TCREUR_Public/130325.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, March 25, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 59



BDZ: Owes Biggest Creditors About EUR35 Million Each


BANK OF CYPRUS: Future Uncertain; Loan Books Show Bad Debt Pile
LAIKI BANK: Put Under Administration Amid ECB Funding Cut Threat

* CYPRUS: Fate Uncertain; Russia Rejects Rescue Proposal
* CYPRUS: S&P Lowers Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CCC'
* CYPRUS: Fitch Says Bailout Stalemate Poses Ad Hoc Crisis Risks
* CYPRUS: Fitch Says Deposit Levy Impact on Russian Banks Unclear


CMA CGM: Moody's Confirms 'B3' CFR; Outlook Positive
OBERTHUR TECH: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'B-'; Outlook Negative


* HUNGARY: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative


KAUPTHING BANK: Ex-Managers Face Market Manipulation Charges
LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Executives Face Market Manipulation Charges


ANDERSON VALLEY: Liquidity Provider Changer No Impact on Ratings


IVS GROUP: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating


ATF BANK: Fitch Lowers Subordinated Debt Rating to 'BB+'


INTELSAT LUXEMBOURG: Debt Upsize No Impact on Moody's Caa1 Rating


PLAZA CENTERS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
ZIGGO NV: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Stable


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Cuts PDR to Ca-PD/LD; Outlook Negative


AEROFLOT OJSC: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDRs to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
HOME CREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB'
MDM BANK: Fitch Withdraws 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings


AYT ANDALUCIA: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on EUR21MM Cl. D Notes
FONCAIXA LEASINGS 2: DBRS Rates Series B Notes BB(high)(sf)
IM PRESTAMOS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa3'


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Automobiles Up for Auction at KVD Kvarndammen

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLOCKBUSTER UK: Agrees Rescue Deal with Gordon Brothers Europe
COVENTRY CITY: Hearing on Finances Scheduled for Tomorrow
CPP GROUP: Explores Options as Debt Deadline Looms
HMV GROUP: Hilco Rescue Deal Expected in Ten Days
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'


* EUROPE: Fitch Says Ratings of MDBs Remain Under Pressure
* EUROPE: Fitch Says Food Retail Industry Faces Challenges
* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 18 to March 22, 2013



BDZ: Owes Biggest Creditors About EUR35 Million Each
FOCUS News Agency reports that Bulgarian Minister of Transport,
Information Technology and Communications Kristian Krastev said
the recovery measures that will be implemented in the Bulgarian
State Railways (BDZ) will be his assessment of the performance of
its management.

The losses of the state-run company run to about BGN716 million,
which is a huge amount, FOCUS News discloses.

According to FOCUS News, the minister said that the debts to the
biggest creditors, i.e. KfW and bondholders in the second bond
loan, run to about EUR35 million/creditor.

Nobody knows why the payment of the first bond loan was stopped
shortly before the final repayment and since 2011, there have
been no payments, FOCUS News notes.  More interest has piled up,
according to the report.

The minister said that the debts in the first bond loan run to
about BGN6 million, FOCUS News relates.

Established in 1885, The Bulgarian State Railways, commonly known
as BDZ, is Bulgaria's state railway company and the largest
railway carrier in the country.  The company's headquarters is
located in the capital Sofia.


BANK OF CYPRUS: Future Uncertain; Loan Books Show Bad Debt Pile
Kerin Hope at The Financial Times reports that it was unclear on
Thursday whether Bank of Cyprus would follow its rival Laiki Bank
into administration.

According to the FT, BoC has managed to avoid a recapitalization
and has only about EUR1 billion of ECB liquidity assistance on
its books.  The bank's loan book includes large amounts of
unrecognized bad debt, the FT notes.

The Greek finance ministry has pledged to protect Greek account
holders by merging the Athens-based operations of both Laiki and
Bank of Cyprus, and arranging a EUR1.5 billion capital injection
before they were offered for sale, the FT discloses.  Greece's
Piraeus Bank, whose largest shareholder is a Russian fund, said
on Friday it had agreed to buy the Cypriot banks' Greek networks
for an undisclosed price, the FT relates.

Bank of Cyprus is a major Cypriot financial institution.  In
terms of market capitalization of 350 million in March 2013, it
is the country's biggest bank.  As at September 2012, the bank
held a 26.7% share of the Cypriot deposit market and a 22.5%
share of the Cypriot loan market, making it the largest bank in
Cyprus.  The Bank of Cyprus Group employs 11,326 staff worldwide.

LAIKI BANK: Put Under Administration Amid ECB Funding Cut Threat
Kerin Hope at The Financial Times reports that Laiki Bank became
the first Cypriot bank to be placed under administration as the
government fought to avoid a disorderly bankruptcy and, possibly,
an exit from the euro.

Founded in 1901 as the Popular Savings Bank Limassol, Laiki
handled the affairs of Slobodan Milosevic, the former Yugoslav
strongman, and his family, the FT recounts.

The bank was set to become the European investment vehicle of
Dubai's sovereign wealth fund in a bold plan that collapsed when
the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, the FT relates.

Legislation splitting Laiki into "good" and "bad" banks was
approved by parliament on Friday after the European Central Bank
warned it would cut off emergency funding that has kept the bank
afloat for more than a year, the FT discloses.

A recapitalized "good" bank would hold deposits below EUR100,000
owned by some 350,000 account holders, while the remaining
assets, including those of several thousand Russian and Ukrainian
companies, would be put into a "bad" bank, losing up to 40% of
their value, the FT notes.

Laiki's collapse has come only months after the Cyprus state
injected EUR1.8 billion of capital and took over management
following a dispute with Greece's Marfin Investment Group, the
bank's biggest shareholder, the FT states.  But it had been
fatally weakened by exposure to Greek sovereign bonds, which lost
70% of their value in a partial default, and a high percentage of
bad loans in its Greece branch network, the FT discloses.

"It got into trouble because of very aggressive expansion mostly
in Greece," the FT quotes Lambros Papadopoulos, an independent
analyst, as saying.  "The balance sheet got overstretched and
then Greece went wrong."

The Greek finance ministry has pledged to protect Greek account
holders by merging the Athens-based operations of both Laiki and
Bank of Cyprus, and arranging a EUR1.5 billion capital injection
before they were offered for sale, the FT relates.  Greece's
Piraeus Bank, whose largest shareholder is a Russian fund, said
on Friday it had agreed to buy the Cypriot banks' Greek networks
for an undisclosed price, the FT recounts.

Laiki was kept afloat by about EUR9 billion of emergency
liquidity assistance from the ECB, the FT notes.  But its fate
was sealed last week when Michalis Sarris, the finance minister
and former bank chairman, failed to find a Russian strategic
investor during a trip to Moscow, the FT relates.

* CYPRUS: Fate Uncertain; Russia Rejects Rescue Proposal
Tom Stoukas and Georgios Georgiou at Bloomberg News report that
Cyprus's fate hangs in the balance as euro-area finance ministers
met on Saturday to decide whether the tiny Mediterranean island
has done enough for a bailout that will avert its financial

As thousands of protestors marched through the capital Nicosia on
Friday, Cypriot officials worked to broker a deal with the
European Central Bank, the European Commission and International
Monetary Fund on how to raise the EUR5.8 billion (US$7.5 billion)
needed to qualify for aid, Bloomberg relates.  According to
Bloomberg, the government said that those talks, which focused on
a plan to impose levies on bank deposits over 100,000 euros,
ended at a "very sensitive stage" on Thursday night and was set
to continue in Brussels on March 23.  Eurogroup finance ministers
were due to convene in the Belgian city at 6:00 p.m. on March 23,
Bloomberg notes.

The ECB has imposed a deadline of March 24 for a new deal to be
struck by threatening to cut off emergency funding to Cypriot
banks, which have been closed all week and are due to reopen on
March 26, Bloomberg discloses.

Cyprus Finance Minister Michael Sarris said on Friday that bank
deposit levies were back on the table in discussions with the so-
called troika of the ECB, Commission and IMF, Bloomberg notes.

President Nicos Anastasiades met with political party leaders on
Friday night to brief them on the troika talks, Bloomberg

"The situation is very difficult and the margins are tight,"
Bloomberg quotes Cyprus government spokesman Christos Stylianides
as saying in an e-mailed statement.  The spokesman, as cited by
Bloomberg, said Messrs. Anastasiades and Sarris were set to fly
to Brussels on March 23 for further discussions.

The Cypriot parliament passed nine bills on March 22 aimed at
preventing capital flight and restructuring the banking sector,
Bloomberg relates.

A collapse of the nation's banking system could precipitate its
exit from the euro and unleash another wave of turmoil across a
region already mired in a debt crisis and recession, Bloomberg

                 Russia Rejects Rescue Proposal

According to Bloomberg News' Olga Tanas and Ilya Arkhipov, Russia
spurned Cyprus's offers of assets for a bailout as the island
nation's lawmakers begin debate on legislation to avert a
financial collapse.

"I think we aren't able to get the support that we wanted to
get," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Sarris as saying in an interview after
checking out of the Lotte Hotel in Moscow.  "But we must go back
home because things are getting serious."

Cypriot lawmakers began debating legislation on Friday to prevent
a financial meltdown as the European Central Bank threatens to
cut off a lifeline for the country's banks in three days unless a
bailout agreement with the European Union is reached, Bloomberg
relates.  Russian companies and individuals may have about
US$31 billion of deposits in Cyprus, which in turn is the biggest
source of foreign direct investment in Russia, Bloomberg

"The only thing that Cyprus could hope for is Gazprom buying some
reserves from them," Bloomberg quotes Vladimir Kolychev, head of
research at Societe Generale SA's Rosbank (ROSB) unit in Moscow,
as saying.  "It's not clear what these gas reserves are worth,
and apparently Gazprom wasn't particularly interested."

Finance Minister Anton Siluanov on Friday said that Russia has
ended talks with Cyprus and will decide on participating in
restructuring debt after the so-called troika overseeing euro-
area bailouts makes its decision, Bloomberg relates.  The troika
comprises officials from the European Commission, ECB and
International Monetary Fund, Bloomberg discloses.

"We didn't close the door, didn't say we won't discuss anything,"
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, as cited by Bloomberg, said on
Friday at a briefing in the Russian capital with Jose Barroso,
head of the European Commission.  While "we are prepared to
discuss various options for supporting" Cyprus, Russia's possible
assistance is contingent on a consensus over a rescue plan
between the nation and the EU.

* CYPRUS: S&P Lowers Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CCC'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Cyprus to 'CCC' from
'CCC+'.  The outlook is negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C'
short-term sovereign credit rating on Cyprus.

The downgrade mainly reflects S&P's view of the acute problems in
Cyprus' banking sector.  Since early 2012, Cyprus' domestic banks
have repeatedly suffered losses because of write-downs on their
holdings of Greek government bonds and credit losses on their
Greek and domestic private-sector loans.  S&P's expectation is
that the two largest Cypriot commercial lenders will together
require EUR10 billion in capital injections.  On March 16, the
Eurogroup (that is, the meeting of the finance ministers of the
eurozone) offered Cyprus' government a three-year financial
assistance package to cover a portion of this capital support for
Cyprus' banks, on top of financing for sovereign debt redemptions
and expected budgetary deficits. A key condition attached to the
offer of EUR10 billion of funding from the European Stability
Mechanism was a proposed financial stability levy on all resident
and nonresident bank depositors.  The levy was designed to raise
EUR5.8 billion of the EUR10 billion in additional capital for
Cyprus' two largest domestic commercial banks, on top of an
estimated EUR1.2 billion in write-downs of the banks'
subordinated bonded debt obligations.

Given that the assets of Cyprus' indigenous banking sector are
more than 5x GDP, S&P considers Cyprus' credit standing to be
inextricably linked to its banking system. Neither the bank
shareholders nor Cyprus' government appear able on their own to
meet the banks' pressing capital needs.  In the absence of
foreign private or official capital injections into the Cypriot
banks, S&P sees few means to recapitalize the distressed portion
of the system without converting bank liabilities, including
deposits, into equity claims.  However, political resistance to
haircutting depositors was clearly signaled on March 19 by the
Cypriot parliament rejecting the Eurogroup proposal, without a
single vote in its favor.

"Despite the parliamentary vote, we believe the Eurogroup is
resolved to reach an agreement with Cypriot authorities on a
credible financing package.  At the same time, in light of
building economic and financial stability pressures, the terms of
any support package are likely to be unpopular and challenging to
implement in the context of a severe, protracted economic
downturn and an extended bank holiday.  As a consequence, we
believe that risks of a sovereign default are rising.  We
estimate the government's remaining 2013 gross borrowing
requirement at 18% of GDP," S&P said.

"We expect that over the next few days Cyprus and the Eurogroup
or other partners could reach an alternative agreement.  The
European Central Bank (ECB) confirmed on Tuesday evening that it
would continue to approve the extension of Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) by the Central Bank of Cyprus to Cyprus' banks
as needed, subject to internal rules.  The current outstanding
ELA advances total EUR9.1 billion (53% of GDP).  Our baseline
expectation is that Cyprus will remain a member of the European
Economic and Monetary Union," S&P added.

Nevertheless, risks remain that renewed deposit flight could
exacerbate the economic downturn, create the need for the
imposition of capital controls, and increase the requirement for
additional bank support.  Failure by the government to broker an
agreement with its European partners in a timely manner could
lead the ECB to demand ELA repayment, which could put Cyprus'
payment system at risk.  The possibility of a write-down of the
deposit base has, moreover, led S&P to revise down its 2013 GDP
forecast to -6%, given that the negative income effect of deposit
levies is likely to weaken demand over the forecast horizon.
This GDP projection is subject to considerable uncertainties,
however, depending on the resolution of Cyprus' financial
difficulties and the future of its banking and business services
sectors.  Weaker GDP performance implies a higher debt-to-GDP
burden.  However, alternative sources of funding appear to S&P to
be limited, particularly since it understands that the Social
Security Funds are already fully invested in government
liabilities, though there may be some latitude for the government
to tap funds held in the private pension system.

S&P would likely lower the rating if Cyprus' government fails to
obtain a financing program soon.  If it secures a program, S&P
could also lower the ratings later this year if it believes the
government is unable to fulfill the program's conditions.  The
ratings could stabilize at the current levels with the
government's 2013 financing requirement in place and with an
agreed-upon bank recapitalization plan.

* CYPRUS: Fitch Says Bailout Stalemate Poses Ad Hoc Crisis Risks
The crisis surrounding Cyprus brings into focus the costs of
policymakers' "muddling through" approach to the eurozone crisis,
Fitch Ratings says. Without greater progress and clarity on the
terms of financial and fiscal risk sharing between Euro Area
Member States, each sovereign and bank crisis prompts an ad hoc
response that exacerbates uncertainty and undermines market
confidence and financial stability. However, there are no
immediate rating implications for other eurozone sovereigns.

The proposed Cyprus bail-out program confirms the strong desire
of European policymakers to minimize costs to other eurozone
taxpayers but marked the first attempt to "bail-in" bank
depositors. But the necessary institutional framework and
resolution mechanisms are not yet in place. To execute this
strategy now, and critically to involve retail depositors, sets a
potentially dangerous precedent for other eurozone countries,
particularly those with weak banking sectors.

"We do not currently expect the instability in Cyprus to spread
to other eurozone banking systems. But in our view any support
package that includes a "stability levy" is effectively "bailing
in" depositors and therefore inevitably increases the danger of
contagion risks within the eurozone. Even if the stability levy
is dropped the proposal sets a precedent that depositor bail-in
mechanisms are now an acceptable policy tool. We have placed the
ratings of Cypriot banks on Rating Watch Negative, reflecting the
potential restricted default that would occur from a significant
levy on deposits," Fitch says.

The loss of insured depositors' savings would be an unprecedented
step in the eurozone crisis and is likely to have longer-term
implications for support-driven bank ratings. The Cypriot crisis
demonstrates that there could be a more rapid removal of support
than we had previously anticipated. This would create uncertainty
for investors and have negative implications for bank ratings.

The situation underlines the necessity of banking union within
the eurozone to provide an effective framework for the management
of the financial crisis. As Cyprus has also demonstrated, deposit
insurance, a key part of the sovereign-bank nexus, is compromised
when the sovereign is financially distressed and the size of the
banks and deposits is overwhelming.

Progress on banking union, including a clear resolution regime
and some form of common deposit insurance, and an effective
single supervisory mechanism, is essential for securing the long-
term financial and economic stability of European Economic and
Monetary Union.

The deposit freeze imposed in Cyprus last week was a de facto
restriction on the free flow of capital. If other forms of
capital controls are introduced as part of a program agreed
between the Cypriot authorities and the EU-IMF, Fitch would
review the 'AAA' Country Ceiling assigned to all eurozone
countries (other than Greece, whose Country Ceiling of 'B-'
reflects the risk of a euro exit), which is premised on the free
movement of capital across the eurozone.

Limited debt service relief and legal constraints, and fears of
the contagion from imposing losses on sovereign debt continue to
be factored into our Cyprus sovereign rating of 'B'/Negative. But
without a quick resolution to an evidently unsustainable
situation, the risk of a disorderly sovereign and bank default
will increase.

* CYPRUS: Fitch Says Deposit Levy Impact on Russian Banks Unclear
The resolution of banks in Cyprus through a customer deposit levy
or some form of burden sharing involving creditors of troubled
banks would be unlikely to result in material losses for Russian
banks, Fitch Ratings says. The risks of a deposit levy appear to
be receding according to press reports on March 21, but the
situation remains highly uncertain.

"Where Russian banks have deposit-taking subsidiaries or branches
in Cyprus, our base case is that the banks' customers would
suffer the majority of losses if a deposit tax or levy is
imposed. There is some risk that Russian banks would need to, or
choose to, absorb some losses, for example where they have
advised clients to place money in Cyprus entities, or where
deposits represent indirect intragroup funding from the parent.
However, Fitch would expect any such losses to be small relative
to the equity of the banks affected," Fitch says.

"VTB is the only Russian bank with a subsidiary in Cyprus,
Russian Commercial Bank Cyprus (RCBC). At end-2011, RCBC had US$3
billion of customer deposits. Assuming these remained the same
and were taxed at the highest rumoured rate of 15%, the levy
would be equal to only 2% of VTB's equity. We would not expect
most of this to represent losses for the bank. VTB has announced
that its potential losses would be limited to tens of millions of
euros, probably related to placements of VTB's non-banking
subsidiaries with RCBC.

"Promsvyazbank (PSB) is the only rated Russian bank with a branch
in Cyprus. As with VTB, we would not expect losses, if any, as a
result of a deposit levy, to be material for PSB.

"Losses could also arise if Russian banks' non-bank Cypriot
subsidiaries or related entities -- brokerage or other associated
companies -- have placed cash in Cypriot banks. However, brokers
usually make settlements though highly rated foreign banks, so we
view the risk of them having significant deposits in local banks
as low. Where SPVs are set up for Eurobond issuance, they do not
typically use local bank accounts, so servicing of these bonds
would be unlikely to be affected if capital controls are
introduced in Cyprus.

"Unless interbank deposits are subject to a levy, we believe
risks from placements of Russian banks in Cypriot banks are
limited. The bulk of these are likely to be related to VTB's
funding of RCBC. VTB has indicated that RCBC has a balance sheet
of EUR14 billion, and we believe most of this is financed by the
parent. At end-2012, total placements of non-EU banks with
Cypriot banks were EUR12.8 billion.

"Under a haircut scenario, there is likely to be limited direct
risk from Russian banks' loans to Cyprus-domiciled entities, as
most of these represent exposures to subsidiaries of Russian (or
other non-Cypriot) corporate groups, and have some form of credit
enhancement (guarantees or collateral) from non-Cypriot group
entities. Some of these borrowers may have deposits with local
banks, but any losses would be borne by these clients. Banks'
risks only potentially increase if such losses materially reduced
borrowers' debt service capacity. We believe this is unlikely as
such entities typically do not hold a large proportion of group
liquidity on deposit at Cypriot banks, and the levies so far
discussed still do not represent sufficiently severe haircuts to
undermine borrowers' creditworthiness.

"Russian banks could face significant operational risks and
challenges if the Cypriot crisis is prolonged and brokerage and
trading counterparties become reluctant to trade with Cyprus-
domiciled entities. However, we would not expect the costs of any
required restructuring of trading/brokerage businesses to have a
substantial impact on the overall performance of any banks
affected. Based on statements on March 21 from Russian state-
owned banks, we also currently view as unlikely a takeover by
them of any of the troubled Cypriot banks."


CMA CGM: Moody's Confirms 'B3' CFR; Outlook Positive
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed CMA CGM SA's corporate
family rating of B3 and the company's senior unsecured bond
rating of Caa2/LGD5. Concurrently, the rating agency has upgraded
CMA CGM's probability-of-default rating to B3-PD from Caa1-PD.

The outlook on the ratings is now positive. This rating action
concludes the review for downgrade that Moody's initiated on
March 13, 2012.

"We have confirmed CMA CGM's B3 rating because the company has
stabilized its credit profile following the recent closing of its
financial restructuring, which it embarked upon in February 2012,
as well as benefited from an improved operating and cost position
during the past year," says Marco Vetulli, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CMA CGM.

Ratings Rationale:

"Specifically, our view that the restructuring has improved CMA
CGM's liquidity, on which our confirmation of the B3 rating is
based, reflects the fact that it encompasses a renegotiation of
financial covenants and the three-year maturity extension of its
revolving credit facility expiring in last February, and
reinforces the company's equity base, thanks to a $ 250 million
injection of equity in the form of bonds redeemable in share,"
explains Mr. Vetulli. Moody's says that of the equity injection,
the Yildrim group subscribed to US$100 million, while Fond
Strategique d'Investissment (FSI) -- France's sovereign wealth
fund -- subscribed to the remaining US$150 million.

"In addition to the restructuring, CMA CGM should further
strengthen its liquidity position through the sale of 49% of its
terminal arm, Terminal Link, to China Merchants Holding for
EUR400 million when completed," concludes Mr. Vetulli.

Moody's says that both FSI's subscription and the Terminal Link
disposal have already been agreed between CMA CGM and its
counterparts. Though the transactions have not been completed
pending the relevant regulatory approvals Moody's has assumed
that both transactions should close before the end of the second
quarter 2013.

The B3 rating also takes into account (1) CMA CGM's sound
business profile, stemming from its leading market positions
gained from the successful commercial and operational strategies
implemented by its management; (2) its low amount of capital
investment commitments relative to its main competitors; (3) the
flexibility of its fleet (due to the fairly amount of vessels
chartered that can be redelivered in the next years); and (4) the
company's strong asset base.

However Moody's says two factors constrain CMA CGM's B3 CFR: (1)
the high cyclicality in the container shipping market; and (2)
the company's still weak credit metrics (though notably improved

Rationale For The Upgrade Of The PDR

The one-notch upgrade of the PDR to B3-PD, which is now in line
with the CFR, reflects Moody's view that the expected
strengthening of CMA CGM's liquidity has significantly decreased
the company's probability of default. Moody's also changed its
estimate of the mean family recovery rate to 50% compared with
the current 65%. This adjustment reflected Moody's expectation of
losses for creditors due to the debt restructuring, and since
this process has now closed, the rating agency has reverted to
using the mean family recovery rate.

Rationale For The Positive Outlook

The positive outlook on the ratings incorporates Moody's
expectation of a sustained operating performance in 2013 leading
to steadily improving credit metrics over time, provided that
there are no significant macro-shocks that would affect the
container shipping market.

The positive outlook also incorporates Moody's expectation that
the company will continue maintaining a comfortable liquidity and
hence assumes that FSI's subscription and the Terminal Link be
closed before the end of the second quarter 2013.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Immediate downwards pressure on the ratings could result from
liquidity pressures though not currently expected. Longer-term,
downwards pressure on the rating could result from the lack of
short-term improvement in market conditions leading to (1)
financial leverage above 7.0x for an extended period of time; or
(2) Funds from Operation (FFO) interest expense coverage below

Conversely, upwards pressure could materialize as a result of (1)
a reduction in CMA CGM's financial leverage sustainably below
6.25x; and (2) an increase in its FFO interest expenses coverage
above 3.0x on sustainable basis.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Shipping Industry published in December 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Headquartered in Marseilles, France, CMA CGM is the third-largest
container shipping company in the world (measured in twenty-foot
equivalent units, or TEU). CMA CGM recorded last-12-months
revenues of US$15.7 billion as of the end of September 2012, and
employed approximately 18,000 staff worldwide. As of December
2012, CMA CGM's fleet amounted to 414 container ships (35%
owned), with a total capacity of 1.45 million TEU.

OBERTHUR TECH: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'B-'; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on France-based smart card group
Oberthur Technologies Holding SAS to 'B-' from 'B'.  The outlook
is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue ratings on Oberthur
Technologies' senior secured debt to 'B-' from 'B'.  The recovery
rating on this debt is '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the event of a

The rating actions reflect the group's weaker-than-expected
performance in 2012 and the subsequent revision of S&P's cash
flow and leverage assumptions for 2013.  S&P still assess
Oberthur's business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged", according to S&P's criteria.

"In our base-case scenario, we believe that revenues could
increase by 5% or more in 2013, after a 2% decline in 2012.  We
think growth could be supported by the company's diversification
into several segments, its global presence, and market position.
However, we have lowered our EBITDA assumptions and we think our
adjusted EBITDA figure for 2013, which notably reflects the
deduction of capitalized development costs, will only be at the
same level as in 2011.  In 2012, adjusted EBITDA declined by 5%,
compared with our previous expectations of an increase of 12%,
mainly because of the revenue decline.  We still think the
reported EBITDA margin will remain in the mid-teens," S&P said.

"We now expect cash flow coverage of debt to be more modest this
year than we previously anticipated, notably with the ratio of
funds from operations (FFO) to debt at about 5%.  Similarly, we
have revised our free operating cash flow (FOCF) assumption to a
modest EUR15 million (after negative EUR25 million in 2012
because of the revenue decline, restructuring costs, and other
one-time cash outlays).  This compares with our previous base
case of about EUR35 million annually," S&P added.

"We expect a high adjusted leverage ratio (debt to EBITDA) of
about 13x, and a senior leverage ratio of 7x in 2013 (excluding
our adjustments for shareholder loans and including the senior
and second-lien debt).  This is also higher than our previous
forecasts, following our lower EBITDA estimates and a
EUR70 million debt increase during 2012, partly caused by
acquisitions in 2012.  We think any material deleveraging will be
difficult to achieve over the next few quarters unless revenues
increase much faster than we anticipate," S&P noted.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a one-notch
downgrade over the next 12 months if Oberthur Technologies
breached the covenants on its debt or appeared likely to do so.
This could be the case for instance if revenues did not increase
by at least 3%-5% in 2013, compared with 2012, or if FOCF were
negative.  Evidence of continued underperformance or higher
earnings volatility compared with S&P's base case could also
cause them to reassess the group's business risk and put
additional pressure on the rating.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if FFO to debt returned to
more than 5%, covenant headroom exceeded 10%, and FOCF were


* HUNGARY: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on its
long-term ratings on Hungary to negative from stable.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB/B' long and short-term sovereign
credit ratings.  S&P has revised the transfer and convertibility
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BBB,' reflecting what S&P views as the
interventionist nature of the Hungarian government.

S&P has also revised to negative from stable its outlooks on the
'BB' long-term issuer credit rating on Hungary's central bank,
the National Bank of Hungary.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that the predictability
and credibility of Hungary's policy framework has continued to
weaken.  This is partly due to policy decisions that, in our
view, raise questions about the independence of oversight
institutions, and hence their credibility.  For example, recent
governance changes at the National Bank of Hungary and amendments
to the constitution could undermine Hungary's institutional
effectiveness and the quality and predictability of policy
making.  These changes follow the introduction over the past
three years of policy measures we consider unorthodox--in
particular those that target some services sectors through the
imposition of tax hikes and various levies.  These measures could
erode Hungary's medium-term growth potential by reducing banks'
willingness to lend and companies' propensity to invest.  In our
opinion, this could eventually undermine the government's efforts
to stabilize and reduce general government debt.  Moreover, we
consider that downside risks to Hungary's creditworthiness may
also increase as the domestic economic environment weakens," S&P

"Despite the uncertain economic outlook, we anticipate that the
government will meet its objective of keeping fiscal deficits
below 3% of GDP over 2013-2015, using the accruals-based European
(ESA 95) accounting standard.  That said, we anticipate that from
2014 continued slow economic growth will make it increasingly
difficult for the authorities to keep the general government
deficit in line with their projections.  Following a stagnation
in economic growth in 2013, we forecast that real per capita
growth will strengthen to around 1.9% on average in the medium
term (we expect real GDP growth to average about 1.6%) as
continued fiscal rationalization, an unpredictable tax
environment, and tight credit conditions are likely to weigh on
the economy," S&P added.

S&P estimates net general government debt at about 71% of GDP at
end-2012, and expects it to plateau thereafter if there is no
increase in economic growth.  S&P's calculation of net general
government debt is more restrictive than national measures, as it
deducts from the general government debt only the most liquid
assets, such as currency and deposits held at the National Bank
of Hungary.

Roughly 40% of general government local-currency debt is, by
S&P's estimate, held by nonresidents.  While S&P views this as a
positive factor in terms of diversified funding, the financial
crisis in late 2008 illustrated the rapidity with which local
currency bonds held by nonresidents can be sold if investor
confidence falters.  This increases pressure on the balance of
payments, the exchange rate, and, ultimately, debt servicing

Although the foreign currency component of general government
debt has fallen, it remains high at an estimated 40% of the
total, which makes the debt burden highly sensitive to exchange
rate fluctuations.

Although external liquidity pressures have been contained by
achieving current account surpluses, Hungary's external
liabilities remain moderately high.  External debt, net of liquid
assets, is estimated at about 55% of current account receipts in
2012, down from a peak of just over 80% in 2009.  S&P views the
stronger external performance positively, but note that Hungary
still faces substantial refinancing needs, particularly in the
short term as the government amortizes its debt to the
International Monetary Fund and EU.  S&P expects the government
to meet its debt service obligations through a mixture of
external and domestic issuance, and that parent banks will roll-
over most of their funding lines to their Hungarian subsidiaries.
Although bank deleveraging in Hungary has been more pronounced
that in other countries in the region, the sector has benefited
from capital injections from parent banks, most recently in 2012.

In light of the high "euroization" of Hungary's financial sector,
and the sensitivity of inflation to the exchange rate channel,
S&P views Hungary's monetary flexibility as relatively limited.
If the Hungarian forint were to depreciate significantly, the
government's debt burden, and that of the private sector, would
rise.  This would undermine what S&P expects to be a fragile
economic recovery this year; real GDP per capita is expected to
expand only marginally, by 0.2% (representing a slight
contraction in real GDP).

The ratings are supported by what S&P views as Hungary's highly
skilled labor force and relatively well-diversified economic and
export structures.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three possibility that it could lower the ratings over the
next year if Hungary's economic recovery weakens significantly,
if banks accelerate their withdrawal of credit, or if S&P sees
external or government finances weaken materially.  In S&P's
view, the Hungarian economy remains vulnerable to diminishing
that could, for example, trigger a substantial decline in
nonresident holdings of government securities, leading to higher
financing costs and weaker economic growth.

Conversely, S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it saw the
government using its strong majority in parliament to establish
policies that encourage investment, while implementing its
structural reform program, known as the Szell Kalman Plan.
Similarly, the ratings could stabilize, or even improve, if S&P
saw a sustained reduction in the country's net external liability
position, even as economic growth strengthens.


KAUPTHING BANK: Ex-Managers Face Market Manipulation Charges
Richard Milne at The Financial Times reports that indictments are
expected to be published today against a slew of former Kaupthing
managers including chairman Sigurdur Einarsson and chief
executive Hreidar Mar Sigurdsson on charges of market

Messrs. Einarsson and Sigurdsson are among the accused in a
separate case due in court next month over loans to a Qatari
sheikh who then invested in Kaupthing shortly before its
collapse, the FT discloses.

                      About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland Kaupthing Bank -- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations
in more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of
services including retail banking, corporate finance, asset
management, brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private
wealth management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to
the Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the
Icelandic Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the
Bankruptcy Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Executives Face Market Manipulation Charges
Richard Milne at The Financial Times reports that Iceland has
charged former executives of Landsbanki with crimes related to
the collapse of its financial system in 2008.

Sigurjon Arnason and five other executives from Landsbanki were
accused of market manipulation by using the bank's own money to
prop up its share price, the FT discloses.

Iceland's special prosecutor said in the indictment that just
before its collapse Landsbanki's proprietary trading desk was
responsible for 79% of all the trade in the bank's shares, the FT

"It is an important part of the aftermath of the crisis to find
out if criminality is involved.  And if so it is dealt with in
the same way as all other criminality.  What is new in this case
[of market manipulation] is that this is an activity that
affected the decision-making in the bank," the FT quotes
Olafur Hauksson, the special prosecutor, as saying.

Pleading in the Landsbanki case will be on April 24 in Reykjavik,
the FT says.

The Landsbanki indictment has two main strands, the FT states.
First, that the bank's prop trading desk was essentially standing
as a willing buyer to anybody wishing to sell Landsbanki's
shares, the FT discloses.  In the year leading up to the bank's
collapse the desk was responsible for 47% of all trade in the
shares, with two days above 80% at the very end, the FT notes.

The second strand is that as the bank approached the limit of
owning 10% of itself, Landsbanki lent money to several companies,
according to the FT.  That money was to be used to buy shares in
the bank but was against insufficient collateral, according to
the indictment, leading to charges of putting the interest of the
company at risk, the FT states.

                    About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


ANDERSON VALLEY: Liquidity Provider Changer No Impact on Ratings
Moody's determines no negative rating impact on Anderson Valley
CDO P.L.C. upon the transfer of the liquidity facility provider
to Merrill Lynch International guaranteed by Merrill Lynch & Co,
currently provided by Bank of America N.A.

Moody's has determined that the Proposal, if implemented, should
not, in and of itself at this time result in a reduction or
withdrawal of the current ratings of the notes issued by Anderson
Valley CDO P.L.C. Moody's does not express an opinion as to
whether the Proposal may be considered to have negative effects
in any other respect.

In determining the impact of this transfer on the current ratings
of the Notes, Moody's took into account, among other factors, the
balance of the current collateral available in the form of a cash
deposit as well as the short remaining life of this transaction.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations" published in September 2009. Other Factors used in
this rating are described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in November

On December 13, 2010, Moody's downgraded its ratings on three
classes of notes issued by Anderson Valley:

US$70M Class S-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Dec 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

US$42M Class S-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Dec 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

US$30.4M Class E-1 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
Sep 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)


IVS GROUP: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB-' preliminary long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-
based vending machine company IVS Group SA (IVS).  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' preliminary issue rating
to IVS' proposed EUR200 million senior secured notes due 2020.
The recovery rating on these proposed notes is '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of a average (30%-50%) recovery for creditors
in the event of a payment default.

The rating on IVS reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of the
company's financial risk profile as "aggressive" and business
risk profile as "fair," as S&P's criteria define these terms.
IVS has smaller operations and weaker geographic diversity when
compared with larger international vending machine companies.
Its business is sensitive to Italy's unemployment level and
therefore the country's continued depressed economic environment.
S&P deems IVS' capital expenditure needs of about 8%-9% of
revenues as moderately high within the business service industry.

Nonetheless, IVS has a leading position in Italy and a
historically stable EBITDA margin of about 20%, even during the
2008-2009 crisis.  Furthermore, the cyclicality of the business
service industry has been low over the past five years.  IVS'
standard working capital requirements are minimal, in S&P's view,
and its operating efficiency benefits from a well-fragmented
client base and a somewhat flexible cost base.  S&P assess IVS'
management and governance as "satisfactory" based on S&P's
criteria, underpinned by an experienced management team with
proven operational effectiveness.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it anticipates that IVS' Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA will stand at about 4.5X at year-
end 2013.  At the same time, S&P expects the company's FFO to
stand at about EUR50 million, or about 17% of adjusted gross
debt. S&P notes that, when gross debt is netted with cash at
subsidiary COIN Service (COIN), both metrics are at the higher
end of S&P's "aggressive" financial risk category.  This is a key
support for the current ratings, in S&P's view.  IVS' debt
metrics improved significantly in 2012 as result of the company's
listing on the Milan Stock Exchange, which followed a capital
injection from new shareholders and the conversion of a EUR124
million shareholder loan to equity by long standing shareholders.
S&P estimates debt to EBITDA and funds from operations (FFO) to
debt to have improved to 4.1x and 16%, respectively, at year-end
end 2012, up from an average of 7x and 10% in 2008-2011.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that IVS'
operational performance will be resilient to the difficult
economic environment in Italy, and that its credit metrics will
moderately improve in 2013 and 2014, owing to slightly better

S&P may consider a negative rating action if it revised downward
its assessment of IVS' business risk profile.  This could happen
if the company's profitability were significantly weaker than S&P
currently anticipates.  S&P could take a positive rating action
if IVS' credit metrics improved to levels S&P views as
commensurate with a "significant" financial risk profile over a
sustained period.


ATF BANK: Fitch Lowers Subordinated Debt Rating to 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded ATF Bank JSC's Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and placed the
ratings on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade is driven by the downgrade of ATF's ultimate parent
bank Unicredit S.p.A. to 'BBB+'/Negative.

The RWN follows Unicredit's announcement on 15 March 2013 that it
has signed an agreement for the disposal of its 99.75% share in
ATF, and reclassified the bank as an asset held for sale. The
prospective buyer, KazNitrogenGaz LLP (not rated), is a Kazakh-
domiciled holding company, fully owned by local businessman
Galimzhan Esenov, and also holds majority stakes in two small
Kazakh insurance companies. Unicredit expects the sale to be
completed by end-April 2013 subject to approval by the National
Bank of Kazakhstan.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch will resolve the RWN on the Long-term IDRs following (i)
completion of the sale, and (ii) a review of ATF's standalone
profile, which drives its Viability Rating (VR) of 'b-'.
Following the resolution of the RWN, Fitch expects that ATF's
Long-term IDR will probably be aligned with its VR, given the
more limited reliability of support from the new shareholder and
significant uncertainty concerning the readiness of the Kazakh
authorities to provide support, even to systemically important
domestic banks.

ATF's VR reflects the bank's weak asset quality, moderate
capitalization, modest pre-impairment profitability (before
expenses and recoveries related to credit protection of the loan
book provided by Unicredit) and negative net income for the past
four years. However, the VR also considers the bank's currently
satisfactory liquidity position, the moderate improvement in
capitalization following the equity injection by Unicredit in
Q312 and the generally supportive operating environment, which
should help efforts to stabilize and improve asset quality.

Fitch's review of the VR will focus in particular on (i) recent
asset quality trends, the current adequacy of loan impairment
reserves and the plans of the new shareholder and management to
resolve problem exposures; (ii) the stability of the bank's
funding following recent deposit outflows and the announcement of
the sale, and the bank's future funding strategy, and (iii) the
structure of the acquisition, including any leverage at the new
shareholder level, and the bank's strategy following the change
in ownership.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to
    'BBB-' from 'BBB', placed on RWN

-- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'F3' placed on RWN

-- National Long-term Rating: downgraded to 'AA(kaz)' from
    'AA+(kaz)', placed on RWN

-- Viability Rating: 'b-', unaffected

-- Support Rating: '2' placed on RWN

-- Senior unsecured debt downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB',
    placed on RWN

-- National senior unsecured debt rating downgraded to 'AA(kaz)'
    from 'AA+(kaz)', placed on RWN

-- Subordinated debt downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', placed on

-- National subordinated debt downgraded to 'AA-(kaz)' from
    'AA(kaz)', placed on RWN

-- Perpetual subordinated notes downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-',
    placed on RWN

In accordance with Fitch's policies the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action that is different from the original rating
committee outcome.


INTELSAT LUXEMBOURG: Debt Upsize No Impact on Moody's Caa1 Rating
Moody's Investors Service reports that Intelsat (Luxembourg)
S.A.'s decision to up-size its senior unsecured notes issue, to
US$3.5 billion from US$1.5 billion, has no ratings or outlook
implications. Luxembourg is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of
Intelsat S.A. (Intelsat) which, as the senior-most issuer in the
Intelsat group of companies, is the entity at which Moody's
maintains corporate family Rating Rationale: and probability of
default ratings, which are Caa1 and Caa1-PD respectively.
Intelsat's ratings outlook is positive.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Communications Infrastructure published in June 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg with executive offices in Washington
D.C., Intelsat S.A. (Intelsat) is one of the two largest fixed
satellite services operators in the world and is privately held
by financial investors. Annual revenues are approximately US$2.6
billion; EBITDA is approximately US$2.0 billion.


PLAZA CENTERS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services on March 21 lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on The Netherlands-based real estate
developer, Plaza Centers N.V., to 'CCC+' from 'B-', and at the
same time removed the rating from CreditWatch where it was placed
on Dec. 27, 2012, with negative implications.  S&P subsequently
withdrew the global scale rating at the issuer's request.  The
outlook at the time of the withdrawal was negative.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Plaza Centers' liquidity
continues to be "weak" under S&P's criteria, as it factors in the
reduction in Plaza Centers' financial flexibility, which depends
highly on proceeds from asset sales.  Plaza Centers primarily
develops shopping malls in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  Its
business model is based on developing mainly retail projects up
to the fully operational stage, and then selling the
developments. With these sales, the company realizes capital
gains and generates positive cash flows.  Although its leverage
(debt to capital) usually diminishes at the end of each
development cycle, the company's liquidity management through the
cycle presents a major credit risk, in our opinion.

In S&P's view, the company's current cash position, after the
receipt of EUR26 million from the sale of U.S. investments, will
enable it to meet its bond payments due on July 1, 2013, but may
be insufficient to meet the next debt amortization payments of
EUR40 million on its Polish and Israeli bonds due, respectively,
in November and December 2013.

To meet these debt payments, the company is reliant on divesting
at least four of its operating properties.  While the company has
reached agreement on some of these, they are all dependent on
Plaza Centers' satisfying financial or operational conditions,
some of which it currently fails to do.  Given the current weak
macro-economic conditions in the CEE region, where the company's
main operations are, S&P believes it may face further delays
regarding these sales.  Since S&P placed the company's rating on
CreditWatch Negative in December 2012, the company has failed to
show significant progress in its planned asset sales or
significant operating improvement, which would positively affect
the visibility of such sales.  The company is therefore, in S&P's
opinion, dependent upon favorable business, financial, and
economic conditions to meet its current financial commitments.

In addition, Plaza Center's major shareholder, Elbit Imaging
Ltd., is currently restructuring its debt, and while S&P believes
this reduces the probability of dividend outflow from Plaza
Centers in 2013, S&P remains uncertain regarding the overall
effect of such restructuring.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of a possible
deterioration in Plaza Centers' liquidity profile due to delays
in its planned asset sales and the tight time frame until the
maturities of November and December 2013.  S&P could take
negative rating action if asset sales are further postponed or
the cash flow visibility decreases due to deterioration in market
conditions.  S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if
the company succeeds in significantly lowering the risk of its
not being able to meet its upcoming maturities, and in light of
positive results from the parent company's debt restructuring
which remove the uncertainty regarding the total effect of the
restructuring on Plaza Centers.

ZIGGO NV: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Ba1 Corporate Family
Rating and a Ba1-PD Probability of Default Rating to Ziggo N.V.
while withdrawing Ziggo Bond Company B.V.'s Ba1 CFR/Ba1-PD

At the same time Moody's assigned a (P) Baa3 rating to the
proposed EUR500 million senior secured notes due 2020 of Ziggo
B.V., which is indirectly wholly-owned by Ziggo and affirmed the
existing bond ratings for Ziggo entities. The outlook for all
ratings for Ziggo and its rated subsidiaries is currently stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of debt instruments and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the debt. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

Ziggo's Ba1 CFR reflects (i) the company's leading position in
the Dutch pay-TV, broadband and telephony markets (approximately
64% market share for standard TV, 59% for digital TV, 48% for
broadband and 43% for telephony within Ziggo's service area),
(ii) its continued solid operating performance with industry-
leading margins, (iii) the expectation that Ziggo can deliver
continued revenue growth, albeit at a slower pace than
historically and (iv) a commitment to maintain a reported Net
Debt/ EBITDA ratio of 3.5x or below. However, Moody's note that
Ziggo's ratings have weakened in the Ba1 category over the last
year as competition for Ziggo has intensified, noticeably through
a more forceful competitive stance taken by the incumbent
telecoms operator KPN (rated Baa2/Negative Outlook by Moody's)
and a further step-up in Ziggo's aggressive distribution policy,
which is designed to fully absorb Ziggo's free cash flow
generation. A stable outlook assumes that Ziggo can show
continued growth momentum while broadly maintaining margins in
this challenging market.

Proceeds from the contemplated bond issue together with a new
senior secured credit facility will refinance term loans B and F
(together EUR1.1 billion) under the company's existing senior
credit facility (SFA). On a pro-forma basis the company's new
revolving credit facility (RCF) of up to EUR400 million will be
drawn in an amount of EUR175 million, leaving ample headroom
relative to Ziggo's operational needs, which Moody's expects the
company to use judiciously. Ziggo might look to upsize the bond
financing with a commensurate reduction of the senior secured
facilities. The term loan E under the existing SFA, which
represents a proceeds loan from Ziggo Finance B.V., the issuer of
Ziggo's existing senior secured bond, will remain outstanding.
All of Ziggo's senior secured instruments will share the same
upstream guarantees and security. While security for the new
bonds and the new SFA will be second ranking behind the existing
security for the term loan E and certain existing hedging
obligations, the creditors under all of Ziggo's senior secured
instruments will agree in an intercreditor agreement to share
security recoveries equally among them. Moody's treatment of all
of Ziggo's senior secured instruments as pari passu claims
therefore relies on the ongoing validity and enforceability of
the intercreditor agreement as contemplated.

Ziggo's recent results for the 2012 financial year showed
continued revenue (+4%) and adjusted EBITDA (+5.5%) growth and
the company's EBITDA margin remained strong at 57.3%. However,
revenue growth slowed down markedly during the second half of the
year to just above 1% and in a highly competitive environment the
company had to step up its marketing investment. While Moody's
believes that the company can show continued revenue growth on
the back of continued broadband and triple play penetration aided
by new marketing initiatives, a continued slowdown in revenue
momentum could result in negative pressure on the ratings. The
company's leverage as measured by the Debt/EBITDA ratio improved
to around 3.4x in 2012 (from 3.8x in 2011). Moody's assumes that
the ratio will at least be broadly maintained at this level.

Ziggo's liquidity provision is appropriate for its current needs.
At the 2012 year end, Ziggo reported EUR92.4 million in cash and
cash equivalents and had availability of EUR50 million in the
form of an undrawn committed bilateral facility. Following the
refinancing transaction, the company will have pro-forma
availability under its new committed RCF of around EUR225
million. The EUR50 million bilateral facility expires in the
second half of 2013. Ziggo has indicated that it will consider
calling its EUR1.2 billion senior notes in 2014. In this context
Moody's notes that on the basis of the current capital structure
(pro forma for the contemplated transactions), any additional
senior secured debt incurrence could have negative notching
consequences for the rated senior secured debt.

Ziggo's Ba1 CFR could come under downward pressure if the
company's operating performance deteriorates noticeably and/or
its Debt/EBITDA ratio moves above 3.5x towards 3.75x. Ratings
pressure would also ensue, if the company's free cash flow turned
negative in a more than marginal fashion. Moody's sees no near-
term catalyst for a ratings upgrade. Over time a combination of
the following factors : (i) a Debt/ EBITDA ratio sustained below
3.0x; (ii) a simplification of the company's group and borrowing
structure and (iii) sustainable solid operating performance could
result in upward pressure.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The principal methodologies used in rating Ziggo were Global
Cable Television Industry published in July 2009, and Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Ziggo, with central offices in Utrecht, is the largest cable
operator in the Netherlands. For FY2012, the company reported
EUR1.5 billion in revenue and EUR840 million in reported EBITDA
(before any adjustments for IPO costs).


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Cuts PDR to Ca-PD/LD; Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the probability of default
rating of Central European Distribution Corporation (CEDC) to Ca-
PD/LD (limited default).

The company's corporate family rating and the rating on the
senior secured notes due in 2016 issued by CEDC Finance
Corporation International remain unchanged at Ca. The outlook on
the ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale:

"T[he] rating action follows the company's failure to repay its
$258 million outstanding convertible notes which were due on
March 15, 2013", says Paolo Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice President
- Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CEDC. "This
triggered an event of default both under the company's
convertible notes indenture and under the US$380 million and
EUR430 million senior secured notes due 2016. Under the 2016
notes indenture, holders of not less than 25% of the outstanding
2016 notes can now declare the principal and any accrued interest
to be immediately due", continued Mr. Leschiutta.

Although Moody's understands the company is still seeking note
holders consent to restructure its debt through a possible
distress exchange offer, Moody's notes the ongoing complexity of
this transaction. Under the latest announcement made by CEDC on
March 19, the company terminated its offer to exchange new equity
in CEDC for its outstanding convertible notes due 2013 but that
will continue soliciting its 2013 notes holders to vote on an
amended pre-packaged chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The
termination follows an agreement reached with part of the holders
of the 2013 notes, including Roust Trading Ltd, representing
approximately 73% of noteholders. According to the agreement
holders of the 2013 notes could recover between 6% and 35.4% of
the principal amount on the 2013 notes.

The economic terms of the restructuring of the 2016 notes remains
unchanged, although Moody's understands that holders of the 2016
notes have now until April 4, 2013 to tender and not withdraw
their notes in order to accept the company's offer.

The rating actions and the "/LD" indicator applied to the PDR
follow the non-conversion and the mis-payment of the company's
outstanding convertible notes within their maturity. With
reference to the company's 2016 notes, currently Ca rated,
Moody's expects that it is still likely that the company will
achieve a debt restructuring that will involve, however, losses
for bondholders and will likely represent a distressed exchange
under Moody's definition. The CFR of Ca reflects the relatively
low recovery rate for notes holders that will accept the offer
and the fact that these represent most of the liability structure
of the company.

The negative outlook recognizes that further downward pressure
could be exerted on the ratings in the coming weeks if the
company failed to reach an agreement with its bondholders or if
other form of debt restructuring takes place resulting in a
greater loss for bondholders or in a default.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Downward pressure on the rating could develop if CEDC were to
pursue a debt restructuring through a bankruptcy procedure.
Ratings might be repositioned upwards once the company completes
its restructuring process and manages to reduce its debt burden.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Alcoholic Beverage Rating Methodology published in September
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, CEDC is one of the largest vodka
producers in the world, with annual sales of around 33.2 million
nine-liter cases, mainly in Russia and Poland. Following
investments in Russia over the past two years and the
consolidation since February 2011 of Whitehall Group, an importer
and distributor of premium spirits and wine, CEDC generated net
revenues of around $830 million during financial year-end
December 2011.


AEROFLOT OJSC: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDRs to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Russia-based OJSC Aeroflot's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
'BB-' from 'BB+'. The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are

The downgrade is driven by the fact that Aeroflot's standalone
credit metrics are no longer commensurate with the 'BB' rating
category. Fitch anticipates the company will maintain relatively
high leverage ratios, despite a forecast improvement of the
financial profile over 2013-2016. The company's ratings are
underpinned by its solid business profile for an airline company,
reflected in its strong market position in Russia that unlocks
high growth potential, solid position at the Sheremetjevo airport
hub, relatively diversified route network and competitive cost
position. Aeroflot's Long-term IDR of 'BB-' also incorporates a
one-notch uplift for state support.

Key Rating Drivers

- State Support

In accordance with Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage
methodology, Aeroflot's Long-term IDR continues to benefit from
parental support via a one-notch uplift to its standalone profile
assessed by Fitch at 'B+'. The agency views the strategic and
operational ties between the parent (Russian Federation;
'BBB'/Stable) and the company as relatively strong. This is
supported, among other things, by its majority state ownership
(51.2% direct stake in addition to a 9.5% indirect stake), import
duty exemptions for the purchase of certain types of aircraft and
the company's importance in the development of the country's air
transportation sector.

At the same time, Fitch acknowledges the potential negative
implications of state links, for example, a potential aggressive
consolidation and/or acquisition plans at the expense of
Aeroflot's credit profile, but highlights that the Rostechnologii
transaction, whilst proposed by the state, was to some extent at
Aeroflot's discretion and following due diligence process.

- Downgrade Reflects High Leverage

The downgrade reflects Fitch's view that Aeroflot's standalone
credit metrics are no longer commensurate with the 'BB' rating
category. Although Fitch forecasts improvement in the company's
financial profile over 2013-2016, its leverage metrics remain
high compared with its 'BB' rated peers.

Fitch forecasts Aeroflot's FFO adjusted leverage to have
decreased to below 6x in 2012 and expects gradual de-leveraging
to below 5x by 2016, despite the company's ambitious fleet
expansion and renewal program. While we acknowledge the benefits
of a newer, more efficient fleet, the funding of the capex
program will require additional debt burden putting pressure on
the company's financials. The agency anticipates FFO fixed charge
cover to increase to around 2x over the forecast period. Based on
these financial ratios, the company is well placed compared with
its 'B' rated airline peers.

- Solid Profitability Expected

Despite some erosion of its profitability in 2011-2012 due to
high fuel prices and consolidation of the financially weaker
Rostechnologii assets, we expect Aeroflot's profitability to
remain solid compared with its European and some US counterparts.
While yield and passenger revenue per available seat-kilometer
(PRASK) are largely in line with those of its rivals, the
company's cost ratios (eg cost per available seat-kilometer
(CASK)) put it at an advantage to other airlines providing a good
foundation for maintaining sound margins.

- Solid Business Profile

Fitch views Aeroflot's standalone business profile as
commensurate with the 'BB' rating category. It is supported by
its dominant position as Russia's national flag carrier in a
highly fragmented market (37% of the Russian passenger traffic in
2012), relatively diversified route network, strong position at
the Sheremetjevo airport hub and ability to capitalize on the
strong growth potential of the domestic market. While the yields
on the domestic routes fall short of those on the European
destinations, Fitch anticipates their increase in the medium

Fitch expects Aeroflot to continue dynamic growth given forecast
Russian GDP growth, increased mobility of Russian citizens and
the integration of the Rostechnologii airline stakes. The
consolidation of these assets has enabled Aeroflot to strengthen
its dominant position in Russia's airline sector and extend its
network and should underpin the implementation of the company's
multi-brand strategy in the medium term.


- Adequate Liquidity

Fitch views Aeroflot's liquidity position as satisfactory, with
cash of US$597 million at end-9M12 and committed credit lines of
about US$500 million (Aeroflot standalone) at end-2012 sufficient
to cover its short-term obligations. As at end-9M12, short-term
debt stood at US$784.6 million (including US$263.8 million of
finance leases). This included bonds totaling c.US$400 million
due in April 2013. The company has registered an issue of RUB-
denominated bonds for about RUB5 billion (around US$167 million),
the proceeds of which are likely to be used for refinancing
purposes. Fitch expects the company to generate negative free
cash flow (after finance lease payments) over 2012-2014.


Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- Evidence of stronger state support.

- Improvement of the financial profile (eg FFO adjusted leverage
   trending towards 4.0x and FFO fixed charge cover above 2.0x on
   a sustained basis) due to, among other things, material
   increase in profitability, moderation of investments in the
   fleet and/or drop in fuel prices.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Further material deterioration of the credit metrics due to,
   among other things, acquisitions, ambitious fleet expansion
   and/or high fuel prices (eg FFO adjusted leverage above 5.0x
   and FFO fixed charge cover below 1.5x on a sustained basis).

- Weakening of state support.


  Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+';
  Outlook Stable

  Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+';
  Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Foreign currency senior unsecured: downgraded to 'BB-' from

  Local currency senior unsecured: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+'

  National Long-term rating: downgraded to 'A+(rus)' from
  'AA(rus)'; Outlook Stable

  National Short-term rating: downgraded to 'F1(rus)' from

  National senior unsecured rating: downgraded to 'A+(rus)' from

HOME CREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Russia-based & Finance Bank to 'BB' from 'BB-' and
Tinkoff Credit Systems (TCS) to 'B+' from 'B'. At the same time,
the agency has affirmed Long-term IDRs of Credit Europe Bank Ltd
(CEB) at 'BB-'; Russian Standard Bank (RSB) at 'B+'; and CB
Renaissance Credit (CBRC) at 'B'. All five banks have Stable


The ratings of the five banks reflect Fitch's view of the credit
profile of the Russian consumer finance sector as a whole, the
banks' relative positioning within the sector and also potential
benefits and risks arising from other group/shareholder assets.

Fitch views positively the generally strong financial metrics of
the banks, reflected in (i) high lending margins, resulting in
usually strong internal capital generation and considerable
capacity to absorb losses through the income statement; (ii)
generally satisfactory asset quality to date, with loss rates
comfortably within those which the banks can sustain; (iii)
mostly solid capital ratios; and (iv) comfortable liquidity,
supported by the high cash generation of the banks' assets and
reduced refinancing risks as a result of lower wholesale funding.
The agency also views favorably the banks' generally strong and
quite experienced management teams, their mostly well-developed
credit underwriting functions and already quite extended track
record of at least reasonable performance in the sector.

At the same time, the sector continues to be rated firmly in sub-
investment grade territory due to (i) the potentially high
cyclicality of the banks' performance, resulting from exposure to
one of the riskiest lending segments in a highly cyclical
economy; and (ii) considerable uncertainty around the long-term
sustainability of their business models given increasing
competition from larger banks (with significant funding and
franchise advantages), the gradually increasing sophistication of
Russian consumers/borrowers and the potential for greater
regulatory scrutiny of high-rate consumer lending. More
immediately, Fitch is concerned about the very rapid recent
growth of the sector, which has resulted in a marked increase of
consumer indebtedness (both at the macro level and in terms of
average loan sizes at most of the banks) and has already
manifested itself in significant increases in loss rates in 2012.

In this context, the agency views positively measures taken or
proposed by the Central Bank to increase impairment reserves and
risk weights for consumer loans, which should help to slow growth
and improve loss absorption. However, these measures alone will
not be sufficient to address the issue of the increasing debt
burden of Russian retail borrowers, meaning longer-term concerns
remain. The stability of the consumer finance banks' recently and
rapidly acquired retail deposit bases is also yet to be tested,
and there is some risk that the high rates offered by the banks
to attract and retain this funding will be subject to greater
future regulatory scrutiny.


The upgrade of HCFB reflects the marked reduction in contingent
group risks related to investments and leverage of the broader
PPF group, the controlling shareholder of the bank, in particular
the confirmation by Assicurazioni Generali SpA (Generali;
'BBB+'/Negative) that it will complete the purchase of PPF's 49%
stake in their insurance joint venture Generali-PPF Holding (GPH)
by end-2014. This eliminates the uncertainty about the upcoming
repayment by PPF of a large EUR2.1 billion syndicated loan
(roughly equal to the group's total liquid assets at end-2011),
which is secured by its stake in GPH.

Fitch continues to view HCFB's standalone profile as consistent
with a 'BB' Long-term IDR due to its robust performance (ROE of
51% in 2012), reasonable, albeit moderately increased, credit
losses (defined as NPLs generated / average performing loans;
10.4% in 2012) and solid capital (regulatory CAR of 14.7% at end-
2012) and liquidity positions. At the same time, Fitch notes that
the doubling of the loan book in 2012 was mainly achieved through
increasing limits for existing borrowers, although growth is
likely to slow significantly in 2013 due to market saturation,
base effects and tighter capital regulation. Accordingly, HCFB's
profitability is likely to moderate somewhat, mainly because
insurance-related commissions (46% of 2012 pre-impairment
profit), which are recognized upfront, are directly linked to
loan issuance volume.


The upgrade of TCS reflects the bank's extended track record of
exceptionally strong financial results (ROE of 59% in 2012);
confirmed ability to diversify acquisition channels and grow the
business (141% in 2012), while keeping credit losses (10.3% in
2012) and costs under control; and an improved funding profile,
reflected in greater diversification by source and maturity.
Capitalization is reasonable (regulatory CAR of 17.4% at end-
2012) and the impact of higher regulatory risk weights (linked to
loan rates) should be manageable as TCS generates a sizable
portion of its revenues from fees for cash withdrawals, which are
not captured in effective interest rate calculations.

As a branchless business, TCS also has the most flexible cost
base, which could compensate the effect, at least partially, of a
potential rise in loss rates in scenario downturn. However, on
the negative side, in Fitch's view TCS would be likely to have
somewhat lower deleveraging capacity in a stress scenario than
other consumer finance banks, due to its monoline focus on credit
cards and the risk that borrowers may tend to maintain or even
increase limit utilization in a downturn.

In Fitch's view, there are no significant risks for TCS as a
result of its holding company, Egidaco plc, being domiciled in
Cyprus. The holdco has no operating activities, and servicing of
the SEK bond issued by Egidaco (the only material non-equity
funding on the parent balance sheet; not rated by Fitch) does not
involve any cash flows going through Cyprus.


The affirmation of RSB's Long-term IDR at 'B+' reflects Fitch's
view that the bank's credit profile, although in many respects
consistent with a 'BB-' rating, is constrained by weak
capitalization and risks relating to other shareholder assets.
Capital distributions during 2011-2012, mostly made to support
the attempted acquisition by RSB's shareholder, Roustam Tariko,
of Central European Distribution Company (CEDC), a distressed
Polish alcoholic beverage company, resulted in the Fitch core
capital (FCC) ratio falling to 6.4% at end-2012. This is notably
lower then reported Basel/regulatory capital ratios as Fitch
deducts from core capital RSB's investment in the equity of its
parent company, as well as some deferred tax assets and

The quality of capital is also weakened by RSB's holdings of CEDC
debt and loans which, in Fitch's view, may be to related parties.
These exposures were equal 30% of FCC (but not deducted from it).
Mr. Tariko has offered to pay US$172 million to support a
restructuring of CEDC's debt in exchange for an 85% stake in the
company. Fitch believes these funds (equal to 31% of RSB's FCC)
would ultimately need to come from RSB, as the shareholder's
other businesses are not cash generative and may themselves
require support. Furthermore, this offer may need to be increased
due to a competing bid to restructure/acquire CEDC.

More positively, RSB's core capital is to be supported in Q113 by
conversion into equity of a RUB5bn subordinated debt facility
initially provided by the shareholder (this should add about
2ppts to the FCC ratio). Performance is also strong (return on
average equity of 28% in 2012), although an expected softening of
profitability in 2013 as loss rates tick up, and targeted 40%
loan growth, mean that internal capital generation is not likely
to have a material net positive impact on capital ratios.
Liquidity remains comfortable, and additional comfort is derived
from the track record of rapid deleveraging and satisfactory
through-the-cycle performance during the last crisis.

The affirmation of CEB's VR at 'bb-' and Long-term IDR at 'BB-'
reflects the lower cyclicality and volatility of its performance
relative to other retail lenders, resulting from its generally
less aggressive past and planned growth and somewhat less risky
business mix (unsecured lending equals only 40% of the loan book,
with the balance mostly accounted for by car loans and corporate
exposures) and reflected in lower retail loss rates (3.3% on
average in 2012) compared with the other reviewed banks.

At the same time, CEB's profitability is lower compared with
peers (ROE of 16.5% in 2012), liquidity is more tightly managed
and the bank is more dependent on wholesale funding (above 50% of
liabilities), resulting in somewhat greater refinancing risks.
CEB's Long-term IDR is underpinned at the 'BB-' level by
potential support from its parent, Credit Europe Bank N.V. (CEBN,


The affirmation of CBRC's 'B' Long-term IDR reflects its markedly
weaker and more volatile performance relative to other banks in
the sector, and the significant increase in loss rates in 2012
which has prompted a review of underwriting policies. NPL
origination rose to 15% of average performing loans in 2012 from
6.5% in 2011, in part, Fitch believes, due to more aggressive
loan growth and underwriting criteria under the former
shareholder. Reported profitability remained strong (ROAE of 19%
in 2012) reflecting good reported cost control, but was supported
by insurance-related commissions (equal to 62% of 2012 pre-
impairment profit; booked up front), and moderate provisioning of
NPLs (69% coverage at end-2012).

However, capital and liquidity remain sound, with the FCC ratio
at 20% at end-2012 and liquid assets exceeding total wholesale
funding (most of which falls due in 2013). CBRC's credit profile
has also benefited from its acquisition in 2012 by the Onexim
Group, which reduced contingent risks relating to other assets of
the broader Renaissance group, and was followed by a RUB3.3bn
equity injection into the bank.

The Stable Outlooks on the five banks reflect Fitch's view that
strengths derived from their financial metrics reasonably offset
increasing risks from rapid growth, higher loss rates and
potentially more onerous regulation. As a result, rating changes
in the near term are relatively unlikely.

However, the ratings of all the banks could come under downward
pressure if there was a marked downturn in the Russian economy or
further sustained very rapid growth of retail lending, resulting
in markedly higher consumer indebtedness and weaker credit
underwriting. Significant deposit outflows at any of the banks,
resulting in a sharp tightening of liquidity, could also result
in negative rating action. Conversely, an extended period of more
balanced growth, sound performance and successful franchise
protection and development could result in moderate rating upside
over the medium term.

RSB's ratings could be downgraded if the shareholder's ongoing
attempts to acquire CEDC result in a further marked deterioration
of the bank's capitalization. Conversely, a failure of the
acquisition bid and a gradual rebuilding of the bank's
capitalization, could result in an upgrade.

The potential for an upgrade of CBRC is somewhat higher than at
other banks due to the rating's current low level. A
strengthening of the bank's underwriting, moderation of loss
rates and greater sustainability of performance could lead to an

CEB's Long-term IDR could be upgraded if there is an upgrade of
the parent. The rating would only come under downward pressure in
case of downgrades both of the parent and of CEB's own VR.

The banks' senior unsecured debt is rated in line with their
Long-term IDRs, reflecting Fitch's view of average recovery
prospects, in case of default. The subordinated debt ratings of
HCFB, RSB and TCS are notched once off their VRs (and hence Long-
term IDRs) in line with Fitch's criteria for rating these

Any changes to the banks' Long-term IDRs would be likely impact
the ratings of both senior unsecured and subordinated debt. Debt
ratings could also be downgraded in case of a further marked
increase in the proportion of retail deposits in the banks'
liabilities, resulting in greater subordination of bondholders.
In accordance with Russian legislation, retail depositors rank
above those of other senior unsecured creditors.


The '5' Support Ratings of HCFB, RSB, TCS and CBRC reflect
Fitch's view that support from the banks' private shareholders
cannot be relied upon. The Support Ratings and Support Rating
Floors of 'No Floor' also reflect the fact that support from the
Russian authorities, although possible given the banks' increased
deposit franchises, is not factored into the ratings due to the
banks' still small size and lack of overall systemic importance.

CEB's '3' Support Rating reflects Fitch's view that CEBN would
have a very high propensity to support CEB if needed, given CEB's
importance to the group (accounting for 25% of assets and 50% of
net income in 2012), the high level of integration within the
group and high reputational risk for CEBN should it allow CEB to
default. At the same time, the one-notch difference between CEBN
and CEB reflects the cross-border nature of the parent-subsidiary
relationship, and moderate uncertainty as to the propensity of
support in case of extreme stress.

The rating actions are:


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: upgraded to 'BB' from
'BB-'; Outlooks Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb' from 'bb-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'BB' from

Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'


Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook

National Long-term Rating: affirmed 'A+(rus)'; Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability rating: affirmed at 'bb-''

Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'BB-'

Senior unsecured debt National Long-term Rating: affirmed at

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B+'


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: upgraded to 'B+' from
'B'; Outlooks Stable

National Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'A(rus)' from
'BBB+(rus)'; Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b+' from 'b'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'B+' from
'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Senior unsecured debt National Long-term Rating: upgraded to
'A(rus)' from 'BBB+(rus)'

Subordinated debt: assigned at 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'


Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable

Long-term local currency IDR: assigned at 'B+'; Outlook Stable

National Long-term Rating: assigned at 'A-(rus)'; Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'B+';
Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B';
Outlook Stable

National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'BBB(rus)', Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'B';
Recovery Rating 'RR4',

Senior unsecured debt National Long-term Rating: affirmed at

MDM BANK: Fitch Withdraws 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn MDM Bank, Open Joint Stock Company's
ratings as the bank has chosen to stop participating in the
rating process. The ratings have been withdrawn without
affirmation because the bank has not provided the agency with
sufficient information to enable it to decide on the appropriate
rating level. Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage of MDM.

Fitch notes that the key areas of concern in respect the bank's
credit profile remain asset quality and adequateness of reserves;
weak capitalization and uncertainty about sufficiency of capital
support from the sale of impaired loans to a fund partially
financed by the bank's shareholders in Q412; weak performance;
and continued franchise erosion.

These ratings have been withdrawn without affirmation:

-- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs): 'BB-'; Negative Outlooks
-- Short-term IDR: 'B'
-- Viability Rating: 'bb-'
-- Support Rating: '4'
-- Support Rating Floor: 'B'
-- National Long-term Rating: 'A+(rus)'
-- Senior unsecured debt: 'BB-'
-- Senior unsecured debt (national scale): 'A+(rus)'


AYT ANDALUCIA: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on EUR21MM Cl. D Notes
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of one mezzanine
note in one Spanish asset backed securities transaction, AyT
Andalucia FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA and confirmed ratings of three
additional tranches of the same transaction. At the same time,
the ratings of the outstanding senior notes of Madrid FTPYME I
and Madrid FTPYME II are confirmed.

Issuer: AyT Andalucia Ftempresa Cajamar, FTA

EUR179M A(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible

EUR27.5M B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible

EUR27.5M C Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR21M D Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Madrid FTPYME I, FTA

A2(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible

Issuer: Madrid FTPYME II, FTA

A2(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible

The rating action concludes the review of six ABS notes backed by
loan receivables granted to small and medium sized entities
(SME), which were placed on review on July 2, 2012, following the
downgrade of Spain's government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on
June 13, 2012. The rating actions are prompted by the
reassessment of the available credit enhancement to address
sovereign risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement that
drives these rating actions reflects the introduction of
additional risk factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the
impact of sovereign risk on structured finance transactions (see
"Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the Impact of
Sovereign Risk", March 11, 2013). The rating actions taken on AyT
Andalucia FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA also reflect increased
counterparty risks related to the issuer's account bank. Moody's
confirmed the ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and
structural features provided enough protection against sovereign
and (if applicable) counterparty risk.

Moody's downgraded the Class C notes in AyT Andalucia FTEmpresas
Cajamar, FTA by one notch to Baa2.
Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects primarily the impact of sovereign
risk. All Spanish ABS SME affected by this rating action are
impacted by the introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions accounting for the impact of the
deterioration of the sovereign's credit condition. In case of AyT
Andalucia FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA, the rating actions also
reflect the relatively high exposure of the rated notes to the
issuer account bank.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling, or "LCC") and the applicable
portfolio credit enhancement for this rating. With the
introduction of these additional factors, Moody's intends to
better reflect increased sovereign risk in its quantitative
analysis, in particular for mezzanine and junior tranches. See
"Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the Impact of
Sovereign Risk" for a more detailed explanation of the additional

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables is
A3. The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required
credit enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
SME transactions, the loss distribution volatility increases to
capture the increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected
loss of a portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the
combination of the highest achievable rating in a country for SF
and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating uniquely
determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution, which is
typically measured as the coefficient of variation (COV) for ABS
SME transactions. All things equal, (i) a higher applicable CE
for a given rating ceiling or, alternatively, (ii) a lower rating
ceiling with the same applicable CE, translate into a higher COV
according to the updated methodology.

- Revision Of Key Collateral Assumptions

For all rating actions referenced herein, Moody's maintained its
default and recovery rate assumptions compared to its last review
in Q4 2012. However, Moody's increased its volatility assumption
in accordance with the updated methodology to account for
sovereign risk in SF transactions. Specifically, for Madrid
FTPYME I Moody's increased its volatility (CoV) assumption to
57.2% (from 40%), which together with a mean DP of 14.6% (as
percentage of current balance) and a fixed recovery rate of 40%,
results into a portfolio credit enhancement of 20.5%. For Madrid
FTYPME II, Moody's increased its CoV assumption to 66.1% (from
43%), which results into a portfolio credit enhancement of 20%
taking into account the mean DP of 10% (as percentage of current
balance) and a fixed recovery rate of 30%. Finally, for AyT
Andalucia FTEmpreasa Cajamar, FTA the CoV was increased to 63%
(from 50%), which together with a mean DP of 18% (as percentage
of current balance) and a fixed recovery rate of 45%, results
into a portfolio credit enhancement of 24.5%.

- Exposure To Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to weakened counterparties acting
either as originator, collection agent, issuer account bank or
swap counterparty in the transactions. The inability of key
transaction parties to perform their roles and difficulty in
replacing them increases the risk of payment disruption and
performance deterioration in structured finance transactions.

Specifically, regarding the issuer account bank, Moody's has
assessed the probability and effect of a default of the issuer
account bank on the ability of the issuer to meet its obligations
under the transactions, including the impact of the loss of any
benefit from the reserve fund and accumulated collections. In
conclusion, these factors will not negatively affect the ratings
of the notes issued by Madrid FTPYME I and II, while the ratings
on the notes related to AyT Andalucia FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA,
were negatively impacted by the exposure to the issuer's account
bank, being Banesto (rated Baa3 / P-3, under review for possible
upgrade). For the latter transaction, the considered exposure
results from: (i) collections currently transferred every day
from the servicer's (Cajas Rurals Unidas, not rated) collection
account to the treasury account held at the issuer account bank,
where the amounts are accumulated until next quarterly payment
date and (ii) the reserve fund representing 16.6% of current pool
balance being also held by Banesto as issuer account bank.
Moody's approach for addressing the counterparty risk related to
the issuer account bank is described in the rating implementation
guideline "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines."

These rating actions take also into consideration the (i) current
swap counterparties (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (Baa3 /
P-3) in case of Madrid FTPYME I and II; CECABank S.A. (Ba1, under
review for possible downgrade / NP) in case of AyT Andalucia
FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA) as well as (ii) the current swap
triggers as applicable to the respective transactions. Although,
the swaps related to Madrid FTPYME I and II remain in breach of
the first level swap triggers since change in swap trigger levels
in December 2012, and the swap for AyT Andalucia FTEmpresas
Cajamar, FTA is in breach of the second level swap trigger, these
swap related elements do not impact the current ratings.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increase portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating level.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the normal inverse distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche."

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, for Madrid FTPYME II the input of the
interest deferral trigger of the Loan B has been corrected during
the review. Similarly, for AyT Andalucia FTEmpresas Cajamar, FTA,
the input for the default definition applicable on the portfolio
has been corrected during the review."

FONCAIXA LEASINGS 2: DBRS Rates Series B Notes BB(high)(sf)
DBRS Ratings Limited has finalized the provisional ratings of A
(sf) to the Series A floating rate notes and BB (high) (sf) to
the Series B floating rate notes to be issued by Foncaixa
Leasings 2 F.T.A. ("FC Leasings 2").  The Notes are backed by a
pool of lease receivables originated in Spain by CaixaBank S.A.

The above mentioned ratings are provisional.  Final ratings will
be issued upon receipt of execution version of the governing
transaction documents. To the extent that the documents and
information provided by CaixaBank and GestiCaixa, Sociedad
Gestora De Fondos De Titulizacion, S.A. ("GestiCaixa") to DBRS as
of this date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS may assign different final ratings to
the Notes or may avoid assigning final ratings to the Notes

The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

   * Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
     available credit enhancement.

   * Relevant credit enhancement is in the form of subordination
     and an amortizing cash reserve which provide credit support.
     Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS
     projected expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption
     under various stress scenarios at an A (sf) standard for the
     Series A Notes and BB (high) (sf) for the Series B Notes.

   * The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
     flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
     in which they have invested.

   * The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
     originations, underwriting, servicing, and financial

   * The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
     servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral.

   * The legal structure and presence of legal opinions
     addressing the assignment of the assets to the issuer and
     the consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European
     Structured Finance Transactions.

IM PRESTAMOS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa3'
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the notes
issued by IM Prestamos Fondos Cedulas, FTA, and the liquidity
facility available to this issuer.

Issuer: IM Prestamos Cedulas, FTA

  EUR344,100,000 (current rated balance EUR178.7M) Class A Notes,
  Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and
  Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR6,900,000 (current rated balance EUR3.2M) Class B Notes,
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2011 Downgraded
  to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR900,000 Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
  on Nov 8, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Remained On Review
  for Possible Downgrade

  EUR30,000,000 (currently undrawn) Liquidity Facility,
  Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and
  Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

This transaction is a static cash CBO of portions of subordinated
loans funding the reserve funds of 7 (at closing 14) Spanish
multi-issuer covered bonds (SMICBs), which can be considered as a
securitization of a pool of Cedulas. Each SMICB is backed by a
group of Cedulas which are bought by a Fund, which in turn issues
SMICBs. Cedulas holders are secured by the issuer's entire
mortgage book. The subordinated loans backing the IM Prestamos
transaction represent the first loss pieces in the respective
SMICB structures (or structured Cedulas). Therefore this
transaction is exposed to the risk of several Spanish financial
institutions defaulting under their mortgage covered bonds

The liquidity facility may be drawn to fund the difference
between interest accrued and due on the subordinated loans of the
seven SMICBs and interest actually received on these loans. The
amount drawn under this facility is thus a function of (i) number
and value of underlying delinquent and defaulted Cedulas, (ii)
level of short term EURIBOR and (iii) time taken for final
realization of recoveries on defaulted Cedulas. While the
liquidity facility is currently not drawn, Moody's analysis
assumes that a portion of it will be drawn at some time during
the remaining life of this transaction.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the rating action is a result of a further decline
in credit quality of some of the issuers of Cedulas which make up
the SMICBs. As a result, Moody's loss expectations for all
underlying covered bonds within the SMICBs have increased.

Moody's considers that should a Cedulas issuer default, it is
likely that the reserve funds that form the underlying portfolio
of IM Prestamos would require to be drawn upon to make good the
potential shortfall suffered by the underlying Cedulas holders.
The extent of such potential shortfall is dependent on the level
of over collateralization and quality of the issuer's underlying
mortgage pool. Moody's analysis indicates that in the light of
such potential shortfalls, the credit quality of the reserve
funds of the seven SMICBs that form the portfolio of IM Prestamos
Fondos Cedulas is presently more consistent with ratings in a
Caa2-Ba3 range compared to a B1(sf)- Ba2(sf) range in Nov 2011
and a Ba3(sf)- Baa2(sf) range in April 2011.

Of the seven SMICBs whose reserve funds constitute the
transaction portfolio, the ratings of 6 SMICBs remain on review
for possible downgrade and 1 on review direction uncertain.
Accordingly, the rating of the liquidity facility available to IM
Prestamos and the Class A notes also remain on review for
possible further downgrade.

The credit quality of the reserve funds of these seven SMICBs is
substantially driven by high recovery rate assumptions on the
underlying Cedulas. The ratings of the liquidity facility
available to IM Prestamos Fondos Cedulas, FTA and the issued
notes are thus sensitive to these recovery rate assumptions.

In addition, the credit quality of the liquidity facility is
affected by the estimated level of draw-down, with higher draw-
downs resulting in declining credit quality. As stated earlier,
draw-down is affected by (i) number and value of delinquent and
defaulted Cedulas, (ii) short-term EURIBOR rates and (iii) time
taken for realization of final recoveries on defaulted Cedulas.

Moody's base case scenario assumes that the liquidity facility is
drawn down to the extent of EUR 8 million. This level of draw
down reflects (i) a vast majority of the current underlying pool
being delinquent or in default, (ii) ongoing short-term EURIBOR
at current levels, and (iii) roughly two years from Cedulas
default to final recoveries.

Moody's undertook a number of sensitivity runs assuming lower and
higher draw down amounts for the liquidity facility. For the
liquidity facility, the model output for an EUR6 million draw
down was 1.5 notches better compared to the base case, whereas it
was 1 notch worse than base case for draw down amount of EUR 10

The model outputs for the notes and the liquidity facility were
affected by about half a notch and a notch respectively for an
increased correlation of c 60% between the underlying assets in
the transaction portfolio. Except for the increased correlation
of c 60% used in the sensitivity run for the notes, underlying
Cedulas default probabilities and recovery rates used in Moody's
model are in line with the covered bond rating methodology

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as 100% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Spain 2) fluctuations
in EURIBOR and 3) the recovery of defaulted assets and the timing
of final recoveries on defaulted Cedulas. Realization of higher
than expected recoveries would positively impact the ratings of
the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations" published in September 2009. The methodology used in
rating the Liquidity Facility was "Moody's approach to
Counterparty Instrument Ratings" published in February 2012.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's CDOROM
is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's default
probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity is
modeled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Automobiles Up for Auction at KVD Kvarndammen
KVD Kvarndammen on March 19 disclosed that the last unique Saabs
are now going to auction at KVD's marketplace

Among the lots are cars that were built in very limited numbers
and a number of car models that Saab Automobile AB started to
produce but that never came to the market.  The auction, which
features 78 Saabs, was set to start on March 19 and conclude on
April 3.

Among the cars are 31 of Saabs SUV, the 9-4X, only 700 of which
were produced.  The auction also sees the sale of seven of the 30
or so 9-5 NEW Sportkombi that were produced and 37 of the 54 9-5
New Sedan for the 2012 model year that were built.

"We held a similar auction at the end of last year and noticed
the strong following that SAAB still has around the world.  The
interest was enormous, both in Sweden and internationally.  With
the last cars now being sold we expect an equally high level of
interest from Saab enthusiasts," says Per Blomberg, Business area
manager at KVD.

Among the cars being sold are the last factory produced Saab 9-3X
built by Saab Automobile AB and one of only three existing Saab
9-3 SportSedan in the colour Skyblue.  In addition, there is a
Saab 9-5 NEW SportSedan TiD6 (Alpha)2.9 superdiesel.

The cars were to be displayed at Wallhamn, some kilometers north
of Gothenburg, on Friday, March 22. For security reasons, a
scheduled appointment is required.  To make an appointment,
interested parties were to send an e-mail with their name,
contact details and which car they are interested in to by Thursday, March 21.

The auction has been commissioned by Saab's receivers in
bankruptcy.  The cars are being sold individually and bidding
takes place on KVD Kvarndammen's market place

Photographs and detailed information about the cars may be found
on these Web sites.  Some of the cars cannot be driven on the
road, while others need to be completed or registered.  The
conditions applying to each car will be found with its
description on the Web site.

More information about the auction: http://www.kvd.seor

More information about the Saab bankruptcy:


PDF with all the cars:

            About Saab Automobile AB and Saab Cars N.A.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.  Saab halted production in March 2011 when it ran out of
cash to pay its component providers.  On Dec. 19, 2011, Saab
Automobile AB, Saab Automobile Tools AB and Saab Powertain AB
filed for bankruptcy after running out of cash.

Some of Saab's assets were sold to National Electric Vehicle
Sweden AB, a Chinese-Japanese backed start-up that plans to make
an electric car using Saab Automobile's former factory, tools and

On Jan. 30, 2012, more than 40 U.S.-based Saab dealerships filed
an involuntary Chapter 11 petition for Saab Cars North America,
Inc. (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 12-10344).  The petitioners,
represented by Wilk Auslander LLP, assert claims totaling US$1.2
million on account of "unpaid warranty and incentive
reimbursement and related obligations" or "parts and warranty
reimbursement."  Leonard A. Bellavia, Esq., at Bellavia Gentile &
Associates, in New York, signed the Chapter 11 petition on behalf
of the dealers.

The dealers want the vehicle inventory and the parts business to
be sold, free of liens from Ally Financial Inc. and Caterpillar
Inc., and "to have an appropriate forum to address the claims of
the dealers," Leonard A. Bellavia said in an e-mail to Bloomberg

Saab Cars N.A. is the U.S. sales and distribution unit of Swedish
car maker Saab Automobile AB.  Saab Cars N.A. named in December
an outside administrator, McTevia & Associates, to run the
company as part of a plan to avoid immediate liquidation
following its parent company's bankruptcy filing.

On Feb. 24, 2012, the Court granted Saab Cars NA relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc., was retained as claims and
noticing agent to Saab Cars NA in the Chapter 11 case.

On March 9, 2012, the U.S. Trustee formed an official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors and appointed these members: Peter Mueller
Inc., IFS Vehicle Distributors, Countryside Volkwagen, Saab of
North Olmstead, Saab of Bedford, Whitcomb Motors Inc., and
Delaware Motor Sales, Inc.  The Committee tapped Wilk Auslander
LLP as general bankruptcy counsel, and Polsinelli Shughart as its
Delaware counsel.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLOCKBUSTER UK: Agrees Rescue Deal with Gordon Brothers Europe
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that Blockbuster has been
rescued following a deal with restructuring group Gordon Brothers

The deal will save 2,000 Blockbuster employees and 264 stores
after the retailer collapsed into administration in January, the
Telegraph says.

A deal between Gordon Brothers and Deloitte, the administrators
to Blockbuster, was agreed on Friday night and confirmed on
Saturday afternoon, the Telegraph relates.

According to the Telegraph, a source close to the deal said that
it would be "business as usual" for Blockbuster following the
deal, the price of which is undisclosed, despite the fact Gordon
Brothers has a reputation as a liquidation specialist.

Blockbuster, which was owned by US pay-TV provider Dish Network,
called in administrators after failing to meet profit targets at
the end of last year, the Telegraph recounts.  The company had
528 stores and 4,190 staff when it called in administrators, but
more than half of the workers have already lost their jobs as
Deloitte has been forced to close stores, the Telegraph notes.

Blockbuster owed creditors and suppliers GBP139 million when it
was placed into administration, the Telegraph discloses.
Deloitte has said that unsecured creditors could be paid a
dividend of as much as 9p if the business is sold as a going
concern, the Telegraph relates.

Blockbuster UK is a DVD rental company.  It is part of
Blockbuster L.L.C.

COVENTRY CITY: Hearing on Finances Scheduled for Tomorrow
Press Association reports that this week, a High Court judge is
due to analyze the finances of Coventry City after the owner of
the stadium where the League One football club plays said it was
owed rent.

Arena Coventry said earlier this month that it was owed more than
GBP1.3 million and planned to ask a High Court judge to place the
club into administration, Press Association relates.

Lawyers representing Arena Coventry appeared at the High Court in
London to outline the latest state of play, Press Association
recounts.  According to Press Association, they said Arena
Coventry bosses had been concerned by a statement made by the
club earlier this week -- and needed more time to consider their

A judge adjourned the hearing until tomorrow, March 26, Press
Association discloses.

Press Association notes that in the statement, a Coventry City
spokesman had said that a "non-operating subsidiary" of the club
had been placed into administration.  The spokesman, as cited by
Press Association, said the "football club itself" was not under
threat and would continue to "trade as normal".

Coventry City Football Club is an English football club based in
Coventry, central England.  It competes in Football League One,
the third-highest tier of the English football league system.

CPP GROUP: Explores Options as Debt Deadline Looms
Agnes Lovasz at Bloomberg News, citing Sunday Times, reports that
CPP Group is exploring options to avoid bankruptcy as it faces
March 30 deadline to raise financing to repay debt.

According to Bloomberg, the Sunday Times said that credit card
insurer's bankruptcy would result in the loss of 1,500 jobs.

The Sunday Times said that the company's options to avoid
insolvency are limited as its long-term prospects is undermined
by Financial Services Authority fine for misselling insurance
policies, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates that the Sunday Times said
PricewaterhouseCoopers may be appointed as administrator in case
of bankruptcy.

CPP Group plc is a British-based company selling life assistance

HMV GROUP: Hilco Rescue Deal Expected in Ten Days
Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph reports that a deal to rescue HMV
could be struck within ten days as restructuring specialist Hilco
tries to strike an agreement with record labels and film studios.

Deloitte, the administrator, had being aiming to agree the sale
of HMV today, March 25, the day retailers pay rent for the next
quarter, the Telegraph discloses.

However, discussions between Hilco are other stakeholders in HMV
-- namely the suppliers and landlords -- have been complex, the
Telegraph notes.

The record labels and film studios, the major suppliers, are
desperate for HMV to survive because it provides a high street
presence for the music and film industries and a rival to Amazon,
Apple and supermarket chains, the Telegraph says.

However, according to one source, the suppliers are "looking to
see what they can get out of this", the Telegraph states.  The
record labels and film studies propped up HMV before it collapsed
by offering the retailer a great access to back catalogues and
agreeing it could offer special promotions, the Telegraph

According to the Telegraph, the talks are being led by a
collection of 15 to 20 film studios and record labels, such as
Universal.  The talks could lead to some of the suppliers taking
a stake in the new HMV, the Telegraph says.

It is understood that Hilco, which controls HMV's debt, is
looking to buy around 120 HMV shops, the Telegraph discloses.  It
is the only party still in discussions with Deloitte about a
deal, although supermarket group Asda was also interested in HMV,
the Telegraph notes.

According to the Telegraph, a source close to the talks said: "We
are still positive a deal will happen."  They said a deal could
happen "within the next seven to ten days".

Documents from Deloitte show that music chain HMV owed GBP347
million of debts when it filed for administration in early
January, the Telegraph discloses.  The loss includes GBP237
million owed to a unsecured creditors, which Deloitte says will
go unpaid, the Telegraph states.

When HMV collapsed into administration, the company had 223 UK
sites and employed 4,123 staff, the Telegraph recounts.

According to The Financial Times' Robert Budden, a deal could see
HMV survive with as many as 140 outlets across the UK -- about 25
more than expected -- as Hilco looks to reverse a number of store
closures that have been unveiled in recent weeks.

A sale by Deloitte, the administrator, to Hilco, could secure the
future of over 1,500 jobs, the FT says.

About 50 parties initially expressed an interest in HMV to
Deloitte, including trade buyers and private equity groups, the
FT discloses.

According to The Scotsman's Kristy Dorsey, although terms for
many of HMV's remaining shops have been re-negotiated to monthly
rents, today's quarterly payment deadline is still said to be
"significant".  Hilco has reportedly put together an offer in the
region of GBP50 million, though there is no guarantee that a sale
will go ahead, the Scotsman discloses.

Hilco, which bought HMV Canada in 2011, has bought up most of the
UK chain's bank debt and is thus negotiating with administrators
Deloitte as both a bidder and a creditor, the Scotsman notes.

                          About HMV Group

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of
pre-recorded music, video, electronic games and related
entertainment products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the
retailing of books principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The
Company operates in four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV
International, HMV Live, and Waterstone's.

On Jan. 14, HMV Group went into administration after suppliers
refused a request for a GBP300 million lifeline for the company.
Deloitte was appointed as administrator to the chain, which was
hit by growing competition from online rivals, supermarkets, and
illegal downloads.

INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed International Personal Finance Plc's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+', Short-term IDR at
'B' and senior unsecured debt at 'BB+'. The Outlook on the IDR is


IPF's ratings reflect significant credit, operational, regulatory
and FX risks arising from unsecured home-collected lending in
emerging markets, as well as IPF's modest business scale and
limited funding diversification, entirely reliant on wholesale
funds. These risks would normally cap the ratings firmly below
investment grade. However, uplift to the IDR is provided by the
company's modest leverage, strong cash and capital generation and
robust risk management.

The affirmation and Stable Outlook reflect continued strong
underlying profitability in its major operating markets in 2012,
modest leverage and an improved equity base helped by strong
capital generation. Although Fitch expects revenue growth and
diversification to continue as IPF expands into new markets
(Bulgaria and Lithuania) and develops new products in 2013, it
will likely take several years for the benefits to become

Strong underlying profitability in its major operating markets in
2012 was mostly sustained by revenue growth backed by steady
growth of receivables in operating countries. While arrears
continued to be a significant part of IPF's business model (25%
of gross receivables were over 90 days overdue at end-2012), they
are monitored centrally on a weekly basis and underwriting is
adjusted accordingly.

IPF is not allowed to take deposits and is fully reliant on bonds
and bank facilities. Liquidity and refinancing risks are partly
mitigated by the cash generative nature of IPF's business and
short-term nature of its lending, which could allow rapid de-
leveraging in case of need. During 2012, key bank facilities were
extended to 2015 and IPF accessed the wholesale markets for
funding throughout the financial crisis with no major
difficulties. Fitch's base case is that IPF will continue to be
able to issue in the markets in 2013. This was tested with a
GBP11 million Hungarian forint issue in January 2013. Moreover,
IPF had GBP159.5 million funding headroom at end-2012, which in
Fitch's view provides an additional cushion to fund business
expansion should wholesale markets become disrupted.

Profit before tax declined by 10% in 2012, mostly affected by
weaker FX rates (GBP14.9 million), one-off restructuring costs
(GBP4.8 million) in the UK head office and higher early
settlement rebates (ESR) costs (GBP10.8 million) due to the
implementation of the EU Consumer Credit Directive in Poland and
Czech Republic in 2011. Excluding these, underlying pre-tax
profit improved by GBP20.3 million yoy, mostly driven by strong
loan and revenue growth in Poland, Hungary and Mexico.

Impairment charges slightly weakened to 27% of revenues (2011:
26%), although they remained at acceptable levels and in line
with previous years. Moreover, given IPF's business model,
earnings volatility will remain linked to FX changes.
IPF is also exposed to significant regulatory risks and 2013
revenues will continue to be affected by additional ESR costs in
Poland (expected GBP10-15 million). The continuing regulatory
scrutiny of consumer credit also presents further risks to IPF's
business model.

Leverage (debt to tangible equity) is modest and fell to 0.8x at
end-2012 (2011: 0.9x). Surplus capital is returned to
shareholders via dividends (25% pay-out ratio) and share buybacks
(GBP25 million in 2012).


Upside potential to the IDRs is limited in the short to medium
term given its full reliance on wholesale funding, the relatively
small scale of the business, lack of diversification and
significant credit risk from unsecured lending in emerging
markets. The ratings could be downgraded if there was an increase
in leverage, significant deterioration in the funding position,
asset quality and performance, or a threat to the business model
due to regulatory or competitive challenges.

The group's senior debt ratings are sensitive to a change in the


* EUROPE: Fitch Says Ratings of MDBs Remain Under Pressure
In a new report, Fitch Ratings says that there are increasing
contrasts in rating trends and outlooks between European and
regional/sub-regional supranational institutions, largely
reflecting the impact of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The
negative trends affecting European multilateral development banks
(MDBs) contrast with the more positive outlook for their
regional/sub-regional counterparts.

Ratings of European MDBs are and will remain under pressure in
the coming years. The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)
was downgraded in 2012 and the Outlooks on the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and International Financing Facility for
Immunisation (IFFIm) are Negative. This largely reflects the
surge in public financing needs and the negative trend for
sovereign ratings in the European Union (EU) since 2010 (the
Outlook on eight of them was Negative at end-February 2013).

The creation of two new supranational financing vehicles, the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), reflects policy-makers' response to
the ongoing eurozone crisis and the potential for further bail-
out support to be required by eurozone sovereigns. In total,
supranational institutions' loans to or guaranteed by European
sovereigns reached an estimated EUR300 billion at end-2012, up
from EUR74 billion at end-2008.

By contrast, the overall credit quality of regional and sub-
regional MDBs will benefit from the continuing improvement in
sovereign ratings of emerging countries and from the capital
injections by member states. All regional MDBs are rated 'AAA' by
Fitch, and no negative rating action is foreseen in the short to
medium term. Ratings of sub-regional institutions are on an
upward trend, as illustrated by the upgrade of East African
Development Bank to 'B' from 'B-' and the Positive Outlook
assigned to PTA Bank in 2012.

In 2013, rating actions on European supranational institutions
will depend upon the evolution of sovereign ratings in Europe.
EIB's ratings would come under downward pressure from a material
deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio related to
sovereign rating downgrades and/or rise in impairments. IFFIm's
rating would be affected if either France ('AAA'/Negative) or the
UK ('AAA'/Negative) were downgraded, while the ratings of the EU
and Euratom would be reviewed if there was a material
deterioration in creditworthiness or political support by the
highly-rated large member states, which include Germany
('AAA'/Stable), France and the UK. A downgrade of France alone
would trigger a downgrade of EFSF's debt issues, but would not
affect the ESM, due to its strong capitalization and other
intrinsic strengths.

Loan approvals from European MDBs will increase further in the
coming years. While CEB's loan portfolio will stabilize, EIB's
lending is expected to increase in 2013-2015, as the EUR10
billion capital increase approved in 2012 will allow the
institution to increase loans by EUR60 billion over its original
plan. In the event of a further sovereign bailout in the
eurozone, the bulk of new financing needs will be provided by the
ESM. Asset quality and capital ratios will remain under pressure,
as the ratings of a number of EU member states could be

Regional and sub-regional MDBs lending will gradually return to
its pre-crisis pace of growth. Due to their counter-cyclical role
in emerging countries, these entities have had to significantly
increase lending since 2009, as a response to the reduction in
commercial bank lending. However, sovereign funding needs in
emerging countries, overall, are not expected to approach levels
seen in Europe.

The trend in overall asset quality of MDBs is mixed. The upgrades
of several emerging countries, especially in Latin America and in
Asia, has benefited regional MDBs' asset quality, while European
MDBs' portfolios suffered from the sovereign downgrades triggered
by the eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012, and further lowering of
asset quality measures is expected. However, MDBs' preferred
creditor status was successfully tested during the crisis;
neither CEB nor EIB suffered losses on their Greek exposure, even
on the bonds held in treasury.

MDBs' capitalization is comfortable but deteriorating: the rapid
growth in lending, mostly funded by debt, translated into a
deterioration in MDBs' capital ratios overall. Due to sovereign
rating downgrades in Europe, Fitch's risk-weighted capital ratios
of EIB and CEB eroded sharply in the last three years, and stand
well below those of regional MDBs. MDBs response to downward
pressure on capitalization was a series of massive capital
increases. However, these largely comprised callable capital. New
capital injections will be spread over several years and will
stabilize capitalization. Hence, while capital ratios will stop
declining, they will not reach the high pre-crisis levels.

Fitch rates 21 supranational institutions, including eight global
and regional MDBs, four European MDBs, five sub-regional MDBs and
four supranational administrative bodies.

The report, "Supranational Industry review: European Institutions
Under Pressure" is available at or by
clicking on the link above.

* EUROPE: Fitch Says Food Retail Industry Faces Challenges
Metro's 2012 results highlight the challenges that the European
food retail industry is facing, Fitch Ratings says. Progress in
fixing the core business rather than just deleveraging through
asset divestments will be the main rating driver for European
food retailers in 2013. The capacity of these groups to improve
their operating margins and reduce debt by internal free cash
flow will be key to stabilizing the industry outlook, which
remains Negative.

Ahold, Metro and Carrefour's business disposals have reached an
aggregate of about EUR6.4 billion since Q412. European retailers'
decision to focus on cash preservation and business
rationalization is positive. After a decade of international
expansion they are attempting to simplify their businesses to
cope with a sluggish consumer market in Europe where customers
are price sensitive and savvy in their consumption.

In addition to asset disposals, some large retailers have also
changed their dividend policies. Metro has proposed a reduction
of its dividends for the financial year 2012 of EUR1.00 per
ordinary share (2011: EUR1.35). Carrefour established in the last
fiscal year a new pay-out policy of about 45% of net earnings
adjusted for exceptional items and is proposing a dividend this
year payable in cash or in shares.

We expect that proceeds from cash received will be used to
partially reduce debt or improve business operations. Investment
is needed to refurbish stores and meet customer demand for online
or other services, such as click and collect or drive-thru
supermarkets, where customers who order online can pick up the
groceries when it suits them and have them loaded into their

The Negative Outlook on Metro's 'BBB' rating reflects operating
pressures in its core Cash and Carry and Media-Saturn divisions
in Europe due to the subdued consumer environment and competition
on its non-food segment offer from retail specialists and online
operators. Metro's cash preservation measures are positive for
bondholders. However, in order to stabilize the rating Outlook we
need to see the group's capacity to improve or at least sustain
its trading performance in 2013, rather than reducing its
adjusted FFO net leverage (currently at about 4x) from dividends
or divestments proceeds.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 18 to March 22, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *