TCREUR_Public/130311.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, March 11, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 49



HYPO ALPE ADRIA: May Face Closure Over Failure to Restructure


* CYPRUS: May Have to Raise Corporate Tax to Help Repay Bailout


TALVIVAARA MINING: Shareholders Back EUR261-Mil. Rights Offer


FRAISNOR: In Administration on Decline of Sales


COREALCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'bb' Viability Rating
PROVIDE BLUE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Certificates


EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Fitch Says NBG Merger Good for Credit Profile
FREESEAS INC: Issues Final 31,755 Settlement Shares to Hanover


SUNDAY BUSINESS: In Examinership; Attracts Potential Buyers


CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' Issuer Rating
* CITY OF NAPLES: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Debt Rating; Outlook Neg.


BANKAS SNORAS: Bankruptcy Estate Demands Repayment From Tenaci


SNS REAAL: ABN Amro Sale Among Options Prior to Nationalization


MOSCOW INTEGRATED: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'BB-'; Outlook Neg.
MOSENERGO AO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Off Watch

S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C

JUGOREMEDIJA: Expresses Interest in Leasing Production Facility


BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Raises Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
GC FTPYME 4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'D'
VALENCIANO DE FINANZAS: S&P Lowers Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: S&P Lowers Rating on Bond Tranches to 'D'


MHP SA: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
SSB NO.1: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Limited Recourse Notes
UKRLANDFARMING PLC: Fitch Publishes 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLIVE RANGER: In Administration, Suspends Online Business
DECO 6: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'C'
DREAMS PLC: Sun Capital Saves Chunk From Bankruptcy
EVENT MANAGEMENT: In Administration, Jobs at Risk
SOPHOS LTD: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable

TAPS: In Administration, HMRC Seeks to Wind Up Firm

* Moody's Revises Outlook on UK Life Insurance Sector to Stable
* Moody's Notes Deterioration of EMEA SME ABS Performance


* EUROPE: EU Commission Mulls Fund for Bankrupt Airlines
* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 4 to March 8, 2013



HYPO ALPE ADRIA: May Face Closure Over Failure to Restructure
Foo Yun Chee at Reuters reports that EU Competition Commissioner
Joaquin Almunia said an Austrian bank is facing possible closure
for failing to restructure, without naming the bank, but a
commission spokesman said Hypo Alpe Adria was the country's only
bank negotiating a revamp.

"No other restructuring decision is outstanding except HGAA,"
Reuters quotes a European Commission spokesman as saying on
Friday, referring to Hypo Group Alpe Adria, a nationalized bank
that was once one of the most important lenders in central and
eastern Europe.

The spokesman did not go as far as confirming that Mr. Almunia,
was referring to Hypo Alpe when he said on Friday Austrian
authorities had failed to make a convincing case to restructure
one of the country's banks, Reuters notes.

"This bank started receiving public support in 2008 and still the
Austrian authorities have not been able to present to us a final
decision or a sensible restructuring plan for this bank," Reuters
quotes Mr. Almunia as saying, speaking at an event in Brussels
organised by think tank Bruegel.  "There should be a bigger
restructuring, an orderly liquidation or an orderly resolution
plan. We are still discussing."

As the guardian of EU state-aid rules, Mr. Almunia has the power
to close banks, and his comments could spell the end for Hypo
Alpe, which currently ranks as the seventh largest Austrian bank
by assets and has a workforce of 7,650, Reuters states.

Hypo Alpe has already received EUR1.5 billion in emergency
capital from the Austrian government, and a further EUR700
million has been earmarked for the lender, Reuters discloses.

The European Commission approved Hypo's recapitalization last
December, but made it conditional on the management presenting a
thorough plan to overhaul the group, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, a spokesman for the Austrian finance
ministry, which effectively runs Hypo Alpe, said it submitted a
restructuring plan to the Commission on Feb. 5.

Hypo Alpe's chairman, Johannes Ditz, has said the bank would like
more time to sell assets in the bank, which had a balance sheet
worth EUR33.7 billion (US$43.75 billion) at mid-2012, Reuters

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB.  It
is active in banking and leasing.  In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.


* CYPRUS: May Have to Raise Corporate Tax to Help Repay Bailout
Jan Strupczewski at Reuters reports that euro zone officials said
on Thursday international lenders would like Cyprus to raise its
corporate tax and introduce a levy on capital gains and a
financial transaction tax to ensure it can repay a euro zone
bailout it asked for last year.

According to Reuters, Cyprus needs up to EUR17 billion (GBP14.8
billion) -- almost as much as its annual gross domestic product
-- in emergency loans, mostly to recapitalize its oversized
banking sector, hit by a Greek debt restructuring, but also to
service debt and government expenses.

The amount is small compared to euro zone GDP, but policy-makers
in several countries, notably Germany which faces elections in
September, are keen to limit taxpayer exposure after earlier
bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain made public
opinion reluctant to further aid, Reuters notes.

One official, briefed on the talks between the International
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European
Commission -- known as the Troika -- and the new government in
Nicosia, said no decisions had yet been taken on any of the
taxes, Reuters relates.

In what could be a welcome relief for euro zone taxpayers
suffering bailout fatigue, officials said Cyprus received signals
from Russia, which has strong business ties with Nicosia, that
Moscow could consider contributing to the bailout if it got the
same credit status as euro zone lenders -- meaning it would get
repaid right after the IMF, Reuters discloses.

Reuters notes that officials said Cypriot President Nicos
Anastasiades is to travel to Russia to meet President Vladimir
Putin in the coming weeks to discuss possible Russian help.  He
will seek a 5-year extension of an existing Russian loan to
Cyprus of EUR2.5 billion that matures in 2016 as well as a
reduction in the 4.5% rate of interest, Reuters says.

Euro zone finance ministers pledged last week to agree a bailout
for Cyprus by the end of March, but details of how the rescue
will be financed are yet to be sorted out, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, German officials, backed by the Netherlands
and Finland, have pushed for depositors in Cypriot banks, many of
whom are Russian and British business people, to help pay for the
cost of the rescue, a process known as a "bail-in".


TALVIVAARA MINING: Shareholders Back EUR261-Mil. Rights Offer
Firat Kayakiran and Kasper Viita at Bloomberg News report that
Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. shareholders approved a EUR261 million
(US$340 million) rights offer that will enable the company stave
off default and bankruptcy.

The company said in a statement on Friday that the company will
issue six new shares for each existing one at a price of 16 euro
cents apiece, Bloomberg relates.  Talvivaara, which currently has
272.3 million shares outstanding, will issue as many as 1.6
billion shares, Bloomberg discloses.  The fully underwritten
rights offer will help Talvivaara repay a EUR76.9 million
convertible bond maturing May 20, and fund efforts to deal with
excess water at its Sotkamo mine following an 11-day leak of
waste that caused a temporary shutdown, Bloomberg says.
Talvivaara will also use proceeds to ramp up annual nickel
production toward its long-term goal of 50,000 metric tons,
Bloomberg notes.

The company posted a net loss of EUR57.6 million last quarter
after a profit of EUR1.9 million a year earlier, Bloomberg

Talvivaara cut its production estimate three times last year to
about 13,000 tons on Nov. 28 from an initial figure of as much as
30,000 tons, Bloomberg relates.  Its results were hurt by the
excess water at its open-pit mine, the waste leak and low prices,
Bloomberg discloses.

Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.


FRAISNOR: In Administration on Decline of Sales
Stuart Todd at just-food reports that Fraisnor has gone into
administration for an initial period of two months following a
decline in sales since the horsemeat scandal broke.

Last month, horse DNA was detected in a single batch of meat
delivered to Fraisnor by a supplier, according to just-food.  The
report relates that the company produces private-label fresh
lasagne for retailers.

"We were blameless, the batch was stamped beef but the loss of
consumer confidence was immediate," the report quoted Fraisnor's
Chief Executive Officer, Alain Leemans, as saying.

The report notes that sales have dropped off 50% in France and
80% in Germany.  Fraisnor has had to lay off some of its 110
staff, the report relates.

"Entering administration provides us with some breathing space.
Our cash flow is stretched and we have asked the state to help us
out financially until we are paid the money due from our retailer
customers.  But to date, the request has fallen on deaf ears . .
. . We remain hopeful the firm can be rescued but it will depend
on regaining consumer trust," the report quoted Mr. Leemans as


COREALCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'bb' Viability Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Aareal Bank AG), Hypo Real Estate Holding AG and its
subsidiary Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG at 'A-'.  The agency has
also affirmed COREALCREDIT BANK AG's and Duesseldorfer
Hypothekenbank AG's Long-term IDRs at 'BBB-'. Berlin-Hannoversche
Hypothekenbank AG's Long-term IDR, driven by assumed
institutional support, has been affirmed at 'A+'. The Outlooks on
all Long-term IDRs are Stable. At the same time, the agency
affirmed the banks' Viability Ratings (VR) and senior debt


The affirmation of the IDRs and Stable Outlooks are driven by
Fitch's view of continued sovereign and, in the case of Berlin
Hyp, institutional support. The affirmation of all banks' VRs,
ranging from 'c' to 'bbb', reflects Fitch's expectation that the
banks' standalone profiles will be stable relative to their
individual VR levels. Among other factors, the VRs take into
consideration the banks' substantial exposure to commercial real
estate (CRE), which is cyclical, and significant exposure to the
public sector in southern peripheral countries, which is subject
to tail risk. These challenges are balanced to various degrees,
reflected in Fitch's spectrum of VRs for these banks, among other
factors by the banks' level of capitalization, recurring earnings
power, geographical diversification of the loan book and track
record of risk management.


- Sovereign Support-Driven Ratings

The Long-term and Short-term IDRs, Support Ratings, Support
Rating Floors and senior debt ratings of Aareal, PBB,
COREALCREDIT and DHB reflect Fitch's continued view that their
status as active Pfandbrief issuers results in a high (indicated
by the SRF of 'BBB-') or very high (indicated by a SRF of 'A-')
probability of state support. For Aareal and PBB (and HRE Holding
where ratings are aligned with PBB), the already provided
sovereign support results also in the higher of two possible
Short-term IDRs at the SRF of 'A-'.

The Stable Outlooks continue to benefit from Fitch's unchanged
view on support. HRE Holding is a strategic and financial holding
company that does not have any banking operations. Through HRE
Holding, SoFFin (Financial Market Stabilisation Fund) controls
its two main subsidiaries PBB and Depfa Bank plc ('BBB-
'/Negative). For COREALCREDIT and DHB, Fitch does not factor in
any potential support from their owners, funds managed by US
financial investor Lone Star (LS), into the ratings.

- Institutional Support-Driven Ratings

Berlin Hyp's Long-term and Short-term IDRs, Support Rating and
senior debt ratings are based on its ownership structure and
forthcoming assumed institutional support, if needed, by its 100%
owner Landesbank Berlin AG (LBB; 'A+'/ Stable). Fitch believes
also that Berlin Hyp's IDRs will remain at their current level if
the bank becomes disentangled from LBB. Fitch's institutional
support assumption is underpinned by Berlin Hyp's forthcoming
membership in the savings banks' mutual support scheme and to a
lesser extent, a profit-and-loss transfer agreement
(Ergebnisabfuehrungsvertrag) concluded with and a declaration of
backing (Patronatserklaerung) provided by LBB. Berlin Hyp's
Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's continued institutional support


- Sovereign Support-Driven Ratings

Fitch's expectation of the likelihood of support is based on its
assessment that Germany's public authorities and Pfandbrief
issuers have a strong interest in safeguarding the standing of
Pfandbriefe as an asset class. The rationale for different SRFs
is indirect sovereign ownership, outstanding capital support of
SoFFin and the size and systemic relevance of these banks.

Fitch does not expect the current support mechanisms for
Pfandbrief issuers to change in the short to medium term,
particularly given the currently volatile and unpredictable
operating environment in the eurozone. However, Fitch's view on
support is sensitive to developments within the regulatory and
legal framework, particularly emanating from the European
Commission with regard to bail-ins, centralised regulatory
oversight and adjustments to deposit insurance schemes, and the
changing attitude of the German authorities towards using their
tools. If Fitch changes its view on support in the future, the
current VRs provide a broad indicator of where IDRs could end up
for the rated Pfandbrief issuers (see 'Support is Key to German
Pfandbrief Issuers' Ratings', dated 28 August 2012 at

In addition, Fitch would review Aareal's and PBB's IDRs if they
repay their perpetual silent participations by SoFFin or, for
PBB, if the bank was sold to a lower rated entity. Fitch views
both banks as systemically relevant due to their size and
Pfandbriefe license and the amount of outstanding Pfandbriefe and
has no indication that these banks' systemic relevance has
weakened in the view of German authorities.

The rating of DHB's EUR1.5bn guaranteed notes is in line with the
German sovereign IDR and is based on Fitch's belief that SoFFin
will honour the guarantee, which is unconditional, irrevocable
and unsubordinated. A change in the sovereign Long-term IDR would
automatically result in a similar change in the guaranteed notes'

- Institutional Support-Driven Ratings

Berlin Hyp's IDRs, Support Rating and senior debt ratings are
sensitive to changes in its ownership structure or contractual
relationships (eg its membership in the mutual support scheme)
with its owners or a deterioration of the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe
(Sparkassen)'s financial strength in combination with a potential
downgrade of Germany's sovereign IDR or perceived lower systemic
importance, which would trigger a downgrade of Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe (Sparkassen)'s SRF (currently 'A+').

Aareal Bank AG
Aareal's 'bbb' VR is the highest among its German monoline peers
and benefits from its resilient performance since 2008. Fitch
believes that Aareal's management is risk averse and that its
risk management is adequate and tested. Its highly geographically
diversified loan book exposes the bank to more volatile markets
compared with the German property market. However, Fitch believes
that inherent risks are offset by higher margins and conservative
underwriting standards.

Due to lower competition, Aareal was able to increase gross
margins and decreased its loan-to-values (LTVs) in new business,
which has improved its risk-return profile. A favorable LTV
distribution, providing substantial buffer against market
deterioration, and its low, albeit higher than its domestically
focused peers, LIC ratio and its low non-performing loan (NPL)
ratio results in strong asset quality, which mitigates high
concentration risks due to its non-granular CRE lending and large
public sector exposure, including Spain and Italy.

Its Basel III compliant capitalization and its strong liquidity
position coupled with funding access to retail housing deposits
drive Aareal's investment grade VR. Its already pro-forma
achievement of the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable
funding ratio thresholds under Basel III are also major
achievements in Fitch's view.

Berlin Hyp's 'bbb-' VR benefits from its solid performance during
the global financial crisis and proven risk management practices
reflected by very low loan impairment charges (LICs) and strongly
reduced NPLs in the last two years. However, Fitch notes that
Berlin Hyp's risk return profile could be influenced by assets
spun off to it in the course of the current reorganization.

Berlin Hyp benefited from the withdrawal of competitors, which
allowed it to cherry-pick new loans in Germany and to a minor
extent in other European markets (which account for about a low
20% of its loan book) at higher margins and lower LTVs. Cost
efficiency is high due to discipline and integration into LBB.
Berlin area assets account for about 30% of the total CRE loan
book, making the bank vulnerable to potential local stress.
Berlin Hyp's total exposure to southern European countries will
disappear in the next few years and should no longer represent a
material risk by end-2016. Its senior unsecured exposure to these
countries could theoretically be offset by a one-year profit by

Although this could result in an upgrade of its VR, Fitch
questions Berlin Hyp's ability to fulfill the net stable funding
ratio under Basel III's current draft. Fitch understands that the
latest draft will be adjusted and may result in some relief for
banks. However, without significant deposit access, Berlin Hyp
faces a strategic challenge, in Fitch's view. The agency believes
that Berlin Hyp will comfortably meet the liquidity coverage
ratio due to its stock of high-quality liquid assets. Berlin
Hyp's Fitch core capital ratio was adequate at 9.5% at end-
September 2012 and the agency expects this ratio to improve

COREALCREDIT's 'bb' VR reflects the bank's progress in improving
its risk profile, its good capitalization and prudent positioning
as a CRE lender in a relatively stable domestic environment. At
the same time, it reflects the bank's need to further improve its
recurring profitability and it's still high, albeit rapidly
declining, NPL portfolio.

COREALCREDIT's legacy NPL loan book continues to benefit from the
industry experience of Hudson Advisors Germany GmbH, an affiliate
of LS, which services the bank's NPLs. Coupled with the sale of
several tranches in 2011 and H112, the NPL portfolio (including
sub-performing loans) had shrunk by more than half at end-2012
since end-2008. The bank's plan to eliminate its remaining legacy
NPL book position by end-2013 appears somewhat ambitious,
although Fitch does not expect any material losses to arise from
the book. The asset quality of the CRE assets originated in the
past few years appears satisfactory. The GIIPS exposure in
relation to its capital is the lowest among its peers (about 35%
at end-2012).

On a pro-forma basis, COREALCREDIT has overachieved the liquidity
coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio at end-May 2012,
obtaining the strongest ratios in comparison with the other four
banks based on data received at that time. Fitch also believes
that COREALCREDIT's recently launched internet retail funding
platform could make the bank more independent from capital market
or wholesale funding in the longer term. The agency views the
bank's capitalisation as strong compared with its peers. The
bank's continued reduction of NPLs and its low exposure to GIIPS
coupled with its strong capital base could result in an upgrade
of its VR during 2013.

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG
PBB's 'bb' VR is driven by the bank's sector and single asset
concentration as well as capital market and wholesale funding
reliance. The VR also takes into account challenges in re-
establishing a viable business, which outweigh PBB's currently
strong asset quality, following the transfer of non-performing
and non-strategic assets to FMS WM in 2010. In Fitch's view, the
currently low level of NPLs and LICs is unsustainable considering
PBB's substantial exposure to cyclical European property markets.
Fitch expects normalized LICs to significantly dent PBB's
earnings as it is unable to quickly improve the return on assets.

PBB's business plan foresees strong new business growth until
end-2015, predominantly in its Real Estate Finance segment and
partly in its Public Investment Finance segment. This will
trigger an increasing annual senior unsecured funding need. Fitch
believes that PBB's access to the senior unsecured funding market
is a key challenge. Constrained funding access or increasing
funding costs (as a result of debt investors anticipating the
sale of PBB, which is planned by latest end-2015 but deemed
unrealistic by Fitch) would constrain business growth. This would
prevent PBB from improving its currently low recurring
profitability. Profitability suffers from its still large volume
of low-yielding legacy public sector assets and cost inefficiency
in connection with the servicing of FMS WM assets (the asset
servicing ends in September 2013).

The bank's solid liquidity overhang allowed it to gradually re-
enter the funding market and consequently the CRE lending market
in 2011. PBB's pro-forma liquidity coverage ratio is Basel III
compliant. The absence of a retail or similar deposit base until
now would make it difficult for PBB to fulfill the net stable
funding ratio under Basel III, although the rules are not yet
final. However, Fitch notes that PBB launched its internet retail
funding platform in March 2013. PBB's capitalization is sensitive
to contingency risks in connection with its exposure to Southern
European countries. Its Fitch core capital ratio of 12.6% is
adequate but its pro-forma fully loaded Basel III Core Tier 1
ratio was a moderate 7.6% (both at end-H112). A rising CRE loan
book, as planned, would result in increasing risk-weighted assets
(RWAs) and lower regulatory capital ratios. Fitch expects that
the introduction of counterparty credit risk (CRR)/CRDIV will
increase RWAs in 2013. Its leverage is still high.

Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG

DHB's 'c' VR reflects the bank's continued challenge to
successfully establish itself as a niche CRE lender since the
near collapse in 2008. It also takes into account the bank's
large exposure to vulnerable public sector assets and its very
weak capitalization, which is in turn constrained by the weak
performance limiting the much needed internal capital generation.

Given the uncertainty underlying the bank's liability-driven
business model, where the asset side of the balance sheet is
driven by the available funding mix (largely secured or covered
by the deposit protection scheme), upside potential for DHB's VR
is currently limited. An improved capital position would be
needed for an upgrade, which in Fitch's view would only come from
an external capital injection. DHB's capitalization is very weak
with a Fitch core capital ratio of 0.6% at end-H112. Even taking
into account the mandatory convertible subordinated bonds (EUR100
million outstanding; EUR50 million was voluntarily converted in
2012), the agency still views the bank's capitalization as weak.
To raise the VR above low speculative grade would additionally
require considerable risk reduction and a sustainable return to
robust profitability.

Fitch expects the return to profitability to be a lengthy process
given insufficient new business volumes to offset the low-margin
public-sector legacy portfolio. New CRE business volumes in 2011
and H112 were low and, in the agency's view, are unlikely to
reach a critical mass in the medium term given the bank's small
franchise and concentration on relatively small participant
tickets. Despite the progress made since 2008, the downsizing of
its sizeable, vulnerable public-sector portfolio adds to the
challenge of a return to a robust earnings profile. At end-H112,
DHB's GIIPS exposure was 88 times its Fitch core capital.


CRE loan books are typically very concentrated, partly mitigated
by granular tenant structures, existing cash flow streams or
through cross collateralization. The banks' earnings capacity and
capital are unlikely be strong enough to offset large single
credit events in a severe scenario. At the same time, they are
reliant on capital market and wholesale funding, with some
exceptions and mitigants, including retail or similar deposits
and/or funding access to crisis-proven Pfandbriefe and partly
protected German Schuldscheindarlehen. In Fitch's view, these
factors constrain the VR potential for German CRE monoline banks
and make it difficult for them to be rated above the 'bbb' range.

Upside potential for all banks could arise from significantly
increasing recurring profitability, improving asset quality and
capital or by funding sources becoming more diversified, eg by
collecting or increasing stable retail or other deposits.
Downward pressure could result from a slump in asset quality
driven by large single credit events or potential stress in the
banks' property markets, indicated by increasing NPLs or LICs.
Further downward pressure would arise from the sovereign debt
crisis again reaching a more critical stage, potentially
resulting in write-downs of public sector assets, affecting each
bank's capitalization.

Fitch would upgrade COREALCREDIT's VR if the bank demonstrates a
track record of sustainably improved core profitability and a
significant work-out of the NPL portfolio to a more manageable

PBB's 'bb' VR could be downgraded if Fitch believes the bank is
unable to establish a track record and fails to implement its
current business plan.

A breach of DHB's minimum regulatory capital ratios, or emergency
external support measures aimed at preventing such a breach,
would trigger a downgrade to 'f', excluding a potential
conversion of DHB's outstanding EUR100m convertible bond into
regulatory capital.

Aareal's, COREALCREDIT's and PBB's subordinated debt is rated one
notch below their respective VRs to reflect the subordinated
ranking of its investors, in line with Fitch's criteria.

Aareal's hybrid securities, issued by Capital Funding GmbH and
Aareal Capital Funding LLC (Delaware), are rated 'BB-'.

PBB's hybrid Tier 1 securities, issued through Hypo Real Estate
International Trust I, are rated 'C' and reflect the uncertain
timing of these securities being serviced again. The European
Commission agreement does not permit distribution on profit-
related capital instruments (excluding SoFFin-related ones) prior
to PBB's re-privatization and the redemption of its outstanding
EUR999 million SoFFin silent participation.

Subordinated debt ratings and hybrid ratings are sensitive to the
potential changes of the banks' respective VRs and changes in
Fitch's criteria.


Aareal Bank AG:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'
Debt Issuance Programme: affirmed at 'A-'/'F1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Capital Funding GmbH (DE0007070088): affirmed at 'BB-'
Aareal Capital Funding LLC (Delaware) (XS0138973010): affirmed at

Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+'

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB-'

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'
Market linked securities: affirmed at 'A-emr'
Debt Issuance Programme: affirmed at 'A-'/'F1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB-'
Hypo Real Estate International Trust I (XS0303478118): affirmed
at 'C'

Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'c'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Long-term SoFFin-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AAA'
Debt Issuance Programme: affirmed at 'BBB-'/'F3'

Hypo Real Estate Holding AG:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'

Fitch may have provided another permissible service to Berlin-
Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG or its related third parties.
Details of this service can be found on Fitch's website in the EU
regulatory affairs page.

PROVIDE BLUE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Certificates
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Provide Blue 2005-1 PLC and Provide
Blue 2005-2 PLC and revised the Outlook to Negative on two
tranches of Provide Blue 2005-2.

Both transactions are synthetic securitizations and reference
portfolios of residential mortgage loans originated by BHW
Bausparkasse AG.


Credit Enhancement & Loss Allocation
Provide Blue 2005-2 has reported a total allocated loss of
EUR12.9 million to the outstanding initial threshold amount
(EUR21.2 million). As a result, available credit enhancement (CE)
for the class E note has decreased. In Fitch's view, loss
allocation towards the threshold amount is expected to continue
and as such, protection further decreases. Current CE together
with the expected speed of loss allocation are commensurate with
the class E notes' current 'Bsf' rating but an unexpected
acceleration of loss allocation could have an immediate impact on
the ratings given the low CE of 0.6%. Fitch has consequently
affirmed the class E notes' rating and the Outlook remains
Negative as protection is reducing.

For the class C and D notes the current CE provides sufficient
protection against losses and therefore the agency affirmed their
ratings. However, reduced CE for the class E notes may adversely
affect future CE levels for the class C and D notes . Therefore,
Fitch has revised the Outlook on the class C and D notes to
Negative from Stable.

Following the regulatory call of Provide Blue 2005-1 on the
January 2010 payment date, the senior CDS and class A+, A, B and
C were paid in full. The outstanding note balance as of the
November 2012 payment date was EUR27.9 million. The remaining
protected portfolio amount stands at EUR442 million.

The amortization of the class D and E notes is currently limited
to proceeds received from cures and recoveries of the overdue
reference claims exceeding new delinquencies in each period. The
relative CE levels have increased for both tranches and are in
line with Fitch's loss expectations for the respective ratings,
as reflected by their affirmation. Accelerating loss allocation
may adversely affect the notes' ratings and therefore the Outlook
on the class E notes remains Negative.


The performance of German RMBS transactions is largely dependent
on the level of defaults and recovery values of properties once a
borrower has defaulted. The German economic environment is
relatively stable and Fitch expects German mortgage loans to
continue to perform well. However, an unexpected and strong
deterioration of economic fundamentals may accelerate loss
allocation towards the class F notes and threshold amount which
may adversely affect CE for the notes and result in a downgrade.

The rating actions are as follows:

Provide Blue 2005-1 PLC:

Class D (ISIN DE000A0E6NX2): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Stable Outlook

Class E (ISIN DE000A0E6NY0): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Negative

Provide Blue 2005-2 PLC:

Senior Credit Default Swap: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Stable Outlook

Class A+ (ISIN DE000A0GHZR1): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Stable

Class B (ISIN DE000A0GHZS9): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Stable Outlook

Class C (ISIN DE000A0GHZT7): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable

Class D (ISIN DE000A0GHZU5): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable

Class E (ISIN DE000A0GHZV3): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Negative Outlook


EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Fitch Says NBG Merger Good for Credit Profile
Fitch Ratings expects that the latest consolidation move in the
Greek banking sector, involving the two largest banks, National
Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG 'CCC'/'f' and Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
(Eurobank 'CCC'/'f'), will prove beneficial to the new group's
credit profile in the medium term, assuming achievement of
synergies. However, in the near term, the risks may outweigh

Fitch expects Eurobank to merge into NBG following the
acquisition of Eurobank by NBG, clearing the way to form Greece's
biggest lender with pro-forma assets of EUR178 billion. The
creation of the NBG-Eurobank group should facilitate a more
efficient structure to cope with Greece's weak macro-economic
prospects. With this transaction, NBG will enlarge its already
leading franchise in Greece, widening the gap with its direct
peers which have also been involved in consolidation moves,
albeit on a lower scale.

According to NBG, the new group's pro-forma market shares will be
about 32% for loans and 36% for deposits. Fitch expects the
group's strong domestic franchise to eventually lead to an
enhanced deposit base and to enable a lowering of retail funding
cost over time. The new group will also benefit from a
strengthened international footprint, particularly in South-East
Europe, where both NBG and Eurobank have had a presence for some

However, Fitch notes that challenges related to the NBG-Eurobank
merger are greater than those faced by other Greek banks that
have played a role in the Greek banking sector consolidation
process. This is due to the two banks' relatively large size and
significant overlap in resources and risks, which results in
larger integration and execution risks. Added to these concerns,
Fitch anticipates that both banks' funding pressures will
persist, at least in the near term, and notes that the merger
comes at a time when the two banks also need to meet
restructuring requirements under the recapitalization processes.

Both NBG and Eurobank have been provided with sizeable capital
support (EUR9.8 billion and EUR5.8 billion, respectively) by the
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) following the capital
needs assessment conducted by the Bank of Greece in 2012.
However, the ultimate capital needs will have to be reassessed by
the national and international authorities. Fitch does not expect
the capital needs of the new group to be higher than the sum of
those specified for each individual bank in view of cost-
restructuring efforts and potential synergies. The new group
expects to realise about EUR570 million-EUR630 million of
synergies per annum, centered on cost and funding synergies, to
be fully phased-in within the next three years.

Fitch believes the new group could find it challenging to
generate revenue synergies quickly, given the continued economic
recession, which will keep business activity at low levels.
Pressure on deposit rates is unlikely to ease substantially in
the near term until Greek banks gain sustained access to other
forms of funding, including through the wholesale markets.
Moreover, Fitch remains cautious about the evolution of banks'
asset quality in view of the economic recession in Greece (Fitch
expects 4% GDP contraction in 2013) and rising unemployment from
already record-high levels (27% at end-November 2012). Fitch
expects the new group's credit profile to suffer from increased
concentration levels and continued asset quality deterioration.

Finally, execution risks could be exacerbated by the poor
operating environment, the banks' differing corporate cultures,
and union resistance that could make it difficult to achieve cost

Fitch-rated Greek banks' Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs),
including those of NBG and Eurobank, are at their Support Rating
Floor (SRF) of 'CCC' based on support and remain linked to the
sovereign. However, the major Greek banks' Long-term IDRs could
at some point be driven by their standalone financial strength as
expressed by banks' Viability Ratings (VRs) if these improve.

Currently, Greek banks' VRs of 'f' reflect Fitch's view that
Greek banks would have defaulted had they not received external
support. Fitch will reassess the banks' VRs when there is more
visibility as to their overall standalone credit profile after
the receipt of capital support through the HFSF in the form of
ESFS bonds and in the context of recent and significant bank
acquisitions, likely re-designed restructuring plans and
recapitalization prospects.

Fitch believes there is near-term upgrade potential for Greek
banks' VRs due to strengthened capital levels after the receipt
of support, stabilized deposit bases and regained access to the
ECB. The latter allowed banks to shift away from more expensive
ELA funds back towards ECB funds. However, Greek banks' VRs are
likely to remain at a deeply sub-investment grade level, still
constrained by materially weak credit fundamentals and the poor
operating and macro-environment in Greece.

FREESEAS INC: Issues Final 31,755 Settlement Shares to Hanover
The Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York,
on Feb. 13, 2013, entered an order approving, among other things,
the fairness of the terms and conditions of an exchange pursuant
to Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, in
accordance with a stipulation of settlement between FreeSeas
Inc., and Hanover Holdings I, LLC, in the matter entitled Hanover
Holdings I, LLC v. FreeSeas Inc., Case No. 150802/2013.  Hanover
commenced the Action against the Company on Jan. 28, 2013, to
recover an aggregate of US$740,651 of past-due accounts payable
of the Company, plus fees and costs.  The Settlement Agreement
became effective and binding upon the Company and Hanover upon
execution of the Order by the Court on Feb. 13, 2013.

As previously reported, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement approved by the Order, on Feb. 13, 2013, the Company
issued and delivered to Hanover 185,000 shares of the Company's
common stock, US$0.001 par value.

The Settlement Agreement provides that the Initial Settlement
Shares will be subject to adjustment on the trading day
immediately following the "Calculation Period" to reflect the
intention of the parties that the total number of shares of
Common Stock to be issued to Hanover pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement be based upon a specified discount to the trading
volume weighted average price of the Common Stock for a specified
period of time subsequent to the Court's entry of the Order.

As previously reported, the Company issued and delivered to
Hanover 90,000 Additional Settlement Shares, on Feb. 25, 2013,
the Company issued and delivered to Hanover another 90,000
Additional Settlement Shares, on Feb. 26, 2013 the Company issued
and delivered to Hanover another 90,000 Additional Settlement
Shares, on Feb. 27, 2013, the Company issued and delivered to
Hanover another 100,000 Additional Settlement Shares, on Feb. 28,
2013, the Company issued and delivered to Hanover another 100,000
Additional Settlement Shares, and on March 4, 2013, the Company
issued and delivered to Hanover another 100,000 Additional
Settlement Shares.

The Calculation Period expired on March 5, 2013.  Based on the
adjustment formula, Hanover was entitled to receive an aggregate
of 786,755 VWAP Shares.  Accordingly, since Hanover had received
an aggregate of only 755,000 Initial Settlement Shares and
Additional Settlement Shares, on March 6, 2013, the Company
issued and delivered to Hanover 31,755 additional shares of
Common Stock pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement
approved by the Order.  No additional shares of Common Stock are
issuable to Hanover pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

                        About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of Oct.
12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational fleet is
approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its fleet is 15

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 18, 2012,
Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified Auditors Accountants S.A., in
Athens, Greece, expressed substantial doubt about FreeSeas'
ability to continue as a going concern, following its audit of
the Company's financial statements for the fiscal year ended Dec.
31, 2011.  The independent auditors noted that the Company has
incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital
deficiency.  "In addition, the Company has failed to meet
scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has
not complied with certain covenants included in its loan
agreements with banks."

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed
US$120.8 million in total assets, US$104.1 million in total
current liabilities, and shareholders' equity of US$16.7 million.


SUNDAY BUSINESS: In Examinership; Attracts Potential Buyers
Donal O'Donovan at reports that the Sunday
Business Post will slash up to a third of the newspaper's
workforce and ask remaining staff to accept their third pay cut
in as many years if it survives an examinership that started on
Thursday at the High Court.

The news comes as fears grow for 50 jobs at Webprint in Cork, an
outside company that had the contract to print newspapers
including the Sunday Business Post and the Irish Examiner for
Thomas Crosbie Holdings until the media group that owned the
Sunday Business Post went into receivership last week, relates.  That printing contract no longer stands
as a result of the receivership, states.

Accountant Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton was appointed as
interim examiner of Post Publishing Ltd., which owns the Sunday
Business Post' newspaper, at the High Court in Dublin by
Mr. Justice Peter Kelly, relates.

The court heard that an interim examiner needed to be appointed
straight away so that a newspaper appears on March 10, relates.

According to, the court was told that failure to
publish an edition of the newspaper would seriously affect the
confidence of advertisers and consumers, and could undermine its
future chance of survival.

The judge, as cited by, said that there is a
reasonable chance that the business can survive following an
examinership, if certain conditions are met.

"Examinership is desirable and necessary," quotes
the judge as saying.

The court was told that the Sunday newspaper has a staff of 76
full-time staff and as many as 120 freelance contributors, notes.

Fresh investment in the business will be needed as part of a
rescue deal, if the company is to emerge from examinership, says.

The company said that a number of potential buyers have expressed
an interest in buying the paper, relates.

Post Publications has been loss-making since 2009,
notes.  The loss for 2012 was EUR1.2 million,

                          Potential Buyers

Separately,'s Tom Lyons reports that four parties
have so far expressed interest in buying The Sunday Business
Post, including Better Capital, a private equity firm led by John

Other bidders for the Post include Key Capital, a financial
adviser co-founded by Conor Killeen and entrepreneur Declan
Ganley, who has teamed up with a Spanish media magnate, says.

The founder of television group Setanta, Michael O'Rourke, is
also mulling a bid, notes.

The Sunday Business Post is an Irish national Sunday newspaper.


CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' Issuer Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Cassa di Risparmio di
Ferrara S.p.A.'s E standalone bank financial strength rating,
which is equivalent to a ca standalone baseline credit
assessment, the Caa1/Non-Prime long- and short-term deposit
ratings, the Caa1 long-term issuer rating, the (P)Caa1 senior
unsecured MTN rating, the (P)C subordinate MTN rating, the (P)C
junior subordinate MTN rating, and the (P)C Tier III Debt rating.
At the time of the withdrawal, all the ratings carried a stable

Ratings Withdrawn:

- Bank Deposits: Caa1/NP

- Issuer Rating: Caa1

- Bank Financial Strength: E

- Senior Unsecured MTN: (P)Caa1

- Subordinate MTN: (P)C

- Junior Subordinate MTN: (P)C

- Tier III Debt MTN: (P)C

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in Ferrara, Italy, CR Ferrara reported total assets
of EUR7.3 billion as of December 2011, and is privately owned.

* CITY OF NAPLES: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Debt Rating; Outlook Neg.
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the B1 debt rating of the
City of Naples and assigned a negative outlook. The confirmation
reflects Naples' commitment to fiscal recovery and Moody's
expectations of increasing oversight from the Italian government
going forward.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated in
October 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that Naples recently applied to the newly
established rehabilitation framework for underperforming cities
and provinces. Under this framework, weaker cities and provinces
are entitled to liquidity support, but are required to submit
recovery plans to structurally rebalance their finances for
approval to Italy's Court of Auditors and the central government.

Naples submitted its recovery plan on January 25, 2013, which if
approved will release up to EUR265 million up-front. The plan
envisages large-scale asset sales, tax hikes, and expenditure
rationalization, including its municipal companies. Moreover,
Moody's expects the government to exercise more stringent
oversight and financial controls throughout Naples' recovery

Naples' recovery plan is aimed at funding the EUR850 million
deficit which stemmed from the write-off of uncollectable taxes
and service charges from previous years (disclosed in November
2012). Moreover, it should help offset potential off-balance
sheet liabilities as well as an expected decline in revenue over
the recovery period.

At year-end 2012, Naples' debt exposure was EUR1.56 billion, or
129% of 2011 operating revenue; this ratio rises to over 160%
when estimates of the financial debt of major municipal companies
are included. Naples' debt structure is amortizing, with debt-
service costs representing 10% of 2011 operating revenue. The
city reports that it has regularly honored debt-service payments
due in December 2012 (approximately EUR 70 million, including
interest and principal). Credit-protection measures embedded in
Italy's institutional framework -- primarily the delegation of
payment mechanism -- provide comfort that debt-service payments
will remain prioritized.

Rationale for the Negative Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the uncertainties associated with
Naples' ability to consolidate its finances in line with its
recovery plan. In particular, Moody's notes (1) the plan's
excessive reliance on asset sales, the income from which is
uncertain; and (2) Naples' challenging socio-economic
environment, which threatens its ability to significantly improve
revenue collection and to cut expenditure in line with forecasts.

Furthermore, the city is exposed to material off-balance-sheet
risk through existing swaps. Termination risk may represent an
additional liquidity challenge.

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

An upgrade is unlikely given the negative outlook. However,
evidence of a structural fiscal recovery and an improved
liquidity position could lead to a stabilization of the outlook
on Naples' B1 rating. This scenario also considers that potential
liabilities associated with swaps do not materialize.

A failure to comply with recovery targets and significant
deterioration in the city's liquidity profile -- also due to the
materialization of financial risks off-balance sheet -- could
precipitate a municipal liquidity crisis and trigger a downgrade
of Naples' rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.


BANKAS SNORAS: Bankruptcy Estate Demands Repayment From Tenaci
Niklas Magnusson at Bloomberg News, citing Dagens Industri,
reports that the bankruptcy estate of Lithuania's Bankas Snoras
has requested that Tenaci Capital, Spyker Cars CEO Victor
Muller's investment company, pay back money it borrowed.

According to Bloomberg, Snoras' bankruptcy lawyers claim the
"tens of millions of euros" that was lent to Tenaci belong to the
bankruptcy estate of Snoras and the bank's creditors.

Spyker bought Saab Automobile in Feb. 2010 from General Motors
Co., Bloomberg relates.  Saab filed for bankruptcy in December
2011, Bloomberg recounts.

                       About Bankas Snoras

Bankas Snoras AB is Lithuania's fifth biggest lender.  Snoras
held LTL6.05 billion in deposits and had assets of LTL8.14
billion at the end of September.  It competes with Scandinavian
lenders including SEB AB, Swedbank AB (SWEDA), and Nordea AB.  It
also controls investment bank Finasta and Latvian lender Latvijas
Krajbanka AS.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 2,
2011, The Baltic Times, citing LETA/ELTA, said Vilnius District
Court accepted the application regarding the initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings against Snoras bank.  The Bank of
Lithuania delivered application on Snoras bankruptcy on Nov. 28,

The TCR-Europe, citing Bloomberg News, reported on Nov. 28, 2011,
that Lithuania's central bank said that Snoras' financial
situation is "worse than previously identified" and saving the
bank "would cost significantly more and would take longer than
the available liquidity" at Snoras.  Governor Vitas Vasiliauskas
said at a news conference on Nov. 24 that some LTL3.4 billion
(US$1.3 billion) in assets are missing, according to Bloomberg.


SNS REAAL: ABN Amro Sale Among Options Prior to Nationalization
Corina Ruhe and Maud van Gaal at Bloomberg News report that SNS
Reaal NV, the Dutch lender nationalized this year, explored
selling its bank operations to ABN Amro Group NV and disposing of
its insurance arm in 2012 as its situation worsened.

"In May 2012, we acknowledged the financial situation at SNS
Reaal was worsening," Bloomberg quotes acting Chairman Piero
Overmars, who was vice-chairman at the time, as saying on Friday
at a hearing in the Hague investigating the nationalization.  "We
foresaw the capital ratio would decline in the third quarter, and
at that time we knew we could not continue on a standalone

Mr. Overmars, as cited by Bloomberg, said the plan to sell to
ABN Amro, state-owned itself since 2008, was abandoned on concern
a deal would be blocked by the European Commission.

The Dutch central bank disclosed last month that it had proposed
a four-way deal that would have seen ABN, ING Groep NV and
Rabobank NV buy and split up SNS's assets, only to be rejected by
the European antitrust regulator, Bloomberg recounts.  The
Commission has forced Dutch banks to sell assets and barred them
from purchases after they received state aid in the financial
crisis, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates that Jan Sijbrand, executive director of the
Dutch central bank, on Friday told lawmakers "We thought it would
not be seen as an acquisition but as a participation in a safety
net," making the rejection a surprise.  "We decided in January
this year that we did not want to get into lengthy legal
procedures involving all the large Dutch banks."

Mr. Overmars was member of the board of directors of ABN Amro in
2006, when it sold the property-finance division of Bouwfondto
SNS Reaal, Bloomberg discloses.  Financial problems at this
division, which was renamed SNS Property Finance, led to the
nationalization of SNS, Bloomberg recounts.  Mr. Overmars told
lawmakers he was not involved in the transaction at that time,
Bloomberg notes.

SNS REAAL NV -- is a Netherlands-based
financial services provider engaged in banking and insurance.
The Company's activities are divided into five segments: SNS
Bank, providing banking services both for the retail and small
and medium enterprises, such as mortgages, asset growth and asset
protection, insurance, payments, savings and financing; Property
Finance; Zwitserleven, providing pension insurance services,
mortgages and investment products; REAAL providing life and non-
life insurances; and Group activities.  As of December 31, 2011,
the Company operated through 16 wholly owned subsidiaries, such
as SNS Bank NV, REAAL NV, SNS REAAL Invest NV and SNS Asset
Management NV, among others.

Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem took control of SNS
Reaal on Feb. 1 after real estate losses brought the bank to the
brink of collapse.  The nationalization included shares and
subordinated bonds in SNS Reaal NV and SNS Bank NV.


MOSCOW INTEGRATED: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'BB-'; Outlook Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating to 'BB-' from 'BB', and its Russia
national scale rating to 'ruAA-' from 'ruAA' on Moscow-based
heating utility Moscow Integrated Power Co. (MIPC).  The outlook
is negative.  At the same time, S&P removed all ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where it placed them on
Dec. 7, 2012.

The actions follow S&P's revision of the likelihood of
extraordinary financial support from the City of Moscow for MIPC
to "moderately high" from "high," as S&P's criteria define the
terms.  Although Moscow currently directly owns 100% of shares
outstanding in MIPC, S&P understands the city government has been
in negotiations with third parties about a potential sale of a
stake in MIPC--up to full divestment--or placing a stake through
an auction.

Although S&P has little clarity on whether the transaction will
go through and under what terms, that privatization is being
contemplated has led S&P to change its assessment of the link
between MIPC and the city government to "strong" from "very
strong."  However, S&P continues to assess MIPC's role for
the government as "important."

S&P currently assess MIPC's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at
'b', based on the company's "fair" business risk profile and
"highly leveraged" financial risk profile.  S&P's assessment
reflects MIPC's less-than-adequate liquidity arrangements,
aggressive liquidity management and strategies, lack of
transparency, and uncertain financial policies.  In addition,
demand in the heating sector is weather-dependent and volatile,
the tariff regime politicized and therefore somewhat
unpredictable, and the Russian economy is in transition.

These weaknesses are mitigated by existing strong ongoing support
from the city government, including annual subsidies, MIPC's
dominant position as the city's leading district heating utility,
its diverse customer base, high wealth and economic diversity in
its service area, a fairly modern asset base, and moderate debt.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that the likelihood of
extraordinary government support for MIPC could weaken further in
the next 12 months depending on the outcome of the privatization

S&P could downgrade MIPC if it believed the Moscow would dispose
of a controlling or full stake in the company.  S&P might revise
its assessment of the likelihood of extraordinary government
support depending on the size of any eventual privatized stake
and S&P's assessment of the city's ability and willingness to
provide timely and full financial support to MIPC in the event of
distress under any potential changed ownership structure.

If there is any transaction, S&P will also assess its impact on
MIPC's market position, profitability, strategies, and funding,
as it could lead S&P to revise its assessment of the company's
SACP. At this stage S&P sees it as unlikely that it would revise
down MIPC's SACP, as it thinks that the company's currently low
debt and strong market position offset the risks of discontinued
ongoing government support.  Positive implications, such as more
supportive long-term tariffs or improvements in corporate
governance and financial management might support a higher SACP,
in S&P's view.

S&P would evaluate the willingness and potential of any potential
new owner to provide financial aid to MIPC if privatization took

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if privatization plans
were discontinued and the city demonstrated its willingness to
maintain its control over and provide financial support for MIPC.
S&P might also consider a revision of the outlook to stable if it
saw a new owner with strong intention and capacity to support
MIPC's creditworthiness.

MOSENERGO AO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Off Watch
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'BB'
long-term corporate credit rating and 'ruAA' national scale
ratings on Russian electricity utility Mosenergo (AO).  At the
same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they
were placed with negative implications on Dec. 7, 2012.  The
outlook is stable.

The rating actions follow the confirmation by Mosenergo's
management that the company would not be involved in the
potential acquisition of Moscow Integrated Power Co. (MIPC).  S&P
also assumes that Mosenergo's credit metrics, liquidity, and debt
maturity profiles will remain commensurate with the ratings over
the next two years.

In December last year, it was announced in the Russian media that
Mosenergo was negotiating with the City of Moscow to acquire a
stake (of up to 100%) in the heating utility MIPC.  S&P assumed
that if the transaction proceeded, Mosenergo's financial metrics
could have weakened, owing to new borrowings to finance the
acquisition.  However, as S&P understands, the negotiations
between the City of Moscow and Mosenergo's ultimate parent
Gazprom don't imply Mosenergo's involvement, or the use of
Mosenergo's funds or cash flows to finance the transaction.  As
such, S&P's base-case scenario for Mosenergo does not incorporate
any potential outflows related to this acquisition.

The ratings on Mosenergo reflect the company's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP), which S&P assesses at 'bb-'.  The SACP is based
on Mosenergo's "fair" business risk profile and "significant"
financial risk profile as defined in S&P's criteria.  The ratings
continue to incorporate a one-notch uplift from the SACP,
stemming from S&P's view that Gazprom, Mosenergo's ultimate
majority owner, would support it if necessary.  At the moment,
Gazprom's wholly owned subsidiary, Gazprom Energoholding, owns
53.5% of Mosenergo.

Mosenergo's SACP is constrained by what S&P sees as the company's
exposure to state intervention in the industry, untested electric
power framework regulations, the volatile spot electricity
market, and weak profitability in a wider context.  In addition,
Mosenergo has an ambitious capital-expenditure program in S&P's
opinion, which is likely to lead to sizable negative free
operating cash flow (FOCF).

The ratings are supported by S&P's view of Mosenergo's strong
market position in the relatively affluent City of Moscow and the
surrounding Moscow Oblast, and the operational benefits of its
affiliation with and support from Gazprom.  S&P considers the
rating to be underpinned by the company's likely moderate
leverage (as measured by the ratio of debt to EBITDA),
competitive heat and
power generation portfolio, significant share of stable regulated
domestic heat sales, and S&P's anticipation of relatively modest
dividend payments.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Mosenergo's adequate
competitive position, moderate financial leverage, and adequate
liquidity should offset the risks associated with its ambitious
capital-expenditure program, rising fuel costs, and exposure to
volatile spot electricity prices.  S&P expects that the program
will lead to sizable negative FOCF in the medium term.

S&P further assumes that Mosenergo will maintain adequate
liquidity and debt maturity profiles.  Specifically, S&P
anticipates that the company's resources, including long-term
committed credit facilities, will cover its funding needs
by at least 1.2x.

S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C

JUGOREMEDIJA: Expresses Interest in Leasing Production Facility
SeeNews reports that Slovakian drug maker Imuna Pharm is
interested in leasing the production facility of Serbian peer
Jugoremedija, currently going through bankruptcy proceedings.

SeeNews relates that the president of Jugoremedija's creditors'
assembly, Branislav Markus, as quoted by daily Dnevnik, said
apart from Imuna Pharm, one more potential partner has shown
interest in the rental of the facility, but its bid was
incomplete and hence was dismissed.

SeeNews notes that Mr. Markus said Imuna Pharm will most probably
need three months to resume production operations at
Jugoremedija's facility, adding that the leasing contract has to
be approved by the creditors' assembly.

In December, Serbia's Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank filed a petition for
bankruptcy proceedings against Jugoremedija as the drug maker
owed EUR1.6 million (US$2.1 million) to the lender, SeeNews
recounts.  According to SeeNews, Dnevnik reported that at the
February hearing Jugoremedija avoided bankruptcy and the
bankruptcy trustee said that, despite the fact that the company's
debt exceeds the value of its assets, Jugoremedija can still
present a restructuring plan.

Jugoremedija is a Slovakian drug maker.


BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Raises Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3'
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Banco de Valencia's long-term
deposit ratings to Ba3 from Caa1. The short-term ratings remain
Not-Prime. The rating upgrade follows the completion of
Caixabank's acquisition of Banco de Valencia on February 28,
2013, whereby Caixabank has become the owner of 98.9% of Banco de
Valencia's capital. Banco de Valencia's deposit ratings remain on
review for upgrade.

The ratings and outlook of the standalone bank financial strength
rating, subordinated debt and preference shares remain unchanged.

The rating action extends the review of Banco de Valencia's long-
term ratings, which was initiated on December 5, 2012 in response
to the announcement of Caixabank's acquisition of Banco de

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's action follows the completion of the acquisition of Banco
de Valencia by Caixabank on February 28, 2013, whereby Caixabank
has become the owner of 98.9% of Banco de Valencia's capital.
After the rating action, Banco de Valencia's deposit ratings
incorporate its full ownership by Caixabank and Moody's
assumption that Banco de Valencia would benefit from a very high
probability of parental support, in case of need. At this stage,
Banco de Valencia's standalone BFSR does not yet reflect any
benefits of the acquisition by Caixabank, and the upgrade of its
deposit ratings therefore only reflect the new parental support

Ratings on Review for Upgrade

Both the standalone BFSR as well as the deposit ratings of Banco
de Valencia remain on review for upgrade; the review will focus
on the extent to which Banco de Valencia's standalone strength
will benefit from a closer integration into Caixabank, combined
with the significant public support package with which the
integration of Banco de Valencia into Caixabank is going to be
carried out. The bank's deposit ratings are linked to the
standalone BFSR, and any change to the BFSR would likely also
affect these ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June

Headquartered in Valencia, Spain, Banco de Valencia had total
consolidated assets of EUR21.5 billion as of December 31, 2012.

GC FTPYME 4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' its credit rating on GC FTPYME PASTOR 4 Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class E notes.

S&P has lowered its rating on the class E notes to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' after the class E notes experienced interest

The class E notes have an interest deferral trigger mechanism,
which was breached when the reserve fund was fully drawn.
Consequently, interest due on the class E notes was not paid.

GC FTPYME PASTOR 4 closed in November 2006 and securitizes
secured loans granted to Spanish small and midsize enterprises
(SMEs) in their normal course of business.  Banco Pastor, S.A.
originated the transaction.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

VALENCIANO DE FINANZAS: S&P Lowers Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
issuer credit rating on financial agency Instituto Valenciano de
Finanzas (IVF) to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The 'B' short-term issuer
credit rating was affirmed.  At the same time, S&P placed both
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The ratings on IVF reflect S&P's view of the strength of the
Autonomous Community of Valencia (Valencia)'s explicit statutory
guarantee, which considers IVF's liabilities as debt of the

S&P understands that IVF's debt maturities are included in
Valencia's request for financial support in the context of
Spain's regional liquidity fund (Fondo de Liquidez Autonomico, or
FLA), the vehicle used by the central government to assist
regions in servicing their debt.

S&P sees IVF as a government-related entity (GRE).  S&P believes
there is an "almost certain" likelihood that Valencia would
provide timely and sufficient support to IVF if needed, according
to S&P's GRE criteria.  S&P bases its view on its assessment of

   -- "Critical" role for the region. IVF carries out key
      functions that a private entity could not undertake, such
      as managing regional debt and public credit policy.
      Consequently, S&P thinks that the markets would perceive a
      default by IVF as tantamount to a default by the region,
      especially considering Valencia's financial guarantee
      covering IVF's debt.  S&P believes IVF's importance to
      Valencia is also reflected in the regional government's
      strong involvement in IVF's management and stable financial
      support; and

   -- "Integral" link with Valencia, considering that it exerts
      total control over IVF's strategy and day-to-day
      operations, and carries out extremely tight financial

Based on IVF's "critical" role for and "integral" link with
Valencia, as S&P's GRE criteria define these terms, S&P equalizes
the ratings on IVF with those on Valencia.  S&P has therefore
lowered and placed on CreditWatch with negative implications its
ratings on IVF, in line with its recent rating action on

S&P assesses IVF's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) as 'b'.
This reflects S&P's view that IVF is facing higher credit risk
due to its growing exposure to the public sector and a riskier
and less resilient private sector, which is suffering from the
effects of sluggish economic growth in the region.

"We also factor into the SACP our view of IVF's total reliance on
Valencia and the FLA to cover upcoming funding maturities and
offset low capitalization and losses in earnings," S&P said.

The CreditWatch on IVF mirrors that on Valencia.  If S&P
downgraded Valencia, it would also downgrade IVF, all other
things being equal.

Standard & Poor's aims to resolve the CreditWatch placement on
Valencia (and IVF) within the next three months.

During this period, S&P expects that both Valencia and Spain will
clarify their respective policy responses regarding Valencia's
budgetary consolidation path.  S&P expects to arrive at a view
about the willingness of Valencia's government to enact further
budgetary measures to redress its fiscal performance.  S&P
expects that the central government will clarify how it will use
the means
available to it under the Budgetary Stability Law to compel
further adjustment measures by Valencia.

Depending on S&P's view of the adequacy of the policy response of
Valencia's management, S&P could downgrade Valencia (and IVF) by
a maximum of three notches, to 'B-'.


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: S&P Lowers Rating on Bond Tranches to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'D'
(default) from 'C' its issue rating on the Norwegian kroner (NOK)
460 million and US$270 million tranches of bonds due June 2017
and issued by Sweden-based mining company Northland Resources
A.B. (Northland).  The recovery rating on the bonds remains
unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-
50%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade stems from Northland's notification to the bond
trustee that it is not permitted to make the interest payment on
its 13% senior secured bonds due on March 6, 2013.  Under Swedish
law, a company that is undertaking a corporate reorganization is
not permitted to pay any liabilities which pre-existed the
reorganization.  The Lulea District Court considers the interest
payment to be a pre-reorganization liability and therefore
Northland is not permitted to pay it.

The terms of the bond agreement specify a grace period of five
days in the event of default.  The bond trustee could apply the
grace period if, in the trustee's opinion, it is obvious that the
failure to pay will be remedied within five days.  However,
because the interest payment has been prevented by a ruling of
Lulea District Court, in S&P's view it is unlikely that the
failure to pay will be remedied within five business days.

Under S&P's criteria, it considers the extension of a due payment
of interest or principal as tantamount to a default if the
payment falls later than five business days after the scheduled
due date.  This is irrespective of any grace period stipulated in
the debt documentation.


MHP SA: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Ukrainian agribusiness
company MHP S.A.  S&P also assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
group's proposed senior unsecured notes of about US$650 million,
the exact amount of which will be later defined.  The recovery
rating on the proposed senior unsecured notes is '3', indicating
S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.  The outlook is negative.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment that the company's business
risk profile is "weak" and its financial risk profile is
"aggressive," according to S&P's criteria.

MHP has an ambitious expansion strategy with related execution
risks, and is exposed to the volatile agribusiness industry.  MHP
plans to more than double its poultry production capacity over
the next five years to 800,000 tons.  The company's geographic
revenues and earnings are concentrated in Ukraine, where all of
its operating assets are located.  More than two-thirds of the
company's sales are domestic.  S&P therefore considers MHP's
country risk exposure to Ukraine a key risk factor.

S&P anticipates that MHP's sales and EBITDA will show double-
digit growth over the next two years, owing to higher volumes due
to the completion of MHP's new green-field facility and
increasing capacity utilization.  MHP's market share benefits
from price leadership and brand awareness, in S&P's view.  S&P
forecasts that MHP's EBITDA margins will decline moderately by
more than 200 basis points over the next few years, but S&P
believes margins will stabilize over time.  This is based on
rising input costs and broadly flat pricing.

MHP has meaningful debt maturities over the next few years, and
S&P considers liquidity to be less than adequate.  Furthermore,
S&P believes there is a risk that the company's liquidity may
come under pressure if its access to international financing
sources deteriorates, given that medium-term financing is limited
in Ukraine's capital markets.

Nevertheless, the rating on MHP is supported by its only modest
debt, an established track record of accessing international
capital markets, and a prudent approach to refinancing upcoming
debt maturities, in S&P's view.

The negative outlook on MHP mirrors that on Ukraine.  Under S&P's
criteria, the long-term sovereign rating and transfer and
convertibility assessment on Ukraine constrain the rating on MHP,
based on S&P's view that the group's cash flow generation is
sensitive to country risk.  A downgrade of Ukraine by one or more
notches would trigger a downgrade of MHP by a similar number of
notches.  Ratings stability for MHP, all else being equal, would
depend on a revision of the outlook on Ukraine to stable.

SSB NO.1: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Limited Recourse Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned SSB No.1 PLC's upcoming issue of
fixed-rate limited recourse notes an expected Long-term rating of
'B(EXP)' and a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. The issue's total amount
and final maturity are yet to be determined. The notes are to be
used solely for a US dollar-denominated loan to Ukraine-based JSC
State Savings Bank of Ukraine (Oschadbank, 'B'/Stable/'b-').

SSB No.1 PLC, a UK-based company, will only pay noteholders
amounts (principal and interest) received from Oschadbank under
the loan agreement. The claims under the loan agreement will rank
at least equally with the claims of other senior unsecured and
unsubordinated creditors of Oschadbank, save those preferred by
relevant Ukrainian legislation. Under Ukrainian law, the claims
of retail depositors rank above those of other senior unsecured
creditors. Oschadbank is the only bank in Ukraine where retail
deposits are fully covered by state guarantee regardless of the
amount. At end-2012, retail depositors accounted for around 44%
of Oschadbank's non-equity funding, according to the bank's local
GAAP reporting.

At end-2012, Oschadbank was the second-largest bank in Ukraine by
total assets and had the largest branch network in the country
with around 6,000 branches and outlets. The Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine holds 100% of the bank's shares.


The issue's Long-term rating corresponds to Oschadbank's Long-
term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR; 'B'/Stable).
The issue's Recovery Rating of 'RR4' reflects average recovery
prospects for bondholders in case of default.

Oschadbank's IDRs, National Long-term rating and Support Rating
are driven by potential support from the Ukrainian authorities,
in case of need, based on the bank's 100% state ownership, its
policy role, high systemic importance, and the track record of
capital support for the bank under different governments. The
ratings also take into consideration the ability of the Ukrainian
authorities to provide such support, which remains limited, as
indicated by the sovereign's 'B' Long-term IDR.

Oschadbank's VR reflects its large deposit-taking franchise,
comfortable liquidity position and a sizeable capital buffer. It
also considers significant concentration risk in Oschadbank's
loan book, notably its exposure to NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine
('CCC'), and dependence on financial support from the National
Bank of Ukraine associated with this exposure.

Any changes to Oschadbank's Long-term foreign currency IDR would
also impact the issue's Long-term rating. The Stable Outlook on
the bank's Long-term IDR reflects that on the sovereign's Long-
term IDR. Improvement or deterioration in Ukraine's sovereign
risk profile would generate upward or downward pressure,
respectively, on Oschadbank's ratings.

Oschadbank's ratings are:

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'; Outlook
-- Senior unsecured debt: 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'
-- Senior unsecured debt in local currency: 'AA-(ukr)
-- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B'
-- Support Rating: '4'
-- Support Rating Floor: 'B'
-- VR: 'b-'
-- National Long-term rating: 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable

UKRLANDFARMING PLC: Fitch Publishes 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has published UkrLandFarming PLC Long-term foreign
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B' and 'B+',
respectively. Fitch has also published a National Long-term
Rating of 'AA+'(ukr). The Outlooks are Stable.


Leading market positions in agribusiness

The ratings reflect ULF's leading position in Ukrainian
agriculture and dominating domestic positions, albeit mitigated
by ULF's exposure to volatility in selling prices for many of the
segments in which it operates; its geographically diverse and
efficient farming operations supported by additional production
of higher value-added products. Fitch recognizes the tough sugar
environment in sugar production in Ukraine although this segment
only accounted for 4% of reported EBITDA in 2012. ULF has also
demonstrated an ability to effectively gain scale in its core
businesses of crop farming and eggs production (the latter via
Avangardco, rated 'B' by Fitch) through both acquisitions and
green field capital projects.

Consolidated group profile

The assigned ratings factor the consolidated profile of the ULF
group reflecting the evidence of some legal ties by way of cross-
default provisions inserted in some of ULF's key loan agreements
even though Avangardco does not provide guarantees to any debt
owed by ULF but also its own debt does not benefit from ULF
guarantees. However, Fitch notes that ULF does control
Avangardco's profits, albeit with the limitations of this
subsidiary to upstreaming cash set by a debt incurrence leverage
test of 3.0x. Fitch acknowledges that Avangardco's management
teams and treasury functions remain separated from ULF and that
trading relations between the two companies are limited. As of
FY12, Avangardco's EBITDA of US$250 million represented 24% of
ULF's consolidated profits.

Solid profitability

ULF shows adequate profitability, measured as funds from
operations (FFO) margin of sales, at 29% (2012), although lower
than some peers, because of ULF's diversification into lower-
margin distribution activities. These operations help diversify
ULF's revenue streams into less capital intensive areas while
ensuring the supply of agriculture inputs to the crops division
on an arms-length basis. By way of comparison, Mriya's ('B') FFO
margin exceeds 40% as a pure farming business.

Regulation Risk Remains

ULF remains exposed to the imposition of regulatory restrictions
on grain trading in Ukraine which can affect grain prices and
volumes and hence the profitability of the crops division which
represented 55% of reported EBITDA (2012). However this may
benefit Avangardco as it purchases forage grain from third
parties (outside ULF) for animal feed as a key input for its egg

Steady free cash flow generation

The company's growth plans -- mostly focused on land bank
expansion and related spending in silos and machinery -- remain
ambitious. However on a consolidated basis Fitch projects average
annual spend over 2013-2015 to remain broadly aligned with 2012's
USD460m (70% of which related to the final phases of Avangardco's
egg capacity expansion projects) and to be funded internally.
Therefore we expect positive annual free cash flow (FCF) and
forecast an average FCF margin (as percentage of sales) exceeding
10% for the next four years, although possibly somewhat weaker in

Moderate leverage

ULF shows moderate financial leverage with an FFO-adjusted net
leverage of 1.8x (2012). However Fitch notes the limited sources
of financing so far outside of bank financing even though we
acknowledge that ULF may be looking to access the debt capital
markets to diversify its funding sources and lengthen its debt
maturity profile. ULF also had US$176 million of cash and
deposits placed in related-party banks. Conservatively excluding
this amount from our net leverage calculation, FFO adjusted net
leverage would be 2.1x, still fully aligned with the assigned

Reliance on short-term debt

ULF's debt profile is skewed towards shorter-term debt maturities
as 41% of the group's debt is due in 2013 (US$537 million). While
any planned bond issue would help to tackle upcoming debt
maturities, any near-term refinancing risks are factored in to
the assigned ratings even though ULF has historically relied upon
related-party banks for committed revolving bank lines. Fitch
expects solid cash flow from operations, available unrestricted
cash, scalable capex and liquid inventories to support the
group's financial flexibility. Fitch expects working capital
facilities to be rolled over and projects that FCF should be
sufficient to cover maturing long-term loans.

Corporate governance concerns

Compared to MHP or Kernel, ULF's corporate governance practices
are considered weaker. Some of those practices are typical for a
non-public company and are expected to constrain any further
positive rating momentum. Several outliers in corporate
governance issues, in Fitch's opinion, provide negative pressure
on the ratings -- in particular, the current state of related
party transactions with banks owned by Mr. Bakhmatyuk, and ULF's
stance to maintain a relationship with these banks in future.
This diminishes the overall transparency of the group in Fitch's
view. We note that the probability of conflicts of interests
between ULF and related-party banks may increase, should the
banking system in Ukraine be further distressed, or if liquidity
issues arise specifically for these banks.


Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- A positive rating action on the local currency IDR would
   ULF to improve its corporate governance practices,
   in the area of transactions with related-party banks.

- In terms of financial guidelines, a higher IDR depends on ULF
   maintaining FFO margin above 30%, positive FCF and expansion
   funded mainly by internal cash flows leading to FFO adjusted
   leverage (gross) below 1.5x on a continuing basis.

An upgrade of the foreign currency IDR would be possible only if
the Country Ceiling for Ukraine was upgraded (currently 'B').

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- A contraction of FFO below USD300m

- An increase in FFO adjusted leverage (gross) to 3.0x on a
   continuing basis

- FFO fixed charge cover weakening below 4x

- Weakening liquidity measured as FCF for 2014 plus unrestricted
  cash and available undrawn bank lines at the beginning of the
  year divided by short-term debt maturities, below 0.8x on a
  continuing basis. This calculation excludes grain inventory in
  silos which Fitch understands is unhedged for price risk.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLIVE RANGER: In Administration, Suspends Online Business
Rachael Taylor at Professional Jeweller reports that retail
jeweller Clive Ranger has fallen into administration.

Deloitte has been appointed as the administrator with Paul Evans
-- -- leading, according to the report.

The report notes that Clive Ranger has suspended its online
business, and has shut down the social media pages it previously
hosted on Twitter and Facebook.

DECO 6: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'C'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 plc's
notes, as follows:

GBP174.3m class A2 due July 2017 (XS0235683223) downgraded to
'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 60% from 'CCCsf'; RE 70%

GBP34.4m class B due July 2017 (XS0235683736) downgraded to 'Csf'
from 'CCsf'; RE 0%

GBP39.3m class C due July 2017 (XS0235684114) downgraded to 'Csf'
from 'CCsf'; RE 0%

GBP24.1m class D due July 2017 (XS0235684544) affirmed at 'Csf';
RE 0%


The downgrades are driven by continued declines in the
performance of the commercial property assets securing the two
remaining loans, both currently in default and special servicing.
This weakening has further reduced the likelihood of the class A2
notes being repaid in full, as reflected in the 'CCsf' rating and
reduced RE (60%). Fitch does not expect the class B, C or D notes
to receive any principal recoveries from the loans, which
corresponds with the 'Csf' ratings and 0% REs.

The Mapeley loan (62.8% of the pool) is secured by 20
secondary/tertiary regional office properties. These offices have
declined in reported value by between 7% and 89% since closing in
March 2006, and overall by 66%. This has been driven by an
extremely weak income profile. The weighted average lease length
to expiry is 5.56 years, while three-quarters of in-place income
will expire prior to loan maturity in July 2015, pushing vacancy
higher than the current 32.7%. With a reported LTV of 242%, the
loan will suffer a substantial loss.

The loan defaulted in October 2011 following a breach of the
1.15x interest coverage ratio (ICR) covenant. This test currently
reports (forward-looking) ICR at 0.63x, which is representative
of the degree to which the portfolio has weakened while in
Mapeley's custody. Interest shortfalls are met by drawing on a
reserve account established by the servicer in July 2009, and
initially funded by setting aside 50% of surplus income (after
interest payments and property expenses). This account now has a
balance of GBP11.6m, which should ensure swap payments continue
to be made for a couple of years.

The issuer's security interests in the loan have been enforced by
the special servicer, Hatfield Philips, which appointed Jones
Lang LaSalle and Deloitte to act as administrative receivers. The
process of liquidating the portfolio is likely to be a drawn-out
affair. However, demand for regional office stock is unlikely to
recover in the medium term, over which time several of the
properties may be practically obsolescent. With so much of the
remaining value tied up in the existing leases, postponing sales
in a bid to minimize senior-ranking swap breakage costs -- swap
value was last reported at GBP12.2 million -- may expose
noteholders to considerably higher losses.

The Brunel loan (37.2%) defaulted in April 2012. It is secured by
the 490,113 sq ft Brunel shopping center in Swindon town center.
This asset was last revalued in October 2011, revealing a fall in
value of 33% from closing. While there was evidence of re-letting
in October 2012 (three leases have recently been signed on a
short-let basis and another under a 10-year lease), the center
has struggled to reduce vacancy, now standing at 8% and much of
which concentrated in the Brunel Arcade extension completed in
2009. This has not been helped by three retailers in the center
failing since the last rating action.

Fitch believes that a lack of occupational demand across
secondary retail locations will constrain income generation, and
that the center is therefore unlikely to see a significant upturn
in value. However, bond maturity is in July 2017, and there is
less pressure to resolve this loan than the Mapeley one. At its
loan maturity in April 2012, Brunel switched to a floating rate
of interest, which caused the ICR to increase to 2.91x from
0.85x. While rates stay low, this allows for some loan
amortization to occur from rental cash sweep.


The distressed characteristics of the Mapeley loan in particular
already severely constrain the ratings of all classes of notes,
which are accordingly highly insensitive to foreseeable changes
in performance.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the
transaction. A performance update report will shortly be
available at

DREAMS PLC: Sun Capital Saves Chunk From Bankruptcy
Karlee Weinmann of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that the European
affiliate of Sun Capital Partners Inc. has scooped up the bulk of
flagging British bed retailer Dreams PLC, snagging 171 of the
chain's 276 stores to give it a boost as it wades through
insolvency proceedings, administrators from Ernst & Young said

According to the report, financial terms of the deal were not
disclosed, but several U.K. outlets pegged the purchase price at
35 million -- a price drastically lower than when the company's
founder sold it to Exponent Private Equity for upwards of EUR200

Dreams is Britain's biggest beds retailer.

EVENT MANAGEMENT: In Administration, Jobs at Risk
St. Helen Star reports that uncertainty surrounds the jobs of
dozens of catering and hospitality staff who works at Saints'
Langtree Park after Event Management Catering slid into

Event Management Catering, the Wiltshire based company contracted
to operate hospitality and catering services at the stadium, hit
financial trouble, according to St. Helen Star.

The report relates that Seneca-ip confirmed it had been appointed
the administrator.  The report notes that it is understood EMC
employs dozens of staff in St Helens on casual and short hours

SOPHOS LTD: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard and Poor's Rating Services said that it revised its
outlook on U.K.-domiciled information technology (IT) security
software company Sophos Ltd. to stable from positive.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating
on Sophos.

In addition, S&P withdrew its rating on Sophos on assignment of
S&P's 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Sophos' parent,
U.K.-domiciled Shield HoldCo Ltd.  The outlook on Shield HoldCo
is stable.

Finally, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on the approximately
$430 million senior secured facilities issued by Shield Finance
Co. S.a.r.l and guaranteed by Shield HoldCo.  The recovery rating
on these facilities is '2', indicating S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery for noteholders in the event
of a payment default.

The outlook revision on Sophos reflects S&P's view that the
company's credit metrics will not improve in line with S&P's
previous forecast over the next 12 months.  The company
experienced some operational setbacks in the second quarter of
financial 2013 (ending March 31) following a false positive
incident in relation to the release of a security upgrade in
September 2012.  This incident contributed to a 1.5%
(US$4.3 million) decline in billings for the first nine months of
financial 2013 on an actual basis and 7.4% (US$22.6 million) on a
like-for-like basis (pro forma for the acquisition of unified
threat management [UTM] company Astaro for the comparable prior-
year period).

S&P's withdrawal of the rating on Sophos and assignment of a
rating to Shield HoldCo reflects S&P's decision to align the
rating with the ultimate parent guarantor for the rated senior
secured facilities.  The change in the level at which S&P assign
the rating has not resulted in a material change to its
assessment of business or financial risk within the Sophos group
of companies.  This is because S&P previously included the debt
issued at Shield Finance in S&P's calculation of adjusted debt
for Sophos.

The rating on Shield HoldCo reflects S&P's assessment of the
group's "weak" business risk profile and "highly leveraged"
financial risk profile.  S&P's assessment of business risk for
Shield HoldCo follows a downward revision to S&P's assessment of
Sophos' business risk profile to "weak" from "fair."

In S&P's view, Shield HoldCo should be able to address its
current operational challenges despite S&P's projection of some
modest deterioration in operating performance over the short
term.  In addition, S&P believes that the company will continue
to maintain cash EBITDA interest coverage (excluding subordinated
preference certificates) of close to 3x, and generate positive
discretionary cash flow of more than US$35 million.

S&P could take a negative rating action if Shield HoldCo's
operating performance deteriorated significantly, such that cash
interest coverage fell to less than 2x for a prolonged period and
the company was unable to generate positive discretionary cash
flow.  This could result from a falloff in renewals due to
increased competition, disruptive technologies, or reputational

S&P considers a positive rating action unlikely at this time
since it believes that the current operating conditions will
prevent a meaningful improvement in credit metrics over the short
term. However, S&P could take a positive rating action if Shield
HoldCo demonstrates a return to organic revenue and EBITDA growth
and sustainable cash EBIITDA interest coverage of more than 4x.

TAPS: In Administration, HMRC Seeks to Wind Up Firm
Sunderland Echo reports that Taps, the plumbing merchants
division of A Thompson & Sons, has gone into administration.

Accountants KPMG were appointed to run the company, in response
to a winding-up petition from HM Revenue and Customs, according
to Sunderland Echo.

The report relates that joint administrators, Mark Firmin -- -- , Howard Smith -- -- and Paul Flint -- --  have also been appointed.

"It has become clear the trading and cash flow challenges that
led to insolvency for Thompsons builders merchants have similarly
impacted on Taps, resulting in our appointment. . . . Outlets
will be closed today as staff assist us in our assessment of the
business," the report quoted Mr. Firmin as saying.

Thompson Building Centres was set up by Anne Ganley's father
Albert as a scrap merchant 60 years ago.

Taps has six branches across the region and employs approximately
20 people.

* Moody's Revises Outlook on UK Life Insurance Sector to Stable
The outlook for the UK life insurance sector has been changed to
stable from negative, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
Industry Outlook entitled "Industry Outlook: UK Life Insurance."

The outlook change reflects the rating agency's expectation of
(1) stable earnings; (2) conservative capital management; and (3)
increasing income diversity from captive asset managers. However,
these factors are counterbalanced by (1) potential short-term
disruption from the Retail Distribution Review (RDR); (2) the
risks posed by insurers' expansion into "new" investment areas;
and (3) the UK's weak economic growth outlook for the next
several years.

"The profitability of the UK life industry is stable and
supported by growing cash generation. We expect that the
industry's earnings will remain healthy overall, whilst earnings
quality will improve given the focus on cash generation," said
Antonello Aquino, Moody's Senior Vice President and author of the
report. "The low interest-rate environment will gradually reduce
profitability, but only marginally, given the industry's
relatively low sensitivity to interest rates", adds Mr. Aquino.

Capitalization has improved and Moody's expects continued
conservative capital management. The introduction of Solvency II,
although postponed, has kept capital in check. Capitalization has
rebounded from its lows in 2008 and is higher than pre-financial
crisis levels. In addition, the industry's exposure to peripheral
euro area investments is minimal.

Captive asset managers have helped insurers to capture
significant growth, provided income diversity and helped some UK
life insurers to expand and partially offset historical cash flow
erosion in the life insurance market. Over 2013, Moody's expects
that this trend will continue.

However, short-term disruption is likely to arise from the RDR.
The introduction of RDR at the end of 2012 will reduce the number
of Independent Financial Advisors (IFAs) and, consequently, life
sales are likely to decline over the outlook period.

Insurers are increasing their credit exposure to new asset
classes such as lending to commercial property companies, SME and
infrastructure projects, albeit in modest amounts thus far. The
retrenching of the UK banking system and the low interest-rate
environment has meant that insurers are increasingly expanding
their investment activities into the realm of banks. As a result,

Moody's believes that risks may arise from the insurance sector's
often limited investment experience in these "new" assets and the
need to develop specific expertise that companies might currently

"The operating environment for UK insurers remains challenging,
given the weak economic growth prospects and high level of
household indebtedness, although some pockets of growth exist,
particularly in the annuity and protection lines", adds Mr.
Aquino. Moody's also expects long-term growth from the expanding
pensioner population, and the continued lack of an adequate level
of private pension provision.

* Moody's Notes Deterioration of EMEA SME ABS Performance
The performance of asset-backed securities backed by loans to
small and medium enterprises and lease securitization
transactions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa deteriorated
in December, according to the latest indices published by Moody's
Investors Service.

The 90-360 day delinquency rate rose to 4.91% in December 2012
from 2.13% in December 2011, predominantly reflecting the
weakness in markets such as Portugal (increase to 10.32% from
0.78%); Spain (increase to 5.79% from 3.02%); and Italy (to 5.42%
from 2.43%). A small number of badly performing transactions are
mainly responsible for the weakness in these markets (i.e., Siena
SME 11-1 S.r.l. in Italy, Atlantes No. 1 in Portugal; or the
Santander-issued transactions in Spain).

While Moody's expects that collateral performance will
deteriorate in Portugal, Italy and Spain, German, Dutch and
Belgian ABS will remain stable. Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain
are currently in recession. German GDP growth will continue to
slow to 0.4% in 2013 (see Credit Option: Government of Germany).
The rating agency expects that SMEs will face further refinancing
problems in 2013 due to tighter lending criteria (see European
ABS and RMBS 2013 Outlook -- Dec 2012).

In the second half of 2012, Moody's rated eight new transactions,
less than in the second half of 2011 when the rating agency rated
15 new transactions. The total outstanding pool balance of EMEA
ABS SME transactions rated by Moody's stood at EUR108.4 million
in December 2012 compared to EUR144.8 million in December 2011,
which is quite a significant decrease mostly due to the early
payment of transactions mostly in the Spanish market.

This month indices report has been extended and now shows more
trend charts and delinquencies information.


* EUROPE: EU Commission Mulls Fund for Bankrupt Airlines
Standart reports that Brussels is considering the creation of a
guarantee fund for airlines to protect passengers in the event of
their bankruptcy.

The European Commission is considering various options for
protecting the rights of passengers following issues raised by
the bankruptcies of Hungarian airline "Malev" and Spanish
"Spanair" in 2012, Standard learnt.

With the collapses, thousands of tour operators and customers
could not get their money back for the missed flights and prepaid
services, Standart notes.  Despite the EU consumer protection
directives for these situations, only the costumers who paid by
credit card for the tickets received their money back, Standart

According to Standart, the European Commission recommended a
number of measures for the self-protection of passengers and
operators, so as to limit losses in the possible bankruptcy of
airlines.  It is expected that after the next discussion on the
topic, the EU Commission will delegate new duties on the EU
governments.  Accordingly, they will probably need to monitor the
financial status of airlines in their country and report to
Brussels if they find financial difficulties or concerns that
airlines cannot protect the rights of passengers, Standart notes.
Once this happens, the union will recommend payments to these
operators to pass through an escrow account and end-users and
operators to organize a backup plan in advance of their travel,
Standart says.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 4 to March 8, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *