TCREUR_Public/130320.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, March 20, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 56

                            Headlines



C Y P R U S

* CYPRUS: Parliament Tosses Rescue Deal; Russia Opposes Bank Levy


F R A N C E

FRANCE TELECOM: EU's Highest Court Overturns State Aid Ruling
REXEL SA: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsecured Notes Rating to 'Ba3'


G E R M A N Y

TITAN EUROPE 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to C


I T A L Y

AGRI SECURITIES 2008: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Downgrades Tier II Debt Rating to 'BB+'


L U X E M B O U R G

INTELSAT SA: Board Appoints David McGlade Chairman and CEO
TMK CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Rating to Proposed LPNs


N E T H E R L A N D S

CHEYNE CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class V Notes


P O L A N D

LOT SA: Survival Hinges on Dreamliner Flights


P O R T U G A L

CAIXA GERAL: S&P Lowers Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to 'C'
REN-REDES: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Ratings; Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

MECHEL OAO: High Leverage Prompts Moody's to Cut CFR to 'B3'
SITRONICS JSC: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Corporate Family Rating


S P A I N

MBS BANCAJA: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Ratings on Two Note Classes
RENTA CORPORACION: Mulls Voluntary Creditor Protection


U K R A I N E

SSB NO.1: Fitch Assigns 'B' Final Rating to Fixed-Rate Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGEL BIOTECHNOLOGY: Sells Two Scottish Manufacturing Sites
GLAMORGAN PACKAGING: Loss of Major Clients Prompts Administration
GROUP LOTUS: Denies Liquidation Rumors
IGLO FOODS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
KCA DEUTAG: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to US$860-Mil. Sr. Sec. Notes

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Deutsche Borse Facing EUR115MM Claim


X X X X X X X X

* Derivative Traders May Be Partially Shielded from Bail-in Rules


                            *********


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C Y P R U S
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* CYPRUS: Parliament Tosses Rescue Deal; Russia Opposes Bank Levy
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Matina Stevis, Stelios Bouras and Gabriele Steinhauser at
Dow Jones Newswires report that Cyprus's parliament rejected its
government's bailout deal with the euro zone without a single
vote in its favor -- a move that could hasten the potential
collapse of its banks and send the tiny island nation hurtling
out of the euro zone.

Even the ruling party of President Nicos Anastasiades, who
negotiated the agreement four days ago, declined to support it,
leaving the country with few options to avert a financial-sector
meltdown, Dow Jones discloses.  According to the report, the
rejection was centered on the most controversial aspect of the
deal -- a tax on individual bank deposits -- and came even after
officials tried to calm objections by exempting depositors with
less than EUR20,000 (US$26,000).

Meanwhile, a government delegation led by the finance minister
headed to Moscow to present a long-shot plan to raise the
EUR5.8 billion the government needs to secure the EUR10 billion
bailout deal with the euro zone and the International Monetary
Fund, Dow Jones discloses.  Their plan: Ask Moscow for the money
in return for stakes in the island's troubled banks and its
energy assets, Dow Jones relates.

Tuesday's vote came after days of fraught political talks in the
Cypriot capital, Dow Jones notes.  Cyprus's banks are due to stay
closed until at least tomorrow, March 21, with some officials
saying the holiday could stretch to Tuesday, March 26, Dow Jones
discloses.

What happens next isn't clear, Dow Jones states.  According to
Dow Jones, a senior European official said that after the vote
that the euro zone would continue to wait for a counterproposal
from Nicosia, outlining how it would raise the EUR5.8 billion.

"The ball is now really in Cyprus's court," Dow Jones quotes
Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem as saying on Dutch
television after the vote, adding there would be no new money for
Cyprus beyond the amount already set.  "Cyprus was granted some
freedom, but it will have to settle with the maximum amount of
EUR10 billion."

Apart from negotiating the rescue deal, the government has been
working on a Plan B that would involve support for its banks from
Russia, a longtime friend of the country and the largest source
of foreign deposits in Cyprus's banks, Dow Jones says.  According
to Dow Jones, two officials familiar with the situation said that
Cypriot officials were planning to offer Russia stakes in energy
projects and banks.  The Cypriot finance minister is due to meet
with his Russian counterpart in Moscow today, March 20, Dow Jones
discloses.

                      Russia Opposes Bank Levy

Kerin Hope and Courtney Weaver at The Financial Times report that
under a deal struck with international lenders in the early hours
of Saturday related to the Cyprus bail-out plan, a 6.75% levy
would be imposed on all deposits under EUR100,000, while accounts
over that threshold would be hit with a 9.9% levy.  Account
holders with EUR100,000 to EUR500,000 would lose 10% while
deposits above EUR500,000 would be cut by 15%, according to a
government adviser, the FT discloses.

The tax on deposits was designed to raise EUR5.8 billion as part
of a EUR17 billion bailout and was demanded by a German-led
creditor group of countries to bring down the rescue's price tag,
the FT says.

The proposals, however, prompted outcry from Vladimir Putin and
other Russian officials and caused uproar in Cyprus, leading to
long queues outside banks over the weekend as savers sought to
withdraw funds, the FT relates.

According to the FT, talks continued Monday to soften the
proposals, including cutting the levy on deposits below
EUR100,000 from 6.7% to 3%.

The FT relates that Mr. Putin, at a meeting with economic
advisers on Monday, was among several Russian leaders to
criticize the bailout, which came without consultation with
Moscow and could cost Russian depositors up to EUR2 billion,
according to Nicosia bankers.

"While assessing the proposed additional levy on bank accounts in
Cyprus, Mr. Putin said that such a decision, should it be made,
would be unfair, unprofessional and dangerous," the FT quotes the
president's spokesman as saying following the meeting.

Anton Siluanov, Russia's finance minister, also criticized the
move, stressing the EU's failure to discuss the proposal with
Russia in advance, the FT notes.  "The decision on the tax on
deposits, in our opinion, is not fair because the problems of the
banking supervision and regulation are passed on to investors,"
Mr. Siluanov, as cited by the FT, said.  "I don't pity our
businessmen."

"We had an agreement with our EU colleagues that we would take
co-ordinated action," the FT quotes Mr. Siluanov as saying.  "Our
role was to possibly relax the terms for [Cyprus] paying back its
credit.  As it turns out, the EU took action to levy a tax on
deposits, without consulting Russia, and for this reason we will
further consider the issue of our participation from the point of
view of restructuring the earlier loan."



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F R A N C E
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FRANCE TELECOM: EU's Highest Court Overturns State Aid Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie Bodoni at Bloomberg News reports that the European
Union's highest court overturned a decision that backed a
proposed EUR9 billion (US$11.6 billion) government loan to France
Telecom SA, handing a victory to competitor Bouygues SA.

According to Bloomberg, yesterday's ruling that the government
aid must be reexamined by the lower EU court also responds to a
challenge by the European Commission, the EU's executive
authority, which said in 2004 that the French loan was unlawful.
Bouygues, the owner of France's third largest mobile phone
company, and the Brussels-based commission sought to annul the
lower court's ruling that France's support when France Telecom
was near bankruptcy didn't qualify as state aid, Bloomberg
discloses.

"Although the loan was not implemented by France Telecom, it
conferred an advantage granted through state resources that could
potentially have burdened the state budget," Bloomberg quotes the
EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg as saying in a statement
yesterday.  The decision sends the case back to the EU General
Court for review, Bloomberg states.

The EU General Court, the bloc's second highest, ruled in 2010
that, while statements by the French government in 2002 that it
would support France Telecom "conferred a financial advantage,"
the comments didn't commit any state resources, Bloomberg notes.

The cases are: C-399/10 P, Bouygues and Bouygues Telecom v.
Commission; C-401/10 P, Commission v. France and Others.

France Telecom is the country's largest phone company.


REXEL SA: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsecured Notes Rating to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Rexel SA's senior unsecured
notes due December 2016, 2018 and 2019 to Ba3 from Ba2.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the company's Ba2 corporate
family rating and Ba2-PD probability of default rating. The
outlook on all ratings remains negative.

Ratings Rationale:

On March 15, 2013, Rexel repaid the EUR150 million drawn under
its EUR1.074 billion revolver, and subsequently replaced it with
a new revolving credit facility agreement whereby the company
will have access to a EUR1.1 billion revolving credit facility
and a EUR165 million swingline facility. The new revolving credit
facility does not benefit from upstream guarantees. As a result,
the upstream guarantees that were attached to the existing senior
unsecured notes will be released so that noteholders and lenders
continue to have equal treatment.

The release of the upstream guarantees from material operating
companies for the benefit of the senior unsecured notes has
resulted in the downgrade of the rating of the senior unsecured
notes to Ba3 from Ba2. The Ba3 rating, one notch below the CFR,
reflects their unmitigated structural subordination to non-
financial liabilities at the operating companies. Moody's notes
however that there is no material secured debt existing within
the group (notwithstanding the receivables securitization
program).

The Ba2 CFR is affirmed. Although it incorporates the positive
steps taken by Rexel to improve its margins, as evidenced in
2010, 2011 and 2012 results, it is currently constrained by the
company's weak credit metrics and the uncertainty about the pace
at which those credit metrics might improve given the global
macroeconomic uncertainties prevailing, the late-cycle nature of
the industry in which Rexel operates and the potential for
shareholder friendly financial policies. Additionally, the terms
and conditions of the new revolving credit facility agreement
offer further flexibility in terms of the maintenance financial
covenants as Rexel is allowed to exceed its 3.5x net leverage
ratio three times during the life of the new revolving credit
facility.

More positively, Rexel's Ba2 CFR remains supported by the
company's large scale as well as its strong market positions with
either number one or two market rankings in most Western European
and North American countries. It is also supported by the
company's solid liquidity profile.

Outlook

The outlook which was changed to negative from stable in February
2013 reflects Rexel's weaker than expected credit metrics as of
December 2012 with limited prospects for meaningful recovery in
2013 given the difficult macro-economic environment and the late-
cycle nature of Rexel's business. It also reflects some
uncertainty as to the level of future free cash flow generation,
considering the level of cash dividends in conjunction with
ongoing M&A activity.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

The ratings outlook could stabilize if Rexel demonstrates a
prudent financial policy as well as a successful implementation
of its Energy in Motion strategy leading to growth in
profitability, while maintaining a net debt/EBITDA ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's) sustainably below 4.0x and a retained cash
flow (RCF)/net debt (as adjusted by Moody's) above 15%. Downward
pressure on the rating could potentially result from any further
deterioration in Rexel's credit protection measures resulting
from more adverse trading conditions beyond Moody's expectations
for 2013; from shareholder friendly policies, such that its
(RCF)/net adjusted debt sustainably falls below 15% or if its net
adjusted debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) remains above 4.0x
or from debt-funded acquisitions beyond Moody's current
expectations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Distribution & Supply Chain Services published in November 2011.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Paris, France, Rexel SA is a global leader in
the EUR165 billion low-voltage electrical distribution market.
Rexel is ultimately controlled by Ray Investment, a holding
company (jointly owned by CD&R Investment Funds, Eurazeo, BAML
Capital Partners and Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec)
which holds about 43% of its shares. Some of the company's shares
are listed on Euronext Paris with the float representing around
54%.



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TITAN EUROPE 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to C
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Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following classes of Notes issued by Titan Europe 2006-3 plc
(amount(s) reflect(s) initial outstanding):

EUR471.975M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR245.427M Class B Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
Apr 28, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

EUR51.917M Class C Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr
28, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

EUR0.05M Class X Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 22,
2012 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The rating action does not impact the rating on the Class D, E
and F Notes. Moody's does not rate the Class G and the Class H
Notes.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade action reflects higher than expected realized
losses and Moody's increased loss expectation for the remaining
pool since its last review.

The higher realized loss relates to the AS Watson Loan (original
securitized loan balance of EUR27.5 million) for which Moody's
loss expectation was 23% compared to the realized loss of 36.4%.

The increased loss expectation for the remaining portfolio is due
to a combination of factors including:

(i) Moody's expectation that the largest loan, the French Target
loan (41.6% of the pool balance) will default on its maturity
date in July 2013 and experience a high loss severity based on a
Moody's collateral value of EUR130 million;

(ii) No principal recovery expected by Moody's on the German
Quelle Nurnberg loan (92.2 million A-loan balance, 16.7% of the
pool) versus a 10% recovery expectation at last review;

(iii) The 66% value decline for the defaulted Dutch Kurhaus Hotel
loan (8.6% of the pool) based on the latest UW value; and

(iv) The 64% value decline for the Belgian Twin Squares loan
(2.3% of the pool) based on the latest UW value.

The rating on the Class X Notes is affirmed because the current
rating is commensurate with the updated risk assessment.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Six of the nine loans in the pool -- representing 54.9% of the
securitized balance -- have defaulted for various reasons and are
in special servicing. Moody's assumes that the Target loan will
default at its maturity in July 2013 and only expect the Stage
loan (1.7% of the pool) and Matrix Data loan (1.8%) with
maturities in April and July 2013 to repay as scheduled.
Consequently, Moody's default probability assumption for the pool
is close to 100%.

Moody's current weighted average A-loan and whole loan LTV is
279% and 292% respectively. In comparison, the Underwriter (UW)
A-loan LTV is 222% and the whole loan LTV is 245%. Moody's value
for the whole securitized portfolio is EUR283 million versus the
EUR448.7 million UW value.

Based on Moody's revised assessment of the loans' default
probability and underlying property value, the loss expectation
for the remaining pool is very large. Moody's has a greater than
75% loss expectation for the Monnet Loan, a 50%-75% loss
expectation for the Target, Rivierstaete Office, Karhaus Hotel
and Twin Squares loans and a 25%-50% loss expectation for the
Syrdall Business Park loan.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

Currently, nine loans of the initial eighteen remain in the pool
and are secured by first-ranking legal mortgages over 30
properties. The pool exhibits above average diversity in terms of
geographic location and property type. By UW value, 57.9% of the
properties are in France, 22.7% in the Netherlands, 7.3% in
Luxemburg, 6.5% in Germany and 5.6% in Belgium. The properties
are predominantly office (46.1%) followed by mixed-use (34.5%)
which mainly consists of warehouse and industrial space. Moody's
uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size, where
a higher number represents greater diversity. Large multi-
borrower transactions typically have a Herf of less than 10 with
an average of around 5. This pool has a Herf of 4.3 compared to a
Herf of 8.2 at closing.

Of the nine loans that have left the pool since closing, three
have been worked out with a loss on the securitized loan portion.
The French SQY Ouest Shopping Centre loan with EUR110 million
securitized balance at closing was worked out with a 74.2% loss.
Moody's loss expectation was 75% which was already taken into
account in the April 2011 rating action. The German Weserstrasse
Loan secured by an office property, left special servicing in
July 2012 after being worked out with a 52.2% loss on the EUR 121
million securitized loan. Moody's had a slightly higher loss
expectation. The AS Watson loan which was secured by an office
property in the Netherlands was worked out in October 2012 with a
36.4% loss. For this loan, Moody's loss expectation was 23%.

The largest loan in the portfolio, the Target Loan (EUR232
million -- 41.6% of the pool) matures in July 2013 and in Moody's
view, a successful refinancing of the loan is not likely. The
loan is secured by a portfolio of 15 office and light industrial
properties located throughout France with a concentration in the
Ile-de-France (Paris) region. Approximately 72% of the rental
income is generated from Thales (rated A2), a major global
electronics company serving Aerospace, Defence, and Security &
Services markets worldwide.

Of the 15 properties, the top five and the smallest property (70%
of the portfolio's UW value) are either single let or above 90%
let to Thales. The top five properties are large, ranging in size
from 26,000 square meters to 51,000 square meters. These
properties are a mix of office and light industrial buildings as
well as a single manufacturing building. All have been
specifically adapted to suit the business activity of Thales. In
Moody's view, the re-letting of these properties could take an
extended period and involve significant costs to retrofit in the
event Thales vacates. In the case of the largest property located
in Colombes (EUR69 million UW value) Thales has given notice of
its intent to vacate the property, but will continue to pay rent
until the end of 2014. According to Thales' website, they are
already in the process of moving to their new headquarters in
Cristal. In reviewing the latest valuation (December 2011),
Moody's disagrees with the optimistic assumptions that it will
only take nine months to re-let the entire site (48,000 square
meters) and with no capex spend. For the remaining Thales leased
properties, the tenant has break options in 2014 and 2017 and
lease maturity dates in 2017 and 2020. For these five properties,
the valuer assumed that Thales will stay until lease expiry after
which they will renew at market rental levels. With respect to
the remaining nine properties in the portfolio, the Osny and Evry
properties are single let to Louis Vuitton and Sem Genopole.
While the remaining seven office and mixed use properties (26% of
the portfolio's UW value) are multi let and have a combined
vacancy of 38%.

Moody's 54% haircut to the 2011 UW value results from the
following assumptions: (i) less than 100% renewal probability at
lease breaks and lease maturities for the Thales and other single
let properties; (ii) after lease break, the rent would revert to
market rent (the properties are moderately over-rented); (iii)
capex or tenant improvements spend would be required to re-let
the properties; and (iv) cap rates between 8.6% and 10% given the
secondary quality of the properties with an average cap rate of
9.5%. Overall, the valuer's opinion was that most of these
properties would be difficult to sell and that it would take a
long time to sell them. Moody's shares this view.

The second largest loan is Quelle Nurnberg (EUR92.2 million --
16.7% of the pool). This loan was transferred into special
servicing in September 2009 following the insolvency of the
single tenant, Karstadt. The latest UW value for the property is
EUR12.5 million. According to the servicer report, an offer of
purchase has been made on the property and the interested party
is currently undertaking due diligence. Given sales related and
other costs as well as the accrued and unpaid interest which
amounts to EUR17.7 million on the whole loan, Moody's has assumed
zero recovery on the securitized loan.

Portfolio Loss Exposure: To date, EUR154.5 million of losses have
been realized on the securitized portion of the loans which have
been partially or fully allocated to the Class D to H Notes.
Losses expected from the Quelle Nurnberg loan will result in full
loss on the outstanding amount of the Class C and D Notes and in
Moody's opinion will also result in partial loss for the Class B
Notes. Moody's furthermore expects very large losses from the
remaining portfolio (excluding the Quelle Nurnberg loan),
stemming mainly from the performance, and refinancing profile and
value deterioration under the securitized portfolio. Given the
default risk profile and the anticipated work-out strategy for
defaulted and potentially defaulting loans, these expected losses
are likely to crystallize in the short to medium term.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006. The
methodology used in rating Class X was Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February
2012.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. The last Performance Overview for this transaction
was published on February 22, 2013.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.



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AGRI SECURITIES 2008: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)' its credit rating on Agri Securities S.r.l.'s series 2008
class B notes.

This rating action follows S&P's receipt of information that
there will be a breach of the transaction's interest deferral
trigger on the March 2013 interest payment date (IPD).  On Feb.
11, 2013, S&P lowered its rating on Agri Securities' series 2008
class B notes based on S&P's view that the transaction was likely
to breach its interest deferral trigger on the next IPD.

The transaction features an interest deferral trigger for the
class B notes, which is based on the cumulative net defaults
ratio.  S&P defines this ratio as cumulative defaulted
receivables minus cumulative recoveries over the initial
portfolio plus subsequent purchases in the first 18-month
revolving period.

In the February 2013 servicer report, the cumulative net defaults
ratio stood at 8.68%--up from 7.59% reported in December 2012.
According to the transaction documents, when the net defaults
ratio exceeds the interest deferral trigger level of 7.80%, the
interest on the class B notes is deferred.

On the March IPD, the class B notes stop receiving interest.  S&P
has therefore lowered its rating on the class B notes to 'D (sf)'
from 'CC (sf)'.

Agri Securities 2008 series 2008 is an Italian lease receivables
asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction, originated by Iccrea
BancaImpresa SpA (formerly Banca Agrileasing SpA). Iccrea
BancaImpresa is a bank specialized in providing corporate
financing in Italy.  It is a member of the Iccrea Group and it is
closely associated with the Banche di Credito Cooperativo, the
Italian cooperative banking network.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Downgrades Tier II Debt Rating to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on seven Italian parent
banks and one non-bank financial institution to reflect the
direct impact of the downgrade of Italy to 'BBB+'/Negative on 8
March 2013.

The rating actions affected issuers with Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) at or above the previous 'A-' sovereign IDR and
banks with Support Rating Floors (SRF) in the 'BBB' range. The
sovereign rating downgrade was partly driven by Fitch's
expectation that the domestic recession in Italy is deeper than
previously expected, which is likely to put the creditworthiness
of Italian banks under further pressure because of heightened
concerns about asset quality deterioration together with weak
earnings prospects.

The agency has downgraded Intesa Sanpaolo SpA's and UniCredit
S.p.A.'s Long-term IDRs to 'BBB+' from 'A-' and Viability Ratings
(VR) to 'bbb+' from 'a-'. The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is
Negative. Intesa Sanpaolo's and UniCredit's Short-term IDR have
been affirmed at 'F2' and their Support Rating at '2'. The banks'
Support Rating Floors (SRF) have been revised to 'BBB' from
'BBB+'.

Agos Ducato SpA's and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's Long-term IDRs
have been downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'. The Outlooks are Negative.
BNL's and Agos's Short-term IDRs have been affirmed at 'F1'.

Fitch has affirmed the Support Ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi
di Siena, Banco Popolare, ICCREA Holding and Unione di Banche
Italiane - UBI Banca at '2' and SRFs at 'BBB'. The Long-term IDRs
of MPS and Banco Popolare have been affirmed at 'BBB' and their
Outlooks revised to Negative from Stable.

Rating Action Rationale

The downgrades of Intesa Sanpaolo's VR and Long-term IDR reflect
Fitch's view that the bank's credit profile is closely correlated
with the sovereign's. These close links include the bank's
exposure to a deteriorating operating environment and direct
exposure to the Italian sovereign through sizeable holdings of
sovereign debt instruments. Therefore, Fitch considers that
Intesa Sanpaolo's VR and therefore IDR cannot be above Italy's
sovereign rating. Despite Intesa Sanpaolo's moderate degree of
international diversification, its domestic core business remains
the main driver of the rating.

The downgrade of UniCredit's VR and Long-term IDR reflects
Fitch's view that despite UniCredit's significant international
diversification, the correlation between the risk profile and
ratings of UniCredit and the Italian sovereign is too high to
rate UniCredit above the sovereign at the current rating level.
UniCredit's direct exposure to the Italian sovereign is smaller
than its peers but in Fitch's view is still a significant rating
driver. The downgrade of the Italian sovereign also mirrors
Italy's worsening operating environment. Fitch expects credit
demand to be more muted and loan impairment charges to be higher
than previously anticipated. This will make turning around the
bank's underperforming Italian operations more challenging and
Fitch therefore expects the performance of UniCredit's domestic
businesses to be weak in the medium term.

The revision of Intesa Sanpaolo's and UniCredit's SRFs to 'BBB'
from 'BBB+' reflects the weakened ability of the sovereign to
provide support following the downgrade of Italy's rating, while
Fitch believes that the propensity to provide support remains
high.

The downgrades of Agos's and BNL's Long-term IDRs, which are
driven by institutional support from Credit Agricole
('A+'/Negative) and BNP Paribas ('A+'/Stable), respectively,
underline Fitch's view that the uplift above the sovereign rating
is limited to one notch to reflect that the strategic importance
of the Italian subsidiaries could decline if the operating
environment deteriorated further, and that in an extreme scenario
the parents could be prevented from effectively providing
support. BNL's 'bbb' VR is unaffected by the rating action.

The affirmation of the Support Ratings and SRFs of MPS, Banco
Popolare, ICCREAH and UBI Banca reflects Fitch's view that
despite the sovereign's reduced ability to provide support
following the downgrade, its propensity to support Italy's
largest banks remains high. The VRs of these banks are unaffected
by today's rating action.

The revision of the Outlook on MPS and Banco Popolare is a direct
consequence of the sovereign downgrade. For MPS, whose 'b' VR on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN) is unaffected by today's rating
action, the Negative Outlook indicates that a downward revision
of its SRF would result in a downgrade of the Long-term IDR. For
Banco Popolare, whose 'bbb' VR is unaffected by today's rating
action, the Negative Outlook reflects that a downward revision of
the SRF would only result in a downgrade of the Long-term IDR if
its VR was also downgraded.

The SRF of six Italian banks is at 'BBB'. This compression of the
SRFs reflects the agency's view that the propensity of the
sovereign to support systemically important banks remains high.

INTESA SANPAOLO

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR, IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT
Intesa Sanpaolo's ratings reflect its sound capitalisation, solid
funding in the current market context, adequate operating
profitability and its leading domestic franchise. The downgrade
reflects that Italy's rating effectively caps Intesa Sanpaolo's
VR.

Intesa Sanpaolo's performance has suffered in the weak operating
environment, but the bank's profitability has remained more
resilient than many of its domestic peers. The bank generated
EUR3.6bn pre-tax profit excluding a EUR299m post-tax impact of
purchase price allocation and a EUR134m post-tax charge for a
staff reduction programme. Fitch expects the group's
profitability to remain under pressure in 2013 as earnings
generation, particularly in domestic retail banking, will remain
difficult and loan impairment charges high, but Intesa Sanpaolo
has demonstrated that it is able to generate sufficient earnings
to absorb high loan impairment charges.

The VR is underpinned by the bank's sound capitalisation with a
core Tier 1 ratio of 11.2% at end-2012 and a 'fully-loaded' Basel
III common equity Tier 1 ratio of 10.6%, which compares well with
international peers. Liquidity also remains sound as the bank had
EUR90bn unencumbered eligible assets at end-February 2013, of
which EUR20bn in cash invested in short-term repurchase
transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR, IDRS, AND SENIOR DEBT
Intesa Sanpaolo's Long-term IDR is based on its VR, therefore a
downgrade of its VR would result in a downgrade of its Long-term
IDR. The Outlook on its Long-term IDR is Negative, which
indicates that an upgrade of Intesa Sanpaolo's IDRs and VR is
currently unlikely.

Intesa Sanpaolo's IDR is at the same level as the sovereign and
is therefore sensitive to a change in the sovereign rating. A
further downgrade of the sovereign would likely result in a
downgrade of Intesa Sanpaolo's VR and IDRs as Fitch considers the
bank's credit profile closely linked to the sovereign's and to
the operating environment in Italy, where the bulk of the group's
operations are located. An upgrade of the sovereign rating, which
given its Negative Outlook is unlikely, would put upward pressure
on the bank's VR and Long-term IDR.

Fitch expects the bank's profitability and asset quality to
remain under pressure given the weak outlook for the domestic
economy. However, the agency expects that Intesa Sanpaolo will
continue to generate adequate operating profit as its operating
performance to date has remained more resilient than that of many
of its domestic peers. Weaker profitability that would erode the
bank's good capitalisation would put the VR under pressure.

Fitch expects Intesa Sanpaolo's funding and liquidity to remain
solid as the bank's funding sources are diversified and wholesale
funding maturities for 2013 have already been refinanced. The
bank estimated a Basel III NSFR and LCR above 100% at end-2012
even excluding the benefit from its European Central Bank
funding. Deteriorating liquidity, which Fitch currently does not
expect, would put ratings under pressure.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY KEY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES
Intesa Sanpaolo's subsidiaries' ratings, Banca IMI and Cassa di
Risparmio di Firenze, reflect Fitch's view of the core function
of these subsidiaries in the group. As their ratings are based on
their parent's Long-term IDR, they are sensitive to changes in
Intesa Sanpaolo's Long-term IDR.

This rating action does not address the ratings of Intesa
Sanpaolo's foreign subsidiaries. Any potential impact of this
rating action on Intesa Sanpaolo's foreign subsidiaries' ratings
will be announced in separate rating action commentaries.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES- SUBORDINATED DEBT
AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by Intesa
Sanpaolo and its subsidiaries are all notched down from Intesa
Sanpaolo's VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably. Their ratings
are primarily sensitive to any change in Intesa Sanpaolo's VR

UNICREDIT

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR, IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT
UniCredit's VR and IDRs remain underpinned by the bank's broad
international franchise with significant operations in well-
performing and highly-rated markets, a diversified and resilient
funding profile, improved capitalisation following a EUR7.5bn
capital increase in Q112 and progress made implementing the
bank's 2011 strategic plan.

The bank's VR also takes into account UniCredit's below-average
asset quality, in particular in Italy, reliance on resilient
collateral values for loan loss coverage, poor profitability in
its Italian business and challenges facing the bank's pan-
European business model in light of increasing regulatory
scrutiny of cross-border funding and capital flows.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR, IDRS, AND SENIOR DEBT
The Negative Outlook on UniCredit's IDR reflects the bank's
challenge to improve the performance of its Italian businesses in
the current adverse macroeconomic climate. The bank's IDRs and VR
are sensitive to a change in Fitch's assumptions around the
development of UniCredit's asset quality and profitability,
notably in Italy. Currently, Fitch expects new impaired loans
formation to slow down towards the end of 2013 and collateral
values, notably Italian real estate, to remain broadly resilient
in 2013.

UniCredit's IDRs and VR are also sensitive to Fitch's assumptions
regarding the risk profile and profitability of UniCredit's
significant foreign operations, which are supportive of
UniCredit's ratings given the poor operating environment in
Italy. While Fitch notes that internationally deployed funding
and capital is not fully fungible due to increasing regulatory
tendencies by local regulators to "ring-fence" the subsidiaries
in their respective jurisdictions, UniCredit's risk profile
nonetheless benefits from various well-performing foreign
subsidiaries with significant dividend payment potential and
sound internal capital generation. The latter is evidenced for
example by the announcement that its German subsidiary UniCredit
Bank AG will pay a dividend of EUR2.5bn, including 100% of 2012
results and EUR1bn out of reserves. Progress on banking union may
also reverse the ring-fencing trend.

As a result of its international diversification, UniCredit's
risk profile is somewhat less correlated to the sovereign's risk
profile than that of its domestic peers. Should the Italian
sovereign rating be downgraded further, depending on the
interplay between domestic performance and benefits from its
international presence, UniCredit could potentially be rated one
notch above the sovereign rating.

Conversely, should the risk profile and notably the profitability
of the bank's activities in Germany (UniCredit Bank AG, which
consolidated much of UniCredit's corporate and investment
banking, 'A+'/Stable/'a-'), Austria and CEE (UniCredit Bank
Austria AG, which consolidates UniCredit's CEE activities except
Poland; 'A'/Stable/'bbb+') and Poland (Bank Pekao SA; 'A-
'/Stable/'a-') worsen, this could be negative for UniCredit's
ratings.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY KEY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES
This rating action does not address the ratings of UniCredit's
foreign subsidiaries. Any impact of this rating action on
UniCredit's subsidiaries' ratings will be announced in separate
rating action commentaries.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES- SUBORDINATED DEBT
AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by UniCredit
are all notched down from UniCredit's VR in accordance with
Fitch's assessment of each instrument's respective non-
performance and relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary
considerably. Their ratings are primarily sensitive to any change
in UniCredit's VRs.

AGOS DUCATO

KEY RATING DRIVERS -IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
Agos's IDRs and Support Rating are driven by support from its
majority shareholder, CA Consumer Finance (CACF;
'A+'/Negative/'F1+'), and reflect Fitch's opinion that Agos is
strategically important for Credit Agricole. The agency believes
that Italy remains an important market for Credit Agricole, where
as well as its majority 61% stake in Agos, the group has banking
operations and also holds a 50% stake in FGA Capital S.p.A.
('BBB'/Negative/'F3'), a joint venture with car manufacturer Fiat
Group Automobiles S.p.A.

Credit Agricole's propensity to support Agos was demonstrated in
2012 when the parent participated in a EUR235m capital increase
together with the company's 39% shareholder, Banco Popolare
('BBB'/Negative). Fitch expects that Credit Agricole will
continue to provide support to Agos if needed, but the agency
believes that its propensity to do so may be affected by market
prospects, hence the downgrade.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
Agos's ratings are sensitive to changes in Credit Agricole's
propensity and ability to provide support. The ratings would come
under further pressure if Italy became a less strategically
important market for Credit Agricole, which could arise if the
operating environment in Italy further materially deteriorated.
The ratings would also come under pressure if CACF's ability to
support Agos, as indicated by its Long-term IDR, declined.

An upgrade of Agos's ratings is currently unlikely as indicated
by the Negative Outlook on its Long-term IDR, which is driven by
the Negative Outlook on the sovereign rating and by Fitch's
expectation that the operating environment in Italy will remain
challenging. Agos's Short-term IDR would come under pressure if
Fitch changed its assumption that short-term liquidity support
from Agos's parent remains strong.

BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO

KEY RATING DRIVERS -IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SUPPORT RATING
BNL's IDRs and Support Rating reflects institutional support from
BNP Paribas. Fitch regards BNL as core to BNP Paribas' strategy
but considers that in an extreme scenario, BNP Paribas could
effectively be prevented from providing support to its subsidiary
bank in Italy. Therefore, BNL's Long-term IDR remains effectively
capped at one notch above the sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
BNL's IDRs and Support Rating are sensitive to changes in Italy's
sovereign rating. The IDRs and Support Rating are also sensitive
to changes in BNL's strategic importance for the group, which
Fitch currently does not expect. A decline in BNP Paribas'
ability to provide support, as indicated by its Long-term IDR,
would only affect BNL's IDRs if its parent's Long-term IDR fell
by more than two notches, as BNL's Long-term IDR is currently
constrained by Italy's sovereign rating. BNL's Short-term IDR
would come under pressure if there were signs of weakening short-
term liquidity support from its parent, which Fitch currently
does not expect.

BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
MPS's Long-term IDR is based on support from the Italian
authorities and is at its SRF. The IDRs, Support Rating and SRF
reflect Fitch's view that as one of Italy's largest banks, MPS
would receive further support from the authorities if needed. The
Negative Outlook on the bank's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's
view that a further downgrade of the sovereign rating would put
pressure on the SRF.

On February 28, 2013, the Italian government subscribed EUR4.1bn
hybrid capital instruments issued by MPS, of which EUR1.9bn were
earmarked to repay the hybrid capital instruments issued by the
bank in 2009. The new instruments include terms that allow for
coupon payment in the form of MPS's ordinary shares and for the
conversion of the instruments into common equity. This means that
the Italian state could become a shareholder of the bank, which
underpins Fitch's view of a high probability of support for the
bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
MPS's Long-term IDR is at its SRF. Any change in the SRF, which
could result from a further sovereign downgrade or a change in
Fitch's assumption of the government's propensity and ability to
provide support, would result in a change in the Long-term IDR
and senior debt ratings.

BANCO POPOLARE

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
Banco Popolare's VR, which is unaffected by today's rating
actions, is at the same level as the bank's SRF. The Long-term
IDR would therefore only be downgraded if the bank's VR and SRF
were downgraded. The Negative Outlook on the Long-term IDR
reflects pressure on Banco Popolare's VR (see "Fitch Affirms Four
Large Italian Banks" dated 29 January 2013 for key rating drivers
and sensitivities of Banco Popolare's VR) and Fitch's view that a
further downgrade of the sovereign rating would put pressure on
its SRF.

The rating sensitivities of Banco Popolare's Support Rating and
SRF are below.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY KEY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES
Banco Popolare's subsidiaries' ratings, Credito Bergamasco, Banca
Aletti & C. S.p.A and Banca Italease, are based on Fitch's view
that Banco Popolare would provide support if needed. Fitch
considers Credito Bergamasco and Banca Aletti as core
subsidiaries given their roles in the group. Fitch believes that
Banco Popolare would also provide support to Banca Italease, as
failure to do so would pose a significant reputation risk to
Banco Popolare. As the ratings of the subsidiaries are based on
their parent's Long-term IDR, the ratings are sensitive to
changes in Banco Popolare's Long-term IDR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES -SUPPORT RATINGS AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOORS
The 'BBB' SRFs of MPS, Banco Popolare, ICCREA Holding, Intesa
Sanpaolo, UniCredit and UBI Banca reflect Fitch's opinion that in
the current crisis the Italian authorities show a high propensity
to support the country's largest banks. The SRFs assigned to
Italian banks are based on Fitch's ranking of the banks,
according to the agency's view of their systemic importance.
ICCREA Holding's Support Rating and SRF factor in the ICCREA
group's role in the mutual banking sector, which has an aggregate
market share of about 7% of loans in Italy, and the agency's view
that support for ICCREA Holding would be used to provide support
for the sector banks if needed.

The SRFs and Support Ratings are sensitive to changes in the
propensity or in the ability of the government to provide
support. A downgrade of Italy's sovereign rating would put
pressure on the SRFs as it would indicate a reduced ability for
the authorities to provide support. In a scenario where this
ability reduced further, Fitch believes that the SRFs of the
Italian banks could see a wider distribution, with the more
regional banks' SRFs coming under more pressure than the SRFs of
the very largest Italian banks with strong domestic market
shares.

The SRFs and Support Ratings would also come under pressure if
Fitch considered that the propensity of the authorities to
support the country's banks had changed, which is not currently
factored into the agency's analysis. In particular, Fitch's view
on support is sensitive to developments within the regulatory and
legal framework, particularly emanating from the European
Commission with regard to bail-ins, centralised regulatory
oversight and adjustments to deposit insurance schemes.

The rating actions are:

Agos Ducato

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
VR: 'b' RWN; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
Debt issuance programme (senior debt): affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt, including guaranteed notes: affirmed at
  'BBB'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'B-' RWN; unaffected
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'CCC'; unaffected
Preferred stock and Tier 1 notes: 'CC'; unaffected

Banca Antonveneta:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
VR: 'bbb'; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior debt: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'

Banco Popolare:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
VR: 'bbb'; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior debt (including programme ratings and guaranteed notes):
  affirmed at 'BBB/F3'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F3'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB-'; unaffected
Preferred stock and junior subordinated debt: 'BB-'; unaffected

Banca Italease:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Senior debt and programme ratings: affirmed at 'BBB'
Market linked securities: affirmed at 'BBBemr'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB-'; unaffected
Trust preferred securities: 'C'; unaffected

Banca Aletti & C. S.p.A.:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Credito Bergamasco:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Iccrea Holding S.p.A.

Long-term IDR: 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative; unaffected
Short-term IDR: 'F2'; unaffected
VR: 'bbb+'; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'

The ratings of Iccrea Banca S.pA. and Iccrea BancaImpresa are not
affected by today's rating action.

Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
VR: downgraded to 'bbb+' from 'a-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
Senior debt (including debt issuance programmes and guaranteed
  notes): Long-term rating downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Short-
  term rating affirmed at 'F2'
Commercial paper/certificate of deposit programmes: affirmed at
  'F2'
Senior market-linked notes: downgraded to 'BBB+emr' from 'A-emr'
Subordinated lower Tier II debt: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
Subordinated upper Tier II debt: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'
Tier 1 instruments (XS0545782020, XS0371711663, XS0456541506,
  XS0388841669): downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze:

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'
Senior debt (including programme ratings): downgraded to 'BBB+'
  from 'A-'
Upper Tier 2 instruments: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'

Banca IMI S.p.A.:

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'
Senior debt (including programme ratings): downgraded to 'BBB+'
  from 'A-'

Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Ireland plc

  Commercial Paper/Short-term debt affirmed at 'F2'
  Senior unsecured debt (guaranteed by Intesa Sanpaolo, including
   programme ratings): downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'

Societe Europeenne de Banque SA:

Commercial Paper and Short-term debt (guaranteed by Intesa
Sanpaolo): affirmed at 'F2'

Intesa Funding LLC

US Commercial Paper Programme: affirmed at 'F2'

UBI Banca:

Long-term IDR: 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative; unaffected
Short-term IDR: 'F2'; unaffected
VR: 'bbb+'; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior debt (including programme ratings): 'BBB+'; unaffected
Commercial Paper Programme/Short-term debt: 'F2'; unaffected
Subordinated Lower Tier 2 debt: 'BBB'; unaffected
Preference stock and hybrid instruments: 'BB'; unaffected

UniCredit S.p.A.:

Long Term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short Term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
VR: downgraded to 'bbb+' from 'a-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'
Guaranteed senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from A-
Market-linked notes: downgraded to 'BBB+emr' from 'A-(emr)'
Lower Tier 2 notes: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
Upper Tier 2 notes: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'
Preferred stock: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'

UniCredit Bank (Ireland) p.l.c. (no issuer ratings assigned):

Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'
Guaranteed senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from
  'A-'

Any rating impact from the above rating actions on banks'
mortgage covered bonds will be detailed in a separate comment.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INTELSAT SA: Board Appoints David McGlade Chairman and CEO
----------------------------------------------------------
Intelsat S.A.'s Board of Directors has elected Dave McGlade,
currently Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, to the
position of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, effective
April 1, 2013.  Mr. McGlade has served as the Company's Chief
Executive Officer for eight years.

Mr. McGlade has appointed Stephen Spengler to the position of
President and Chief Commercial Officer, effective March 18, 2013,
a new role for the Company.  Mr. Spengler has been with Intelsat
in various executive positions since 2003, most recently serving
as Executive Vice President, Sales, Marketing and Strategy.
Mr. Spengler has over 25 years of experience in the satellite and
telecommunications industry.  Mr. Spengler will maintain his
responsibilities covering corporate strategy, product innovation,
global sales, government sales including oversight of Intelsat
General Corporation, marketing, product development and
corporation communications, and will be adding responsibility for
business development.

The Company and Mr. McGlade entered into an amendment to his
employment agreement pursuant to which his base salary will be
increased to $1,128,595 and his target bonus payable under the
Company's annual bonus plan was increased to 125% effective for
the full 2013 fiscal year.

Michael McDonnell, Intelsat's Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer, remains in his current role in the leadership
team, and will add responsibility for corporate development.

Michelle Bryan has been appointed to the position of Executive
Vice President, General Counsel and Chief Administrative Officer.
Prior to joining Intelsat, Ms. Bryan served as General Counsel of
US Airways Group and Laidlaw International.  Ms. Bryan will
succeed to the general counsel role effective March 18, 2013, and
will maintain her responsibilities covering human resources and
corporate services.

The current General Counsel, Phillip Spector, will transition to
a new role as a member of Intelsat's Board of Directors,
effective April 1, 2013.  A sector expert with over 30 years of
practice in the satellite and telecommunications sector, Mr.
Spector has served since 2005 as Intelsat's Executive Vice
President, Business Development, and General Counsel.

In other executive changes, Thierry Guillemin was promoted to
Executive Vice President and Chief Technical Officer.  Mr.
Guillemin most recently served as Senior Vice President and Chief
Technical Officer.  Mr. Guillemin has over 25 years' experience
in the satellite industry and is responsible for satellite
operations, spacecraft development and acquisition.  Mr.
Guillemin will maintain responsibility for network and teleport
operations, network engineering, satellite operations, space
systems management and planning, and joint responsibility for
information technology.

In announcing these changes, Mr. McGlade stated, "On behalf of
the Intelsat team, I thank Phil Spector for his many years
contributing to Intelsat's success.  He has helped to build this
company into the premier satellite company that it is.  I look
forward to continuing to rely on his judgment and expertise as we
serve together on the Intelsat Board."

McGlade continued, "As a company, Intelsat is focused on
providing its customers with services that support their future
growth.  With the organizational changes announced today,
Intelsat is securing a highly experienced and knowledgeable
executive team and board, providing leadership into the future."

Additional information can be found at http://is.gd/bBh1dk

                           About Intelsat

Luxembourg-based Intelsat is the leading provider of satellite
services worldwide.  For over 45 years, Intelsat has been
delivering information and entertainment for many of the world's
leading media and network companies, multinational corporations,
Internet Service Providers and governmental agencies.  Intelsat's
satellite, teleport and fiber infrastructure is unmatched in the
industry, setting the standard for transmissions of video, data
and voice services.  From the globalization of content and the
proliferation of HD, to the expansion of cellular networks and
broadband access, with Intelsat, advanced communications anywhere
in the world are closer, by far.

Intelsat S.A. incurred a net loss of $145 million in 2012, a net
loss of $433.99 million in 2011, and a net loss of $507.76
million in 2010.  The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012,
showed $17.30 billion in total assets, $18.53 billion in total
liabilities and a $1.27 billion total Intelsat S.A. stockholders'
deficit and $45.67 million in noncontrolling interest.


TMK CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Rating to Proposed LPNs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating,
with a loss given default assessment of LGD4 (57%), to the
proposed loan participation notes (LPN) to be issued by, but with
limited recourse to, TMK Capital S.A., a limited liability
company incorporated in Luxembourg. The new LPNs are rated the
same as the existing notes, B1. The notes will be issued for the
sole purpose of financing a loan to OAO TMK (TMK) under a loan
agreement with TMK Capital S.A., therefore the noteholders are
relying solely on TMK's credit quality to service and repay the
debt. TMK will use the proceeds from the loan for refinancing
existing indebtedness. The outlook on the rating is stable.

"The (P)B1 rating we have assigned to the notes is in line with
TMK's corporate family rating, which balances the competitiveness
of the steel pipe market, the volatility of global steel prices
and the company's high leverage with its leading position in
Russia's market for pipe products, its geographical
diversification and its favorable cost profile," says Denis
Perevezentsev, Moody's vice-president and lead analyst for TMK.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, and these ratings represent only the rating
agency's preliminary opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will assign
definitive ratings to the bonds. A final rating may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

The assigned rating on the notes is the same as the corporate
family rating of TMK. Moody's ranks the proposed notes pari passu
with other unsecured debt of TMK. The noteholders will benefit
from certain covenants made by TMK in the underlying loan
agreement, including limitation on incurrence of indebtedness,
liens and mergers.

TMK's B1 CFR primarily reflects the intense competitiveness of
the steel pipe market. Combined with the volatility of energy
prices and the oil and gas industry, this competition can lead to
significant swings in demand for oil-country tubular goods (OCTG)
and pipe products, as well as in inventory and TMK's
profitability. Other credit-negative rating drivers are (1) the
high customer concentration of TMK's Russian business; (2) the
volatility in global steel prices since steel is TMK's largest
cost; (3) TMK's fairly high leverage; and (4) the company's
constant need to refinance maturing short-term debt.

However, more positively, the rating also reflects (1) TMK's
leading position in Russia's market for pipe products, especially
for high-margin seamless OCTG; (2) its geographical
diversification, with meaningful production assets in North
America and Europe; (3) its favorable cost profile; (4) the
volume and margin benefits associated with its investment
program; and (5) the stable outlook for oil and gas exploration
and production (E&P) drilling and pipeline construction. The
latter is especially relevant in terms of intensity-of-use, as
drill-hole lengths get longer and horizontal drilling becomes
more common.

Key factors to watch over the next year include the progress on
capex implementation by the Russian oil and gas majors and any
adjustments to their capex plans, as well as the stabilization
and growth of the rig count in the US given TMK's exposure to
this market.

The stable rating outlook on the rating reflects TMK's strong
market position and the stable outlook for the oil and gas
industry in Russia and worldwide, which underpin the company's
stable financial metrics. The fact that the company has largely
completed its investment program and is committed to reducing
debt also provides support for the outlook.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's could upgrade TMK's rating if the company is able to (1)
generate free cash flow; (2) reduce its absolute level of debt to
around $3.2 billion or its leverage, measured by the ratio of
debt/EBITDA, to less than 2.75x on a sustainable basis (using
Moody's adjustments); and (3) maintain good liquidity.

Conversely, a rating downgrade could be triggered by (1) a
failure to generate positive free cash flow on a rolling 12-month
basis; (2) debt/EBITDA exceeding 4.0x (using Moody's
adjustments); (3) a significant decline in oil and gas prices and
oil and gas companies' capital spending; and (4) a deterioration
in TMK's liquidity profile.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Steel Industry Methodology published in October 2012. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009 (and/or) the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in July 2010.

OAO TMK is Russia's largest producer -- and one of the world's
largest producers -- of steel pipe products for the oil and gas
industry, operating around 30 production sites across the US,
Russia, Romania and Kazakhstan. The largest proportion of TMK's
shipments comprises high-margin OCTG, with line pipe, large-
diameter pipe and industrial pipe also in the company's sales
mix, including pipes with the entire range of premium
connections. More than half TMK's sales, by volume, are of
seamless pipe. In 2012, TMK shipped approximately 4.2 million
tons of steel pipes, including 2.5 million tons of seamless
pipes. For the same period, the company reported revenues of
approximately US$6.7 billion and EBITDA of around US$1.0 billion.
TMK's largest shareholder is Mr. Dmitriy Pumpyanskiy, who owns an
approximate 70% stake in the company.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CHEYNE CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class V Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all rated classes of notes in Cheyne Credit Opportunity CDO I
B.V.

S&P has reviewed the transaction's performance using data from
the latest available trustee report, dated Feb. 18, 2013.  S&P
has taken into account recent developments in the transaction and
reviewed the transaction under its 2009 collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) and 2012 counterparty criteria.

According to the trustee reports, EUR121.62 million of class IA
funding notes were redeemed on the last two payment dates.  This
has resulted in higher credit enhancement levels for all rated
classes of notes when compared with S&P's previous review on
Sept. 13, 2012.

The portfolio now has a higher weighted-average spread of 3.86%
(compared with 3.71% at S&P's previous review) and a reduced
weighted-average life of 3.53 years (compared with 3.99 years at
S&P's previous review).

Since S&P's previous review, the percentage of assets that it
considers as defaulted (rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective
default], or 'D') has increased to 7.86% from 6.75%.  In line
with S&P's 2009 CDO criteria, it has included these assets in its
cash flow analysis at the lower of their reported market value,
and its recovery assumptions.

S&P has subjected the capital structure to its cash flow
analysis, to determine the break-even default rates (BDRs) for
each rated class of notes at each rating level.

S&P applied a number of cash flow stress scenarios, using various
default patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate
scenarios.  S&P's analysis shows that the BDRs for the class IA
funding, IB, and II notes now pass at the same levels as at S&P's
previous analysis.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)'
ratings on the class IA funding and IB notes, and has affirmed
its 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class II notes.

S&P's ratings on the class III def, IV def, and V def notes are
constrained by the application of the largest obligor test, a
supplemental test that S&P introduced in its 2009 CDO criteria.
This test addresses event and model risk that might be present in
the transaction.  The BDRs for the class III def, IV def, and V
def notes are now passing at higher rating levels compared with
S&P's previous review and their credit enhancement levels have
increased.  However, as the application of the largest obligor
test constrains S&P's ratings on these classes, it has affirmed
its ratings on the class III def, IV def, and V def notes at
their current levels.

The Bank of New York Mellon (AA-/Negative/A-1+) acts as account
bank and custodian in the transaction.  Under S&P's 2012
counterparty criteria, it considers this counterparty to be
appropriately rated to support the ratings in this transaction.

Cheyne Credit Opportunity CDO I has entered into a number of
derivative agreements to mitigate currency risks in the
transaction.  The documentation for the derivative agreements,
currently present in the transaction, does not fully comply with
S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria.  Therefore, in S&P's cash flow
analysis for scenarios above 'AA-', it has applied additional
foreign exchange stresses.

Cheyne Credit Opportunity CDO I is a cash flow CDO transaction,
managed by Cheyne Capital Management Ltd.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in February 2011.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class         Ratings

Ratings Affirmed

Cheyne Credit Opportunity CDO I B.V.
EUR1 Billion Variable Funding And Floating-Rate Notes

IA funding    AAA (sf)
IB            AAA (sf)
II            AA+ (sf)
III def       A+ (sf)
IV def        BBB+ (sf)
V def         BB+ (sf)



===========
P O L A N D
===========


LOT SA: Survival Hinges on Dreamliner Flights
---------------------------------------------
Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News reports that LOT, surviving on
state aid after five years of losses, was set to file a recovery
plan yesterday without knowing when the Boeing Co. 787 Dreamliner
on which the strategy is built will fly again.

LOT, one of the world's oldest airlines, tracing its roots to
1922, had been counting on a fleet of eight 787s to spur a return
to profit through a 20% cut in operating costs, Bloomberg
discloses.  According to Bloomberg, with two planes delivered, it
managed a single long-haul trip before the model was ordered out
of service with battery faults.

Bloomberg notes that while its boarding passes still advertise
Europe's first Dreamliner flights, Warsaw-based LOT has also
taken the lead in publicly demanding compensation for the global
grounding.  Chief Executive Officer Sebastian Mikosz must
meanwhile convince the Polish government to extend its support by
proposing an overhaul that could call for the 787 to make up one
quarter of the fleet, Bloomberg relates.

"It's a gamble," Bloomberg quotes Sash Tusa, an analyst at
Echelon Research & Advisory LLP in London, as saying.  "If the
Dreamliner comes back and operates as promised it could have a
transformational effect on LOT in a way it won't for most other
airlines.  But pinning a recovery plan on a new model is very
risky because the aerospace industry does not have a good record
of delivering on time."

At LOT, as Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT SA is known, a PLN400
million government loan granted in December may be less than half
the total financing that the company needs, Deputy Treasury
Minister Pawel Tamborski said at the time, Bloomberg notes.

According to Antoine Colombani, a spokesman for the European
Commission, said that Poland in turn faces a June 20 deadline to
submit the LOT aid package to EU regulators for approval.

LOT's losses over the years amounted to PLN1.26 billion,
according the Treasury, while it went through 10 CEOs or interim
chiefs in the seven years before the reappointment of Mikosz --
an average tenure of just eight months, Bloomberg discloses.

Samuel Engel, a consultant at ICF SH&E, who worked on LOT's part-
privatization in 1999, said that cash reserves were probably
"close to nothing" at the time of LOT's government loan in
December, Bloomberg recounts.

Poland, which holds a 93% stake, says the longer-term aim is to
sell stock to another airline or private-equity fund, Bloomberg
notes.  LOT lost one potential buyer in June, when Turk Hava
Yollari AO, or Turkish Airlines (THYAO), terminated talks over EU
rules that cap outside ownership of the bloc's airlines at 49%,
Bloomberg relates.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CAIXA GERAL: S&P Lowers Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its issue
ratings on the junior subordinated debt issued by Portugal-based
bank Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. (CGD) and its subsidiary CGD
Finance and guaranteed by CGD to 'C' from 'CCC-'.  At the same
time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where it placed them on Feb. 22, 2013.

On March 18, 2013, CGD skipped the coupon payments on its two
outstanding junior subordinated debt issues.  Although the state
aid CGD received in June 2012 strengthened the bank's financial
position, it nevertheless prevents it from making any
discretionary payment until the hybrid instrument subscribed by
the government is fully reimbursed.  CGD had already stopped
paying the dividends on its preference shares.  The two issues
affected, with ISIN numbers XS0160043328 and XS0160043757, have
outstanding amounts of EUR3.7 million and EUR6.4 million,
respectively.

This rating action does not affect the counterparty credit
ratings or any other issue ratings on CGD.

RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                        To         From
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.
Junior Subordinated                    C          CCC-/Watch Neg

Caixa Geral de Depositos Finance
Junior Subordinated*                   C          CCC-/Watch Neg

*Guaranteed by Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.


REN-REDES: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Ratings; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Portuguese gas and electricity grid operator REN-Redes
Energeticas Nacionais SGPS S.A. (REN) to stable from negative.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on the utility.

The rating action mirrors S&P's similar action on Portugal.
Under S&P's rating criteria, sovereign risk is a key factor that
influences the credit strength of utilities.  S&P assess REN as
having "high" exposure to Portuguese country risk, based on the
utility sector's "high" sensitivity to country risk and REN's
domestics focus.  REN is purely a domestic gas and electricity
grid operator so almost 100% of its revenues are regulated and
originated in Portugal.

S&P's ratings on these types of utilities are generally
constrained by the rating on the sovereign where they are
domiciled.  Exceptions are those that have extraordinary credit
strength or other characteristics that mitigate domestic risk
factors, and REN falls into this category.  S&P believes there is
a reasonable likelihood REN would be able to withstand a
Portuguese default.  S&P has stress tested RENs business and
financial risk profile in a hypothetical Portuguese default
scenario and believe the utility's ability to service and repay
debt is superior to that of the sovereign.

The stable outlook on REN mirrors that on Portugal and factors in
S&P's expectations that REN will likely sustain its business and
financial profiles.  Under S&P's criteria, the long-term rating
on Portugal constrains the ratings on REN, based on S&P's view
that REN has "high" exposure to Portuguese country risk.

A downgrade of Portugal to 'BB-' or lower would automatically
trigger a similar downgrade of REN.

S&P could also lower its rating on REN if international expansion
or an unexpected and far-reaching regulation overhaul in Portugal
significantly diluted S&P's view of the utility's business risk
profile as strong.  S&P would also likely lower the rating if it
believed that REN would struggle to achieve and maintain adjusted
funds from operations (FFO) to debt in the range of 11%-13%.

Ratings upside is very limited at this stage, and, all else being
equal, would be conditional on an upgrade of Portugal or an
upward assessment of the support REN receives from its larger
shareholder.  In particular, if S&P believed REN would receive
exceptional support from its shareholders or related banks if it
faced liquidity stress--a scenario S&P sees as highly unlikely by
2016 in light of REN's strong liquidity situation-- S&P might
consider an upgrade.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MECHEL OAO: High Leverage Prompts Moody's to Cut CFR to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Mechel OAO's corporate
family rating and probability of default rating to B3 and B3-PD
from B2 and B2-PD, respectively, and changed the outlook on the
rating to negative from stable.

"We have downgraded Mechel's ratings to B3 and changed the
outlook to negative because of the group's high leverage, its
impending breach of financial covenants and uncertainties
surrounding their renegotiation, as well as low coking coal
prices and the challenges this presents for the group given its
limited liquidity and high level of refinancing risk," says Denis
Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President and lead analyst for
Mechel. "The downgrade and outlook change also reflect our
understanding that Mechel's metrics are likely to be under
pressure over the next 12-18 months, and that it will take some
time for the group to implement its strategy regarding the
disposal of non-core assets given the challenging market
conditions."

Ratings Rationale:

- High Leverage, Negative Outlook For Coking Coal Sector And
   Weak Liquidity Drive Change In Rating And Outlook

The change in rating and outlook reflects Mechel's (1) aggressive
capital structure and historical debt-financed acquisition
strategy, which have led to high leverage and modest cash flow
metrics that might deteriorate further over the next 12-18 months
unless currently low coking coal prices improve; (2) low coking
coal prices with a fairly low probability of substantial recovery
over the next 12-18 months; (2) ongoing refinancing risk and the
group's reliance on the renewal or extension of sizable working
capital facilities; (3) capital expenditure (capex) program,
which although reduced from 2012, nevertheless further pressures
liquidity; and (4) ownership concentration, which could lead to
shareholder-friendly financial strategies, particularly when
under financial stress.

- Financial Metrics Are Weak and Are Expected To Deteriorate
   Further

In the first nine months of 2012, only Mechel's mining segment
remained profitable, as measured by operating profits/losses,
with that segment's EBITDA margin falling to 30% (from 37% during
the first nine months of 2011) and its operating margin flat at
26%. Other segments, including steel, ferroalloys, generated
operating losses due to the continuing weaknesses in the end user
markets, including stainless steel. Mechel's Moody's-adjusted
EBIT fell to 10% in the last twelve months ending 30 September
2012 (compared with 15% in 2011) and the group's Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA increased to 5.8x by 30 September 2012 (compared with
4.2x as of 31 December 2011). Improved operating cash flows in
2012 and reduced capex (cash outflows related to investment
activities were US$0.8 billion in the first nine months of 2012,
compared with US$1.7 billion in 2011) helped to conserve cash and
improve Mechel's Moody's-adjusted free cash flows, which were
US$0.6 billion in the last twelve months ending September 30,
2012 (compared with minus US$1.2 billion in 2011).

The weaker performance has endangered several of the financial
covenants under certain of the company's credit facilities, which
Moody's believes will require amendment. More generally, Mechel's
liquidity is also threatened by its sizable maturing debt --
approximately $8 billion in loans and credit lines come due over
the next three years, -- its reduced but still significant
capital expenditure outlays, and challenging commodity markets.

While Mechel has sold several assets and is moving ahead on more
disposals, this process could still take some time and there is
uncertainty on the scale of deleveraging these disposals could
bring to the company given the current volatility in the markets.
With respect to liquidity, this leaves the company very dependent
on a rebound in coking coal, ferroalloy and steel prices, as well
as the willingness of its lenders to grant an amendment and
provide new credit facilities to replace those that are maturing.
Moody's sees little basis for commodity prices to significantly
improve in 2013 given relatively soft global demand for steel.
Therefore, Moody's can see a continuation of Mechel's subdued
performance and the potential for Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA
moving above 7x in 2013.

- Outlook Negative On Anticipated Deterioration Of Financial
   Metrics

The negative outlook on the rating reflects Moody's view that
Mechel's financial metrics could deteriorate over the next 12-18
months unless coking coal prices improve and/or the group's
efforts to dispose of its non-core assets or attract a strategic
investor yield tangible results.

- Leading Market Position Underpins B3 Rating

The rating positively reflects (1) Mechel's role as a leading
domestic coal and steel producer, with strong positions in key
industries, including specialty steel and ferroalloy production;
(2) the group's ownership of the largest coal reserve base in
Russia; (3) a favorable business profile, the result of a high
degree of vertical integration, which ensures stable production
and, to some extent, preserves operating margins; (4) the
strategic location of the group's key assets, close to the major
steel-consuming markets, as well as its ownership and control of
essential infrastructure including ports and rolling stock, which
provide guaranteed access to export markets; (5) the diversity of
its mining operations, with no significant concentration on any
single mine, which mitigates the risks of interruption in coal
production; and (6) good disclosure and adequate corporate
governance, supported by the group's NYSE listing.

What Could Change The Rating Down/Up

Negative rating pressure would develop if Mechel's financial
metrics continue deteriorating due to unfavorable market dynamics
or a failure to achieve meaningful deleveraging over the next 12-
18 months. Increased refinancing risk or difficulties in
renegotiating covenants to a more comfortable level would also
exert negative pressure on the rating.

An upgrade of the rating is unlikely over the next 12-18 months
unless Mechel takes steps to deleverage the business. Moody's
would consider stabilizing Mechel's outlook if the company were
to demonstrate a more conservative financial profile, with (1)
gross debt/EBITDA below 5.0x on a sustainable basis; (2) an EBIT
margin sustainably above 10%; and (3) prudent liquidity
management.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry Methodology published in May 2009.

Mechel OAO is a vertically integrated mining and metals company.
Its business comprises four segments: mining, steel, ferroalloys
and power. The group produces coal, iron ore concentrate, nickel,
ferrochrome, ferrosilicon, and steel products. Mechel's products
are sold domestically and internationally, with approximately 55%
sold in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The group's subsidiaries are located in 13 regions of Russia and
in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Lithuania, the UK and the US. Mechel owns
three trade ports and a transport operator. In the first nine
months of 2012, Mechel reported revenue of US$8.8 billion (a 9%
decrease year-over-year) and EBITDA of US$1.2 billion (a 34%
decrease year-over-year). Mechel is majority owned by its
Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. Zyuzin, who controls
65.49% of the voting shares. After its initial public offering in
2004, 34.51% of the group's shares are in free float.


SITRONICS JSC: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Sitronics JSC's Caa1
corporate family rating and Caa1-PD probability of default
rating.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating because of inadequate
information to monitor the rating, due to the issuer's decision
to cease participation in the rating process.



=========
S P A I N
=========


MBS BANCAJA: Moody's Confirms Caa2 Ratings on Two Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two mezzanine
and one junior notes in MBS Bancaja 6. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed the ratings of senior notes in MBS Bancaja 6 and junior
notes in MBS Bancaja 7 and 8.

Insufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk and
revision of key collateral assumptions prompted these downgrades.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and revision of key
collateral assumptions. Moody's confirmed the ratings of
securities whose credit enhancement and structural features
provided enough protection against sovereign and counterparty
risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
the rating actions reflect the introduction of additional factors
in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of sovereign
risk on structured finance transactions.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios. As a result,
Moody's downgraded mezzanine Class B in MBS Bancaja 6 to Baa3
despite credit enhancement above MILAN CE. This is due to higher
probability of scenarios where losses are greater than MILAN CE
and due to the small size of this class.

- Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has revised its lifetime loss expectation (EL) assumption
in MBS Bancaja 6 because of worse-than-expected collateral
performance since the last review of the Spanish RMBS sector in
November 2012. Moody's has also reassessed the MILAN CE in all
three affected transactions. Downgrade of Classes C and D in MBS
Bancaja 6 reflects the revision of the key collateral assumptions
in addition to the impact of the sovereign risk.

Expected Loss:

In light of the rapid increase in defaults, Moody's increased the
portfolio EL assumption in MBS Bancaja 6. Moody's has reassessed
its lifetime loss expectation taking into account the collateral
performance to date as well as the current macroeconomic
environment in Spain. Moody's had already revised EL assumptions
on MBS Bancaja 6 in November 2012. Collateral performance has
deteriorated further and MBS Bancaja 6 is currently performing
outside of Moody's expectations as of the last rating review.
Cumulative write-offs rose to 1.28% of original pool balance in
MBS Bancaja 6, up from 0.71% a year earlier. The share of 90d+
arrears currently stands at 5.03% of current pool balance.
Moody's have updated the EL assumption to 4.5% of original pool
balance, up from 3.9%.

Milan CE:

Moody's has increased the MILAN CE in MBS Bancaja 6, 7 & 8 to
15.3%, 43% and 38.6% respectively. Moody's has assessed the loan-
by-loan information to determine MILAN CE. Moody's updated the
MILAN CE in MBS Bancaja 6 due to the revision of the portfolio
expected loss which resulted in higher Minimum Expected Loss
Multiple EL, one of the two floors defined in Moody's updated
methodology for rating EMEA RMBS transactions. Moody's increased
the MILAN CE in MBS Banaja 7 & 8 to account for increased risks
associated with increased share of loans in negative equity.

- Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to Banco Santander (Baa2/P-2), which
acts as a treasury account bank in all three affected
transactions.

In October 2012 the Management Company has amended Treasury
Account Agreements to lower the replacement triggers from loss of
P-1 to loss of Baa3. Moody's has assessed the probability and
effect of a default of the treasury account bank on the ability
of the issuer to meet its obligations under the transaction,
including the impact of the loss of any benefit from the reserve
fund, commingling reserve and accumulated collections. In
conclusion, these factors will not negatively affect the ratings
of the notes.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Additional factors that may affect the ratings are described in
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines: Request for Comment" and
"Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment"
both published on 2 July 2012.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche."

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished on 11 March
2013, along with the publication of its Special Comment "
Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the Impact of
Sovereign Risk.".

Issuer: MBS Bancaja 6 Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos

EUR37.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR28.5M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR30M D Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR904M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: MBS Bancaja 7, FTA

EUR402.5M B Notes, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MBS Bancaja 8, FTA

EUR175.5M B Notes, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RENTA CORPORACION: Mulls Voluntary Creditor Protection
------------------------------------------------------
Charles Penty at Bloomberg News reports that Renta Corporacion
Real Estate said the company was set to hold extraordinary board
meeting yesterday to consider seeking voluntary protection from
creditors.

Trading in the company's shares was suspended earlier yesterday
by the market regulator.

Renta Corporacion Real Estate SA is a Spanish real estate
developer.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


SSB NO.1: Fitch Assigns 'B' Final Rating to Fixed-Rate Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned SSB No.1 PLC's US$500 million issue of
fixed-rate limited recourse notes a final Long-term rating of 'B'
and a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. The issue has a maturity date of
March 20, 2018, and a coupon rate of 8.875%.

The notes are being used solely for financing a US dollar-
denominated loan to Ukraine-based JSC State Savings Bank of
Ukraine (Oschadbank; Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings 'B'/Stable).

The loan agreement contains a set of covenants, including ones
which limit disposals and mergers and transactions with
affiliates. Oschadbank and its banking subsidiaries also commit
to comply with any capital adequacy ratio requirements set by the
National Bank of Ukraine (minimum capital adequacy ratio is
currently 10%). According to the terms of the loan agreement, the
bank may be restricted from making certain payments and
distributions under some circumstances; a cross-default is
triggered if overdue indebtedness of Oschadbank or any of its
subsidiaries exceeds US$10 million. Oschadbank shall redeem the
notes if Ukraine, directly or indirectly, ceases to own, at least
51% of Oschadbank's capital stock and if such an event results in
a downgrade of Oschadbank's ratings.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANGEL BIOTECHNOLOGY: Sells Two Scottish Manufacturing Sites
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Business Insider reports that Angel
Biotechnology's two Scottish manufacturing bases have been sold
out of administration.

Administrator KPMG on Monday announced the company's development
and manufacturing operations at Pentlands Science Park -- Angel
Biotech -- has been sold to US-based AB BioTechnologies for an
undisclosed sum, Business Insider relates.

The administrator said the deal will see 23 jobs transfer to the
buyer firm, Business Insider notes.

"This sale will secure the long term viability of the development
and manufacturing operations at Pentlands Science Park, saving
the vast majority of jobs during a time of continued economic
uncertainty," Business Insider quotes Blair Nimmo, joint
administrator and head of restructuring at KPMG Scotland, as
saying.

A separate deal has also been reached for Angel Biotechnology's
Glasgow collagen manufacturing facility -- Angel Biomedical -- to
a newly formed company, Collbio Ltd., Business Insider discloses.

Collbio Ltd was registered as a new company with Companies House
in Cardiff on February 26, Business notes.

According to Business Insider,no details have been released on
the value of the sale, which includes a "major" inherited
contract with US-based Cardium Therapeutics to provide collagen
products for its diabetic ulcer treatment, Excellagen.

Angel reported its first-half losses had widened as a result to
GBP2.86 million in the six months to December 30, 2012, Business
Insider relates.

Edinburgh-based Angel Biotechnology makes antibodies, stem cells
and viruses for clinical trials.

Angel Biotechnology went into administration on February 8 after
failing to find a strategic partner to secure its longer term
financial position.


GLAMORGAN PACKAGING: Loss of Major Clients Prompts Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Insider News Wales reports that Glamorgan Packaging Ltd. entered
administration after it started experiencing financial
difficulties with the loss of two major customers.

According to Insider News Wales, the outcome to unsecured
creditors of the company in Bridgend is also uncertain because of
a conflict after an insolvency practitioner was appointed without
the support of the secured creditor.

Glamorgan Packaging ceased trading in November 2012 after it
began to suffer losses and Samantha Hawkins of Hawkins and
Company was appointed administrator on December 11, Insider News
Wales relates.

The business was founded in 2007 and had traded profitably,
employing 15 members of staff at its peak, Insider News Wales
recounts.  But it began to suffer bad debts and the administrator
said its payments were often slowed because of issues higher in
the building supply chain, as it was a supplier to builders and
subcontractors, Insider News Wales discloses.

A factoring agreement was created in June 2011 with Bibby
Financial Services Ltd., Insider News Wales relates.

According to Insider News Wales, the administrator said that,
despite the factoring agreement with Bibby, once the business
ceased trading, the director of the company approached an
insolvency practitioner in Swansea to place the company into
liquidation.

Bibby advised the Swansea insolvency practitioner (IP) that it
would not support this appointment, Insider News Wales discloses.
But the IP sent out notices to creditors and company information
was passed to this IP, Insider News Wales notes.

Hawkins and Company was then appointed by Bibby, Insider News
Wales recounts.

The administrator, as cited by Insider News Wales, said the
Swansea IP instructed agents to remove and sell the company's
assets and added the agent has taken about 60% of the funds
received in relation to its fees in relation to selling the
assets.

The company's book debts are set to be collected by Bibby,
Insider News Wales notes.

There is expected to be GBP16,235 available for other creditors,
including surplus from the book debts and proceeds received from
the agents, according to Insider News Wales.

Unsecured creditors are estimated to be owed GBP150,000 but the
administrator said this is only an estimate because all paperwork
relating to this class of creditor was passed to the Swansea IP,
Insider News Wales discloses.

Based on these figures, unsecured creditors are set to lose out
on GBP133,765, Insider News Wales states.

Glamorgan Packaging Ltd. is a timber packaging manufacturer and
supplier.


GROUP LOTUS: Denies Liquidation Rumors
--------------------------------------
Leo Wilkinson at The Telegraph reports that Group Lotus, which
includes Lotus sports cars, says that media claims it could go
into liquidation are wrong.

Lotus has denied a number of stories suggesting that it could be
liquidated, the Telegraph relates.

Group Lotus PLC was one of the names on Monday's Companies Court
Winding Up List, leading to widespread media speculation, the
Telegraph discloses.

Media reports have suggested that Lotus' creditors could be
seeking to have the company's assets liquidated to pay its debts,
the Telegraph notes.

According to the Telegraph, Lotus, however, has issued the
following statement:

"Contrary to rumours, Lotus is not being liquidated.

"Earlier this year, Lotus was in a contractual dispute which was
resolved amicably a number of weeks ago.  However the High Court
process meant that the matter was still shown on the High Court
website, as there was a hearing scheduled for today.

"This is what appears to have been seen and misunderstood.  The
case was only listed for the proceedings to be disposed of.  The
claim has now been dismissed with no order as to costs."

Group Lotus is owned by Malaysian company DRB-HICOM, which
acquired it when it bought previous owner Proton in January 2012.


IGLO FOODS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based frozen foods
producer Iglo Foods Holdings Ltd. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its issue rating of 'B+' on the
senior secured facilities issued by Iglo Foods Midco Ltd.  The
recovery rating on these facilities is unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation follows Iglo's announcement, in February 2013,
that some of its beef products had been contaminated with horse
meat.  Iglo subsequently withdrew the contaminated products.

Although the contaminated products only represent about 0.5% of
Iglo's earnings, S&P believes that the contamination poses a risk
of brand damage for Iglo, as well as for the frozen food industry
in general.  The contamination could discourage consumers from
buying Iglo's products and lead to weaker operational
performance. However, Iglo's track record of good operational
performance has a positive bearing on S&P's assessment of the
likely impact of the contamination on the group's future
performance.

In 2012, Iglo's sales fell by about 1.7% on a constant currency
basis, due partly to competition by private labels and
discounters.  Nevertheless, the group's reported EBITDA before
restructuring costs remained resilient.  S&P estimates that in
2013, Iglo will generate EBITDA of EUR300 million-EUR350 million
and that it will pay cash interest of about EUR100 million on its
debt.  This means that the ratio of EBITDA to cash interest
should remain above the minimum 2.0x-2.5x range that is
compatible with the current rating.  S&P continues to assess
Iglo's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," because the
group's ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt (including its
noncash interest-accruing shareholder loans) to EBITDA is more
than 5x.

S&P could lower the ratings if the group's leading market
positions and premium pricing ability weaken.  This could happen
if a lack of innovation and/or a weakening of the group's brand
power--particularly in light of the recent product contamination-
-resulted in the commoditization of its products.  This could
hamper Iglo's ability to protect its margins in an environment of
rising input costs.  S&P estimates that if EBITDA shrank from its
current level by about one-third, cash interest coverage would
likely fall to about 2x.  However, S&P currently view such a
reduction in EBITDA as unlikely.

S&P could also lower the ratings if the group refinances the rest
of its shareholder loans into cash-paying loans or bonds such
that cash interest coverage falls to less than 2x.  Furthermore,
S&P could take a negative rating action if weak operational
performance in light of the product contamination resulted in a
material weakening of the headroom that Iglo has under its
covenants.

S&P could consider an upgrade if adjusted leverage falls to, and
remains at, less than 5x.  S&P considers that Iglo would most
likely achieve such a large reduction in leverage with a change
to its financial policy, and therefore S&P currently consider an
upgrade to be unlikely.


KCA DEUTAG: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to US$860-Mil. Sr. Sec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
issue rating to both the proposed US$860 million senior secured
notes due 2020 to be issued by KCA Deutag Finance PLC and the
proposed US$400 million senior secured Term Loan B (TL B) due
2019 to be borrowed by KCA Deutag Finance Sarl.  S&P assigned a
recovery rating of '4' to the proposed notes and term loan,
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.  The notes and TL B
are guaranteed by oil services company KCA DEUTAG Alpha Ltd.
(KCDA), which has its headquarters in the U.K.

The issue and recovery ratings on the proposed senior secured
debt instruments are based on preliminary information and are
subject to the successful issuance of the notes and our
satisfactory review of the final documentation.  S&P understands
that the proceeds of the proposed senior secured notes and TL B
will be used to refinance the company's existing debt.  S&P's
recovery and issue ratings on the existing US$1.3 billion senior
secured debt, excluding letters of credit, issued by KCAD are
unchanged at, respectively 'B' and '3', and S&P expects to
withdraw these ratings on the completion of the refinancing.

The recovery rating on the proposed notes and the proposed TL B
is underpinned by the fairly comprehensive security package
including valuable assets.  The recovery rating is constrained by
the large size of super senior debt ranking ahead of the notes
and TL B, significant second-ranking debt, weak documentation,
and multi-jurisdictional exposure.

The company's proposed capital structure following the
transaction will comprise the senior secured notes due 2020, the
term loan due 2019, and a US$250 million super senior revolving
credit facility (RCF) due 2018.

S&P understands that the RCF, notes, and TL B will benefit from
the same security composed of pledges over all assets of certain
subsidiaries and parent companies excluding intellectual
property, real estate, and insurance policies, as well as share
pledges over the company and its main subsidiaries, account
pledges, and vessel mortgages.  An intercreditor agreement will
establish the super senior status of the RCF, and the pari passu
status in right and order of payment between the TL B and the
notes.  The senior secured debt will be guaranteed by guarantors
representing a clear majority of consolidated assets but
excluding entities that generated nearly half of the group's pre-
exceptional EBITDA as of end-December 2012.

The notes' documentation will allow for material additional debt
to be raised.  In particular, the company will be able to
increase the super senior RCF by US$50 million and incur
additional senior secured indebtedness subject to consolidated
senior secured leverage of less than 4.0x through June 30, 2014,
and 3.75x thereafter.  Also, the TL B documentation does not
contain maintenance financial covenants, which is not common.

Recovery prospects for the senior secured debt are supported by
S&P's view that, in a default, KCAD would be reorganized, rather
than liquidated, due to the company's leading position in its
core markets, the contract-based nature of the business, and
S&P's view of the relatively creditor-friendly insolvency regime
in the U.K. Under S&P's default scenario, it envisages a default
in 2016, by which time S&P anticipates that EBITDA will have
declined to about US$194 million.  Assuming a stressed multiple
of 4.5x, S&P calculates a stressed enterprise value of about
US$872 million at the hypothetical point of default.  From this
stressed valuation, S&P deducts priority liabilities, primarily
relating to enforcement costs and pension liability of
approximately US$144 million, leaving a net enterprise value of
about US$728 million for secured lenders.  S&P assumes a fully
drawn RCF of approximately US$261 million that will be prior
ranking at default (including six months of prepetition
interest).  This leaves average (30%-50%) recovery prospects for
senior secured debtholders, which translates into a recovery
rating of '4'.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Deutsche Borse Facing EUR115MM Claim
-----------------------------------------------------
Suzi Ring, writing for Dow Jones Newswires, reports that Deutsche
Borse AG disclosed that it faces a claim of about EUR115 million
($150.37 million) that the administrator for an overseas arm of
Lehman Brothers Inc. said was paid to the exchange group's
clearinghouse unit on the day the U.S. investment bank filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2008.  The exchange disclosed the claim
in its annual report Friday, just weeks before the first interim
distribution of money is due to be made to former clients of
Lehman Brothers International (Europe), Lehman's London-based
arm.

According to Dow Jones, Deutsche Borse called the claim on its
Eurex Clearing arm "unfounded" and said it was defending itself
against the action.  Deutsche Borse said the claim from the
administrator of Lehman Brothers Bankhaus, the bank's German arm,
relates to EUR113.5 million in collateral payments made to Eurex
Clearing on Sept. 15, 2008.  The claim includes the repayment of
the EUR113.5 million, plus an additional EUR1 million and accrued
interest.

The report relates Deutsche Borse declined additional comment.
Michael Frege, a partner in the Frankfurt law firm CMS Hasche
Sigle, which has acted as administrator for Lehman's German arm,
also declined to comment.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Derivative Traders May Be Partially Shielded from Bail-in Rules
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Brunsden at Bloomberg News reports that derivatives traders
using clearinghouses may be partially shielded from European
Union proposals to write down creditors of crisis-hit banks,
under draft plans being considered by lawmakers.

The European Parliament is weighing whether investors holding
derivatives that give them a claim on a bank should have
preferential treatment in a crisis if the contracts were
centrally cleared, Bloomberg says, citing two legislators working
on the file.  According to Bloomberg, the EU is seeking to boost
the use of clearinghouses in a bid to make the derivatives market
safer and more transparent.

"We want to move trading onto regulated markets," Bloomberg
quotes Wolf Klinz, the lawmaker leading work on the measures for
the parliament's Liberal group, as saying in an interview.
Mr. Klinz, as cited by Bloomberg, said that under the plan,
non-centrally cleared derivatives would be targeted for
writedowns ahead of similar instruments that were traded via a
clearinghouse.

The EU faces a self-imposed June deadline to adopt legislation
for handling bank failures, in a bid to take taxpayers off the
hook for rescues, Bloomberg notes.  Michel Barnier, the bloc's
financial services chief, proposed empowering regulators to force
losses -- known as bail-ins -- on unsecured creditors, and that
would require nations to set up bank-financed funds to cover the
costs of winding down lenders, Bloomberg discloses.

Preferential treatment for derivatives that are centrally cleared
"is an idea that's been discussed," said Bloomberg quotes Elisa
Ferreira, the lawmaker leading work on the rules for the
parliament's Socialist group, as saying in an interview.  "But
there is no decision yet."

Mr. Klinz said that under the plan, centrally cleared derivatives
would only face losses if writing down more-junior creditors and
non-centrally cleared derivatives failed to stabilize the lender,
Bloomberg notes.

EU leaders and the IMF have said that the bail-in rules are
needed to help break the link between national public finances
and banking systems, as the euro area seeks to tame a fiscal
crisis that has forced Greece, Portugal,  Ireland, Spain, and
most recently Cyprus to seek international aid, Bloomberg
relates.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *