TCREUR_Public/130218.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, February 18, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 34



* CYPRUS: Cypriots Vote for New President Amid Financial Crisis


BANQUE PSA: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB+'
PEUGEOT SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
SOCIETE GENERALE: Q412 Weak Profit No Impact on Fitch Ratings


PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B3'
TITAN EUROPE 2006-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'


OTP BANK: Moody's Lowers Subordinated Debt Rating to 'Ba3'
* HUNGARY: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to US$2-Bil. 2023 Bond
* HUNGARY: Int'l Bond Market Return Confirms Fitch Rating Outlook


* ICELAND: Ends Financial Fraud Probe; Faces Krona Overhang Woes


HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes


AUDIOVISUAL TIBER: Arrests Rizzoli in Fraudulent Bankruptcy Probe
ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: Moody's Rates New EUR350MM Notes '(P)Ba2'
ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: S&P Rates EUR350MM Sr. Unsecured Notes 'BB+'
VELA PUBLIC: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR328.5-Mil. Notes to 'Ba1'


UKIO BANKAS: Four Banks Mull Acquisition of Assets


ARCELORMITTAL SA: Mandatory Convertible No Impact on Fitch Rating


SNS REAAL: Dutch Court Hears Appeals on Expropriation Decree
VAN DER MOOLEN: Bad Management Prompted Collapse, Court Says


SEVERSTAL OAO: Vorkutinskaya Blast No Impact on Moody's 'Ba1' CFR


BANKIA SA: Shares Suspended; Investors May Face Heavy Losses
CABLEUROPA SAU: Moody's Rates EUR260-Mil. Sr. Secured Notes 'B1'
GC SABADELL: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB'
IM SABADELL: S&P Lowers Rating on Three Note Classes to 'BB'
ORIZONIA: Seeks Creditor Protection as Globalia Merger Stalls
REYAL URBIS: Creditors Reject Debt Restructuring Proposal


* SWITZERLAND: CCB Curbs Banks' Property Risks, Fitch Says


* TURKEY: S&P Withdraws Unsolicited Issue Ratings

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COSALT: Asks Banks to Appoint Administrator, Seeks Buyer
DAILY MAIL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Ratings; Outlook Positive
ECO-BAT: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'; Outlook Stable
JESSOPS PLC: Owes More Than GBP80-Mil. at Time of Administration
SHRUBBERY HOTEL: Continues Operations Amid Administration

WEAVERING CAPITAL: Two Ex-Employees Must Repay Hedge Fund Losses
* UK: Moody's Notes Impact of Water Scarcity on Mining Companies


* New Debt Issuance in Europe Tops US$12-Bil., Moody's Says
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 11 to January 15, 2013



* CYPRUS: Cypriots Vote for New President Amid Financial Crisis
Paul Tugwell and Georgios Georgiou at Bloomberg News report that
Cypriots were voting for a new president on Sunday in a ballot
where, for the first time since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the
economy is the main issue rather than reunification of the
divided island.

The country, which became the fifth euro-area member to request
international financial aid in June 2012, has been shut out of
debt markets for nearly two years with lenders including Bank of
Cyprus Plc and Cyprus Popular Bank Plc losing EUR4.5 billion
(US$6 billion) in Greece's debt restructuring last year,
Bloomberg discloses.

Cyprus has been negotiating for eight months with the so- called
troika of the European Commission, European Central Bank and
International Monetary Fund over terms of a bailout, which could
equal the size of its EUR18 billion economy, Bloomberg relates.
Completing an agreement on the rescue and preventing financial
collapse will fall to the winner of Sunday's election, Bloomberg

With the exception of Greece, the Cypriot bailout is set to be
the highest proportional to gross domestic product, Bloomberg
says.  As much as EUR10 billion may be required to rescue the
banks and EUR7.5 billion  will be needed by the government, with
the total about the same as the nation's GDP in 2011, Bloomberg
discloses.  As with other bailout recipients, Cyprus will have to
adhere to strict austerity measures, which could exacerbate
economic weakness, Bloomberg states.


BANQUE PSA: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered to 'BB+/B'
from 'BBB-/A-3' its long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A.'s captive
finance company, Banque PSA Finance (BPF), and its subsidiary
Credipar.  The outlooks are negative.

S&P also lowered its issue rating on BPF's subordinated debt
tranche of its medium-term note program to 'BB-' from 'BB+'.  S&P
lowered its short-term counterparty credit rating on Sofira, also
a subsidiary of BPF, to 'B' from 'A-3'.

At the same time, S&P revised its assessment of BPF's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'.

The rating actions follow S&P's downgrade of Peugeot.

S&P caps the long-term rating on BPF at two notches above the
rating on Peugeot based on S&P's view that BPF's creditworthiness
is correlated to that of its parent.

S&P has lowered its assessment of BPF's SACP to reflect S&P's
view that the company's ability to maintain revenues at the
resilient historical levels has diminished, owing to Peugeot's
weakening sales.

S&P thinks that Peugeot's lackluster sales prospects in Europe
could translate into a contracting potential customer base at
BPF. In S&P's view, BPF's opportunities to stabilize its new
financing and its loan book have diminished as its exposure to
Europe is about 90%.  In 2012, Peugeot's vehicle sales already
declined by 12% in the countries where BPF operates.  This
translated for BPF into a drop in new financing and a contracting
loan book to EUR23.1 billion from EUR24.3 billion in the same
year.  More specifically, because of the likelihood of a
contracting loan book and increasing funding costs, BPF's net
interest income could potentially decline in 2013-2014, in S&P's
opinion.  S&P has consequently lowered its assessment of BPF's
business position.

The lowering by two notches of the issue rating on the
subordinated debt tranche of BPF's medium-term note program
reflects S&P's criteria for issuers with an SACP equal to or
below 'bb+'.  There are no debt issues outstanding under this
tranche of the program.

The negative outlook on BPF indicates that S&P would likely
downgrade BPF if S&P downgraded Peugeot.

S&P could revise BPF's SACP downward if S&P concluded that, for

   -- Peugeot's depressed sales led to a decrease in BPF's asset
      quality, notably owing to its exposure to dealers;

   -- The European Commission did not give its approval for the
      remaining amount of the EUR7 billion French state
      guarantee; or

   -- BPF did not maintain a RAC ratio higher than 10% because of
      further deteriorating economic risks in its main markets or
      increasing risk in its loan book due to growth in emerging

All else remaining unchanged, the lowering of BPF's SACP by
another notch would not automatically lead to a downgrade.  This
is because of the notch of uplift for government support that S&P
incorporates into the ratings.

S&P would likely consider revising the outlook on BPF to stable
if S&P revised the outlook on Peugeot to stable, everything else
remaining equal.

PEUGEOT SA: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered to 'BB-'
from 'BB' its long-term corporate credit ratings on France-based
European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A. and related entity GIE
PSA Tresorerie.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-
term ratings on the companies.  The outlook is negative.

S&P has also lowered to 'BB-' from 'BB' its issue rating on the
senior unsecured notes issued by Peugeot and GIE PSA Tresorerie.
The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.

The downgrades reflect S&P's expectation that Peugeot's credit
ratios will remain below those commensurate with the previous
ratings in the coming years.

"Among European volume automakers, Peugeot is the most affected
by the currently depressed car market on the continent," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Eric Tanguy.

This is because of what S&P regards as several fundamental
weaknesses, namely Peugeot's:

   -- Geographic mix, still largely focused on Southern Europe;

   -- Relatively high cost base and substantial excess capacity;

   -- Mid-market product range, with some brand overlap and a
      focus on small cars, a segment for which price pressure is
      intense; and

   -- Apparent inability, so far, to generate substantial
      earnings outside Europe, other than equity earnings from
      its 50% joint venture with the Chinese company Dongfeng.

In 2012, these factors contributed to a fall in Peugeot's market
shares in several regions and to significant operating losses.
Before asset-impairment charges, the company's core automotive
operations reported large recurring operating losses of
EUR1.5 billion for the year, higher than in 2009.

"Over 2013-2014, the company will attempt to address some of its
cost problems through an announced restructuring and cost-savings
program.  But we expect that several of the above-mentioned
operating challenges will likely remain," Mr. Tanguy added.

In light of continually stiff competition in its core markets,
Peugeot is unlikely to generate break-even free operating cash
flow (FOCF) before the end of 2014.  In S&P's base case, it
foresees an improvement in FOCF to only about -EUR1.4 billion in
2013, when the cash impact of the announced restructuring
measures will likely also be felt.  As a result, S&P anticipates
credit ratios remaining very weak throughout 2013 and reaching
the lower end of the range S&P considers "aggressive," such as
Standard & Poor's adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of
about 12% and debt to EBITDA below 5x, only by year-end 2014.
S&P also base these projections on its assumption of real cuts in
Peugeot's capital expenditures to a maximum of EUR3.2 billion, no
dividends, and no adverse working capital swings.

"The outlook is negative because we believe that Peugeot's
relatively weak performance in a continuously stressed market
environment, and continuing operating challenges, could hamper
its plans to restore break-even cash flow by the end of 2014,"
said Mr. Tanguy.

Over the next two years, S&P expects the company's credit metrics
to gradually return to a level consistent with a 'BB-' rating,
such as adjusted FFO to debt in the 12%-20% range and debt to
EBITDA below 5.0x.  In addition, in S&P's base-case scenario it
considers that cash flow depletion will halve in 2013, allowing
for the possibility of breakeven by the end of 2014.  However,
because S&P considers the current ratios weaker than appropriate
for an "aggressive" financial risk profile, any deviation from
the recovery trajectory S&P anticipates in its base case for 2013
and beyond would likely result in a downgrade.  Worsening market
conditions, weaker competitive positioning, or insufficient
turnaround efforts could result in such a deviation.

S&P also sees a risk that Peugeot's announced restructuring will
be insufficient to restore the operating profitability of its
automotive business sustainably above breakeven.  Although the
company showed, in S&P's view, good execution of its disposal
strategy in 2012, it considers one-time transactions of similar
magnitude to be unlikely in the future.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it saw credit ratios
improving, specifically FFO to adjusted debt at close to 20% over
the medium term.  This will depend partly on sufficiently
supportive industry conditions, as well as on Peugeot's
demonstrated ability to restore profitability and reduce debt.

SOCIETE GENERALE: Q412 Weak Profit No Impact on Fitch Ratings
Fitch Ratings says that Societe Generale's Q412 earnings release
did not provide information that would prompt any immediate
rating action. Operating profit for the quarter (EUR0.7 billion
as calculated by Fitch) was down by over one-third on Q312
(EUR1.1 billion), but was higher than in Q411 (a loss of EUR0.2
billion). This partly highlights the seasonality of quarterly
earnings. Q4 is usually the lowest of the year, especially for
the Corporate and Investment Banking (CIB) business. Fitch
derives operating profit, its measure of underlying earnings,
after adjusting for items such as revaluation of own debt (a loss
of EUR686 million in Q412 as spreads came in), impairment of
goodwill (EUR392 million) mainly relating to the brokerage
subsidiary Newedge and non-recurring litigation and regulatory
provisions (EUR300 million).

Operating profit from CIB declined in the quarter (EUR442 million
in Q412 excluding legacy assets vs. EUR554 million in Q312).
Revenue from capital markets activities (which represents two-
thirds of CIB revenue) decreased, particularly due to equities
where revenue was over 30% lower, a weaker end to the year than
most European peers despite SG's strong franchise in equity
derivatives. However, the bank is focusing more selectively on
areas of strength in fixed income, where revenue was more stable.
Financing and advisory activities generated slightly lower
revenue quarter-on-quarter and continue to suffer from reduced
volumes as part of the bank's deleveraging plan and losses on the
sale of loans. Operating expenses appear to be under control and
continued to decline in the quarter, translating into a
cost/income ratio considered satisfactory by Fitch (63% in Q412
excluding legacy assets). Moreover, the agency views the impact
of legacy assets as manageable (EUR135 million of operating
losses, similar to previous quarters).

Operating profit from French retail banking (EUR386 million) was
negatively affected by an increase in loan impairment charges,
especially on SMEs. However, Fitch believes these should remain
manageable (65bp of average customer loans in Q412 on an
annualized basis as calculated by the bank). The bank's
specialized financial services & insurance business generated
relatively stable operating profit (EUR231 million in Q412).

The contribution from international retail banking was poor
(EUR63 million in Q412) and continues to suffer from high loan
impairment charges, especially in Romania. Loan impairment
charges (183bp of average customer loans in Q412) absorb the bulk
of pre-impairment operating profit. The bank's Viability Rating
is negatively affected by exposure through commercial bank
subsidiaries in CEE/Russia. Nevertheless, the bank sold its Greek
bank subsidiary in November 2012, which will no longer weigh on
impairment charges. The pre-tax loss on the sale was booked in
Q312 (EUR375 million).

SG's Basel 2.5 core Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio rose to 10.7%
at end-2012 (9.0% at end-2011), which is viewed positively by the
agency. This was a result of deleveraging, largely by reducing
legacy assets and selling loans, and retention of earnings. SG's
estimated fully loaded Basel III ratio was 8.3% at end-2012 based
on the bank's calculation of a negative impact of 240bp
(including 30bp for the deduction of insurance subsidiaries).
Fitch estimates the bank is on track to meet its target of a
fully loaded Basel III ratio of between 9% and 9.5% by end-2013.
Retained earnings led to an increase of 67bp in the core Tier 1
regulatory capital ratio in 2012 net of dividend payments despite
the current pressure on profitability. The bank will resume
paying dividends on 2012 earnings. No dividends were paid on 2011

SG's liquidity buffer amounted to EUR133 billion at end-2012
(EUR114 billion at end-June 2012) and the proportion of deposits
with central banks increased to 49% (40% at end-June 2012). The
total liquidity buffer covers the bank's one year short-term
wholesale funding (EUR131 billion). However, Fitch understands
that deposits with central banks and investments in highly-rated
government bonds do not fully cover the bank's one-year short-
term wholesale funding.


PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B3'
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these classes of Notes
issued by Portfolio GREEN German CMBS GmbH (amounts reflect
initial outstanding):

- EUR40M Class C Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
   Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

- EUR35M Class D Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

At the same time Moody's has affirmed the following classes of

- EUR425.5M Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Apr 9, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

- EUR40M Class B Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on
   Oct 8, 2010 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

- EUR20M Class E Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on
   Sep 3, 2010 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

- EUR12M Class F Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on
   Sep 3, 2010 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

- EUR4M Class G Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Sep 3, 2010 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class H Notes.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade action reflects continuing uncertainty relating to
(i) the credit strength of the largest borrower in the pool, as
well as (ii) the re- and prepayment allocation of a large
proportion of the pool that can repay either sequential over time
or pro-rata upon prepayment on an interest reset date.

The rating on the Class A Notes and the Class B Notes is affirmed
because the respective credit enhancement levels of 44.1% and
33.5% sufficiently support the classes despite an increase in
loss expectation and the level of uncertainty around that
expectation. The classes E to G have been affirmed since the
increased potential severity on the second largest loan is
already factored into the rating level.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio (LTV) for the pool
of loans is 105%, which compares to a ratio of 101% at the last
review. The pool performance has become more bifurcated over
time, with a larger number of loans paying down and reducing
leverage, while a few loans exhibit significantly increased
leverage through large value declines of the property security.
Most notably, the largest two loans (53.9% of the pool balance)
have reported U/W LTV's above 100%.

The overall pool performance is better than other EMEA CMBS
transactions. Only one borrower default resulted in losses so far
(0.1% of the current pool balance), with one other borrower
default likely to result in losses in the short term (0.5%).
Total arrears are 1.1% of the pool balance as of January 2013.
Moody's notes that a number of loans have been granted to
individuals or with recourse to individuals, who are incentivized
to repay the loans from other sources than just the real estate

The class A to E notes are sensitive to the future performance of
the largest two loans, both due to their size relative in the
pool, but also due to their high LTV's combined with potential
personal liabilities involved in the borrower structures.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market, while remaining subject to strict
underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the underlying
property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between prime and
secondary properties, with further value declines expected for
non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets will remain
under pressure in the short term and will only slowly recover in
the medium term in line with anticipated economic recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario for the
world's largest economies is for only a gradual strengthening in
growth over the coming two years. Fiscal consolidation and
volatility in financial markets will continue to weigh on
business and consumer confidence, while heightened uncertainty
hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. Moody's
expects no growth in the Euro area in 2013.

Moody's portfolio analysis

In this transaction, Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG ("Seller") sold
its economic interest in claims for interest and principal under
a portfolio of mortgage loans granted to individual and corporate
borrowers in Germany to the Issuer. The legal title in the
underlying loans and respective collateral was ultimately
transferred to the Collateral Agent (Florian (No.3) GmbH). The
initial 416 mortgage loans with a principal balance of EUR585.4
million were combined into 98 borrower groups. The loans are
secured by commercial properties, including office (43% of the
current pool), retail (10%), residential (16%), mixed-use (13%)
and other types including hotel and nursing homes (21%) located
in Germany.

Since closing of the transaction in November 2007, the number of
borrower groups decreased to 38 and the outstanding balance
decreased to EUR 222.2 million (38% of the total balance at
closing) as per last interest payment date ("IPD") in January

The largest loan in the pool, granted to borrower group G13 (42%
of the pool), is secured by an office let to sole tenant Deutsche
Bahn AG. An updated valuation in 2011 of EUR98.5 million results
in a UW (LTV) of 118%.While the leases in place mature in 2018 at
the earliest, Moody's perceives the building to be difficult to
relet in case the tenant was to vacate the property. The property
income is also significantly lower than at closing of the loan
due to renegotiated lower rents. While the loan does provide for
some limited amortization, it will not be sufficient to reduce
leverage significantly in light of the lease maturities. Moody's
notes that the legal structure of the borrower provides for
recourse to personally liable individuals. Based solely on real
estate fundamentals, the loan repayment is at risk, but
potentially mitigated by the credit strength of the borrowers or
other liable individuals. Given the loan is the largest loan in
the pool and the weak credit characteristics, the loan has
significant influence on the ratings of most classes of notes.

The second largest borrower group G11(11.5% of the current pool)
comprises two loans secured by a senior living and hotel
property. A new valuation in 2012 revealed a 64% drop in value,
resulting in a reported LTV of 145%. The property income is down
sharply from the closing date to EUR 1 million. The property
currently does not generate sufficient cash flow to cover the
debt service payment, but a guarantee is available that covers
the debt service and to date, the borrower has been covering the
shortfall. Even though Moody's recognizes the property's very
good location adjacent the shore of a major lake in Bavaria, the
driver of the default risk is less the real estate and more the
credit quality of the personally liable individuals.

On a probability weighted basis Moody's expects a significant
amount of losses on the remaining portfolio, driven mainly by the
largest loan. Given the linkage to private individuals for all of
the larger exposures, there is still a chance that a low amount
of losses materializes on those loans. This makes the credit
profile of the mezzanine classes of the transaction more similar
despite difference in credit enhancements.

The transaction structure provides for a modified pro-rata
allocation of principal proceeds. In simple terms, prepayments
and repayments of loans with an initial LTV of more than 70% are
allocated pro-rata, while scheduled amortization payments and
repayments of loans with a lower LTV are allocated sequentially.
According to this schedule, the majority of loans would repay or
prepay on a pro-rata basis. The credit profile of the notes hence
changes depending on whether loans repay over time with scheduled
amortization, or prepay on rate reset dates. The sensitivity of
the Class A to C notes to most adverse scenarios is one to two
notches, but can vary if the credit quality of the remaining pool

The principle methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated March 12, 2012. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on November 19, 2012.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

TITAN EUROPE 2006-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC's class A1, A2, A3, and B notes.  At the
same time, S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class C, D, E,
and F notes.

Titan 2006-5 is a European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction that closed in December 2006.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that the notes have become
more vulnerable to further cash flow disruptions and follow S&P's
review of the underlying loans under its November 2012 European
CMBS criteria.


The loan is secured by a landmark hotel in the center of Berlin.
It is a fixed-rate, interest-only loan.  The outstanding
securitized balance is EUR160 million, which represents 43% of
the total securitized portfolio balance.  The loan matures in
July 2016.

The loan is currently performing and has a reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.65x, compared to a covenant of 1.50x.

The reported securitized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 66.12%,
based on a 2011 valuation of EUR242 million.

                        QUARTIER 206 LOAN

The Quartier loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The loan defaulted in April 2010 because of debt service
shortfalls; it was then transferred into special servicing.  The
property has been forced into administration and the borrower is
not making any debt service payments.  The administrator has not
released any rental income.  The asset manager's strategy has
been to focus on holding onto the existing tenants by reducing
the rent to a level closer to market rents in exchange for lease

The whole loan is secured by a prime office and retail property
in central Berlin.

The asset was valued in December 2010 at EUR86.8 million, against
an outstanding securitized balance of EUR114.8 million (which
represents 31% of the total securitized portfolio balance),
giving a securitized LTV ratio of 132%.  In S&P's opinion,
significant losses on this loan appear likely.

                     ABC RETAIL PORTFOLIO LOAN

The loan is secured by a portfolio of 27 retail assets in
suburban areas of smaller cities and towns throughout Germany.

The properties are typically anchored by a supermarket or
discount store.

The outstanding securitized balance is EUR54.6 million, which
represents 15% of the total securitized portfolio balance.  The
loan matures in October 2015.

The loan is currently performing and has a reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.53x compared to a covenant of 1.45x.

The reported securitized LTV ratio is 77.48%, based on a 2006
valuation of EUR70.5 million.

In S&P's opinion, full recovery of this loan appears unlikely as
in S&P's view, the asset value has decreased since the latest
reported valuation.

                          REMAINING LOANS

The remaining three loans are secured, respectively, by a
shopping center, office building, and industrial warehouse, all
in Germany. The outstanding securitized balance of the three
loans is EUR42.3 million, which accounts for 11% of the total
securitized balance.  All three loans are performing.

                        INTEREST SHORTFALL

S&P understands that the excess spread, which is distributed to
the class X notes, is not available to mitigate interest
shortfalls.  The issuer relies on the liquidity facility to
address timely payment of interest on the notes.  However, the
transaction documents indicate to S&P that the liquidity facility
is not available to cover interest shortfalls under the notes if
such shortfalls have resulted from periodic fees or special
servicing fees.

According to the January 2013 cash manager report, the class A2,
A3, B, C, D, E, and F notes experienced interest shortfalls.
Although the existing interest shortfall on the class A2 and A3
notes is, in S&P's view, minor, S&P considers that there is an
increased risk of additional interest shortfalls on these
classes, as well as an increased risk of future interest
shortfalls affecting the class A1 notes.  In S&P's opinion, the
issuer's ability to service the senior classes of notes will
likely deteriorate, given the transaction's cash flow mechanics
and loan pool performance.  In light of these factors, S&P
considers that the senior classes of notes have become more
vulnerable to future cash flow disruptions.

                         RATING RATIONALE

In S&P's opinion, the class A1, A2, and A3 notes have become more
vulnerable to cash flow disruptions and S&P considers that the
risk of additional interest shortfalls on the class A2 and A3
notes has increased and future interest shortfalls may also
affect the class A1 notes.  S&P has therefore lowered its ratings
on the class A1, A2, and A3 notes to 'BB+ (sf)', 'B- (sf)', and
'CCC- (sf)', respectively.

In S&P's opinion, recovery of full principal appears increasingly
unlikely, and S&P considers that there is at least a one-in-two
likelihood of principal losses on the class B and more-junior
notes.  As these notes have also experienced interest shortfalls,
S&P has lowered its ratings on the class B notes to 'D (sf)' and
affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C, D, E, and F notes.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class                    Rating
            To                        From

Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC
EUR660.97 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A1          BB+ (sf)                  A- (sf)
A2          B- (sf)                   BB+ (sf)
A3          CCC- (sf)                 BB- (sf)
B           D (sf)                    CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C           D (sf)
D           D (sf)
E           D (sf)
F           D (sf)


OTP BANK: Moody's Lowers Subordinated Debt Rating to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service lowered by between one and two notches
the standalone credit assessments of OTP Bank Nyrt (OTP Bank),
OTP Mortgage Bank (OTP MB) and FHB Mortgage Bank (FHB MB).

The lower standalone credit assessments, in turn, have prompted
the following rating downgrades:

(i) FHB MB's long-term deposit rating to B2 from Ba3,

(ii) OTP Bank's subordinated debt rating to Ba3 from Ba2 and its
junior subordinated debt rating to B1 (hyb) from Ba3 (hyb).

Moody's has also confirmed OTP Bank's senior debt at Ba1 and its
local and foreign-currency deposit ratings at Ba1 and Ba2
respectively, and OTP MB's local and foreign-currency deposit
ratings at Ba1 and Ba2 respectively.

According to Moody's, the drivers of the lower standalone credit
assessments are the increasingly weak economic and operating
environment in Hungary and the challenges this creates for all
three banks' franchises, asset quality and profitability.

The actions conclude Moody's reviews for downgrade initiated on
December 12, 2012. The reviews initiated on December 12 remain
ongoing for the remaining four rated Hungarian commercial banks:
K&H Bank, Budapest Bank, Erste Bank Hungary and MKB Bank.

The review of all seven banks' ratings was triggered by Moody's
view that (1) the macroeconomic environment in Hungary remains
weak and the risks of contagion from the euro area remain; (2)
the Hungarian government's recently approved tax measures, which,
combined with the risk of further policy measures, may result in
additional pressure on banks creditworthiness; (3) the banks'
capacity to generate sustainable earnings is increasingly weak;
and (4) the banks' asset quality is under pressure.

Ratings Rationale

OTP Bank

Moody's lowered OTP Bank's standalone credit assessment by one
notch to ba2 from ba1, reflecting the bank's increasing
challenges resulting from the current difficult business
environment, and the negative impact of this on asset quality and
earnings capacity, particularly in its core market of Hungary,
but also in Ukraine. The increasingly difficult macroeconomic and
operating environments in these two countries, which account for
69% of the group's total assets, in Moody's view, constrain the
group's capacity to continue to produce substantial and
sustainable profits in the medium term, leading to increased
reliance on earnings from potentially volatile unsecured consumer
business in Russia, which currently accounts for 10% of OTP
Bank's total assets. The more diversified and solid business
model in Bulgaria, accounting for 13% of OTP Bank's total assets
is, instead, expected to contribute to more stable earnings for
the group in the medium term. Moody's also acknowledges that the
group currently maintains a good level of capitalization in
relation to its risk profile, with a core Tier 1 capital ratio of
13.9% in Q3 2012, and satisfactory liquidity.

The lower standalone credit assessment, in turn, resulted in the
downgrade of OTP Bank's subordinated debt rating to Ba3 from Ba2
and its junior subordinated debt rating to B1 (hyb) from Ba3

At the same time, Moody's confirmed OTP Bank's local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings of Ba1 and Ba2 respectively, as well as
its Ba1 senior debt rating. This reflects Moody's view of a high
likelihood that the bank would benefit from systemic support from
the Hungarian authorities if needed, given its leading market
position in Hungary (26.2% of total assets and 22.6% of total
deposits in the system). This provides rating uplift of one notch
for the local-currency deposit rating and senior debt rating for
OTP Bank from the ba2 standalone credit assessment. The Ba2
foreign-currency deposit rating is constrained by Hungary's Ba2
foreign-currency deposit ceiling.

All the bank's ratings carry a negative outlook, reflecting the
ongoing business and financial challenges of the group, as well
as the negative outlook on Hungary's debt rating of Ba1.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

An upgrade of the bank's ratings in the short term is unlikely,
given the negative outlook. Longer term, upwards pressure could
develop if there is a material improvement in the operating
environment in Hungary and in the other countries where OTP Bank
operates. This might lead to more sustainable profitability in
the medium term and a reversal of the bank's weakening asset

The bank's ratings could come under downwards pressure if worse-
than-expected market conditions exert greater pressure on the
bank's financial fundamentals, especially asset quality,
profitability and capital adequacy.


Moody's lowered OTP MB's standalone credit assessment by one
notch to ba2 from ba1. This is positioned at the same level as
its parent, given that the bank (16% of OTP Bank's total assets)
is 100% owned by OTP Bank., and is an integral part of the
parent's franchise, and operates as the mortgage division of its
parent. Although recently under pressure as business volumes are
decreasing and profitability and asset quality are weakening, the
bank has a leading position in mortgage lending in Hungary and
has high operational integration with OTP Bank's retail
operations, and is dependent on its parent for most of its
treasury activities.

At the same time, Moody's confirmed OTP MB's local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings of Ba1 and Ba2, respectively. This
reflects Moody's view that OTP MB will be supported by its parent
if required, as stipulated in the full, irrevocable and
unconditional guarantee of the bank's obligations by the parent
bank. This provides rating uplift of one notch for the local-
currency deposit rating for OTP MB from the ba2 standalone credit
assessment. The Ba2 foreign-currency deposit rating is
constrained by Hungary's Ba2 foreign-currency deposit ceiling.

All the bank's ratings carry a negative outlook, given the
negative outlook on the parent.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

An upgrade of the bank's ratings is unlikely, given that the
bank's ratings and the parent's ratings carry a negative outlook.
However, upwards pressure could develop, following a material
improvement in the operating environment in Hungary, leading to a
large and sustainable profitability in the medium term and a
reversal of the weakening asset quality. In addition, upwards
pressure on OTP Bank's ratings could affect OTP MB's ratings.

OTP MB's standalone credit assessment could deteriorate if the
level of integration with OTP Bank were to weaken. The deposit
ratings could be negatively affected by any weakening of the debt
guarantees from the parent. In addition, OTP MB's ratings would
be negatively affected by any adverse change in OTP Bank's


Moody's lowered FHB MB's standalone credit assessment to b3 from
b1, reflecting the increasingly weak economic and operating
environment in Hungary, and subsequent pressures on the bank's
earnings-generating capacity and asset quality, which is already
indicated in P&L losses and high non-performing loans at 19.1% in
Q3 2012. In addition, the bank's high, albeit partially reduced,
reliance on wholesale funding has recently led to higher funding
costs, evidencing the bank exposure to potential volatility
and/or deterioration in market sentiment. However, Moody's
acknowledges that the bank's ongoing diversification strategy has
produced some benefits in terms of new business opportunities and
deposit collection, and that the bank's capital position has been
recently strengthened.

The lower standalone credit assessment, in turn, resulted in the
corresponding two notch downgrade of FHB MB's local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings to B2 from Ba3. The B2 rating continues
to reflect Moody's view of a moderate likelihood that the bank
would benefit from systemic support from the Hungarian
authorities in the case of need given (1) the nature and the
specialized role in mortgage lending of this institution in the
Hungarian market; and (2) the historical evidence of support that
the bank received from the Hungarian government. This provides
one notch of rating uplift for the deposit ratings for FHB MB
from the b3 standalone credit assessment.

All the bank's ratings carry a negative outlook, reflecting its
ongoing business and financial challenges.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

An upgrade of the bank's ratings is unlikely, given their
negative outlook. In the longer term, upwards pressure might
develop on the bank's standalone credit assessment if its
universal banking-strategy results in strengthening of its
franchise, thus significantly improving its earnings generating
capacity and funding profile. In addition, a significant
improvement of the operating environment in Hungary would be
credit positive.

The bank's ratings could be negatively impacted if the worsening
operating environment results in a more significant deterioration
in the bank's financials than currently envisaged. A significant
weakening of the bank's franchise, weighing on its revenue-
generating ability, would also have negative rating implications.

List of affected ratings

OTP Bank

- Local-currency long-term deposit rating confirmed at Ba1

- Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating confirmed at Ba2

- Foreign-currency long-term senior unsecured debt rating
   confirmed at Ba1

- Foreign-currency long-term subordinated debt rating (Lower
   Tier 2) downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2

- Foreign-currency long-term junior subordinated debt rating
   (Upper Tier 2) downgraded to B1 (hyb) from Ba3 (hyb)

- BFSR downgraded to D/ba2 from D+/ba1

These ratings are on negative outlook


- Local-currency long-term deposit rating confirmed at Ba1

- Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating confirmed at Ba2

- BFSR downgraded to D/ba2 from D+/ba1

These ratings are on negative outlook


- Local-currency and foreign currency long-term deposit ratings
   downgraded to B2

- BFSR of E+ confirmed, but re-mapped to b3 from b1

These ratings are on negative outlook.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, OTP Bank reported
consolidated total assets of HUF9,830 billion as of September 30,

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, OTP MB reported total assets
of HUF1,583 billion as of June 30, 2012.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, FHB MB reported consolidated
total assets of HUF751 billion as of September 30, 2012.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June

* HUNGARY: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to US$2-Bil. 2023 Bond
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Republic of Hungary's US$2 billion
bond, due Feb. 21, 2023, and US$1.25 billion bond, due Feb. 19,
2018, a 'BB+' rating.

The 2023 bond has a coupon of 5.375% and the 2018 bond has a
coupon of 4.125%. The rating is in line with Hungary's 'BB+'
Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR), on which
the Outlook is Stable.

* HUNGARY: Int'l Bond Market Return Confirms Fitch Rating Outlook
Hungary's return to the international bond market after 20 months
indicates that the country can meet its fiscal and external
financing needs in 2013-2014 without putting undue strain on
domestic capital markets, Fitch Ratings says.

Fitch says: "It confirms one of the assumptions made when we
revised the Outlook on Hungary's 'BB+' rating to Stable from
Negative in December: that Hungary retains sufficient access to
international bond markets to roll over maturing foreign-currency
debt in 2013. Hungary has now financed over two-thirds of the
EUR5bn in FX debt it needs to repay in 2013, including EUR3.8bn
of repayments to the IMF.

"International issuance means Hungary need not rely on a further
increase in non-resident participation from already historically
high levels for fiscal financing this year.

"A deep domestic capital market gives Hungary the capacity and
fiscal financing flexibility to meet sovereign debt obligations
in the face of market adversity. The country had met its growing
fiscal financing requirement in 2012 (11.3% of GDP, versus 4.4%
in 2011) without recourse to external borrowing, as non-resident
participation effectively financed just over three-quarters of
Hungary's gross 2012 external redemptions.

"The issue further reduces the prospect of any re-engagement with
the IMF, to which we already assigned a low probability because
of the government reluctance to submit to Fund conditionality.
The receding prospect of a new precautionary financing deal was
factored into our December Outlook revision.

"An IMF deal would still be valuable to Hungary. It could further
improve the terms on which the country accesses term financing on
the Eurobond market and would provide a backstop should investor
sentiment turn negative. Adherence to IMF requirements could
anchor economic policy and reduce the uncertainty that is holding
back investment and potential growth.

"Our revision of the Outlook to Stable recognized the
government's commitment to fiscal consolidation, some easing in
fiscal financing risks and an improvement in external flows.
However, the medium-term growth outlook is weak (GDP contracted
0.9% in Q412 from the previous quarter, and was down 2.7% on
Q411, according to data released on Thursday), public and
external debt ratios are high, and economic policy is
unpredictable. These factors expose Hungary to shocks to global
liquidity and risk appetite and constrain Hungary's IDR.

"Hungary raised USD3.25bn via a five-year and a 10-year tranche
on Tuesday. This follows a EUR1 billion retail-targeted issue
completed in January."


* ICELAND: Ends Financial Fraud Probe; Faces Krona Overhang Woes
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland
completed its investigation of the financial fraud that led to
the island's 2008 collapse with the top regulator warning that
the bank system is still too weak to survive a free-floating

Bloomberg relates that the Reykjavik-based Financial Supervisory
Authority on Thursday wrapped up more than four years of
investigations, which included 205 cases of financial
malpractice, 103 of which were referred to the prosecutors.
Fines were imposed in four of the cases, while 98 were dropped,
Bloomberg discloses.

The island imposed currency restrictions after its three biggest
banks collapsed in 2008, defaulting on US$85 billion that the
US$13 billion economy didn't have the means to honor, Bloomberg
recounts.  According to Bloomberg, the failures triggered a krona
sell-off, sending the currency down as much as 80% against the
euro, offshore.  Investors with about US$8 billion in krona
assets are still trapped behind the controls, Bloomberg notes.

The central bank has had limited success in reducing the krona
overhang and earlier this month accepted just ISK5.7 billion
(US$44 million) out of a total of ISK9.3 billion in bids in one
of its dual currency auctions, Bloomberg says.

The bank is seeking to phase out the controls through a program
designed to take pressure off the krona even as investors sell
their holdings by offering financial benefits and the option of
reinvesting, Bloomberg discloses.  Though the bank has indicated
the controls may be removed by 2015, it has emphasized targets
are linked to financial and economic goals rather than dates,
Bloomberg notes.

The International Monetary Fund said in November Iceland is
unlikely to be able to remove the currency controls before 2015
Finance Minister Katrin Juliusdottir said in October the most
viable prospect is to keep some form of currency controls in
place until Iceland can join the euro, Bloomberg relates.  The
nation started European Union membership talks in 2010, Bloomberg

Bloomberg notes that the IMF said that as of November, Iceland's
exchange-rate auctions had released a "modest" amount of kronur,
equal to 4.5% of gross domestic product.  The IMF estimates
progress has been "partly offset" by payments on offshore kronur
and currency released by the estates of the failed banks, leaving
offshore kronur equal to about 23% of the economy, Bloomberg

"Iceland's financial sector is tied to the capital controls,"
Bloomberg quotes Unnur Gunnarsdottir, chief executive officer at
the financial watchdog, as saying in an interview on Thursday in
Reykjavik.  "For that reason alone, it's not as healthy as we'd
want it to be.  The owners of the banks are the Treasury and
creditors" of Iceland's failed banks, Kaupthing Bank hf, Glitnir
Bank hf and Landsbanki Islands hf.  "That's not the healthiest
form of ownership" or the kind of ownership structure "that we'd
like to see".

Local investors, including shareholders in MP Banki hf and the
Iceland Enterprise Investment Fund, are in talks with the winding
up committees of Kaupthing and Glitnir on purchasing shares in
Arion and Islandsbanki, Morgunbladid reported on Thursday,
without saying how it obtained the information, Bloomberg


HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 3 Limited's notes,
as follows:

  EUR127.6m class A (ISIN XS0152283692): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  Recovery Estimate 95%

  EUR21.0m class B-1 (ISIN XS0152285630): affirmed at 'CCsf'';
  Recovery Estimate 0%

  EUR5.0m class B-2 (ISIN XS0152285804): affirmed at 'CCsf';
  Recovery Estimate 0%

  EUR8.0m class C (ISIN XS0152286281): affirmed at 'CCsf';
  Recovery Estimate 0%

The affirmation reflects concerns regarding the long-dated bucket
which has increased to 80% of the remaining portfolio from 47%
since the last review in February 2012 and might expose the
transaction to substantial market value risks The final legal
maturity of the transaction is in July 2014.

Potential losses given an expected default and liquidation
scenario are considered in the Recovery Estimate, which
represents Fitch's calculation of expected principal recoveries,
as a percentage of current note principal outstanding. The
expected recoveries on Class A notes are estimated at 95% of the
current outstanding balance, whereas recoveries on Classes B-1,
B-2 and C notes are expected to be 0% of their respective
outstanding balance.

The class A notes have been paid down by EUR130 million since
last year, reducing the outstanding balance to 33% of the note's
initial balance. This natural amortization positively affected
credit enhancement for the Class A and B notes.

The 'CCC' and below bucket has increased to 26% from 17% since
the last review and indicates a reduction in the overall
portfolio quality. Nevertheless, all over-collateralization tests
are passing and showing increasing trends.

Harbourmaster CLO 3 Limited is a securitization of mainly
European senior secured loans and structured finance securities.
At closing, a total note issuance of EUR438 million was used to
invest in a target portfolio of EUR430 million. The portfolio is
actively managed by Harbourmaster Capital Ltd.


AUDIOVISUAL TIBER: Arrests Rizzoli in Fraudulent Bankruptcy Probe
Gazzetta del Sud On Line reports that Angelo Rizzoli, former
chairman of the Rizzoli publishing empire (RCS), was arrested on
Thursday in Rome for alleged fraudulent bankruptcy involving his
company Audiovisual Tiber (previously Rizzoli Audiovisual) of
which he was the sole director.

According to Gazzetta del Sud On Line, Rome's tax police said
that the ailing, 70-year-old entrepreneur and producer is accused
of a financial fraud worth some EUR30 million that he allegedly
ran through his four subsidiary production companies.

Following Thursday's arrest, companies and real estate assets
worth some EUR7 million were seized and two of Mr. Rizzoli's
homes were searched, Gazzetta del Sud On Line relates.
Investigators also included Mr. Rizzoli's wife, Melania De
Nichilo, in probes, Gazzetta del Sud On Line notes.

Mr. Rizzoli was transferred to Rome's Sandro Pertini hospital
after he was deemed physically unfit for prison due to multiple
health problems, Gazzetta del Sud On Line discloses.  On Monday,
he will be questioned by investigators, Gazzetta del Sud On Line

ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: Moody's Rates New EUR350MM Notes '(P)Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)Ba2 rating to
EUR350 million of Senior Unsecured Guaranteed Notes to be issued
by Italcementi Finance SA. All ratings of Italcementi S.p.A. and
Ciments Francais SA remain unchanged.

The proceeds of the notes will be used to lengthen Italcementi's
maturity profile and to further diversify the group's exposure
with a view to increase the share of capital market debt.

The assignment of a definitive rating on the EUR350 million
senior guaranteed notes is subject to a review of the associated

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, and these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the securities. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

Moody's downgraded Italcementi's Corporate Family Rating to Ba2
with a negative outlook back in November 2012. The downgrade was
prompted by a weak operating performance and cash flow generation
during the first nine months of 2012. Credit metrics as per last
twelve months June 2012 deteriorated with RCF / Net debt dropping
to 11.4% from 13.4% as per December 2011. In addition debt/EBITDA
increased to 5.1x positioning Italcementi weakly in the Ba2
rating category, hence the negative outlook.

For 2013, Moody's expects Italcementi to face challenging market
conditions in its key markets Egypt and France and, to a lesser
extent, in Morocco where trading conditions could improve
modestly. Year-to-date September 2012, Egypt accounted for 19% of
Italcementi's reported EBITDA and France / Belgium accounted for
38%. The HSBC Purchaser Manager Index ('PMI') for Egypt has
declined to 37.1 in December, the lowest level in the series
history pointing towards a sharp deterioration in overall
business conditions in the country. Trading conditions should
remain challenging in Italy as well notwithstanding that the
contribution of this market currently is not material to the
group anymore due to the weak overall environment. On a positive
note Moody's expects markets such as the US, India and Thailand
to support the group's operating performance. The group will
remain largely focused on reducing costs during 2013 but it will
be challenging to stabilize the group's credit given the
continued difficult market conditions expected in several of the
group's most important markets.

Italcementi has an adequate liquidity profile over the next
twelve months including a well spread maturity profile with
manageable maturities over the next five years and a liquidity
headroom higher than 2 years.

The liquidity of the group is mainly supported by EUR470 million
of cash and cash equivalent and current financial assets as well
as EUR1.7 billion of availabilities under revolving credit
facilities at September 30, 2012. Alongside the group's funds
from operations this should be sufficient to fund short term
needs of cash mainly consisting of working cash, modest WC
requirements, capex, debt repayments and dividends. Moody's notes
that Italcementi has limited flexibility in adjusting dividend
levels as most of the dividends paid are dividends to minority
shareholders of Ciments Francais and emerging markets affiliates.
Moody's also notes that Italcementi has financial covenants in
some of its principal credit facilities with leverage covenant
levels of 3.75x versus leverage of 3.5x at September 30, 2012,
which leaves limited covenant headroom. Italcementi's February 5
press release implies that it expects leverage to have dropped to
3.1x-3.2x by fiscal year end 2012.

Positive rating pressure is currently not anticipated. A recovery
in the group's credit metrics with Debt/EBITDA dropping
sustainably below 4.0x and RCF/Net debt increasing sustainably
above 15% could lead to positive rating pressure over time.

Negative pressure on the ratings would increase if RCF/Net debt
would be trending towards 10% and Debt/EBITDA would exceed 5.0x.
In addition, declining headroom under the company's financial
covenants, which might put pressure on the short term liquidity
position, could lead to a negative rating action.


Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba2

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range of LGD
4, 60 %

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Building Materials Industry published in July 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

The Italcementi group, headquartered in Bergamo, Italy, is one of
the top five cement producers globally, with an installed cement
capacity in excess of 70 million tons and sales of approximately
EUR4.5 billion per December 2012. The group's cement and clinker
business, which accounts for more than two-thirds of total sales
is supplemented by aggregates, ready-mix concrete businesses.
Including its Italian market, Italcementi (ITC), via its 83.2%-
owned subsidiary Ciments Francais (CF), is active in 22
countries, with an emphasis on the Mediterranean basin. The
company is majority-owned by Italian investment holding

ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: S&P Rates EUR350MM Sr. Unsecured Notes 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' issue
rating to the proposed EUR350 million senior unsecured notes due
2018 to be issued by Italcementi Finance S.A., a subsidiary of
Italy-based cement manufacturer Italcementi SpA.  These notes
will be guaranteed by Italcementi SpA.  The recovery rating on
the proposed unsecured notes is '4', indicating S&P's expectation
of average (30%-50%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default.  The issue rating is in line with S&P's 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Italcementi SpA, in accordance with
S&P's notching criteria for a '4' recovery rating.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' rating on the
EUR750 million senior unsecured notes due 2020 issued under the
same euro medium-term note (EMTN) program by Italcementi Finance
S.A. and guaranteed by Italcementi SpA.  The recovery rating on
this debt instrument is also '4', indicating S&P's expectation of
average (30%-50%) recovery for debt holders in the event of
payment default.

"In addition, we affirmed our 'BB+' long-term and 'B' short-term
corporate credit ratings on Italcementi SpA.  The long-term
rating outlook is stable.  We have further revised downward our
expectations for operating performance in 2013; nevertheless, we
believe credit metrics will continue to make limited
improvements, supported by significant cost actions that
management have put in place in Italy.  We continue to assess the
group's liquidity as "adequate" despite covenant headroom on bank
debt that we believe could still fall short of 15% when measured
at June 30, 2013. Nevertheless, we believe this risk is mitigated
by the group's strong relationships with its lenders, limited
drawings on bank facilities, and significant other sources of
liquidity," S&P said.

"We have also affirmed our 'BB+' issue rating on the
EUR500 million senior unsecured notes issued by Ciments Francais
("CF," a consolidated 83%-owned subsidiary of Italcementi SpA)
due in 2017, in line with the corporate credit rating on the
group. The recovery rating on this debt instrument is '3',
indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for
debtholders in the event of payment default.  Although debt
recovery prospects exceed 70%, we have capped this recovery
rating at '3', in accordance with our criteria, because of this
debt's unsecured nature and the resulting risk that recovery
prospects could be impaired by the issuance of additional
priority or pari passu debt prior to default," S&P added.

The recovery rating of '4' on the proposed EUR350 million and
existing EUR750 million senior unsecured notes reflects the value
of the assets at the level of parent company Italcementi
(significantly smaller and less profitable than those of CF) and
the parent company's approximate 83% equity interest in CF.  It
also reflects the EUR650 million intercompany loans extended from
Italcementi SpA and Italcementi Finance S.A. to CF (which equates
to an unsecured claim on CF).  The recovery rating on these notes
is constrained, however, by their structural subordination to
CF's debt (EUR250 million bank debt at the operating company
level and the EUR500 million senior unsecured notes at CF S.A.)
vis-a-vis the assets located at CF.  The recovery rating on these
notes is also constrained, however, by the notes' senior
unsecured status and lack of meaningful protection in their
documentation, and by Italy's relatively unfriendly insolvency
regime for creditors.

S&P understands that Italcementi Finance S.A. will use the
proceeds of the proposed notes to repay the outstanding amount of
various revolving credit facilities borrowed at Italcementi SpA
and Italcementi Finance S.A. levels maturing in 2013.  The
proposed notes will be issued under the existing EMTN program and
will, therefore, benefit from the same documentation as the
existing EUR750 million (currently EUR738 million outstanding),
with the exception of the step-up clause in the final terms.
They will therefore be senior unsecured notes issued by
Italcementi Finance S.A. and will be guaranteed by Italcementi
SpA.  The documentation for the new and existing notes is
relatively light, in line with an investment-grade company.

The issue and recovery ratings on CF's notes reflects the
subsidiary's significant asset valuation, based on its solid
market positions, significant geographic diversity, and healthy
profitability through the industry cycle.  The recovery rating
also factors in the notes' senior unsecured status and lack of
meaningful protection in their documentation, as well as the
presence of relatively modest better-positioned debt located at
various subsidiaries and France's relatively less friendly
insolvency regime for creditors.

In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, it assumes that a payment
default occurs in 2017, when Italcementi will face some debt
maturities.  In evaluating recovery prospects, S&P believes that
the business would retain value as a going concern in the event
of bankruptcy, based on Italcementi's strong market positions and
broad geographic and customer diversity.  S&P estimates a
stressed enterprise value of about EUR2.6 billion, implying a
stressed EBITDA multiple of 6.0x.

After deducting priority liabilities of EUR620 million,
comprising enforcement costs, pension liabilities, finance
leases, the securitization program, debt located at subsidiaries,
and prepetition interests, the residual value of the Italcementi
group (including CF and other Italcementi companies) would be
about EUR1.9 billion.  S&P treats the debt at the CF level (and
CF's operating subsidiaries) as structurally senior to the debt
sitting at the Italcementi Finance and Italcementi SpA levels
vis-a-vis the assets at CF.  S&P treats all debt outstanding and
prospective (including the existing undrawn revolver) at
Italcementi Finance as pari passu to the debt at Italcementi SpA
by virtue of the guarantee of the latter to the former.  In S&P's
default scenario, the debt at CF would amount to about
EUR510 million (consisting primarily of the notes issued at that
level) and would attract numerical (before considering the
jurisdictional risk) recovery expectations well in excess of 70%.

Recovery expectations for Italcementi Finance's existing
EUR750 million and proposed EUR350 million senior unsecured
notes, would, in S&P's view, marginally exceed the 30%-50% range.
However, given these notes' lack of guarantee from CF and
structural subordination to CF's existing and any potential
prospective debt, S&P has assigned a '4' recovery rating to this
debt instrument.


New Rating

Italcementi Finance S.A.
Senior Unsecured*
  EUR350 mil 6.125% med-term nts        BB+
  due 02/21/2018
   Recovery Rating                      4

Ratings Affirmed

Italcementi SpA
Ciments Francais S.A.
Corporate Credit Rating                BB+/Stable/B

Ciments Francais S.A.
Senior Unsecured Debt                  BB+
  Recovery Rating                       3                  3

Italcementi Finance S.A.
Senior Unsecured Debt*                 BB+
  Recovery Rating                       4                  4
Commercial Paper                       B

*Guaranteed by Italcementi SpA.

VELA PUBLIC: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR328.5-Mil. Notes to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Vela Public Sector S.r.l.:

  EUR328.5M (74M current outstanding) Class A2 Notes, Downgraded
  to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2012 Downgraded to Baa3
  (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

This transaction is a static CLO of a portfolio of loans to
Italian public entities which closed in November 2004. Currently,
the pool includes exposures to Italian public debtors, mainly
Municipalities, Regions, Provinces, with the top five obligors
representing roughly 60% of the pool. About 16% of the current
portfolio is publicly rated by Moody's. Moody's has assessed the
creditworthiness through credit estimates and Q Scores.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action is driven by the recent
downgrade of relevant Italian sub-sovereign entities. Since
July 20, 2012, when the Class A2 notes were downgraded to Baa3
(sf) and placed under review for possible downgrade, Moody's has
received updated collateral information and has refreshed the
credit estimates and Q scores, some of the Italian sub-sovereign
entities included in the portfolio have been downgraded by 1 to 3

Moody's notes that about 75% of the collateral pool consists of
loans whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's
credit estimates and Q scores. As credit estimates and Q scores
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a one notch-equivalent assumed downgrade
was applied to each of these estimates; moreover the credit
estimates for two debtors in the portfolio with exposures above
3% were stressed by 2 notches in Moody's base case scenario.
Also, the quasi sovereign and sovereign profile of the majority
of the debtors who are all domiciled in Italy leads to a 100%
correlation assumption in Moody's model.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's
considered a sensitivity analysis by downgrading individually to
Caa2 the largest two exposures for which the creditworthiness was
assessed through credit estimates. Moody's ascertained that the
model output for the rated tranche is within one notch compared
to the base case.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as 100% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Italy.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations" published in September 2009. Other factors used in
this rating are described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's CDOROM
is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's default
probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity is
modeled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


UKIO BANKAS: Four Banks Mull Acquisition of Assets
Bryan Bradley at Bloomberg News reports that the Bank of
Lithuania said four banks in Lithuania are interested in
acquiring the assets of Ukio Bankas AB, which was the nation's
sixth-largest lender by assets until its operations were
suspended last week.

According to Bloomberg, the Bank of Lithuania said in an e-mailed
statement on Friday that Siauliu Bankas AB is already negotiating
with Ukio's temporary administrator and three more lenders are
seeking to start talks.  It didn't name the other institutions,
Bloomberg states.

The central bank suspended Ukio's operations on Feb. 12 and said
the lender was insolvent after risky lending to related
companies, Bloomberg relates.  The Bank of Lithuania on Thursday
said it was seeking to avoid the bankruptcy of Ukio to limit the
potential impact on public finances, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Baltic News Service reported on Friday,
without saying where it got the information, that the potential
bidders for Ukio's assets are the local units of Scandinavian
banks SEB AB and DNB ASA, and the Finasta investment banking unit
of defunct Snoras Bankas AB, which the Lithuanian government took
over in 2011.

"The Bank of Lithuania wants to determine the prospects for Ukio
Bankas's operations with great rapidity," Bloomberg quotes the
central bank as saying in its statement.  "The temporary
administrator must, no later than Feb. 18, offer conclusions and
proposals regarding whether and how the bank's activities can be

Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies.  It
is Lithuania's sixth-largest lender by assets.


ARCELORMITTAL SA: Mandatory Convertible No Impact on Fitch Rating
Fitch Ratings has clarified its rationale for the treatment of
ArcelorMittal S.A's recent US$2.25 billion mandatorily
convertible subordinated notes (MCN) as 100% debt. AM's 'BB+'
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and 'B' Short-term IDR are
unaffected by this change. The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is

The treatment of the notes continues to be 100% debt. Previously,
Fitch attributed this to the presence of a dividend pusher or
look-back clause within the draft documentation, which under the
agency's criteria represents a constraint upon the ability of the
instrument/issuer to defer interest coupon payments. Following
further legal advice and discussion, Fitch no longer considers
the terms and conditions of the MCNs contain a dividend pusher or
look-back provision. The notes continue to be treated as debt due
to the requirement to pay outstanding coupons in cash at the
conversion of the notes. In order to receive equity credit under
Fitch's criteria, the outstanding coupons would either have to be
able to be deferred through the conversion date or convert into


- Deleveraging Targets

AM has set a target of achieving net debt of US$17 billion by
June 2013. This is expected to come from a variety of non-
operational means including the recent equity/MCN issue, the
announced US$1.1 billion sale of a 15% stake in ArcelorMittal
Mines Canada, and the agreed sale of a 50% stake in Kalagadi
manganese for approximately US$450 million. A further net debt
reduction target of US$15 billion in the medium term will come
from operating cash flows. For 2013, Fitch now expects an EBIT
margin of around 2.5% with funds from operations (FFO) gross
leverage of between 3.5x-4.0x.

- Western European Steel Market

Fitch expects market conditions to remain challenging for western
European steel producers in 2013. From a demand perspective,
construction is expected to be weakest with a 5%-10% volume fall
whilst no improvement in automotive markets is expected until
late 2013. Steel prices are unlikely to increase materially in
the coming 12 months, translating into ongoing weak profitability
and free cash flow generation for producers.

- Significant Scale and Diversification

The ratings reflect AM's position as the world's largest steel
producer. AM is also the world's most diversified steel producer
in terms of product mix and geography, and it benefits from a
solid level of vertical integration into iron ore.

- Mid-Point Cost Position

AM has an average cost position (higher second quartile) overall,
varying across the key regions in which it operates. The cost
positions of individual plants vary significantly, with those in
Europe generally operating at higher costs, while those in the
Americas, Asia and the Commonwealth of Independent States have
the lowest costs. The company has embarked on a cost-saving
initiative that will see utilization rates increased at the
lower-cost plants, supporting an improvement in longer-term

- Increasing Mining Output

AM is expected to continue to expand its mining operations,
notably through investments in iron ore in Liberia, Canada and
Brazil. Fitch expects the mining division to become a larger
contributor to group EBITDA, contributing over 35% by 2014.
Higher mining margins compared to those generated by the steel
operations will have a positive effect on group profitability.


Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- FFO gross leverage below 2.25x
- Recovery in EBIT margins to above 6%

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- FFO gross leverage sustained above 3.0x
- Persistently negative free cash flow


-- Foreign currency Long-term IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Senior unsecured rating: 'BB+'
-- Foreign currency Short-term IDR: 'B'
-- US$650 million Perpetual Capital Securities: 'BB-'
-- US$2.25 billion Mandatorily Convertible Notes: 'BB-'


SNS REAAL: Dutch Court Hears Appeals on Expropriation Decree
Maud van Gaal and Fred Pals at Bloomberg News report that the top
Dutch administrative court heard appeals from investors on Friday
against the government's decree to expropriate SNS Reaal NV.

Lawyers argued the state's decision was disproportionate and
relied too heavily on one assessment of the company's real estate
loans, Bloomberg relates.  Representatives of international bond
investors said it infringed on the free movement of capital,
Bloomberg notes.

"The minister said bond holders should contribute to the costs of
nationalization," Bloomberg quotes William Schonewille, a lawyer
representing subordinated bondholders including Aviva Plc's
French asset manager, as saying at the hearing.  "That is,
however, not a ground for expropriation."

Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem took control of SNS
Reaal on Feb. 1 after real estate losses brought the bank to the
brink of collapse, Bloomberg recounts.  The nationalization
included shares and subordinated bonds in SNS Reaal NV and SNS
Bank NV, Bloomberg notes.  Bloomberg relates that Mr.
Dijsselbloem said the expropriation of subordinated creditors
reduced the rescue costs for the state by about EUR1 billion
(US$1.3 billion).

According to Bloomberg, the Hague-based Dutch Council of State
said it received about 700 appeals from investors, including
Italian insurer Unipol Assicurazioni SpA and Dutch trade union
FNV Bondgenoten, in the 10 days following the nationalization.
The court's ruling is scheduled for Feb. 25, Bloomberg discloses.

Eric Daalder, a lawyer at Pels Rijcken & Droogleever Fortuijn in
The Hague, representing the finance minister, said
Mr. Dijsselbloem had to choose between letting SNS fail and
nationalizing it, Bloomberg recounts.  The government applied a
systematic "ladder of bankruptcy" in assessing which investors
were expropriated, Bloomberg states.

"The state doesn't intervene in banks to protect their
investors," Mr. Daalder, as cited by Bloomberg, said.  "If you
invest, you know you are taking risks."

The intervention also met the legal requirement of a grave and
acute danger, Bloomberg says.  Between Jan. 16 and Feb. 1,
EUR2.5 billion of savings were withdrawn from the bank, Bloomberg
discloses.  Bloomberg notes that Mr. Daalder said SNS bank had a
cash position of about EUR4.5 billion at the end of last month,
which would have been depleted by mid-February if outflows
continued at the same pace, and considering other obligations.

According to Bloomberg, the finance ministry said the company's
real estate investments had a book value of EUR8.55 billion at
the end of June.  That compares with SNS Bank's balance sheet of
EUR82.3 billion, Bloomberg states.

                         Property Study

The Finance Ministry said in its decree that a study by Cushman &
Wakefield Inc. commissioned by the Dutch government found SNS
Property Finance would face additional losses of as much as
EUR3.2 billion in a worst-case scenario, Bloomberg relates.

The central bank said in a letter on Jan. 24 that in a base case,
estimated losses were EUR2.4 billion, EUR1.4 billion more than
foreseen by Ernst & Young in a separate study, Bloomberg

SNS REAAL NV -- is a Netherlands-based
financial services provider engaged in banking and insurance.
The Company's activities are divided into five segments: SNS
Bank, providing banking services both for the retail and small
and medium enterprises, such as mortgages, asset growth and asset
protection, insurance, payments, savings and financing; Property
Finance; Zwitserleven, providing pension insurance services,
mortgages and investment products; REAAL providing life and non-
life insurances; and Group activities.  As of December 31, 2011,
the Company operated through 16 wholly owned subsidiaries, such
as SNS Bank NV, REAAL NV, SNS REAAL Invest NV and SNS Asset
Management NV, among others.

VAN DER MOOLEN: Bad Management Prompted Collapse, Court Says
------------------------------------------------------------ reports that the Amsterdam company court said on
Friday the collapse of Van der Moolen in 2009 was due to bad
management by its executives and supervisory board.

The investigation into potential maladministration was called for
by the investors' organization VEB and major shareholder ASR
Nederland, relates.  The successful outcome clears
the way for damages claims, says.

The 117-year-old firm filed for bankruptcy on September 10, 2009,
blaming big losses in the US, unsuccessful new initiatives like
Online Trader, decreasing revenues in connection with the
financial crisis and a cost pattern that structurally exceeded
benefits, recounts.

                       About Van der Moolen

Headquartered in Amsterdam, Netherlands, Van der Moolen Holding
N.V. -- was an international
securities trading and brokerage firm that specialized in
providing low-cost liquidity in markets worldwide.  Its business
was to make money on financial markets, as a broker and
proprietary trader in securities, futures, derivatives indexes
and exchange traded funds.


SEVERSTAL OAO: Vorkutinskaya Blast No Impact on Moody's 'Ba1' CFR
Moody's Investors Service reports that Severstal OAO's Ba1
corporate family rating and stable rating outlook are unaffected
by the methane blast at the company's Vorkutinskaya coal mine on
February 11.

The blast happened at a mine operated by Vorkutaugol, which is
part of the Severstal Resources division, killing 18 people and
injuring three. While the full damage to the mine is yet to be
estimated, Moody's does not currently expect this accident to
have a significant impact on Severstal's performance in 2013 or
adversely affect its self-sufficiency in coking coal (which is
above 100%). Moreover, Moody's expects the impact on the
company's coal reserves to be insignificant. The group has a
robust financial profile, underpinned by conservative credit
metrics and a sound liquidity position, which provides headroom
against certain negative credit developments.

Specifically, there are a number of factors that cause Moody's to
believe that the impact of the accident on Severstal's financial
metrics and operations is likely to be limited: (1) total coal
production at the mine in 2012 comprised approximately 2.0
million tons of raw coal and 1.0 million tons of concentrate,
which represented only 19% of coal concentrate produced by
Vorkutaugol and 13% of the consolidated concentrate produced by
Severstal, respectively; (2) if following the investigation it
appears that not all the faces of the mine were impacted, it
would moderate the negative impact on the production numbers of
the mine in the future; (3) Vorkutaugol contributed around 12% to
the consolidated EBITDA of Severstal in the first nine months of
2012; (4) the Vorkutinskaya mine's recoverable economic reserves,
in accordance with the Russian classification, are approximately
29 million tons, representing 12% of Vorkutaugol's total
reserves; and (5) Severstal benefits from a degree of
diversification: there are 5 mines that are operated by
Vorkutaugol, which limits the potential impact on Severstal of
such an accident.

The reasons for build-up of methane that caused the blast are
being investigated by a governmental commission comprising
representatives of the Ministry on Emergency Situations of Russia
and Federal Environmental, Engineering and Technical Supervisory
Authority (Rostekhnadzor). A criminal case has been filed by the
Investigative Committee of Russia.

Moody's will continue to monitor the situation at the mine,
paying particular attention to (1) the conclusions of the
governmental commission investigating the accident; and (2) the
rulings of Rostekhnadzor, which could have an impact on the
operations of all or part of Vorkutinskaya mine or on the
extension of its license, which is valid until December 2013.
Moody's will also pay attention to (1) the promptness with which
operations at the mine will be restarted; and (2) the level of
investments and expenses that may be involved in resuming
operations at the mine, including those associated with the
company's health and safety measures to avoid such accidents in
the future.

As more information comes to light with respect to the impact of
the blast on other mine faces, Moody's will reassess the effect
of the accident on the company's credit metrics in 2013, although
it does not expect this to be significant.

Severstal is a vertically integrated global steel and steel-
related mining company, with assets in Russia, the US, Ukraine,
Latvia, Poland, Italy, Liberia and Brazil. Severstal is listed on
the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) and the company's
global depository receipts are traded on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE). Currently, approximately 79.17% of Severstal's
share capital is indirectly controlled by Mr. Alexey Mordashov,
the company's CEO. In 2011, Severstal had revenue of US$15.8
billion (H1 2012: US$7.4 billion) and EBITDA of US$3.6 billion
(H1 2012: US$1.2 billion; unless noted, all financial figures
incorporate Moody's standard adjustments). Severstal's crude
steel production in 2011 reached 15.3 million tons (H1 2012: 7.8
million tons).


BANKIA SA: Shares Suspended; Investors May Face Heavy Losses
Giles Tremlett at The Guardian reports that small retail clients
who invested in Spain's nationalized Bankia face substantial
losses, with the bank's shares temporarily suspended on the
Madrid stock exchange on Thursday morning amid rumors that
existing stock would be declared almost worthless.

The Frob, the country's bank restructuring fund, was forced to
admit that the price it will set for swapping debt into shares at
the bailed-out bank would be low -- but denied reports that it
would value shares at just 1 euro cent each, the Guardian

According to the Guardian, Spain's Expansion newspaper had
reported that the Frob had set the 1 cent level for shares that,
when floated amid an aggressive marketing campaign in 2011, were
valued at EUR3.75 (GBP3.23) each.  About 350,000 retail investors
are thought to have bought at up to that price, the Guardian
discloses.  A valuation of 1 cent would in effect wipe out their
investments, the Guardian states.

Bankia asked to be rescued last year as it drowned in a sea of
toxic real estate left over from a residential construction
bubble that burst five years ago, leaving a million new
properties unsold, the Guardian recounts.

The bank took EUR18 billion of European aid, which went via the
Frob and was added to Spain's national debt, the Guardian

Formed by the merger of seven provincial savings banks, Bankia
was devastated -- along with many of its Spanish peers -- by the
property market collapse, and a government-enforced clean-up of
real estate exposures left it short of capital last year, the
Guardian notes.

The complex recapitalization of Bankia will see parent group BFA,
now controlled by the Frob, subscribe to EUR10.7 billion of
Bankia-issued bonds that will then be converted into shares, the
Guardian says.

But the Frob insisted on Thursday that, although Bankia's debts
outweighed assets by EUR4.2 billion in December, the conversion
price had not yet been fixed, the Guardian notes.

"The entity's negative valuation and its end-2012 projected
results indicate that the price at which the Frob [will
participate in Bankia] via BFA will entail a big reduction in the
shares' nominal value," the Guardian quotes the Frob as saying in
a statement.

Bankia is a Spanish banking conglomerate that was formed in
December 2010, consolidating the operations of seven regional
savings banks.  As of 2012, Bankia is the fourth largest bank of
Spain with 12 million customers.

CABLEUROPA SAU: Moody's Rates EUR260-Mil. Sr. Secured Notes 'B1'
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B1 rating with a
loss given default assessment of LGD3 (43%) to the EUR260 million
8.5% senior secured notes due in 2020 issued by Nara Cable
Funding II Limited (Nara II), a special purpose vehicle that has
on-lent the funds to Cableuropa S.A.U. (ONO). All other ratings
of the group remain unchanged with a stable outlook.

ONO will use the proceeds of this issuance to voluntarily prepay
all amortization payments until 2016 due under Term Loan A of its
senior facility. The notes rank pari passu with ONO's existing
senior secured facility and senior secured notes. The notes have
essentially the same terms and covenant package as the senior
secured notes issued by Nara Cable Funding Limited (Nara).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on January 30, 2013.

The B1 rating assigned to the notes is one notch higher than
ONO's B2 corporate family rating, reflecting the impact of the
presence of junior debt in the company's capital structure. This
junior debt primarily comprises a total of EUR460 million worth
of senior subordinated notes due in 2019 issued by ONO Finance II

This transaction is leverage neutral but has some credit-positive
implications, such as the extension of ONO's debt maturity
profile and the removal of all mandatory debt amortizations until
2016. In addition, the company is in the process of amending its
senior facility to enhance its flexibility in the event of an
IPO. Nevertheless, the notes carry a higher coupon than the term
loan that it is retiring, which will have some impact on the
company's cash flows.

Despite the broadly credit-positive features of this bond
issuance, Moody's changed the outlook on ONO's ratings to stable
from positive on January 30, 2013 to reflect the reduced
visibility with regard to the company's medium-term operational
performance due to the increasingly difficult macroeconomic and
competitive environment. As a result, an upgrade of the rating
over the next 12 months is now unlikely.

ONO has demonstrated a resilient operating performance throughout
Spain's macroeconomic downturn, and for the last 12 months ended
September 2012 it reported solid revenue growth, albeit at the
expense of some margin pressure. This performance has been
supported by its technologically advanced high-speed networks and
new product offerings, such as mobile and TiVo.

However, Moody's believes that ONO will find it increasingly
difficult to sustain these levels of performance. This is because
the macroeconomic environment in Spain, where ONO generates 100%
of its cash flows, will remain challenging. Moody's expects
Spain's GDP to decline by -1.4% in 2013 (following a similar
decline in 2012) and unemployment to reach 26%. This recessionary
environment is adversely affecting consumer disposable income and
some of ONO's most price-sensitive customers are dropping their
telecom or television services.

In addition, the Spanish government has recently taken measures
to increase tax collections, which are affecting all corporates
in general and ONO in particular. The recent increase in VAT
makes ONO's products more expensive for the consumer, while
restrictions on the use of tax credits and on the tax
deductibility of depreciation will result in an increase in taxes
payable in 2013, reducing the company's available free cash flow.

In terms of competition, the recent launch of a convergent
quadruple-play offer (called Movistar Fusion) by Telefonica at
very competitive prices has forced the rest of Spain's
telecommunications service providers to reposition their
offerings at lower levels. This, combined with the expected
acceleration of Telefonica's fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) network
rollout, may reduce ONO's competitive advantage and its ability
to price its high-quality products at a premium.

ONO's B2 corporate family rating (CFR) reflects the company's
position as Spain's largest cable operator and leading
alternative provider of telecommunications, broadband and
internet and pay-TV services, its resilient operating performance
in a challenging environment, and its solid liquidity profile.
These considerations are balanced by the company's high, albeit
reducing, leverage (Moody's expects ONO's adjusted debt/EBITDA to
be 4.8x at YE 2012), its weakening interest coverage ratios due
to the high cost of debt, and the reduced visibility with regards
to the company's future operating performance in the context of a
more competitive environment and a recessionary macroeconomic
environment. A deterioration of ONO's operating performance
could, over the longer term, reduce the company's headroom under
the financial covenants of its senior facility, thereby exerting
pressure on its liquidity profile.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will maintain its market position and profitability levels, while
reporting growing positive free cash flow generation in the
medium term.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down?

Upward pressure on the rating will hinge on the ability of ONO's
management to deliver on its business plan, while continuing with
its deleveraging efforts, such that debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by
Moody's) remains sustainably below 5.0x, EBITDA to interest
expense trends towards 3.0x and the company generates growing
positive free cash flow. A rating upgrade could result if,
through the proceeds from an IPO, ONO is able to increase the
pace at which it is currently reducing its debt levels. However,
upward pressure on the rating could be tempered if a significant
deterioration in the macroeconomic or competitive environment in
Spain were to affect ONO's prospects of successfully implementing
its business plan.

Downward rating pressure could arise if (1) ONO's EBITDA
generation declines below Moody's estimates (whether as a result
of strategic or operational issues or a more material
deterioration of the domestic macroeconomic or competitive
environment), (2) the company's free cash flow generation turns
negative in light of its high cost of debt, resulting in debt
affordability concerns, or (3) Moody's were to become concerned
about ONO's liquidity as a result of a reduction in headroom
under the company's financial covenants.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Cable Television Industry published in July 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Madrid, Cableuropa S.A.U. (ONO) is Spain's
largest cable operator and leading alternative provider of
telecommunications, broadband and internet and pay-TV services.
It is the only cable operator in the country with national
coverage. For the 12 months ended September 2012, ONO generated
net revenues of EUR1.545 billion and EBITDA of EUR756 million.

GC SABADELL: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on all classes of GC
SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecario's notes.

On April 30, 2012, S&P lowered its issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Banco de Sabadell S.A. (BB/Negative/B).  On Oct. 15, 2012, S&P
again lowered its ICR on Banco de Sabadell following S&P's Oct.
10 lowering of its sovereign ratings on the Kingdom of Spain.

Banco de Sabadell is the swap provider for GC SABADELL 1.
However, it is no longer an eligible swap counterparty in this
transaction because it did not comply with its obligations under
the swap documentation, which states that the swap counterparty
must be replaced if its short-term rating falls below 'A-3'.  In
accordance with the documentation, and as Banco de Sabadell's
short-term rating is 'B', a replacement swap provider must be

As more than 60 days had elapsed since S&P's April 30, 2012
downgrade of the swap provider, Banco de Sabadell, and no remedy
actions were taken in relation to the swap counterparty, on
Dec. 27, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on all classes of GC
SABADELL 1's notes on CreditWatch negative.

These CreditWatch negative placements did not imply that the
period for the execution of the remedy actions was extended.  It
allowed S&P to perform further analysis to evaluate the exposure
of this transaction to the swap contracts.

In accordance with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria and using the
latest available portfolio and structural features information,
S&P has conducted a credit, cash flow, and structural analysis--
without giving benefit to the swap agreement--and have removed
from CreditWatch negative all of its ratings on these notes.

This transaction presents a very low level of arrears and
defaults.  As of Dec. 31, 2012, 90+ days arrears up to defaults
(defined in this transaction as loans in arrears for more than 12
months), represent only 0.77% of the outstanding balance of the
pool and cumulative defaults represent 0.47% of the initial
balance of the pool.  The performance has been stable during the
entire life of the transaction.

The swap agreement in this transaction provides a significant
amount of support to the structure.  The swap counterparty pays
the weighted-average cost of the notes, plus a guaranteed margin
of 50 basis points (bps), on a notional amount defined as the
outstanding balance of the notes.  While in the scenarios where
S&P assumes that there is no swap agreement, interest income (in
addition to three-month EURIBOR [Euro Interbank Offered Rate]) is
limited to the margin on the pool, which as of Dec. 31, 2012 was
65 bps--after assuming margin compression and further stresses.
This stress is mitigated only by the increase in credit
enhancement since closing.

In S&P's cash flow analysis without giving benefit to the swap
agreement, only the class A2 notes has experienced a sufficient
increase in credit enhancement to allow it to support a rating
higher than the long-term ICR on the swap counterparty ('BB').
Since closing, the credit enhancement for the class A2 notes has
increased to 7.09% from 3.35%.

Therefore, S&P's rating on the class A2 notes is de-linked from
the rating on the swap counterparty.  The maximum rating the
class A2 notes can achieve in scenarios without giving benefit to
the swap agreement is 'BBB- (sf)'.  S&P has therefore lowered its
rating on the class A2 notes to 'BBB- (sf)'.

The class B and C notes need the support of the swap in order to
achieve a rating above the long-term ICR on the current swap
counterparty.  S&P's ratings on these classes are linked to the
long-term ICR on the current swap counterparty.  Consequently, as
S&P's ratings on the class B and C notes are constrained to its
'BB' long-term ICR on the current swap counterparty, S&P has
lowered its ratings on the class B and C notes to 'BB (sf)'.

Should Banco de Sabadell be replaced by an eligible counterparty,
S&P would conduct further analysis while giving benefit to the
swap and take rating actions accordingly.  All else being equal,
the class B and C notes could achieve investment-grade ratings if
the swap counterparty complies with the downgrade language
defined in the transaction documents.

GC SABADELL 1 is a residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transaction issued by Banco de Sabadell.  It securitizes a
portfolio of mortgage loans granted to individuals located in


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class             Rating
            To               From

GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.2 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          BBB- (sf)        A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BB (sf)          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

IM SABADELL: S&P Lowers Rating on Three Note Classes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on all classes of IM
Sabadell RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' notes.

On April 30, 2012, S&P lowered its issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Banco de Sabadell S.A. (BB/Negative/B).  On Oct. 15, 2012, S&P
again lowered its ICR on Banco de Sabadell following its Oct. 10
lowering of S&P's sovereign ratings on the Kingdom of Spain.

Banco de Sabadell is the swap provider for IM Sabadell RMBS 2.
However, it is no longer an eligible swap counterparty in this
transaction because it did not comply with its obligations under
the swap documentation, which states that the swap counterparty
must be replaced if its short-term rating falls below 'A-3'.  In
accordance with the documentation, and as Banco de Sabadell's
short-term rating is 'B', a replacement swap provider must be

As more than 60 days had elapsed since S&P's April 30, 2012
downgrade of the swap provider, Banco de Sabadell, and no remedy
actions were taken in relation to the swap counterparty, on
Dec. 27, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on all classes of IM
Sabadell RMBS 2's notes on CreditWatch negative.

These CreditWatch negative placements did not imply that the
period for the execution of the remedy actions was extended.  It
allowed S&P to perform further analysis to evaluate the exposure
of this transaction to the swap contracts.

In accordance with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria and using the
latest available portfolio and structural features information,
S&P has conducted a credit, cash flow, and structural analysis--
without giving benefit to the swap agreement--and has removed
from CreditWatch negative all of its ratings on these notes.

This transaction presents a very low level of arrears and
defaults.  As of Dec. 31, 2012, 90+ days arrears up to defaults
(defined in this transaction as loans in arrears for more than 12
months), represent only 1.40% of the outstanding balance of the
pool and cumulative defaults represent 1.11% of the initial
balance of the pool.  The performance has been stable during the
entire life of the transaction.

The swap agreement in this transaction provides a significant
amount of support to the structure.  The swap counterparty pays
the weighted-average cost of the notes, plus a guaranteed margin
of 40 basis points (bps), on a notional amount defined as the
outstanding balance of the notes.  While in the scenarios where
S&P assumes that there is no swap agreement, interest income (in
addition to three-month EURIBOR [Euro Interbank Offered Rate]) is
limited to the margin on the pool, which as of Dec. 31, 2012 was
62 bps--after assuming margin compression and further stresses.
This stress is mitigated only by the increase in credit
enhancement since closing.

All classes of notes need the support of the swap in order to
achieve a rating above the long-term ICR on the current swap
counterparty.  S&P's ratings on all classes of IM Sabadell I's
notes are linked to the long-term ICR on the current swap
counterparty.  Consequently, as S&P's ratings on all classes of
notes are constrained to its 'BB' long-term ICR on the current
swap counterparty, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class A, B,
and C notes to 'BB (sf)'.

Should Banco de Sabadell be replaced by an eligible counterparty,
S&P would conduct further analysis while giving benefit to the
swap contract and take rating actions accordingly.  All else
being equal, the class A, B, and C notes could achieve
investment-grade ratings if the swap counterparty complies with
the downgrade language defined in the transaction documents.

As of now there is no commingling reserve constituted in the
transaction, although one was defined in the transaction
documents upon loss of an 'A-2' short-term rating on the
servicer.  S&P has therefore applied commingling risk in its cash
flow analysis to size for this risk.  The application of the
commingling risk does not have an impact on the ratings assigned.

IM Sabadell RMBS 2 is a residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction issued by Banco de Sabadell.  It securitizes a
portfolio of mortgage loans granted to individuals located in


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class             Rating
            To               From

IM Sabadell RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.4 Billion Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           BB (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BB (sf)          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

ORIZONIA: Seeks Creditor Protection as Globalia Merger Stalls
Sharon Smyth at Bloomberg News reports that Orizonia sought
protection for four months as it negotiates with investors and

According to Bloomberg, Orizonia said it presented request for
creditor protection in Palma de Mallorca court Feb. 15.  The
company, as cited by Bloomberg, said it is "confident" it will
resolve negotiations in less than four months.

The company filed the request after Spain competition regulator
announced delay in authorizing integration of company into
Globalia, Bloomberg discloses.

Orizonia said the measures were taken to ensure continuity of
company though its airline Orbest will suspend some flights
temporarily, Bloomberg relates.

Separately, Gabriel Trindade at 02B reports that Orizonia has
declared on Friday a preliminary stage leading to a creditors'

According to the 02B, the company has opted for explore this
formula to release four more months' room to complete its merging
into Globalia.  By doing so, the firm is expecting to dodge
insolvency proceedings, 02B says.

Both companies agreed a sale in December last year, but are still
expecting to be given the final go-ahead by the Comision Nacional
de Competencia, Spanish competence watchdog, to start merging
structures, 02B recounts.  When the process is completed,
Globalia is to become the largest tour-operator in Spain, 02B

Rumor said it over the last days that Orizonia financial dire
straits were getting worse, 02B discloses.  The company has even
called its employees to agree on a restructuring plan to cut
costs, 02B relates. However, the last straw has been, said
sources from the industry to 02B, settling a payment with
International Air Transport Association for the Billing and
Settlement Plan, 02B notes.  Inability to pay up has led the
company to admit its difficulties at a court in Palma de
Mallorca, 02B states.

According 02B, sources from aviation industry said the BSP for
Orizonia was to the tune of EUR10 million.  The company said that
has resorted to request preliminary stages of insolvency
proceedings following "a non-fulfillment by Globalia of its
commitments whilst the CNC is postponing its go-ahead," 02B

Orizonia is a Spanish tour operator group.

REYAL URBIS: Creditors Reject Debt Restructuring Proposal
Tomas Cobos and Carlos Ruano at Reuters report that creditors of
Reyal Urbis rejected the company's EUR3.6 billion
(US$4.8 billion) debt restructuring proposal, pushing it a step
closer to bankruptcy.

Reyal Urbis, battered by the sharp downturn in Spain's property
sector, had until Feb. 23 to reach an accord with its lenders or
begin bankruptcy proceedings, a deadline set by the courts,
Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, two sources familiar with the talks on
Friday said that although last-minute talks are still possible,
the company's lenders and Spain's so-called bad bank, where some
of the loans are now parked, were not eager to refinance Reyal,
making bankruptcy the most likely option.

Reyal Urbis said in October if it could not reach an agreement
with its creditor banks it might need to seek creditor
protection, Reuters recounts.  The company's creditors include
Santander, BBVA, Bankia and Banco Popular, Reuters discloses.

The company said its assets were worth EUR4.2 billion at end-June
compared with debt of EUR4.3 billion, Reuters relates.

Reyal Urbis is a Spanish listed real estate developer.


* SWITZERLAND: CCB Curbs Banks' Property Risks, Fitch Says
The initiative by Swiss authorities to impose a 1%
countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) for banks' domestic
mortgages will help offset the credit risk build-up from the
threat of a mortgage market bubble, Fitch Ratings says.

The Swiss banks should be able to adjust to the additional
capital requirement, announced on Feb. 13, 2013, by the end-
September deadline given they already hold high levels of capital
to meet the "Swiss finish" standards. Depending on their size and
complexity, Swiss banks have to comply with common equity Tier 1
ratios of between 7% and 9.2% and total capital ratios of at
least 10.5%. All the banks we rate already exceed these minimum
requirements, so the additional 1% capital buffer on domestic
residential mortgages should not be material for them.

Large international banks such as UBS and Credit Suisse will be
generally less affected than domestic regional cantonal banks and
co-operative banks. Risk-weighted assets (RWA) for residential
mortgages accounted for a mere 9.6% and 8.1% of total credit risk
RWA at UBS and Credit Suisse, respectively, at end-H112. This
reflects the use of Basel's advance internal ratings based
approach and the banks' considerable international
diversification. Conversely, at cantonal banks, residential
mortgages are typically 35% risk-weighted under the standardized
approach and accounted for over 60% of their assets at end-2011.

A flexible capital cushion that increases in favorable and
decreases in unfavorable economic conditions is a sensible way
for the banks to address unexpected losses. The Swiss National
Bank can raise the CCB up to the maximum 2.5% for all domestic
assets, not just mortgage loans. So there is still some degree of
flexibility to help cool the property market.

The CCB comes on top of actions by the financial regulator,
FINMA, to impose stricter underwriting and capital standards for
mortgage exposures since mid-2012. A 100% risk-weight is now
assigned to mortgages with loan-to-values greater than 80% and
minimum equity and amortization requirements have been tightened.
Risk-weights have also been raised for new domestic property
loans at UBS and Credit Suisse. The incremental CHF2 billion-CHF3
billion RWA needed each year for the next five years is not
material for each of these banks.

Others countries, such as Sweden and Singapore, have also taken
measures to curb mortgage lending growth and enhance banking
sector stability. But Switzerland has also activated a CCB. These
measures should improve the resilience of the banks to a domestic
housing downturn and maintain market confidence among debt
investors. However, the measures on their own are unlikely to
significantly slow down mortgage lending growth. Mortgage
interest rates will still be significantly lower than in the
early 1990s, the peak of the last real estate cycle, even if the
higher cost of capital were to be fully passed on to customers.

Property prices in Switzerland have risen every year since 2002-
2003, helped by low interest rates and net immigration, although
mortgage lending growth has been moderate, at around 5% annually.
Signs of overheating in some regions, notably around Geneva and
Zurich, are behind the CCB activation.


* TURKEY: S&P Withdraws Unsolicited Issue Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has withdrawn its
unsolicited issue ratings on the sovereign debt issued by Turkey
(unsolicited, foreign currency BB/Stable/B; local currency BBB-
/Stable/A-3) and the Sukuk Lease Certificates issued by Hazine
Mustesarligi Varlik Kiralama Anonim Sirketi, a special-purpose
vehicle wholly owned by Turkey.

On Jan. 14, 2013, S&P converted its issuer credit ratings on
Turkey, as well as the issue ratings on Turkey's individual
sovereign debt issues, to "unsolicited" in anticipation of the
rating withdrawal.

Standard & Poor's nonetheless will continue to publish
unsolicited issuer credit ratings on Turkey.  S&P's withdrawal of
the abovementioned issue ratings is not related to its view of
Turkey's creditworthiness.


Not Rated Action
                                        To                 From
Turkey (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
Senior Unsecured (foreign currency)    NR                 BB
Senior Unsecured (local currency)      NR                 BBB-
Recovery Rating                        NR                 3
Senior Secured*                        NR
AA+/Watch Neg

* Guaranteed by the United States of America and Defense
   Security Assistance of the U.S.

Hazine Mustesarligi Varlik Kiralama Anonim Sirketi (Unsolicited

Senior Unsecured                       NR                 BB

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COSALT: Asks Banks to Appoint Administrator, Seeks Buyer
Ros Snowdon at Yorkshire Post reports that troubled offshore
services group Cosalt has asked its banks to appoint
administrators after failing to raise any alternative sources of

The company said that no employees, customers or suppliers are
expected to be affected and all the subsidiaries should continue
to trade as normal, according to Yorkshire Post.

The report relates that the administrators will try to sell the
company's assets including the shares in Cosalt Offshore and
Cosalt Workwear in order to minimize losses.

The report notes that the group has agreed to sell Cosalt
Offshore to Dunwilco and said the business will continue to trade
as normal and all employee, customer and supplier contracts will
remain in force.

It said the Cosalt Workwear business will be unaffected and will
not be placed into any insolvency process, the report discloses.

The report relays that instead the administrators will look to
sell the work wear business to a third party.  As a result no
employees, customers or suppliers are expected to be affected,
the report notes.

Shareholders are not expected to get anything from the disposals.

Last week, the report recalls that the group warned it was likely
to enter insolvency proceedings later this month if it couldn't
reach an agreement with its banks.  The report relays that the
company said at the time it was in discussions with potential
fundraisers, but no alternative sources of funding were

It added that if banking conditions couldn't be met and the banks
wouldn't agree an alternative course of action, "the directors
consider that Cosalt would be likely to enter insolvency
proceedings on or before February 28," the report adds.

DAILY MAIL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Ratings; Outlook Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
U.K.-based media group Daily Mail & General Trust PLC (DMGT) to
positive from stable.  At the same time S&P affirmed its 'BB+/B'
long- and short-term corporate credit ratings and 'BB' senior
unsecured debt ratings on the group.

The recovery rating on DMGT's senior unsecured debt is unchanged
at '5', indicating S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery
for creditors in the event of a payment default.

The outlook revision reflects DMGT's move toward a more moderate
financial policy, S&P's view of its gradually improving business
risk profile following the sale of its regional newspaper
division Northcliffe, and the steady growth of its business-to-
business (B2B) division.  If DMGT continues to demonstrate a
conservative approach in its acquisition strategy and shareholder
remuneration that does not jeopardize its 2.0x net debt-to-
EBITDA, its credit metrics could become commensurate with a
higher rating within the next 12 months.

The sale of Northcliffe supports S&P's assessment of DMGT's
business risk profile as "satisfactory" because it has removed
some potential cyclicality in the group's earnings, and
ultimately its credit metrics.  The local newspaper business had
been the worst hit by the structural shift of advertising
spending to the Internet, and was draining significant resources
in the form of restructuring costs.

The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that steadily improving
profitability, along with a more moderate financial policy,
should enable DMGT to improve its financial metrics sustainably
toward a range beyond the level S&P considers adequate for the
current ratings.  S&P sees adjusted FFO to debt of more than 20%
and debt to EBITDA of less than 4x as commensurate with the
current ratings.

S&P could raise the ratings if DMGT maintained a prudent
acquisition and dividend policy and did not deviate from its net
debt-to-EBITDA target of 2.0x.  In particular, S&P expects the
group to balance its acquisition strategy and shareholder
remuneration with protection of its credit metrics.  S&P views
adjusted debt to EBITDA below 3.0x, adjusted FFO to debt above
30%, and free operating cash flow to debt above 15% on a
sustainable basis as adequate for a higher rating level.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if adverse market
developments or shortfalls in the group's operating performance
affected its EBITDA and free cash flow generation, causing its
credit measures to fall behind the levels cited above.  S&P might
also consider a negative rating action if financial policy
evolved away from the moderate direction that S&P currently

ECO-BAT: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based lead recycler Eco-Bat
Technologies Ltd. (Eco-Bat) to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on Eco-Bat's
senior unsecured notes due 2017 to 'B' from 'B+', in line with
the corporate credit rating.  The recovery rating on the senior
unsecured notes remains unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for noteholders in
the event of payment default.

The downgrade reflects S&P's estimate that new recycling capacity
in the U.S., together with a contraction of the auto market in
Europe, will translate into weak cash flow in 2013.  This is in
addition to ongoing pressure on margins.  Consequently, S&P
anticipates a material drop in Eco-Bat's EBITDA in 2013 and 2014,
from GBP154 million in the 12 months to Sept. 30, 2012.  The 2012
figure was already down substantially from GBP197 million in
full-year 2011, on the back of low lead prices and low
availability of scrap lead.

S&P therefore believes that Eco-Bat's enterprise value no longer
covers the sizable GBP871 million payment-in-kind (PIK) loan at
its 86.7% immediate parent EB Holdings II, Inc. (EB Holdings; not
rated).  S&P further believes that Eco-Bat will not be able to
upstream sufficient dividends in future to reduce the loan

An additional negative rating factor remains S&P's lack of
visibility on Eco-Bat's financial strategy under its ultimate
shareholder, Mr. Howard Meyers.  While S&P acknowledges
management's strengths and operational standards in running the
business, it sees this entrepreneurial ownership and associated
lack of visibility as materially negative factors, leading S&P to
assess Eco-Bat's management and governance as "weak."

In S&P's view, Eco-Bat is able to generate flat free operating
cash flow under S&P's base-case scenario, notwithstanding the
deterioration it anticipates in operating conditions in 2013.
The ratings also factor in a hypothetical scenario whereby Eco-
Bat makes a large one-off dividend payment to service EB
Holdings' PIK loan.

Rating downside could occur if there is:

   -- Any restructuring of PIK loan that results in a material
      increase in gross debt at Eco-Bat; and

   -- A lack of a plan to refinance the PIK loan by early 2016,
      one year before it matures.

A positive rating action is unlikely at this stage.  It hinges
first and foremost on improved visibility over the shareholders'
strategy for restructuring the PIK loan at the parent level, even
if Eco-Bat's profitability recovers to its levels in previous

JESSOPS PLC: Owes More Than GBP80-Mil. at Time of Administration
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that Jessops collapsed
into administration with debts of more than GBP80 million,
including GBP43 million to suppliers.

Jessops fell into administration last month, leading to 2,000 job
losses and 192 store closures within days, the Telegraph

According to the Telegraph, the statement of affairs from
Jessops' directors shows the company had debts of GBP81.4
million.  The report estimates that creditors will face a major
shortfall from the administration, with just GBP3.4 million
likely to be raised from asset sales, the Telegraph discloses.

The debts include GBP28.8 million to HSBC, GBP2.5 million to the
Pension Protection Fund, which owned a stake in Jessops, GBP1.4
million to employees, and GBP42.6 million to suppliers, the
Telegraph notes.

The list of trade creditors includes major camera makers such as
Canon, which was owed GBP16.4 million, as well as Nikon and Sony,
which were both owed more than GBP3 million, the Telegraph

However, the report also shows that suppliers were selling stock
to Jessops with retention of title, the Telegraph says.  This
means that although the stock was in Jessops stores, it was still
owned by the suppliers until the retailer sold the product, the
Telegraph notes.

According to the Telegraph, this explains why Jessops shops
closed within days of the company calling in administrators --
because suppliers could simply reclaim the stock they still
owned.  Of the GBP42.6 million of debt to suppliers, GBP23.3
million was stock held by retention of title and has therefore
already been claimed by suppliers, the Telegraph notes.

Despite the decline into administration, the Jessops brand is
expected to live on after it was bought by the Dragons' Den
entrepreneur Peter Jones, the Telegraph says.

Mr. Jones is planning to run Jessops as an online retailer but is
also exploring a deal to buy a handful of its former stores, the
Telegraph discloses.

Wm Morrison, the supermarket group, has already bought seven
Jessops sites for use as convenience stores, the Telegraph

Headquartered in Leicester, United Kingdom, Jessops plc -- is a holding company of a group of
companies whose principal activity is the retail of photographic
products and services.  It operates via the Internet and through
mail order and telesales.  Jessops plc sells a range of digital
and analogue cameras, digital and analogue camcorders,
binoculars, digital home print solutions, memory cards, film and
photographic materials, as well as a range of accessories for the
photographic market, including its own brand products.  The
Company also provides developing and printing, and digital
imaging services.  The Company is engaged in the business of
selling branded photographic equipment.  Its subsidiaries include
Camera Bond Limited, Camera Mezz Limited, Camera Equity Limited,
The Jessop Group Limited, Well Hall (Jersey) Limited, Expert
Imaging Limited, MacKinnons of Dyce Limited and Jessops
Photographic (Ireland) Limited.

SHRUBBERY HOTEL: Continues Operations Amid Administration
Daily Echo reports that the Shrubbery Hotel has been placed in

Stuart and Liz Shepherd, who have run the hotel for over 50
years, announced the decision, but vowed that the hotel would
continue to run as normal, according to Daily Echo.

"It has been a very difficult decision to make, but we felt we
had no alternative. . . .  We have filed a notice of intention of
going into administration, and this has been caused by a problem
over land registration for development in the grounds of the
Shrubbery, combined with the deep recession, but we'd like out
clients and customers to know the Shrubbery, despite going into
administration, will continue to run as normal with the same
management and staff," the report quoted Mr. Shepherd as saying.

Last year, the report recalls that the couple, who are both in
their 70s, put the hotel on the market with a price tag of
GBP1.5million, but to date they have failed to find a buyer.

WEAVERING CAPITAL: Two Ex-Employees Must Repay Hedge Fund Losses
Kit Chellel at Bloomberg News reports that two former employees
of Weavering Capital (UK) Ltd. must participate in paying
liquidators of the collapsed hedge fund US$450 million after they
failed to persuade a London court they weren't responsible for
its losses.

Weavering's former deputy investment manager Edward Platt and
director Charanpreet Dabhia denied knowing about the fraud
uncovered by liquidators at MCR, a unit of Duff & Phelps Corp.,
Bloomberg relates.  They are among 10 employees, including fund
founder Magnus Peterson, ordered last year to repay a total of
US$450 million, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Judge Richard McCombe said that Messrs.
Platt and Dhabia's roles "in negligently enabling this business
to continue, caused the loss claimed," affirming the earlier
ruling that they should have investigated Weavering's trades more
fully.  The two were the only defendants to appeal the 2012
decision, Bloomberg states.

MCR said at a London trial in 2011 that Mr. Peterson told
Weavering's investors he achieved returns of as much as 12% a
year, while covering losses with sham swap contracts, Bloomberg
recounts.  While the U.K. Serious Fraud Office initially decided
not to bring criminal charges over the fund's 2009 collapse, the
agency re-opened the case in June of last year, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Dabhia denies being negligent and said in a phone interview
that he was a whistle blower who alerted accountants to the fraud
when he discovered it, Bloomberg relates.

Weavering Capital (UK) Limited is an English incorporated
investment management firm, which went into administration on
March 19, 2009, whose primary function was to act as investment
advisor to a Cayman Islands incorporated hedge fund, Weavering
Macro Fixed Income Fund Limited ("the Macro Fund").  Liquidators
were appointed over the Macro Fund on March 19, 2009.  The Macro
Fund was understood to have funds under management of around
US$639 million in late 2008.

* UK: Moody's Notes Impact of Water Scarcity on Mining Companies
Environmental factors, such as water scarcity, could adversely
affect the ratings of global mining companies if they fail to
proactively manage the accompanying operational and political
risks to their businesses, says Moody's Investors Service in a
new report entitled "Global Mining Industry: Water Scarcity to
Raise Capex and Operating Costs, Heighten Operational Risks".

Mining projects are already competing with local communities for
limited water resources, while having to comply with stringent
environmental rules is adding to the capital expenditure (capex)
budgets for new mines. In addition, tighter environmental
permitting requirements could add to project timelines and
require the companies to seek more complex water procurement
systems. This in turn will push up the companies' operating costs
because of the higher associated maintenance and energy costs.
Furthermore, political risk is likely to increase as competition
for water resources between mining companies and local
populations intensifies.

"Water scarcity is already changing the mining landscape as
environmental legislation becomes more stringent, and operating
in some countries increases political risk as mining companies'
water supplies can be restricted if the needs of communities
increase," says Andrew Metcalf, an analyst in Moody's Corporate
Finance Group and author of the report. "If, as a result,
projects take longer to complete, and become costlier and riskier
to execute, we would expect these factors to exert downward
pressure on the ratings of the mining companies."

In general, smaller, less-diversified mining companies --
particularly those with single-mine operations -- in water-scarce
regions, such as South America, are the most vulnerable. This is
because they are likely to have the greatest exposure to event
risks, but have more limited financial and technical resources at
their disposal to handle them.

The large, globally diversified mining companies, such as Rio
Tinto plc (A3 stable), Anglo American plc (Baa1 stable) and BHP
Billiton Limited (A1 stable), will continue to be adversely
affected given their global footprints and willingness to operate
in the most remote and arid regions. While these companies have
the expertise and financial strength necessary to build complex
water procurement systems for large-scale projects -- and are
likely to emerge as the 'partners of choice' in water-scarce
countries seeking to benefit from their natural resources as a
result -- evidence suggests that they have to date needed to
absorb increasingly significant costs related to environmental


* New Debt Issuance in Europe Tops US$12-Bil., Moody's Says
With over US$12 billion of new issuance in January the European
non-financial corporate high-yield market opened the year as it
closed 2012, with a flurry of new issuers and increasing risk
appetite across the capital structure and for peripheral
corporate credit risk. However, Moody's believes that the
European high-yield market remains more prone to bouts of
volatility and illiquidity than the US market, especially given
the ongoing weak euro area economic activity. As a result, credit
discrimination remains critical says Moody's in the February
edition of its "High Yield Interest -- European Edition"

"Our new Moody's MIR (Market Implied Rating) dashboard launched
in this month's newsletter is designed to further assist
investors in their credit analysis by highlighting where our
views on an issuer's creditworthiness differs from that of the
market," says Chetan Modi, head of Moody's European leveraged
finance team.

Each month, "High Yield Interest -- European Edition" provides
unique Moody's data and commentary on the European high-yield

* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 11 to January 15, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *