TCREUR_Public/130401.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, April 1, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 63

                            Headlines



A R M E N I A

ARMAVIA: Declares Bankruptcy; To Cease Flights Today


B U L G A R I A

BDZ: Transport Minister Resumes Talks with Creditors


C Y P R U S

BANK OF CYPRUS: Gov't May Impose Losses of Up to 60% on Deposits
CYPRUS POPULAR: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to 'C' After Closure

* CYPRUS: Banks Open After Two Weeks; Withdrawal Limits Imposed
* CYPRUS: EU at Odds Over Use of Bailout Model in Future Rescues
* CYPRUS: Moody's Downgrades Country Ceilings to 'Caa2'


F R A N C E

APRICUS BIOSCIENCES: French Units Under Bankruptcy Reorganization
KEMONE: Goes Into Administration, Chairman Files for Insolvency


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Fitch Says Buyout of Cypriot Banks' Operations Risky


I R E L A N D

CHARTIS EXCESS: To Wind Down for Parent AIG's Sake
* IRELAND: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating; Outlook Negative


K A Z A K H S T A N

ATF BANK: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Rating for Possible Downgrade
IC ALLIANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

INTELSAT SA: To Use Offering Proceeds to Redeem 2017 PIK Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

DE JONG COLDSTORES: Declared Bankrupt; Fails to Meet Obligations
HARBOURMASTER CLO 9: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes


P O L A N D

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: RTL Amends Plan Support Pact and Term Sheet
GANT: Creditors Agree to Delay Debt Payments Until May 31
PBG SA: Expects to Finalize Debt Restructuring Terms by End-April


P O R T U G A L

* PORTUGAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Bond Ratings; Outlook Negative


R O M A N I A

CHIMOPAR: Declared Insolvent by Bucharest Court
OLTCHIM SA: Employees Stage Protest Over Unpaid Salaries


R U S S I A

AEROFLOT JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(EXP)' Rating to RUB5-Bil. Notes
IBA-MOSCOW: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to RUB3BB Bond Issue
* RUSSIA: Fitch Sees Positive Outlook for Subnationals


S L O V E N I A

CIMOS: Creditors Extend Moratorium on Loans Until End of May


S P A I N

BANCAJA 7: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
BBVA CONSUMO 3: Moody's Confirms 'Caa2' Rating on Class B Notes
BBVA RMBS 11: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3'
CAIXA PENEDES: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class C Notes
IM CAJAMAR 4: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Serie B Notes

IM CAJAMAR 5: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' Rating to Class B Notes
RENTA CORP: In Voluntary Bankruptcy; Administrator to Be Assigned


S W E D E N

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Corp. Family Rating


S W I T Z E R L A N D

GATEGROUP HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Negative


U K R A I N E

MRIYA AGRO: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Guaranteed Eurobond
UKREXIMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New US$100MM Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Rates $100MM Recourse Notes 'B(EXP)'
COVENTRY CITY: Faces Administration Threat Over 'Unpaid Rent'
DREAM STORE: Scunthorpe Keeps Trading Following Administration
DUNFERMLINE: In Administration After Court Hearing in Edinburgh
GALA ELECTRIC: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Stable

HOLLOID PLASTICS: In Administration, Cuts 38 Jobs
OPAL 1: Owner In Administration, Impact on Student Hall Unclear
ORTAK: In Administration, 150 Jobs at Risk


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Moody's Sees Decline in Light Vehicle Demand in 2013
* Moody's Notes Stable Performance of Consumer Loan ABS in EMEA
* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 25 to April 1, 2013


                            *********


=============
A R M E N I A
=============


ARMAVIA: Declares Bankruptcy; To Cease Flights Today
----------------------------------------------------
Sara Khojoyan at Bloomberg News reports that Armavia declared
bankruptcy on Friday and will cease flights starting today,
April 1.

According to Bloomberg, Armavia said in an e-mailed statement on
Friday that the company was unable to pay debt accumulated to the
Zvartnots airport in Yerevan, Armenia's capital, and to its
contractors.  Armavia owner Mikayel Baghdasarov told the Arminfo
news service on March 15 that the total debt was less than US$50
million, Bloomberg relates.

Armavia said in its statement that the company's owners have been
diverting funds from other businesses to fund the airline in the
past three years, Bloomberg relates.

Armavia is Armenia's national airline.  The company founded in
1996 has 14 aircraft and was the first operator of Sukhoi's
Superjet 100.



===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


BDZ: Transport Minister Resumes Talks with Creditors
----------------------------------------------------
FOCUS News Agency reports that Bulgarian Minister of Transport,
Information Technology and Communications Kristian Krastev said
in an interview with bTV "I have resumed the dialogue with the
creditors and the staff of the Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) and
I believe I have made the right moves.  The goal is recovery and
stability in BDZ".

According to FOCUS News, Mr. Krastev said that the privatization
of BDZ Freight Services is one of the recovery options for the
company.  He said that if the bidders show no interest, the
Agency for Privatization and Post-Privatization Control may
terminate the sale of the company, FOCUS News relates.  He added
that in the past few weeks, he had held meetings with trade
unions and creditors in order to decide what changes should be
made in the BDZ management, FOCUS News notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 25,
2013, FOCUS News Agency related that the losses of the state-run
company run to about BGN716 million.  Mr. Krastev said that the
debts to the biggest creditors, i.e. KfW and bondholders in the
second bond loan, run to about EUR35 million/creditor, FOCUS News
disclosed.

Established in 1885, The Bulgarian State Railways, commonly known
as BDZ, is Bulgaria's state railway company and the largest
railway carrier in the country.  The company's headquarters are
located in the capital Sofia.



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


BANK OF CYPRUS: Gov't May Impose Losses of Up to 60% on Deposits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Tugwell, Tom Stoukas and Georgios Georgiou at Bloomberg News
report that Cyprus may impose losses of as much as 60% on Bank of
Cyprus Plc accounts exceeding EUR100,000 (US$128,000) as part of
an aid deal to stop the country from going bankrupt.

According to Bloomberg, the Nicosia-based central bank said in an
e-mailed statement that customers will have 37.5% of their
deposits above this amount converted into shares with full voting
rights and access to any future Bank of Cyprus dividend.  The
central bank, as cited by Bloomberg, said that a further 22.5%
will be temporarily withheld to ensure the lender meets the terms
of its recapitalization, as agreed under Cyprus's loan agreement
with international creditors.

President Nicos Anastasiades agreed on March 25 to impose losses
on Bank of Cyprus's larger depositors in exchange for a EUR10
billion bailout after failing to get financial aid from Russia,
one of the nation's biggest investors, Bloomberg relates.  The
agreement also shuttered Cyprus Popular Bank Pcl, the country's
second largest lender, Bloomberg discloses.

The deposit-loss plan "will make things worse as small and
medium-sized companies will run out of liquidity," Bloomberg
quotes Marios Mavrides, a lawmaker for the ruling Disy party, as
saying in a phone interview from Nicosia.  The move "does not
help to gain back people's trust, deposits should be free in
order to gain that trust."

According to Bloomberg, the statement said that the Central Bank
of Cyprus will appoint an independent valuer for the commercial
lender and all or part of the 22.5% additional haircut may also
be converted into shares within 90 days of that process being
completed.  The central bank said that any remaining amount will
be returned to customers with interest, Bloomberg notes.

The statement said that the so-called bail-in won't apply to Bank
of Cyprus account holders whose debts to the lender bring their
net balance below the EUR100,000 threshold, Bloomberg discloses.
Holders of accounts at other banks on the Mediterranean island
aren't being touched, Bloomberg states.

The remaining 40% of Bank of Cyprus deposits above EUR100,000
that aren't subject to the bail-in will be temporarily frozen to
ensure the lender's liquidity, Bloomberg says.  According to
Bloomberg, the central bank said that this money, which won't be
used to recapitalize the lender, will receive interest at 10
percent above current levels and be released "within a short
time-frame".

The statement said that Cyprus Popular Bank will be divided into
"good" and "bad" banks, Bloomberg relates.  Deposits of less than
EUR100,000 will be absorbed by Bank of Cyprus and those above
that level will be placed in the bad bank, Bloomberg says.

The statement said that Cyprus Popular Bank will operate normally
from April 2 with all staff and branches passing to the control
of Bank of Cyprus, Bloomberg notes.

Bank of Cyprus is a major Cypriot financial institution.  In
terms of market capitalization of 350 million in March 2013, it
is the country's biggest bank.  As of September 2012, the bank
held a 26.7% share of the Cypriot deposit market and a 22.5%
share of the Cypriot loan market, making it the largest bank in
Cyprus.  The Bank of Cyprus Group employs 11,326 staff worldwide.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 26,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa3, from Caa2,
the deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of Bank of Cyprus
Public Company Limited.  These ratings have also been placed on
review for downgrade.  At the same time, Moody's affirmed the
Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSRs) of Bank of Cyprus at E.
It lowered the standalone credit assessment for Bank of Cyprus to
ca from caa3.


CYPRUS POPULAR: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to 'C' After Closure
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior unsecured debt
and deposit ratings of Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd. to C,
from Caa3, and affirmed the subordinated debt ratings at C. No
outlook is assigned to the ratings.

These rating actions were prompted by the Central Bank of Cyprus'
decision to wind down CPB, which implies a haircut on the bank's
uninsured depositors and senior unsecured debt holders that will
likely exceed 65%, which reflects losses consistent with Moody's
C rating.

Recent Events

On March 25, the Central Bank of Cyprus announced the appointment
of an administrator for CPB. The administrator will transfer
CPB's bad assets to a "bad bank", along with equity holders' and
creditors' claims (including uninsured depositors), which will be
run-down gradually. Insured deposits (under EUR100,000),
performing assets, and CPB's Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
that Moody's estimates at around EUR9 billion, will be
transferred to a "good bank", which will be folded into Bank of
Cyprus Public Company Limited (deposits Caa3 on review for
downgrade, standalone bank financial strength rating E/baseline
credit assessment Ca).

Ratings Rationale:

These rating actions reflect Moody's view that under the terms of
this resolution, losses to CPB's creditors, including senior debt
holders and uninsured depositors, will likely exceed 65%, a level
captured by a C rating, the lowest rating on Moody's 21 notch
scale.

Given the size and structure of CPB's balance sheet (40% of net
loans are in Greece and have been taken over by Piraeus Bank S.A
(Greece)), Moody's believes that the portion of assets
transferred to the bad bank will be low relative to the size of
claims. As a result, Moody's believes that losses to CPB's
creditors will be severe. The Eurogroup's statement on March 25
also signaled the severity of these losses, stating an
expectation that the bank will be resolved "with full
contribution of equity shareholders, bondholders and uninsured
depositors".

The affirmation of the bank's subordinated debt ratings at C
reflects the full inclusion of junior claims as loss absorbing
instruments as part of the resolution.

Review for Downgrade of Other Rated Cypriot Banks Continue:

As the situation in Cyprus remains fluid, with authorities still
working on the implementation of the recent agreement to address
the Cypriot banking crisis, Moody's is maintaining the review on
the Caa3 deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of Bank of
Cyprus and Hellenic Bank, and the Caa2 deposit ratings of Russian
Commercial Bank (Cyprus) Ltd.

List of Affected Ratings:

Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd:

- Deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings: Downgraded to C no
   outlook from Caa3 on review for downgrade

- Short term deposit ratings: Affirmed at Not Prime

- Subordinated debt rating: Affirmed at C

- Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating: Affirmed at E,
   equivalent to a baseline credit assessment of c, from Ca
   previously

   No outlook is currently assigned to the E BFSR, short term
   deposit ratings and subordinated ratings.

Egnatia Finance Plc. (the funding subsidiary of Cyprus Popular
Bank):

  - Senior unsecured debt rating: Downgraded to (P)C no outlook
    from (P)Caa3 on review for downgrade

  - Subordinated debt rating: Affirmed at (P)C

    No outlook is currently assigned to the subordinated debt
    rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in
June 2012.


* CYPRUS: Banks Open After Two Weeks; Withdrawal Limits Imposed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Stoukas, Maria Petrakis and Marcus Bensasson at Bloomberg
News report that Cyprus averted panic withdrawals as banks opened
for the first time in almost two weeks, with government controls
on access to cash leading to orderly lines rather than runs on
deposits.

"We expected much more people," Bloomberg quotes Argyros
Eraclides, manager of a Bank of Cyprus Plc branch in the Stavrou
area of Nicosia, as saying.  "Fortunately there are only some
people who needed cash for the day, but customers reacted
fantastically.  We expected some people to be more aggravated."

Banks opened at midday local time on Thursday, March 28, with
lines of about 15 to 20 people waiting to enter branches in the
Cypriot capital, and closed at 6:00 p.m., Bloomberg relates.  The
Central Bank of Cyprus's controls include a EUR300 (US$383) daily
limit on withdrawals and restrictions on transfers to accounts
outside the country, Bloomberg discloses.

Cyprus's lenders had been shut since March 16, when the European
Union presented a proposal to force losses on all depositors in
exchange for a EUR10 billion bailout, Bloomberg notes.

A subsequent agreement closed down Cyprus Popular Bank Pcl, the
second largest lender, and imposed larger losses on uninsured
depositors, Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, a statement from the Finance Ministry
said that the controls will be in force for seven days.  The
European Commission said in a statement on Thursday that the
control on capital movements must remain "proportionate" and be
lifted as soon as possible, Bloomberg relates.  The Cyprus
Parliament gave wide-ranging powers to the central bank governor,
Panicos Demetriades, and Finance Minister Michael Sarris, who
spent the last days deciding which measures to implement,
Bloomberg notes.

They've chosen to include bans on terminating time deposits and
cashing checks, Bloomberg discloses.  Customers can transfer
abroad at most EUR5,000 per month from a given financial
institution, Bloomberg says.  According to Bloomberg, a spokesman
for the Bundesbank in Frankfurt said on Thursday that euro
banknotes were supplied to Cyprus as a precaution.

European Central Bank data showed on Thursday that Cypriot banks
lost EUR1 billion in deposits in February amid rising uncertainty
over the country's ability to secure a bailout, Bloomberg
recounts.


* CYPRUS: EU at Odds Over Use of Bailout Model in Future Rescues
----------------------------------------------------------------
Evan Weinberger of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that European
officials appeared at odds this week over whether the Cyprus
bailout should become a model for resolving future eurozone
banking crises, but experts predict the European Commission's
forthcoming regime for winding down banks will similarly force
large depositors and creditors to foot the bill for failed
financial firms.

As part of a US$13 billion bailout deal, the Cypriot government
and the so-called Troika -- the European Union, the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund -- agreed to a
resolution, the report said.


* CYPRUS: Moody's Downgrades Country Ceilings to 'Caa2'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service lowered its assessment of the highest
rating that can be assigned to a domestic debt issuer in Cyprus
to Caa2, based on the increasing risk of an exit by the country
from the euro area. Any rating actions taken as a result of the
new country ceiling will be released during the coming week.

Cyprus's Caa3 government bond rating, and negative outlook,
remains unchanged.

Ratings Rationale:

While the risk of a euro exit by Cyprus is substantial, Moody's
does not consider it as its central scenario. Following the
economic dislocation that will be caused by the restructuring of
the island's two largest banks and the imposition of capital
controls in the country, it is possible that the risk of euro
exit will increase further. If that were to occur, the maximum
rating Moody's would assign to Cypriot securities would fall
further.

An exit would result in large losses to investors due to the
redenomination of government debt and private debt securities
issued under Cypriot law. It would also lead to further severe
disruption to the country's banking system and additional acute
dislocations in the real economy. Such disruption would generally
imply additional losses for holders of debt securities issued by
Cypriot entities, irrespective of their governing law.

Moody's country ceilings capture externalities and event risks
that arise unavoidably as a consequence of locating a business in
a particular country and that ultimately constrain domestic
issuers' ability to service their debt obligations. Country
ceilings encapsulate elements of economic, financial, political
and legal risks in a country, which include political
instability, the risk of government intervention, the risk of
systemic economic disruption, severe financial instability risks,
currency redenomination and natural disasters, among other
factors. These factors need to be incorporated into the ratings
of the strongest issuers. The ceiling caps the credit rating of
all issuers and transactions with material exposure to those
risks. In other words, the ceiling affects all domestic issuers
and transactions other than those whose assets and revenues are
predominantly sourced from or located outside of the country, or
which benefit from an external credit support.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


APRICUS BIOSCIENCES: French Units Under Bankruptcy Reorganization
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On March 14, 2013, Apricus Biosciences, Inc. issued a press
release announcing that the Company intended to cease continued
funding of its French subsidiaries, Finesco SAS, Scomedica SAS
and NexMed Pharma SAS (formerly Portalis SARL).

On March 28, 2013, the Commercial Court of Versailles, France
opened a bankruptcy reorganization of the French Subsidiaries
following a declaration of insolvency by their legal
representative. The court appointed a trustee to oversee the
bankruptcy reorganization.  It is difficult at this time to
ascertain whether the French Subsidiaries will emerge from the
bankruptcy reorganization or whether this reorganization
bankruptcy will be converted into a liquidation bankruptcy.

Apricus Biosciences, Inc. is in the pharmaceutical industry
primarily focusing on research and development using its drug
delivery technology called NexACT.


KEMONE: Goes Into Administration, Chairman Files for Insolvency
---------------------------------------------------------------
Platts reports that KemOne has been put into administration.
In view of the financial position of KemOne, its chairman, Gary
Klesch, filed for insolvency with the Commercial Court of Lyon,
KemOne said, according to Platts.

The report relates that the company will continue to operate as
normal during the administration proceedings.

The KemOne management team said it was confident in the
commitment of its former shareholder, Arkema -- which agreed to
divest its vinyl branch to the Klesch Group in July 2012 -- and
its main supplier, Total, to find sustainable solutions for its
activities, with the full support of the French government, the
report notes.

The report says that the news follows a protest by KemOne
employees, a KemOne labor-union source said.

"We [the employees] are convinced that the company is viable. We
are looking for another buyer . . . .  We did not go on strike
and want to continue production to demonstrate the viability of
KemOne to our suppliers, the tribunal, and the judge," the report
quoted the source as saying.

The Klesch Group said earlier in March it was seeking damages of
EUR310 million (US$403 million) from Arkema, the former owners of
the KemOne assets, saying it was misled by information provided
at the time of the sale, the report relates.  This was denied by
Arkema, but the Klesch Group said that months of discussions had
not resolved the dispute, hence its request for formal
arbitration, the report adds.

KemOne is a France-based chlor-alkali and polyvinyl chloride
maker.  KemOne operates at 22 industrial sites in 10 countries
and has 2,600 employees, of whom 1,780 are based in France.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


* GREECE: Fitch Says Buyout of Cypriot Banks' Operations Risky
--------------------------------------------------------------
Piraeus' acquisition of the Greek operations of three Cypriot
banks raises short-term risks despite longer-term benefits from a
stronger domestic franchise, Fitch Ratings says.

This deal increases execution risks as Piraeus is already
integrating two banks it acquired in H212, ATEbank and Geniki.
The group also needs to undergo significant restructuring and
rationalization of excess capacity under the Greek banks'
recapitalization process. Undertaking both strategies at the same
time is likely to require substantial management effort and
raises operational risks exacerbated by Greece's weak economy.
But Piraeus benefits from previous experience in bank
integrations, albeit on a smaller scale.

The greater scale from the acquisition does not protect the group
from recessionary pressures on asset quality. Instead the deal is
likely to increase risk concentrations in the loan portfolio.
Downside risks are partly mitigated by the high 85% coverage of
acquired loans, which takes into account expected losses under
the Troika stress test for Cypriot banks. Nevertheless, asset
quality could deteriorate as the loans being acquired are
performing worse than Piraeus' portfolio.

"We do not expect this acquisition to generate additional capital
needs because of the terms of the transaction. However, a
reassessment of Piraeus' capital needs by the national and
international authorities may be needed as the acquisition and
any alterations to restructuring plans need to be taken into
account. Deleveraging, profit and risk-weighted asset forecasts
may differ from those initially presented," Fitch says.

"We believe the acquisition is neutral for funding. While there
is an apparent improvement in the bank's net loans-to-deposits
ratio from 125% to 120%, this is largely related to high
provisions in the acquired portfolio. The stability of acquired
deposits will be tested in the coming days.

"More positively, the recent acquisitions have made Piraeus the
second-largest Greek bank, from fourth. This deal increases the
group's market shares in loans and deposits by around 50% to 28%
and 27%, respectively. This narrows the gap with leading group
NBG-Eurobank, which is also undergoing a merger.

"If the banks successfully overcome their M&A challenges, we
believe the consolidation and restructuring of the banking sector
should help create a smaller number of more efficient and viable
institutions. These should be better placed to cope with Greece's
sovereign crisis and weak economic prospects.

"Greater scale through consolidation should allow cost synergies.
Branch and staff optimization and rationalization of central and
IT processes should improve efficiency and enable continued cost-
cutting. However, the banks are unlikely to benefit from revenue
synergies because of the low level of business activity in the
recession.

"A stronger domestic franchise could enhance the deposit base and
lower retail funding costs when the banking sector regains
sustainable access to other forms of funding in the longer term.
But we expect funding pressure to persist until the sovereign
crisis has subsided."

Piraeus agreed to acquire all the Greek banking operations of
Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank and Hellenic Bank for EUR524
million on March 26. The acquisition will be funded by Greece's
bail-out fund, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. Piraeus
will acquire EUR16.2 billion in net loans (about 37% of its net
loans at end-Q312) and EUR15 billion in deposits alongside 312
branches and 5,268 staff. After completion of the transaction,
Piraeus will have total assets of EUR95 billion.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CHARTIS EXCESS: To Wind Down for Parent AIG's Sake
--------------------------------------------------
Richard Vanderford of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that Chartis
Excess Ltd., an Irish member of American International Group Inc.
filed for bankruptcy protection in New York on Monday, saying it
will wind down as part of a reorganization plan intended to make
AIG more simple and transparent.

The report said the Dublin-based insurer asked the bankruptcy
court in Manhattan to grant recognition to its bankruptcy
proceedings now under way in Ireland. The insurer, which writes
business insurance policies, intends to shuffle current policies
to other entities within AIG and liquidate itself, it said in a
court filing, the BLaw360 report related.


* IRELAND: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Republic of Ireland's
Ba1/Not Prime government bond ratings and negative outlook.

The drivers for maintaining the negative outlook on Ireland's
sovereign ratings are:

1.) The euro area's continued vulnerability to shocks emanating
from the regional debt crisis, most recently the agreement by the
European Union (EU) to the "bail-in" of bank deposits to raise
part of the funds needed for Cyprus' financial rescue.

2.) The continued poor asset quality of the Irish banking system.

The drivers for affirming Ireland's Ba1/NP sovereign ratings are:

1.) The Irish government's progress in implementing the economic
adjustment program under the auspices of EU, International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB),
collectively known as the Troika.

2.) Ireland's steady progress in regaining market access and
obtaining private-sector financing at an affordable cost, a
prerequisite for the country to successfully conclude its EU/IMF-
sponsored economic adjustment program this year without needing a
second bailout.

3.) Ireland's regained competitiveness, with generally positive
growth deriving from a strong contribution of net exports, the
apparent bottoming-out of the housing sector correction and its
continued ability to attract foreign direct investment.

In a related rating action, Moody's has also affirmed the Ba1/NP
ratings and negative outlook on Ireland's National Asset
Management Agency (NAMA), whose debt is irrevocably and
unconditionally guaranteed by the government.

Rationale for Maintaining Ireland's Negative Rating Outlook

The first driver underlying Moody's decision to maintain a
negative outlook on Ireland's Ba1 sovereign rating is the
country's susceptibility to euro-area-related event risk because
of its very high debt levels and ongoing asset quality issues
affecting its banking system. Such risks were most recently
evidenced by the EU's unprecedented decision to fund Cyprus's
financial rescue by imposing a levy on bank deposits above a
certain size. The move has significantly heightened fears
surrounding the safety of bank deposits in other European
systems. More generally, Moody's believes that Ireland's
vulnerability to wider euro-area stresses has been reaffirmed by
euro area policymakers' handling of the Cyprus crisis, the
increased risk tolerance apparent in their actions, and the
uncertain risk assessment prompted by a more uncompromising and
less predictable approach to crisis management.

The second driver for maintaining Ireland's sovereign rating on
negative outlook is the continued poor asset quality of Ireland's
banking system, which represents a constraint on their
willingness to provide new credit at such time when loan demand
revives. In addition, Moody's notes that Irish banks have not yet
begun implementing the Central Bank of Ireland's new requirement
to repossess homes when mortgages have been non-performing for a
lengthy period, nor to adequately provision for their non-
performing portfolios. Moody's baseline case is that Irish banks'
large capital cushions should be able to accommodate this process
without additional liabilities accruing to the government's
balance sheet.

Rationale for Affirming Ireland's Ba1/Np Ratings

The primary driver underpinning Moody's decision to affirm
Ireland's Ba1/NP sovereign ratings is the government's successful
implementation of the Troika's economic adjustment program, which
began in November 2010 and is coming to an end later this year.
From the start, the Irish government has consistently met and in
some respects exceeded the quarterly program criteria, despite
difficult domestic and external conditions. Moody's expects that
Ireland's debt will likely peak at roughly 120% of GDP in 2013
and 2014, before starting to drop in 2015, thereby reversing the
adverse debt trend of the recent past.

The second driver informing the rating affirmation is the steady
progress that Ireland has made in gradually regaining market
access at an affordable cost of financing. The Irish government
has made several forays into the market since January 2012, first
to swap shorter-term for longer-term debt to reduce early
refinancing risks, and then to obtain new funds in successive
medium-term bond issues. This progress, which most recently
culminated in a well-received ten-year bond issue, has allowed
Ireland to meet all of its financing needs for 2014. In addition,
Moody's observes that refinancing risks will diminish further in
subsequent years as a result of (1) the restructuring of the
government's promissory note debt, which was incurred when the
sovereign extended support to the Irish banking system in 2010,
and (2) the agreement with the EU to extend bailout maturities.

The third driver for maintaining Ireland's sovereign rating is
Moody's expectation that Ireland's economy will be able to grow
at a moderate pace in the coming years, although the initial pace
is likely to be below its long-term potential. Thanks to the
dynamism and high value added of the country's export sector, the
relatively diversified export markets and the improved
competitiveness that have been achieved via nominal wage
adjustments, Moody's expects that growth in Ireland is likely to
remain positive this year, even though the rating agency expects
the euro area economy as a whole to register a second consecutive
contraction in 2013.

What Could Move the Rating Down/Up

Moody's would consider downgrading the country's Ba1 sovereign
ratings if sizeable additional banking sector liabilities were to
be added to the Irish government's balance sheet, or in the event
of a further rise in the government's debt ratios due to fiscal
slippage. The rating agency would also view negatively any
renewed increase in Ireland's debt costs because of a loss of
market confidence in the Irish recovery and/or in euro area
policymakers' ability to contain the euro area debt crisis.

Conversely, the agency would consider raising Ireland's rating
outlook and eventually upgrading the country's Ba1 government
bond ratings if the government's financial balance, excluding
interest payments, were to move into a surplus large enough for
the country's debt-to-GDP ratio to stabilize and then begin to
decline. Moody's would also view positively the IMF and EU's
approval of external monitoring or a precautionary credit line
that would qualify Ireland for the ECB's Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) scheme.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in September 2008.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ATF BANK: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Rating for Possible Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade the
following ratings of ATF Bank: the B1 long-term local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings, the B1 senior unsecured
foreign-currency debt rating, the B3 junior subordinated foreign-
currency debt rating, and the E+ standalone bank financial
strength rating.

The review follows a joint announcement on March 15, 2013 -- by
ATF bank and by UniCredit Group (UniCredit, the owner of a 99.75%
stake in ATF Bank via its subsidiary UniCredit Bank Austria AG)
-- regarding UniCredit's decision to dispose of its Kazakh
banking subsidiary, ATF Bank. The ultimate parent -- UniCredit
Group is rated Baa2 deposits negative, BFSR C-/BCA baa2 negative.

Ratings Rationale:

In placing ATF Bank's deposit and debt ratings on review for
downgrade, Moody's noted that they currently benefit from a two-
notch uplift from the bank's b3 baseline credit assessment (BCA),
due to the rating agency's assessment of a moderate probability
of parental support from UniCredit. Moody's will continue to
incorporate a moderate probability of parental support to ATF
Bank's ratings because the rating agency expects UniCredit to
maintain its support towards ATF Bank until the proposed
transaction is concluded. However, Moody's is likely to remove
the two notches of uplift if and when UniCredit completes the
transaction with KazNitrogenGaz LLP, which requires regulatory
approvals and is scheduled for completion in the second quarter
of 2013.

Moody's further explained that ATF Bank's fundamental credit
quality -- reflected in its standalone BFSR and BCA, currently at
E+/b3 -- might be also pressured by UniCredit's exit due to (1)
ATF Bank's weak asset quality, which may continue to deteriorate
and put pressure on its capital; (2) the potential negative
impact on liquidity, given that 15% of the bank's liabilities (as
at H1 2012) were attracted from UniCredit, while close linkage
with UniCredit provided an additional leverage to attract
deposits; and (3) possible deterioration in profitability and
operating efficiency as well as in franchise value as a result of
the negative impact of UniCredit's exit on ATF Bank's average
cost of funding and business volumes.

Focus of the Review

The ratings review will focus on: (1) the progress that UniCredit
and KazNitrogenGaz LLP make towards implementing the ATF Bank
transaction; (2) the strategy which the new shareholder will be
aiming to introduce in ATF Bank when it obtains control; (3) the
direct impact of the transaction on the bank's financial
fundamentals and funding profile; and (4) the structure of the
proposed transaction in respect of problem loans that are
currently under-provisioned and covered by the parent's
guarantees, i.e., enabling ATF Bank to enhance its capital base.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, ATF Bank reported total
assets of KZT852 billion ($5.7 billion) and total shareholder
equity of KZT71 billion ($474 million) as at YE2012 under
unaudited regulatory reports.


IC ALLIANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Kazakhstan-based JSC IC Alliance Polis
an Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating of 'B' and a National
IFS rating of 'BB+(kaz)'. The Outlooks are Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings reflect the operational challenges faced by the
company in 2012, as evidenced by worsening in key operating
metrics, exacerbated by the merger with Pana Insurance. The
ratings also reflect poor underwriting profitability in the past
three years and the low credit quality of the company's
investment portfolio. Positively, the ratings are supported by
the company's good capitalization and the agency's view that the
capital will remain robust and absorb potential losses in 2013.

Alliance Polis experienced operational difficulties in 2012,
which was reflected in the decline in sales, loss of franchise
and deterioration in profitability. This was worsened by the
merger with Pana Insurance in Q112, which put additional pressure
on the company's loss and expense ratios, but at the same time
marginally improved its capital position.

The company's underwriting profitability has been negative over
the past three years. In 2012, the underwriting loss increased to
KZT0.9 billion (2011: KZT0.6 billion), as a result of growth in
claims incurred and high fixed administrative expenses. Net
claims incurred surged to KZT2.1 billion in 2012 (2011: KZT1
billion), which stemmed from a large increase in the loss ratio
for the obligatory employee accident insurance line and less
significant increases in other lines across the portfolio. The
expense ratio deteriorated to 71.4% in 2012 from 55.8% in 2011,
pressured by expenses not declining in line with premium income.

Alliance Polis's risk-adjusted capital position, as assessed by
the agency, is good and, despite weak asset credit quality,
supports the current rating level. The capital strength stems
from the current relatively low levels of premium written by the
insurer compared to the shareholders equity volume. The company's
statutory solvency margin was well above the required minimum in
2012 with the average level of 255% in that year. However, if
premium volumes were to grow significantly, the capital and
solvency position could worsen, although Fitch's expectation is
that it will still stay supportive of the current ratings.

The credit quality of the company's investment portfolio is
relatively low, with substantial holdings in below-investment-
grade debt, in common with Kazakhstani insurers generally. At
end-2012, 74% of assets were concentrated in the Kazakhstani
banking sector. However, on the other hand, the investment
portfolio is of good liquidity.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch would view a material decline in Alliance Polis's risk-
adjusted capitalization or a fall in its statutory solvency
margin below 100% as triggers for a downgrade. Any indication
that the shareholder was unwilling to support Alliance Polis
would also be viewed negatively for the ratings.

Alliance Polis's ratings could be upgraded if the company
improves its operational profitability through better
underwriting and expense management, or if it significantly
improves the credit profile of its investments.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INTELSAT SA: To Use Offering Proceeds to Redeem 2017 PIK Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Intelsat S.A.'s subsidiary, Intelsat (Luxembourg) S.A., priced
US$3.5 billion aggregate principal amount of senior notes,
consisting of US$500 million aggregate principal amount of 6.75%
senior notes due 2018 US$2 billion aggregate principal amount of
7.75% senior notes due 2021 and US$1 billion aggregate principal
amount of 8.125% senior notes due 2023, in each case, at an
offering price of 100%.  Intelsat Luxembourg's obligations under
the notes will be guaranteed by Intelsat S.A.  The notes offering
is expected to close on April 5, 2013, subject to certain
conditions.

The net proceeds from the sale of the notes are expected to be
used by Intelsat Luxembourg to redeem US$915 million aggregate
principal amount of its outstanding 11 1/2 / 12 1/2% Senior PIK
Election Notes due 2017 on April 5, 2013, in its previously
announced redemption, to redeem the remaining approximately
US$1,588 million aggregate principal amount of its outstanding
2017 PIK Notes, to redeem approximately US$754.8 million
aggregate principal amount of its outstanding 11 1/4% Senior
Notes due 2017, to pay related fees and expenses and for general
corporate purposes, which may include the repayment, redemption,
retirement or repurchase of additional 2017 Senior Notes or other
outstanding indebtedness of Intelsat Luxembourg and its
subsidiaries.

The notes are being offered and sold to qualified institutional
buyers in accordance with Rule 144A under the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, and to persons outside the United States in
accordance with Regulation S under the Securities Act and
applicable exemptions from registration, prospectus or like
requirements under the laws and regulations of the relevant
jurisdictions outside the United States.  The notes will not be
registered under the Securities Act and, until registered, may
not be offered or sold in the United States except pursuant to an
exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the
registration requirements of the Securities Act and applicable
state securities laws.  The notes will also not be registered in
any jurisdiction outside of the United States and no action or
steps will be taken to permit the offer of the notes in any such
jurisdiction where any registration or other action or steps
would be required to permit an offer of the notes.

No prospectus as required by the Directive 2003/71/EC (and the
implementing laws and regulations in the relevant member states)
has been filed with respect to the notes and therefore no offers
of notes may be made in any Member States of the European
Economic Area unless made pursuant to an exemption under the
Directive 2003/71/EC (and the implementing laws and regulations
in the relevant Member States).

                   Issuance of Redemption Notices

On March 21, 2013, Intelsat (Luxembourg) issued a notice of
redemption pursuant to the indenture governing its 11 1/4% Senior
Cash Pay Notes due 2017 and 11 1/2% / 12 1/2% Senior PIK Election
Notes due 2017 that it intends to redeem all of the outstanding
aggregate principal amount of 2017 PIK Notes for which a notice
of redemption has not previously been given, which equals
approximately US$1.5 billion principal amount of 2017 PIK Notes,
at a redemption price equal to 105.75% of the principal amount of
the 2017 PIK Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon to
the redemption date on April 20, 2013.

The PIK Notes Redemption is conditioned on the completion of one
or more debt financings on or prior to the Redemption Date by
Intelsat Luxembourg on terms satisfactory to Intelsat Luxembourg
providing funds sufficient for Intelsat Luxembourg to pay the
aggregate redemption payment for the portion of the outstanding
2017 PIK Notes to be redeemed on the Redemption Date.

On March 21, 2013, Intelsat Luxembourg also issued a notice of
redemption pursuant to the Indenture that it intends to redeem,
subject to the financing condition described below,
US$754,800,000 aggregate principal amount of 2017 Senior Notes at
a redemption price equal to 105.625% of the principal amount of
the 2017 Senior Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon
to the redemption date on the Redemption Date.

The Cash Pay Notes Redemption is conditioned on the completion of
one or more debt financings on or prior to the Redemption Date by
Intelsat Luxembourg on terms satisfactory to Intelsat Luxembourg
providing funds sufficient for Intelsat Luxembourg to pay the
aggregate redemption payment for the applicable portion of the
outstanding 2017 Senior Notes to be redeemed on the Redemption
Date.

Intelsat Luxembourg expects that if its previously announced
offering of senior notes is completed on or about April 5, 2013,
the financing conditions to each of the PIK Notes Redemption and
the Cash Pay Notes Redemption described above will have been
satisfied.

                           About Intelsat

Luxembourg-based Intelsat is the leading provider of satellite
services worldwide.  For over 45 years, Intelsat has been
delivering information and entertainment for many of the world's
leading media and network companies, multinational corporations,
Internet Service Providers and governmental agencies.  Intelsat's
satellite, teleport and fiber infrastructure is unmatched in the
industry, setting the standard for transmissions of video, data
and voice services.  From the globalization of content and the
proliferation of HD, to the expansion of cellular networks and
broadband access, with Intelsat, advanced communications anywhere
in the world are closer, by far.

Intelsat S.A. incurred a net loss of US$145 million in 2012, a
net loss of US$433.99 million in 2011, and a net loss of
US$507.76 million in 2010.  The Company's balance sheet at
Dec. 31, 2012, showed US$17.30 billion in total assets, US$18.53
billion in total liabilities and a US$1.27 billion total Intelsat
S.A. stockholders' deficit and US$45.67 million in noncontrolling
interest.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DE JONG COLDSTORES: Declared Bankrupt; Fails to Meet Obligations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fresh Plaza reports that De Jong Coldstores was declared bankrupt
on March 26.  The company unfortunately could no longer meet its
payment obligations, Fresh Plaza discloses.

According to Fresh Plaza, the reasons given for the bankruptcy
were a large debt burden on a modern cold store, which was built
in Ridderkerk, the Netherlands.

The economic crisis has unfortunately not passed by unnoticed by
De Jong Coldstores, Fresh Plaza notes.  Prices have been under
pressure in recent years and competition is high, Fresh Plaza
discloses.

Netherlands-based De Jong employs 52 people and operates four
offices including the cold store in Ridderkerk.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 9: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 9 B.V.'s notes, as
follows:

Class A1-T floating-rate notes (XS0296310856): affirmed at
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class A1-VF floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable

Class A2 floating-rate notes (XS0296311581): affirmed at 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable

Class B floating-rate notes (XS0296312126): affirmed at 'A-sf';
Outlook Negative

Class C floating-rate notes (XS0296312639): affirmed at 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Negative

Class D floating-rate notes (XS0296313017): affirmed at 'BB-sf';
Outlook Negative

Class E floating-rate notes (XS0296313108): affirmed at 'B-sf';
Outlook Negative

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the satisfactory portfolio performance
since the last review in November 2012. The portfolio exposure to
refinancing risk over the next 18 months is limited as only a
small proportion of the current portfolio is scheduled to mature
during that period. Nevertheless the Outlook on the mezzanine and
junior notes remains Negative due to the low levels of credit
enhancement available for the given rating levels.

The CE levels and over-collateralization cushions have declined
since the last review due to defaults. There are currently four
defaulted assets in the portfolio making up 1.7% of the
portfolio. The weighted average rating of the pool is unchanged
at 'B'/'B-'.

Fitch notes that the process of clarifying the defaulted assets
definition for Harbourmaster CLO 9 is still ongoing. The agency
has no visibility on a potential outcome.

The issuer may invest up to 40% of the portfolio notional into
non-euro obligations. These assets will either be asset swapped,
or naturally hedged if denominated in GBP or USD by a
corresponding drawing in the same currency on the multi-currency
Class A1-VF notes. However, in certain situations, this natural
hedge will not fully cover the FX risk and the residual currency
risk will be absorbed by the structure through FX loss and
utilization of excess spread.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch ran various rating sensitivity stresses on the transaction
to outline the impact on the notes' ratings if the key risk
drivers -- default rates and recovery rates -- were stressed.
Lowering the rating of all the assets in the portfolio by one
notch would likely result in a downgrade of up to three notches
while applying a recovery rate haircut of 25.0% on all the assets
would likely result in a downgrade of up to two notches on the
notes.

Fitch also considered the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to
the transaction's exposure to countries where Fitch has imposed a
country rating cap less than the ratings on any notes in the
transaction. These countries are currently Spain, Ireland,
Portugal and Greece, but may include additional countries if
there is sovereign rating migration. Fitch believes that exposure
of up to 15% of the total investment amount to these countries,
under the same average portfolio profile and assuming the current
ratings on the UK and eurozone countries are stable, would not
have a material negative impact on the notes' ratings.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: RTL Amends Plan Support Pact and Term Sheet
-------------------------------------------------------------
Roust Trading and the members of the Ad Hoc 2013 Notes Committee
entered into an Amended and Restated Plan Support Agreement and
Amended and Restated Term Sheet on March 20, 2013, in order to,
among other things:

   (i) modify certain milestone dates set forth in the Plan
       Support Agreement entered into among Roust Trading and the
       members of the Ad Hoc 2013 Notes Committee on March 14,
       2013;

  (ii) provide that under the Amended Plan, if the Class of
       claims consisting of the Existing 2013 Notes and the RTL
       Notes votes in favor of the Amended Plan, each holder of
       such notes, after giving effect to the RTL Notes Purchase,
       will receive its pro rata share of an aggregate amount of
       cash equal to US$16.9 million;

(iii) modify the allocation of the New Common Stock under the
       Amended Plan; and

  (iv) provide that Roust Trading's obligation to make the RTL
       Notes Purchase (which would occur simultaneously with the
       effective date of the Amended Plan) and its agreement to
       the terms set forth in the Amended and Restated Term Sheet
       will be subject to Roust Trading's receipt of 100% of the
       New Common Stock under the Amended Plan, unless Roust
       Trading agrees otherwise.

A copy of the Amended and Restated Plan Support Agreement is
available for free at http://is.gd/nX4vRq

A copy of the Amended and Restated Term Sheet is available at:

                        http://is.gd/XPfeQo

                            About CEDC

Mt. Laurel, New Jersey-based Central European Distribution
Corporation is one of the world's largest vodka producers and
Central and Eastern Europe's largest integrated spirit beverages
business with its primary operations in Poland, Russia and
Hungary.

Ernst & Young Audit sp. z.o.o., in Warsaw, Poland, expressed
substantial doubt about Central European's ability to continue as
a going concern, following the Company's results for the fiscal
year ended Dec. 31, 2011.  The independent auditors noted that
certain of the Company's credit and factoring facilities are
coming due in 2012 and will need to be renewed to manage its
working capital needs.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2012, showed
US$1.98 billion in total assets, US$1.73 billion in total
liabilities, US$29.44 million in temporary equity, and US$210.78
million in total stockholders' equity.

Mark Kaufman and the A1 Investment Company announced in March
2013 that they are offering to sponsor a chapter 11 plan of
reorganization for CEDC.  In a letter to members of the Board of
CEDC, A1 and Dr. Kaufman proposed to invest up to US$225 million
in the restructuring of CEDC in exchange for 85% of the equity of
the reorganized CEDC.

At the end of February 2013, Roust Trading Ltd. and certain
holders of senior secured notes announced a term sheet for a
proposed restructuring for CEDC where Roust Trading would provide
a new US$172 million cash investment.


GANT: Creditors Agree to Delay Debt Payments Until May 31
---------------------------------------------------------
David McQuaid at Bloomberg News reports that Gant said in a
regulatory statement on Friday the company's creditors took
PLN29.2 million in new bonds and agreed on delay of payments due
them until May 31.

According to Bloomberg, Gant said its creditors "expressed
interest" in swapping outstanding debt of various maturities for
new three-year bonds needed to ensure the company's liquidity.

The company will hold shareholders meeting on April 3 to decide
on the bond issue, Bloomberg discloses.

Gant is a Polish developer.


PBG SA: Expects to Finalize Debt Restructuring Terms by End-April
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bastian Krzysztof at Polska Agencja Prasowa reports that Agenor
Gawrzyal, PBG SA's restructuring coordinator, said the company
hopes to reach agreement on debt restructuring term sheet by end-
April.

"In terms of settlement proposals and term sheet, by mid-April or
by end-April at the latest we should have all the important
questions settled," PAP quotes Mr. Gawrzyal as saying.  "We will
be left with verifying business assumptions, which is related to
PBG securing the means to pay creditors back."

Mr. Gawrzyal said that the next stage of the process will be to
draw up the final list of liabilities, PAP relates.

"I think that in April the list of liabilities will be presented
by the court, then appeals will follow, and only after this
process is over .  .  . will we be able to work on the approved
financial data on the scale of liabilities," Mr. Gawrzyal, as
cited by PAP, said.  "If there are no surprises, end-June is the
time when I expect that this procedure will be realized -- I mean
internal decision-making processes by creditors."

PBG secured court bankruptcy protection for debt restructuring
proceedings in June last year, after signing a stand-down
agreement with its banking creditors in May, PAP recounts.
Negotiations with creditors entered an advanced phase in January
this year, PAP relates.

PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


* PORTUGAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Bond Ratings; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Republic of Portugal's Ba3
government bond ratings and negative outlook.

The drivers for maintaining the negative outlook on Portugal's
sovereign ratings are:

1.) The euro area's continued vulnerability to shocks emanating
from the regional debt crisis, most recently the agreement by the
European Union to the "bail-in" of bank deposits to raise part of
the funds needed for Cyprus' financial rescue.

2.) Portugal's very high level of government debt and its
continued large deficit.

3.) The country's weak economy, which is likely to undergo a
larger-than-expected contraction this year, and the risks this
poses to the stabilization of Portugal's debt metrics in 2014-15.

The drivers for affirming Portugal's Ba3 sovereign ratings are:

1.) Portuguese policymakers' significant progress in achieving
fiscal consolidation and implementing structural reforms in the
context of the economic adjustment program by the EU and
International Monetary Fund (IMF).

2.) Portugal's progress in regaining market access in recent
months, a prerequisite for the country to successfully exit the
EU/IMF support program in May 2014 without needing a second
bailout.

Rationale for Maintaining Portugal's Negative Rating Outlook

The first driver underlying Moody's decision to maintain a
negative outlook the Portugal's Ba3 sovereign rating is the
country's susceptibility to euro-area-related event risk, mainly
because of its very high debt levels and subdued growth
prospects. Such risks were most recently evidenced by the EU's
unprecedented decision to fund Cyprus' financial rescue by
imposing a levy on bank deposits above a certain size. The move
has significantly heightened fears surrounding the safety of bank
deposits in other European systems. More generally, Moody's
believes that Portugal's vulnerability to wider euro area
stresses has been reaffirmed by euro area policymakers' handling
of the Cyprus crisis, the increased risk tolerance apparent in
their actions, and investors' uncertain risk assessment prompted
by a more uncompromising and less predictable approach to crisis
management.

The second driver underpinning the negative outlook on Portugal's
sovereign rating is the country's continued high debt stock,
which at an estimated 123% of GDP (end-2012) is currently one of
the highest among Moody's rated sovereigns. Although more cuts in
the structural fiscal balance are envisaged for 2013-15, the
rating agency expects Portugal's general government gross debt-
to-GDP ratio to rise further to over 124%. In addition, Portugal
is targeting a government deficit level of 5.5% of GDP in 2013.
The progressive postponement of the debt peak due to a delay in
lowering the deficit to less than 3% of GDP casts some doubt on
when the debt will begin to decline and at what pace.

The third driver behind the negative outlook is Moody's
expectation of a larger-than-expected contraction in economic
growth. The rating agency now projects that Portugal's real GDP
will shrink by 2% this year, nearly twice the level Moody's had
previously forecast, and that the country will achieve a modest
recovery of just 0.5% in 2014. The ongoing recession has been the
main reason that revenue shortfalls have persisted and has
contributed to the further deterioration in the government's debt
metrics. Moreover, the weak asset quality of the Portuguese
banking system could be exacerbated by these trends, posing the
risk that additional government funding for the system will be
required, including the use of remaining bank solvency funds.

Rationale for Affirming the Ba3 Ratings

The primary driver underpinning Moody's decision to affirm
Portugal's Ba3 rating is the Portuguese government's
comprehensive response to the economy's structural weaknesses,
most notably institutional reform in the public sector, the tax
system and the labor and product markets, within the context of
its EU/IMF economic adjustment program. The government achieved a
substantial cyclically-adjusted fiscal consolidation of more than
4% of GDP in 2011-12, excluding all one-off measures, even though
the economy contracted by a cumulative five percentage points
relative to its 2010 levels. Nonetheless, the rating agency notes
that achieving the program's goals remains challenging for
Portugal given the interplay between public finances and weak
macroeconomic conditions.

The second driver informing the rating affirmation is the steady
progress that Portugal has made in regaining market access. Since
July 2012, the Portuguese government has been issuing debt that
will mature beyond the May 2014 expiry of its EU/IMF program with
progressively lower interest rates. This debt issuance implies a
recovery of investor confidence, and has allowed the Portuguese
government to pre-finance a portion of its gross borrowing needs
for 2014. In addition, the EU's extension of Portugal's debt
repayment obligations eases the country's refinancing
requirements at a time when its economy will be recovering from a
three-year-long recession and when European debt markets are
likely to still be susceptible to event risk.

What Could Move the Rating Down/Up

Moody's would consider downgrading Portugal's sovereign ratings
in the event of a further significant rise in the government's
debt ratio as a result of an inability to sustain sufficiently
large primary surpluses, which would in turn lead to a second
bailout. The rating agency would also view negatively any renewed
increase in Portugal's debt costs stemming from a loss of market
confidence in the Portuguese economic and fiscal recovery and/or
in euro area policymakers' ability to contain the euro area debt
crisis.

Conversely, Moody's would consider raising Portugal's rating
outlook and eventually upgrading the country's government bond
ratings if the government's financial balance, excluding interest
payments, were to move into a surplus large enough for the
country's debt-to-GDP ratio to stabilize and then begin to
decline. Moody's would also view positively the IMF and EU's
approval of external monitoring or a precautionary credit line
following the expiry of the current economic adjustment program
that would qualify Portugal for the ECB's Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) scheme.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2008.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


CHIMOPAR: Declared Insolvent by Bucharest Court
-----------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Chimopar said a Bucharest court has declared
it insolvent.

According to SeeNews, Chimopar said in a statement sent to the
Bucharest Stock Exchange on Thursday that the court accepted the
company's insolvency petition in September last year and
appointed CII Siliste Cristian Dragos as the judicial
administrator.

The company reported a net loss of RON6.2 million (US$1.8
million/EUR1.4 million) in 2011, SeeNews says, citing latest
available financial data.

Chimopar is a Romanian chemical producer.


OLTCHIM SA: Employees Stage Protest Over Unpaid Salaries
--------------------------------------------------------
Romania-Insider reports that over 1,000 employees of Oltchim SA
started a protest outside the production unit in Ramnicu Valcea
on March 28, as they were unhappy with their unpaid salaries and
the news that they would be laid off, before the company's
reorganization plan was approved.

Oltchim is currently insolvent and going through a
reorganization, Romania-Insider discloses.

According to Romania-Insider, around half of the protesters come
from the petrochemical division in Pitesti, which is also part of
Oltchim, and they too complained of unpaid salaries and of their
division still not being functional.  This is the second such
strike after the one at Mechel Targoviste in recent weeks,
Romania-Insider notes.

Employee unions say the production facility in Ramnicu Valcea is
working at only 6% of its capacity, and the EUR45 million
promised as working capital never came, Romania-Insider relates.
The money would have allowed an increase in production to 65%,
which would have also kept employees working, Romania-Insider
notes.

On March 27, around 500 people from Oltchim and its petrochemical
division blocked traffic in Ramnicu Valcea and in Pitesti
respectively, and asked government representatives to come down
and present them the plan for Oltchim, Romania-Insider recounts.

Oltchim's preliminary financial results for 2012 show that losses
doubled and sales halved last year, Romania-Insider discloses.
The insolvent chemical producer, which went through a failed
privatization attempt last year, saw losses increase to around
EUR90.5 million in 2012, Romania-Insider relates.

Production stopped at the factory last year for extended periods
of time, which was reflected in the operating losses -- some
EUR62 million, or three times bigger than in 2011,
Romania-Insider recounts.

By December 31, 2012, Oltchim's total debt had reached over
EUR620 million, Romania-Insider states.  The Romanian government
approved Oltchim's insolvency on January 23, with a consortium of
Rominsolv SPRL and BDO Business Restructuring RPRL as judiciary
administrator, Romania-Insider relates.  The state announced it
was seeking European Commission (EC) approval to grant the
factory state aid, Romania-Insider discloses.  The government is
requesting approval for some EUR45 million in state aid for
Oltchim in the much delayed and still ongoing privatization
process of the state owned facility, Romania-Insider says.

Oltchim SA is a Romanian state-owned chemical plant.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AEROFLOT JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(EXP)' Rating to RUB5-Bil. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Aeroflot's ('BB-'/Stable) proposed
RUB5 billion notes an expected local currency senior unsecured
rating of 'BB-(EXP)' and an expected National senior unsecured
rating of 'A+(rus)(EXP)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

- State Support
In accordance with Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage
methodology, Aeroflot's Long-term IDR continues to benefit from
parental support via a one-notch uplift to its standalone profile
assessed by Fitch at 'B+'. The agency views the strategic and
operational ties between the parent (Russian Federation;
'BBB'/Stable) and the company as relatively strong. This is
supported, among other things, by its majority state ownership
(51.2% direct stake in addition to a 9.5% indirect stake), import
duty exemptions for the purchase of certain types of aircraft and
the company's importance in the development of the country's air
transportation sector.

At the same time, Fitch acknowledges the potential negative
implications of state links, for example, a potential aggressive
consolidation and/or acquisition plans at the expense of
Aeroflot's credit profile, but highlights that the Rostechnologii
transaction, whilst proposed by the state, was to some extent at
Aeroflot's discretion and following due diligence process.

- Downgrade Reflects High Leverage
The downgrade on March 21, 2013 reflected Fitch's view that
Aeroflot's standalone credit metrics are no longer commensurate
with the 'BB' rating category. Although Fitch forecasts
improvement in the company's financial profile over 2013-2016,
its leverage metrics remain high compared with its 'BB' rated
peers.

Fitch forecasts Aeroflot's FFO adjusted leverage to have
decreased to below 6x in 2012 and expects gradual de-leveraging
to below 5x by 2016, despite the company's ambitious fleet
expansion and renewal program. While we acknowledge the benefits
of a newer, more efficient fleet, the funding of the capex
program will require additional debt burden putting pressure on
the company's financials. The agency anticipates FFO fixed charge
cover to increase to around 2x over the forecast period. Based on
these financial ratios, the company is well placed compared with
its 'B' rated airline peers.

- Solid Profitability Expected
Despite some erosion of its profitability in 2011-2012 due to
high fuel prices and consolidation of the financially weaker
Rostechnologii assets, we expect Aeroflot's profitability to
remain solid compared with its European and some US counterparts.
While yield and passenger revenue per available seat-kilometer
(PRASK) are largely in line with those of its rivals, the
company's cost ratios (eg cost per available seat-kilometer
(CASK)) put it at an advantage to other airlines providing a good
foundation for maintaining sound margins.

- Solid Business Profile
Fitch views Aeroflot's standalone business profile as
commensurate with the 'BB' rating category. It is supported by
its dominant position as Russia's national flag carrier in a
highly fragmented market (37% of the Russian passenger traffic in
2012), relatively diversified route network, strong position at
the Sheremetjevo airport hub and ability to capitalize on the
strong growth potential of the domestic market. While the yields
on the domestic routes fall short of those on the European
destinations, Fitch anticipates their increase in the medium
term.

Fitch expects Aeroflot to continue dynamic growth given forecast
Russian GDP growth, increased mobility of Russian citizens and
the integration of the Rostechnologii airline stakes. The
consolidation of these assets has enabled Aeroflot to strengthen
its dominant position in Russia's airline sector and extend its
network and should underpin the implementation of the company's
multi-brand strategy in the medium term.

LIQUIDITY & DEBT STRUCTURE

- Adequate Liquidity
Fitch views Aeroflot's liquidity position as satisfactory, with
cash of US$597 million at end-9M12 and committed credit lines of
about US$500 million (Aeroflot standalone) at end-2012 sufficient
to cover its short-term obligations. As at end-9M12, short-term
debt stood at US$784.6 million (including US$263.8 million of
finance leases). This included bonds totalling c.US$400 million
due in April 2013. The company has registered an issue of RUB-
denominated bonds for about RUB5 billion (around US$167 million),
the proceeds of which are likely to be used for refinancing
purposes. Fitch expects the company to generate negative free
cash flow (after finance lease payments) over 2012-2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- Evidence of stronger state support.

- Improvement of the financial profile (eg FFO adjusted leverage
  trending towards 4.0x and FFO fixed charge cover above 2.0x on
  a sustained basis) due to, among other things, material
  increase in profitability, moderation of investments in the
  fleet and/or drop in fuel prices.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Further material deterioration of the credit metrics due to,
  among other things, acquisitions, ambitious fleet expansion
  and/or high fuel prices (eg FFO adjusted leverage above 5.0x
  and FFO fixed charge cover below 1.5x on a sustained basis).

- Weakening of state support.

FULL LIST OF RATINGS

Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

Long-term local currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'

Short-term local currency IDR at 'B'

Foreign currency senior unsecured rating at 'BB-'

Local currency senior unsecured rating at 'BB-'

Expected local currency senior unsecured rating: assigned at 'BB-
(EXP)'

National Long-term rating at 'A+(rus)'; Outlook Stable

National Short-term rating at 'F1(rus)'

National senior unsecured rating at 'A+(rus)'

Expected National senior unsecured rating: assigned at
'A+(rus)(EXP)'


IBA-MOSCOW: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to RUB3BB Bond Issue
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based IBA-Moscow's upcoming
RUB3 billion bond issue an expected 'BB(EXP)' Long-term rating.
The issue benefits from recourse to IBAM's parent, International
Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA, 'BB'/Stable/'b-').

The bond will have a three-year tenor, and proceeds from the
issue will be used solely for IBAM's purposes. Should IBAM fail
to make an interest or principal payment under the terms of the
bond, bondholders will benefit from a put option, allowing them
to sell the bonds to IBA.

IBA's offer to purchase the bonds in case of a default by IBAM
represents an irrevocable undertaking and ranks equally with
IBA's other senior unsecured obligations, save those preferred
under Azerbaijan law. Under Azerbaijan law, retail depositors
rank ahead of other senior unsecured creditors. Retail deposits
accounted for 25% of IBA's total liabilities at end-2012,
according to the bank's unconsolidated statutory accounts.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The bond's rating is equalized with IBA's Long-term foreign-
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR), reflecting Fitch's view
that default risk on the bond and on IBA's other senior unsecured
obligations is essentially the same. In Fitch's view, it could be
challenging for bondholders to enforce the put option in an
Azerbaijan court, in case of need. However, the agency believes
that a selective default on the put option is very unlikely,
given the reputational risks for IBA, the small size of the issue
and the potential for such a default to trigger acceleration of
IBA's other debt. Furthermore, in Fitch's view, IBA would have a
high propensity to provide support to IBAM, its fully-owned
subsidiary, to ensure that that IBAM could itself service its
obligations.

IBA's Long-term IDR in turn reflects Fitch's view that there is a
moderate probability of support for the bank, if needed, from the
Azerbaijan authorities. This view factors in IBA's majority
(50.2%) state ownership, its large domestic franchise (the bank
accounts for 35% of sector assets), substantial funding from
state-owned corporations (30% of deposits at end-Q312), the
bank's relatively small size relative to the sovereign's
available resources and the potentially significant reputational
damage for the authorities in case of IBA's default. The two-
notch differential between the 'BBB-' sovereign rating and IBA's
rating reflects the delayed and limited recapitalization of the
bank by the Azerbaijan authorities during the past two years, the
only 50.2% government stake in IBA, and the potential for the
bank to be privatized further in the medium term.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The bond's rating is likely to move in tandem with IBA's Long-
term IDR. The Outlook on the IDR is currently Stable, reflecting
limited potential for the rating to change in the near term.


* RUSSIA: Fitch Sees Positive Outlook for Subnationals
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says its Outlook on Russian subnationals is Stable.
The credit strength of Russian local and regional governments
(LRGs) is supported by the moderate debt burden, still sound,
albeit modestly deteriorating operating performance, and
potential support from the federal government in any situation of
severe distress.

The main challenge facing Russian subnationals is increasing
pressure on expenditure. Operating expenditure is under pressure
due to election promises made by regions by federal authorities
during the national elections in 2011 and 2012. Additional
spending obligations include salary increases, expenditure on
medical care and road construction and maintenance.

Russian LRGs are faced with increasing centralization that
reduces their flexibility. The proportion of earmarked transfers
from the federal government, mostly for the implementation of
capital investment in various budgetary areas like healthcare and
education is constantly increasing. This trend together with
mandatory salary increases for public employees and the
establishment of regional road funds with earmarked revenue
sources lead to higher centralization in intergovernmental
relations.

A sound operating balance will support high self-funding capacity
and the creditworthiness of the majority of Russian LRGs rated
'BB' and above. Regions and municipalities with lower ratings
usually have low self-funding capacity and are highly dependent
on financial aid from the federal government and on the national
policy of intergovernmental relations.

The debt burden of the Russian LRGs is moderate. Fitch estimates
that their total direct debt was 18% of total revenues in 2012.
Fitch expects a further increase in direct debt of about 10% in
2013, which stays in line with operating revenue growth, so the
relative debt burden will remain stable.

Despite the overall moderate debt burden, it is spread unevenly
across LRGs. Thus net debt (debt net of cash available) varies
from zero or even negative for LRGs with ratings of 'BB+' and
above but could reach 60% of operating revenue for lower-rated
LRGs. Additionally, low rated LRGs often rely on short-term
borrowing that leads to high refinancing needs and significant
liquidity risks.

LRGs with low indebtedness that are committed to controlling
their budget balances could improve their creditworthiness
despite the negative external conditions. Deterioration of
budgetary performance due to revenue decline caused by falls in
international commodities' prices coupled or federal transfers
decline with increasing operating expenditure could lead to a
revision of the Outlooks to Negative.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


CIMOS: Creditors Extend Moratorium on Loans Until End of May
------------------------------------------------------------
The Slovenia Times, citing the daily Dnevnik, reports that some
20 bank creditors, including Slovenia's biggest bank NLB,
extended on Friday the moratorium on loans to Cimos until the end
of May.  According to the Slovenia Times, the Cimos group owes
them a total of EUR400 million.

Jerko Bartolic was appointed acting chairman on Thursday to
replace Franc Krasovec, the Slovenia Times discloses.

It is not yet known how the buyers will respond to the move, but
a meeting with them is scheduled for this week, the Slovenia
Times notes.

Mr. Antoncic is confident that with the help of the state, the
troubled company employing some 3,000 people in Slovenia, will
avoid bankruptcy, the Slovenia Times says.

According to the Slovenia Times, Dnevnik said that the new
management will start restructuring the company by closing down
some of production facilities in the countries of former
Yugoslavia and by merging some of them, the Slovenia Times
discloses.

In Slovenia, no major layoffs are planned, the Slovenia Times
states.

Cimos is a Slovenian car parts maker.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCAJA 7: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine junior
and three senior notes in four Spanish RMBS . At the same time,
Moody's confirmed the ratings of two securities in BANCAJA-BVA
VPO 1. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign
risk and commingling risk have prompted this rating action.

The rating action concludes the review of five notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 13, 2012. This
rating action concludes the review of six notes placed on review
on November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key
collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market. This
rating action also concludes the review of one junior note placed
on review in December 2011 for weak performance and two other
notes initially placed on review in June 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

This rating action reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and counterparty exposure.
Moody's confirmed the ratings of securities whose credit
enhancement and structural features provided enough protection
against sovereign and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
the rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

In all four affected transactions, Moody's maintained the current
expected loss and MILAN CE assumptions. Expected loss assumptions
remain at 0.43% for Bancaja 4, 0.39% for Bancaja 5, 0.90% for
Bancaja 7 and 1.90% for Bancaja-BVA VPO 1. The MILAN CE
assumptions remain at 10% for Bancaja 4, 10% for Bancaja 5, 10%
for Bancaja 7 and 12.9% for Bancaja-BVA VPO 1.

- Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The downgrade of the senior notes in Bancaja 4, Bancaja 5 and
Bancaja 7 also reflects the commingling risk due to the exposure
to Bankia (Ba2/NP) acting as servicer and collection account
bank.

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to Bankia (Ba2/NP), which still acts
as swap counterparty for the BANCAJA 4 transaction and the
exposure to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (Baa3/P-3
"BBVA"), which acts as swap counterparty in Bancaja-BVA VPO 1 .
Moody's notes that, following the breach of the second rating
trigger, the swaps in BANCAJA 4 and Bancaja-BVA VPO 1 do not
reflect Moody's de-linkage criteria. The rating agency has
assessed the probability and effect of a default of the swap
counterparties on the ability of the issuers to meet their
obligations under the transactions. Additionally, Moody's has
examined the effect of the loss of any benefit from the swaps and
any obligation the issuers may have to make a termination
payment. In conclusion, these factors will not negatively affect
the rating on the notes.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in
March 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, for Bancaja 7, FTA, the input for the
provisioning mechanism through the Principal Deficiency Ledger,
the Interest deferral trigger, the pro-rata amortization trigger
and the cash reserve mechanism have been corrected during the
review. For Bancaja-BVA VPO 1, FTA the interest deferral trigger
and to the pro-rata amortization trigger have been corrected
during the review as well.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BANCAJA 4 Fondo De Titulizacion Hipotecaria

EUR970.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR20.5M B Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR9M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BANCAJA 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

EUR960.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR24.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR15M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BANCAJA 7 Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos

EUR1670.2M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR39.9M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR23.8M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 16,
2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR16.1M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: BANCAJA-BVA VPO 1, FTA

EUR371.4M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR7.8M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR5.1M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR5.7M D Notes, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BBVA CONSUMO 3: Moody's Confirms 'Caa2' Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded by two notches the junior
tranche of BBVA Consumo 4 and upgraded by one to four notches the
ratings of three mezzanine or junior tranches of BBVA Consumo 1
and BBVA Consumo 2. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the
ratings of six tranches (rated from Caa2(sf) to A3(sf)) of BBVA
Consumo1, BBVA Consumo 2, BBVA Consumo 3 and BBVA Consumo 4.
While increased counterparty risk triggered the downgrade of the
junior tranche of BBVA Consumo 4, sufficient credit enhancement,
which protects against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily
drove the upgrade and rating confirmations.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on July 2, 2012. These four transactions are Spanish
asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions backed by consumer
loans originated by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA,
Baa3/P-3).

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness has had no effect on the ratings of
six classes of notes in the four transactions. Furthermore, the
current level of credit enhancement available under the Class C
notes of BBVA Consumo 1 and under the Class B and C notes of BBVA
Consumo 2 in the form of reserve funds or subordination is
sufficient to support the following upgrades: to Baa3 (sf) from
Ba2 (sf) for Class C notes of BBVA Consumo 1; to Baa1 (sf) from
Baa2 (sf) for the Class B and to Ba1 (sf) from B2 (sf) for the
Class C notes of BBVA Consumo 2.

While sovereign risk is largely mitigated by the high level of
credit enhancement (49.5%) as of December 2012, increased
counterparty risk drove the downgrade of the Class B notes of
BBVA Consumo 4. As this credit enhancement is entirely in the
form of a reserve fund held at BBVA (Baa3/P-3), the Class B notes
are strongly linked to BBVA's rating. Moody's downgraded the
Class B notes to Baa2 (sf) from A3 (sf) to reflect this strong
linkage. The quality of the assets backing the notes allows for a
one-notch uplift from BBVA's rating.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the four transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

For BBVA Consumo 1, the current default assumption is 6.0% of the
current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed recovery rate
is 20.0%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 79.5% from 25.0%,
which, combined with the revised key collateral assumptions,
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 22.5%.

For BBVA Consumo 2, the current default assumption is 8.5% of the
current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed recovery rate
is 20.0%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 55.9% from 27.5%,
which, combined with the revised key collateral assumptions,
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 22.5%.

For BBVA Consumo 3, the current default assumption is 12.0% of
the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed recovery
rate is 20.0%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 45.8% from 30.0%,
which, combined with the revised key collateral assumptions,
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 25.5%.

For BBVA Consumo 4, the current default assumption is 13.0% of
the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed recovery
rate is 30.0%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 49.9% from 30.0%,
which, combined with the revised key collateral assumptions,
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 25.5%.

Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

In all transactions, BBVA acts as servicer and collections
account bank, and transfers collections daily to the treasury
accounts in the name of the funds at BBVA. The reserve funds also
reside at BBVA.

In BBVA Consumo 1 and 2, Societe Generale, Sucursal en Espana
(SGSE, A2/ P-1) guarantees the cash held in the treasury accounts
up to EUR33 million and EUR35 million, respectively. In addition,
any cash held at the treasury accounts in excess of the guarantee
amount is transferred on an ongoing basis to SGSE's additional
treasury accounts (in the name of the funds). For these two
transactions, Moody's incorporated into its analysis the
potential default of BBVA as servicer and considered medium
linkage between the rating of the notes and the rating of BBVA,
which could expose the transaction to a limited commingling loss
of one month of collections.

In BBVA Consumo 3 and 4, the treasury accounts in the name of the
funds are held by BBVA. Collections are transferred by the
servicers on a daily basis to the treasury accounts at BBVA, and
the treasury account bank has to be replaced upon BBVA's rating
falling below Baa3. For these two transactions, Moody's
incorporated into its analysis the potential default of BBVA as
servicer and treasury account and considered strong linkage
between the rating of the notes and the rating of BBVA, which
could expose the transaction to a commingling loss on the
quarterly collections and a loss on the reserve fund.

Deutsche Bank A.G (London branch) (A2/P-1) acts as swap
counterparty in BBVA Consumo 1 and BBVA Consumo 2 while BBVA acts
as swap counterparty in BBVA Consumo 3 and BBVA Consumo 4. As
part of its analysis, Moody's assessed the exposure to the swap
counterparties, which in all transactions does not have a
negative effect on the rating levels at this time.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cash flow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, Moody's has corrected the input for some
coupons for BBVA Consumo 1, 2 and 3 during the review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions", published in
October 2012.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013, along with the publication of its
Special Comment " Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the
Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BBVA Consumo 1, FTA

EUR1447.5M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR28.5M B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR24M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA Consumo 2, FTA

EUR1440.7M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR16.5M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR42.8M C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA Consumo 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

EUR916.5M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR58.5M B Notes, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA Consumo 4, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

EUR937.7M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR162.3M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BBVA RMBS 11: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two junior
and two senior notes in two Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions: BBVA RMBS 5, FTA and BBVA RMBS 11, FTA.
At the same time, Moody's confirmed the ratings of three
securities in BBVA RMBS 9, FTA and BBVA RMBS 10, FTA.
Insufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk has
prompted this action.

The rating action concludes the review of five notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 13, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed the
ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign and
counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
the rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

In all four affected transactions, Moody's maintained the current
expected loss and MILAN CE assumptions. Expected loss assumptions
as a percentage of original pool balance remain at 6.75% for BBVA
RMBS 5, 4.50% for BBVA RMBS 9 and 10 and 7% for BBVA RMBS 11. The
MILAN CE assumptions remain at 20% for BBVA RMBS 5, 9 and 10 and
22.5% for BBVA RMBS 11.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,
S.A. ("BBVA", Baa3/P-3), which still acts as Issuer Account Bank
in all four transactions and swap counterparty for BBVA RMBS 5, 9
and 10. Moody's notes that, following the breach of the second
rating trigger, the swaps in BBVA RMBS 5, 9 and 10 do not reflect
Moody's de-linkage criteria. The rating agency has assessed for
each deal the probability of a default of the swap counterparty
on the ability of the issuer to meet its obligations under the
transaction. Additionally, Moody's has examined the effect of the
loss of any benefit from the swap and any obligation the issuer
may have to make a termination payment. In conclusion, these
factors will not negatively affect the rating on the notes.

Moody's has also assessed exposure to Issuer Account Bank taking
into consideration the probability of default of the Issuer
Account Bank and examining the effect of the loss of reserve fund
and collections deposited in the Issuer Account Bank. In
conclusion, these factors will not negatively affect the rating
of the notes. The ratings of the notes could be negatively
affected in case of deterioration of BBVA credit profile. This
linkage is more relevant in the case of BBVA 9 where the reserve
fund is the main source of credit enhancement.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment"
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in
March 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and note holders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition the following have been corrected during
the review: for BBVA RMBS 5 the triggers to stop pro rata
amortization in pro rata scenario and the triggers for reserve
fund to build up; for BBVA RMBS 9 the reserve fund amortization
trigger and for BBVA RMBS 11, the input for the cumulative
default value to trigger interest deferral on mezzanine and
junior notes.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 5, FTA

EUR4675M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 9, FTA

EUR1295M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 10, FTA

EUR1376M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR224M B Notes, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 11, FTA

EUR1204M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR119M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 12,
2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

EUR77M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2012
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)


CAIXA PENEDES: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Caixa Penedes PYMES 1 TDA, F.T.A.'s
notes, as follows:

EUR147.4m Class A (ISIN ES0357326000): affirmed at 'AA-sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR44.6m Class B (ISIN ES0357326018): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR19.4m Class C (ISIN ES0357326026): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
revised to Negative from Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the notes' adequate credit enhancement.
The notes have accumulated additional credit enhancement due to
deleveraging of the portfolio.

The revision of the Outlook on the class C notes to Negative
reflects their vulnerability to a sudden spike in defaults. Loans
in arrears of more than 90 days increased to 4.9% of the
portfolio notional from 2.5% at the last review in April 2012.
The deterioration is mainly driven by obligors in the real estate
and building & materials industries. These two industries account
for 44.0% of the portfolio notional.

The portfolio continues to be granular, with only three obligors
each representing over 50bp of the portfolio notional. The
largest obligor accounts for 0.97% of the portfolio notional.

The transaction has experienced strong recoveries on defaulted
loans. The weighted-average recovery rate (ratio of cumulative
recoveries to cumulative defaults) has remained close to 96%
since the last review.

The transaction is exposed to a lowly rated servicer (Banco Mare
Nostrum, 'BB+'/RWN/'B). The resulting payment interruption risk
is mitigated by the reserve fund (RF) in the structure. The RF is
sized at EUR13.4 million and has remained fully funded since the
last review.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of zero to two notches for
the notes.

Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of zero to two notches for
the notes.

Caixa Penedes PYMES 1 TDA, F.T.A. is a granular cash flow
securitisation of a static portfolio of secured and unsecured
loans granted to Spanish small- and medium-sized enterprises by
Caixa Penedes (now part of Banco Mare Nostrum).


IM CAJAMAR 4: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Serie B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of the Class
A2(G) and B notes issued by IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME, FTA and
confirmed the ratings of the Class A notes issued by IM Cajamar
Empresas 4, FTA. At the same time, Moody's upgraded the rating of
the Class C notes to Baa3 (sf) from Ba2 (sf) of IM Cajamar
Empresas 2 FTPYME and affirmed the rating of the Class B notes of
IM Cajamar Empresas 4. Sufficient credit enhancement, which
protects against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove
the rating action.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on July 2, 2012. Both transactions are Spanish asset-
backed securities transactions backed by loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS) originated by Cajamar Caja
Rural, Soc. Coop. de Credito (unrated).

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness and the revision of key collateral
assumptions and increased exposure to lowly rated counterparties
has had no negative effect on the ratings of all classes of notes
in both transactions.

Furthermore, the current level of credit enhancement available
under the Class C notes of IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME in the
form of cash (via the reserve fund) is sufficient to support an
upgrade to Baa3 (sf) from Ba2 (sf).

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk:

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions:

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
both transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

For IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME, the current default assumption
is 12.5% of the current portfolio and the assumption for the
fixed recovery rate is 40%. Moody's has increased the CoV to
73.4% from 45%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of
20%.

For IM Cajamar Empresas 4, the current default assumption is
12.3% of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 45%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 75.4% from
61.2%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of
20%.

Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk:

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

In both transactions, Cajamar Caja Rural, Soc. Coop. de Credito
acts as servicer and transfers collections every day to the
reinvestment accounts at the Bank of Spain (unrated) for IM
Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME and at Banco Santander S.A. (Baa2) for
IM Cajamar Empresas 4. The reserve funds reside at the Bank of
Spain for IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME and at Banco Santander for
IM Cajamar Empresas 4. Moody's has incorporated into its analysis
the potential default of both counterparties, which could expose
the transaction to a commingling loss on the collections and a
loss on the reserve fund.

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (Baa3/P-3) acts as swap
counterparty in IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME. As part of its
analysis, Moody's assessed the exposure to the swap counterparty,
which does not have a negative effect on the rating levels at
this time. There is no swap in place in IM Cajamar Empresas 4.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes:

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013, along with the publication of its
Special Comment "Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the
Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: IM Cajamar Empresas 2 FTPYME, FTA

EUR162.9M A2(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR41.6M B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR28M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IM CAJAMAR EMPRESAS 4, FTA

EUR840M Serie A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR210M Serie B Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22,
2012 Definitive Rating Assigned Caa1 (sf)


IM CAJAMAR 5: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' Rating to Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned IM Cajamar Empresas 5, F.T.A.'s notes
expected ratings, as follows:

EUR175.0m Class A1: 'A+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR365.0m Class A2: 'A+(EXP)sf': Outlook Stable
EUR135.0m Class B: 'CCC(EXP)sf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

IM Cajamar Empresas 5, F.T.A. is a granular cash flow
securitization of a EUR675 million static portfolio of secured
and unsecured loans granted to Spanish small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed individuals (SEIs). The
loans were originated by Cajamar Caja Rural and Caja Rural del
Mediterraneo, Ruralcaja. Cajamar and Ruralcaja merged in October
2012 to form Cajas Rurales Unidas (CRU, 'BB'/Stable/'B').

The ratings address the likelihood of investors receiving
interest payments in accordance with the terms of the transaction
documentation and full repayment of principal by legal final
maturity in November 2055.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Segmented Default Risk:
Fitch applied a forward-looking annual probability of default
(PD) of 3.7% and 1.8% to the SME and SEI segments originated by
Cajamar (83.0% of the portfolio). The agency applied a PD of 7.2%
and 2.7% to the SME and SEI segments originated by Ruralcaja
(17.0% of the portfolio).

Lower Recoveries:
Fitch expects a base-case rating recovery rate of 45% for the
portfolio. Fitch used its MVD framework to calculate expected
recoveries for the portfolio and then applied an adjustment
reflecting the low observed recoveries achieved by the
originator.

Limited Obligor Concentration:
The transaction is exposed to limited obligor concentration risk.
The largest obligor group accounts for 1.5%. Obligor groups
larger than 50bp represent a total 4.9% of the portfolio.

Counterparty Risk Rating Cap:
The highest achievable rating in the transaction is capped at
'A+sf' due to the treasury account bank rating triggers embedded
in the transaction documentation. Banco Santander S.A.
('BBB+'/Negative/'F2') will serve as the treasury account bank.

Dedicated Liquidity:
Fitch believes that liquidity risk is mitigated by the reserve
fund. The reserve fund, sized at 17%, is used exclusively to
cover any interest shortfalls on the most senior class of notes
(A1 and A2, then B) during the life of the transaction. Any
remaining balance can be used to amortize the notes on the last
payment date.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge:
The structure features no interest rate derivatives. A rise in
interest rates is partially hedged by the fixed-rate coupon
payable on the class A1 note. Loans with a fixed interest rate
account for 15.2% of the portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of the class A1 and A2 notes to
'BBB+(EXP)sf'. A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates
would lead to a downgrade of the class A1 and A2 notes to 'A-
(EXP)sf'. The rating of the class B notes would be 'CCC(EXP)sf'
or below in both scenarios.

Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further described
in the accompanying pre-sale report.


RENTA CORP: In Voluntary Bankruptcy; Administrator to Be Assigned
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BIA reports that Renta Corp Real Estate SA has been admitted into
voluntary bankruptcy.

According to Bloomberg News' Sharon Smyth, Renta Corp. was
notified by mercantile court no.9 in Barcelona that it will be
assigned an administrator by the stock market regulator to
oversee its petition for protection from creditors.

Renta Corporacion Real Estate SA is a Barcelona-based real estate
developer.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Corp. Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Caa3 corporate family
rating and bond rating of Northland Resources AB ('Northland').
Concurrently, Moody's has applied the 'limited default' ('/LD')
indicator to the company's Ca-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), to reflect the recently missed interest payment on its
outstanding notes, which the rating agency considers a default
according to its definition of default. As a result, Moody's PDR
for Northland has been affirmed at Ca-PD/LD. In addition, the
outlook on all ratings remains negative.

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of the CFR at Caa3 reflects (1) the credit-
positive implications of the continuous support Northland's major
creditors have decided to grant to the company; and (2) the $20
million of short-term super-senior funding that bondholders and
key suppliers recently decided to provide to the company to
support its operations until April, subject to the achievement of
pre-defined operational milestones.

The application of the '/LD' indicator to the Ca-PD PDR follows
the non-payment of interest due on Northland's senior secured
notes on March 6, 2013, which meets Moody's definition of
default, irrespective of any support or waiver from bondholders
the company may still be benefitting from, pending its current
reconstruction process supervised by the administrator appointed
by the Court of Lulea in Sweden.

Despite recent progress made by Northland to secure short-term
funding, Moody's reiterates that the probability of default for
the company remains very high. This is because Northland's
liquidity is inadequate and having only recently obtained $20
million from its creditors, on top of the $6 million super-senior
loan received in early March by the bondholders, management has
little time to find a much-needed long-term funding solution for
the production and commercial ramp-up phase of its Kaunisvaara
project, including the installation of the second process line,
which will cost at least $375 million to complete. Indeed,
Moody's cautions that this funding gap could widen further, as
the execution of the project, which so far has achieved its key
operational milestones on time (including the first shipment of
ore to customers in late February), could be subject to material
delays while management struggles to address the company's
liquidity crisis.

The Caa3 CFR reflects Moody's opinion that the issuer may be
unable to operate as a going concern in the near term, absent an
urgent equity infusion or other supplemental liquidity. The
higher CFR compared with the PDR reflects Moody's expectations
regarding creditors' better-than-average recovery prospects in
the event of a default (an estimate of 60%-70%). This viewpoint
reflects the amount of equity already invested in the Kaunisvaara
project, as well as a comprehensive guarantee and security
package for the notes, which are supported by guarantees from all
material subsidiaries and first ranking security over the shares,
corporate and real estate assets of the group, as well as
Northland's bond escrow account, where nearly $60 million of
restricted cash is still held for bondholders.

Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's view that
considerable challenges and uncertainties lie ahead for Northland
as it moves to arrange new financial resources under difficult
conditions.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Given Northland's near-term liquidity shortages and the negative
outlook on the ratings, Moody's considers that there is currently
limited potential for any upwards rating pressure. However, if
Northland finds a solution to address the long-term liquidity
requirements of the Kaunisvaara project, and the company
positively concludes the reconstruction process, Moody's could
stabilize the outlook and remove the '/LD' indicator. Moreover,
further positive pressure might develop over time as the project
becomes fully funded, achieves further development milestones and
starts to generate positive free cash flows.

Conversely, negative pressure on the ratings would result if
Northland is unable to secure additional liquidity in the near
term, and/or fails to find an adequate long-term source of
capital in due course, which then would make an acceleration of
its main debt obligations highly likely.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry published in May 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Northland Resources AB, a subsidiary of publicly listed Northland
Resources SA, is a special purpose vehicle created to manage the
construction and development of the Kaunisvaara iron ore project
in northern Sweden. The Kaunisvaara project comprises the Tapuli
mine, the nearby Sahavaara mine, a dual-line processing plant and
a fully integrated logistics solution for the delivery of iron
ore concentrate to the Port of Narvik in Norway. The company
announced the shipment of the first vessel leaving the Port of
Narvik with approximately 55,000 tons of iron ore concentrate on
February 25, 2013. The Kaunisvaara project is planned to produce
4.4 million dry metric tons of high-grade iron ore concentrate
per annum.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


GATEGROUP HOLDING: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on the ratings of
gategroup Holding AG to negative from stable. Moody's has also
affirmed the company's B1 corporate family rating, B1-PD
probability of default rating and the B1 rating of EUR350 million
senior notes due 2019 issued by gategroup Finance (Luxembourg)
S.A.

Ratings Rationale:

"The change in outlook reflects Moody's view that gategroup's
credit metrics are now weakly positioned for the B1 category",
says Tanya Savkin, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and
lead analyst for gategroup. "Weaker than expected operational
profitability and cash flow generation during 2012 combined with
a degree of uncertainty surrounding the success of the company's
restructuring measures puts negative pressure on the ratings."

Despite an 11% year-on-year growth in revenue at c. CHF3 billion,
gategroup's normalized EBITDA (before restructuring costs and
impairment charges) declined to CHF171 million from CHF205
million and normalized EBITDA margin dropped to 5.7% from 7.6%.
Additionally, cash flow generation was negatively affected by
overall lower profitability, high restructuring charges of CHF22
million and an increase in working capital of CHF95 million
leading to negative free cash flow for the year (as adjusted by
Moody's). As a result of the underperformance, gross Debt to
EBITDA (Moody's adjusted) increased to 5.1x from 4.3x as of the
end of 2011 and (EBITDA-Capex) to Interest Expense reached 1.2x
(versus 2.4x as of the end of 2011).

However, Moody's expects some improvement in the company's
metrics in 2013 (although they are likely to be back-ended) due
to savings from the restructuring program launched by the company
to address a drop in profitability in Airline Solutions Europe
division as well as some normalization of volumes in the
company's European portfolio. The company expects to achieve c.
CHF30-40 million of cost savings during the course of 2013
related to labor, back office streamlining and portfolio
optimization. Furthermore, Moody's expects free cash flow to turn
positive in 2013 due to EBITDA improvement and normalization of
working capital. Failure to achieve these would put further
pressure on the ratings.

Moody's remains concerned about the customer concentration of
gategroup given the consolidation trend prevalent in the airline
industry, as well as its geographical diversification, which,
although improved in Asia Pacific through the acquisition of
Skygourmet and the acquisition of two Qantas's kitchens in
Australia, remains focused on Europe and the US (together, 78% of
2012 revenue).

The company's liquidity remains good, including c. CHF171 million
cash on balance sheet and fully undrawn CHF120 million (EUR100
million) revolving credit facility.

Given the rating positioning and outlook, there is limited
prospect of a ratings upgrade. The outlook could stabilize if the
company demonstrates the anticipated improvement in operating
performance including profitability and cash flow generation.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

A ratings upgrade would require Gross Adjusted Debt / EBITDA to
fall towards 3.5x, free cash flow to stay positive, and (EBITDA -
Capex) / Interest expense ratio to be sustained well above 2.0x.
Additionally, Moody's will consider the extent to which the
company has increased its geographical and customer
diversification.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Further negative rating pressure could develop if Gross Adjusted
Debt/EBITDA (before restructuring charges) remains above 4.5x by
the end of 2013, free cash flow remains negative during 2013 or
(EBITDA -- Capex) / Interest expense ratio is below 1.5x for the
year of 2013. A material deterioration in the liquidity position
of the company or a sizeable debt funded acquisition would also
be negative for the company's rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Zurich, gategroup Holding AG is the leading
independent airline caterer and hospitality and logistic services
provider in the world.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MRIYA AGRO: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Guaranteed Eurobond
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Mriya Agro Holding Public Limited's
new planned benchmark size guaranteed Eurobond an expected rating
of 'B(EXP)' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. The final ratings
are contingent upon receipt of final documents conforming to
information already received by Fitch.

Mriya's Long-term foreign currency and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) are 'B' with a Stable Outlook. The National
Long-term rating is 'A-(ukr)' with a Stable Outlook.

Part of the proceeds of the new issue will be applied to finance
a tender offer for a portion of the existing US$250 million
senior notes due 2016, which will help phase out the group's debt
maturities. In addition, Fitch understands that the remaining
proceeds will be applied to repaying other debt facilities, capex
and boosting liquidity to support working capital swings
throughout the year. We do not expect changes in Mryia's dividend
policy and assume no dividends to be paid out from bond proceeds.

The notes will rank as senior unsecured obligations, and benefit
from upstream guarantees (which are suretyships under Ukrainian
law) from several operating subsidiaries representing a minimum
of 80% of EBITDA, net income and total assets of the group. The
terms of the new notes are substantially the same as the terms of
the existing notes, including a debt incurrence covenant based on
a net debt/EBITDA of less than 3x. Bondholders are protected by a
cross-default with any indebtedness of the issuer, the sureties
or any material subsidiary above the threshold of US$10 million.

Given the level of investments made and growing asset base,
Fitch's recovery analysis indicates higher recoveries for
creditors arising from the liquidation. Unsecured creditors'
recoveries are supported by limited senior indebtedness, thus
unsecured creditors are expected to obtain at least 50% recovery
for their claims. However, Fitch applies a soft-cap of 'RR4' for
the Ukrainian jurisdiction resulting in expected recoveries upon
default of 31%-50%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Resilient Operating Performance
Mriya delivered outstanding revenue growth in 2012 while keeping
the funds from operations (FFO) margin above 40%. However,
depending on the future pace of land bank expansion, we assume
somewhat slower revenue growth in 2013 and 2014 as we do not
envisage a further dramatic improvement in crop yields while soft
commodity prices will remain volatile. Fitch expects an FFO
margin at or above 40%, which is healthy for the rating,
supported by investments in logistics and infrastructure (silos).

Capex Key Part of Strategy
Mriya conducted heavy investments in 2012 in storage facility
construction and logistic fleet expansion that will enable the
group to enhance its existing operations' efficiency. The current
rating factors in annual capex between USD150m and USD180m
(averaging around 40% of sales), a combination of further land
lease rights and additional infrastructure. Therefore Fitch
assumes gradual deleveraging with FFO adjusted net leverage
remaining between 2x and 2.5x by 2016 (2012: 2.5x), consistent
with a 'B' rating for the sector.

Adequate Liquidity, Limited Debt Redemptions
The planned bond issue will improve Mriya's liquidity profile and
allow an extension of the average debt maturity for at least 1.5
years. Despite high capex in 2012, even prior to the planned bond
placement and partial refinancing, Mriya had cash and liquid
inventories and account receivables totalling US$280 million by
end-December 2012. This level of liquid assets, excluding any
committed bank lines, is sufficient to fund its working capital
cycle (equating to US$140 million swing from peak to trough or
0.7x-0.8x EBITDA intra-year).

Limited Exposure to Cyprus
As the top holding and issuer of the public notes, Mriya is
incorporated in Cyprus. Fitch anticipates limited or no impact
for Mriya as a result of the current uncertainty surrounding the
Cypriot banking system as the group currently does not hold any
meaningful cash holdings while interest payments are made
directly from its bank accounts located overseas. In addition,
Mriya conducts 100% of its activities in Ukraine, where most
surety providers are based. Therefore we consider that a
disruption in the banking sector or economic conditions in
Ukraine could potentially be more damaging for Mriya than the
current turmoil in Cyprus.

Corporate Governance Issues Remain
Relative to other Ukrainian peers, such as Kernel and MHP,
Mriya's corporate governance is still weak, albeit scoring better
than UkrLandFarming. Mriya maintains related party transactions
in relation to all of its sugar beet production (this represented
16% of Mriya's total revenues in 2012; 40% in 2011). This decline
is a positive sign. However, we consider that it may be not
sustainable as it is partly driven by weak environment in
Ukraine's sugar market. We do not expect the bond proceeds to
fund the related party sugar business. Although this is a
constraining factor for a future positive rating development,
Fitch understands the sugar companies owned by the controlling
shareholder do not have meaningful financial debt as they have no
major capital spending plans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- Contraction of related party transactions or full consolidation
  of the sugar business into the group.

- Evidence of positive or at least only moderately negative FCF
   margin.

The above factors would have to be accompanied by at least two of
the following triggers:

- FFO margin above 35% or FFO above USD200m in absolute terms.

- FFO adjusted net leverage below 1.5x (and below 2.5x at peak
  throughout the year).

- FFO fixed charge coverage consistently above 4.5x.

- Maintained strong liquidity - available cash, committed
  available bank lines and expected next year's CFO less
  maintenance capex covering at least 150% of short-term debt
  maturities.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Declining profitability driven by sustained cost increases
  and/or yield erosion bringing FFO margin down to the 25%-30%
  range.

- Weaker liquidity profile.

- FFO adjusted net leverage consistently above 2.5x at year-end
  (or 3.5x at the peak during the year).

- FFO fixed charge below 3x.


UKREXIMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New US$100MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating of B3 to
Ukreximbank's upcoming foreign-currency senior unsecured notes.
Moody's expects that the issuance will be US$100 million. The
notes will be consolidated and form a single series with US$500
million limited-recourse notes issued by Biz Finance PLC, a UK-
based special-purpose vehicle, for the sole purpose of funding a
loan to Ukreximbank in January 2013 under 8.75% per annum and
maturing in 2018. The outlook for the rating is negative.

Ratings Rationale:

The notes' B3 rating is based on the underlying obligor
Ukreximbank's fundamental credit quality, which is rated
B3/NP/E+, with a negative outlook.

According to Moody's, Ukreximbank's ratings are driven primarily
by the linkages between the bank's credit profile and sovereign
credit risk. This reflects Ukreximbank's (1) sizeable exposure to
Ukraine's government bonds, which account for over 50% of the
bank's Tier 1 capital; (2) geographical concentration in
Ukraine's weak and volatile operating environment; and (3)
significant medium-term refinancing risks, as foreign-market
borrowings account for a third of Ukreximbank's total funding.

According to the terms and conditions of the notes, Ukreximbank
must comply with a number of covenants, including negative-pledge
covenants, merger limitations, disposals, transactions with
affiliates and minimum capital-adequacy maintenance.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, Ukreximbank reported (under
IFRS), total assets, equity and net income of US$9.36 billion,
US$2.17 billion and US$9.91 million, respectively at end-H1 2012.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Rates $100MM Recourse Notes 'B(EXP)'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Biz Finance PLC's US$100 million 8.75%
upcoming tap issue of fixed-rate limited recourse notes an
expected Long-term rating of 'B(EXP)' and a Recovery Rating of
'RR4'. The notes will be consolidated to form a single series
with the outstanding US$500 million 8.75% notes due in January
2018. The notes are to be used solely for financing a loan to
Ukraine-based JSC The State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine
(Ukreximbank, 'B'/Stable/'b').

Biz Finance PLC, a UK-based company, will only pay noteholders
amounts (principal and interest) received from Ukreximbank under
the loan agreement. The claims under the loan agreement will rank
at least equally with the claims of other senior unsecured and
unsubordinated creditors of Ukreximbank, save those preferred by
relevant laws. Under Ukrainian law, the claims of retail
depositors rank above those of other senior unsecured creditors.
At end-2012, retail depositors accounted for around 23% of
Ukreximbank's non-equity funding, according to the bank's local
GAAP reporting.

At end-2012, Ukreximbank was the second-largest bank in Ukraine
by total assets; its key role is to support foreign trade. The
state, represented by the Ukrainian cabinet, is the only
shareholder in the bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The issue's Long-term rating corresponds to Ukreximbank's Long-
term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR; 'B'/Stable).
The issue's Recovery Rating of 'RR4' reflects average recovery
prospects for bondholders in case of default.

Ukreximbank's IDRs, National Long-term and Support Ratings are
underpinned by potential support from the Ukrainian authorities,
if needed, based on the bank's state ownership, its policy role,
its high systemic importance, and the track record of capital
support for the bank under different governments. The ratings
also take into consideration the ability of the Ukrainian
authorities to provide such support, which remains limited, as
indicated by the sovereign's Long-term IDR of 'B'.

Ukreximbank's IDRs and VR reflect the bank's sizable capital
buffer and solid pre-impairment profitability available to absorb
losses, comfortable liquidity and solid corporate franchise.
However, Ukreximbank's VR also considers its high loan impairment
(albeit lower than for the sector as a whole), high loan
concentrations, the large share of FX lending and currently weak
profitability, driven by loan impairment charges.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Any changes to Ukreximbank's Long-term foreign currency IDR would
also impact the issue's Long-term rating. The Stable Outlook on
the bank's Long-term IDR reflects that on the sovereign's Long-
term IDR. Improvement or deterioration in Ukraine's sovereign
risk profile would generate upward or downward pressure,
respectively, on Ukreximbank's ratings.

Ukreximbank's ratings are:

Long-term IDR: 'B'; Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured debt: 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Subordinated debt: 'CCC'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Short-term IDR: 'B'

Support Rating: '4'

Support Rating Floor: 'B'

VR: 'b'

National Long-term rating: 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable


COVENTRY CITY: Faces Administration Threat Over 'Unpaid Rent'
-------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Coventry City Football Club Holdings said a
non-operating subsidiary of the club has been put into
administration.

It comes the day before Coventry and owners Sisu are due in
London's High Court to face an administration order, according to
BBC News.  The report relates that the application is from Arena
Coventry Limited, who manage the Ricoh Arena for joint owners the
Alan Edward Higgs Charity and Coventry City Council.

"It is important to stress that the football club itself is not
under threat . . . . This is merely a property subsidiary which
owns no material assets and has no employees, on or off the
pitch. . . . The club can confirm that all staff wages, PAYE and
all other creditor commitments will continue to be met as before
by Coventry City Football Club Holdings. . . . Unlike other
instances of clubs being taken either wholly or partially into
administration, there are no HMRC or VAT implications and the
football club will continue to trade as normal without
interruption. . . . Our main objective now is to remain
competitive on the pitch and give Steven Pressley and the playing
staff our full backing and commitment," the report quoted a
spokesman for the club as saying.

However, the report notes that the date with the High Court could
result in the whole operation being placed into administration.
The court claimed that the Sky Blues owe over GBP1.3 million to
ACL in unpaid rent stretching back a year, the report relates.

The row has seen their bank accounts frozen, while earlier this
month Coventry were placed under a transfer embargo having failed
to file their annual accounts on time, the report discloses.

Coventry face a 10-point deduction if they go into
administration, the report adds.


DREAM STORE: Scunthorpe Keeps Trading Following Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Southern Telegraph reports that a Scunthorpe store was still
trading (Wednesday, March 6) after the parent company, Dreams
Plc, went into administration.

The Dreams store is on the Lakeside Retail Park at Ashby Ville.

Alan Hudson, Craig Lewis and Joe O'Connor, of Ernst & Young LLP,
were appointed Joint Administrators of Dreams Plc.

A sale has been completed that sees the majority of the Dreams
business, including 171 of its stores, being sold to a new
company controlled by Sun Capital Partners, according to Southern
Telegraph.

However, Southern Telegraph notes that the Scunthorpe store is
not included in that sale.

The report says that the Joint Administrators, when appointed,
sold the company's business and assets to a new company
controlled by Sun Capital Partners, for an undisclosed sum.

As a result, they say, the business has secured new investment
and will continue to operate as a going concern outside of
insolvency, the report discloses.

The new owner will honour customer orders where part-payment
deposits have been made for goods and customer warranties, the
report adds.

Dreams is the UK's leading specialist retailer of beds and
associated products with 266 stores across the UK, employing
approximately 2,000 employees.


DUNFERMLINE: In Administration After Court Hearing in Edinburgh
---------------------------------------------------------------
twentyfour7football.com reports that Lord Hodge granted interim
administration at the Court of Session, setting April 11 as the
date to decide on whether to grant full administration.

The Scottish Division One club failed to meet a deadline to
settle the GBP134,000 debt owed to Her Majesty's Revenue and
Customs, according to twentyfour7football.com.

The report notes that Dunfermline Director of football Jim
Leishman said earlier to Sky Sports News, "This is great for us.
We are back in the game.  It was either liquidation, where you
are done and dusted and left with nothing, or this. . . . What we
have done now is give it a chance and if this is given the go
ahead then the next move is for us to speak to the
administrator."


GALA ELECTRIC: Moody's Upgrades CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating
and the probability of default rating of Gala Electric Casinos
Plc. to B3 and B3-PD from Caa1 and Caa1-PD respectively. It also
upgraded the rating of the GBP275 million senior notes due 2019
to Caa2 from Caa3 and the rating of the GBP350 million senior
secured notes due 2018 issued by Gala Group Finance Plc. to B2
from B3. The rating outlook is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

"The upgrade to B3 reflects Moody's view that the company's
operating performance in FY2013 will be better than expected as a
result of improvement in the core Coral and growing Gala
interactive divisions offsetting underperformance in Gala Bingo
and Coral Interactive", says Douglas Crawford, Moody's lead
analyst for Gala Electric. "The upgrade also assumes that the
company's sale of the majority of its casinos will further reduce
leverage in FY2013 and that this trend will continue in FY2014,
driven by the recent capex investment in the Coral and
interactive divisions as well as the World Cup and a full year of
having new Infinity cabinets in place."

GEC's performance so far in the year ending September 2013 was
stronger than the rating agency expected, boosted by performance
in Coral Retail, Gala Interactive and Italy. This in combination
with the expected sale of 19 casinos to Rank Group for GBP179
million and reduced company defined exceptional costs, leads
Moody's to expect adjusted leverage to fall towards 6.5x by
FY2014. Although Moody's has some concerns regarding recent
results at Gala Bingo, which have deteriorated significantly, and
poor performance at Coral Interactive as the new platform is
developed, the other divisions are expected to more than
compensate.

GEC reported unrestricted cash of GBP74 million at January 19,
2013. In addition, GEC benefits from an undrawn GBP100 million
revolving credit facility of which GBP26 million is utilized for
guarantees. The rating agency anticipates positive free cash flow
in FY2013 and FY 2014 following a reduction in capital
expenditure from the high level seen in FY2012. Moreover, there
is no debt amortization or refinancing requirements in the
restricted group until the revolver matures in 2017. Covenant
compliance is currently acceptable and will improve if the
casinos disposal is completed, although covenants tighten during
FY2013.

However, Moody's notes that the GBP344 million loan at Propco
Three Limited (Propco) matures in April 2014. Although this is
ring-fenced from the rest of the group and there are no cross
defaults in the debt within the rest of the rated group, the
current rating assumes that the maturity or any restructuring of
the loan will have no impact on the rated group.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that recent
strategic initiatives as well as increased capital expenditure in
FY2012 will result in a reduction in leverage going forward. It
also incorporates an assumption that the company preserves at all
times an adequate liquidity profile and that the Propco loan
maturity in FY2014 will have no impact on the company.

Positive rating pressure could develop if the company succeeds in
halting the decline in Gala Retail's EBITDA, while maintaining
its improved performance in the Coral and the interactive
divisions, with adjusted leverage falling to under 6.0x,
EBIT/Interest coverage above 1.2x and meaningful positive free
cash flow. Negative pressure could quickly materialize if
leverage were to increase above 7.0x on an adjusted basis or if
the company's EBIT/interest coverage ratio were to decline below
1x. The rating could also come under pressure if the criteria set
for the stable outlook were not met.

Gala Electric Casinos Plc.'s ratings were assigned by evaluating
factors that Moody's considers relevant to the credit profile of
the issuer, such as the company's (i) business risk and
competitive position compared with others within the industry;
(ii) capital structure and financial risk; (iii) projected
performance over the near to intermediate term; and (iv)
management's track record and tolerance for risk. Moody's
compared these attributes against other issuers both within and
outside Gala Electric Casinos Plc.'s core industry and believes
Gala Electric Casinos Plc.'s ratings are comparable to those of
other issuers with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Gala Electric Casinos Plc. has its registered office in
Nottingham, England. Through its subsidiaries it owns and
operates a diversified gaming company (sales of GBP1.2 billion
for the year ending September 2012) with operations mainly in the
UK. Following the closing of a restructuring in June 2010, funds
managed by the principle investors (Apollo, Cerberus, Park Square
and York Capital) indirectly hold a majority in Gala shares.


HOLLOID PLASTICS: In Administration, Cuts 38 Jobs
-------------------------------------------------
Hamish Champ prw.com reports that Holloid Plastics has gone into
administration with the loss of 38 jobs.

The firm was placed into administration by the company's
directors on 6 March, with joint administrators Gilbert Lemon --
gil.lemon@smith.williamson.co.uk -- and Steve Adshead --
steve.adshead@smith.williamson.co.uk -- of Smith & Williamson
(S&W) appointed to oversee a wind-down of the business.

A statement from S&W said that after "considerable investment" in
the business turnover dropped "significantly" during 2012,
although it was unable to say where - or why - the decline
occurred, according to prw.com.  The report relates that the
company was put up for sale last September, but attracted no
takers, the statement added.

prw.com notes that S&W said it had been asked to assist Holloid
in February 2013 "when it seemed possible that a sale of the
business, by way of a pre-pack administration, could occur.

"However, the two parties that were considering purchasing the
business advised at the end of February that they could not
proceed.  This was a major disappointment for the directors and
staff of Holloid. . . . As a sale of the business as a going
concern unfortunately proved impossible, there was - very sadly -
no option but to make 38 employees redundant," the report quoted
S&W as saying.

S&W said 15 staff had been retained to ensure an orderly run-down
of the business and that this process was ongoing, the report
notes.

PRW understands that one company interested in buying the
business had been unable to ascertain from the administrators how
much it cost Holloid to make its products.

Holloid Plastics is a Basingstoke-based injection moulder.  The
firm  was founded in 1952.


OPAL 1: Owner In Administration, Impact on Student Hall Unclear
---------------------------------------------------------------
South Wales Argus reports that Opal Property Group Limited the
affairs of Opal Property Group Limited are now being managed by
joint administrators.

It is currently unclear what impact the administration process
will have on the student halls in Newport, known as Opal 1,
according to South Wales Argus.

Opal 1 is located near the George Street Bridge near the River
Usk, and is a short distance from the University of Wales,
Newport, City Centre campus.

Leslie Ross, Daniel Smith and David Riley were appointed Joint
Administrators of Opal Property Group Limited on March 14, 2013.

The Joint Administrators are managing the affairs, business and
property of the company.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 15,
2013, Insider Media reports that Ernst & Young has been appointed
administrator of 13 companies in the Manchester-based Opal group.
The news follows the appointment of Mazars as administrator of
its Ocon Construction subsidiary, according to Insider Media.

Newport Opal 1 offers students accommodation with free internet,
contents insurance, CCTC, 24 hour security and Wi-Fi in common
rooms.


ORTAK: In Administration, 150 Jobs at Risk
------------------------------------------
Daily Record reports that Ortak has gone into administration
threatening more than 150 jobs.

The company said the rising costs of materials and the impact of
the recession on the high street had put pressure on it in the
last few years, according to Daily Record.

Daily Record notes that it has appointed financial services
company BDO as its administrator to provide "breathing space"
while a potential buyer is sought.

"The board regrets to announce that after an exhaustive review of
the business we feel unable to continue to trade outside of
insolvency protection and in the circumstances has appointed BDO
as administrators to provide a breathing space in order to
explore a sale of the business as a going concern. . . . The
current business model has come under pressure over the past few
years as the recession has impacted on the high street and the
cost of raw materials has increased significantly," the company
said in a statement.

Ortak has 13 retail shops in Scotland, including two on Orkney,
as well as branches in Sheffield and Newcastle.  Its other
Scottish stores are in Aberdeen, Dundee, two in Edinburgh, four
in Glasgow, Inverness, Livingston and Stirling.  The firm employs
155 staff, with 44 on Orkney.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Moody's Sees Decline in Light Vehicle Demand in 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service is maintaining its negative outlook for
European auto parts suppliers in anticipation of a further 5%
decline in light vehicle demand in Europe in 2013, and the
corresponding contraction in suppliers' revenues in Europe.

In its new report entitled "European Automotive Parts Suppliers:
Negative Outlook Based on Continued Decline in European Demand
and Revenues", Moody's expects the free cash flow of auto parts
suppliers to weaken in 2013, reflecting the challenges they face
investing in growth markets like the US, Latin America and Asia
to compensate for shrinking demand in Europe. Financially strong
companies such as Hella KGaA Hueck & Co (Baa2 stable) will fare
better, while companies with less financial flexibility such as
Faurecia SA (B1 stable) will be challenged to defend their market
positions.

Moody's industry outlook has been negative since February 2012
and takes account of the rating agency's expectation that euro
area growth will stagnate in 2013, followed by moderate growth in
2014. However, risks to that forecast remain skewed to the
downside and include a deeper-than-expected euro area recession
with a more severe credit contraction, triggered by an
intensification of the sovereign debt crisis.

Although several parts suppliers -- such as Schaeffler AG (B1,
positive), SKF AB (A3, stable) and Valeo SA (Baa3, stable) --
remain under investigation from antitrust authorities in Europe,
the US, and other countries, Moody's continues to believe that
the market positions and operating profitability of these
suppliers will not suffer materially from the investigations.

Moody's would consider stabilizing the outlook on the sector if
European light vehicle production volumes were to stabilize over
the next 6 -- 12 months. The rating agency expects the market for
new light vehicles to bottom out during 2013 after a six-year
decline, and to potentially recover by 5% in 2014, bringing
registrations back to 2012 levels. However, Moody's would require
more supporting evidence before considering a stabilization in
the outlook for this sector.


* Moody's Notes Stable Performance of Consumer Loan ABS in EMEA
---------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of EMEA consumer loan asset-backed securities
(ABS) remained stable in the three-month period leading to
January 2013, according to the latest indices published by
Moody's Investors Service.

The overall 90 to 180 day delinquencies index remained stable at
1% in January 2013. In France and Germany delinquencies remained
unchanged at 0.7% and 0.4% respectively in the three-month period
leading to January 2013, with an homogeneous trend across all
outstanding transactions, which are currently four in France and
three in Germany. A stable trend with a slight improvement can be
seen in Italy as well where delinquencies 90-180 Day ended at
1.2% in January 2013 from 1.3% in October 2012. The trend is
mainly driven by Consumer One S.r.l., a transaction representing
in January 2013 around 40% of the outstanding Italian portfolio
and in which delinquencies ended in December 2012 at 0.6%. In
Spain, delinquencies rose to 1.2% in January 2013 from 1% in
October 2012.

Moody's cumulative default index increased slightly in the three-
month period leading to January 2013, ending at 3% from 2.8% in
October 2012.

Moody's outlook for EMEA consumer loan ABS is negative, as
detailed in the report "European ABS and RMBS: 2013 Outlook", 10
December 2012.

Italian and Spanish GDP will contract respectively by 1% and 1.4%
in 2013 while the GDP for France will remain flat during the same
time period (see the credit opinions published by Moody's for
Italy, Spain and France Government between January 2013 and
February 2013).

In 2013, Moody's expects that unemployment in Italy and France
will rise by 0.5% and in Spain by 1.1%.

As of January 2013, the total outstanding pool balance in the
EMEA consumer loan ABS market was around EUR24.6 billion with 35
outstanding transactions. Between December 2012 and March 2013,
four transactions early redeemed (Jump S.r.l., Apulia Finance 5
Cessioni S.r.l., Financiacion Bancaja 1, FTA, and BBVA Consumo 5,
FTA).


* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 25 to April 1, 2013
------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *