDC) to Caa3 from Caa2.

"The downgrade follows CEDC announcement on the 28 of December
that it had agreed with Russian Standard a revised transaction to
repay its US$310 million of convertible notes due March 2013
which, in Moody's view, has increased the risk of potential loss
for existing bondholders", says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CEDC.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


HMS HYDRAULIC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term corp. Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Russian pump and oil and gas equipment manufacturer HMS Hydraulic
Machines & Systems Group PLC (HMS) to stable from negative.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
rating on the group and its long-term Russia national scale
rating at 'ruA+'.  The recovery rating of '5' remains unchanged.

"The outlook revision mainly reflects our assessment that under
our base-case and alternative scenarios we do not see the group's
liquidity deteriorating to "weak," which was a concern driving
the previous negative outlook following debt-financed
acquisitions in mid 2012.  Although liquidity has not improved to
"adequate" the company has successfully refinanced the bank lines
drawn for its two 2012 acquisitions with long-term bank lines,
thereby lengthening its debt maturity profile.  In addition, we
expect only marginally negative discretionary cash flow for 2012
and 2013.  With the refinancing of bank debt and the expected
cash generation according to our forecasts we no longer see a
one-in-three chance of a downgrade," S&P said.


INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: Moody's Withdraws 'E' Standalone BFSR
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the following ratings of
International Investment Bank (IIB):

- Standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E,
   equivalent to a standalone credit assessment of c

- The long-term and short-term foreign and local-currency
   deposit ratings of C/Not Prime

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has withdrawn the rating because it believes it has
insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the rating.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, International Investment Bank
reported total assets of US$88 million and shareholders' equity
of US$40 million as of year-end 2011, according to the bank's
non-audited statutory reports under Russian Accounting Standards.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO POPULAR: Fitch Places 'B-' Pref. Share Rating on Watch Pos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the preference shares issued by Banco
Popular Espanol, SA through its vehicles on Rating Watch Positive
(RWP). The action follows the request for a group of investors in
the notes to vote on a proposal to amend the trigger on the
coupon omission of these notes from the availability of
"Distributable Profits" to the wider-ranging "Distributable
Profits and Reserves".

SENSITIVITIES/RATING DRIVERS

The RWP reflects Fitch's view that it is highly likely that the
amendment will be approved. The change will lower the coupon
omission trigger to the prevailing regulatory capital minima and
will therefore make it harder for the issuer not to pay coupons
on the notes. If the amendment is approved, Popular will be able
to pay coupons out of distributable reserves and not just out of
the previous year's income.

In accordance with its criteria, Fitch believes that this change
will reduce the risk of non-performance compared to the anchor
rating, the Viability Rating (VR) to minus two (currently minus
three). Like most other Spanish banks, Popular currently sets the
coupon payments on the above listed securities to depend on the
previous year's net income, a much easier trigger to activate.

Fitch will continue to apply two notches from the VR for loss
severity as recoveries are expected to be poor relative to the
average. Therefore, on resolution of the RWP, Fitch expects to
upgrade the preference shares by one notch to 'B'. The approval
of the change in the issuing vehicles' by-laws and issues' terms
and conditions is expected by early March.

The rating of Popular's preference shares are sensitive to any
rating action on its VR.

The rating actions are:

BPE Preference Shares International Limited:
Preference shares (ISIN: KYG717151099 and KYG1280w1015) of 'B-'
placed on RWP

Popular Capital, S.A.:
Preference shares (ISIN: DE0009190702; DE000A0BDW10; XS0288613119
and ES0170412003) of 'B-' placed on RWP


NARA CABLE: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR250MM Sr. Secured Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
issue rating to the proposed EUR250 million senior secured notes
due 2020, to be issued by the special-purpose vehicle (SPV) Nara
Cable Funding II Ltd. Nara Cable Funding II is issuing the notes
on behalf of Spanish cable operator Cableuropa S.A.U.  The issue
rating on the proposed notes is in line with the corporate credit
rating on Cableuropa.

"We understand that if the issuance of the proposed notes is
successful, Nara Cable Funding II will lend the proceeds to
Cableuropa through a proposed loan facility ("the new notes
tranche").  We have assigned an issue rating of 'B+' to the
proposed new notes tranche, in line with the corporate credit
rating on Cableuropa.  We also assigned a recovery rating of '3'
to the proposed new notes tranche, reflecting our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for the lenders in the event of a
payment default," S&P said.

S&P understands that Cableuropa plans to use the proceeds of the
proposed issuance to prepay part of its existing senior secured
term loan A.

Nara Cable Funding II is an orphan SPV, whose activity is limited
to the issue of the notes and the onlending of the proceeds to
various group entities.  These features offset the facts that
neither Cableuropa nor any of its subsidiaries guarantee or
provide any credit support to Nara Cable Funding II, and that the
notes do not have a direct claim on the cash flows and the assets
of the Cableuropa group.

The issue rating on the notes reflects the issue rating on the
new notes tranche, since S&P believes that recovery prospects for
the notes are intrinsically linked to the recovery prospects for
the proposed new notes tranche.  S&P base this view on the
assignment to noteholders of rights under the new notes tranche.
S&P considers that recovery prospects for noteholders depend
entirely on the effective operation of the pass-through structure
between the corporate entity (Cableuropa) and the issuer (Nara
Cable Funding II).

The ratings on the proposed notes and new notes tranche are based
on preliminary information and are subject to S&P's review of the
final documentation.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its existing issue and recovery
ratings on Cableuropa's debt.

                        RECOVERY ANALYSIS

The issue and recovery ratings on the existing secured SPV
tranche loans and the proposed new notes tranche reflect S&P's
estimate of the value available to the respective creditors.
S&P's estimate is supported by its valuation of Cableuropa on a
going-concern basis in light of its solid market position and
network infrastructure.  S&P's recovery ratings are constrained
by its view of the likelihood of Cableuropa's Spanish domicile
adversely influencing insolvency proceedings, and the high
proportion of senior secured debt instruments in the capital
structure.  The recovery ratings also reflect the weak security
package, including a first-ranking share pledge over Cableuropa
and any material subsidiaries (no assets are pledged).

In order to determine recoveries, S&P simulates a hypothetical
default scenario.  In particular, S&P believes that a payment
default would most likely occur in 2016 as a result of a weaker
operating performance on the back of prolonged weakness in the
macroeconomic environment. This would be further accelerated
by a tough, competitive climate, resulting in an increase in
Cableuropa's churn rate and a reduction in its profitability
margins.

At the hypothetical point of default, S&P values Cableuropa at
about EUR2.9 billion.  S&P assumes about EUR3.3 billion of debt
outstanding at the point of default, including a fully drawn
revolving credit facility (RCF) and six months of prepetition
interest.

"Although we have not assigned a recovery rating to the proposed
senior secured notes, we believe that recovery prospects for
these notes are intrinsically linked to the recovery prospects on
the senior secured SPV tranche facilities.  We base this view on
the assignment to noteholders of rights under the SPV tranche
facilities.  We consider that potential recovery for noteholders
would depend entirely on the effective operation of the pass-
through structure between the corporate entity (Cableuropa) and
the issuer (Nara Cable Funding II)," S&P said.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating

Cableuropa S.A.U.
Senior Secured
  EUR250 mil. due 2020 bank ln            B+
   Recovery Rating                      3

Nara Cable Funding II Ltd.
Senior Secured
EUR250 mil. notes*                       B+

Ratings Affirmed

Cableuropa S.A.U.
Senior Secured                         B+
   Recovery Rating                      3

Nara Cable Funding Ltd.
Senior Secured*                        B+

ONO Finance II PLC
Senior Unsecured*                      B-
  Recovery Rating                       6

*Guaranteed by Cableuropa S.A.U.


REPSOL INT'L: Fitch Affirms BB- Hybrid Capital Instrument Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Repsol SA's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BBB-'. The Outlook has been revised to Stable
from Negative.

The affirmation and revision of the Outlook reflect our
expectation that Repsol's deconsolidated credit metrics and
business profile will not weaken to levels consistent with a
lower rating. Fitch believes Repsol should be able to complete
fixed asset divestments by the end of 2013 and use these proceeds
to reduce debt and stabilize credit metrics. In our opinion,
Repsol's credit profile has limited additional downside, even in
the absence of fixed asset divestments, which supports the Stable
Outlook.

KEY DRIVERS

Fixed Asset Sales:

Fitch views Repsol's asset disposal program as being very
important to strengthening its investment grade rating. Repsol is
trying to dispose of certain fixed assets and could use the
proceeds to reduce financial indebtedness. Fitch views the
completion and closing of assets disposals in 2013 as supportive
of the ratings. Repsol's Outlook would likely be revised to
Positive upon the completion of any material disposal, and
upgraded if proceeds are fully utilized for debt reduction.

New Strategic Plan:

Repsol has announced a new strategic plan that anticipates
increasing oil production to 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent
per day by 2016 and improving downstream profitability. Repsol
plans around EUR19.1 billion of total capex during 2012-2016,
excluding Gas Natural (GN; 'BBB+'/Stable). Fitch views the
company's target upstream production growth rate of consistently
greater than 7% a year as ambitious, but the company is currently
meeting this target.

Challenging Downstream Environment:

Repsol's downstream core business has significant exposure to the
Spanish economy, with 100% of middle distillates sold
domestically, accounting for 25% of EBITDA. Macroeconomic
volatility could reduce demand for transportation fuels, which
would decrease refining margins and internally generated cash
flow, affecting the company's 'self-financing' investment plans.

Scrip Dividend:

In January 2013 Repsol announced that a total of 69% of Repsol
shareholders opted to be paid the interim dividend from 2012
earnings in shares, up from 64% who chose to receive shares for
the final dividend from 2011 earnings. Fitch view this as
positive, as it allows the company to conserve cash. However,
significant de-levering steps still need to be taken to improve
credit ratios to more solid investment grade levels.

GN Debt Non-Recourse:

Fitch considers GN debt to be non-recourse to Repsol.
Consequently, Repsol is rated on a deconsolidated basis and the
analysis is largely driven by the company's core businesses.
However, GN's dividends to the parent company are also reflected
in the rating (EUR247 million in 2012).

RATING SENSITIVITY GUIDANCE:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-Asset disposal proceeds being fully utilized to reduce
  financial indebtedness
-Deconsolidated FFO adjusted net leverage around 2.5x
-Deconsolidated FFO fixed charge cover around 8x
-Upstream production growth around 10% per annum
-Stable deconsolidated FFO margin of greater than 15%
-Rational capex spending of no more than 100% operating cash
  flow
-Consistent downstream sales volumes

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-Failure to complete and close asset disposals in 2013
-Deconsolidated FFO adjusted net leverage consistently greater
  than 3x
-Deconsolidated FFO fixed charge cover consistently less than 7x
-Upstream production growth by less than 7% per annum
-Deconsolidated FFO margin less than 10%
-Capex to CFO consistently greater than 100%
-Decline in refining volumes sold in conjunction with a
  deteriorating macroeconomic environment and oil product demand
  destruction

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: Repsol had EUR8.4 billion of total liquidity at
end-Sept 2012, with EUR3.9 billion of cash and EUR4.5 billion of
available committed credit lines, excluding GN. This should
comfortably cover Repsol's financial needs for the following 24
months. As of December 2012, cash and available credit lines
comfortably cover the company's EUR2.8 billion of recourse debt
maturing in 2013 and EUR2 billion of recourse debt maturing in
2014.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Repsol SA
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

Repsol International Capital Ltd.
Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'BB-'

Repsol International Finance
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Commercial Paper Short-term Rating: affirmed at F3



===========
S W E D E N
===========


VERISURE HOLDING: S&P Rates New EUR100MM Tap on Secured Notes 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
issue rating to the proposed EUR100 million tap on the existing
senior secured notes series A, due 2018, to be issued by Verisure
Holding AB.  The issue rating is in line with S&P's long-term
corporate credit rating on Verisure.

At the same time, S&P assigned its '3' recovery rating to the
notes, indicating its expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery prospects in the event of a default.

S&P understands that Verisure will use the proceeds of the
proposed notes to repay the outstanding amount under its
revolving credit facility (RCF).  The RCF commitment will remain
the same at EUR279 million, with about EUR268 million available
at the close of the refinancing transaction.

The holders of the RCF, the first-lien senior secured notes and
loan series A, and the second-lien senior secured notes and loan
series B, benefit from essentially the same security package.
However, under the terms of the intercreditor agreement, the
holders of the RCF will rank first for the proceeds of the
collateral, followed by the series A first-lien senior secured
debtholders, the series B second-lien senior secured noteholders,
and finally, the mezzanine noteholders.  The recovery ratings on
the first- and second-lien senior secured debt are supported by
the group's fair valuation.  However, they are constrained at the
'B' rating level by existing prior-ranking liabilities, the
potential for cross-jurisdictional insolvency issues (in Spain
and Sweden), and what S&P deems to be a relatively weak security
package.

In order to determine recovery prospects, S&P simulates a default
scenario.  Under S&P's hypothetical default scenario, it expects
the churn rate among the existing portfolio of clients to
increase due to the prevailing weak economic conditions,
especially in Spain.  To offset these conditions, the group would
continue investing materially in acquiring new customers, thereby
increasing installation costs.  These costs would be compounded
by excessive financial leverage and a large interest burden.

As a result, S&P assumes that with a restructured balance sheet
Verisure would be able to keep, to a large extent, its long-term
subscriber contracts and customer relationships for a sustainable
business model.  Under S&P's simulated default scenario, it
assumes that a default would occur in 2015, at which point S&P
anticipates that EBITDA would have declined to about
EUR144 million.

"We value the business assuming a going-concern sale at the point
of default.  Verisure is an intermediate holding company for
Sweden-based residential alarm monitoring services provider,
Securitas Direct AB.  Our assumption that Verisure would be sold
instead of liquidated in the event of default is based on
Securitas Direct's leading position in the Spanish and Nordic
alarm monitoring services market for homes and small businesses.
Our going-concern valuation yields a stressed enterprise value of
about EUR792 million, equivalent to 5.5x the EBITDA at default,"
S&P said.

In order to determine recoveries, S&P deducts EUR372 million from
the stressed enterprise value, mainly comprising finance leases,
debt at the subsidiary level, enforcement costs, and the super
senior RCF (including six months of prepetition interest).  This
leaves a net stressed enterprise value of EUR420 million for the
different debtholders.

Assuming about EUR830 million of first-lien senior secured debt
outstanding at default (including the series A notes and loan),
S&P sees sufficient value for recoveries in the 50%-70% range,
translating into a recovery rating of '3'.  This leaves no
residual value for the second-lien senior secured noteholders,
which equates to a recovery rating of '6'.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


2E2: Daisy Group Among Potential Bidders for Businesses
-------------------------------------------------------
Duncan Robinson at The Financial Times reports that Daisy Group,
the Aim-traded IT group, emerged as a potential bidder for 2e2,
which fell into administration last week.

Talks between the two companies were described as "fairly
advanced" by someone with knowledge of the negotiations, the FT
says.  According to the FT, administrators FTI Consulting said
that a sale was very near and could be completed as early as this
week.

The FT relates that Simon Granger, joint administrator at FTI
Consulting, said there was a "significant number of expressions
of interest" in acquiring 2e2's UK and international businesses.
"We are confident that a sale can be concluded in the very near
term," the FT quotes Mr. Granger as saying.

Cable & Wireless made an informal bid of GBP360 million for the
group as recently as 2011, which was rejected by management, the
FT recounts.  That year the group, which specialized in cloud
computing, reported full-year revenues of GBP403 million, the FT
relates.  It struggled through 2012 as the wider IT industry
creaked under the pressure of mounting capital expenditure costs
and dwindling margins, the FT discloses.  Contractors were not
being paid on time while bailiffs visited 2e2 offices, according
to former staff members, the FT says.

Duke Street Capital, the private equity firm that owned a 75%
stake in the group, wrote down the value of nearly all its stake
last summer, the FT recounts.  The value of the remaining chunk
of equity was written down at the end of 2012, the FT discloses.
The IT group sacked 319 of its near-1,500 staff on Jan. 29
without notice, while 26 more were made redundant in a conference
call on Feb. 1, the FT relates.

Those who have been laid off have not been paid for January, say
two former staff members, the FT states.

According to the FT, George O'Connor, analyst at Panmure Gordon
said that other potential bidders include Computacenter, which
has similar operations to 2e2.

Founded in 2002, 2e2 is a Newbury-based IT group.


BAGGALEY CONSTRUCTION: Goes Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------
Nick Brimacombe at chad.co.uk reports that Mansfield's Baggaley
Construction has gone into administration.

The building company, which is based on Melton Way, confirmed on
its website that Chris Pole and Richard Philpott of KPMG have
been appointed joint administrators of both Herbert Baggaley
Construction Limited and Baggaley Group Limited, according to
chad.co.uk.

The report relates that the affairs, business and property of the
Companies are being managed by the joint administrators.

Chris Pole is authorized to act as an insolvency practitioner by
the ICAEW, the report notes.


BLOCKBUSTER: Administrator Fights to Save Jobs at Stores
--------------------------------------------------------
Helia Ebrahimi at The Telegraph reports that Blockbuster
administrator Lee Manning explains why retailers should learn the
lessons of failed high street chains if they want to flourish in
2013.

According to the Telegraph, Mr. Manning says his job is as much
about rescuing companies as making people redundant.  Perhaps
this will come as a surprise to staff at the video retailer
Blockbuster, where as lead administrator Manning has announced
that up to 160 stores could close, leading to a possible loss of
1,000 jobs, the Telegraph notes.  But Mr. Manning insists
difficult decisions are not taken lightly, the Telegraph states.

"We try and save as many jobs as we can," the Telegraph quotes
Mr. Manning, who is also president of the insolvency body R3, as
saying.  "But we can't save all of them.  We have to deal with
people that are in distress both emotionally and financially.
With people who want their money back.

"We are basically fighting in the trenches -- but we get shot at
by all sides."

However, he declares that the era of the traditional high street
is sadly past, the Telegraph notes.

"It is just too late.  There might be nostalgia for the high
street, but it is too late now.  It is over," Mr. Manning, as
cited by the Telegraph, said.

"Firstly, technology and the internet have challenged the high
street beyond what most shops have been able to cope with.

"And secondly, the significant expansion of out of town, top-
notch shopping centers have made it almost impossible to compete
for local high streets."

Mr. Manning is also very critical of local authorities which he
blames for making high streets too expensive for shoppers, the
Telegraph notes.

"There is a real reason HMV and Blockbuster are distressed and
that goes beyond the problems of the high street.  That is much
more driven by technology and the fact that the delivery method
of their product had been fundamentally challenged by
technology," Mr. Manning, as cited by the Telegraph, said.

"Simply put, there is less demand for the physical product when
people can buy it easier and cheaper online."

According to the Telegraph, Mr. Manning says the US online giant
could easily buy some of the UK's struggling retailers such as
HMV or Blockbuster and diversify and use the click-and-collect
format to sell product.

Mr. Manning also says many stores were too big and inefficient,
the Telegraph notes.

According to the Telegraph, Mr. Manning's strategy is to decrease
the size of the stores and have the shops operate like large
vending machines.

He says there is some hope for a new type of Blockbuster, the
Telegraph states.  Indeed, just like HMV and even Game, some
shops could survive for some time -- as long as the three
companies understand how to make the most of their strengths, the
Telegraph notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 21,
2013, the Financial Times related that Blockbuster, which has 528
stores across the UK employing 4,190 staff, fell into
administration after the failure to secure a sale of the UK
business following a plunge in profits.  Blockbuster has been
suffering following the launch of rival services such as Netflix
and Lovefilm, which enable users to stream films and TV shows on
their televisions and other devices such as tablets and PCs, the
FT disclosed.

Blockbuster UK is an entertainment retailer.  It is part of
Blockbuster L.L.C.


GLOBAL ENDURO: In Administration on Current Economic Climate
------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Wilby at Motorbike Times reports that Global Enduro has gone
into administration on Jan. 28, 2013.

The directors released a statement that put the blame onto the
poor economic climate stating that "we have fallen victim to the
immense financial pressures faced by many retail businesses in
the current economic climate," according to Motorbike Times.

The report relates that they go on to explain "despite our best
efforts, we have determined that our current financial situation
is not capable of sustaining our normal operations and,
accordingly, we will cease to trade with immediate effect."

Global Enduro specialized in adventure holidays, including 15
different motorbike tours.


HMV GROUP: Up to 100 Shops Face Closure This Week
-------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that the administrators
to HMV Group are preparing to close as many as 100 shops.

According to the Telegraph, it is understood that Deloitte will
this week announce plans to close between 60 and 100 HMV stores,
resulting in the loss of up to 1,500 jobs.  The shops will not
close immediately, however, but will remain open until they have
run out of stock, the Telegraph notes.

A source close to HMV said the administrators were preparing to
take the "next stage of restructuring" at the retailer, the
Telegraph relates.  The restructuring plans are being considered
last weekend, with the location of the stores to close still to
be finalized, the Telegraph states.

However, Deloitte and Hilco, which has bought HMV's debt, believe
that for it to emerge as a viable high-street retailer the
company must reduce its portfolio of stores to between 120 and
160 shops, the Telegraph discloses.

As part of the restructuring, one of HMV's two flagship shops in
central London is likely to close, according to the Telegraph.
The store on Oxford Street is profitable, while HMV's Piccadilly
Circus location is loss-making, the Telegraph says.

HMV, which has 223 UK shops in total and employed more than 4,000
staff, called in Deloitte last month, the Telegraph recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 24,
2013, The Financial Times related that Hilco UK acquired the
bank debt of HMV, effectively giving it control and paving the
way for a rescue of the company that fell into administration.
The FT disclosed that people familiar with the situation said
Hilco had acquired the debt from the group's lenders, Lloyds and
Royal Bank of Scotland for about GBP40 million.  HMV had
underlying net debt of GBP176 million as at the end of October,
although people familiar with the matter said this had fallen to
about GBP120 million following the crucial Christmas and new year
trading period, the FT noted.  Although Hilco has not acquired
HMV, it means Hilco can effectively take control of the retailer,
and any rival bidder would need its agreement, the FT stated.

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of
pre-recorded music, video, electronic games and related
entertainment products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the
retailing of books principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The
Company operates in four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV
International, HMV Live, and Waterstone's.


JESSOPS PLC: WM Morrison Buys Seven Stores From Administrators
--------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that WM Morrison
Supermarkets has bought a collection of Jessops stores as it
steps up its fightback following a slump in Christmas sales.

According to the Telegraph, Britain's fourth-largest supermarket
group has acquired seven Jessops shops from the administrators to
the collapsed camera retailer for an undisclosed price,

The sites will be used to expand Morrisons' convenience store
business -- M Local -- which is vital to the company's future
strategy, the Telegraph says.  Four of the Jessops sites are in
London, two elsewhere in England, and one in Scotland, the
Telegraph discloses.

Jessops collapsed last month with the loss of 2,000 jobs and 192
store closures, the Telegraph recounts.  Peter Jones, the
Dragons' Den businessman, has agreed to buy the Jessops brand
from administrators PricewaterhouseCoopers and will relaunch the
business as an online-only retailer, the Telegraph relates.

Headquartered in Leicester, United Kingdom, Jessops plc --
http://www.jessops.com/-- is a holding company of a group of
companies whose principal activity is the retail of photographic
products and services.  It operates via the Internet and through
mail order and telesales.  Jessops plc sells a range of digital
and analogue cameras, digital and analogue camcorders,
binoculars, digital home print solutions, memory cards, film and
photographic materials, as well as a range of accessories for the
photographic market, including its own brand products.  The
Company also provides developing and printing, and digital
imaging services.  The Company is engaged in the business of
selling branded photographic equipment.  Its subsidiaries include
Camera Bond Limited, Camera Mezz Limited, Camera Equity Limited,
The Jessop Group Limited, Well Hall (Jersey) Limited, Expert
Imaging Limited, MacKinnons of Dyce Limited and Jessops
Photographic (Ireland) Limited.


MANGANESE BRONZE: Geely Acquires Business for GBP11 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
Patti Waldmeir and John Murray Brown at The Financial Times
report that Manganese Bronze has been sold to Geely, adding
another well-known European brand to the private Chinese carmaker
that already owns Volvo.

According to the FT, Geely, which already owned 20% of Manganese
Bronze, bought the company for only GBP11 million after it went
into administration last October.

The Chinese company, which was Manganese Bronze's largest
creditor, said it would continue to assemble the company's TX4
model at the Manganese Bronze plant in Coventry, the FT relates.
The acquisition came after Geely refused to provide funding to
keep Manganese Bronze afloat, the FT notes.

Daniel Li, the chairman of Geely UK, said the Chinese company
planned to use the Manganese Bronze operation as a base to sell
Geely cars into the European market, the FT discloses.

Mr. Li, as cited by the FT, said the Coventry plant, which
employs 107 people, "could get even bigger".  He indicated that
Geely expects to invest GBP30 million-GBP50 million in the
Coventry plant over the next 5 years to bring new models into
production, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Peter Johansen, group finance officer of
Manganese Bronze who becomes executive vice-president of Geely
UK, said cab production, which has been suspended since October,
would resume "in the next few weeks".

Manganese Bronze Holdings Plc is the manufacturer of London's
traditional black cabs.


NORD ANGLIA: Moody's Rates New US$150-Mil. Notes '(P)Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)Caa2 rating
to the proposed US$150 million PIK toggle notes due 2018 to be
issued by Nord Anglia Education Inc.

At the same time, Moody's assigned a B3 corporate family rating
(CFR) and B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to NAE Inc.,
and withdrew the B2 CFR and B2-PD PDR of Nord Anglia Education
(UK) Holdings plc (NAE plc), a wholly owned subsidiary of NAE
Inc.

The rating of the US$325 million senior secured notes due 2017
remains unchanged at B2 and the outlook on all ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the PIK toggle notes. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

The B3 CFR is mainly driven by NAE Inc.'s announcement that it is
looking to raise US$150 million PIK toggle notes in order to
partially redeem the preference shares held in NAE Inc. The
proposed transaction will add to the company's leverage with
adjusted debt/EBITDA expected to rise towards 7.2x pro-forma for
the transaction, compared to the previously expected debt/EBITDA
of around 5.9x for FY13.

The (P)Caa2 rating for the PIK toggle notes reflects the fact
that the notes will be structurally subordinated to any existing
and future indebtedness of the subsidiaries of the Issuer -
including the US$325 million Senior Secured Notes (due 2017) at
NAE plc - and will not be guaranteed by any of the Issuer's
subsidiaries.

The interest on the PIK toggle notes is optionally payable in
cash at the election of the Issuer. Moody's anticipates that the
group will elect to make cash payments on the PIK notes, if it is
able to do so. However, given that the Issuer is a holding
company with no independent business operations, it will rely on
the cash up-streaming from its subsidiaries to service the PIK
with cash. The indenture for the US$325 million Senior Secured
Notes at NAE plc provides that the company would be able to make
restricted payments outside of the restricted group of up to 50%
of its Consolidated Net Income (as defined in the indenture) if
it is able to incur US$1.0 of indebtedness on a pro forma basis
pursuant to the debt incurrence test (of 2.5x fixed charge
coverage ratio).

The withdrawal of the B2 CFR from NAE plc and the assignment of
the B3 CFR at NAE Inc. reflect Moody's view that all group debt
including the PIK should be considered in consolidated metrics.
Consolidated financial reporting will also move to NAE Inc. from
NAE plc. The one notch change in CFR level reflects the
additional PIK debt. The re-leveraging transaction signals a more
aggressive financial policy stance than previously factored in
Moody's rating, as does the fact that just over a year after NAE
refinanced its capital structure and partially repaid the
shareholder loans, the company is looking to redeem part of the
existing preference shares.

Liquidity

Moody's expects that NAE Inc. will maintain an adequate liquidity
position over the next twelve months. The company receives cash
tuition payments prior to the start of the term, therefore the
amount of cash on balance sheet at the end of the fiscal year is
at its highest point and does not reflect the average amount of
cash reserves held by NAE Inc. The rating agency anticipates that
the company will periodically draw under its US$30 million
revolver during the course of the year to cover working capital
swings as well as capital expenditure.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that NAE Inc.
will continue to generate positive free cash flow and will not
engage in any material debt-funded M&A activity.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Positive pressure on the ratings could develop if (1) the
company's utilization rate and revenue per student were to
improve leading to the adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio falling below
6.0x on a sustainable basis; (2) the company sustains positive
free cash flow generation and (3) the company reports ample
headroom under its financial covenants. Conversely, negative
pressure on the ratings could arise if the company's leverage
materially rises above 7.0x by August 2013 and if it does not
trend towards 6.5x by August 2014. Furthermore, any material
deterioration in the company's liquidity position could
contribute towards a rating downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Hong Kong, China (after moving from
Staffordshire, UK, in 2011), Nord Anglia Education Inc., is the
parent company of Nord Anglia Education Limited and several other
subsidiaries operating 14 international schools in Asia, Central
Europe, Switzerland and Middle East.


NORD ANGLIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Nord Anglia Education
(UK) Holdings PLC (Nord Anglia Education UK).  At the same time
S&P assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Nord
Anglia Education UK's parent, Cayman Islands-based Nord Anglia
Education Inc.  The outlook on both companies is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'CCC+' long-term debt rating to Nord Anglia
Education Inc.'s proposed US$150 million senior payment-in-kind
toggle notes issue with an expected tenor of five years.  S&P has
assigned a recovery rating of '6' to the notes issue, indicating
S&P's expectation of "negligible" (0%-10%) recovery for holders
of the proposed notes in the event of a payment default.

S&P understands that the proposed notes are not underwritten by
the arranger.  The ratings on the pending notes issue are subject
to the successful issuance of this instrument and S&P's review of
the final documentation.  Any change in the amount, terms, or
conditions of the notes issue would have to be reviewed by
Standard & Poor's and could affect the current ratings on the
proposed notes.

"Pro forma the proposed notes issuance, we expect Standard &
Poor's-adjusted EBITDA interest cover of 1.1x and fully adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 10x.  Excluding the remaining US$225
million preference shares, we expect these ratios to improve to
1.7x and 6.0x by the fiscal year-end, Aug. 31, 2013.  The
calculation of the interest cover ratios includes the coupon
payments on the proposed notes because we understand that it is
the company's intention to service the interest in cash.  While
we consider this transaction to be aggressive from a creditor's
perspective, given that it is expected to reduce Nord Anglia
Education UK's capacity to generate free cash flow, we think that
the impact on the capital structure and on the corporate credit
rating is limited.  This is also because we expect that the
company will sustain positive free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation, even in a less benign economic environment," S&P
said.

Nord Anglia Education Inc. intends to use the proceeds of the
proposed US$150 million notes to repay US$141 million of the
preference shares issued by the same entity (the remaining
US$9 million being expensed on transaction fees).  As of Nov. 30,
2012, Nord Anglia Education Inc. had about US$366 million of
preference shares outstanding when including accrued interest of
12% per year.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that Nord Anglia
Education Inc. will have enough funds to service the proposed
notes in cash.  S&P would also expect the company to switch to
payment-in-kind interest on the proposed notes in case free cash
flow were to fall below zero.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Nord Anglia
Education UK will continue to generate positive organic top-line
growth and a reported EBITDA margin in excess of 25%.  This is
based on positive dynamics for private schools in the premium
segment in general, and on the continued growth of expatriates
increasing demand for private schools in Nord Anglia Education
UK's key markets, particularly in China.  Moreover, S&P forecasts
that the company will sustain positive FOCF generation even in a
less benign economic environment.

S&P might lower the ratings if large and aggressively priced
mergers and acquisitions transactions or unexpected operating
setbacks caused earnings to decline to the extent that FOCF
generation turned negative.  S&P could also lower the ratings if
adjusted EBITDA interest coverage fell below about 1x, or to
about 1.5x, excluding the noncash interest element from the
preference shares.

A positive rating action would depend on sustainable deleveraging
to less than 6x on a fully adjusted basis, and the company's
ability to consistently generate positive discretionary cash
flow.  Given the company's highly leveraged capital structure,
S&P considers a near-term positive rating action to be unlikely
under its base case.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Global Housing Markets Face Different Outlooks, FitchVoice Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that the world's major residential mortgage
markets face starkly different outlooks for the coming year,
driven predominantly by contrasting macroeconomic fortunes. While
markets in countries such as Australia, Germany and the US
promise a degree of house price stability and mortgage
affordability, the peripheral eurozone is at the opposite end of
the scale, with real risk of further deterioration.

In an article in Fitch Voice: Structured Finance, released on
Jan. 31, 2013, Gregg Kohansky, Head of EMEA RMBS, summarizes the
findings of a report, Fitch Residential Mortgage Briefing, which
compares the major mortgage markets across the globe. The report
takes into account the underlying macroeconomic trends and uses
this analysis to support its assumptions for individual factors
affecting the key drivers of mortgage and, ultimately, RMBS
performance.

"Although we expect growth in the major core economies to remain
sluggish this year, we are positive about the increasing
stability of their housing markets but, in peripheral Europe,
significant downside risks remain," says Mr. Kohansky. "This
dichotomy is also visible in mortgage performance and is
reflected in our rating outlooks between core EU and EU periphery
markets."

Fitch Voice: Structured Finance provides a quarterly series of
topical articles on developments in the global structured finance
sector. It has replaced the previous quarterly US and EMEA
Snapshot reports.


* Fitch Says Foreign Bank Rules May Cut Growth of Global Banks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Proposals by the Federal Reserve for regulating foreign banks
could raise the bar for the largest global banks yet again and,
if introduced in other jurisdictions, may hinder their growth,
Fitch Ratings says. The plans to tighten capital and liquidity
rules for foreign banks operating in the US should be technically
manageable for most foreign banks. But it is unlikely that
national regulators elsewhere would be comfortable allowing
capital and liquidity reallocation to the US without reciprocal
rules in their home jurisdictions.

The banking structural reform agenda for global policymakers is
still in flux. Heightened national regulatory requirements would
be in contrast to the sentiment behind European Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier's statements in Davos
last week that Liikanen ring-fencing proposals needed to avoid
"penalizing" lenders that were supporting the economy.

Fitch says, "The impact of the new rules would be felt most by
global trading and universal banks with large US operations.
Deutsche Bank's management discussed in its 2012 full-year
results announcement today the possible implications of tougher
US rules. Down-streaming of core capital into foreign
subsidiaries should theoretically be neutral for consolidated
ratios. But in practice we expect domestic regulators to object
to the trapping of capital and liquidity overseas if it is to the
detriment of resources available to support domestic activities.
Therefore consolidated capital requirements could be effectively
raised if the flow of capital among entities is restricted.

"We believe that a number of foreign banks would have to evaluate
their operations in the US and where they book transactions if
the capital and liquidity requirements are increased. Depending
on the final implementation and decisions by other regulators,
this could result in a more extreme scenario with a material re-
shuffling of activities across geographies, reducing the US-based
balance sheets of the foreign banks.

"Deutsche Bank's capitalization is weaker than most of its global
peers on a "look-through" Basel III common equity Tier 1 (CET1)
ratio and adjusted-leverage basis. But the pro forma regulatory
capital ratio improved to 8% at end-2012 from below 7% six months
earlier. We expect Deutsche to continue strengthening capital
ratios quickly and achieve its target 10% Basel III CET1 ratio on
a "look-through" basis earlier than end-2015 to bring this more
into line with peers.

"The Fed's proposed rules to strengthen the oversight of US
operations of foreign banks, in consultation until March 31,
would force non-US banks to establish a separate US intermediate
holding company, with more stringent capital and liquidity
standards that are also applicable to US bank holding companies.
The proposals are aimed in part at reducing the risk of de-
stabilizing runs on US dollar assets and the type of collapse in
short-term funding that occurred during the global financial
crisis."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 28 to February 1, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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