TCREUR_Public/130221.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, February 21, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 37

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

* BELGIUM: Moody's Notes Stable Performance of Belgian RMBS


F R A N C E

BANQUE PSA: Moody's Reviews 'D+' Standalone BFSR for Downgrade


G E R M A N Y

ATU AUTO-TEILE: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
TITAN EUROPE 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: June 17 Nasdaq Listing Compliance Deadline Set


H U N G A R Y

MFB HUNGARIAN: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Senior Debt Rating


I R E L A N D

DONATEX LTD: McNamara Can Halt Suit v. DDAA Over Irish Glass Deal
INDEPENDENT NEWS: Seeks Pension Benefit Cuts; Faces Funding Woes


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Former Officials to Stand Trial in Bankruptcy Suit
CASA D'ESTE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Caa1'
CONSUM.IT SPA: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on EUR750MM Notes
ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: Moody's Rates New EUR350MM Senior Notes Ba2
TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Rates Capital Securities '(P)Ba2'


L I T H U A N I A

UKIO BANKAS: Lithuania Mulls Loan to Meet Insurance Obligations


N E T H E R L A N D S

CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Subordinated Debt Rating
GRESHAM CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
HARBOURMASTER CLO 11: S&P Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC+'
* Moody's Sees Increase in Dutch RMBS 60+-Day Delinquencies


N O R W A Y

SPAREBANK 1: Fitch Affirms BB+ Hybrid Capital Instruments Rating


R U S S I A

KOKS OAO: S&P Puts 'B' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Neg.


S P A I N

FTPYME BANCAJA 6: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'D'
REYAL URBIS: Files for Bankruptcy Protection; In Creditor Talks
* SPAIN: Moody's Notes Deteriorating Performance of RMBS Market


S W E D E N

SAS AB: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


T U R K E Y

* TURKEY: Monetary Tightening Prompts Bankruptcy Hike


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BYRE THEATRE: Owes GBP470,000 to Creditors; Needs Cash Injection
CORNWALL AND THE ISLES: Put Into Liquidation Over Bad Debts
DRACO PLC: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
HTLP LIMITED: Put Into Administration; Duff & Phelps Seeks Buyer
POWDER TRAIN: In Administration; Buyers for Pubs Sought

VOYAGE BIDCO: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
WELLINGS LTD: In Administration After a Period of Trading Losses
* UK: More Shops Likely to Close Following Retail Administrations


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Notes Negative Impact of ECB's Repo Criteria Revisions
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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* BELGIUM: Moody's Notes Stable Performance of Belgian RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Belgian residential mortgage-backed securities market's
performance was stable in the six month period leading up to
December 2012, according to the latest indices published by
Moody's Investors Service.

From June to December 2012, the 90+ day delinquency trend
increased to 0.7%, from 0.6% of the outstanding portfolio.
Cumulative defaults stabilized at 0.2%. Moody's annualized total
redemption rate (TRR) trend increased to 10.6%, from 8.2% over
the year.

Moody's expects that delinquency rates will remain at similar
levels. In 2013 the Belgian economy is forecast to only grow
0.7%. Although the level of economic growth is unlikely to
support job growth, it is also unlikely to materially increase
unemployment levels. Broadly flat house price growth will help
contain losses on foreclosed properties, and as a result losses
are likely to remain steady. House prices increased 2% year-on-
year in Q3 2012.

On November 14, Moody's placed on review the ratings of tranche A
notes issued by Penates Funding 4 due to a lack of remedial
action following the issuer account bank being downgraded to
below A2/P-1.

In the 6-month period through December 2012, Moody's rated one
transaction in the Belgian RMBS market:

- Belgian Lion N.V/S.A, Compartment Belgian Lion RMBS II,
   originated by ING Belgium SA/NV (A2, Prime-1 deposits,
   negative), issued EUR3.2 billion.

As of December 2012, the 17 Moody's-rated Belgian RMBS
transactions had an outstanding pool balance of EUR65.4 billion,
which constitutes a year-on-year increase of 1.7%.



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F R A N C E
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BANQUE PSA: Moody's Reviews 'D+' Standalone BFSR for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reports that Banque PSA Finance (BPF)'s
D+ standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR), its Baa3
long-term debt and deposit ratings and its P-3 short-term debt
and deposit ratings have been placed under review for downgrade.

The bank's (P)Ba2 subordinated and its (P)Ba3 junior subordinated
debt program ratings were also placed under review for downgrade.

Moody's has also placed the Baa3 backed long-term debt ratings of
BPF's subsidiary, Peugeot Finance International N.V. (PFI) under
review for downgrade, as well as the P-3 backed commercial paper
rating of SOFIRA SNC.

The review will primarily focus on:

- The assessment of the implications for BPF's standalone BFSR
   of a deterioration of the credit strength of its industrial
   parent PSA; and

- The extent to which support from the French government could
   mitigate any reduction in BPF's standalone strength resulting
   from this review.

Ratings Rationale:

The review on the ratings of BPF and the aforementioned related
entities follows the review for downgrade on the long-term
ratings of BPF's parent, PSA Peugeot Citroen.

Given the intricate strategic, commercial and financial ties to
its parent, Moody's considers BPF's creditworthiness to be
inherently linked to that of PSA, even though its financial
performance has thus far displayed low correlation with that of
the manufacturer. The review for downgrade on PSA has therefore
prompted Moody's to review for downgrade BPF's standalone BFSR
and long-term debt and deposit ratings.

BPF supports the sales of its industrial parent PSA by offering
auto loans and related services to retail and corporate
customers, as well as loans to car dealers to help them finance
their inventories. On the funding side, BPF relies on access to
senior unsecured and asset-backed securitization markets,
collateralization (mainly ECB repo eligible assets), as well as
credit lines provided by larger banks. Its rating is constrained
by its lack of business diversification, large exposures to car
dealers, its reliance on confidence-sensitive wholesale funding
and by its inherent credit linkages with its lower-rated
industrial parent PSA. These are characteristics more commonly
associated with non-investment-grade ratings, as shown by the
rating levels of certain other non-bank auto finance companies
with similar business models.

However, Moody's takes into consideration certain mitigating
factors, including good capitalization levels, sound
profitability and a greater degree of asset and liability
matching than those of traditional retail and commercial banks.
Moreover, Moody's notes that unlike many other vendor finance
companies, BPF has a banking license, and for this reason it is
subject to similar regulatory standards as other credit
institutions and to ongoing supervision. This oversight, together
with access to central bank refinancing facilities, provides a
certain level of protection to creditors.

What Could Change The Rating UP

Moody's believes there is little likelihood of any upward
pressure on BPF ratings given the current review for downgrade on
PSA.

What Could Change The Rating DOWN

A downgrade of PSA's long-term ratings would likely result in a
downgrade of BPF's standalone BFSR, which could in turn result in
a downgrade of BPF's debt and deposit ratings.

The debt and deposit ratings of BPF could also be downgraded in
the event of (1) a deterioration in the bank's credit
fundamentals; (2) a negative development in relation to the
European Commission conditions attached to the definitive support
plan for the bank; and/or (3) any elements that would lead
Moody's to reduce its assessment of systemic support available to
the bank.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating published in June 2012.



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G E R M A N Y
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ATU AUTO-TEILE: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based auto parts retailer
A.T.U Auto-Teile Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG (ATU) to 'CCC+' from
'B-'.  The outlook is negative.  At the same time, S&P lowered
its issue rating on ATU's EUR450 million senior secured notes due
2014 to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that there are increasing
uncertainties regarding the refinancing of ATU's senior secured
bonds maturing in May 2014 and its revolving credit facility
(RCF) falling due in March 2014.  In S&P's opinion, refinancing
risk is accentuated by ATU's high leverage of about 10.7x on a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA basis (about 7.2x debt
to EBITDAR) for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2012.

S&P understands that ATU has started to look for refinancing
options for its EUR593 million of on-balance-sheet debt and its
EUR45 million RCF maturing in 2014.

The negative outlook primarily reflects S&P's opinion of ATU's
refinancing risks.  In S&P's view, ATU's ability to secure the
necessary refinancing in the coming months is uncertain,
especially given the company's weak performance in the past two
years.

S&P could lower the ratings if a viable refinancing plan is not
agreed over the next few months or if any further near-term
liquidity issues arise, such as negative free operating cash
flows, a dwindling cash balance, or a larger working capital
drain than S&P currently foresees.  In S&P's view, ATU's current
capital structure would become unsustainable if the group's
operating performance failed to improve.  This would increase the
risk of the group undertaking credit-dilutive debt restructuring
measures. S&P will monitor this risk closely because it would
view such debt restructuring as tantamount to a default under its
criteria.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if ATU is able to
undertake a timely and sustainable refinancing of its upcoming
debt maturities and improve its debt maturity profile.


TITAN EUROPE 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC's class B and C notes.  S&P has also
removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B
notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on
the class D, E, F, G, and H notes, and has withdrawn its ratings
on the class A and X notes.

Titan 2006-1 is a European commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction that closed in March 2006.

The rating actions reflect S&P's review of the underlying loans
under its November 2012 European CMBS criteria.

On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on the class B notes on
CreditWatch negative following an update to its criteria for
rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

LOAN ANALYSIS

                STEIGENBERGER HOTELS PORTFOLIO LOAN

A settlement amount of EUR49.6 million was agreed on Jan. 7,
2013, in relation to the Steigenberger Hotels Portfolio Loan.
This resulted in a principal loss on the loan of EUR2.9 million,
which has been allocated to the class H notes.  The proceeds were
used toward full repayment of the class A notes and partial
repayment of the class B notes.

                   KQ WAREHOUSE PORTFOLIO LOAN

All properties securing this loan have been sold and proceeds
paid to the noteholders.  However, EUR63.5 million of the loan is
still outstanding.

The special servicer is pursuing legal claims against the
borrower group and is expecting a final payment of between
EUR500,000 and EUR2.1 million.  The loan will remain outstanding
until the legal action is finalized.

Significant losses on this loan are likely to occur, in S&P's
opinion.

                       TIDEN PORTFOLIO LOAN

The Tiden Loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The loan failed to repay on the loan maturity date of Jan. 18,
2013, and has been transferred into special servicing.

The collateral consists of seven office properties located in
Germany.

The asset was last valued in June 2012 at EUR42.37 million,
compared with an outstanding securitized balance of
EUR84.81 million.  This gives a securitized loan-to-value (LTV)
of 166%.  In S&P's opinion, full recovery of this loan appears
unlikely.

                    MANGUSTA (KINDERMANN) LOAN

The loan has been in special servicing since June 23, 2008, due
to a breach of the financial information loan covenant.  In
February 2010, an insolvency administrator was appointed.

The loan is secured by seven properties providing office, retail,
and residential accommodation in Germany.

The reported securitized LTV is 703%, based on an August 2009
valuation of EUR8.95 million.

In S&P's opinion, significant losses on this loan appear likely.

            NUREMBERG RETAIL DISTRIBUTION CENTRE LOAN

The loan has been in special servicing since Oct. 22, 2012, due
to failure to repay the loan at maturity.

The loan is secured by one office and distribution building
located in Nuremberg, Germany.

The outstanding loan balance is EUR19.15 million, compared with a
reported value of EUR26.75 million, as of September 2005.

However, in S&P's opinion, losses on this loan may occur.

                        INTEREST SHORTFALL

S&P understands that the excess spread, which is distributed to
the class X notes, is not available to mitigate interest
shortfalls.  The issuer relies on the liquidity facility to
address timely payment of interest on the notes.  However, the
transaction documents indicate to S&P that the liquidity facility
is not available to cover interest shortfalls under the notes if
such shortfalls result from periodic fees or special servicing
fees.  The liquidity facility is not available for loans that are
no longer backed by properties.

According to the January 2013 cash manager report, the class C,
D, E, F, G, and H notes experienced interest shortfalls.  In
S&P's opinion, the issuer's ability to service the notes will
continue to weaken, given the transaction's cash flow mechanics
and loan pool performance.

                         RATING RATIONALE

S&P has withdrawn its rating on the class A notes following their
full repayment.

In S&P's opinion, recovery of full principal with respect to all
classes of notes appears increasingly unlikely, and it considers
that there is at least a one-in-two likelihood of the class B and
lower classes of notes experiencing principal losses.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B notes following
the application of our European CMBS criteria.

At the same time, S&P has lowered its rating on the class C notes
to 'D (sf)' because they have experienced interest shortfalls.

S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D, E, F, G, and H notes
at 'D (sf)' due to continued interest shortfalls.

S&P has lowered and withdrawn its rating on the class X notes to
reflect the application of its criteria "Global Methodology For
Rating Interest-Only Securities," published on April 15, 2010.
These criteria apply to ratings on interest-only securities that
were outstanding on April 15, 2010.  According to S&P's criteria,
it maintains the ratings on such securities until they are
retired or the ratings on them fall below 'AA-', at which point
S&P withdraws them.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17-G7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating                    Rating
            To                        From

Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC
EUR723.3 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B          CCC- (sf)                 BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Lowered

C           D (sf)                   CCC- (sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

A           NR                       AA- (sf)

Rating Lowered Then Withdrawn

X           CCC-(sf)                 AA- (sf)
X           NR                       CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

D           D (sf)
E           D (sf)
F           D (sf)
G           D (sf)
H           D (sf)



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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: June 17 Nasdaq Listing Compliance Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
FreeSeas Inc. on Feb. 19 disclosed that The Nasdaq Stock Market
has approved its application to transfer its stock listing from
the Nasdaq Global Market to the Nasdaq Capital Market, effective
February 19, 2013.  The Nasdaq Capital Market is a continuous
trading market that operates in the same manner as the Nasdaq
Global Market.

On February 14, 2013, FreeSeas received a letter from Nasdaq
notifying the Company that the appeals hearing in relation to a
notification received on December 19, 2012 from Nasdaq that the
Company's stock would be delisted from The Nasdaq Global Market,
was cancelled because the Company meets the market value of
publicly held shares and all other applicable requirements for
initial listing on the Capital Market (except for the minimum bid
requirement).  FreeSeas has until June 17, 2013 to regain
compliance with the minimum bid price rule and the Company's
stock will continue to be listed and traded on Nasdaq.

The Company recently completed a reverse stock split of the
Company's issued and outstanding common stock at a ratio of one
new share for every 10 shares currently outstanding.  Beginning
on February 14, 2013, FreeSeas' common stock began trading under
the ticker symbol "FREED", and will continue to trade under this
symbol for a period of 20 days to provide notice of the reverse
stock split.  After this period, the symbol will revert to
"FREE."  The Company believes that as a result of the reverse
stock split, the Company's common stock will continue to trade
over $1.00 per share, which will allow the Company to regain
compliance with Nasdaq.

                         About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of Oct.
12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational fleet is
approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its fleet is 15
years.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 18, 2012,
Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified Auditors Accountants S.A., in
Athens, Greece, expressed substantial doubt about FreeSeas'
ability to continue as a going concern, following its audit of
the Company's financial statements for the fiscal year ended Dec.
31, 2011.  The independent auditors noted that the Company has
incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital
deficiency.  "In addition, the Company has failed to meet
scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has
not complied with certain covenants included in its loan
agreements with banks."

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed
US$120.8 million in total assets, US$104.1 million in total
current liabilities, and shareholders' equity of US$16.7 million.



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H U N G A R Y
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MFB HUNGARIAN: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Senior Debt Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed MFB Hungarian Development Bank
Ltd.'s Ba1 foreign-currency senior debt ratings and Ba2/Not-Prime
foreign-currency deposit ratings. The affirmation reflects the
rating agency's affirmation of Hungary's Ba1 government bond
rating and the country's Ba2 foreign-currency deposit ceiling on
February 8, 2013. The outlook on all MFB's ratings remains
negative.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that MFB is a fully government-owned bank that
plays a vital role in the government's policy to support
Hungary's economic development.

The ratings affirmation for MFB reflects the affirmation of
Hungary's Ba1 government bond rating, with a negative outlook, as
well as the affirmation of the country's Ba2 ceiling for foreign-
currency deposits. In addition, Moody's lowered MFB's standalone
credit assessment to b2 from b1.

This adjustment reflects (1) the impact of the weaker economic
environment on the bank's public-policy mandate to support
Hungarian corporates; (2) MFB's ongoing loss-making profile,
driven mainly by high loan-loss charges and weak revenue-
generating capacity and one-off items; and (3) its increasing
non-performing loans, with significant exposure to the commercial
real-estate and construction sector. The bank's dependence on
wholesale funding continues to expose it to volatility and/or
deterioration in market sentiment.

Hungarian economy has contracted by 1.7% in 2012, and Moody's
expects very little growth, if any, in 2013, and unemployment
likely to exceed 11%.

Moody's believes that MFB is likely to report a loss in 2012 and
experience challenges in 2013 in terms of generating earnings in
the currently difficult economic environment in Hungary. In 2011,
MFB realized a net loss of HUF29.4 billion on a consolidated
basis (or -3.3% of its average risk-weighted assets) due to
increased provisioning and weakening net interest income.

Moody's expects that the asset quality of the bank's direct
lending portfolio has continued to deteriorate in 2012 and that
this should remain the case in 2013, given the adverse operating
environment and the bank's substantial exposure to the higher-
risk real-estate and construction sectors. Excluding MFB's
lending to commercial banks, which is aimed at supporting their
lending to the local economy, non-performing loans increased to
26.6% at year-end 2011, from 21.6% at year-end 2010.

Moody's notes that MFB is wholesale funded, and in 2013 the bank
will need to refinance over 20% of its total liabilities.
Although MFB has a successful track record in accessing the
markets -- because it benefits from a government guarantee --
market volatility could result in higher funding costs, exerting
further pressure on the bank's profitability.

Moody's continues to assume a very high probability of support
from the Hungarian government for MFB, reflected in the framework
of explicit and irrevocable state guarantees for funding,
foreign-currency risk and credit risk. In addition, Moody's
acknowledges that the Hungarian government has historically
provided capital support to MFB, with a capitalization of HUF130
billion at the end of 2011, bringing the capital adequacy ratio
to 24.4% at year-end 2011. However, in light of the expected loss
in 2012, Moody's expects that the capital ratio will have
weakened.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

The debt and deposit ratings of MFB could be downgraded following
a downgrade of the Hungarian government's ratings.

Due to the negative outlook, there is no immediate upwards
pressure on the ratings. Over time, the debt and deposit ratings
of MFB could be upgraded if the Hungarian government's ratings
are upgraded.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Government-
Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, MFB reported consolidated
total assets of HUF1.4 trillion as of December 31, 2011.



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DONATEX LTD: McNamara Can Halt Suit v. DDAA Over Irish Glass Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that a judge has ruled
bankrupt developer Bernard McNamara is not entitled to continue
his action against the Dublin Docklands Development Authority
over the controversial EUR412 million purchase in 2006 of the
Irish Glass Bottle site at Ringsend.

An issue remains whether Donatex Ltd., a company of Mr. McNamara,
may continue with the case and that, and other related matters,
will be dealt with by the Commercial Court next month, the Irish
Times notes.

The case was initiated in 2008 but has been delayed due to
several factors, the Irish Times states.

After Mr. McNamara was adjudicated bankrupt in the UK last year,
doubts arose whether the action would proceed to hearing next
month as listed, the Irish Times discloses.

As a bankrupt, Mr. McNamara is not entitled to maintain court
proceedings himself, the Irish Times says.

Mr. Justice Peter Kelly was told on Monday that the joint UK
bankruptcy trustees had decided not to continue Mr. McNamara's
case, the Irish Times relates.

Donatex Ltd. is the vehicle used by Mr. McNamara in relation to
the former Irish Glass Bottle site in Ringsend, Dublin.



INDEPENDENT NEWS: Seeks Pension Benefit Cuts; Faces Funding Woes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Coyle at The Irish Times reports Staff at Independent
News will have their pension benefit almost halved under
management proposals to address a EUR155 million funding
shortfall.

The plan is part of a dramatic ongoing restructuring of the
business over recent months, the Irish Times notes.

INM is also understood to be seeking approval from scheme
trustees to purchase sovereign annuities to meet the cost of
pensions, a move that would leave retired workers exposed to any
future default by the State on its debt, the Irish Times states.

The company, the Irish Times says, concedes it is asking members
to take a "severe" cut in their entitlements.

"Specifically, a 64-year-old on a salary of EUR60,000 will have
his pension reduced from EUR40,000 per annum to EUR21,600 -- a
cut of 46%," they concede in a document outlining the proposals,
the Irish Times discloses.

According to the Irish Times, getting workers and pensioners to
accept the changes will require that "they understand the
weakness of their legal position and that they recognize the
consequences of wind-up and/or INM failure".

Existing defined benefit pension schemes at INM's Irish business
will close to future contributions under the planned
restructuring, the Irish Times discloses.  The age at which
members could draw down on the scheme will also rise to 68, the
Irish Times states.

Management is reported to see its options as either "walking
away" from its pension liabilities by winding up the pension
scheme "with likely major industrial disruption" or secure
approval from the pensions regulator under a section 50
restructuring proposal by the end of June next, the Irish Times
says.

According to the Irish Times, the funding shortfall of EUR155
million compares with a current market capitalisation for INM of
about EUR19 million.

Management, the Irish Times says, argues that tackling the
shortfall will "significantly increase the value of its Irish
business".

Under the restructure, younger staff would have the option of
transferring out of the scheme, but that would effectively mean
accrued benefits slashed to roughly one-third of their current
value, the Irish Times notes.

If the scheme were wound up, it is likely that staff and those
made redundant in recent years would receive little or no pension
from the group, the Irish Times states.

                  About Independent News & Media

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Independent News & Media PLC
(ISE:IPD) -- http://www.inmplc.com/-- is engaged in printing and
publishing of metropolitan, national, provincial and regional
newspapers in Australia, India, Ireland, New Zealand, South
Africa and the United Kingdom.  It also has radio operations in
Australia and New Zealand, and outdoor advertising operations in
Australia, New Zealand, South-East Asia and across Africa.  The
Company also has online operations across each of its principal
markets.  The Company has three business segments: printing,
publishing, online and distribution of newspapers and magazines
and commercial printing; radio, and outdoor advertising.  INM
publishes over 200 newspaper and magazine titles, delivering a
combined weekly circulation of over 32 million copies with a
weekly audience of over 100 million consumers.  In March 2008, it
acquired The Sligo Champion.  During the year ended December 31,
2007, the Company acquired the remaining 50% interest in
Toowoomba Newspapers Pty Ltd.



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I T A L Y
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ALITALIA SPA: Former Officials to Stand Trial in Bankruptcy Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a judge in Rome has ordered
trial for seven former officials in the bankruptcy of Alitalia
commenced several years ago when it was still a state-run
airline.

The present Alitalia began flying in 2009 as a new company owned
by a group of Italian investors, the AP discloses.  The airline's
62 years as a state-run company ended in bankruptcy in 2008, the
AP recounts.

The AP relates that consumer advocate group Codacons said
Tuesday's indictments will allow shareholders of the old Alitalia
to seek damages as part of the trial set to begin on June 18.
Prosecutors allege that former executives of the old Alitalia
cause billions of euros (dollars) in losses from 2001 to 2007,
basically through poor management, the AP relates.

According to Adnkronos Business, Francesco Mengozzi and Giancarlo
Cimoli, Alitalia's CEOs from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007
respectively are accused of bankruptcy "due to distraction or
dissipation of resources".

Mr. Cimoli also faces charges of market rigging for allegedly
releasing false news reports aimed at boosting Alitalia's share
price, Adnkronos Business notes.

The other suspects due to stand trial are Gabriele Spazzadeschi,
former director of Aliltalia's administration and finance
department, Pierluigi Ceschia and Giancarlo Zeni, both ex-heads
of its special finance division, and former managers Leopoldo
Conforti and Gennaro Tocci, Adnkronos Business discloses.

                          About Alitalia

Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.


CASA D'ESTE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Caa1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded to Caa1 (sf) the class B notes in two
Italian RMBS transactions Casa D'Este Finance S.r.l. (CDE I) and
Casa D'Este Finance S.r.l. II (CDE II). The ratings of these
notes were placed on review in December 2012 following the review
placement of the class B note guarantor Cassa di Risparmio di
Ferrara S.p.A. ("CARIFE").

Issuer: Casa D'Este Finance S.r.l.

EUR35.2M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 5,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CASA D'ESTE FINANCE S.R.L. II

EUR80.65M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 5,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action was driven by: a) the downgrade of Cassa di
Risparmio di Ferrara S.p.A. from Ba3 to Caa1 on January 24, 2013
and b) the low level of credit enhancement available to class B
notes.

In both transactions, CARIFE guarantees payments on interest and
principal for all classes of rated notes. While the credit
enhancement of class A1 and A2 notes in both deals is sufficient
to reach the current ratings on a standalone basis, the ratings
of the class B notes were primarily based on the guarantee as
their available credit enhancement is limited. Moody's
reconsidered the standalone credit quality of the class B notes
and concluded that the rating of these two notes is consistent
with Caa1(sf) in case no value is given to the guarantee.

Key Collateral Assumptions and Performance

In both transactions, Moody's applied the current EL and MILAN
assumptions for determining the loss distribution. The
assumptions are unchanged from the last review in November 2012
and are 2.6% EL and 13.5% MILAN for CDE I and 4.4% EL and 15.9%
MILAN for CDE II.

While the performance of CDE I had been stable over the past year
CDE II's performance showed a deteriorating trend. In CDE I loans
more than 90 days in arrears decreased to 0.2% in November 2012
from 1.2% in February 2012. At the same time cumulative defaults
on original balance plus cumulative replenishments increased to
3.2% from 2.7%. In CDE II loans more than 90 days in arrears
fluctuated around 2% during 2012 and stood at 1.6% as per October
2012. At the same time cumulative defaults on original balance
plus cumulative replenishments increased to 4% from 2.7%.

CDE I closed in December 2004 and had an almost five year
revolving period. CDE I is a mixed portfolio of 86% loans to
residential and 14% loans to commercial borrowers. The current
pool factor of the portfolio is 53%. CDE II closed in December
2008 and had an almost 1.5 years revolving period. CDE II's
collateral is a mixed portfolio of 77% loans to residential and
23% to commercial borrowers. The current pool factor is 67%.

Factors and Sensitivity Analysis

Expected Loss assumptions remain subject to uncertainty with
regard to general economic activity, interest rates and house
prices. Lower than assumed realized recovery rates or higher than
assumed default rates would negatively affect the ratings.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could negatively
affect the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa
published in June 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche."

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by this
rating action may be negatively affected.


CONSUM.IT SPA: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on EUR750MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade the
A2(sf) ratings of Class A and Class B notes issued by Consum.it
Securitization S.r.l., an Italian asset-backed securities
transaction originated by Consum.it S.p.A (not rated), the wholly
owned subsidiary of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (MPS,
Ba2, on review for downgrade).

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed the rating of Class C
notes at Caa2(sf). These rating actions reflect increased
operational risk concerns following the placement on review of
the rating of the servicer's parent and back-up servicer, Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Ba2, on review for downgrade).

Issuer: Consum.it Securitization S.r.l.

EUR1710.05M A Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 2, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR540M B Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 2, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR750M C Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2010
Assigned Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

These rating actions reflect the increased operational risks
following the rating action on MPS on January 30, 2013 given the
limited benefit of back-up servicing arrangement in the
transaction to date.

The transaction is serviced by Consum.it S.p.A, an unrated
entity, which benefits from support from its parent company MPS
acting as servicer guarantor and back-up servicer. However,
benefits of the back-up servicing arrangement are limited by the
fact that the back-up servicer is the parent company of the
servicer and the two entities lack independence. Despite a
significant amount of liquidity in the transaction and the
commingling reserve which was funded in December 2011 upon MPS's
loss of its P-1 rating, the transaction is still exposed to
servicing disruption given the absence of an independent third
party responsible to ensure servicing continuity. This risk has
further increased following Moody's downgrade of MPS to Ba2 from
Baa3 on October 18, 2012 and placement on review for downgrade on
January 30, 2013.

Moody's has been informed that the issuer will be implementing
amendments to the transaction by appointing a back-up servicer
facilitator in the coming weeks. As part of the review process,
Moody's will consider the effective implementation of such
amendments as well as MPS's rating review.

Key modeling assumptions, sensitivities, cash-flow analysis and
stress scenarios for the affected transaction have not been
updated as the rating action has been primarily driven by
increased operational concerns.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions published in
October 2012.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Global
Structured Finance Operational Risk Guidelines: Moody's Approach
to Analyzing Performance Disruption Risk published in June 2011.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modeling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by this
rating action may be negatively affected.


ITALCEMENTI FINANCE: Moody's Rates New EUR350MM Senior Notes Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive Ba2 rating to
EUR350 million of Senior Unsecured Guaranteed Notes (6.125%, due
2018), which were recently issued by Italcementi Finance SA.
Italcementi S.p.A.'s Ba2 Corporate Family Rating and Ciments
Francais SA's Ba1 Corporate Family Rating remain unchanged with a
negative outlook.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's definitive ratings on this debt obligation is in line
with the provisional rating assigned on February 14, 2013.

The proceeds of the notes will be used to lengthen Italcementi's
maturity profile and to further diversify the group's funding mix
with a view to increase the share of capital market debt.

The Ba2 rating of the Italcementi group reflects the group's
adequate business profile with geographically diversified
operations and strong market positions in emerging markets, which
should benefit from better demographic and demand trends over the
long term, but are also exposing Italcementi to increased
political and country risks. Italcementi's majority owned
subsidiary Ciments Francais is concurrently experiencing
difficult market conditions in the US (albeit improving), Spain,
Greece and in Egypt, while the group's operations in Italy have
improved to break-even EBITDA year-to-date September 2012. France
and Morocco remain the cash cows for the group, but performance
there has been weakening recently. The rating also takes comfort
from the conservative growth strategy of the group which in the
past did not lead to a significant increase in the debt position
and the well-managed liquidity profile.

Weighing negatively on Italcementi's rating is its leverage which
has weakened continuously during the last couple of years to a
Debt/EBITDA ratio of 5.1x and a RCF/net debt ratio of 11.4% as
per last twelve months June 2012, both of which position
Italcementi weakly in the Ba2 rating category. In addition,
Moody's takes into account the high share of minority interests,
which as of June 2012 accounted for around 40% of the group's
reported equity, resulting predominantly from minority interests
in its Ciments Francais subsidiary, as well as minorities in
Ciments Francais' Egyptian subsidiaries. Assuming proportional
consolidation of these assets would lead to a further weakening
of Italcementi's leverage ratios.

Italcementi has announced a EUR 160 million cost reduction
program to be implemented during 2012 and which will reduce both
fixed and variable costs. The implementation of the cost
reduction program is currently progressing according to plan.
More recently, Italcementi has announced further material
restructuring actions focused on its operations and holding-level
staff in Italy, with over 700 people impacted by a lay-off plan.
Even though Moody's sees these programs as material, this is
expected to be just sufficient to offset weakening performance in
Europe.

Italcementi has an adequate liquidity profile over the next
twelve months including a well spread maturity profile with
manageable maturities over the next five years and a liquidity
headroom higher than two years. The liquidity of the group is
mainly supported by EUR470 million of cash and cash equivalent
and current financial assets as well as EUR1.7 billion of
availabilities under revolving credit facilities at 30th
September 2012. Alongside the group's funds from operations, this
should be sufficient to fund short term needs of cash mainly
consisting of working cash, modest WC requirements, capex, debt
repayments and dividends. Moody's notes that Italcementi has
limited flexibility in adjusting dividend levels as most of the
dividends paid are dividends to minority shareholders of Ciments
Francais and emerging markets affiliates. Moody's also notes that
Italcementi has financial covenants in some of its principal
credit facilities with leverage covenant levels of 3.75x versus
leverage of 3.5x at 30 September 2012, which leaves limited
covenant headroom. Italcementi's February 5th press release
implies that it expects leverage to have dropped to 3.1x-3.2x by
fiscal year end 2012.

Positive rating pressure is currently not anticipated. A recovery
in the group's credit metrics with Debt/EBITDA dropping
sustainably below 4.0x and RCF/Net debt increasing sustainably
above 15% could lead to positive rating pressure over time.

Negative pressure on the ratings would increase if RCF/Net debt
would be trending towards 10% and Debt/EBITDA would exceed 5.0x.
In addition, declining headroom under the company's financial
covenants, which might put pressure on the short term liquidity
position, could lead to a negative rating action.

Assignments:

Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 21, 2018, Assigned
Ba2

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Building Materials Industry published in July 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

The Italcementi group, headquartered in Bergamo, Italy, is one of
the top five cement producers globally, with an installed cement
capacity in excess of 70 million tons and sales of approximately
EUR 4.5 billion per December 2012. The group's cement and clinker
business, which accounts for more than two-thirds of total sales
is supplemented by aggregates, ready-mix concrete businesses.
Including its Italian market, Italcementi (ITC), via its 83.2%-
owned subsidiary Ciments Francais (CF), is active in 22
countries, with an emphasis on the Mediterranean basin. The
company is majority-owned by Italian investment holding
Italmobiliare.


TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Rates Capital Securities '(P)Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)Ba2 long-term
rating to Telecom Italia S.p.A.'s proposed issuance of "Capital
Securities due 2073". The outlook on the rating is negative. The
size and completion of the hybrid debt remain subject to market
conditions.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the hybrid debt. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

The (P)Ba2 rating assigned to the hybrid debt is two notches
below the group's senior unsecured rating of Baa3. The (P)Ba2
rating differential reflects the deeply subordinated nature of
the hybrid debt as well as the fact that it (1) is a 60-year
instrument; (2) provides Telecom Italia with the option to defer
coupons on a cumulative basis; and (3) has no step-up prior to
year 10 and only 100 basis points (bps) thereafter.

Moody's notes that the proposed issuance of the hybrid debt is in
line with Telecom Italia's recently announced financial policies.
This transaction is part of a range of actions initiated by
management with a view to underpinning the group's capital
structure and enhancing its financial flexibility. This is in the
context of a challenging operating environment in which Telecom
Italia's performance will remain weak, affected by regulation,
fierce competition and the adverse macroeconomic conditions in
Italy as well as in other countries in which the group operates.

Telecom Italia's Baa3 rating is supported by the company's (1)
scale; (2) integrated telecoms business model, with strong market
positions in both the fixed and mobile segments; (3) geographical
diversification, mainly as a result of its presence in Brazil and
Argentina; (4) continued commitment to debt reduction and
financial discipline; and (5) high operating margins, ongoing
operational expenditure (opex) reductions and strong liquidity.
The Baa3 rating also factors in: (1) the deterioration in Telecom
Italia's operating performance including an expected further
EBITDA decline this year; (2) management's plan to partially
offset the weakened performance with a more robust capital
structure; and (3) the company's revised outlook for the period
2013-15.

Despite Telecom Italia having partially mitigated the effects of
a very tough market, the group's year-end 2012 results reveal a
deterioration in its domestic revenues, EBITDA and cash flow
generation, as well as a failure to achieve its committed
reported net financial position target of EUR27.5 billion. As a
result, Moody's considers that Telecom Italia's financial risk
has increased. Moreover, this risk might not be fully offset by
the group's proposed cut in its dividend and its plan to issue up
to EUR3 billion of hybrid bonds over the next 18-24 months.

Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's concerns
related to Telecom Italia's future operating performance in an
increasingly tough market, in which the group will have to
continue to weather macroeconomic, regulatory and competitive
pressures.

The outlook also reflects that management has now changed its
reported net financial position target for this year to below
EUR27 billion from EUR25 billion. This, combined with Telecom
Italia's public guidance of a single-digit decline in reported
EBITDA for 2013, represents a substantial deviation from Moody's
previous expectation that there would be a gradual improvement in
the group's credit profile.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Given the negative outlook, Moody's does not currently anticipate
upward rating pressure. However, the rating agency could consider
a stabilization of the rating outlook if Telecom Italia delivers
improved financial metrics on the back of a supportive operating
environment, including adjusted net debt/EBITDA comfortably below
2.8x. Upward pressure could result over time if Telecom Italia's
adjusted net debt/EBITDA improves to below 2.5x.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could potentially
result if Telecom Italia deviates from management's announced
debt reduction plan and the group's overall financial metrics do
not gradually improve in line with the plan. The plan includes a
reported net financial position of less than EUR27 billion by
year-end 2013, positive low single-digit revenue and a low EBITDA
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) through 2015. More
specifically, a rating downgrade could result if the group fails
to reduce its net adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio to below 2.8x.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010 and
Updated Summary Guidance for Notching Bonds, Preferred Stocks and
Hybrid Securities of Corporate Issuers published in February
2007.

Telecom Italia Group, domiciled in Rome, Italy, is the leading
integrated telecommunications provider in Italy, delivering a
full range of services and products, including telephony, data
exchange, interactive content and information and communications
technology solutions. It is also the operator of one of the three
national TV networks. As of December 31, 2012, the group reported
some 14.0 million fixed-network physical access telephone lines
and 32.2 million mobile telephone lines in Italy. The group is
also one of the top telecoms players in Argentina, with 19.0
mobile customers, and is present in the Brazilian mobile market,
operating through its subsidiary Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM)
Brasil, which had 70.3 million mobile telephone lines as of
December 31, 2012.



=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


UKIO BANKAS: Lithuania Mulls Loan to Meet Insurance Obligations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Bradley at Bloomberg News reports that Lithuania's
government plans to lend between LTL500 million (US$193 million)
and LTL600 million to help the state deposit-insurance fund meet
obligations related to insolvent lender Ukio Bankas AB.

Ukio's liquidation could cost the deposit-insurance fund as much
as LTL2.7 billion, Bloomberg says, citing central bank data based
on the amount of insured deposits.

According to Bloomberg, Finance Minister Rimantas Sadzius said on
Tuesday on Lithuania's LRT public radio in the capital Vilnius
that the fund is "rather empty" following the 2011 bankruptcy of
Bankas Snoras AB.

The central bank said on Monday it plans to sell Ukio's assets
and liabilities to Siauliu Bankas AB, reducing the obligations
for the deposit insurer to an estimated LTL800 million, Bloomberg
notes.

Mr. Sadzius, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the deposit
insurance fund would seek to recover its money over time through
bankruptcy proceedings for the "bad" part of Ukio's assets that
won't be taken over by Siauliu.

According to Bloomberg, spokesman Giedrius Sniukas said in an e-
mail that the finance ministry plans to raise the money by
borrowing on the domestic market.

                         About Ukio Bankas

Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies.  It
is Lithuania's sixth-largest lender by assets.  The Central Bank
suspended Ukio Bankas' operations on Feb. 12, 2013, after it was
established the lender had been involved in risky activities.  A
majority 64.9% of Ukio Bankas had been owned by Russian born-
businessman Vladimir Romanov.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Subordinated Debt Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 foreign-currency
subordinated debt rating to the subordinated debt issuance by
Credit Europe Bank NV. The debt instrument is eligible for Tier 2
capital treatment under Dutch law. The outlook is positive.

Ratings Rationale:

Under the terms and conditions of the notes, the notes will be
unconditional, subordinated and unsecured obligations and will
rank pari passu with all CEB-NV's other subordinated unsecured
obligations. The notes are US-dollar-denominated and their rating
is in line with CEB-NV's subordinated unsecured foreign-currency
debt rating.

CEB-NV's foreign-currency subordinated debt rating is positioned
one notch below the bank's ba2 standalone credit assessment, and
does not incorporate any rating uplift from systemic (government)
support. The assigned rating is also same as CEB-NV's existing
subordinated unsecured local-currency debt rating and the
positive outlook on the subordinated debt rating reflects the
positive outlook on CEB-NV's standalone bank financial strength
rating.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

The subordinated debt rating is notched off CEB-NV's standalone
credit assessment. Therefore, any upwards or downwards pressure
on the bank's standalone credit profile will result in a similar
rating action on the bank's subordinated debt.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.


GRESHAM CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Gresham Capital CLO IV B.V.'s notes,
as follows:

  EUR63.5m Class A1A VFN (no ISIN): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  EUR64.3m Class A1B (ISIN XS0300109146): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR48.8m Class A2 (ISIN XS0300109658): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR24.1m Class B (ISIN XS0300110078): affirmed at 'AAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR21.9m Class C (ISIN XS0300111639): affirmed at 'Asf';
  Outlook Negative

  EUR22.0m Class D (ISIN XS0300112017): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook Negative

  EUR10.8m Class E (ISIN XS0300112363): affirmed at 'Bsf';
  Outlook Negative

The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance
since the last surveillance review in March 2012 and the level of
credit enhancement commensurate with the notes' current ratings.

The Fitch weighted average rating factor has improved to 28.8, as
of the January 2013 investor report, from 31.3 as of last review,
above the threshold of 29.5. Assets rated 'CCC' or below account
for 10.2% of the portfolio, down from 16.8% as of the last
review. The portfolio includes seven defaulted assets from two
issuers, which account for EUR5.5m of principal balance compared
with zero defaults at the last review.

As of the January 2013 payment date, all over-collateralization
(OC) tests were passing. Class D and E OC tests have been failing
since late 2009, but were cured on the last payment date. The
class A2 interest coverage test is in compliance, while the
reinvestment test stands at 106.1%, above its required threshold
of 105.6%.

The weighted average spread (WAS) on the portfolio continues to
increase, partly reflecting amend and extend activity. The WAS
currently stands at 3.87% compared with 3.50% as of the last
review. The weighted average life of the portfolio is 4.11 years,
compared to 4.32 as of the last review and below the required
threshold of 6 years.

The Negative Outlooks on the class C, D and E mezzanine and
junior notes reflect their vulnerability to a clustering of
defaults and negative rating migration in the European leveraged
loan market due to the approaching refinancing wall.

As part of its analysis, Fitch considered the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to the transaction's exposure to countries where
Fitch has imposed a country rating cap lower than the ratings on
any notes in the transaction. These countries are currently
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, but may include additional
countries if there is sovereign rating migration. Fitch believes
that exposure of up to 15% of the total investment amount to
these countries, under the same average portfolio profile and
assuming the current ratings on the UK and eurozone countries are
stable, would not have a material negative impact on the notes'
ratings.

Gresham Capital CLO IV B.V. is a securitization of mainly senior
secured loans, senior unsecured loans, second-lien loans,
mezzanine loans (including revolvers) and CLOs. At closing, a
total note issuance of EUR310.4m was used to invest in a target
portfolio of EUR300m. The portfolio is actively managed by
Investec Bank plc.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 11: S&P Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Harbourmaster CLO 11 B.V.'s class B notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, and A4
notes.

The rating actions follow its performance review and cash flow
analysis of the transaction.

                     TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE

Since S&P's last review on Feb. 17, 2012, it has observed a
relatively mixed rating migration of the underlying portfolio.
According to the trustee report dated Dec. 31, 2012, assets that
S&P rates in the 'CCC' category (i.e., 'CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-')
have increased to 8.0% from 7.4%, while defaulted assets have
decreased to 1.84% from 2.41%.

At the same time, the credit enhancement available to each class
of notes has slightly decreased following a decrease in the
aggregate collateral balance to EUR488.7 million from
EUR491.4 million.  The transaction is now past its reinvestment
period (since August 2012) and only the class A1 notes have
marginally amortized so far.  All of the interest and par
coverage tests are currently in compliance with the documented
triggers.

Positive factors that S&P has observed from its analysis include
the reduction of the transaction's weighted-average life to 3.8
years from 4.2 years and the increase of the weighted-average
spread to 3.74% from 3.31%, following the continuous reinvestment
of redemption proceeds into assets that pay greater margins.
However, the weighted-average recovery rates (WARR) have
decreased due to lower assumed recovery ratings.

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class.  S&P used the portfolio balance that it consider to
be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the WARR
that S&P consider to be appropriate.  S&P incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.

                       COUNTERPARTY ANALYSIS

Non-euro-denominated assets denominated in U.S. dollars and
British pounds sterling account for about 15% of the underlying
portfolio, and the resulting foreign exchange rate risk is hedged
via perfect asset swaps with Bank of America N.A. (A/Negative/A-
1) and Credit Suisse International (A+/Negative/A-1) as swap
counterparties.  S&P has stressed the transaction's sensitivity
to and reliance on the swap counterparties, especially for the
senior classes of notes rated higher than the swap
counterparties, by applying foreign exchange stresses to the
notional amount of non-euro-denominated assets.  S&P's analysis
showed that the A1 notes could withstand a 'AAA' stress under
these conditions, and the class A2 notes could withstand a 'AA+'
stress.

           APPLICATION OF NONSOVEREIGN RATINGS CRITERIA

S&P caps the maximum potential ratings on structured finance
transactions with assets in the eurozone (European Economic and
Monetary Union) at six notches above S&P's rating on the related
sovereign, in line with its nonsovereign ratings criteria.

To assess the amount of securities that can achieve the maximum
potential rating, S&P applies a haircut to the cash flows from
assets located in jurisdictions where it rates the sovereign
lower than the relevant eligible jurisdictions.

This transaction has an aggregate exposure of approximately 10.7%
to assets located in Spain, Italy, and Ireland.  Therefore, the
maximum potential rating on the notes in this transaction is 'AAA
(sf)' since at least one sovereign in the portfolio is rated 'A-'
or higher.  However, S&P can only consider up to 10% of assets in
Spain, Italy, and Ireland as their sovereign ratings do not
support a 'AAA (sf)' rating on the notes, in accordance with
S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria.  In 'AAA' stress scenarios,
S&P reduces the aggregate performing balance in its analysis by
EUR3.3 million, notwithstanding other stresses that S&P apples to
account for counterparty or foreign-exchange risks.

S&P's analysis shows that the class A1 notes could withstand this
'AAA' stress--applied on top of the other stresses that S&P
applies as part of its credit and cash flow analysis.  Therefore,
the maximum achievable rating for the class A1 notes is 'AAA
(sf)'.

According to S&P's analysis, the credit support available to the
class A1, A2, A3, and A4 notes is commensurate with their current
ratings, and S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings on these
notes.

However, the drop in the aggregate collateral balance has
decreased the credit enhancement for the class B notes (the most
junior class in the capital structure), which has also suffered a
reduced WARR.  S&P has therefore lowered its rating on the class
B notes.

Harbourmaster CLO 11 is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction backed primarily by leveraged loans
to speculative-grade corporate firms.  The portfolio is
concentrated in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K.,
which together account for about 60% of the portfolio.
Harbourmaster CLO 11 closed in May 2008 and is managed by
Harbourmaster Capital Ltd.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
           To               From

Harbourmaster CLO 11 B.V.
EUR485.2 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

B          CCC+ (sf)        B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A1         AAA (sf)
A2         AA+ (sf)
A3         A+ (sf)
A4         BB+ (sf)


* Moody's Sees Increase in Dutch RMBS 60+-Day Delinquencies
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's index of 60+ day delinquencies of Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), comprising transactions that
are both backed and not backed by the Nationale Hypotheek
Garantie (NHG), recorded an increase to 0.76% of the current
balance in December 2012, from 0.66% in December 2011.

The cumulative defaults trend decreased to 0.41% of the original
balance in December 2012, down from 0.62% in December 2011. This
apparent improvement was mainly driven by index composition
change rather than actual performance improvement. Some older,
weak-performing transactions fully repaid and left the index in
2011 and 2012. The cumulative losses index remained stable,
increasing slightly to 0.07% in December 2012 from 0.06% in
December 2011.

As of December 2012, the Dutch RMBS market had an outstanding
pool balance of EUR263.3 billion, which constitutes a year-on-
year decrease of 12.0%. This decrease was mainly driven by the
early termination of the Stichting Orange Lion III RMBS
transaction on 12 June 2012. Currently, the Moody's-rated Dutch
RMBS portfolio comprises 129 outstanding transactions.

Moody's outlook for Dutch RMBS collateral performance is stable.
The Dutch economy is forecast to grow 0.3% in 2013 and the
unemployment rate is expected to rise to 5.7% in 2013, from 5.2%
in 2012. The weaker macroeconomic environment, which began in
2008, has caused a contraction in Dutch house prices of around
16% from August 2008 to August 2012, and Moody's expects that
prices will continue declining for at least another year (see
"Netherlands, Credit Analysis", December 2012).



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


SPAREBANK 1: Fitch Affirms BB+ Hybrid Capital Instruments Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SpareBank 1 SMN's, SpareBank 1 SR-
Bank's and Sparebanken Vest's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR) at 'A-' with Stable Outlooks and Short-term IDRs at 'F2'.
The agency has also affirmed SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge's (SNN) Long-
term IDR at 'A', with a Stable Outlook and Short-term IDR at
'F1'.

Rating Action Rationale

The affirmation of SNN, SMN, SR and SV's ratings (collectively
Sparebanken) reflect the Sparebanken's sound asset quality, and
good capital and leverage ratios. These outweigh the negative
considerations with respect to the significant rise in house
prices over the past 20 years, reliance on wholesale funding and
the geographical concentration of these banks.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

The Stable Outlooks reflect Fitch's expectation that the
Sparebanken will maintain satisfactory profitability and continue
to build capital, while not increasing their risk profiles.
Downward pressure on the Sparebanken's ratings is most likely to
be a result of a significant correction in house prices, should
that lead to a deterioration in asset quality and/or operating
profit, although this is not Fitch's base case. The ratings would
also be sensitive to prolonged dislocation in wholesale funding
markets affecting the banks' ability to grow profitably. Upside
potential to the banks' ratings is limited given that the ratings
are already high for banks with relatively limited franchises and
wholesale funding dependence.

Fitch expects the banks' asset quality to remain sound, driven by
the continued strong Norwegian economic outlook. A potential
softening in the housing market represents a downside risk for
the banks following strong house price growth over the past 20
years. In its base case, Fitch does not expect such a scenario to
lead to a significant deterioration of the banks' retail
portfolios. A more likely possible scenario is that lower private
consumption would affect business generation and the asset
quality of the banks' corporate exposures.

The Sparebanken have strong deposit franchises in their
respective regions, but also rely on wholesale markets for their
structural funding. Fitch expects the Sparebanken to maintain
access to both domestic and international funding markets, in
particular issuing covered bonds through SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt
(S1B; a joint funding vehicle of Alliance member banks) and
Sparebanken Vest Boligkreditt.  This funding structure makes the
banks sensitive to investor confidence.

The Sparebanken's creditworthiness continues to benefit from
their entrenched regional franchises and their good core
operating profitability, the latter benefiting especially from
low loan impairment charges.

SNN
The affirmation of SNN's ratings reflects its lower dependency on
market funding, property prices that have risen largely in line
with the national average (albeit from a lower absolute level)
and somewhat wider lending margins due to lower competition.
Fitch considers that the combination of these factors makes the
bank's creditworthiness slightly more resilient than the other
rated Alliance banks. SNN's asset quality also benefits from its
majority retail lending, while single name concentration remains
a moderate risk. Fitch considers SNN well capitalized and its
earnings generation solid. Credit growth in 2012 was relatively
high, and SNN's ratings would be sensitive to further significant
credit growth leading to higher wholesale funding dependency or
putting pressure on capital ratios.

SMN
SMN's ratings are driven by Fitch's expectation that the bank's
asset quality will remain sound, backed by the diversified
economy in mid Norway. SMN raised additional capital in 2012, and
Fitch expects the bank to continue to build capital via retained
earnings. Single name concentration remains a moderate risk.

SR
The affirmation of SR's ratings reflects its strong position in
the growing Western Norwegian economy and the agency's
expectation that asset quality will remain sound. Similarly to
SMN, SR raised additional capital in 2012. Property prices in
SR's region have increased more strongly than the national
average, making the bank's asset quality more sensitive to a
potential price correction. SR also relies more heavily on
wholesale funding than other rated Alliance members, which makes
the bank more sensitive to a prolonged dislocation of
international wholesale funding markets or a change in sentiment
to Norwegian issuers.

SV
The affirmation of SV's ratings reflects its sound risk profile
and good capitalization. Around three-quarters of SV's lending
related to retail and mainly mortgage lending at end-2012 and
Fitch expects asset quality to remain robust. Wholesale funding
dependence is significant although SVB (its wholly-owned covered
bond vehicle) has diversified the funding base. The higher
loan/deposit ratio at SV compared with the rated Alliance banks
is driven by its 100% ownership and consolidation of SVB, its
covered bonds issuer. The covered bond issuer for the Alliance
banks is minority owned by each of them.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The Sparebanken's Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors
reflect Fitch's expectation that there would be a moderate
probability that support would be forthcoming from the Norwegian
authorities if required. This is driven by the regional
importance of these banks, where they hold leading market shares,
and a strong ability of the Norwegian authorities to provide
support if required.

The Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are sensitive to any
potential change in Fitch's assumptions about the propensity or
ability of Norwegian authorities to provide timely support to the
bank, which would most likely be driven by a broader review of
support considerations for banks in Norway, Europe or globally.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by the
Sparebanken are all notched down from the banks' VRs. The ratings
are in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each instrument's
respective non-performance and relative loss severity risk
profiles, which vary considerably. Their ratings are primarily
sensitive to any change in the Sparebanken's VRs.

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES

S1B's ratings reflect its role as a covered bond funding vehicle
for its shareholder banks, which are members of the SpareBank 1
Alliance. Given S1B's close integration in the Alliance,
including operational support and servicing of the mortgage
assets, no VR is assigned. S1B's ratings are sensitive to the
same factors that might drive a change in the parent banks'
ratings.

These rating actions have no impact on the ratings of the covered
bonds issued by S1B and SVB.

The rating actions are:

SMN:
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB+'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+

SR:
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+

SNN:
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A'
Subordinated debt affirmed at 'A-'

S1B:
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '1'

SV:
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+'



===========
R U S S I A
===========


KOKS OAO: S&P Puts 'B' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Russia-based vertically
integrated coking coal, coke, iron ore, and pig iron producer OAO
Koks on CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same
time, S&P also placed its issue rating on Koks' US$350 million
Eurobond due in 2016 on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch placement follows Koks' publication of a request
to reset the incurrence covenant, and reflects S&P's view of the
risks that may arise for the company if the bondholders do not
consent.

S&P anticipates that, due to unfavorable industry conditions in
2012, Koks' leverage as measured by net debt to EBITDA will have
exceeded the 3.5x threshold under the Eurobond documentation as
of Dec. 31, 2012.  Hence, S&P anticipates that without a covenant
reset, the company will not be able to attract additional debt to
fund its working capital and capital expenditure program as early
as April 2013, after it publishes its annual report.  In
addition, S&P expects that Koks will not be able to draw funds
under its sizable committed lines, which are its main source of
liquidity, while cash on the balance sheet remains very limited.
This would likely lead to a revision of our liquidity assessment
to "weak".

The CreditWatch placement also reflects the weak coal price
environment, which will likely lead to leverage in 2013 beyond
S&P's previous expectation of debt to EBITDA of 4.0x.

S&P is therefore revising its assessment of Koks' financial risk
profile to "highly leveraged" from "aggressive".

S&P intends to resolve the CreditWatch placement when Koks
discloses the results of the bondholders' vote on its request to
reset the covenant.

S&P will evaluate the company's leverage, liquidity, and covenant
compliance risk in the next quarters, taking into account Koks'
substantial negative FOCF in light of weak market conditions and
continued capital expenditure.



=========
S P A I N
=========


FTPYME BANCAJA 6: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' its credit ratings on FTPYME Bancaja 6, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class B and C notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class D notes.

The class B and C notes experienced an interest shortfall on the
Dec. 27, 2012 payment date.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on the class B and C notes.
These notes have an interest deferral trigger mechanism, which
was breached in March 2010 for class C notes and in March 2011
for class B notes.  Nevertheless, the class B and C notes had
been able to repay due to the ongoing replenishment that the
reserve fund had experienced until the last payment date, when
the reserve fund was fully drawn.  S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)'
rating on the class D notes as it remains in default.

FTPYME Bancaja 6 closed in September 2007 and securitizes secured
loans granted to Spanish small and midsize enterprises (SMEs) in
their normal course of business.  Bankia S.A. is the originator
of the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an residential mortgage-backed security
as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available
to investors and a description of how they differ from the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in
issuances of similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope
securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or
after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To              From

FTPYME Bancaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.028 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

B           D (sf)          CCC- (sf)
C           D (sf)          CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D           D (sf)


REYAL URBIS: Files for Bankruptcy Protection; In Creditor Talks
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Roman and Pablo Dominguez at Dow Jones Newswires report
that Reyal Urbis SA said it would file for bankruptcy protection
in what could become the second-largest default in Spanish
corporate history.

Dow Jones relates that the firm said Tuesday it expects to reach
an agreement with its creditors.  Under Spanish law, such a deal
- even if it involves a debt default, which financial analysts
consider likely - would allow it to avoid liquidation, Dow Jones
notes.

Reyal Urbis, controlled by construction tycoon Rafael Santamaria,
owes EUR3.6 billion (US$4.8 billion) to a group of banks
including Sareb, the government-run "bad bank" set up last year
to buy nonperforming property loans and other assets from the
country's ailing commercial banks, Dow Jones discloses.

The filing indicates Spain's once-mighty real-estate sector is
still struggling from heavy debt loads, comatose sales and a
continued slide in property prices, Dow Jones states.  According
to Dow Jones, the sector's weakness has potentially damaging
implications for Spain's commercial banks, most of which extended
huge loans to the sector.  It was unclear whether Reyal Urbis's
bankruptcy filing would have a negative impact on Sareb and the
government's finances, Dow Jones states.

According to Dow Jones, Manuel Romera, head of the financial
department of Spain's IE Business School, said any effect on
Sareb would depend on the terms of Real Urbis's final deal with
creditors and the price at which Sareb took on the loans from the
commercial banks.  A Sareb spokeswoman said Sareb will monitor
the bankruptcy process but didn't provide specifics on its
exposure to Reyal Urbis loans, Dow Jones notes.

Reyal Urbis was involved in talks with creditors in recent years
as it sought to stay in business as Spanish property prices
dropped by around 40% from their 2008 peak, Dow Jones recounts.
The company said Tuesday it owes EUR400 million in unpaid taxes
in Spain, Dow Jones relates.

In the third quarter last year, the last in which it reported
earnings, Reyal Urbis posted a EUR258 million net loss, Dow Jones
discloses.

Reyal Urbis, primarily a residential developer, owned real-estate
assets valued at EUR4.2 billion as of June 30, including land and
more than 780 completed homes, according to Dow Jones.  The
company hasn't built anything new in three years, Dow Jones
notes.

Besides Sareb, Banco Santander SA, U.S. hedge fund Appaloosa
Management and Banco Popular SA are among Reyal Urbis's largest
creditors, Dow Jones states.

Trading in the company's shares was suspended on Tuesday, Dow
Jones relates.

Reyal Urbis is a Spanish listed real estate developer.


* SPAIN: Moody's Notes Deteriorating Performance of RMBS Market
---------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities market continued deteriorating in the three-month
period leading up to December 2012, according to the latest
indices published by Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's index of cumulative defaults increased to 2.8% of the
original balance in December 2012, up from 2.7% in September
2012. In December 2012, 60+ day delinquencies increased to 3.2%
of the current balance, up from 3.1% in September 2012 while 90+
day delinquencies rose to 2.2% of the current balance, from 2% in
the same period.

The reserve funds of 79 transactions are currently below their
target levels, coming from 61 transactions in September. 16 of
these reserve funds are fully drawn down. 11 deals have breached
their interest deferral triggers, affecting 17 tranches. Moody's
also notes that the annualized constant prepayment rate (CPR)
decreased to 3.5% in December 2012, down from 3.7% in September
2012, notably lower than the CPRs recorded prior to 2008, which
were over 10%.

Overall, Moody's currently rates 190 transactions in the Spanish
RMBS market, with a total outstanding pool balance of almost
EUR105 billion as of December 2012.

Moody's outlook for Spanish RMBS remains negative. The Spanish
economy is in recession and Moody's expects that it will contract
1.4% in 2013, the same rate as in 2012. Moody's expects that the
unemployment rate will continue to rise to 26.3% in 2013, up from
25% in 2012. Mortgage delinquencies will rise as more borrowers
are expected to lose their jobs. House prices will continue to
fall in 2013 as the supply of housing outweighs demand, with
falling house prices increasing losses on foreclosed properties.

On November 23, 2012 Moody's took rating actions on 156 Spanish
RMBS transactions further to its reassessment of the entire
Spanish RMBS market. The reassessment took into consideration the
continued collateral performance deterioration, the updated
European RMBS rating methodology and ongoing deterioration in the
credit quality of the Spanish sovereign and transactions'
counterparties. Moody's has commented on these three ratings
drivers in "European ABS and RMBS: Structured finance ratings in
Aaa-countries ratings are stable; downgrades expected in other
countries" published on November 14, 2012.

Moody's downgraded the ratings of 196 notes previously rated at
the country ceiling, 61 notes previously rated below A3(sf) and
confirmed the ratings of 63 notes out of 156 Spanish RMBS
transactions.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAS AB: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it removed from
CreditWatch and affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit
rating on Sweden-based airline group SAS AB.  The rating was
placed on CreditWatch with negative implications on Nov. 19,
2012. The outlook on SAS is stable.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that SAS has reduced its
near-term liquidity risk following the implementation of its
refinancing and restructuring plan.  S&P understands that SAS has
secured availability of its new Swedish krona (SEK) 3.5 billion
revolving credit facility (RCF) maturing in March 2015; amended
its financial covenants; and introduced the cost-reduction
measures set out in the restructuring plan.  In addition, S&P
believes that customer confidence has stabilized to the extent
that future bookings are currently at levels S&P considers
reasonable.  As a result, S&P now sees less risk of a near-term
default.

However, S&P believes that SAS' main challenge in future will be
the improvement of its cost competitiveness relative to low-cost
carriers in its core markets.  In addition, despite S&P's
understanding that headroom under SAS' new financial covenants is
adequate at the end of January 2013, S&P believes that it could
tighten toward year-end if SAS does not complete its disposal and
cost-cutting program in a timely manner.  If SAS breached its
financial covenants, it could render its RCF unavailable, and S&P
believes that the group would then find it difficult to fund its
financial and operational needs in the seasonally weak first
quarter of the calendar year.

In S&P's view, increased efficiency linked to the cost-reduction
program should allow SAS to improve its operating performance and
maintain its credit ratios in line with S&P's forecasts.
Nevertheless, the industry environment remains challenging,
characterized by high fuel prices and growing low-cost
competition, which weigh on SAS' credit risk.

S&P could take a positive rating action if, after the completion
of its disposal program and the full implementation of the
restructuring plan, S&P believes that SAS has a more competitive
cost structure.  A positive rating action is also contingent on
SAS's liquidity position improving sustainably, including S&P's
forecast of sufficient headroom under its covenants.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the completion of the
disposal program and the full implementation of the restructuring
plan become less likely, leading S&P to believe that the group
will breach its covenants and lose availability of its RCF.  S&P
could also consider taking a negative rating action if it
believes that SAS' operating performance will fall materially
below its base-case forecasts.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


* TURKEY: Monetary Tightening Prompts Bankruptcy Hike
-----------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Benjamin Harvey, Sabah newspaper
reported that "Monetary tightening created by the central bank's
policies and the excessive interest rates charged by banks are
causing bankruptcies to rise".

Sabah said that Turkish bank policies are based on incorrect
forecasts and bank has tightened policy excessively, Bloomberg
relates.

Sabah, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the central bank decision
yesterday to cut two interest rates by 25bp while increasing
required reserves "tightened even more instead of relaxing the
economy".

Sabah said that banks are charging exorbitant interest rates
despite record-low central bank rates, Bloomberg notes.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BYRE THEATRE: Owes GBP470,000 to Creditors; Needs Cash Injection
----------------------------------------------------------------
Accountancy Live reports that creditors of the Byre Theatre,
based in St Andrews, which brought down the curtain at the end
January with the loss of 25 jobs, stand to receive an estimated
dividend of 31 pence in the pound after liquidators from
Henderson Loggie have examined the accounts.

Henderson Loggie, who were appointed as liquidators earlier this
month, said that creditors are owed a total of GBP471,271, while
the assets of the theatre have been estimated to have a
resaleable value of GBP271,103, leaving a deficit of GBP200,168,
Accountancy Live discloses.

"The key issues to be taken from the report and the statement of
affairs are the extreme difficulties faced in the current
financial climate as a result of the reduction of grant funding
available to the Byre.  Despite funding being available for one-
off projects, which allowed a number of outreach projects to be
carried out for the benefit of the community, existing general
funding did not cover the overheads of maintaining the Byre
Theatre and the staff needed to operate it," Accountancy Live
quotes Henderson Loggie insolvency partner Graeme Smith --
Graeme.Smith@hendersonloggie.co.uk -- as saying.

Mr. Smith, as cited by Accountancy Live, said that the company
would have needed a cash injection of between GBP60,000 and
GBP80,000 to sustain the theater until its proposed transfer to
Fife Cultural Trust in April 2013.  Its financial difficulties
stemmed from the costs of repayments due on a bank loan of
GBP143,000 taken out in 2000 to cover the cost of a new building,
plus employees' claims, coupled with poor income from audiences
over the last few months, Accountancy Live discloses.

Mr. Smith said the theatre's operating loss was "unsustainable,"
Accountancy Live notes.


CORNWALL AND THE ISLES: Put Into Liquidation Over Bad Debts
-----------------------------------------------------------
Insolvency practitioners from national accountancy firm Chantrey
Vellacott DFK have been appointed liquidators of Cornwall and the
Isles of Scilly Credit Union Limited.

Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Credit Union Limited (trading as
Cornish Community Banking) was placed into liquidation following
an order of the High Court on Friday, February 15, 2013, with
Kevin Murphy -- kmurphy@cvdfk.com -- and Richard Toone from
Chantrey Vellacott DFK appointed liquidators.

The not-for-profit financial co-operative, which had its offices
in Truro, was open for membership to anyone who lives or works in
Cornwall or the Isles of Scilly.

It was owned and controlled by approximately 2,100 members with
savings totaling around GBP550,000.

The directors of the credit union have attributed its failure to
bad debts on loans made by the credit union.

Mr. Murphy has stressed that all savers will be compensated in
full.

"Every member of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Credit Union
will get their money back in full, as they are protected by the
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS)," he said.

"The FSCS has confirmed this process is automatic, so members do
not need to act to get their money back.  People with less than
GBP1,000 will receive a letter to get cash over the counter at
the Post Office, while anyone with more than GBP1,000 will
receive a check.

"Members are advised that payments from their accounts will be
stopped from the date of liquidation.  Members are advised to
notify the recipient of any payments and make alternative
arrangements.

"If members have an outstanding loan with the credit union,
please continue to make your repayments using the usual method of
payment."

For further information, members are asked to refer to the notice
on the credit union's Web site at:

            http://www.cornishcommunitybanking.co.uk

The liquidators will be writing to all members shortly enclosing
a statement showing the balances on members' savings accounts
together with the balances on any loan accounts.


DRACO PLC: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Draco (Eclipse 2005-4) plc's class B
to E notes as follows:

  GBP98.m class A (XS0238139983): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  GBP12.4m class B (XS0238140569): downgraded to 'AAsf' from
  'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP11.4m class C (XS0238140999): downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AA-
  sf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP16.6m class D (XS0238141377): downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'A-
  sf'; Outlook Negative

  GBP8.8m class E (XS0238141617): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
  'BBB-sf' assigned Recovery Estimate (RE) 50%;

The rating actions for the class B and C notes are primarily
driven by the risks related to complex pay down rules which,
under certain adverse scenarios, expose these noteholders to
continued pro-rata payment of principal from the Flinstone
borrower. For the classes D and E notes, meanwhile, the severe
downgrades are due to the continued deterioration of the Herbert
House loan, which Fitch expects to make significant losses.

Subject to the sequential pay trigger, the structure allows for
significant principal receipts to be allocated on a pro-rata
basis (for the GBP144.1 million Flinstone, 50%; for the GBP8.5
million Herbert House, 100%). Given the weakness with Herbert
House, a key concern with the payment rules would be that a large
principal payment from Flinstone could reduce the nominal amount
of loss-absorbing credit enhancement available to higher-ranking
notes.

Sequential pay will be breached by a loss being realised or the
aggregate loan balance falling below GBP30 million, depending on
which is earlier. Since, for the purposes of such calculations,
the aggregate loan balance is measured on a "calculation date",
and this also marks the end of the relevant collection period,
Fitch believes that an implicit cap in the amount of further
principal that can be paid non-sequentially is established at
GBP61.3 million.

A higher cap of GBP65.6 million will apply if the Herbert House
borrower repays in full and thus contributes to the gross
GBP122.6 million capable of being repaid without triggering
sequential pay; in this case, GBP8.5 million would be treated
100% pro rata in addition to 50% of the GBP114.1 million that
Flinstone could prepay without triggering sequential pay. Fitch
considers the likelihood of Herbert House avoiding loss as very
low, reflected by both an estimated 183% Fitch loan-to-value
ratio (LTV) and a distressed rating on the class E notes.

The most plausible outcome in Fitch's eyes is for the interest-
only Flinstone loan to repay in one single payment, most likely
at or soon after its October 2015 maturity. Since the aggregate
loan balance remaining at the end of the applicable collection
period would also have fallen below GBP30 million, no further
principal could be distributed pro rata at or after the next
payment date. Fitch understands that the full GBP144.1 million
balloon repayment would be paid out in a sequential fashion, and
the classes B and C notes would fare better than their ratings
now imply.

However while plausible, this outcome is by no means certain.
Were the Flinstone borrower instead to prepay -- but by no more
than the c.GBP122.6 million cap -- then Fitch understands that
50% of this prepaid principal would be distributed on a pro rata
basis (with the pro rata shares recalculated after the 50% of
principal had first been applied to noteholders sequentially).
While it would probably oblige the borrower to make a swap
breakage payment, the sponsor is entitled to make a partial
prepayment in any amount, which therefore cannot be discounted
from Fitch's ratings.

One possible scenario leading to this less favorable outcome (for
senior-ranking bondholders) would be the borrower choosing to
sell its largest property, UK House, a prime mixed-use building
located on the east side of London's Oxford Street (accounting
for 78% of its portfolio value). For the prepayment to be below
the GBP122.6 million level qualifying for 50% pro rata treatment,
the release price governing the sale would have had to fall from
its current 110% to the minimum 105%. For this switch to occur,
the LTV reported for Flinstone would have had to fall below 60.0%
from its current 60.3%, which in turn hinges on either the
sponsor being tempted by a lower release price to make a minor
equity injection, or else the collateral being revalued upwards.
In either case, pro rata treatment also depends on Herbert House,
which matures in January 2014, not already having suffered a
loss.

Fitch has tested its ratings against both cases -- namely the
full repayment and the qualifying partial repayment of the
Flinstone loan. The ratings are heavily weighted by the worse of
the two outcomes, although the range is in the order of magnitude
of a single rating category. Any upgrade potential does not
warrant a Positive Outlook, especially given the back-dated
maturity date of Flinstone. In either case, the class E notes are
considered at risk of default, and the Recovery Estimate
approximately equal (because pro rata pay returns capital to this
class at the same time as reducing loss protection available to
it). The class D notes also suffer a severe downgrade and have a
Negative Outlook given their highly leveraged exposure to the
Herbert House loan should a partial prepayment of Flinstone cause
the class E and (non-rated) class F notes to amortize.

In terms of underlying performance, Flinstone has improved since
the last rating action in March 2011. The collateral valuation
increased by 10% to GBP239 million, reducing the reported LTV %
to 60.3%from 66.3, very close to the agency's estimate of 63%.
The portfolio maintains its strong property fundamentals as
evidenced by an occupancy rate close to 100%, and a weighted
average lease length to break of 9.1 years. Fitch expects the
loan to repay at maturity in October 2015.

The Herbert House loan is secured by a single-tenanted secondary
office property located in Birmingham city center. The building
is fully let to Cable and Wireless Communications with a break in
July 2015. The uncertainty around future income is reflected in
the 55% decline in market value to GBP5.1 million revealed in a
July 2012 valuation. Vacant possession value of GBP3.2 million
may not even be achievable given the condition of the property.
The loan is likely to default at maturity and suffer significant
losses.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the
transaction.


HTLP LIMITED: Put Into Administration; Duff & Phelps Seeks Buyer
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Bond and Ben Wiles have been appointed as joint
administrators of HTLP Limited t/a The Hotel on February 14,
2013.

The Cheltenham-based business trades as a high-end boutique
hotel, comprising of 12 rooms with bar and restaurant facilities.

The Hotel had already been placed on the market for a number of
months prior to Duff & Phelps appointment.

The Joint Administrators were appointed as the Company has
experienced a downturn in trading performance due to the current
economic climate.  This, in turn, impacted on the business' cash
flow.

Commenting on the appointment, Matt Bond of Duff & Phelps --
matthew.bond@duffandphelps.com -- states: "We, the Joint
Administrators, will continue to trade the hotel on a 'business
as usual' basis whilst seeking a buyer for the Hotel which
remains open and looking forward to a busy Festival week."

Interested parties are asked to contact Peter Brunt Director of
Colliers International Hotels on 0117 917 2062 for further
information.

Mr. Brunt said the Grade II-listed town house hotel, which dates
back to the 1830s, on Evesham Road in the swish Pittville area of
town, "has a dozen stunning bedrooms and has recently undergone a
top quality refurbishment.  It retains many original features but
has also undergone a complete refurbishment bringing all the
facilities very much up to date."

Perhaps the most striking feature is the variety of luxury
bathrooms that include not just whirlpools, but
aromatherapy/chromotherapy baths and an amazing infinity pool,
where the water is allowed to cascade over the sides.

"If you feel the need to indulge yourself there can be few
locations in the town where you can expect to be pampered as you
would be at The Hotel.

"It's a luxurious oasis of calm right in the center of Cheltenham
with numerous opportunities for exploring the legendary shops or
further afield in the Cotswolds."

Sumptuously appointed throughout, facilities at The Hotel include
a stylish and contemporary bar and the elegant Parkers Brasserie,
winner of Cotswold Life Restaurant of the Year 2006, which seats
around 42.

The Caramel Lounge is a cosy residents' lounge with marble
surround fireplace and doors to the garden at the back of the
hotel and which can be used as a private dining room.

The 12 letting bedrooms are either doubles or twins and furnished
and decorated in different styles.  All have flat screen TV, CD
player and DVD player.  WiFi is available throughout the hotel.
There is a flat on the lower ground floor consisting of large
bedroom, kitchen/living room and office.


POWDER TRAIN: In Administration; Buyers for Pubs Sought
-------------------------------------------------------
Powder Train LLP, a partnership which holds 5 freehold pubs
across the south of England, was placed into administration on
February 6, 2013, after several years of difficult trading
conditions.

Administrators Julie Palmer, Simon Campbell, and Gavin Savage --
gavin.savage@begbies-traynor.com -- from Begbies Traynor are
trading the business forward with a view to maximizing value for
creditors.

The five pubs are the Anchor Hotel in Warminster, Wiltshire and
the George Inn, in Longbridge Deverill, nr Warminster; The Chilli
Pad (formerly the Jolly Miller) in North Warnborough, Hampshire;
The Chequers Inn in Maresfield, East Sussex and The Handsome Pig
(formerly the Kings Arms) in Fernhurst, West Sussex.

Powder Train LLP has been trading since 2006 and employed
approximately 100 staff.

Administrator, Julie Palmer, said: "The 5 pubs present a diverse
offering geographically and to the market-place.  However, the
trading businesses appear to be viable in their own right and we
expect strong interest in all 5 units over the next few months".


VOYAGE BIDCO: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Voyage BidCo Ltd., the
parent company of U.K.-based health care group Voyage Care Ltd.
(Voyage). The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the
GBP222 million senior secured notes due 2018, issued by Voyage
BondCo PLC.  The recovery rating on the notes is '2', indicating
S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'CCC+' issue rating to the proposed
GBP50 million second lien notes due 2019, issued by Voyage
BondCo. The recovery rating on the senior secured notes is '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.

The rating reflects S&P's view of Voyage's relatively aggressive
capital structure after a leveraged buyout by private equity
group HgCapital in 2006.

S&P assess Voyage's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged"
under S&P's criteria.  Voyage BidCo raised GBP272 million of
notes to refinance its bank debt.  S&P estimates that Voyage's
Standard & Poor's-adjusted net debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about
13x by March 31, 2013.  S&P's estimate includes financial debt of
GBP272 million; GBP303 million in the form of a shareholder loan;
and about GBP46 million of obligations under operating leases.

Although S&P views the shareholder loan as debt-like, it
recognizes its cash-preserving function.  Excluding this debt-
like instrument, Voyage's financial risk profile would still
remain in line with S&P's "highly leveraged" classification, with
debt to EBITDA of about 6x by Dec. 31, 2013.  Due to Voyage's
long-dated debt maturity profile, any future improvement in
leverage is likely to result from higher profitability rather
than from any reduction in debt, thereby leading to a relatively
high cost of funding.  This could, in S&P's view, potentially
compromise Voyage's operating flexibility.

S&P estimates that Voyage will achieve adjusted EBITDA of about
GBP48 million in 2013 and 2014.  This will cover by 1.8x annual
cash interest payments of about GBP23 million and an operating
lease interest adjustment of about GBP5 million, supported by
positive free operating cash flow (FOCF).

S&P considers Voyage's business risk profile to be "fair" under
S&P's criteria.  S&P bases its view on Voyage's relatively small
size, with reported revenues of GBP160 million and EBITDA of
GBP41 million in 2012, and its exposure to the vagaries of the
political climate in the U.K. Public funds, particularly payments
from local authorities, account for the majority of Voyage's
revenues.  Both social care and health care are undergoing
significant changes as the government curbs public expenditure,
and S&P expects the challenging funding environment to persist in
2013.  This will put pressure on both the volumes and fees of
Voyage and other social care operators and will challenge their
profitability, especially in an environment of rising cost
inflation.  In addition, wages account for a significant portion
of social care providers' operating costs, and wage increases
could cause margin erosion.  S&P anticipates a small increase in
Voyage's wage costs in 2013 due to the implementation of pension
reforms in the U.K.

These negative factors are partially offset by Voyage's position
as the leading provider of care services for adults with learning
disabilities, a segment of the elderly care market that S&P views
as niche.  Voyage focuses on the higher end of acute care
provision, with the majority of clients classified as requiring
"critical" or "substantial" care.  These categories of care are
less discretionary and have limited alternatives, which should
insulate Voyage's services to a certain extent from volume and
fees cuts.  Local authorities purchase tailored packages on a
case-by-case basis depending on the needs of the individuals.
This gives Voyage greater flexibility to alter services, protect
its margins, and charge higher fees than standard social and
elderly care operators.  Further support stems from Voyage's
well-invested, mainly freehold property portfolio, and its high
rating from independent regulator The Care Quality Commission.
S&P considers this to be an important competitive advantage in
light of the recent high level of negative publicity surrounding
the quality of care in the U.K.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Voyage will sustain
broadly positive underlying revenue growth over the next 12
months.  The outlook also assumes that the company will maintain
its operating performance, despite the potentially negative
effect of the U.K. government's public spending cuts.

Moreover, to maintain the rating, S&P believes that Voyage should
be able to generate positive FOCF of at least GBP10 million
without significantly expanding its borrowing base.  S&P views
adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of about 2x and cash balances
of at least GBP15 million as commensurate with the 'B' rating.

S&P could take a negative rating action if adjusted debt to
EBITDA interest coverage drops to less than 1.5x, or if Voyage is
unable to generate positive FOCF.  Such deterioration could arise
from deeper cuts to public funds putting pressure on fees and
volumes; higher capital investments than S&P estimates; or debt-
financed acquisitions.

Rating upside is remote at this stage in light of Voyage's
relatively small size and high leverage.


WELLINGS LTD: In Administration After a Period of Trading Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------
letsrecycle.com reports that Wellings Ltd, which trades as Pink
Skips, has gone into administrative receivership with the loss of
37 jobs.

Wellings Ltd appointed Grant Thornton as administrative receivers
after a period of trading losses, according to letsrecycle.com.

The report relates that the receivers are now inviting offers and
contacting potential interested parties who may wish to acquire
the trade and assets of the business.

The report notes that the administrative receivers recommend that
customers contact the company through the normal channels if they
have any enquiries.

"Following a period of trading losses and cash pressure the
directors of the company decided to seek an outside investor or
strategic partner to allow for the continuation and development
of the company.  Corporate finance advisors were engaged to
undertake a period of marketing but unfortunately no formal
offers were received.  In view of this, the directors concluded
the company could not continue to trade and took the difficult
decision to invite the bank to appoint administrative receivers,
which they duly did," the receivers said in statement obtained by
the news agency.

Shropshire-based Wellings Ltd, which trades as Pink Skips, is a
family-owned waste and recycling company.


* UK: More Shops Likely to Close Following Retail Administrations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Batchelor at The Financial Times reports that retail
administrations mean thousands more shops could close in the
coming year leaving one in six stores empty on high streets.

According to the FT, research published on Tuesday by the Local
Data Company showed there were more than 35,500 empty shops and a
national vacancy rate of 14.2% across the country's top 650 town
centers.

Although the vacancy rate remained flat in 2012, this failed to
reflect the collapse of retailers including Blockbuster, Jessops
and HMV, which have since closed hundreds of stores, the FT
notes.

Matthew Hopkinson, director of LDC, predicted that the vacancy
rate could nudge 17% taking those closures into account -- more
than one in six shops -- if current trends continue, the FT
discloses.

The West Midlands saw the largest rise of unoccupied units, up to
18.5%, the FT notes.  London, Yorkshire and the Humber and the
East Midlands saw a rise in the number of shops let to new
tenants, the FT says.

Wales remains the worst performing country, with 18% of its shops
unoccupied, the FT states.  Scotland follows with 15.5%, while
England performed the best with 13.9% of its retail premises
unoccupied, the FT notes.

According to the FT, the report said that independent stores,
which accounted for 68% of the shops surveyed, were faring better
than bigger stores.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Notes Negative Impact of ECB's Repo Criteria Revisions
----------------------------------------------------------------
The European Central Bank's change to its repo eligibility
criteria for covered bonds is credit negative for programs with
cover pools containing asset-backed securities (ABS), says
Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment entitled "EMEA
Covered Bonds: New ECB Repo Rules are Credit Negative for Cover
Pools Containing ABS Assets".

According to the new guidelines, cover pools containing ABS
assets can no longer serve as collateral for covered bonds used
in ECB repo transactions. "In our view, the change in repo
eligibility is credit negative because it will reduce the
purchase prices of cover pools containing ABS assets, should the
pools need to be sold" says Dr. Martin Rast, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Analyst and author of the report.

"This increase in refinancing risk affects the value of all ABS
assets in cover pools, including those originated within the
issuer group. We also note that the change in repo eligibility
might prompt issuers to gradually restructure their programs in
order to maintain repo eligibility and contain issuance spreads,"
explains Dr. Rast.

Moody's notes that of the covered bond programs that it rates
rate in EMEA, only five French covered bond programs contain ABS
assets, ranging from 7% to 100%. One of them (DEXMA) contains
around 11% public-sector ABS, whilst the other four contain
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) notes in different
shares of 8% to 100%.

"The change in ECB repo eligibility is likely to make it more
expensive for issuers to issue covered bonds that are secured by
a cover pool that contains ABS notes, because investors will
request higher returns on those covered bonds," adds Dr. Rast.


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

Feb. 17-19, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Advanced Consumer Bankruptcy Practice Institute
         Charles Evans Whittaker Courthouse, Kansas City, Mo.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Feb. 20-22, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      VALCON
         Four Seasons Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nev.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Apr. 10-12, 2013
   TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
      TMA Spring Conference
         JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
            Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Apr. 18-21, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Annual Spring Meeting
         Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
         National Harbor, Md.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

June 13-16, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Central States Bankruptcy Workshop
         Grand Traverse Resort, Traverse City, Mich.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 11-13, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Northeast Bankruptcy Conference
         Hyatt Regency Newport, Newport, R.I.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 18-21, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
         The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 8-10, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
         Hotel Hershey, Hershey, Pa.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 22-24, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Southwest Bankruptcy Conference
         Hyatt Regency Lake Tahoe, Incline Village, Nev.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 3-5, 2013
   TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
      TMA Annual Convention
         Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
            Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 1, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      NCBJ/ABI Educational Program
         Atlanta Marriott Marquis, Atlanta, Ga.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Dec. 2, 2013
   BEARD GROUP, INC.
      19th Annual Distressed Investing Conference
          The Helmsley Park Lane Hotel, New York, N.Y.
          Contact:   240-629-3300 or http://bankrupt.com/

Dec. 5-7, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Winter Leadership Conference
         Terranea Resort, Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *