TCREUR_Public/130214.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, February 14, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 32

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Oesterreichische Among Potential Bidders


C R O A T I A

DALEKOVOD TIM: Files Request for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
OPTIMA TELEKOM: Seeks Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT CITROEN: Has Six Months to Present Restructuring Plan
PEUGEOT CITROEN: Posts Record EUR5-Bil. Net Losses in 2012


G E R M A N Y

EUROHYPO CAPITAL: Fitch Lowers Hybrid Instruments Rating to 'C'
PROVIDE VR: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class E Tranche
* German Banks May Limit Trading Rather Than Split, Fitch Says


G R E E C E

DRYSHIPS INC: Launches Public Offering of Ocean Rig Shares


I R E L A N D

B&Q IRELAND: Court Confirms Examiner; Has 4 Potential Investors
DRYDEN IX: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes From 'Ba1'
IRISH BANK: Liquidation Cues Moody's to Cut Sr. Debt Rating to C


I T A L Y

* ITALY: Medium to Large Banks Need More Capital, Visco Says


L I T H U A N I A

UKIO BANKAS: Lithuania Suspends Operations on Lack of Capital


M A L T A

FIMBANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC PROGRAM: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
HARBOURMASTER CLO 4: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to CCC
HARBOURMASTER CLO 6: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Ratings on 4 Note Classes


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'


S P A I N

AYT CAJA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB+'


S W E D E N

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: S&P Lowers Ratings on Bond Tranches to 'C'


T U R K E Y

* TURKEY: Fitch Says Anti-Terrorism Law to Cut Market Access Risk


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRITISH ARAB: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class B Notes
HIBU PLC: Expects to Reach Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors
NORTEL NETWORKS: UK Retirees Seek Arbitration After Failed Talks
PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Watch Negative

TITAN EUROPE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to Ba3


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Says Hybrid Issuance Does Not Guarantee Current Ratings


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Oesterreichische Among Potential Bidders
----------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News reports that Oesterreichische
Kontrollbank AG is among bidders for Kommunalkredit Austria AG, a
lender whose bailout cost Austrian taxpayers more than EUR2
billion (US$2.7 billion).

According to Bloomberg, four people with knowledge of the
situation said that OeKB, a Vienna-based specialist lender owned
by Austrian banks that operates with a government guarantee, and
private-equity investor Apollo Global Management LLC, based in
New York, are among those who analyzed Kommunalkredit's books and
are still in talks with the Fimbag state agency charged with
selling the company.

Kommunalkredit, previously owned by Oesterreichische Volksbanken
AG and Dexia SA, was nationalized in November 2008 to avoid a
collapse when liquidity dried up, Bloomberg recounts.  It was
split into Kommunalkredit, which continues as a lender to
municipalities with a revamped business model, and KA Finanz AG,
a "bad bank" that's winding down securities, loans and credit-
default swaps that aren't part of Kommunalkredit's main business,
Bloomberg relates.

Together, Kommunalkredit and KA Finanz have cost taxpayers EUR2.6
billion of equity-like capital so far, Bloomberg discloses.
According to Bloomberg, about EUR6.4 billion are additionally at
risk because of government guarantees for the lenders' assets and
bonds.

Fimbag has to sell the bank by the end of June under European
Union conditions of the bailout, Bloomberg says.  Fimbag Chief
Executive Officer Klaus Liebscher said the agency has asked the
EU to extend this deadline, Bloomberg relates.

Kommunalkredit Austria AG operates as a bank for municipal and
public infrastructure-related project businesses.  The company
serves local authorities, municipalities, provincial governments,
and public institutions primarily in Austria, as well as in new
EU Member States, Germany, and Switzerland.  The company was
formerly known as Kommunalkredit Depotbank AG and changed its
name to Kommunalkredit Austria AG in November 2009.  The company
was founded in 1958 and is based in Vienna, Austria.
Kommunalkredit Austria AG operates as a subsidiary of
Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes.



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C R O A T I A
=============


DALEKOVOD TIM: Files Request for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Croatian power transmission equipment maker
Dalekovod said its Dalekovod TIM unit has filed a request for the
opening of pre-bankruptcy settlement proceedings.

Dalekovod provided no further details in a bourse filing issued
on Monday, SeeNews notes.

Dalekovod TIM employs about 140 workers and produces metal guards
and protective rails for road infrastructure.


OPTIMA TELEKOM: Seeks Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
-----------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Optima Telekom said that its business bank
account has been blocked as of Monday and that it has submitted a
motion for the commencement of a pre-bankruptcy settlement
procedure.

According to SeeNews, Optima Telekom also notified its
bondholders in a bourse filing on Monday that it had failed to
secure additional funds for payment of due interest incurred on a
seven-year corporate bond issued in 2007.

Optima Telekom is a Croatian fixed-line operator.



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F R A N C E
===========


PEUGEOT CITROEN: Has Six Months to Present Restructuring Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Barker at The Financial Times reports that PSA Peugeot
Citroen has six months to present a full restructuring plan to
Brussels to justify its government lifeline, after the carmaker
won temporary EU approval for part of the French rescue of its
struggling financing arm.

The European Commission on Monday gave a green light to EUR1.2
billion of rescue aid for Banque PSA Finance in the form of
French government guarantees for its three-year bonds, saying the
intervention was necessary to prevent financial contagion, the FT
relates.

The state support is the first installment of EUR7 billion in
planned guarantees from France, the biggest state intervention
yet launched against the crisis buffeting some European mass-
market carmakers, the FT notes.

According to the FT, before the full EUR7 billion package is
sanctioned, the commission will require Peugeot to propose a
restructuring plan for its entire carmaking business, which it
sees as benefiting from the state safety net offered to its
financing operation.

Paris was initially irritated by the commission insisting on a
full state-aid investigation of its support for Peugeot, arguing
it was limited to the financing arm, which would be paying market
rates for the guarantees, the FT discloses.

After the initial analysis, Joaquin Almunia, the EU's competition
commissioner, decided it should be considered support for the
entire company -- potentially opening the door to more onerous
conditions being attached to the aid, the FT relates.

It remains unclear how stringent the conditions imposed on
Peugeot are likely to be, the FT notes.  The group is already
undergoing a painful restructuring that sheds about 8,000 jobs
and closes a plant at Aulnay outside Paris, the country's first
such closure in 20 years, the FT says.

According to the FT, any plan will need to satisfy Brussels that
Peugeot can return to viability in the absence of state support.
When approving state aid, Brussels can also impose restrictions
on business practices to ensure that Peugeot cannot undercut
rivals as a result of its public support.

PSA Peugeot Citroen S.A. -- http://www.psa-peugeot-citroen.com/
-- is a France-based manufacturer of passenger cars and light
commercial vehicles.  It produces vehicles under the Peugeot and
Citroen brands.  In addition to its automobile division, the
Company includes Banque PSA Finance, which supports the sale of
Peugeot and Citroen vehicles by financing new vehicle and
replacement parts inventory for dealers and offering financing
and related services to car buyers; Faurecia, an automotive
equipment manufacturer focused on four component families: seats,
vehicle interior, front end and exhaust systems; Gefco, which
offers logistics services covering the entire supply chain,
including overland, sea and air transport, industrial logistics,
container management, vehicle preparation and distribution, and
customs and value added tax (VAT) representation, and Peugeot
Motocycles, which manufactures scooters and motorcycles.

                           *    *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 12,
2012, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
ratings of Peugeot S.A. ("PSA") and its rated subsidiary GIE PSA
Tresorerie ("GIE"). This concludes the review initiated by
Moody's on July 26, 2012.  The outlook on the ratings is
negative.


PEUGEOT CITROEN: Posts Record EUR5-Bil. Net Losses in 2012
----------------------------------------------------------
James Boxell at The Financial Times reports that PSA Peugeot
Citro‰n, the ailing French carmaker, made record net losses in
2012 of EUR5 billion but said it remained on target to cut its
rate of operational cash burn by half this year.

The heavy losses had been expected, the FT notes.  The company
announced a EUR3.9 billion writedown last week after being forced
to reassess the value of assets in its automotive business, the
FT recounts.

The net loss was slightly better than feared by some analysts,
the FT states.  On an operating level, the company lost EUR576
million, compared with a EUR1.1 billion operating profit in 2011,
the FT discloses.  According to the FT, sales fell 5% to EUR55.4
billion, while sales in the struggling automotive division were
10% lower at EUR38.3 billion.

Peugeot, the FT says, has struggled badly because it is heavily
exposed to the depressed car markets in France, Spain and Italy.
Its European sales fell by 15% in a market that declined 8.6%,
the FT notes. It has been forced to seek a EUR7 billion state aid
rescue package from the French government for its financing arm,
the FT recounts.

PSA Peugeot Citroen S.A. -- http://www.psa-peugeot-citroen.com/
-- is a France-based manufacturer of passenger cars and light
commercial vehicles.  It produces vehicles under the Peugeot and
Citroen brands.  In addition to its automobile division, the
Company includes Banque PSA Finance, which supports the sale of
Peugeot and Citroen vehicles by financing new vehicle and
replacement parts inventory for dealers and offering financing
and related services to car buyers; Faurecia, an automotive
equipment manufacturer focused on four component families: seats,
vehicle interior, front end and exhaust systems; Gefco, which
offers logistics services covering the entire supply chain,
including overland, sea and air transport, industrial logistics,
container management, vehicle preparation and distribution, and
customs and value added tax (VAT) representation, and Peugeot
Motocycles, which manufactures scooters and motorcycles.

                           *    *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 12,
2012, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
ratings of Peugeot S.A. ("PSA") and its rated subsidiary GIE PSA
Tresorerie ("GIE"). This concludes the review initiated by
Moody's on July 26, 2012.  The outlook on the ratings is
negative.



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G E R M A N Y
=============


EUROHYPO CAPITAL: Fitch Lowers Hybrid Instruments Rating to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG's and
Hypothekenbank Frankfurt International S.A.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'A-' with a Stable Outlook. At the same
time, Fitch has downgraded the hybrid instruments of Eurohypo
Capital Funding Trusts I and II to 'C' from 'CC'.

Rating Rationale

The support-driven ratings of the banks are at their Support
Rating Floors and reflect Fitch's view of the high likelihood of
support from the Federal Republic of Germany ('AAA'/Stable),
particularly in view of their large size and outstanding issuance
in the Pfandbrief market.

The downgrade of the hybrid instruments to 'C' from 'CC' reflects
that the instruments are non-performing. Fitch does not expect
the instruments to be serviced for a prolonged period, and any
servicing of the instruments would likely result in severe
economic losses, particularly in light of the fact that the bank
is being wound down.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, SUPPORT RATING AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Fitch expects that state support would be forthcoming via the
bank's ultimate owner, Commerzbank AG ('A+'/Stable). Fitch's view
of the likelihood of state support reflects HF's
interconnectivity with its ultimate parent's creditworthiness and
its large volume of issued German Pfandbriefe. HF has a letter of
backing (Patronatserklaerung) from Commerzbank and a profit and
loss transfer agreement is in place with its direct owner,
Commerzbank Inlandsbanken Holding GmbH (not rated), a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Commerzbank.

Any change in the support-driven ratings would result from a
change in either Fitch's view of the Federal Republic of
Germany's own creditworthiness or in the agency's opinion of the
authorities' propensity to provide support. Fitch does not assign
a Viability Rating (VR) to HF as it is in orderly wind-down mode.
In addition, HF is highly operational and financially integrated
within Commerzbank Group.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Fitch views Commerzbank's 'bbb-' VR as the initial source of
support for the bank's subordinated debt, should it be required,
given the Patronatserklaerung and profit and loss transfer
agreement. The degree of notching relative to Commerzbank's VR
reflects Fitch's opinion that there is greater non-performance
risk on HF's sub debt than there is on Commerzbank's own
subordinated debt (rated 'BB+'). This is because HF is in wind
down and its large size relative to Commerzbank means a situation
could arise where additional support for HF ultimately needs to
be channelled from federal sources.

Under such circumstances, support for subordinated debt cannot be
assumed, given the precedent in the EU for subordinated debt
burden sharing. The rating of the subordinated debt is therefore
sensitive to an increase in the likelihood of such an event
occurring.

Fitch also notes that in 2012 the European Commission changed the
condition imposed on Commerzbank in 2009 to divest its subsidiary
Eurohypo, now HF, into a condition that the company be run down.
As a bank in wind-down, HF is not a viable entity.

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES
HFI's ratings are in line with its 100% parent HF as the
subsidiary benefits indirectly from the support provided to the
parent, as well as having a Patronatserklaerung from HF. As a
result the ratings sensitivities for HFI are the same as those
for HF.

The rating actions are:

HF:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B+'

HFI:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

EUROHYPO Capital Funding Trust I/II preferred stock
(XS0169058012, DE000A0DZJZ7): downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'


PROVIDE VR: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class E Tranche
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Provide VR 2003-1 & Provide VR 2004-1
and revised the Outlook to Stable on two tranches.

The affirmations reflect the transactions' performance, the
current credit enhancement levels for the respective tranches and
the expected loss allocations to the junior tranches.

Both transactions are synthetic securitizations backed by
residential mortgages originated by several institutions
belonging to the German Cooperative Banking group.

Following the early redemption date for Provide VR 2004-1 all
notes except the class D and E notes were paid in full and the
remaining collateral consists of defaulted and delinquent loans
only (roughly EUR7 million). The balance outstanding on the class
D notes corresponds to 15.3% of its initial amount and the rated
notes will be reduced as the protected amount reduces by regular
amortization and recoveries on defaulted loans. Losses remaining
after the sale of properties of defaulted borrowers are expected
to be further allocated to the class E notes (not rated), which
act as the first loss piece.

The current outstanding balance of the first loss piece is 61.6%
of its initial amount (compared with 66% 12 months ago). Fitch
has factored into its loss expectation the fact that the
portfolio consists of overdue reference claims only. The agency
does not expect the losses to reach the class D notes, and deems
the credit enhancement available (82.8%) to the notes as
sufficient to withstand the 'BBsf' rating stresses, which is
reflected in the affirmation of the rating and revision of the
Outlook to Stable from Negative. The cumulative loss rate as of
the most recent payment date (January 2013) was 0.7% of the
original portfolio. Fitch has analyzed the transaction for tail
risk arising from the reduced number of outstanding loans (131).
In line with its criteria, the agency may decide to withdraw the
ratings once the number of loans reduces further.

In Provide VR 2003-1, losses have been fully allocated to the
first loss piece (class F) and are now being allocated to the
class E notes ('Csf'). At present, the losses allocated to the
class E notes amount to EUR3.3m, and the agency expects the loss
amounts to reach the full outstanding balance of the class E
notes by legal final maturity. Fitch considers it possible that
losses will also be allocated to the class D notes, as reflected
by the current rating of 'CCsf'. The cumulative loss rate as of
December 2012 was 2.0% of the original pool balance. The credit
enhancement available to the rest of the structure remains
sufficient to withstand the current rating stresses and for this
reason the agency affirmed the current ratings and revised the
Outlook on the class C notes to Stable.

The rating actions are:

Provide VR 2003-1 Plc:

Senior credit default swap: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A+ (ISIN DE000A0AAZ03): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A (ISIN DE000A0AAZ11): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN DE000A0AAZ29): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN DE000A0AAZ37): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative
Class D (ISIN DE000A0AAZ45): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 60%
Class E (ISIN DE000A0AAZ52): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
0%

Provide VR 2004-1 Plc:

Senior credit default swap: Paid in Full
Class A+ (ISIN DE000A0DDC04): Paid in Full
Class A (ISIN DE000A0DDC12): Paid in Full
Class B (ISIN DE000A0DDC20): Paid in Full
Class C (ISIN DE000A0DDC38): Paid in Full
Class D (ISIN DE000A0DDC46): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative


* German Banks May Limit Trading Rather Than Split, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Some of the banks that qualify for a potential split under draft
legislation agreed by the German government last week may choose
to stop the restricted activities rather than incur the costs of
separation, as the affected businesses make relatively small
contributions to earnings, Fitch Ratings says. Only a few banks
would end up putting trading activities into separate
subsidiaries, although up to a dozen may fall under the scope of
the proposed legislation.

"Placing "risky activities" into separate subsidiaries would be
neutral to slightly positive for bank credit profiles. We
understand that the parent banks would not be allowed to make
declarations of backing ("Patronatserklaerung") or profit-sharing
agreements, which are typical support arrangements for German
companies. We would expect some support to flow to the
subsidiaries to avoid reputational damage. However, as the
regulator would restrict parent banks from supporting them in
times of stress, downside risk for the parent banks could
reduce," Fitch states.

"The separation will have minimal impact at the consolidated
group level. However, it could lead to greater ratings
differentiation between legal entities within a banking group.

"Banks with "risky activities" assets that exceed EUR100bn, or
20% of balance sheets greater than EUR90bn would be affected
under the draft legislation. This limit covers the entire trading
book, which includes derivatives for hedging purposes (those that
do not technically qualify for hedge accounting) and part of the
German GAAP liquidity reserves.

"Proprietary and speculative trading, credit and guarantee
business with hedge funds and leveraged alternative investment
funds, and high frequency trading will have to be separated or
closed according to the draft legislation. Like their French
peers, German banks would not be required to separate market-
making activities. This runs counter to the initial
recommendations of the European Liikanen Group. Deutsche Bank is
the most obvious candidate for setting up a separate subsidiary,
but smaller capital market banks may also be affected, for
instance Commerzbank, LBBW and Unicredit Bank AG.

"If collateralized exposures, such as secured prime brokerage
operations, are included the activities being separated would be
much greater than just cordoning off unsecured exposures. In
addition, the regulator, BaFin, could force a stop or spin-off of
market-making or other businesses that it views as risky or
speculative if they pose a threat to the solvency of the bank.
BaFin has discretionary power to assess all lenders.

"The German banking reforms are likely to come into force in
2014, before any structural reform is decided at European level.
They would require banks to separate their risky businesses by
July 2015. If ring-fencing additional trading activities becomes
a requirement under European legislation, Germany would have to
comply."



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G R E E C E
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DRYSHIPS INC: Launches Public Offering of Ocean Rig Shares
-----------------------------------------------------------
DryShips Inc. on Feb. 11 disclosed that it is offering 5,000,000
common shares of Ocean Rig that it owns in an underwritten public
offering pursuant to Ocean Rig's effective shelf registration
statement on Form F-3ASR filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  Following the completion of the offering, DryShips
is expected to own approximately 61.3% of Ocean Rig's outstanding
shares.

Deutsche Bank Securities and Credit Suisse are acting as joint
book-running managers for the offering.

                       About DryShips Inc.

Based in Greece, DryShips Inc. -- http://www.dryships.com/--
-- owns and operates drybulk carriers and offshore oil
deep water drilling units that operate worldwide.  As of
Sept. 10, 2010, DryShips owns a fleet of 40 drybulk carriers
(including newbuildings), comprising 7 Capesize, 31 Panamax and 2
Supramax, with a combined deadweight tonnage of over 3.6 million
tons and 6 offshore oil deep water drilling units, comprising of
2 ultra deep water semisubmersible drilling rigs and 4 ultra deep
water newbuilding drillships.

DryShips's common stock is listed on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market where it trades under the symbol "DRYS".

On Nov. 25, 2010, DryShips Inc. entered into a waiver letter
for its US$230.0 million credit facility dated Sept. 10, 2007,
as amended, extending the waiver of certain covenants through
Dec. 31, 2010.

The Company reported a net loss of US$47.28 million in 2011,
compared with net income of US$190.45 million during the prior
year.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2011, showed
US$8.62 billion in total assets, US$4.68 billion in total
liabilities, and US$3.93 billion in total equity.



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I R E L A N D
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B&Q IRELAND: Court Confirms Examiner; Has 4 Potential Investors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ann O'Loughlin at Irish Examiner reports that the High Court has
confirmed an examiner to B&Q Ireland Ltd.

According to Irish Examiner, Mr. Justice Peter Kelly noted that
as part of cost-cutting proposals, B&Q's two stores in Athlone
and Waterford are to close with the "regrettable" loss of 92
jobs, 69 part time and 23 full time.

A key ingredient for the survival of some of the company's other
stores includes renegotiation of what the judge described as
"extraordinary" rents, Irish Examiner notes.  The court heard
that total rent roll for the nine stores is EUR11.6 million a
year, EUR5.8 million above market rates, Irish Examiner relates.

The judge was told that Declan McDonald, who was appointed
interim examiner to the company late last month, had been
encouraged by expressions of interest from four potential
investors in addition to the company's parent, Kingfisher plc,
Irish Examiner recounts.

Rossa Fanning, counsel for B&Q, presented letters to the court in
which Kingfisher, owed some EUR17 million by the company,
indicated it was prepared to support the company through the
examinership process and to invest in it on certain conditions,
including implementation of a cost-cutting program and the
successful negotiation of a survival scheme, Irish Examiner
discloses.

Mr. Justice Kelly on Tuesday said he was satisfied to appoint
Mr. McDonald as examiner, Irish Examiner relates.  There was no
opposition to the proposed appointment while the Revenue
Commissioners took a neutral position, Irish Examiner notes.
There are no arrears owed to the Revenue and the company has
undertaken to meet payments due shortly to the Revenue, totaling
about EUR1.25 million, Irish Examiner states.

B&Q Ireland is a DIY chain.


DRYDEN IX: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes From 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Dryden IX Senior Loan Fund p.l.c.:

USD34.1M Class B-1 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct
25, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR3.4M Class B-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct
25, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR2.7M Class B-3 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct
25, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

USD74.15M Dollar Fund Notes (current rated balance is USD13.6M),
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

EUR30.3M Euro Fund Notes (current rated balance is EUR5.5M),
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the Class A-1 and Class A-2
notes issued by Dryden IX Senior Loan Fund p.l.c.:

USD262.5M Class A-1 Notes (current balance is USD237.9M),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

EUR115.1M Class A-2 Notes (current balance is EUR104.3M),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

The ratings of the Dollar Fund Note and the Euro Fund Note
address the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal
final maturity. The 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Fund Note on the Issue Date minus the
aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date,
either through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance
may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Dryden IX Senior Loan Fund p.l.c., issued in October 2005, is a
multi-currency Collateralized Loan Obligation backed by a
portfolio of mostly US Senior Secured loans. The portfolio is
managed by Pramerica Investment Management and it has entered
amortization phase in September 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of credit improvement of the underlying
portfolio since the rating action in October 2011. in addition
the transaction has recently entered amortization phase and will
begin to deleverage, which is credit positive for the
transaction.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an improved
average rating of the portfolio (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In particular, as
of the latest trustee report dated December 2012, the WARF is
currently 2,403 compared to 2,553 in the September 2011 report,
and securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 4.19% of
the underlying portfolio versus 7.84% in September 2011.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR
499.6 million, defaulted par of EUR9 million, a weighted average
default probability of 15.43% (consistent with a WARF of 2,495),
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.68% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 61 and a weighted
average spread of 3.57%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 92.97% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

The WARF calculation used in the previous rating action was
derived as a weighted average of the default probability of each
asset's rating and remaining life, rather than the weighted
average of the default probability of each asset's rating at 10
years as called for in the methodology. The rating action
reflects the adjustment in the WARF calculation.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the
rated notes:

Sensitivity scenario to address the refinancing and sovereign
risks in the portfolio: Approximately 7.49% of the portfolio are
Euro loans rated B3 and below with maturities between 2014 and
2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. The
portfolio is also exposed 2.64% to obligors located in Ireland
and Spain. Moody's considered the scenario where the WARF of the
portfolio was increased to 2,606 by forcing to Ca the credit
quality of 25% of such exposures subject to refinancing or
sovereign risks. This scenario generated model outputs that were
consistent with the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the liquidation agents behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Portfolio Amortization: Another source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether amortization from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering of the
transaction may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.


IRISH BANK: Liquidation Cues Moody's to Cut Sr. Debt Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the unguaranteed senior
ratings of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation to C. The
unguaranteed senior unsecured debt rating was downgraded to C,
from Caa2, and the long-term bank deposit rating was downgraded
to C, from Caa1. The senior unsecured debt that is guaranteed by
the Irish Government was affirmed at Ba1, negative outlook. The
Not-Prime short-term rating, the E bank financial strength
rating, and the C rating on the remaining junior securities were
unaffected. Moody's will subsequently withdraw all the ratings.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action has been triggered by IBRC having been placed
into liquidation following the introduction of emergency
legislation by the Irish Government. This is part of a wider
transaction that has enabled the Irish Government to extinguish
the expensive promissory notes used to recapitalize Anglo Irish
Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society (the entities that
formed IBRC). The transaction will involve the National Asset
Management Agency (NAMA) acquiring, with NAMA bonds, the floating
charge that the Central Bank of Ireland held over IBRC in return
for the provision of funding. Then following a valuation of the
assets by the "Special Liquidator" NAMA will acquire any assets
that are not purchased by other third parties. At this point if
the value of these assets is less than the nominal value of NAMA
Bonds issued to the CBI to acquire the floating charge, then the
shortfall will be made good to NAMA by the Minister for Finance.
In this scenario there will be no recovery for unsecured
creditors. However if the total value of these assets is greater
than the nominal value of the NAMA bonds issued to the CBI the
excess will be transferred to the pool available for unsecured
creditors. Only in this latter scenario will there be a recovery
for the unsecured creditors, including the unguaranteed senior
unsecured bondholders, and the depositors who are not covered by
the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme or the deposit
protection scheme.

In the event that there were assets available to the unsecured
creditors these would need to be shared with the Minister for
Finance who it is estimated (by the Department of Finance) will
be owed between EUR 0.9 billion and EUR 1.1 billion due to paying
out under the ELG scheme. As a result of this Moody's expects
that any recovery for unsecured creditors, including the
unguaranteed senior unsecured debt, and deposits not covered by
the deposit protection scheme or the ELG scheme, will be very
limited and therefore the ratings have been downgraded to C.

Moody's expects that holders of the senior unsecured debt that
benefits from a guarantee from the Irish Government will be able
to make a claim under the ELG scheme, and that they will
therefore be paid in full and on demand. As a result the rating
of Ba1 with a negative outlook has been affirmed.

The other ratings of the bank, including the Not-Prime short-term
rating, the E bank financial strength rating, and the C rating on
the remaining junior securities are unaffected by this action.

Following this rating action, Moody's will withdraw all of IBRC's
ratings as the bank has been placed into liquidation.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


* ITALY: Medium to Large Banks Need More Capital, Visco Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Frye and Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News report that
European Central Bank council member Ignazio Visco said some
medium to large Italian banks need more capital as the country's
recession drags on.

"Some large- and medium-sized groups still must make progress on
the road to broadening their resources," Bloomberg quotes Mr.
Visco, also head of Italy's central bank, as saying.  Increasing
capital "allows a reduction of financial leverage without cutting
credit support to the real economy.  The strengthening is in the
interests of shareholders."

Italy is mired in its fourth recession since 2001 as Prime
Minster Mario Monti's policies to contain the budget deficit curb
domestic demand, Bloomberg discloses.

The image of Italy's banks has been affected by the fallout of
accounting irregularities and criminal probes of Banca Monte Dei
Paschi di Siena SpA, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Visco, as cited by Bloomberg, said that regulators need more
power to fire managers at the companies it oversees.

"When a lender isn't in a situation of crisis, the Bank of Italy
can ask shareholders to change management, but it can't overrule
their decision," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Visco as saying.
Regulators "must be able to effectively intervene in cases where,
on the basis of established evidence, they see fit to oppose the
appointment of managers or remove them."



=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


UKIO BANKAS: Lithuania Suspends Operations on Lack of Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Bradley at Bloomberg News reports that Lithuania suspended
the operations of Ukio Bankas AB.

According to Bloomberg, the central bank, based in Vilnius, said
on Tuesday in an e-mailed statement Ukio had insufficient capital
and liquidity and refused to stop lending money to companies
associated with majority owner Vladimir Romanov, who also owns
Edinburgh soccer club Heart of Midlothian Plc.

According to Bloomberg, prosecutors said they'd investigate
"suspicious transactions" in 2005 to 2012.

"Bankruptcy is the last option -- our priority is for Ukio Bankas
to continue operating after a restructuring," Bloomberg quotes
central bank Chairman Vitas Vasiliauskas as saying on Tuesday.
"All other banks operating in Lithuania and foreign bank branches
implement prudential requirements and there's no
risk to their stability."

The Nasdaq OMX Vilnius stock exchange said on Tuesday in a
statement that it had suspended trading of Ukio shares at the
central bank's request, Bloomberg relates.

Mr. Vasiliauskas, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the Kaunas-
based bank's situation is better than that of Snoras.  The
central bank appointed Adomas Audickas, a former deputy economy
minister, as temporary administrator to assess and report on Ukio
within six days, Bloomberg discloses.

Ukio had assets of LTL4.1 billion on Sept. 30, equal to about 5%
of Lithuania's total, Bloomberg says, citing the Association of
Lithuanian Banks' Web site.

Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius on Tuesday said that money
held at the bank by residents is covered by state deposit
insurance, Bloomberg notes.  The lender's deposits totaled LTL3.5
billion at the end of the third quarter, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Vasiliauskas said that Siauliu
Bankas, a Lithuanian lender whose biggest shareholder is the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, told the
central bank on Tuesday that it would be prepared to participate
in any possible restructuring of Ukio.

Mr. Romanov owns 64.9% of Ukio, which lost LTL44 million (US$17
million) in the first nine months of 2012, Bloomberg discloses.
The central bank said that loans to companies related to him
comprise the largest part of Ukio's problem-loan portfolio,
Bloomberg notes.

"The shareholders and management of Ukio didn't fulfill the loan-
restructuring plan and disregarded the Bank of Lithuania's order
to reduce the part of the loan portfolio related to the main
shareholder," Bloomberg quotes the central bank as saying in its
statement.

Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies.  It
is Lithuania's sixth-largest lender by assets.



=========
M A L T A
=========


FIMBANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Malta-based Fimbank's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB', Short-term IDR at 'B', Viability
Rating (VR) at 'bb' and revised the Outlook on the IDR to Stable
from Negative. The Support Rating is affirmed at '5' and the
Support Rating Floor at 'No Floor'.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - IDRs and VR

The bank's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic strength as reflected
in its VR.

The ratings affirmation reflects the bank's niche focus on trade
finance, resilient profitability and relatively healthy asset
quality, whose risk is mitigated by the secured, short-term
nature of much of its business. However, the bank is relatively
small in absolute terms and as a result, both funding and assets
are highly concentrated. Furthermore, Fitch's view is that its
widespread business, including a large number of minority stakes
in various affiliates, increases its operational risk and puts
additional pressure on the value of its franchise. Fitch
considers its core capital ratio of 14.8% at end-June 2012 to be
just adequate for its rating level.

The revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the actions FIM
has taken to improve its funding profile, to find new sources of
capital and to bring in new shareholders. These should enable it
to compete more effectively in its chosen markets. Nonetheless,
the ratings remain sensitive to continued losses at its
affiliates and low profitability in its traditional trade finance
business. Furthermore, the ratings could be under negative
pressure again if a change in shareholding does not result in an
improvement in capital ratios and a more focused strategy. Upward
rating movement is limited given the bank's small size, limited
franchise and low profitability.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

Although the bank would first look for support from its
shareholders, the availability of such support cannot be
ascertained by Fitch and therefore it is not factored into the
ratings. The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect
Fitch's view that support from the Maltese authorities may be
possible but is not certain and, again is not factored into the
ratings. For the above reasons, the lowest Support Rating of '5'
and the Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' have been affirmed.

The Support Rating is sensitive to the rating and propensity of
Malta to support FIM. However, a strengthening of the shareholder
base may result in an upward revision of the Support Rating (and
withdrawal of the Support Rating Floor), depending on Fitch's
view of the ability and propensity of any new shareholder to
provide support on a timely basis as and when required.

FIM is a bank based in Malta that specializes in international
trade finance, forfaiting and factoring. It fully owns a
forfaiting subsidiary, London Forfaiting Company, and has
interests in factoring ventures with local operators in emerging
countries. It is currently in discussion with the KIPCO group of
Kuwait regarding their acquisition of a majority stake in FIM.
The deal is still subject to regulatory approvals.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook revised to Stable
    from Negative

-- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

-- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'

-- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

-- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC PROGRAM: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in in E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-I (E-MAC
2007-I), E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL 2008-I (E-MAC
2008-I), E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL 2008-II (E-MAC
2008-II), and E-MAC Program II B.V. Compartment NL 2008-IV (E-MAC
2008-IV).

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Lowered its rating on E-MAC 2007-I's class D notes and
      affirmed its ratings on the class A2, B, C, and E notes.

   -- Affirmed its ratings on E-MAC 2008-I's class A1, A2, B, C,
      and D notes.

   -- Lowered its rating on E-MAC 2008-II's class D notes and
      affirmed its ratings on the class A2, B, and C notes.

   -- Lowered its rating on E-MAC 2008-IV's class D notes and
      affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, and C notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's performance review, its credit
and cash flow analysis using information from the servicer (as of
January 2013), and the application of its Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria.

Apart from E-MAC 2008-I, the level of arrears increased in all
EMAC transactions throughout 2012.  Although this is not
necessarily the case in all four EMAC transactions analyzed, this
reflects their overall deteriorating performance, which is below
S&P's Dutch RMBS index.

The reserve funds are either amortizing, such as E-MAC 2007-I, or
drawn due to realized losses, therefore reducing the level of
credit enhancement available to the junior classes of notes in
three of the four transactions.

A key factor in S&P's analysis is the observed decline in Dutch
house prices, which has been most significant in the past six
months.  S&P's calculations show that the weighted-average
indexed loan-to-value (LTV) ratio has increased for all four
transactions since its previous review.

S&P incorporated Dutch house price decline into its analysis,
which subsequently increased the weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) and weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for
all four transactions.

All four transactions feature put options, which the noteholders
have the right to exercise on the first put date and each
interest payment date (IPD) thereafter.  The put option notes
were not redeemed on the first put date for E-MAC 2008-I, E-MAC
2008-II, and E-MAC 2008-IV, as the mortgage payment transactions
(MPT) provider, CMIS Nederland B.V., did not have the financial
means to grant the servicing advance.  As a result, the excess
spread received as part of the structural features has decreased,
in line with the terms of the swap agreement.

S&P's ratings on the notes in all four transactions do not
address the repayment of the notes at a put date or the payment
of subordinated extension interest after the put date.

Some senior note-holders of other EMAC transactions have voted to
proceed with legal action against the MPT providers because they
did not provide the servicing advance in order to redeem the
notes on the first put date.  S&P has factored potential legal
costs into its analysis, where relevant.

E-MAC 2007-I, 2008-I, 2008-II, and 2008-IV are backed by Dutch
residential mortgages originated by CMIS Nederland B.V.
(previously GMAC-RFC Nederland B.V.).

                           E-MAC 2007-I

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on July 12, 2012,
the level of credit enhancement available has increased for the
class A2, B, and C notes, and remained at the same level for the
class D notes because the reserve fund amortization took place
before S&P's last review.

Since S&P's previous review, the level of 90+ days arrears has
increased to 1.42% from 92 bps.  Despite the increase in arrears,
S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the level of credit
enhancement available to the class A2, B, C, and E notes is
commensurate with the assigned rating levels.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its ratings on the class A2, B, C, and E notes.

At the same time, S&P has lowered to 'BB- (sf) from 'BB (sf)' its
rating on the class D notes, because S&P considers this class of
notes to be vulnerable to the performance deterioration and the
effect of falling Dutch house prices.

Rating    WAFF (%)      WALS (%)

AAA       19.15         41.49
AA        15.72         37.93
A         12.18         32.83
BBB       7.92          29.61
BB        6.19          24.36

                           E-MAC 2008-I

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Oct. 6, 2011,
the level of credit enhancement available to the class A1, A2, B,
and C notes has increased slightly, but has decreased for the
class D notes due to the draw on the reserve fund, which is 15%
below its target required amount under the transaction documents.

The reserve fund has been drawn in recent quarters, as losses on
foreclosed properties have been realized.  This has resulted in
decreasing 90+ days arrears.

Since S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the level of credit
enhancement available to the class A1, A2, B, C, and D notes is
commensurate with the assigned rating levels, S&P has affirmed
its ratings on these classes of notes.

Rating    WAFF (%)      WALS (%)

AAA       16.63         39.73
AA        13.45         36.13
A         10.09         31.14
BBB       6.41          28.02
BB        4.79          23.02

                           E-MAC 2008-II

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Oct. 6, 2011,
the level of credit enhancement available to the class A and B
notes increased slightly, but decreased for the class C and D
notes due to the amortization of the reserve fund.  The reserve
fund, which is 10% below its target required amount under the
transaction documents, has been drawn and 90+ days arrears have
increased to more than 1.14%.

Since S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the level of credit
enhancement available to the class A2, B, and C notes is
commensurate with the assigned 'A (sf)' rating levels, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.

At the same time, S&P has lowered to 'BB- (sf) from 'BBB (sf)'
its rating on the class D notes, because S&P considers this class
of notes to be vulnerable to the performance deterioration and
the effect of falling Dutch house prices.

Rating    WAFF (%)      WALS (%)

AAA       17.87         38.60
AA        14.48         35.06
A         11.01         30.07
BBB       7.17          27.00
BB        5.50          22.19

                          E-MAC 2008-IV

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Oct. 6, 2011,
the level of credit enhancement available to all classes of notes
has increased.  Since then, the reserve fund has been drawn and
90+ days arrears have increased sharply to more than 1.7%--the
most significant level of deterioration in all four transactions.

Since S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the level of credit
enhancement available to the class A, B, and C notes is
commensurate with the assigned 'A (sf)' rating levels, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.

At the same time, S&P has lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'
its rating on the class D notes based on the result of S&P's
cash-flow analysis, reflecting the performance deterioration and
the effect of falling Dutch house prices.

Rating    WAFF (%)      WALS (%)

AAA       19.37         41.48
AA        15.80         37.95
A         12.00         32.88
BBB       7.91          29.67
BB        6.12          24.34

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (RBS; A/Stable/A-1) is the
guaranteed investment contract (GIC) provider for all four
transactions.  S&P do not consider the GIC agreements to be in
line with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria.  Therefore, S&P's
2012 counterparty criteria cap at 'A (sf)' the maximum potential
ratings in all four transactions to reflect the 'A' issuer credit
rating on RBS.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To                 From

E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-I
EUR602.7 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate And
Excess-Spread
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

D           BB- (sf)          BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2          A (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
E           CCC (sf)

E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL 2008-I
EUR253.4 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate And
Excess-Spread
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A1          A (sf)
A2          A (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           A- (sf)
D           BBB-(sf)

E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL 2008-II
EUR121.65 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed And Excess-Spread
Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

D           BB- (sf)           BBB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2          A (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           A (sf)

E-MAC Program II B.V. Compartment NL 2008-IV
EUR263.2 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
And
Excess-Spread-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

D           BB (sf)            BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A           A (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           A (sf)


HARBOURMASTER CLO 4: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Harbourmaster CLO 4 B.V.'s class A4,
B1, B2E and B2F notes, as follows:

EUR132.3m Class A1 (ISIN XS0203060339): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR28.0m Class A2E (ISIN XS0203060925): affirmed at 'AAsf';
Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

EUR40.0m Class A2F (ISIN XS0203061063): affirmed at 'AAsf';
Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

EUR32.0m Class A3 (ISIN XS0203061493): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
Outlook Negative

EUR16.0m Class A4 (ISIN XS0203061659): downgraded to 'Bsf' from
'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

EUR11.0m Class B1 (ISIN XS0203061907): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'B-sf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 30%

EUR3.1m Class B2E (ISIN XS0203062467): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'B-sf'; RE 0%

EUR4.7m Class B2F (ISIN XS0203063945): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'B-sf'; RE 0%

EUR26.6m Class S1 (ISIN XS0203066294): affirmed at 'AA+sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR3.1m Class S2 (ISIN XS0203066534): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'B-sf'; RE 30%

The downgrades of the mezzanine and junior notes reflect the
excess spread compression in the transaction. While the weighted
average spread (WAS) of the assets has increased to 3.32% from
2.93% at the last review in February 2012, this was more than
offset by the expiration of the interest rate hedge designed to
mitigate the mismatch between fixed-rate liabilities and
floating-rate assets. The weighted average life (WAL) has
remained largely unchanged at 3.50 years due to extensions in the
maturities of the portfolio assets, which accompanied the
increase in WAS. This compares with a WAL of 3.57 years in
February 2012.

On the liability side, there is a mismatch between the floating-
rate interest received from the portfolio and interest payments
due on fixed rate liabilities. The class A2F notes pay a fixed
coupon of 4.398%, which is senior to the A2 overcollateralization
(OC) test. Furthermore, the class B2F notes pay a fixed coupon of
10.908%, leading to very high interest rate accruals once the
class B1 OC test is breached. At closing, the interest rate
mismatch was mitigated by an interest rate floor. However, the
floor expired in January 2013, leaving the transaction
particularly vulnerable in the current low interest rate
environment.

The affirmation of the class A1, A2E, A2F and A3 notes reflects
the adequate credit enhancement levels for the current ratings.
The notes have benefited from deleveraging following the end of
the reinvestment period in January 2010. All principal proceeds
are now used to amortize liabilities, as the portfolio manager's
ability to reinvest unscheduled principal proceeds ended in
January 2012.

The Negative Outlook on all non-senior notes reflects their
sensitivity to additional maturity extensions as lower-quality
obligors may seek to amend loans in the absence of viable
refinancing options.

The portfolio credit quality has deteriorated, with the share of
assets rated 'CCC' or below increasing to 26.5 % from 20.1% in
February 2012. Among the assets rated 'CCC' or below is the
largest asset in the portfolio, which accounts for 3.4% of total
assets. The portfolio has experienced four additional defaults
since the last review.

None of the OC tests has failed since the last review. The
additional OC test failed briefly towards the end of 2012,
causing 65% of excess spread to be diverted towards the repayment
of the class A1 notes and the remainder used to repay the class
B2E and B2F notes. The interest coverage has been passing with an
increasing cushion.

Harbourmaster CLO 4 B.V. is a securitization of a portfolio of
mainly European senior secured and unsecured loans. The portfolio
is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe
Limited.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 6: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 6 B.V.'s notes, as
follows:

Class A1 (XS0233868107): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class A2 (XS0233873875): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative

Class A3 (XS0233875227): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class A4E (XS0233876209): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class A4F (XS0233876381): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class B1 (XS0233876621): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative

Class B2 (XS0233877603): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative

Class S1 Combo (XS0234258076): 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
withdrawn

Class S3 Combo (XS0234260643): 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
withdrawn

Class S4 Combo (XS0234648375): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook
Negative

Class S6 Combo (XS0234649852): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook
Negative

The affirmation reflects levels of credit enhancement (CE)
commensurate with the ratings and the transaction's stable
performance since the last review in March 2012. The class S4 and
S6 combination notes' ratings have been affirmed in line with the
affirmations of their respective rated component notes. The
ratings of combination notes S1 and S3 have been withdrawn as
these have been exchanged for their underlying component notes,
and subsequently cancelled.

The senior notes continue to delever which has resulted in
increased CE levels across the capital structure. The Outlook
revision on the class A2 notes to Stable from Negative reflects
the positive cushions of available CE at the current rating
stresses. The Negative Outlooks on the mezzanine and junior notes
reflect their vulnerability to a clustering of defaults and
negative rating migration in the European leveraged loan market
due to the potential sensitivity to the leveraged loan
refinancing wall.

There has been a marginal improvement in the portfolio credit
quality with assets rated 'CCC' or below at 12%, down from 16% at
the last review. Currently there are no defaulted assets in the
portfolio. All the overcollateralization tests and the interest
coverage test are passing above their required thresholds with
increased cushions.

The weighted average spread on the portfolio continues to
increase and is correlated with amend and extend activity on the
underlying loans. A considerable number of assets in the
portfolio have extended their maturities since the last review
and as a result the weighted average life of the portfolio has
only stepped down to 3.80 from 3.90 over the past year. The
transaction has one long dated asset in the portfolio with a
maturity beyond the legal maturity of the notes and accounts for
0.77% of the portfolio.

As part of its analysis, Fitch considered the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to the transaction's exposure to countries where
Fitch has imposed a country rating cap less than the ratings on
any notes in the transaction. These countries are currently
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, but may include additional
countries if there is sovereign rating migration. Fitch believes
that exposure of up to 15% of the total investment amount to
these countries, under the same average portfolio profile and
assuming the current ratings on the UK and eurozone countries are
stable, would not have a material negative impact on the notes'
ratings.

Harbourmaster CLO 6 B.V. is a securitization of mainly European
senior secured loans with the total note issuance of EUR511
million invested in a target portfolio of EUR500 million. The
portfolio is actively managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe
and advised by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe
Limited.


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) its 'CCC+' long-term and 'C' short-term
corporate credit ratings on Norway-based forest products group
Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske Skog).  The ratings were
removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on Nov. 21, 2012.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'D' (default) from 'CCC+' its
issue ratings on Norske Skog's outstanding unsecured debt.

The 'CCC+' issue ratings on the US$200 million bond maturing in
2033, which was not part of the buybacks, were affirmed.  The
recovery rating is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery for senior unsecured bondholders in the event
of a payment default.

The rating actions follow the release of Norske Skog's financial
report for the fourth quarter of 2012, which revealed that the
group had conducted additional transactions to acquire its own
debt.  S&P estimates that Norske Skog had bought back a total of
about 6.5% of its outstanding debt as of year-end 2011, and S&P
understands the group has repurchased bonds through several
transactions at an average discount of about 30%.

S&P views these transactions as distressed on a cumulative basis,
rather than opportunistic, for several reasons.  First, the
transactions represent a sizable amount of the group's total
debt, and for some bonds well above 10% of the outstanding
amount.  Second, Norske Skog has publicly stated that it will
engage in these transactions, which could be interpreted as an
invitation for debt restructuring.  Third, by reacquiring its
bonds at a large discount, Norske Skog in S&P's view paid
investors participating in the transactions less than originally
promised. Consequently, S&P considers the cumulative effect of
the transactions to be tantamount to a debt restructuring, which
is synonymous with a default under S&P's criteria.

S&P expects to review the group's financial risk and business
risk profiles over the next few days.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CAJA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all of its credit
ratings in AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on AyT
Caja Murcia Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos'
class B and C notes and has affirmed its rating on the class A
notes.  S&P has also removed from CreditWatch negative its
ratings on all classes of AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II's notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the credit quality and
structural features of AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I and II.  S&P
has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis and have also
applied its relevant criteria to assess counterparty and country
risk.

                  CREDIT AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P has based its credit and cash flow analysis on the latest
data available (as of the January 2013 interest payment date).

Available credit enhancement for the rated notes in both
transactions has increased since May 2011.  This has been due to
the transactions' amortization features and the level of
performing collateral available to the notes.

The performance of the underlying collateral has so far been
stable, with all of the securitized loans for each transaction
being first-lien and granted mainly to borrowers purchasing a
first property.  The weighted-average loan-to-value ratios for
both transactions are low at 45.73% and 47.51% for AyT Caja
Murcia Hipotecario I and II, respectively.  The underlying
collateral
consists of highly seasoned loans, originated between August 1994
and December 2004 for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, and between
May 2001 and December 2003 for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II.

AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I has experienced no defaults, and
AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II has experienced only one default
in April 2011 that was fully recovered in accordance with the
data provided by the trustee.  S&P has noticed that 90+ days
arrears in both transactions have not been rolling into defaults
due to the originator, Banca Mare Nostrum (formerly Caja Murcia)
supporting
the performance of the securitized collateral by removing the
nonperforming loans before they become defaulted.

S&P has observed relatively stable delinquencies in both
transactions since closing.  Since March 2012, long-term
delinquencies (defined in the transactions' documents as loans in
arrears for more than 90 days) have increased to 1.13% from 0.47%
for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I.  In AyT Caja Murcia
Hipotecario II, long-term delinquencies have decreased to 0.10%
from 0.58%.

Both transactions benefit from the following structural features:

   -- A combined priority of payments, with current pro rata
      payments on the notes.

   -- Interest deferral triggers for the class B and C notes,
      which are based on the level of cumulative defaults.  If
      breached, these triggers can benefit the more senior
      classes of notes.  If cumulative defaults reach 6.7% and
      4.6% of the closing portfolio for the class B and C notes,
      respectively, the transaction will divert the cash flows
      due to service the interest payments on the class B and C
      notes to repay interest on the class A notes.  While this
      mechanism intends to protect the senior notes, the triggers
      are set at high levels, which weakens this senior
      protection feature, in S&P's opinion.

   -- Reserve funds that are at their required levels under the
      transactions' documents.

   -- A swap that hedges the mismatch between the assets paying
      12-month EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) and the
      notes paying three-month EURIBOR.

   -- Credit enhancement of 9.17% for AyT Caja Murcia I
      Hipotecario's class A notes and 8.77% for AyT Caja Murcia
      Hipotecario II's class A notes.  This compares with 4.49%
      and 4.38% at closing for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I and
      II's class A notes, respectively.

                        COUNTERPARTY RISK

Under the transaction documents for both AyT Caja Murcia
Hipotecario I and II, the counterparties will take remedy actions
within 60 days if the bank account provider is downgraded below
the required minimum rating.  In accordance with the transaction
documents, the minimum required rating and remedy actions
relating to the bank account provider for both transactions
(Barclays Bank PLC; A+/Negative /A-1) are in line with S&P's 2012
counterparty criteria.

S&P do not consider the swap documents for AyT Caja Murcia
Hipotecario I to be in line with S&P's 2012 counterparty
criteria. However, under S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, the
long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the swap provider
(JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.; A+/Negative/A-1) can support the
current ratings on the notes and the swap provider also complies
with the triggers specified in the transaction documents.
Therefore, the maximum potential rating in AyT Caja Murcia
Hipotecario I is 'AA- (sf)', which reflects the ICR on the swap
provider plus one notch.

On Nov. 6, 2012, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II's class A, B, and C notes for
counterparty reasons, as S&P needed to measure the impact of not
giving credit to the swap on the ratings on the notes.

Under S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, Cecabank still remains an
ineligible counterparty to support the current ratings on the
notes.  S&P has therefore conducted its credit and cash flow
analysis without giving benefit to the swap agreement.  S&P's
analysis indicated that the class A notes can maintain their
current rating without the benefit of the swap agreement, due to
the increased credit enhancement available to the notes.  S&P has
therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its 'A
(sf)' rating on the class A notes.  However, the class B and C
notes cannot achieve a rating that is higher than Cecabank's
long-term ICR of 'BB+'.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB+ (sf)'
and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class B
and C notes.

                           COUNTRY RISK

S&P's 'AA- (sf)' rating on AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I's class
A notes is also constrained by S&P's sovereign rating on the
Kingdom of Spain (BBB-/Negative/A-3) and the application of S&P's
nonsovereign ratings criteria, in which S&P rate issuers or
transactions in the European Monetary Union up to six notches
above the sovereign rating.

Based on the stable delinquency levels that S&P has observed in
the underlying portfolios of both transactions, as well as the
transactions' structural features and the increase in available
credit enhancement for the rated notes, S&P has affirmed all of
its ratings on AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I's classes of notes

S&P has also affirmed AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II's class A
notes as the level of available credit enhancement is
commensurate with the current rating on the notes.  Although the
transaction's performance has been stable, S&P's analysis showed
that its ratings on the class B and C notes cannot be maintained
without giving benefit to the swap.

AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I and II are Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by pools of
first-ranking mortgages secured over owner-occupied residential
properties in Spain. Caja Murcia (now Banca Mare Nostrum)
originated the underlying collateral between August 1994 and
December 2004 for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, and between May
2001 and December 2003 for AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II.  AyT
Caja Murcia Hipotecario I and II closed in December 2005 and
November 2006, respectively.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
           To              From

AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR350 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A          AA- (sf)
B          A (sf)
C          BBB (sf)

AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR315 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A          A (sf)         A (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B          BB+ (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Neg
C          BB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: S&P Lowers Ratings on Bond Tranches to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'C' from 'CCC' its
issue rating on the Norwegian kroner (NOK) 460 million and
US$270 million tranches of bonds due June 2017 and issued by
Sweden-based mining company Northland Resources A.B. (Northland).
At the same time, S&P maintained the CreditWatch negative on the
issue rating.  The recovery rating on the bonds is unchanged at
'4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery
in the event of a payment default.

The rating action reflects that on Feb. 8, 2013, Northland filed
an application for reconstruction with the Lulea District Court.
During the period of reconstruction, S&P expects full salaries
will be paid to employees and suppliers will be paid for work
completed during the reconstruction.  Northland is currently
seeking about $12 million in support from bondholders to enable
operations to continue until March 4, 2013.  If granted, S&P
expects such support to be provided by bondholders, thereby
permitting Northland access to a small portion of the cash held
in the bond interest escrow account, which is set aside to meet
the next three semi-annual bond interest payments.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that, despite the
support of the escrow account, and the relatively long-dated
maturity of the bond due in 2017, a default may occur if
bondholders agree a distressed exchange: for example, if
bondholders agreed to a reduced interest coupon on the bonds, as
part of long-term financing negotiations.  A default is also
likely if long-term financing negotiations fail to result in an
agreement over the next four-to-six weeks or if Northland is
unable to maintain operations during this time.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the issue rating if Northland fails to negotiate long-term
financing for the project or if bondholders agree a distressed
exchange as part of these negotiations.

S&P could raise the rating if long-term negotiations result in
long-term financing arrangements, which enable the company to
emerge from receivership.

S&P aims to review the CreditWatch placement over the next month,
or once Northland has finalized its funding plan.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


* TURKEY: Fitch Says Anti-Terrorism Law to Cut Market Access Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Turkey's adoption of anti-terrorism financing legislation last
week reduces the risk of suspension from the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), which could have disrupted access to financial
markets for Turkish entities including the sovereign, Fitch
Ratings says.

"Had it restricted market access, FATF suspension could have
increased Turkey's vulnerability to an external financing shock
and reduced the benefits it has received from its strong fiscal
financing options and debt-management capacity, and its well-
established international capital market access. FATF had set a
deadline of February 22 for Turkey to adopt legislation.

Turkey's low savings rate means it needs to run current account
deficits and secure external funding to finance investment and
growth. The country has been able to roll over debt and attract
net inflows despite volatile external conditions during the
financial and eurozone sovereign debt crises.

"Nevertheless, net short-term and portfolio debt forms the
largest proportion of current account deficit financing, while
the FDI share remains moderate. However, as we said when we
upgraded Turkey to investment grade last year, we have grown more
confident that Turkey could cope with a severe shock without
suffering a full-blown financial or sovereign debt crisis.

"We upgraded Turkey to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' in November, citing a
combination of reduced, near-term macro-financial risks as the
economy heads for a soft landing and underlying credit strengths
including moderate government debt, a sound banking system and
favourable growth prospects. One of our key assumptions was that
FATF membership would not be suspended, or that if membership
were suspended it did not result in countermeasures that
prevented Turkish entities accessing international financing.

"The FATF, which sets international standards for combating money
laundering and terrorist financing, had said it would suspend
Turkey's membership on 22 February unless the country adopted
legislation "to adequately remedy deficiencies in its terrorist
financing offence" and "to establish an adequate legal framework
for identifying and freezing terrorist assets." While there is no
precedent for suspension, the FATF lists avoiding the risk of
sanctions "or other action by the international community" as one
of the benefits of implementing its recommendations."



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRITISH ARAB: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed British Arab Commercial Bank's Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'. The Outlook is Stable.
The Viability Rating (VR) has been affirmed at 'bb'.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - IDRs AND VR

BACB's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic strength, as indicated by
its VR. The VR is constrained by the high-risk markets in which
BACB operates, especially following the Arab Spring. The VR also
takes into account significant concentrations, especially on the
funding side: Libyan state-owned institutions provide virtually
all of the bank's funding. However, sound liquidity management
and satisfactory capitalization has helped protect the balance
sheet from the high level of depositor concentration.

BACB's ratings could come under pressure if the situation in
Libya significantly worsened, or if the bank's strategic
importance to its majority shareholders diminished -- evidenced
by a substantial withdrawal of deposits or business or both.
Pressure on the ratings could also arise from a substantial
deterioration in asset quality, although given the bank's focus
on short-term trade-finance related lending, and its expertise in
this area, Fitch does not anticipate further material
deterioration in loan quality.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING

The Support Rating reflects that potential support from the
bank's major shareholder, the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB) is
possible, and that the LFB has demonstrated support for BACB in
the past, but this is not factored into the ratings. This is
because it is difficult for Fitch to assess the ability to
provide such support on a timely basis as and when required given
the current circumstances in Libya, and therefore the lowest
Support Rating of '5' has been affirmed.

In the longer term, the Support Rating could be sensitive to a
strengthening of the LFB's profile which, in addition to
increased stability in Libya and a continued propensity to
support BACB, could lead to an upward revision.

Established in 1972, London-based BACB is majority owned (83.5%)
by the LFB. Aside from LFB, the Banque Centrale Populaire of
Morocco and the state-owned Banque Exterieure d'Algerie of
Algeria each own 8.26% of the bank's shares. BACB's core
activities are trade finance, treasury, and banking services,
focusing on the Middle East and Africa region. The bank is based
in London and has representative offices in Algeria and Libya.

The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Stable Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'bb'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'


CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed CPUK Finance Ltd.'s class A1, A2 and B
notes at 'BBB', 'BBB' and 'B+' respectively. The Outlook on all
the notes is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation is driven by the solid performance of Center
Parcs (Operating Company) Limited (Center Parcs, forming the
borrower group together with four property holding companies
among others) with FY13 EBITDA (36 weeks) rising by 3.9% and
revenues up by 3.1% despite the ongoing weak UK economic
environment, reduced discretionary spending, as well as rising
operating costs. Growth was supported by the continuation of
Center Parcs' capex program with GBP26.6 million total capex
invested in FY13 thus far.

Overall 307 lodges were refurbished in FY12 and 255 in FY13 (thus
far). It is expected that 68% of units (out of a total of 3,413)
will either be new or have had a major refurbishments (since
2008) by end of FY13. Full FY12 results (revenues +0.4% / EBITDA
+2.6%) were partially impacted by the conversion of 16 retail
units to concession agreements (also affecting H113 to some
extent), one fewer trading week in FY12 and the VAT increase in
calendar year 2011. However, on an EBITDA basis the borrower
performed broadly in line with Fitch's expectations in FY12 and
has been slightly ahead (+1%) of Fitch' base case in FY13. The
Stable Outlooks reflect the expectation that the relatively high
quality estate and proactive management will continue to deliver
steady performance at least in the near term.

FY13 performance was especially supported by a strong third
quarter (+6.6% in revenue growth) -- aided mainly by favorable
half term school holidays patterns, better booking patterns (less
late discounting; yield management) and improved on-site
spending.

Center Parcs continues to benefit from a high level of advance
bookings. Guests have the ability to book 18 months in advance
giving the company a high degree of visibility on its staffing
and expenditure requirements. 36 weeks into FY13, ca. 90%
physical capacity has been booked and already 20% of FY14
capacity has been booked (marginally ahead of this time last
year).

As expected, the class B cumulative interest expense ratio (1.7x
as per first half of FY13) is below its restricted payment
covenant (1.9x) so that no dividends have been paid (except
management fees) and cash is being locked up (GBP17.5 million as
per Q313).

Fitch's base case 29-year (to legal final maturity of the notes
in February 2042) free cash flow (FCF) compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) is mildly negative (-0.8%), resulting in Fitch's
median base case FCF debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) to
legal final maturity to remain in line with last year, 2.1x and
1.7x for the class A and B notes respectively.

The Fitch base case FCF DSCRs are more conservative than for
whole business securitizations (WBS) of, for example, managed pub
transactions at the same rating level. In Fitch's view, more
conservative coverage ratios are warranted due to the holiday
park industry's higher long term obsolescence risk and niche
product offering, which makes Center Parcs more vulnerable to
changes in its operating environment.

The ratings also reflect the structural protections (mainly
benefiting the senior ranking class A notes) which include faster
amortization than traditional WBS through a cash sweep and a
comprehensive WBS security and covenant package, including full
senior ranking asset and share security available for the benefit
of the noteholders, with the security granted by way of the usual
fixed and (qualifying) floating security under an issuer-borrower
loan structure. In addition, there is the ability for class A
noteholders to gain greater control earlier on in the transaction
if the class A notes are not refinanced one year past their
expected maturity (2018 in the case of class A1 notes) which
would result in a borrower event of default.

The ratings for class B notes reflect their deep subordination in
comparison to class A notes both in terms of ranking in the
priority of payments and in terms of controlling rights, their
interest deferral mechanism kicking in earlier than in
traditional WBS transactions and the fact that they do not
benefit from the liquidity facility.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A material and sustainable outperformance of Fitch' base case
over a prolonged period of time in combination with material
deleveraging could trigger a Positive Outlook or upgrade.
Conversely, any material deterioration in performance and / or
business risk profile (e.g. due to prolonged drop in occupancy
levels; sale and leaseback transactions) could trigger a Negative
Outlook or downgrade. Also a failure to refinance the notes at
their expected maturities could lead to a negative rating action,
at least for the class B notes. However, Fitch considers it
unlikely that CPUK Finance's ratings would be upgraded above
'BBB+' even in the event of material outperformance. This is
mainly due to the sector's exposure to discretionary consumer
spending, in conjunction with concerns as to whether the Center
Parcs' concept will remain in favor over the long term.

CPUK Finance Ltd is a whole business securitization of four
purpose-built holiday villages in the UK: Sherwood Forest in
Nottinghamshire; Longleat Forest in Wiltshire; Elveden Forest in
Suffolk and Whinfell Forest in Cumbria.

The rating actions are:

GBP300m class A1 fixed-rate secured notes due 2042: affirmed at
'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

GBP440m class A2 fixed-rate secured notes due 2042: affirmed at
'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

GBP280m class B fixed-rate secured notes due 2042: affirmed at
'B+'; Outlook Stable.


HIBU PLC: Expects to Reach Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Cookson at The Financial Times reports that Hibu, the
debt-laden publisher of the Yellow Pages in the UK, said it
expected to reach an agreement with its creditors to restructure
GBP2 billion of loans "in the near future".

Hibu warned last October that it would be unable to make an
interest payment to lenders on February 28, an event that would
amount to default, the FT recounts.

The company is one of several European directories groups that
have been hit hard by competition from rival services on the
internet, the FT discloses.

The FT relates that Hibu said on Tuesday it was having
"constructive discussions" with lenders, which include Soros Fund
Management, HSBC, and GE Capital.  But it warned that the
restructuring was "likely to result in little or no value being
attributed to the group's ordinary shares", the FT notes.

Lenders are bracing for big losses, the FT states.  Hibu's loans
due in 2014 were trading at about 20% of their face value, the FT
says.

Net debt was just over GBP2 billion as of December 31, the FT
discloses.

Hibu Plc is a British Yellow Pages publisher.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 14,
2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'CC' from 'SD'
(selective default) its long-term corporate credit rating on
U.K.-based international publisher of classified directories hibu
PLC.  S&P said that the outlook is negative.


NORTEL NETWORKS: UK Retirees Seek Arbitration After Failed Talks
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lance Duroni of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that after mediation
efforts failed last month, retirees of Nortel Networks Corp.'s
U.K. unit on Friday proposed arbitration to end a protracted
fight over how to split US$9 billion of liquidation proceeds
among creditors of the bankrupt telecom and its global
affiliates.

The trustee for Nortel's U.K. pension plan -- who is seeking at
least US$1.3 billion from the company's U.S. unit on behalf of
pensioners -- said in a Delaware bankruptcy court filing that
arbitration is preferable to the litigation path proposed by the
Canada-based company, the report added.

                       About Nortel Networks

Headquartered in Ontario, Canada, Nortel Networks Corporation and
its various affiliated entities provided next-generation
technologies, for both service provider and enterprise networks,
support multimedia and business-critical applications.  Nortel
did business in more than 150 countries around the world.  Nortel
Networks Limited was the principal direct operating subsidiary of
Nortel Networks Corporation.

On Jan. 14, 2009, Nortel Networks Inc.'s ultimate corporate
parent Nortel Networks Corporation, NNI's direct corporate parent
Nortel Networks Limited and certain of their Canadian affiliates
commenced a proceeding with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) seeking
relief from their creditors.  Ernst & Young was appointed to
serve as monitor and foreign representative of the Canadian
Nortel Group.  That same day, the Monitor sought recognition of
the CCAA Proceedings in U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Bankr. D. Del.
Case No. 09-10164) under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

That same day, NNI and certain of its affiliated U.S. entities
filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 09-10138).

In addition, the High Court of England and Wales placed 19 of
NNI's European affiliates into administration under the control
of individuals from Ernst & Young LLP.  Other Nortel affiliates
have commenced and in the future may commence additional creditor
protection, insolvency and dissolution proceedings around the
world.

On May 28, 2009, at the request of administrators, the Commercial
Court of Versailles, France, ordered the commencement of
secondary proceedings in respect of Nortel Networks S.A.  On
June 8, 2009, Nortel Networks UK Limited filed petitions in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the English Proceedings as
foreign main proceedings under Chapter 15.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross presides over the Chapter 11
and 15 cases.  Mary Caloway, Esq., and Peter James Duhig, Esq.,
at Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, in Wilmington, Delaware,
serves as Chapter 15 petitioner's counsel.

In the Chapter 11 case, James L. Bromley, Esq., at Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, in New York, serves as the U.S.
Debtors' general bankruptcy counsel; Derek C. Abbott, Esq., at
Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP, in Wilmington, serves as
Delaware counsel.  The Chapter 11 Debtors' other professionals
are Lazard Freres & Co. LLC as financial advisors; and Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions LLC as claims and notice agent.

The United States Trustee appointed an Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors in respect of the U.S. Debtors.  An ad hoc
group of bondholders also was organized.

Fred S. Hodara, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in
New York, and Christopher M. Samis, Esq., at Richards, Layton &
Finger, P.A., in Wilmington, Delaware, represent the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

An Official Committee of Retired Employees and the Official
Committee of Long-Term Disability Participants tapped Alvarez &
Marsal Healthcare Industry Group as financial advisor.  The
Retiree Committee is represented by McCarter & English LLP as
Delaware counsel, and Togut Segal & Segal serves as the Retiree
Committee.  The Committee retained Alvarez & Marsal Healthcare
Industry Group as financial advisor, and Kurtzman Carson
Consultants LLC as its communications agent.

Several entities, particularly, Nortel Government Solutions
Incorporated and Nortel Networks (CALA) Inc., have material
operations and are not part of the bankruptcy proceedings.

As of Sept. 30, 2008, Nortel Networks Corp. reported consolidated
assets of US$11.6 billion and consolidated liabilities of US$11.8
billion.  The Nortel Companies' U.S. businesses are primarily
conducted through Nortel Networks Inc., which is the parent of
majority of the U.S. Nortel Companies.  As of Sept. 30, 2008, NNI
had assets of about US$9 billion and liabilities of US$3.2
billion, which do not include NNI's guarantee of some or all of
the Nortel Companies' about US$4.2 billion of unsecured public
debt.

Since the commencement of the various insolvency proceedings,
Nortel has sold its business units and other assets to various
purchasers.  Nortel has collected roughly US$9 billion for
distribution to creditors.  Of the total, US$4.5 billion came
from the sale of Nortel's patent portfolio to Rockstar Bidco, a
consortium consisting of Apple Inc., EMC Corporation,
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Microsoft Corp., Research In
Motion Limited, and Sony Corporation.  The consortium defeated a
US$900 million stalking horse bid by Google Inc. at an auction.
The deal closed in July 2011.

Nortel has filed a proposed plan of liquidation in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court.  The Plan generally provides for full payment
on secured claims with other distributions going in accordance
with the priorities in bankruptcy law.


PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed all notes issued by Punch Taverns
Finance Plc's and Punch Taverns Finance B Ltd. on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN). This follows Punch Taverns plc's announcement of
its proposal to restructure the capital structure of the two
associated pub securitizations. Fitch considers the restructuring
proposal (if implemented in the way proposed) would only
represent a distressed debt exchange (DDE) for the junior
tranches in Punch B that would be partially written down.

Punch has proposed to restructure the group's capital structure
by -- among other things -- extending the maturities of the notes
issued by Punch A and Punch B, deferring scheduled amortization,
modifying covenants as well as extinguishing some of its junior
Punch B debt. However, many details of the restructuring proposal
are still left open.

When considering whether a transaction or class of notes should
be classified as having experienced a DDE, Fitch would expect
both of the following to apply: the relevant noteholders will
suffer a material reduction in terms compared with the economics
of the existing contractual terms; and the restructuring or
exchange will avert a probable payment default on the underlying
notes.

For all tranches, including those which (based on Punch's current
proposal) would not be subject to an immediate notional debt
write off, Fitch considers Punch's proposal to represent a
material reduction in terms compared with the economics of the
existing contractual terms - amongst others due to the deferral
of amortization and extension of maturities (without the
compensation of e.g. increased coupon payments). However, Fitch
does not consider the proposal (if implemented) to avert a
probable payment default on the underlying notes (which are not
subject to an immediate notional debt write off) given that
junior tranches can defer debt service without triggering a note
event of default and given that Fitch does not expect the Punch A
and Punch B senior tranches to fail on their debt service in the
foreseeable future (without a debt restructuring).

While Fitch believes that the credit quality of the notes issued
by Punch A past such restructuring would not be materially
different to their current rating, placing them on RWN is mainly
driven by the execution risk of any restructuring and potential
de-grouping risks from the wider Punch group due to operational
linkages with management and supply arrangements controlled at
group level.

Similarly Fitch believes that following such restructuring, the
credit quality of Punch B's senior notes may not deteriorate
beyond their current rating but placing them on RWN is mainly
owing to the execution risk of any restructuring and potential
de-grouping risks from the wider Punch group. The situation would
be viewed differently for Punch B's junior debt tranches. If the
restructuring of Punch B was announced in its currently proposed
form Fitch would likely downgrade the tranches B1, B2 and C1 to
'C' and eventually to 'D' upon execution of the transaction. Post
restructuring a newly issued class B3 could potentially be rated
higher than 'CCC' due to deleveraging at the class level but will
depend on the terms of the transaction.


Fitch understands that such proposals have the support of the
majority of the group's shareholders, involved monoline insurers
and some (mainly junior) bondholders. However, the proposed
capital restructuring may potentially not be implemented in the
currently proposed form subject to negotiations with other
stakeholders.

The current ratings for the transactions are:

Punch A:
Class A1(R) fixed-rate notes due 2022: 'BBB-'; RWN
Class A2(R) fixed-rate notes due 2020: 'BBB-'; RWN
Class M1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: 'B'; RWN
Class M2(N) floating-rate notes due 2029: 'B'; RWN
Class B1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: 'CCC'; RWN
Class B2 fixed-rate notes due 2029: 'CCC'; RWN
Class B3 floating-rate notes due 2031: 'CCC'; RWN
Class C(R) fixed-rate notes due 2033: 'CCC'; RWN
Class D1 floating-rate notes 2032: 'CCC'; RWN

Punch B:
Class A3 fixed-rate notes due 2022: 'B+'; RWN
Class A6 fixed-rate notes due 2024: 'B+'; RWN
Class A7 fixed-rate notes due 2033: 'B+'; RWN
Class A8 floating-rate notes due 2033: 'B+'; RWN
Class B1 fixed-rate notes due 2025: 'CCC'; RWN
Class B2 fixed-rate notes due 2028: 'CCC'; RWN
Class C1 floating-rate notes due 2035: 'CCC'; RWN


TITAN EUROPE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the following class of notes
issued by Titan Europe 2007-1 Limited (amount reflecting initial
outstanding):

GBP435.85M Class A Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
due 2017 Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun
19, 2012 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and
the Class X Notes.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade reflects Moody's increased loss expectation for the
pool since its last review in June 2012 largely due to a 15% drop
in the value of the underlying nursing homes. The collateral
value decline worsened the Moody's Class A note-to-value to 77%
from 66%.

The performance of the underlying care homes presented during a
Noteholder meeting on February 1, 2013 was somewhat worse than
Moody's expected, and explains the drop in value. Nonetheless,
the operations of the underlying care homes appear to have now
stabilized, with a three year business plan in place that
includes substantial investments of GBP84 million until 2015
financed by the diversion of cash flows away from the
securitization and the swap counterparty to the operating company
("HC-One"). Moody's is concerned that not all the significant
investment in infrastructure, capital expenditure and care
standards will translate into value preservation or creation.

In Moody's view, the business plan looks convincing and
achievable. However, the Class A Noteholders remain exposed to
material execution and exit risk with limited influence over
other transaction parties that control the timing and path of any
exit and whose obligations and motivations may not necessarily be
completely aligned. The chances of a successful exit via a sale
or refinance are improved by the quasi corporate nature of the
collateral that is likely to attract a wide range of investors
and lenders (with a capital markets exit also a possibility).
Execution risk is mainly related to uncertainty surrounding the
HC-One business plan, but also heavily influenced by the
prospects for the care home industry (including the outcome of
the on-going debate about funding long-term care in the UK). With
over 80% of HC-One's residents publicly funded, revenues will be
sensitive to the outcome of the April 2013 Local Authority weekly
fee settlements. New government regulation that imposes strict
financial criteria for care home operators may negatively impact
ultimate recoveries.

Moody's now gives benefit to the value of the WholeCo (i.e. the
value of the operating company "opco" combined with the property
company "propco") given HC-One forms part of the security, and
because for the first time there is sufficient information on the
operations of underlying care homes.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions . There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market, while remaining subject to strict
underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the underlying
property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between prime and
secondary properties, with further value declines expected for
non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets will remain
under pressure in the short term and will only slowly recover in
the medium term in line with anticipated economic recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario for the
world's largest economies is for only a gradual strengthening in
growth over the coming two years. Fiscal consolidation and
volatility in financial markets will continue to weigh on
business and consumer confidence, while heightened uncertainty
hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. Moody's
expects no growth in the Euro area in 2013.

Moody's portfolio analysis

Titan Europe 2007-1 (NHP) Limited represents a true-sale
securitization of a GBP 610 million Senior A Loan extended to The
Libra Borrower, and secured by a portfolio of around 300 care
homes located across the UK. Additionally, a GBP 534 million
Junior B Loan was provided to The Libra Borrower that has not
been securitized in this transaction, but is secured by the same
portfolio. HC-One Limited, a recently formed wholly-owned
Subsidiary of the Libra Borrower that was created after the
collapse of Southern Cross, operates 232 care homes. A mixture of
third party tenants operate the remaining 62 care homes.

Moody's expects a large amount of losses on the securitized
portfolio. Given the default risk profile and the anticipated
work-out strategy (with a sale or refinance likely in 2015/2016),
the expected losses are likely to crystallize only towards the
end of the transaction term. Moody's included in its analysis a
GBP 60 million estimate of prior ranking claims to account for
potential liabilities arising from swap breakage costs or
outstanding servicer advances.

Rating methodology

The methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2012 Central Scenarios published in February 2012.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated June 19, 2012. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on November 15, 2012.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Says Hybrid Issuance Does Not Guarantee Current Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
While the issuance of hybrid debt by Telecom Italia S.p.A and
Telekom Austria AG could have some positive credit implications
for these companies, hybrid bonds are not a solution to the
underlying challenges facing these and other European telecoms
service providers, says Moody's Investors Service in a new report
on the sector entitled "Hybrid Issuance Will Help Preserve Some
European Telcos' Financial Ratios, But Is No Panacea".

European telecoms companies are all at differing stages of a
down-cycle and hybrid bond issuance generally follows other
credit-positive moves like the cancellation of share buybacks and
dividends cuts. However, the issuance of hybrids also shows that
some companies have begun to exhaust internal options to protect
their financial profile and need to revert to external options,
reflecting their limited financial flexibility.

"Other telecoms companies could follow the lead of Telecom Italia
and Telekom Austria and, in some instances, hybrid bonds may help
strengthen balance sheets, but they won't be enough to protect
ratings if there is prolonged weak operating performance," says
Carlos Winzer, a Senior Vice President in Moody's Corporate
Finance Group and author of the report.


                            *********

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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