TCREUR_Public/130415.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, April 15, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 73

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

ALFACAM GROUP: Faces Bankruptcy Risk; Shares Suspended


C Y P R U S

ABH FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
* CYPRUS: Cost of Bailout Increases to EUR23 Billion


F I N L A N D

ARCO INVESTEERINGUTE: Danske Bank Files Bankruptcy Petition


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT SA: Poor 2012 Results Cue Moody's to Lower Rating to 'B1'


G E R M A N Y

DAPD: Halts Operations; Nearly 200 Jobs Affected
UNITYMEDIA HESSEN: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR350MM Notes
* GERMANY: Sagging Power Prices Reinforce Weak Sector Outlook


G R E E C E

NATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
PUBLIC POWER: S&P Keeps CC Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Treasury Buys 18.7% Stake in Landsbankinn


I R E L A N D

BARNA WASTE: High Court Appoints Interim Examiner
FOLEY'S BAR: Seek to Continue Court Protection
* IRELAND: Gets Extension to Repay Emergency Bailout Loans


I T A L Y

GOLDEN BAR: DBRS Confirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class B Notes
LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Series B Notes
PARMALAT SPA: Grant Thornton Gets Wins Malpractice Suit Dismissal


L U X E M B O U R G

CARMEUSE HOLDING: Debt Reduction Cues Moody's to Lift CFR to Ba3
ORCO PROPERTY: Deloitte Raises Going Concern Doubt


N E T H E R L A N D S

ABN AMRO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Tier 1 Subordinated Debt
* NETHERLANDS: Fitch Says Banks' CRE Loan Books Deteriorate


P O R T U G A L

SECUR BBVA: DBRS Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Class B Notes
* PORTUGAL: Obtains Extension of Bailout Loan Maturities


R O M A N I A

BANCA ROMANEASCA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT IDR; Outlook Negative
MECHEL CAMPIA: Files for Insolvency


R U S S I A

NATIONAL RESERVE: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings


S P A I N

AYT GENOVA IX: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR10.7MM D Notes to 'Caa1'
BANCAJA LEASING 1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to Ba2
GC SABADELL 4: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on Class C Certificate
IM GRUPO II: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR45MM D Notes to 'B3'
RURALPYME 2: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR23.2MM C Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SUNTECH POWER: Swiss Unit Obtains Two-Month Debt Moratorium


T U R K E Y

FIRST QUANTUM: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Watch Neg. on Inmet Deal


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BELLATRIX ECLIPSE 2005-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
HBOS PLC: KPMG Faces Audit Probe; Crosby Gives Up Knighthood
TRAVELPORT LLC: Moody's Rates US$630MM 2nd Lien Term Loan Caa2
* UK: Fitch Places State-Guaranteed Bank Debt on RWN


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 8 to April 12, 2013


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
=============


ALFACAM GROUP: Faces Bankruptcy Risk; Shares Suspended
------------------------------------------------------
Ben Deighton at Reuters reports that Alfacam Group said it may
have to file for bankruptcy if a final bid for protection under
Belgian law fails.

The company, which also provides broadcast services and TV
studios, was granted creditor protection in October and has been
seeking investors since then, Reuters recounts.

It released the statement after talks with creditors and
investors failed, Reuters relates.

"No agreement has been found about a solution between all the
parties involved in this negotiation," Reuters quotes the company
as saying said.

The Belgian market regulator suspended its shares on Thursday,
and the company said they would remain suspended until further
notice, Reuters notes.

Alfacam struggled to make enough money from its broadcast vans to
cover its debts, and earlier this month, its lenders cancelled
its credit lines, Reuters discloses.

It signed a memorandum of understanding in December with its
banks and Indian family-owned conglomerate Hinduja Group, Reuters
relates.  It has also been talking with Hinduja and other
potential investors, but no deal has materialized, Reuters
states.

Now it is making a final attempt to avoid bankruptcy under
Belgian corporate law, which involves officers from Belgium's
Court of Commerce trying to transfer its activities to some of
its investors, according to Reuters.

According to Bloomberg News' John Martens, the company's AGM was
postponed until June 5 from originally scheduled May 15.

Alfacam Group is a Belgium-based the provider of Europe's largest
fleet of outside broadcast vans.



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C Y P R U S
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ABH FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ABH Financial Limited's (ABHFL) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' with a Stable Outlook
and its Short-term IDR at 'B'.

Key Rating Drivers

The review was triggered by the recent downgrade of Cyprus's
Country Ceiling to 'B' from 'AAA' following the de facto
imposition of capital controls. The affirmation of ABHFL's
ratings above the Country Ceiling reflects Fitch's view that the
capital controls will not hamper ABHFL's ability to service its
obligations.

According to Fitch's criteria report 'Rating Financial
Institutions Above the Sovereign', an issuer may be rated above
the Country Ceiling if it is shielded from transfer risk, for
example because of substantial foreign assets and earnings and
limited domestic liabilities. ABHFL's main operating subsidiaries
-- Russian OJSC Alfa-Bank (Alfa, 'BBB-'/Stable) and Dutch-based
Amsterdam Trade Bank -- accounted for 94% of total consolidated
assets at end-2012, and about 99% of 2012 net income. ABHFL's
third party obligations (US$430 million of ECP notes, including
accrued interest) are not domestic, and are also not significant
relative to the overall size of the group. Alfa Capital Holdings
(Cyprus) Ltd, a Cyprus-based broker-dealer consolidated by ABHFL
(end-2012 assets of US$2.2 billion, equal to 6% of the group's
balance sheet) also has negligible local liabilities.

Fitch understands that ABHFL's ability to repay/pay interest on
the ECP notes (which were issued by Alfa Debt Markets, a Cyprus-
based SPV, and guaranteed by ABHFL) is not constrained by Cypriot
capital controls, because this will be done by ABHFL transferring
funds from accounts with Alfa directly to the paying agent. The
ECP notes mature in Q213-Q313 and ABHFL will seek to refinance
them. Alternatively, they may be repaid from dividend income from
group subsidiaries or redeemed directly by subsidiaries and/or
shareholders.

ABHFL's 'BB+' Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's view that its
default risk is highly correlated with that of Alfa, given the
high fungibility of capital and liquidity within the group, which
is managed as a single entity. The small volume of holding
company debt to non-related parties also supports the close
alignment of ABHFL's ratings with the bank.

The one notch difference between the bank and holding company
ratings reflects the absence of any regulation of the
consolidated group, the fact that the holding company is
incorporated in a different jurisdiction and the high level of
double leverage at the holding company. The latter, defined by
Fitch as equity investments in subsidiaries divided by holdco
equity, stood at a reported 192% at end-2012, although this would
have been somewhat lower if certain equity investments had been
restated to fair value.

Rating Sensitivities

A further upgrade or downgrade of Alfa Bank would be likely to
result in a similar rating action on ABHFL. In addition, ABHFL
could be downgraded if future debt issuance (currently not
planned) results in a further marked increase in double leverage
or gives rise to significantly increased liquidity risks at the
holdco level.


* CYPRUS: Cost of Bailout Increases to EUR23 Billion
----------------------------------------------------
The cost of the bailout for Cyprus has increased to EUR23 billion
(US$30 billion; GBP19.5 billion), BBC News reports, citing a
draft document prepared by the country's creditors.

The original cost of the bailout was put at EUR17.5 billion, BBC
notes.

But the new total, disclosed in a document seen by news agencies,
means Cyprus will have to find EUR13 billion to secure EUR10
billion from the European Union and the IMF, BBC discloses.

Previously, it was thought that Cyprus would have to raise EUR7.5
billion, BBC states.

Analysts are now questioning if Cyprus can raise such a sum, BBC
says.

"The sheer size of the increase has underlined the extent of the
enormous challenges facing Cyprus itself," BBC quotes Jonathan
Loynes of Capital Economics as saying in an analyst note.

The Cypriot economy is only worth about EUR18 billion and
accounts for less than 0.2% of the eurozone total.  Several
analysts now think the Cypriot economy may shrink by more than
10% this year alone, BBC discloses.



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F I N L A N D
=============


ARCO INVESTEERINGUTE: Danske Bank Files Bankruptcy Petition
-----------------------------------------------------------
On February 4, 2013, Arco Vara announced to the stock exchange
that in order to recover a loan, Danske Bank A/S had initiated
enforcement proceedings against Arco HCE OU, which is a 50% joint
venture of Arco Investeeringute AS that is a wholly-held
subsidiary of Arco Vara AS.  The object of the proceedings was to
exercise a mortgage created for the benefit of Danske Bank A/S on
a property located at Ahtri 3 in Tallinn.

On February 20, 2013, the court satisfied ARCO HCE OU's
application for securing the action and suspended the enforcement
proceedings against the company.  Together with the application
for securing the action, Arco HCE OU filed an action against
Danske Bank A/S seeking that Danske Bank A/S extend the loan
agreement.

Since Arco Investeeringute AS has provided a surety guarantee to
Arco HCE OU's bank loan, Danske Bank A/S sent Arco
Investeeringute AS a claim for paying out the guarantee, which
extends to EUR1,917,349.46.

Arco Investeeringute AS challenged the claim for paying out the
surety guarantee.  In simplified terms, the basis for the
challenge was that if the loan cannot be called in, then the
surety guarantee cannot be called in either.

In response, Danske Bank A/S filed a petition for declaring Arco
Investeeringute AS bankrupt.

Arco Investeeringute AS is of the opinion that there is no basis
for calling in the surety guarantee and intends to challenge the
bankruptcy petition.

The shares in Arco HCE are held, in equal proportions, by Arco
Investeeringute AS and Ahtrimaa OU (former name U.S. Real Estate
Management OU).



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F R A N C E
===========


PEUGEOT SA: Poor 2012 Results Cue Moody's to Lower Rating to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded by one notch to B1 from Ba3
the ratings of Peugeot S.A. and its rated subsidiary GIE PSA
Tresorerie. This concludes the review initiated by Moody's on
February 15, 2013. The outlook on the ratings is now stable.

"We have downgraded PSA's rating in response to its worse-than-
anticipated financial performance in FY2012, particularly due to
greater-than-expected losses in its automobile division, negative
free cash flow from industrial operations and ongoing challenges
to restructure its automotive operations," says Falk Frey, a
Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for PSA.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects PSA's materially worse-than-
anticipated financial performance in FY2012, in particular with
regard to operating losses in the company's automobile division
and the negative free cash flow (FCF) from industrial operations.
Moreover, PSA continues to experience challenges in successfully
restructuring and turning around the operating performance of its
automotive operations against the background of a European market
environment that continues to worsen and is characterized by
historically high discount levels, especially in the small and
medium-sized passenger car segments. "Unless Western European
market demand recovers strongly in 2014 from anticipated 2013
levels, PSA may be forced to undertake further cost-saving
measures beyond the announced restructuring plan in order to
achieve its target of break-even operating cash flow by year-end
2014," adds Mr. Frey.

PSA's financial and operating results for FY2012 were well below
Moody's expectations. Impacted by the erosion of Western European
light vehicle demand (-8.4% in 2012 compared to 2011), the
automotive division reported a recurring operating loss of --
EUR1.5 billion, which resulted in a recurring operating loss of
the industrial divisions (including a positive +EUR514 million
contribution from Faurecia and +EUR23 million from others) of --
EUR967 million compared with Moody's expectation of no greater
than -EUR500 million. PSA reported negative operating FCF without
exceptional and restructuring items of -EUR2.966 million,
exceeding Moody's initial expectation of approximately -EUR2.4
billion.

Despite the introduction of the new model 208 and some other
additional new cars, PSA has been unable to limit further decline
in its passenger car market share in Western Europe (EU15+EFTA
countries), with its share dropping to 11.9% in 2012 from 12.6%
in 2011. That being said, some of the reduction is due to PSA's
unfavorable exposure to Southern European markets.

Moody's does not anticipate a material improvement in the
operating performance of the automotive division in 2013 and, as
a result, expects that PSA will again record a recurring
operating loss of around EUR1.5 billion for the year. This
expectation is exposed to further downside risk, if market demand
in Western Europe declines by more than the currently anticipated
5% or pricing pressure increases any further. Although negative
operating FCF should be halved compared to 2012's consumption of
nearly EUR3.0 billion, the payment of restructuring measures
during the year will result in additional cash outflows.

The B1 rating with stable outlook incorporate Moody's expectation
that PSA's operating and financial performance will begin to
gradually improve in late 2013, with the company reaching break-
even in group operational free cash flow by end 2014. Factors
supporting this expectation include the aging of the automotive
fleet in Europe, which should eventually support a rebound in
unit sales, and a new product pipeline that shows promise for
halting the erosion of market share by the beginning of 2014. The
refresh of the C4 Picasso and 308 and a new cross-over derivative
from the new 208 (2008) are expected to represent approximately
20% of global volume sales in 2014. Moreover, the company is
likely to increase its emphasis on brand differentiation across
the various Peugeot and Citroen platforms.

Rationale for the Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that PSA will
execute its restructuring program on time and successfully and
that its adequate liquidity profile will ensure that PSA will
accommodate the difficult reorganization period and the
substantial cash outflow from operations over the next 12-15
months. The rating agency assumes that PSA will continue its
prudent approach to preserve sufficient liquidity. Furthermore,
the stable outlook includes Moody's expectation of stabilizing
market shares in Western Europe over the course of 2013 based on
a continued flow of new model launches.

What Could Change the Ratings Down/Up

Moody's anticipates rating stability over the coming 12 months,
however, the following factors could cause the rating to be
downgraded: (1) cash outflow (including restructuring) exceeding
EUR2 billion in 2013 and a failure to achieve break-even
operating FCF by year-end 2014; (2) a failure to maintain market
shares, despite a high number of important new model
introductions over the course of 2013; (3) evidence that
liquidity would weaken materially beyond current expectations;
and (4) signs that the turn-around expected to begin in early
2014 will be delayed or weaker than expected.

The rating is unlikely to be upgraded in the foreseeable future
given Moody's expectations for poor results in 2013 and
continuing broad weakness in the company's core European
automobile market. However, the ratings could come under upward
pressure in case of a faster-than-anticipated and sustained
recovery in the operating performance and cash generation of
PSA's automotive business. This recovery would be reflected by
positive operating profits in the industrial business in 2013,
with profitability improving to a positive EBIT margin by 2014
and beyond.

Liquidity

Moody's notes that PSA currently maintains an adequate liquidity
position, which provides the company with a sufficient period of
time to reverse negative performance trends. At year-end 2012,
PSA's principal liquidity sources for its industrial business
consisted of (1) cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet
amounting to EUR5.4 billion; (2) availability under undrawn
committed credit lines of EUR2.4 billion maturing July 2015
(excluding additional headroom of EUR600 million under Faurecia's
facility); (3) financial assets of EUR1.5 billion less some
haircuts; and (4) potential cash flow generation from operations
over the next 12 months. Together with the recent bond issue in
March providing an additional EUR1.0 billion in cash, these cash
sources provide adequate coverage for PSA's major liquidity
requirements that could arise during the next 12 months. These
requirements consist of short-term debt maturities, capital
expenditures, working capital funding and day-to-day operating
needs.

Structural Considerations

Peugeot's funding policy is based on borrowing at the holding
company level (PSA), and on-lending to its operating subsidiaries
via GIE PSA Tresorerie. Based on a cash-pooling agreement between
PSA and GIE, all operating subsidiaries' payment obligations to
GIE rank pari-passu with trade payables at the subsidiaries'
level. In addition, Moody's understands that, over the near
future , PSA will put in place a guarantee by GIE that will
benefit PSA bondholders. In the absence of such a guarantee, the
bonds at the PSA level might be rated one notch lower (at B2)
than the rating for bonds issued by GIE.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Automobile Manufacture Industry published in June 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Peugeot S.A., headquartered in Paris, is Europe's second-largest
maker of light vehicles with its two main brands Peugeot and
Citro‰n. The group's other industrial operations include
Faurecia, one of Europe's leading automotive suppliers in which
PSA holds a 57% interest. The group also provides financing to
dealers and end-customers through its wholly owned finance
subsidiary, Banque PSA Finance. In 2012, PSA generated revenues
of EUR54 billion.



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G E R M A N Y
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DAPD: Halts Operations; Nearly 200 Jobs Affected
------------------------------------------------
Xinhua reports that DAPD ended its operation Thursday afternoon.

According to Xinhua, nearly 200 employees lost their jobs.

Petra Hilgers, the insolvency administrator for the ailing
agency, announced in a staff meeting in Berlin that efforts to
find investors had failed, Xinhua relates.

DAPD currently had about 175 permanent employees, Xinhua notes.

German Journalists' Association chairman Michael Konken called
the shut-down "a disaster for the editors and freelance
journalists of DAPD", Xinhua discloses.

Since it filed for bankruptcy in October 2012, DAPD has been
making efforts to find new investors, Xinhua recounts.  Russian
news agency RIA Novosti was seen as the last hope for the
insolvent agency, Xinhua states.  Their negotiation, however, was
cancelled recently, Xinhua relates.

DAPD is the second largest news agency in Germany.


UNITYMEDIA HESSEN: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR350MM Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
issue rating to the proposed EUR350 million senior secured notes
to be issued by Unitymedia Hessen GmbH & Co. KG and Unitymedia
NRW GmbH, operating subsidiaries of Germany-based cable operator
Unitymedia KabelBW GmbH (Unitymedia; B+/Stable/--).  At the same
time, S&P assigned a recovery rating of '3' to the proposed
notes, indicating its expectation of average (50%-70%) recovery
for creditors in the event of a payment default.

At the same time, S&P placed its 'BB-' issue ratings on the
existing senior secured debt issued by Unitymedia on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The recovery rating on the existing
senior secured debt remains unchanged at '2', indicating S&P's
expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery for creditors in
the event of a payment default.

The CreditWatch negative placement signals that on completion of
the proposed issuance, S&P expects to lower the issue rating on
the existing senior secured debt to 'B+' and revise downward the
recovery rating to '3'.  This reflects S&P's view that the
increased amount of senior secured debt in the capital structure
will reduce the recovery prospects for the existing debt.

S&P understands that the proposed notes will rank in line with
the existing senior secured debt and that Unitymedia will use the
proceeds for general corporate purposes and not to repay any
outstanding debt.  This is what leads S&P to believe there will
be an increase in the amount of senior secured debt outstanding
by the hypothetical point of default.

                         RECOVERY ANALYSIS

The proposed notes are secured and guaranteed obligations similar
to the existing notes and bank facilities.  However, there has
been some moderate weakening of certain clauses in the
documentation to bring it into line with the terms of other
similar debt instruments in other financing pools in the Liberty
Global Inc. group, the ultimate parent of Unitymedia.  In line
with S&P's previous analysis, it assumes that the senior secured
notes would rank pari passu with the bank facilities at the
hypothetical point of default.

S&P's simulated default scenario assumes that a payment default
would most likely result from excessive leverage and Unitymedia's
inability to refinance its revolving credit facility (RCF) and
senior secured notes when they mature in 2017, following
operating underperformance due to increased competition and high
capital expenditure.

At S&P's hypothetical point of default in 2017, it assumes that
EBITDA would have declined to approximately EUR635 million.  S&P
estimates Unitymedia's enterprise value at the simulated point of
default to be about EUR3.65 billion, which corresponds to an
enterprise-value-to-EBITDA multiple of about 5.75x.

After deducting EUR250 million of enforcement costs and about
EUR100 million comprising principally the fully drawn super
senior RCF and finance leases, S&P arrives at a net enterprise
value of about EUR3.3 billion.  Assuming the successful issuance
of the proposed debt, S&P calculates that the overall senior
secured debt outstanding at default would amount to about EUR4.8
billion, including full drawings on the pari passu RCF and six
months of prepetition interest.  On this basis, recovery
prospects for the senior secured lenders would be in the 50%-70%
range, which translates into a recovery rating of '3'.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating

Unitymedia Hessen GmbH & Co. KG
Unitymedia NRW GmbH
Senior Secured (1)                     B+
   Recovery Rating                      3

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action

                                        To                 From
Unitymedia Hessen GmbH & Co. KG
Senior Secured (2)                     BB-/Watch Neg      BB-
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

Unitymedia KabelBW GmbH
Subordinated (2)                       B-                 B-
   Recovery Rating                      6                  6

Unitymedia NRW GmbH
Senior Secured (3)                     BB-/Watch Neg      BB-
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

(1) Guaranteed by Unitymedia Hessen GmbH & Co. KG & Unitymedia
     KabelBW GmbH.

(2) Guaranteed by Unitymedia Hessen GmbH & Co. KG, Unitymedia
     Management GmbH, Unitymedia KabelBW GmbH, UPC Germany Holdco
     1 GmbH, Kabel BW GmbH, Unitymedia Hessen Verwaltung GmbH.

(3) Guaranteed by Unitymedia KabelBW GmbH.


* GERMANY: Sagging Power Prices Reinforce Weak Sector Outlook
-------------------------------------------------------------
The continuing fall in German forward-power prices reinforces
Fitch Ratings' view that sluggish demand and base-load
overcapacity will weigh on German power utilities' results for
several years. One-year and three-year forward contracts have
fallen recently to close to EUR40 per MWh, from over EUR80 in
2008. This is substantially reducing operating cash flow from
generation, because large portions of the operating costs are
fixed (nuclear, hydro, lignite) and the reduction in variable
fuel costs (except for hard coal) has not kept pace.

Weak economic growth will limit electricity demand growth, which
will also suffer from the trend towards increasing energy
efficiency. "At the same time, we believe a further subsidy-
fuelled surge in renewables capacity and some net growth in
thermal generation is likely to lead to overcapacity for at least
the next three years. We expect utilities' cash flow in power
generation to decline in the next few years due to a fall in
average achieved electricity prices, as the forward hedges closed
at higher levels are replaced with hedges entered into at lower
prices," Fitch says.

The outlook from 2016 is less clear, as environmental rules will
force the decommissioning of some thermal plants. Further out,
the closure of Germany's remaining nuclear power plants will be
concentrated in 2021 and 2022, which may result in a more even
balance between supply and demand.

The impact of overcapacity, and the broader government energy
policy on the major generators in Germany and surrounding
countries, will vary. RWE is well placed thanks to its low-cost
lignite-fired generation fleet, which remains profitable even
amid weak pricing conditions. However, lignite's advantage may be
taken away by a political change such as minimum carbon pricing
or the introduction of a tax on coal -- as seen in other
countries.

E.ON's fleet is more reliant on nuclear power plants that have a
remaining life of about seven years -- and which could be
difficult to replace given the market dynamics (lacking
commercial incentives) and the level of public opposition to
greenfield projects. EnBW is also reliant on nuclear power, but
with a slightly longer remaining life, and a higher contribution
from hydro assets which keep production costs down.

Czech utility CEZ, which is also exposed to cyclicality and
German wholesale electricity price risk, is still able to
generate solid margins due to its low-cost generation fleet.
This, together with forward hedging of electricity sales,
mitigates to a large extent the company's exposure to structural
changes in the power-generation market.



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G R E E C E
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NATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'CCC/C' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on both
National Bank of Greece (NBG) and Eurobank Ergasias S.A.  S&P
affirmed its 'CC' ratings on the banks' preferred securities and
subordinated debt.  The outlook is negative.

The affirmation follows the banks' announcement that they would
be recapitalized independently of each other and that the
previously announced merger had been suspended.

The affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that the Hellenic
Financial Stability Fund (HSFS) and the European authorities--the
European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the
European Central Bank--would continue to provide sufficient
capital and liquidity support to both banks.

S&P believes the suspension of the merger will most likely allow
the two banks to comply with the April 30, 2013, deadline set by
the Bank of Greece to complete their recapitalization plans.  In
S&P's view, the banks' combined financial profile would not have
been materially different than the individual profiles S&P
incorporates in its current ratings on NBG and Eurobank.

S&P's long-term ratings on NBG and Eurobank incorporate the
EUR9.7 billion and EUR5.8 billion, respectively, in capital that
the HSFS has already committed to the banks.

S&P expects this capital commitment to be formally converted into
equity and that the HSFS will become the largest shareholder of
NBG and Eurobank once recapitalization process is completed.  S&P
believes this capital will be necessary to absorb increased
credit losses in the banks' domestic loan portfolios in 2013 and
2014, which S&P believes will exceed their capacity to absorb
losses through operating profits.

In addition, S&P expects the HSFS will continue to provide
further extraordinary capital support to the four largest Greek
banks, if needed, to maintain adequate regulatory capital ratios.

The outlooks on both banks are negative because there is a
one-in-three probability that S&P would lower the ratings if it
believed NBG and Eurobank could default on their obligations,
according to S&P's criteria.

S&P might lower the ratings on NBG and Eurobank if their access
to the EU's extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms, including
the Emergency Lending Assistance discount facility at the
European Central Bank (ECB), and access to the ECB were impaired
for any reason.

This support currently underpins the banks' capacity to meet
their financing requirements.  In this context, despite a mild
recovery in recent months, S&P believes the pressure on the
banks' retail funding base due to the ongoing recession may lead
to further deposit outflows.  This could, in S&P's opinion,
increase the banks' need for additional extraordinary liquidity
support from the EU authorities.

S&P could also lower the ratings if it believed the banks were
likely to default as a result of any developments associated with
a substantial impairment of their solvency.  This could happen if
NBG or Eurobank were unable to access external capital support,
or if S&P considered such support insufficient to allow the banks
to continue meeting regulatory capital requirements, mainly as a
result of potential recognition of continued large loan
impairments.

S&P could revise the outlooks to stable if economic conditions in
Greece improved and pressure on the banks fragile financial
profiles eased, or if additional external support materialized.


PUBLIC POWER: S&P Keeps CC Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'CC' long-term corporate credit rating on Greece-based utility
Public Power Corp. S.A. (PPC).  The outlook remains negative.

The affirmation follows PPC's disclosure that it is negotiating
with its Greek lenders an intermediate bridge refinancing
facility, maturing in April 2014, that will cover up to
EUR1.1 billion of maturities from May 2013 until February 2014.
The company is also negotiating a medium-term syndicated facility
to cover about EUR2 billion in maturities, including this bridge
refinancing.

S&P views such refinancing plans as "distressed" because PPC's
ability to continue as a "going concern" hinges on the successful
immediate refinancing of its short-term loan obligations with its
Greek banks (four of which are rated CCC/Negative/C).

Should PPC fail to immediately refinance its short-term loans, a
conventional default would likely occur.  Should Greek banks
agree to and implement the intermediate and the medium-term
refinancing of PPC's debt without appropriate compensation for an
extended tenor (for example, an amendment fee or increased
interest rate), S&P would likely consider it as a de facto
restructuring, which under its criteria is tantamount to a
default.

The negative outlook reflects the likelihood that S&P would lower
its issuer credit rating on PPC to 'D' if PPC fails to refinance
its short-term financial obligations and, as a result, faces a
conventional default.  The negative outlook also reflects the
likelihood that S&P would lower its issuer credit rating on PPC
to 'SD' (selective default) if it was to assess some of PPC's
recent loan extensions or PPC's proposed intermediate or medium-
term refinancing plans as a de facto restructuring.  S&P will
base its assessment on the terms and conditions of the extensions
of all maturities.

In the absence of sufficient information to maintain appropriate
surveillance, S&P would likely suspend our rating on PPC.

In S&P's view, a positive rating action is conditional to what it
considers as an appropriate compensation for all loan extensions
PPC is contracting with its banks.  Should PPC meet this
condition while significantly and structurally improving its
liquidity position in the medium term, S&P would likely raise the
rating. This could result, in S&P's view, from:

   - A material decrease in refinancing risk, thanks to a
     smoother and longer debt maturity profile.

   -- A material improvement in PPC's cash flow generation.  This
      could be supported by an effective liberalization of energy
      markets allowing PPC to fully pass onto consumers its
      generation and supply costs, from a redesign of Greece's
      energy regulations that supports PPC, or from an
      improvement in macroeconomic conditions.

   -- A material reduction in PPC's debt, which could result from
      some asset disposals if the proceeds are not returned to
      PPC's shareholders.



=============
I C E L A N D
=============


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Treasury Buys 18.7% Stake in Landsbankinn
-------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
Treasury has acquired an 18.7% stake in Landsbankinn hf from the
creditors of failed Landsbanki Islands hf in exchange for a
contingent ISK92 billion (US$777 million) bond denominated in
euros.

"[Thurs]day the Treasury is handed a very valuable part of
Landsbankinn without paying for it," Bloomberg quotes Steinthor
Palsson, chief executive officer of Landsbankinn, as saying in an
e-mailed statement.  "The book value of the Treasury's stake has
appreciated considerably and the gain after the cost of financing
is 55 billion kronur."

Landsbankinn was created in 2008 from the domestic operations of
Landsbanki Islands after it failed in October the same year,
Bloomberg recounts.  Landsbanki's collapse threatened to wipe out
the savings of 350,000 U.K. and Dutch depositors, before their
governments stepped in to cover the losses, Bloomberg relates.
Iceland estimated proceeds from the bank's liquidated assets
would be big enough to compensate the two countries, Bloomberg
notes.

                    About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BARNA WASTE: High Court Appoints Interim Examiner
-------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that several rivals
offered to buy Barna Waste about 24 hours before it sought High
Court protection from its creditors on Thursday.

The court on Thursday appointed Neil Hughes of Hughes Blake as
interim examiner to Galway-based Bruscar Bhearna Teoranta,
trading as Barna Waste and Joe McLoughlin Waste Disposal,
following an application from its directors the Irish Times
relates.

The move means that the company has court protection from its
creditors, including Bank of Scotland Lloyds, which is owed
EUR9 million, and, if the examiner's appointment is confirmed at
another hearing this week, up to 100 days to put together a
rescue plan for the business, which is unable to pay its debts,
the Irish Times notes.

According to the Irish Times, sources confirmed late on Thursday
that on Wednesday, up to five potential buyers submitted formal
bids for the group to adviser Grant Thornton, which had been
overseeing a sale of the troubled business.

Wednesday, April 10, was the deadline for final bids for the
company, and it emerged that at least three companies were likely
to offer to buy Barna, which was put up for sale several weeks
ago, the Irish Times recounts.

Ross Gorman, for the group, told the court on Thursday that Bank
of Scotland had appointed Grant Thornton to sell the assets, and
had told the Currans that the group's assets would have to be
transferred to a new company and the firms would have to be
liquidated, the Irish Times discloses.

Baran Waste -- http://www.barnawaste.com/-- is a family owned
business founded in 1993 by Sean & Annette Curran.  The company's
office is located in Carrowbrowne, Headford Road, Galway.  It
holds the largest waste transfer station in Connacht.


FOLEY'S BAR: Seek to Continue Court Protection
----------------------------------------------
Independent.ie reports that a judge has been urged to continue
court protection so as to finalize a survival scheme for the
family-run Foley's bar and restaurant business, and the adjoining
O'Reilly's bar, on Dublin's Merrion Row.

According to Independent.ie, Bank of Scotland, the business'
major creditor owed some EUR5 million by the operating and
holding companies, is strongly opposing examinership and its
counsel Cian Ferriter SC made clear on April 10 in the High Court
it would provide no further finance.

The court heard trading figures from 2012 indicate the business
has potential to trade profitably into the future and its counsel
Ross Maguire SC said both an independent accountant and its
interim examiner believe it has a reasonable prospect of survival
once certain conditions are met, Independent.ie relates.

Mr. Ferriter argued the EUR5 million debt could not be ignored
but no proposals had been advanced to deal with that,
Independent.ie discloses.

The court also heard a receiver appointed by the bank in October
2012, but discharged by the High Court last month, had taken
steps aimed at selling the business, Independent.ie notes.

The Revenue Commissioners are also opposing examinership but
Mr. Maguire argued his client had honored an agreement with the
Revenue to make payments to it arising from a 2007 revenue audit,
Independent.ie says.

Examinership is being sought for Belohn Ltd. and Merrow Ltd.,
respectively the operating and holding companies for the
business, Independent.ie discloses.  The BOS receiver to Belohn
was discharged by the High Court on the morning of Friday,
March 22, Independent.ie relates.

Lawyers for the business secured examinership ex parte (one side
only represented) at emergency High Court hearings on Saturday,
March 23, for Belohn, and on the night of Sunday, March 24 for
Merrow, Independent.ie recounts.

The business employs about 20 people.


* IRELAND: Gets Extension to Repay Emergency Bailout Loans
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Ireland is to be granted an extra seven
years to pay back its emergency bailout loans.

The European Union and the International Monetary Fund bailed out
the Republic of Ireland in 2010, BBC recounts.

The 17-member group that uses the euro currency agreed to the
terms at a meeting of finance ministers in Dublin, BBC relates.

The plan for Ireland is intended to give the countries' financial
systems more time to recover from the debt crisis after its
bailout loans run out, BBC notes.

Ireland's bailout money will run out later this year, BBC says.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


GOLDEN BAR: DBRS Confirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) has confirmed the ratings of 'A' (sf)
to the Series 2012-2 Class A notes and BB (sf) to the Series
2012-2 Class B notes issued by Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l.
Additionally, DBRS has removed the ratings from Under Review with
Negative Implications.  The rating action follows the ratings
being placed Under Review with Negative Implications on 13 March
2013 due to the 6 March 2013 downgrade of the Republic of Italy's
long-term and local currency debt to 'A' (low) from 'A' with both
ratings remaining on Negative trend.

The confirmation is based upon a review of the underlying
receivables which incorporates a sovereign related stress
component in the rating analysis to address the impact of
macroeconomic variables on collateral performance.  Additionally,
transaction counterparties continue to meet DBRS criteria.


LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Series B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) has removed the Under Review with
Negative Implication and has placed Under Review with Developing
Implications the following Notes issued by Leo Consumo 1 S.r.l.:

* Series A Notes: BBB (low) (sf) - UR - Dev

* Series B Notes: B (sf) - UR - Dev

The ratings on the Notes were previously placed Under Review with
Negative Implications on 13 March 2013 due to the 6 March 2013
downgrade of the Republic of Italy's long-term and local currency
debt to 'A' (low) from 'A' with both ratings remaining on
Negative trend.

The ratings on the Notes are placed Under Review with Developing
Implications following DBRS receiving updated historical recovery
data for the transaction.  DBRS was notified by the Issuer that
historical recovery data was reported on the monthly servicer
reports was reported incorrectly prior to December 2012.  DBRS
has received updated recovery data from Securitisation Services
S.p.A. (the Sub Servicer) and is assessing the impact of the
updated data on the ratings.


PARMALAT SPA: Grant Thornton Gets Wins Malpractice Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tiffany Kary and William Rochelle at Bloomberg News report that
Grant Thornton LLP won dismissal of a lawsuit alleging accounting
malpractice related to the 2003 bankruptcy of Parmalat SpA.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John Darrah granted a summary judgment to
the Chicago-based accounting firm in an order entered April 9 in
Chicago district court, Bloomberg relates.  After a 10-year legal
history involving several changes of venue, Judge Darrah, as
cited by Bloomberg, said he would retain jurisdiction over the
case, and rule in favor of Grant Thornton for the same reason a
prior court had.

Parmalat, the Italian diary giant sought protection from
creditors in December 2003 after an accounting scandal, Bloomberg
recounts.  It completed its Italian reorganization in October
2005, giving bondholders 50% of the new stock while Italian and
foreign banks received 30%, Bloomberg discloses.

In a parallel bankruptcy in the U.S., Parmalat's foreign
representative Dr. Enrico Bondi sued Grant Thornton in Illinois
state court, alleging accounting malpractice, negligent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, Bloomberg relates.  The
suit was transferred to federal district court in New York,
Bloomberg says.

U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan in Manhattan dismissed the suits
in September 2009 based on a defense known as the in pari delicto
doctrine, Bloomberg recounts.  Under the theory, no one can sue
to recover damages from a fraud in which it was a willing
participant, Bloomberg notes.  Judge Kaplan dismissed the suit on
what's known as a motion for summary judgment, Bloomberg
discloses.  Mr. Bondi had appealed, contending there was no
definitive ruling on whether Illinois law would impose the in
pari delicto defense on a bankruptcy trustee, according to
Bloomberg.

Grant Thornton asked the federal district court in Chicago to
dismiss the suit rather than send it to state court, Bloomberg
relates.

Parmalat disclosed more than EUR14 billion (US$20.1 billion) of
debt when it filed for bankruptcy, about eight times the amount
reported by its former management, Bloomberg notes.

The case is Bondi v. Grant Thornton International, 04-6031, U.S.
District Court, Northern District Illinois (Chicago).

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that
can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about
40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter,
cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable
sauces, soups and juices.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


CARMEUSE HOLDING: Debt Reduction Cues Moody's to Lift CFR to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating of
Carmeuse Holding S.A. and its Probability of Default Rating to
Ba3 and Ba3-PD, respectively, from B1 and B1-PD respectively.
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded the rating on the company's
$450 million of senior secured notes and the EUR250 million of
floating-rate notes (FRNs) to Ba3 (LGD3, 44%) from B1. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

"This rating action was driven by our positive assessment of the
developments of Carmeuse's credit profile since we maintained a
positive outlook on the company's ratings in April 2011," says
Gianmarco Migliavacca, a Moody's Vice President and lead analyst
for Carmeuse. In particular, the upgrade reflects (1) the
materially lower amount of debt reported by Carmeuse as of
December 2012, after the company used a large portion of the cash
proceeds of the March 2012 disposal of its sand division to
reduce outstanding debt and (2) the company's resilient operating
and financial performance in 2012, despite a weak macroeconomic
environment negatively affecting its reference end-user markets,
namely the European and US steel and construction sectors.

Moody's also notes management's reiterated commitment to retain
adequate flexibility and liquidity at all times, targeting a net
debt/EBITDA ratio, on reported figures, consistently below 3.0x.
In Moody's view, this focus on prudent leverage, coupled with the
executed debt reduction, highlights a more conservative financial
approach by Carmeuse, which the rating agency had considered as a
main prerequisite for an upgrade. As a result of this more
disciplined financial policy, and of the lower debt amount,
Moody's expects Carmeuse will manage to maintain adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA and retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt in the region
of 3.0x-3.5x and 18%-22%, respectively, over the next 12-18
months.

Nevertheless, the Ba3 rating factors in the currently low
visibility with regard to the evolution of demand in Carmeuse's
reference markets in 2013 and beyond. Moreover, the rating
reflects Moody's expectation that Carmeuse's performance could
moderately deteriorate in the first half of 2013, mainly due to
the seasonally weaker first quarter, the protracted weakness of
the steel industry in both Europe and US (for which the rating
agency maintains negative regional industry outlooks) and the
stagnation in the European building materials industry (for which
Moody's has a stable outlook), which is the second-largest end-
user market for Carmeuse after steel, accounting for nearly 17%
of its 2012 revenues.

Carmeuse's liquidity position is supported by EUR35 million of
cash on the balance sheet and committed undrawn revolving credit
facilities amounting to EUR325 million as of December 2012.
Moody's expects these resources, and the positive operating cash
flows the business will continue to generate, will be adequate to
cover the main cash outflows scheduled in the coming 18 months,
namely (1) maintenance capital expenditure (capex) in the region
of EUR100 million per annum; (2) expansionary capex for 2013 in
the region of EUR80 million, which can be reduced when/if needed
as most of it is not committed; and (3) a modest ordinary
dividend. Carmeuse's scheduled debt repayments over the next 18
months mainly include the EUR183 million Floating Rate Notes
(FRNs) outstanding, due in July 2014. However, EUR120 million of
the revolving facilities are already committed to be used to
repay the FRNs, when due, and the remainder could be covered with
existing cash and any residual availability under the revolving
credit facilities.

Outlook

The stable outlook on the ratings assumes that Carmeuse will
maintain a prudent approach to implementing its investment
strategy. The outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that the
company will focus on maintaining credit metrics aligned with its
rating and an adequate liquidity profile through the cycle, by
materially reducing expansionary capex and fixed costs, if needed
under a downside scenario.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Although unlikely, Moody's could upgrade the rating if Carmeuse
can further improve its operating and financial performance such
that it (1) further reduces its adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
sustainably below 2.5x; (2) achieves an RCF/net debt ratio in
excess of 30%; and (3) further strengthens its liquidity
position, proactively managing its forthcoming debt maturities
and keeping a comfortable headroom for financial covenants
compliance at all times. An upgrade would also require Carmeuse
to successfully complete its expansion project in Oman, allowing
a meaningful geographic diversification outside of Europe and
North America, aimed primarily at serving the Indian market.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the rating if Carmeuse's
operating performance deteriorates materially, leading to (1)
adjusted debt/EBITDA rising above 3.5x on a sustained basis,
hence reducing headroom under the company's financial covenants;
and (2) RCF/net debt dropping below 15%. Furthermore, higher than
anticipated execution risks for the expansion project in Oman
would also be considered for a possible downgrade if they were
leading to significant cost overruns and weaker liquidity.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Building Materials Industry published in July 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Carmeuse Holding SA (holding company for the Carmeuse Group) is
one of the world's leading producers of lime and lime-related
products. The group is active in approximately 90 locations
spread over 13 countries in North America, Europe and Africa. It
maintains a global market share of around 10%, with leading
positions in most of its markets, and a number one position in
North America in terms of revenues, which has been further
strengthened after the acquisition of Oglebay Norton in 2008.
Carmeuse is a privately held company majority owned by the
founder family, with the remainder being held by the Belgian
investment company Cobepa and by other individual and
institutional shareholders. The company operates in a niche
industry with only a handful of large players globally, while its
operations are subject to licenses and are difficult to
replicate. In 2012, Carmeuse reported EUR1.13 billion in revenues
and an EBITDA of EUR248 million.


ORCO PROPERTY: Deloitte Raises Going Concern Doubt
--------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Donovan at Bloomberg News reports that Deloitte commented
on its audit of Orco Property Group's 2012 financial statements.

According to Bloomberg, Deloitte cited "existence of material
uncertainities that may cast significant doubt on the Group's
ability to continue as a going concern."

                       Debt-to-Equity Swap

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 29,
2012, Krystof Chamonikolas at Bloomberg News reports that Orco
reduced its debt in a court-approved business overhaul.  Orco's
share capital more than doubled to EUR145.2 million (US$183
million) after the company issued new shares on May 14, the first
part of a conversion of debt into stock, Bloomberg disclosed.

Orco Property Group SA -- http://www.orcogroup.com/-- is a
Luxembourg-based real estate company, specializing in the
development, rental and management of properties in Central and
Eastern Europe.  Through its fully consolidated subsidiaries,
Orco Property Group SA operates in several countries, including
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Croatia
and Russia.  The Company rents and manages real estate and hotels
properties composed of office buildings, apartments with
services, luxury hotels and hotel residences; it also develops
real estate projects as promoter.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ABN AMRO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Tier 1 Subordinated Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ING Group's, ING Bank NV's (ING Bank),
and ABN AMRO Bank NV's (ABN AMRO) ratings. The Outlook on the
Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) is Negative.

Rating Action Rationale

The affirmations of ING Bank and ABN AMRO's Viability Ratings
(VRs) reflect Fitch's opinion that while both banks'
profitability is materially challenged by elevated loan
impairment charges (LICs), as would be expected in a low phase of
the economic cycle, their fundamentals have so far proven
resilient. Both banks reported significant improvement in their
already solid capitalization in 2012, further streamlined their
funding profiles and have continued to maintain large liquidity
buffers. The latter mitigates the risk associated with their
structural reliance on capital markets for funding.

The Netherlands has experienced poor economic conditions since
H212 and Fitch forecasts this will prevail until late this year.
GDP contracted by 0.9% in 2012 and is forecast to fall by a
further 1% in 2013. This has resulted in a number of material
challenges for Dutch banks, including the impact of rising
unemployment, higher company bankruptcies and significant strains
in commercial real estate. However, their strong domestic (and in
the case of ING Bank, also in neighboring countries) franchises
in retail and commercial banking have provided them with
resilient revenues.

The affirmation of ING Bank's, ING Group's and ABN AMRO's IDRs,
Support Rating Floors (SRFs), Support Ratings and senior debt
ratings reflects Fitch's belief that the Dutch state's
willingness to support systemically important domestic banks, and
not impose losses on senior creditors remains strong given a
still unsettled eurozone crisis and related turbulences in the
financial markets.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT
RATING and SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

ING Bank and ABN AMRO's IDRs are at their SRFs of 'A+'. The SRFs
reflect Fitch's expectation that there is an extremely high
probability that the Dutch state will support these institutions,
given their respective systemic importance to the domestic
financial system.

ING Group is the holding group for ING Bank and ING's insurance
operations. Its SRF and Long-term IDR is currently notched down
once from ING Bank's, indicating Fitch's view that although still
extremely high, the probability that the holding company will
receive support is slightly weaker than the bank's, given that
support could flow to the bank directly.

All the entities' IDRs, SRFs and senior debt ratings are
sensitive to any change in the Dutch state's ability or
willingness to support them.

The Dutch state's ability to provide such support is largely
dependent upon its creditworthiness, which is reflected in its
ratings ('AAA'/Negative). For European banks, Fitch considers it
appropriate to only have SRFs of 'A+' for banks in 'AAA'
countries that have shown a strong willingness to support senior
creditors. A sovereign downgrade by one notch would no longer be
commensurate with a 'A+' SRF. Should this take place, Fitch would
likely downgrade ING Bank and ABN AMRO's Long-term and Short-term
IDRs by one notch.

Furthermore, there is a clear political intention within the EU
to ultimately reduce the implicit state support for systemically
important banks, as demonstrated by a series of policy and
regulatory initiatives aimed at curbing systemic risk posed by
the banking industry. This will result in Fitch factoring less
support into banks' IDRs in the medium term. ING Bank's and ABN
AMRO's SRFs and, therefore, their Long-term and Short-term IDRs
are highly sensitive to a change in Fitch's view of the
likelihood of authorities in Europe to provide full support to
creditors in their banks. The resolution of two major banks in
Cyprus demonstrates that there could be a more rapid removal of
support than previously anticipated. Given that ING Bank's VR is
at 'a', any support-driven downgrade would be limited to one
notch.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - VRs

ING Bank's 'a' VR continues to be driven its strong banking
franchise, especially in the Benelux, which provides the bank
with solid and resilient income streams and sizeable deposit
gathering capacities. ING Bank is essentially exposed to the
health of the eurozone economies (with manageable exposures to
the peripheral countries, virtually all Spain and Italy) and, in
particular, to the economic conditions in the Netherlands, as its
domestic exposure represents around one-third of total lending.
Although LICs eroded close to 40% of pre-impairment operating
profitability in 2012 (and will erode earnings again in 2013),
operating profitability remains acceptable given the economic
environment.

Wholesale funding reliance remains, but is lower than other Dutch
banks, benefiting from the geographical diversification of the
bank's deposit base, and access to capital markets has been
resilient. ING Bank's liquidity position is good despite
liquidity being not fully fungible within the group. Aided by
deleveraging, capitalization improved significantly in 2012, a
necessary move ahead of the repayment of residual state aid
(EUR3.375bn including repayment premium) and increased regulatory
capital requirements from Basel III/CDR IV regulations. Taking
these and expected retained earnings into account, Fitch views
ING Bank's capitalization as robust.

ING Bank's VR is sensitive to any effective or anticipated
materially higher economic stress in the Netherlands and/or in
the eurozone, notably in Spain and Italy (EUR30 billion and EUR20
billion of exposures at end-2012, i.e. 80% and 53% of equity,
respectively). Investor sentiment turning against the bank or any
marked reduced prudence in liquidity management would also be
detrimental to its VR given ING Bank's funding reliance on
capital markets. Although not expected, any setback in ING
Group's ample on-going restructuring plan could also potentially
create negative pressure on ING Bank's VR.

ABN AMRO's 'bbb+' VR reflects its solid domestic franchise,
moderate risk profile, robust capitalization, but also its
funding reliance on confidence-sensitive wholesale funding, a
structural feature of Dutch banks. This is mitigated by its
liquidity position, which although materially composed of
retained securitizations, is solid. The bank's access to the
capital markets has been uninterrupted in recent years.

Downside risks from economic headwinds in the Netherlands weigh
on ABN AMRO's VR more than ING Bank because of its greater
domestic focus. Any material revision of the scale and length of
the economic recession and the related impacts on the bank's
asset quality, capital and potentially its access to wholesale
funding would be detrimental to the bank's VR. The continued
improvements in the banks' fundamentals (in particular
capitalization and funding profile) indicate a potential upgrade
of the VR, provided the bank's capitalization and liquidity
remain resilient to the current economic recession in the
Netherlands.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED DEBT
ING Bank's and ABN AMRO's state-guaranteed debt securities are
rated 'AAA', reflecting the sovereign Dutch guarantee and so are
sensitive to any change in the Netherlands' rating.

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES
Fitch considers ING Belgium as a 'core' subsidiary of ING Bank
and its Long-term IDR is equalized with ING Bank's, in line with
the agency's criteria 'Rating FI Subsidiaries and Holding
Companies'. ING Belgium's IDR is sensitive to any change in ING
Bank's IDR.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID
SECURITIES
The ratings of the subordinated debt and other hybrid capital
issued by these institutions are all notched down from their VRs
in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each instrument's
respective non-performance and relatively loss severity risk
profiles, which vary considerably. Hence they are sensitive to
any change in the VRs.

The rating actions are:

ABN AMRO

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'
Long-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+'
Short-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'F1+'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Non-innovative Tier 1 subordinated debt (XS0246487457): affirmed
at 'BB'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt (XS0244754254): affirmed at 'BB+'
Dutch government guaranteed securities: affirmed at 'AAA'/'F1+'

ABN AMRO Funding USA LLC

Short-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'F1+';

ING Group

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'
Senior unsecured debt rating affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Subordinated perpetual preference shares (US456837AC74): affirmed
at 'BB+'

ING Bank

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+';
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+/F1+'
Short-term senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'F1+'
Market-Linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
Commercial paper affirmed at 'A+/F1+'
Dutch government guaranteed securities: affirmed at 'AAA'/'F1+'

ING Belgium

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+'
Market-linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A+'

Fitch will shortly publish a special report on the major Dutch
banks' exposure to real estate lending and a report on these
banks' 2012 results.


* NETHERLANDS: Fitch Says Banks' CRE Loan Books Deteriorate
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a new report that the current deterioration
in the residential and commercial real estate (CRE) loan books of
Dutch banks are manageable for Rabobank Group (Rabobank,
'AA'/Negative/'aa'), ING Bank NV (ING Bank, 'A+'/Negative/'a')
and ABN AMRO Bank NV (ABN AMRO, 'A+'/Negative/'bbb+') in the
agency's base case.

Cyclical issues have combined with structural factors to create
an adverse environment in the Netherlands for both the housing
and CRE markets, with asset prices falling since 2008. Housing
prices have dropped by 17% since 2008, and the value of CRE has
fallen by around 15% overall and up to 25% for offices. Fitch has
recently increased its projected peak-to-trough decline for the
housing market to 25% from 18%. It should start to bottom-out
from 2014, notably helped by the adoption of the long-discussed
changes to the tax regime for Dutch mortgages.

The performance of Dutch residential mortgages has deteriorated
gradually, but to a limited extent since 2011, mainly due to
slightly rising unemployment. This has caused loan impairment
charges (LICs) for mortgage books to rise at the three banks,
albeit remaining at low levels. In Fitch's base case, LICs on
mortgages will remain higher than their historical average in
2013 (and likely 2014) but will stay manageable, given the still
solid overall credit quality of Dutch borrowers and their strong
incentive not to default on their mortgages. The ratio of 90-day
past due mortgages to total mortgages is still below 1% for the
three major Dutch banks and should not rise materially.

The situation is significantly worse in the CRE loan books
(ratios of impaired loans in the 6%-9% range). Although much
smaller in size than the mortgage books, CRE exposure will
continue generating high LICs. Fitch considers that SNS Bank
('BBB+'/RWE/'f)' was a unique case. It ran a particularly large
and weak CRE loan book, which ultimately led to the bank's
nationalization in February 2013. LICs for CRE are set to remain
high at the three large banks, unless the economy improves.

The sensitivities of the three banks to Fitch's stress tests is a
function of the proportion of their large, but low risk, mortgage
book and relatively moderate, but high risk, CRE exposure to
total assets and equity. The stress tests indicate that the three
banks' solid capitalization should not be materially affected by
any further deterioration in CRE and mortgage quality, even if
LICs largely exceed those reported in 2012.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SECUR BBVA: DBRS Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned the following rating to the
Class A and Class B Notes issued by Secur BBVA:

- Class A rated 'A' (sf)

- Class B rated B (sf)

The Class C notes are not rated by DBRS.

The receivables securitized in the transaction consist of
obligations arising under mortgage loans to individuals secured
by residential properties in Portugal.  The mortgages were
originated and are serviced by BBVA Portugal S.A.

The ratings are based upon review by DRBS of the following
analytical considerations:

* The transaction's capital structure and the form and
   sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

* Relevant credit enhancement in the form of subordination, a
   reserve fund and the possibility of excess spread.  Credit
   enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS projected
   expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumptions under various
   stress scenarios for the Class A and Class B notes issued by
   Secur BBVA.

* BBVA Portugal S.A. capabilities with respect to originations,
   underwriting, servicing and financial strength.

* BBVA Spain S.A. capabilities and private rating with regards
   to the Account Bank and Back-up Servicing.

* The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
   servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral.

* The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
   assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of the
   transaction documents.

* The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
   the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the consistency
   with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
   Transactions.


* PORTUGAL: Obtains Extension of Bailout Loan Maturities
--------------------------------------------------------
Joao Lima at Bloomberg News reports that Portugal said an
extension of the maturities of its aid loans will help the
country issue 10-year bonds and regain access to debt markets
after requesting a bailout two years ago.

"This deal is extremely important for Portugal because it allows
the country to create enough space to issue a 10-year bond and
that in turn is a crucial step to regain full bond- market
access," Bloomberg quotes Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar as saying
in Dublin on Friday after a meeting with euro-area colleagues.
The extension of seven years is "perfectly sufficient."

The loan extensions for Ireland and Portugal were agreed on in
principle on Friday by finance ministers from the euro area and
the remaining 10 European Union states, Bloomberg relates.
According to Bloomberg, ministers said in a joint statement that
for Portugal, the agreement is subject to the government showing
"continued successful" implementation of its program in a review
by international creditors.

To complete that review, Portugal has to find alternative
measures to meet budget targets set in its EUR78 billion (US$102
billion) bailout after its Constitutional Court blocked a plan to
suspend the equivalent of a monthly salary payment to state
workers and pensioners, Bloomberg says.

Mr. Gaspar, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the government will
"redesign" a measure blocked by the court that affects payments
from recipients of unemployment and illness subsidies.  He said
that it plans budget savings of about EUR600 million and will
bring forward "state reform" measures that may also represent
about EUR600 million of savings, Bloomberg relates.  Officials
from the so-called troika of bailout partners will return to
Lisbon today, April 15, Bloomberg discloses.

"This extension is very important because it allows Portugal and
Ireland to smooth their debt redemption profiles and consequently
it reduces the two countries' financing needs in the post-program
period," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Gaspar as saying.  Portugal's aid
program ends in May 2014, Bloomberg notes.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


BANCA ROMANEASCA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT IDR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca Romaneasca S.A.'s Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating at 'B-' with a Negative Outlook, Short Term
Issuer Default Rating at 'B', Viability Rating at 'b-' and
Support Rating at '5'. The agency has simultaneously withdrawn
all the ratings.

The ratings have been withdrawn as the issuer stopped
participating in the rating process and they are no longer
considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage.
Fitch will no longer provide rating or analytical coverage of
this issuer.


MECHEL CAMPIA: Files for Insolvency
-----------------------------------
Ecaterina Craciun at Ziarul Financiar reports that Mechel Campia
Turzii said in a statement on April 12 that the company filed for
insolvency on March 22.

Mechel Campia is a Romanian steel maker.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


NATIONAL RESERVE: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based National Reserve Bank's
(NRB) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B-', and
removed them from Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Outlook is
Negative. A full list of rating actions is at the end of this
commentary.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL LONG-TERM RATING AND
VIABILITY RATING
The affirmation of the ratings, and the removal of the RWN,
reflects the reduction in near-term liquidity risk as NRB has
continued to generate sufficient cash to repay creditors, and has
increased its coverage of outstanding third party liabilities by
liquid assets.

The 'B-' Long-term IDR is driven by the 'b-' Viability Rating and
reflects the bank's narrow and concentrated franchise, still
significant operational and liquidity risks relating to the
ongoing wind-down of the business, the investment of the bank's
equity in illiquid and/or related party assets, and weak
operating performance. The Negative Outlook reflects the
potential for further deterioration in the bank's stand-alone
profile as the business continues to contract.

During Q113, NRB repaid a further RUB1.1bn of third party retail
deposits (partly driven by branch closures). At end-Q113, the
bank held RUB3.3 billion of highly liquid assets against RUB4.4
billion of third party unsecured liabilities (mostly customer
accounts).

In addition, the bank has RUB3.3 billion of secured (repo)
funding, including RUB2.1 billion, which it intends to repay
rather than seek to extend upon contractual maturity in April
2013, and RUB1.2 billion that NRB aims to redeem during Q313. The
unwinding of the first facility will free up from encumbrance
RUB2.5 billion of shares in OAO Gazprom ('BBB'/Stable), meaning
that highly liquid assets will increase by RUB0.4 billion. The
second facility is secured by shares in JSC Aeroflot ('BB-
'/Stable), which can also be used to generate liquidity, if
needed, as they can be refinanced with the Central Bank of
Russia. NRB currently controls RUB3.9 billion of Aeroflot shares
(including those currently pledged and held in a mutual fund).
The loan book (net value of RUB3.6 billion) and real estate and
land investments (RUB3.8 billion) could potentially also generate
some liquidity through further repayments / sales.

Overall, Fitch views NRB's current liquidity position as
reasonably comfortable and as having stabilized compared to 2012.
However, the position is still dependent to a significant degree
on the relative stability of remaining customer deposits.

NRB's franchise is limited and concentrated, with a few customers
dominating both the loan book and deposit base. Reported
capitalization is solid, with an equity/assets ratio of 57% at
end-Q113, but the bank's RUB15.8 billion of equity is
substantially tied up in shares of leasing company Ilyushin
Finance (RUB2.7 billion), real estate and land (RUB3.8 billion),
investments in associates (RUB1.7 billion) and other illiquid
assets (RUB2.9 billion). The bank recorded a profit of RUB108
million in Q113 after a loss of RUB131 million in 2012 under
Russian Accounting Standards.

NRB is yet to pay the RUB0.8 billion of accrued interest (this is
included in the RUB4.4 billion of unsecured liabilities above),
on a subordinated loan which the bank repaid (the principal) in
January 2013. NRB is negotiating with the creditor on the form of
repayment/set-off of the remaining obligation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, VR
The bank could be downgraded if there is renewed deterioration of
the liquidity profile, significant distributions of dividends
(assets) to the shareholder or renewed political pressure on the
owner. Stabilization of the ratings at their current level is
unlikely without a clean-up of the balance sheet and clearer
prospects for the bank's future development.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR
The affirmation of the Support Rating at '5' and the Support
Rating Floor at 'No Floor' reflect the bank's low systemic
importance and Fitch's view that support from either the
shareholder or the Russian authorities cannot be relied upon.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-Term foreign and local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-';
-- Outlook Negative; removed from RWN
-- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'; removed from RWN
-- National Long-Term Rating: affirmed 'BB-(rus)'; Outlook
    Negative; removed from RWN
-- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'; removed from RWN
-- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
-- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT GENOVA IX: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR10.7MM D Notes to 'Caa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine junior
and three senior notes in four Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transactions: AyT Genova Hipotecario IV,
FTH; AyT Genova Hipotecario VI, FTH; AyT Genova Hipotecario IX,
FTH and TDA Pastor 1, FTA. At the same time, Moody's confirmed
the ratings of two securities in TDA Pastor 1. Insufficiency of
credit enhancement to address sovereign risk, exposure to
counterparty risk and revision of key collateral assumptions have
prompted the downgrade action.

The rating action concludes the review of eight notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 2012. This rating
action also concludes the review of six notes placed on review on
November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key collateral
assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. The rating action on
Genova deals also reflects the exposure to Barclays Bank S.A. as
both servicer and Issuer Account Bank and, in the case of AyT
Genova IX, the revision of key collateral assumptions. Moody's
confirmed the ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and
structural features provided enough protection against sovereign
and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

- Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

During its review Moody's increased its expected loss (EL)
assumption in AyT Genova IX to 1.20% from 0.90% due to worse-
than-expected collateral performance. Loans more than 90 days in
arrears as of current portfolio balance were 0.82% as of January
2013 up from 0.26% as of January 2012. In the same period
cumulative defaults (defined as loans more than 18 months in
arrears) moved from 0.42% to 0.48% of original portfolio balance.
Milan CE assumption for this transaction remains at 10%.

Moody's has not revised the key collateral assumptions for AyT
Genova IV, VI and TDA Pastor 1. Expected loss assumptions as a
percentage of original pool balance remain at 0.44% for AyT
Genova IV, 0.56% for AyT Genova VI and 0.40% for TDA Pastor 1.
The MILAN CE assumptions remain at 10% for the three
transactions.

- Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to Barclays Bank S.A. (not rated),
which acts as Servicer and Issuer Account Bank in all Genova
transactions. The deals include Issuer Account Bank replacement
triggers in case Barclays Bank PLC owns less than 51% of Barclays
Bank S.A. or is downgraded below P-1, however there is not an
explicit guarantee of the amounts deposited in these accounts.
Moody's has assessed the probability and effect of a default of
the issuer account bank on the ability of the issuer to meet its
obligations under the transactions, and determined this risk has
some impact on the ratings on the notes.

As part of its analysis Moody's assessed the exposure of TDA
Pastor 1 to Cecabank S.A. (Ba1/NP on review for possible
downgrade) as swap counterparty. The revised ratings of the
notes, which are driven by the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk, were not negatively
affected by this exposure.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in
March 2013.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines."

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and note holders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, the following have been corrected during
the review: for AyT Genova VI, class B margin and potential PDL
modeling; for AyT Genova IX, notes margins and some trigger
inputs switching the priority of payments and related to reserve
fund amortization.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria

EUR776M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR24M B Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: AyT GENOVA HIPOTECARIO VI

EUR524M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR7M B Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR7.7M C Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR7.3M D Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AyT GENOVA HIPOTECARIO IX Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria

EUR750M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR11M B Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR10.8M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR10.7M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: TDA PASTOR 1 FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR429.8M A1 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR47.5M A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR10.6M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR3M C Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANCAJA LEASING 1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two notes and
confirmed the rating of one note in Bancaja Leasing 1, FTA, a
Spanish asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions backed by
small ticket leases. High levels of credit enhancement, which
protect against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove
the rating action. The rating action concludes the review for
downgrade initiated by Moody's on July 2, 2012.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: Bancaja Leasing 1, FTA

EUR576M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR96M B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

EUR128M C Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
Definitive Rating Assigned Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. Moreover, the upgrade reflects the rating
agency's view that the credit enhancement levels of these classes
of notes (54.8% and 27% respectively) are sufficient to protect
against sovereign and counterparty risk at a A3 (sf) and Ba2 (sf)
level, respectively. Credit enhancement has built up to high
levels as a result of the deleveraging of this transaction. The
introduction of new adjustments to Moody's modeling assumptions
to account for the effect of deterioration in sovereign
creditworthiness has had no negative effect on the ratings in
Bancaja Leasing 1.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

- Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Following Moody's update of its methodology, the rating agency
increased its CoV for Bancaja Leasing 1, which is a measure of
volatility, to 59.0% from 46.0%. Together with a mean default
probability of 20% on current pool balance and a recovery rate of
35.0%, this volatility increase corresponds to a portfolio credit
enhancement of 29.5%.

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
this transaction, which it updated on December 18, 2012.

- Counterparty Exposure Has Increased

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

Bankia (Ba2, uncertain), acts as servicer and transfers
collections every two days to the issuer account at Banco
Santander S.A. (Baa2). The reserve fund also resides at Banco
Santander. The reserve fund represents 27.0% of the current pool
balance.

Moody's has incorporated into its analysis the potential default
of Bankia, which could expose the transaction to a commingling
loss on the collections as well as the potential default of Banco
Santander, which could leave the transaction without the support
of the reserve fund.

- Interest Deferral Trigger analysis

Moody's views positively the high level of the reserve fund,
which can be used to pay deferred interest on the Class B and C
notes in order to mitigate the risk of non-payment of interest
upon interest deferral trigger breach.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse-normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transaction affected by this rating action,
Moody's adjusted some inputs to reflect the new approach.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign risk to
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"), along with
the publication of its Special Comment "Structured Finance
Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in this rating are described in "The Temporary
Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions: Eligible
Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March 2013.


GC SABADELL 4: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Rating on Class C Certificate
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of class A, B and
C in GC Sabadell Empresas 4, FTA, a Spanish asset-backed
securities (ABS) transactions backed by small ticket leases. High
levels of credit enhancement, which protect against sovereign and
counterparty risk, primarily drove the rating action. The rating
action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by Moody's on
July 2, 2012.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: GC Sabadell Empresas 4, FTA

EUR525.8M A Certificate, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR25.1M B Certificate, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR69.1M C Certificate, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. Credit enhancement has built up to high levels
as a result of the deleveraging of this transaction. The
introduction of new adjustments to Moody's modeling assumptions
to account for the effect of deterioration in sovereign
creditworthiness has had no negative effect on the ratings in GC
Sabadell Empresas 4.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

- Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Following Moody's update of its methodology, the rating agency
increased its CoV, which is a measure of volatility, to 76.5%
from 54.7%. Together with a mean default probability of 13.0% on
current pool balance and a recovery rate of 35.0%, this
volatility increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement
of 26.2%.

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
this transaction, which it updated on December 18, 2012.

- Counterparty Exposure Has Increased

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

Banco Sabadell, S.A. (Ba1), acts as servicer and transfers
collections daily to the issuer account at Banco Santander S.A.
(Baa2). The reserve fund also resides at Banco Santander. The
reserve fund represents 25.6% of the current pool balance.

Moody's has incorporated into its analysis the potential default
of Banco Sabadell, which could expose the transaction to a
commingling loss on the collections as well as the potential
default of Banco Santander, which could leave the transaction
without the support of the reserve fund.

Banco Sabadell also acts as swap counterparty in the transaction
and has made a deposit of collateral in an account at Banco
Santander. As part of its analysis, Moody's assessed the exposure
to the swap counterparty, which does not have a negative effect
on the rating levels at this time.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse-normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transaction affected by the rating action,
Moody's adjusted some inputs to reflect the new approach.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign risk to
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"), along with
the publication of its Special Comment "Structured Finance
Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.


IM GRUPO II: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR45MM D Notes to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three mezzanine
notes and confirmed the ratings of six senior and mezzanine notes
issued by two Spanish asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions
backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME): IM
Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME I, FTA, and IM Grupo Banco Popular
FTPYME II, FTA. At the same time, the rating agency affirmed the
ratings on both equity notes. Sufficient credit enhancement,
which protects against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily
drove the rating action.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on July 2, 2012. Both SME ABS transactions were
originated by Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Ba1 /NP, review for
downgrade).

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness has had no effect on the ratings of
all classes of notes in both transactions. Furthermore, the
current level of credit enhancement available under the Class D
notes issued by IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME I and under the
Class C and D notes issued by IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME II in
the form of cash (via the reserve fund) and over-
collateralization is sufficient to support their three-notch
upgrade. Increasing borrower concentration risk and deterioration
of the creditworthiness of the swap counterparty limited the
magnitude of the upgrades of the notes issued by IM Grupo Banco
Popular FTPYME II.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

- Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
both transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

For IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME I, the current default
assumption is 16.5% of the current portfolio balance and the
assumption for the fixed recovery rate is 60.0%. Moody's has
increased the CoV to 93.0% from 42.0%, which, combined with the
revised key collateral assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio
credit enhancement of 21.5%.

For IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME II, the current default
assumption is 16.5% of the current portfolio balance and the
assumption for the fixed recovery rate is 45.0%. Moody's has
increased the CoV to 82.0% from 43.0%, which, combined with the
revised key collateral assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio
credit enhancement of 31.3%. This revised volatility also takes
into account the risk stemming from borrower concentration, with
the top 10 borrowers representing 20.5% of the portfolio
according to the February 2013 collateral report.

- Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

In both transactions, Banco Popular Espanol acts as servicer and
collections account bank, and transfers collections every day to
the reinvestment accounts at the Bank of Spain (unrated). The
reserve funds reside at the Bank of Spain. Moody's has
incorporated into its analysis the potential default of both
counterparties, which could expose the transaction to a
commingling loss on the collections and a loss on the reserve
fund.

HSBC Bank PLC Spanish Branch (Aa3/P-1) acts as swap counterparty
in IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME I, while Banco Popular Espanol
plays this role in IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME II. In the
latter transaction, the swap provides significant protection to
the noteholders by guaranteeing the payment of the coupon on the
Class A3(G) to D notes plus 60 basis points of excess spread. As
a result, the deterioration of the counterparty credit quality
has resulted in negative pressure on the rating of the notes in
this transaction while the first transaction is not affected by
swap counterparty risk.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transactions affected by the rating action,
some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new approach.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign risk to
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"), along with
the publication of its Special Comment "Structured Finance
Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME I, Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos

EUR150M A4 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR155.4M A5(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR30M B Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR28M C Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR60M D Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR30M E Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned C (sf)

Issuer: IM Grupo Banco Popular FTPYME II, Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos

EUR221.7M A3(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR47M B Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR23M C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR45M D Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR39M E Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)


RURALPYME 2: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on EUR23.2MM C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of seven notes
issued by RURALPYME 1 FTPYME, FTA and RURALPYME 2 FTPYME, FTA,
both Spanish asset-backed securities transactions backed by loans
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS). At the same
time, Moody's upgraded to A3 the Class C notes issued by
RURALPYME 1 FTPYME, FTA. Sufficient credit enhancement, which
protects against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove
the rating action. The rating action concludes the review for
downgrade initiated by Moody's on July 2, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness has had no effect on the ratings of
the notes.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk:

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions:

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the two transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

For RURALPYME 1 FTPYME, FTA Moody's has increased its CoV from
45% to 98%. Together with the unchanged assumptions on mean
default rate of 7.5% and the recovery rate of 30%, this
volatility increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement
of 20%.

For RURALPYME 2 FTPYME, FTA Moody's has increased its CoV from
50.4% to 70%. Combined with the unchanged assumptions on mean
default probability of 16% and the recovery rate of 45%, this
volatility increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement
of 25.3%.

Counterparty Exposure Has Not Increased:

Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P1) has replaced Banco Cooperative Espanol,
S.A.(Ba1/NP DNG) as the Issuer Account Bank and Paying Agent in
both transactions. Banco Cooperative Espanol, S.A.(Ba1/NP DNG)
has remained as the basis swap counterparty in both transactions.
Based on the provided information, Banco Cooperative Espanol,
S.A.(Ba1/NP DNG) has been posting cash collateral on a weekly
basis to an account with Barclays Bank PLC. There is a daily
sweep from the servicer account to the issuer account in both
transactions. The revised ratings of the notes, which reflect the
sufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk, are
consistent with this exposure.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes:

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment," July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

Principal Methodology:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013, along with the publication of its
Special Comment " Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the
Impact of Sovereign Risk".

Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: RURALPYME 1 FTPYME, FTA

EUR53.7M A2(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR14.6M B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR7.2M C Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR4.4M D Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RURALPYME 2 FTPYME, FTA

EUR487M A1 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR53.7M A2(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR29.1M B Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR23.2M C Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SUNTECH POWER: Swiss Unit Obtains Two-Month Debt Moratorium
-----------------------------------------------------------
SolarServer reports that the main European operating subsidiary
of Suntech Power Holdings Company Ltd. has been granted a
provisional two-month moratorium on creditor claims by Swiss
courts.

Schaffhausen, Switzerland-based Suntech Power International had
applied for the provisional moratorium due to over-indebtedness,
the majority of which is inter-company debt, SolarServer relates.
The court has appointed an administrator to assess SPI's
financial condition and the prospects of reaching an agreement
with creditors, SolarServer discloses.

"The goal of the provisional moratorium is to allow time to
restructure debt, primarily inter-company debt," SolarServer
quotes Suntech CEO David King as saying.  "During this process,
we are committed to continuing to deliver high-quality solar
products to our customers in Europe."

SPI states that it will continue its operations during the two-
month period, SolarServer notes.

                          About Suntech

Wuxi, China-based Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. (NYSE: STP)
produces solar products for residential, commercial, industrial,
and utility applications.  With regional headquarters in China,
Switzerland, and the United States, and gigawatt-scale
manufacturing worldwide, Suntech has delivered more than
25,000,000 photovoltaic panels to over a thousand customers in
more than 80 countries.

As reported by the TCR on March 20, 2013, Suntech Power Holdings
Co., Ltd., has received from the trustee of its 3% Convertible
Notes a notice of default and acceleration relating to Suntech's
non-payment of the principal amount of US$541 million that was
due to holders of the Notes on March 15, 2013.  That event of
default has also triggered cross-defaults under Suntech's other
outstanding debt, including its loans from International Finance
Corporation and Chinese domestic lenders.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


FIRST QUANTUM: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Watch Neg. on Inmet Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
First Quantum Minerals' (FQM) ratings remain on Rating Watch
Negative RWN) following the completion of its acquisition of
Inmet Mining Corporation, Fitch Ratings says. The agency is
waiting to obtain clarification on the treatment of Inmet's
existing bonds, the refinancing of the US$2.5 billion acquisition
bridge loan and the amount and timing of capex for the combined
group between 2013 and 2016.

The RWN on FQM followed the announcement on December 16, 2012 of
its CAD5.1 billion (US45.2 billion) offer for fellow Canada-based
producer Inmet and also reflected the potential for a higher
offer from FQM. Fitch's Issuer Default rating for First Quantum
is 'BB'.

The latter is no longer a concern given Inmet's successfully
completion of the transaction on April 4, 2013 under the terms
announced in December. A total of 65,206,044 common shares of
Inmet representing 92.74% of its outstanding stock (on a fully
diluted basis) were tendered, accepted and paid by FQM on or
before 5 April 2013. FQM is in the process of acquiring the
balance of shares not tendered to the offer by way of compulsory
acquisition.

FQM offered CAD72.0 per share, a 33% premium to Inmet's closing
share price on November 23, after two friendly approaches of
CAD62.5 on October 28 and CAD70.0 on November 25 were rejected by
Inmet's board. The final offer was split 50% cash/50% shares with
a maximum aggregate cash consideration of CAD2.5 billion.

From an operational standpoint, Fitch views the proposed
transaction positively. The combined group forecasts pro-forma
sales of US$3.5 billion in 2013 and is expected to rank among the
world's largest copper mining producers with 1.3mt production
projected by 2018 based on its current projects pipeline (Brook
Hunt's estimate). Inmet's existing producing assets in Turkey,
Finland and Spain plus the development of the Cobre Panama mine
will materially improve FQM's operational and geographic
diversification and simultaneously reduce its current large
exposure to Zambia.

Fitch's ongoing review will focus on the potential cost savings
at Cobre Panama. The project, which belonged to Inmet, is one of
the world's largest undeveloped deposits and the open pit mine is
expected to produce 300,000T of copper per annum from 2016. FQM
believes that it will be able to employ in-house expertise and
materially reduce construction costs. Following the closing of
the acquisition, FQM suspended contracts with engineering firms
hired by Inmet for the project, in line with its strategy.

Fitch is also seeking clarification on the allocation of
engineering resources across the combined group, particularly
regarding FQM's Sentinel project in Zambia, which is of a similar
size and is due for completion in 2014.

Finally, Fitch's review will encompass the financial aspects of
the transaction, including acquisition financing and treatment of
Inmet's existing borrowings. At end-2012, Inmet's total debt of
US$2.0 billion consisted of its 8.75% US$1.5 billion senior
unsecured notes maturing in June 2016 and its 7.5% USD0.5bn
senior unsecured notes maturing in 2021.

Fitch expects to complete its review and resolve the RWN in the
next two months.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BELLATRIX ECLIPSE 2005-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'A
(sf)' its credit rating on BELLATRIX (ECLIPSE 2005-2) PLC's class
D notes.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on
the class E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the credit quality of
the remaining underlying loans under its updated criteria for
rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

     THE OXFORD STREET LOAN (43% OF THE SECURITIZED LOAN POOL)

The loan has an outstanding balance of GBP7.0 million and matures
in April 2013.  The loan is backed by a mixed-use property
(consisting of a multistorey car park with a restaurant on the
ground floor) in central Manchester.  The asset is fully occupied
by two unrated tenants on long leases that expire in 2025.

The servicer is in discussions with the borrower regarding loan
refinancing.  In January 2013, the servicer reported a projected
interest coverage ratio (ICR) of 2.56x and a loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 54.71%, based on a November 2011 valuation.

Following S&P's review, it do not currently anticipates principal
losses on this loan under its base case scenario.

   THE CAVENDISH SQUARE LOAN (35% OF THE SECURITIZED LOAN POOL)

The loan has an outstanding balance of GBP5.8 million and matures
in April 2013.  The loan is backed by an asset of good quality,
in S&P's view, and is located in the West End in central London.

The servicer is in discussions with the borrower regarding loan
refinancing.  The property is fully let to a single tenant until
2020.  In January 2013, the servicer reported a projected ICR of
1.39x and an LTV ratio of 75.08%, based on a March 2005
valuation.

Following S&P's review, it do not currently anticipates principal
losses on this loan under its base case scenario.

    THE RIVERMEAD COURT LOAN (22% OF THE SECURITIZED LOAN POOL)

The loan has an outstanding balance of GBP3.5 million and matures
in April 2014.  The loan is backed by two adjoining office
buildings located at the Kenn Business Park entrance in Clevedon,
North Somerset.

In November 2012 the sole tenant in the portfolio went into
administration.  The borrower also informed the servicer that
they are currently marketing the asset to new tenants.

In January 2013, the servicer reported a projected ICR of 0.09x
and an LTV ratio of 63.38%, based on a May 2005 valuation.

The loan is current, but it may default at any time, in S&P's
opinion.  Following S&P's review, it considers that the risk of
principal losses has increased in light of the deteriorating
performances of the properties.  S&P has assumed losses in its
base case scenario.

                         CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

The October 2012 and January 2013 cash manager's reports note
that the issuer failed to meet its interest payment obligation
under the class D notes on these two interest payment dates
(IPD).  The class D notes experienced an aggregate interest
shortfall of EUR11,132.37.

It is S&P's understanding that the issuer continues to pay
interest and principal in accordance with the pre-acceleration
priority of payments because the trustee has not issued an
acceleration notice.

The earlier repayment of eight of the 13 initial loans caused a
spread compression between the three remaining loans and the
remaining notes.  As a consequence of the payment of ordinary but
nonrecurring fees due to third parties on the October 2012 and
February 2013 IPDs, and although the three remaining loans paid
full interest, the weighted-average cost of the remaining notes
exceeded the weighted-average loan coupon on these two IPDs.

In accordance with the transaction documents, the class D and E
notes deferred unpaid interest (EUR284,442.87).

In S&P's opinion, the class D notes' existing interest shortfalls
may be repaid under certain scenarios, whereas the class E notes
are likely to continue to accrue interest shortfalls.

                           RATING ACTIONS

S&P's ratings on Bellatrix (Eclispe 2005-2)'s notes address
timely payment of interest and repayment of principal no later
than the legal maturity date (January 2017).

S&P has lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on the
class D notes due to the deferral of unpaid interest.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for rating CMBS in the event of
interest shortfalls, it have not lowered to 'D (sf)' its rating
on the class D notes because the existing shortfall is minor and
could be repaid, in S&P's view.  However, notes experiencing
interest shortfalls are no longer commensurate with investment-
grade ratings, in S&P's opinion.  Continuing or additional
interest shortfalls on the class D notes could lead S&P to lower
its rating on these notes to 'D (sf)'.

As the class E notes have experienced ongoing interest shortfalls
since November 2010, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on this
class of notes.

S&P will continue to monitor the transaction's performance,
particularly with regards to interest shortfalls.  S&P may take
rating actions in future if interest shortfalls persist.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To              From

Bellatrix (Eclipse 2005-2) PLC
GBP393.69 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

D           BB+ (sf)        A (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E           D (sf)


HBOS PLC: KPMG Faces Audit Probe; Crosby Gives Up Knighthood
------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Aldrick and James Kirkup at The Telegraph report that KPMG
is facing a possible investigation by the accounting watchdog
into its audit of HBOS, the failed lender that a parliamentary
commission claimed would have gone bust even without the
financial crisis.

According to the Telegraph, although the Big Four accounting firm
was not criticized by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards, the damning report revealed HBOS was carrying
GBP47 billion of losses when rescued by the taxpayer despite
getting a clean bill of health from KPMG.

In HBOS's corporate arm alone, KPMG cleared management's decision
to set aside just GBP370 million in provisions in May 2008, when
the final divisional losses ended up being GBP25 billion, the
Telegraph relates.

In light of the findings, the Financial Reporting Council, as
cited by the Telegraph, said it would review both the
commission's report and the conclusions of the Financial Services
Authority's upcoming review into HBOS' collapse, "to see whether
there is a case for an investigation under our powers".

The parliamentary report was highly critical of the HBOS
management's "reckless" stewardship, the Telegraph notes.

Concerns about KPMG's audits will raise further questions about
John Griffith-Jones' position as chairman of the Financial
Conduct Authority, which has taken over responsibility for the
HBOS report following the FSA's disbanding, the Telegraph states.
Mr. Griffith-Jones was chairman of KPMG during the years it
audited HBOS and, as a former partner, would be liable for claims
against the firm, the Telegraph discloses.

The Telegraph notes that an FCA spokesman said Mr. Griffith-Jones
"does not sit on the FCA sub-committee which is tasked with
overseeing the HBOS report".  According to the Telegraph, she
said it is "not responsible for regulation of auditors.  We will
look at the factual input of auditors in areas such as
provisioning and ask questions where appropriate."

According to the Telegraph's Szu Ping Chan and Alistair Osborne,
corporate governance adviser Pirc has also raised further
questions over KPMG's role as HBOS's auditor in the run up to its
collapse.

Alan MacDougall, Pirc's managing director, said that the collapse
of HBOS raised "significant issues about the conduct" of KPMG,
and in particular Mr. Griffith-Jones, its chairman during the
years it audited HBOS, the Telegraph relates.

Mr. Griffith-Jones was present at an Financial Services Authority
board meeting where it was decided not to investigate KPMG or the
role of accounting standards in the HBOS collapse, the Telegraph
recounts.

He declared an interest but did not excuse himself from the
meeting, the Telegraph notes.

"In Pirc's opinion, both the presence of Mr. Griffith-Jones at
the meeting and the scope agreed at the meeting raise more
questions," the Telegraph quotes Mr. MacDougall as saying in a
letter to the Financial Times.

"It cannot be right that the chairman of the new FCA has any link
with the second largest UK banking collapse in history.  He
should at least step down until the performance of KPMG in the
audit of HBOS, and accounting standard setting, has been properly
and independently investigated."

                            Knighthood

Alistair Osborne at The Telegraph reports that Sir James Crosby,
the former HBOS chief executive, is dramatically giving up his
knighthood and almost a third of his GBP580,000-a-year pension
after being severely criticized by a report into the downfall of
the bank.

Breaking his silence after the April 5 damning account from the
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Sir James, as
cited by the Telegraph, said he was "deeply sorry for what
happened at HBOS and the ensuing consequences for former
colleagues, shareholders, taxpayers and society in general".
According to the Telegraph, he acknowledged that the report,
which painted him as the "architect of the strategy that set the
course for disaster" had "made for very chastening reading".

The commission, chaired by Tory MP Andrew Tyrie, found a
"colossal failure of senior management" and called for Mr. Crosby
and two other former HBOS directors -- his successor Andy Hornby
and chairman Lord Stevenson -- to be banned for life from the
financial services industry, the Telegraph discloses.

According to the Telegraph, Sir James, who stepped down from HBOS
in 2006, said: "Shortly after I left HBOS, I received the
enormous honor of a knighthood in recognition of my own -- and
many other people's -- contribution to the creation of a company
which was then widely regarded as a great success.

"In view of what has happened subsequently to HBOS, I believe
that it is right that I should now ask the appropriate
authorities to take the necessary steps for its removal."

HBOS was rescued by Lloyds Banking Group at the height of the
financial crisis in 2008 but still required a GBP30 billion
taxpayer bail-out, the Telegraph recounts.  Mr. Crosby, the
Telegraph says, was lambasted by the commission for putting in
place a "culture of perilously high-risk lending", where shoddy
risk controls produced an "accident waiting to happen".

Mr. Crosby said he would also give up 30% of his "substantial
pension entitlement", though the cut will still leave him with an
index-linked GBP406,000 this year that will rise with inflation,
the Telegraph notes.

                             Pension

According to the Financial Times' Elizabeth Rigby, Daniel Schafer
and Hannah Kuchler, conservative and Labor MPs are pushing for
the former chief executive of HBOS to give up some of his GBP20
million pension pot, after a parliamentary report accused him and
two other former directors of presiding over a "colossal
failure".

Vince Cable, the Liberal Democrat business secretary, also said
the pension may be under scrutiny, an adviser said on April 7, as
he pressed for three of the former top directors to be banned
from serving on company boards, the FT relates.

John Mann, a Labor member of the Treasury select committee,
Brooks Newmark, a Tory member of the committee, and Lord
Oakeshott, a Liberal Democrat peer, all called for Mr. Crosby to
sacrifice some of his pension, the FT discloses.

There have already been calls for Mr. Crosby to be stripped of
his title -- as the former chief executive of RBS Fred Goodwin
was last year -- and for the three former board members to be
banned from serving as company directors, the FT notes.

"Morally, given that he screwed up and following the opprobrium
that has been directed at him, he shouldn't be entitled to it,"
Mr Newmark told The Times on April 8.

Lord Oakeshott, as cited by the FT, said if HBOS had been allowed
to fail, Mr. Crosby would only receive GBP30,000 a year under
insolvency rules, rather than the GBP700,000 a year he gets now.

Mr. Crosby received an annual pension entitlement of GBP572,000
when he left HBOS seven years ago, the FT discloses.  Taking into
account the ceased lender's rules on how to adjust its executive
pensions for inflation, this is likely to have risen to at least
GBP684,000 by the end of 2012, the FT notes.

                                Ban

Mr. Cable, the FT says, is pushing for the three former directors
of HBOS to be banned from serving as company directors in any
sector, as he looks to exact punishment on the collapsed bank's
management team.

The UK business secretary has ordered officials to investigate
whether there is enough evidence to begin disqualification
proceedings against Messrs. Crosby, Stevenson and Hornby for
their role in the bank's collapse in 2008, the FT discloses.

The business secretary issued the order on April 5 after the
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards suggested the three
executives who were presiding should not be allowed to run a
financial company in the future, the FT recounts.  However,
Mr. Cable wants to go one step further and stop them from serving
on any boards, regardless of the sector, the FT states.

HBOS plc is a banking and insurance company in the United
Kingdom, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group
having been taken over in January 2009.  It is the holding
company for Bank of Scotland plc, which operates the Bank of
Scotland and Halifax brands in the UK, as well as HBOS Australia
and HBOS Insurance & Investment Group Limited, the group's
insurance division.  The group became part of Lloyds Banking
Group through a takeover by Lloyds TSB January 19, 2009.


TRAVELPORT LLC: Moody's Rates US$630MM 2nd Lien Term Loan Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors service assigned a Caa2 rating to the proposed
US$630 million second-lien term loan (tranche 1) to be issued by
Travelport LLC as part of its comprehensive debt restructuring
announced on March 12.

Moody's has also assigned a Caa2 rating to Travelport's US$225
million of second-lien debt (tranche 2); a Caa2 rating to
Travelport's new senior unsecured notes ("the extended notes")
maturing March 1, 2016; and a Caa3 rating to the US$25 million
tap issuance under the group's subordinated notes. Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed Travelport's Caa1 corporate family rating
and Caa1-PD probability of default rating. The outlook on all
ratings is negative.

On March 27, Travelport announced it had met the minimum
conditions set with respect for the exchange offer and consent
solicitations for the various holders of debt classes affected by
the restructuring. Should the company not obtain 100% consent for
its exchange offering concerning its (1) existing 2014 and 2016
senior unsecured notes ("the existing notes") and (2) the
existing second-lien facility maturing December 2016, Moody's
would expect to withdraw the current Caa2 ratings on these
existing debt instruments.

Ratings Rationale:

Assignment of Caa2 to Proposed Second Lien:

The Caa2 rating assigned to tranches 1 and 2 of Travelport's
second-lien debt reflects their ranking in Travelport's revised
capital structure. The two tranches rank pari-passu with each
other and have security on the same collateral as the first-lien
obligations, but rank behind them in the waterfall. Moody's
understands guarantors to represent at least 95% of EBITDA.

Assignment of Caa2 to Proposed Unsecured Notes

The Caa2 rating assigned to the extended notes -- in line with
the current Caa2 rating on the existing notes -- mainly reflects
their contractual subordination to the first- and second-lien
debt instruments ranking ahead of them in the waterfall. The
extended notes will be guaranteed by subsidiaries representing
virtually all of Travelport's EBITDA for financial year (FY) 2012
(to December 31).

However, Moody's notes that when compared with the existing notes
under the current capital structure, the extended notes will have
a higher LGD rate in view of the incremental amount of secured
debt ranking ahead of it. Should the amount of priority debt
relative to the extended notes increase in the future, this may
at some point induce a two-notch rating differential relative to
the CFR.

Affirmation of the Caa1 CFR and Caa1-PD PDR:

The affirmation of Travelport's Caa1 CFR is driven by (1) the
net-debt-neutral nature of the transaction at the operating
company (with the exception of the incremental US$25 million of
subordinated notes); (2) an improvement in Travelport's liquidity
profile, as the refinancing will leave the group with no
significant maturing debt until the second half of 2015; and (3)
the removal of event risk for the company, as the litigation with
its bondholders following the 2011 refinancing is settled.

While Moody's notes that the approximately US$480 million of
payment-in-kind (PIK) notes at Travelport Holdings sit outside of
the restricted group and therefore are not included in the
consolidated accounts of Travelport LLC, the rating agency
considers the equitizing of these notes to be a positive in that
it removes any type of refinancing risk related to them. As part
of the equitation of the PIK notes, the current owner of
Travelport will see its ownership in Travelport Worldwide reduced
such that it will no longer have majority control. Moody's
understands that this will not trigger any change-of-control
clauses in the company's existing legal documentation.

Following the refinancing, Moody's expects Travelport's liquidity
profile to be adequate. While the rating agency notes positively
that Travelport's near-term refinancing risk is significantly
reduced, it expects headroom under the company's financial
covenants to remain limited. Moreover, as a consequence of the
refinancing, Travelport will see its annual interest expenses
increase, which will negatively affect its free cash flow
generation.

Negative Outlook:

The maintenance of the negative outlook essentially reflects
Travelport's continued high leverage, measured as adjusted
debt/EBITDA. Moody's acknowledges that Travelport's operating
performance is likely to improve in 2013 as (1) from Q2 2013, the
group will no longer face the headwind from the loss of its
master services agreement with United Airlines, which had a
negative impact on Travelport of approximately US$50 million in
FY2012; and (2) litigation expenses -- which negatively affected
the group's EBITDA by US$53 million in 2012 -- are likely to
abate following Travelport's settlement with American Airlines on
13 March and noteholders' waiving of claims related to the
litigation that arose following Travelport's refinancing during
the autumn of 2011. However, stabilization of the outlook would
require Travelport to show throughout 2013 that its capital
structure is sustainable by achieving a reduction in its leverage
towards 7.0x debt/EBITDA over time.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Given Travelport's high leverage, any positive rating pressure is
unlikely in the short term. However, Moody's could stabilize the
ratings if the group succeeds in implementing the deleveraging
trend.

Conversely, negative pressure would likely be exerted on the
rating if there were no improvement in Travelport's earnings in
2013. Finally, negative pressure could also result if
Travelport's near-term liquidity were to become constrained.
Given the group's lack of near-term debt maturities, constrained
liquidity would likely result from a lack of covenant headroom on
the company's loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Travelport LLC was the
Global Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology,
published in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA, published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Travelport is a leading
provider of transaction processing services to the travel
industry through its global distribution system (GDS) business,
which includes the group's airline information technology
solutions business. During FY2012, the group reported revenues
and adjusted EBITDA of US$2.0 billion and US$455 million,
respectively.


* UK: Fitch Places State-Guaranteed Bank Debt on RWN
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the state-guaranteed debt programs
and/or state-guaranteed debt issued by Barclays Bank plc
(Barclays), Abbey National Treasury Services plc (ANTS), Lloyds
TSB Bank plc, Northern Rock (Asset Management) (NRAM) and
Bradford & Bingley (B&B) on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The
rating actions follow the RWN placed on the UK sovereign Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) on March 22, 2013.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings of Barclays', Lloyds TSB's, and ANTS's guaranteed
programs and/or issues made under the program reflect the
guarantee of the UK government under the National Loan Guarantee
Scheme (NLGS). Although ANTS has an NLGS program outstanding, it
has not issued any notes under it.

NRAM and B&B's senior unsecured debt is guaranteed by the UK
government until maturity under public law and Fitch views the
default risk of these securities to be materially the same as the
UK sovereign risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SENIOR UNSECURED GUARANTEED DEBT AND
GUARANTEED PROGRAMME RATINGS

The banks' senior unsecured guaranteed debt is sensitive to any
change in the UK sovereign rating. In the case of the NLGS Fitch
believes that timely payment will be made on any guaranteed
liabilities because of the high strategic importance of this
scheme to the UK government as it is intended to facilitate
access to cheaper financing for small businesses. In the case of
NRAM and B&B, the rating is also sensitive to any material
changes to the conditions of the guarantee granted by the UK
government to these banks' senior debt.

The following is a list of issues affected by this rating action.

Abbey National Treasury Services
GBP1bn guaranteed program: 'AAA' placed on RWN

Barclays Bank plc
GBP1.5bn notes issued with NLGS guarantee, XS0768454844: 'AAA'
placed on RWN

Lloyds TSB Bank plc
GBP6bn guaranteed program: 'AAA' placed on RWN
GBP1.4bn senior long-term notes issued with NLGS guarantee,
XS0778434000: 'AAA' placed on RWN

Northern Rock (Asset Management)
Senior long-term guaranteed notes, XS0209776714; XS0254697807;
XS0203310973; XS0215699686; XS0204375371; XS0101368818;
XS0297756214; XS0307941764; XS0220474695,: 'AAA' placed on RWN

Bradford & Bingley
Senior long-term guaranteed notes, XS0210889605; XS0201827929;
XS0318465795: 'AAA' placed on RWN



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 8 to April 12, 2013
------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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