/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130422.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, April 22, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 78
Headlines
B E L G I U M
ALFACAM GROUP: Declared Bankrupt by Antwerp Court
F R A N C E
HOLDING BERCY: S&P Gives BB- Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
SPANGHERO: Court Orders Liquidation; Buyer Sought
G E R M A N Y
SOLARWORLD AG: Debt-to-Equity Swap Among Rescue Options
TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
G R E E C E
* GREECE: Moody's Says Outlook Remains Neg. for Banking System
I R E L A N D
EIRCOM GROUP: Examinership Process Cost EUR63 Million
FOLEY'S BAR: High Court Confirms Examiner
VELTI PLC: Baker Tilly Raises Going Concern Doubt
I T A L Y
WIND ACQUISITION: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR500MM Debt
WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates New Floating Notes 'BB(EXP)'
WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Corp. Family Rating
K A Z A K H S T A N
KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Subordinated LPNs
N E T H E R L A N D S
GRESHAM CAPITAL I: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
REFRESCO GROUP: Merger Triggers Moody's Review of 'B2' Ratings
WILLY SELTEN: Court Rejects Bid to Quash Meat Recall Order
* NETHERLANDS: Major Banks' Profitability to Remain Subdued
P O L A N D
PBG SA: To Present Debt Restructuring Proposals by End of June
R U S S I A
AEROFLOT JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to RUB5-Bil. Notes
ATF BANK: Fitch Affirms 'b-' Viability Rating
BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Affirms Rating on Old Style Sub Debt Issues
S L O V E N I A
* SLOVENIA: IMF Head Christine Lagarde Dismisses Bailout Rumors
* SLOVENIA: Adopts Amendments to Company Insolvency Proceedings
S P A I N
BBVA CONSUMO: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating to Series B Notes
CAIXA PENEDES: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
GC FTPYME 5: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
NCG BANCO: Fitch Maintains 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
PESCANOVA SA: Stock Market Regulator May Replace Chairman
TDA EMPRESAS 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to 'B1'
T U R K E Y
TURK EKONOMI: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating From 'bb+'
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
BREWHOUSE THEATRE: No Recovery for Creditors After Administration
HEALTHCARE SUPPORT: S&P Lowers Rating on Sr. Secured Debt to BB+
MERCHANT HOUSE: Follows Unit Into Administration
SCOTTISH COAL: In Administration, Cuts 590 Jobs
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 15 to April 19, 2013
*********
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B E L G I U M
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ALFACAM GROUP: Declared Bankrupt by Antwerp Court
-------------------------------------------------
Andrew Clapham at Bloomberg News, citing De Standaard, reports
that Alfacam was officially declared bankrupt by a commercial
court in Antwerp, Belgium.
According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said that the court
appointed three trustees to handle the firm's bankruptcy.
Alfacam said last week it would ask court to end creditor
protection after banks withdrew support, Bloomberg recounts.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 15,
2013, Reuters related that Alfacam was granted creditor
protection in October and has been seeking investors since then.
Talks with creditors and investors failed, Reuters noted. The
Belgian market regulator suspended its shares on April 11, and
the company said they would remain suspended until further
notice, Reuters disclosed. Alfacam struggled to make enough
money from its broadcast vans to cover its debts, and earlier
this month, its lenders cancelled its credit lines, Reuters
recounted.
Alfacam Group is a Belgium-based the provider of Europe's largest
fleet of outside broadcast vans. The company also provides
broadcast services and TV studios.
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F R A N C E
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HOLDING BERCY: S&P Gives BB- Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating to France-based food
services provider Holding Bercy Investissement S.C.A. (HBI). The
outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the
proposed EUR300 million senior secured notes due in 2020 to be
issued by special-purpose vehicle (SPV) Elior Finance & Co.
S.C.A. (Elior Finance).
S&P also assigned its 'BB-' issue ratings to the facility H1 loan
that Elior Finance will extend to HBI, and to the group's other
senior secured facilities. The recovery rating on the loan and
senior secured facilities is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
The ratings are based on preliminary information and are subject
to S&P's satisfactory review of final documentation. In the
event of any changes to the amount and terms of the facilities,
the issue and recovery ratings might be subject to further
review.
The ratings on HBI reflect S&P's view of the group's "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile and "satisfactory" business
risk profile.
Although HBI's financial risk profile is at the upper end of the
"highly leveraged" category, it is constrained by S&P's estimate
of HBI's Standard & Poor's-adjusted total debt of nearly
EUR2.4 billion on Dec. 31, 2013, and its view of the group's
financial policy as aggressive. This amount of total debt
comprises S&P's estimate of gross debt of more than
EUR2.1 billion, operating lease adjustments of EUR200 million,
and an adjustment of nearly EUR100 million for post-retirement
benefit obligations. S&P forecasts that funds from operations
(FFO) will be nearly EUR310 million on Dec. 31, 2013, leading to
adjusted FFO to debt of 13%. At the same time, S&P anticipates
that debt to EBITDA will be about 5.5x.
The ratings are supported by significant free operating cash flow
generation, which S&P forecasts will be nearly EUR75 million in
2013 and more than EUR110 million in 2014, and which S&P believes
HBI can use for deleveraging.
HBI's business risk profile reflects the group's key business
strengths, including:
-- Supportive industry trends of increasing outsourcing for
both the contract catering and concession segments;
-- Leading positions in the markets HBI operates in;
-- Sustainable and predictable cash flow generation due to
medium- and long-term contracts;
-- Contract clauses allowing HBI to preserve profitability;
-- A diverse customer base with elevated retention rates;
-- Limited capital outlays; and
-- A relatively flexible cost structure.
These strengths, however, are offset by:
-- A more limited scale than global players, which can reduce
the group's ability to bid on global tenders;
-- A concentration on western European markets, where S&P do
not anticipate economic recovery before 2014;
-- Exposure to changes in employment regulation in France; and
-- Exposure to wage inflation.
In S&P's view, HBI's operating performance will improve steadily
in line with management's forecast, and its credit metrics
strengthen. S&P considers a ratio of adjusted FFO to debt of
more than 12% to be commensurate with the 'BB-' rating. S&P
views a steady increase in revenues, cash flows, and deleveraging
as supportive of the rating.
Sustained deleveraging, improvements in EBITDA and cash flow
generation, as well as stronger credit metrics than S&P currently
anticipates could lead to upward rating pressure. Additionally,
rating upside depends on an absence of one-off events such as
changes to French labor or tax regulations with negative
implications for HBI, or more aggressive acquisition spending.
Specifically, sustained adjusted FFO to debt of more than 20% and
adjusted debt to EBITDA of less than 4x, alongside a less
aggressive financial policy, could provide a basis for rating
upside.
Downward pressure on the rating could arise from more limited
deleveraging than S&P currently anticipates, lower margins, a
reduction in cash flow generation, or tightening liquidity.
Additionally, debt-financed acquisitions, shareholder
distributions, and adjusted FFO to debt of less than 12% could
lead to a lower rating. A potential sale of the business that
results in increased leverage could also lead to rating downside.
SPANGHERO: Court Orders Liquidation; Buyer Sought
-------------------------------------------------
Jim Silver at Bloomberg News, citing Figaro, reports that
Spanghero, which French authorities said shipped horse meat
labeled as beef, is given court order of liquidation.
Bloomberg relates that Figaro said the court allows Spanghero to
continue operating for three months while seeking a buyer.
According to Bloomberg, Chairman Barthelemy Aguerre, as cited by
Figaro, Spanghero was a victim of fraud by Dutch meat supplier
and hasty fraud accusation by French authorities, leading to loss
of clients.
Spanghero is a meat processing and wholesale company based in
Castelnaudary, France.
Spanghero filed protection from creditors on February 27, 2013.
The company filed an outline survival plan with a commercial
court in the nearby city of Carcassone. It stopped the wholesale
trade of frozen meat after the agriculture ministry upheld a ban
on it stocking frozen meat following a probe.
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G E R M A N Y
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SOLARWORLD AG: Debt-to-Equity Swap Among Rescue Options
-------------------------------------------------------
Hendrik Varnholt and Eyk Henning at The Wall Street Journal
report that Solarworld AG is working on a plan in which current
creditors will take over the company almost entirely in a debt-
to-equity swap backed by a Qatari investor.
According to the Journal, three people familiar with the
negotiations said Friday that under the plan, the company's
shareholders will likely end up with a less than 5% stake in
Solarworld, while creditors will take the majority, roll parts of
their debt into longer dated maturities and/or forego on parts of
their claims in a so called "haircut". The Journal notes that
one of sources said an agreement could be reached by mid-May.
Two of the people said that in one of the scenarios discussed,
creditors would be paid out around 7% in cash over the next two
years and would prolong the maturity of around one third of the
debt outstanding, adding that the remainder would be swapped into
equity, the Journal notes.
The people, as cited by the Journal, said it also foresees that a
Qatari investor, which backs a silicon joint venture between The
Qatar Foundation and Solarworld, will provide either fresh equity
or guarantees for the part of the debt to be prolonged.
According to the Journal, an institutional bondholder said that
up to EUR200 million would be needed to secure the prolonged
debt, adding that Solarworld's creditors mandated Macquarie Group
to help with the restructuring.
Viable Future
Brian Parkin at Bloomberg News reports that Solarworld CEO Frank
Asbeck said talks with creditors show they believe the company
"deserves and is capable" of surviving into the future as a solar
research and production company.
Mr. Asbeck said in a telephone interview on Friday that Germany
must continue as a leader of solar research and technology,
Bloomberg relates. He said that its industry has a viable future
once "unfair" solar panel price dumping has been curbed,
Bloomberg notes.
According to Bloomberg, Mr. Asbeck said that Solarworld "fights
day in, day out for the preservation of Germany's position as
leader in solar technology and for the preservation of 3,000
jobs". He said that Solarworld is in initial talks with Bosch
Solar on parts of company, Bloomberg discloes. Solarworld wants
Bosch's know-how to stay in Germany, Bloomberg states.
Estimated Loss
Arno Schuetze, Alexander Huebner and Anneli Palmen at Reuters
report that SolarWorld, laden with EUR900 million (US$1.2
billion) in liabilities, is struggling with weak demand, industry
overcapacity and falling government subsidies. The company, once
Germany's biggest solar group, said on April 17 that its
estimated 2012 loss amounted to half of its nominal share capital
and its equity capital was negative at about EUR20 million to
EUR50 million, Reuters relates. The company, as cited by
Reuters, said on April 17 that plunging solar module prices and
asset writedowns led to a 2012 loss of 520 million to EUR550
million, adding an ongoing audit of its books may "significantly
modify" this estimate.
SolarWorld has long campaigned for steps against alleged price
dumping in the solar industry and led European solar panel
manufacturers to take respective steps in the United States and
Europe, blaming Chinese peers of receiving state subsidies to
flood the EU with panels sold below cost and putting Europeans
out of business to corner the market, Reuters notes.
SolarWorld AG is Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.
TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC's class A, B, C, and D notes.
At the same time, S&P has removed its ratings on the class A, B,
and C notes from CreditWatch negative.
On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on the class A, B, and C
notes on CreditWatch negative following an update to its criteria
for rating European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions see.
The rating actions follow S&P's review of the credit quality of
the transaction's five remaining loans, applying its updated CMBS
criteria.
THE BEWAG BERLIN LOAN (44.4% OF THE POOL)
The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of
EUR119.7 million (80% of the whole loan). There is additional
debt of EUR29.2 million, which does not form part of this
transaction.
The loan matures on April 18, 2013, and breached its loan-to-
value (LTV) covenant in March 2011. It is therefore trapping
cash.
The Bewag Berlin loan, which is the largest in the transaction,
is secured by a single purpose-built office property situated in
the Trepstow district of Berlin. The property serves as the
headquarters to Vattenfall and is let in its entirety until
October 2017 (4.75 years unexpired).
In January 2013, the servicer reported a securitized LTV of 101%,
based on an August 2010 valuation, and a securitized interest
coverage ratio of 1.87x.
The securitized loan is unlikely to repay in full in our base-
case scenario.
THE HANSE CENTRE LOAN (18.5% OF THE POOL)
The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR49.8
million (81% of the whole loan). There is additional debt of
EUR12 million, which does not form part of this transaction.
The Hanse Centre loan was due to mature on Jan. 18, 2013.
However, the servicer has agreed with the borrower to enter into
an extension agreement with a revised maturity date of April 18,
2013, in order to achieve a sale, and repay the outstanding
amounts under the loan.
This loan is secured by the Hanse Centre, which is a retail
warehouse complex of 61,214 square meters and located in a suburb
of Rostock, north east Germany. The property is 99.3% occupied
and anchored by Kaufland-Centre GmbH. The remaining tenancy
profile comprises predominantly national retailers and has a
weighted-average unexpired lease term of 5.3 years.
In January 2013, the servicer reported a securitized LTV of 69%,
based on a September 2010 valuation, and a securitized interest
coverage ratio of 2.87x.
The securitized loan is unlikely to repay in full in our base-
case scenario.
THE WALZMUHLE LOAN (16.7% OF THE POOL)
The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of
EUR44.98 million (84% of the whole loan). There is additional
debt of EUR8.82 million, which does not form part of this
transaction.
The borrower has failed to repay the loan by the loan maturity
date of Jan. 18, 2013, and the repayment event of default remains
outstanding. Consequently, the loan has been transferred to
special servicing.
The loan is secured by a mixed-use property close to the center
of Ludwigshafen in south-west Germany. The property is leased to
a total of 18 tenants, with the shopping center and office
accommodation accounting for 91% and 9% of the income,
respectively. The property is 97.5% occupied and has a weighted-
average unexpired lease term of 5.9 years.
The largest tenant by income (79%) is METRO Group Asset
Management Service GmbH (parent company METRO AG), which is a
leading Germany-based diversified retailer and has a lease until
2019.
In January 2013, the servicer reported a securitized LTV of 61%,
based on a November 2005 valuation and a securitized interest
coverage ratio of 2.33x. The special servicer has since obtained
an updated valuation in respect of the property. The market
value of the property as of February 2013 is EUR45.61 million and
would reflect a securitized LTV of 99%.
The securitized loan is unlikely to repay in full in S&P's base-
case scenario.
THE BREMEN LOAN (16.3% OF THE POOL)
The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR44.1
million (76% of the whole loan). There is additional debt of
EUR13.7 million, which does not form part of this transaction.
The loan failed to repay on the scheduled loan maturity date in
October 2010 and was transferred to special servicing in November
2010. Subsequently, the borrower was forced to file for
bankruptcy.
The loan is secured by a shopping center located in Vegesack, a
suburb north west of Bremen. The property is let to
approximately 75 tenants, with the main anchor tenant being
EDEKA, which is responsible for 25% of rental income and has a
lease term until 2023. The entire property is 87% occupied, with
a weighted-average unexpired lease term of 4.25 years.
In January 2013, the servicer reported a securitized LTV of 109%,
based on an October 2012 valuation, and a securitized interest
coverage ratio of 2.78x.
The securitized loan is unlikely to repay in full in S&P's base-
case scenario.
THE RUHR LOAN (4.1% OF THE POOL)
The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR11.3
million (80% of the whole loan). There is additional debt of
EUR2.8 million, which does not form part of this transaction.
The borrower failed to repay the loan when it matured on Jan. 18,
2011. The loan was transferred to special servicing on the same
date.
The loan is secured by a total of ten properties distributed
throughout Germany, comprising either office or industrial
accommodation.
In January 2013, the servicer reported a securitized LTV of 63%,
based on an October 2012 valuation, and a securitized interest
coverage ratio of 1.65x.
The securitized loan is unlikely to repay in full in S&P's base-
case scenario.
RATING ACTIONS
S&P's ratings on Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1's notes address the
timely payment of interest and the repayment of principal no
later than the legal maturity date in April 2015.
Following S&P's review and the application of its updated
European CMBS criteria, its analysis indicates that the level of
available credit enhancement on the class A, B, C, and D notes is
not sufficient to absorb the amount of losses that the underlying
properties would suffer under their currently assigned rating
levels. Therefore, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class A,
B, C, and D notes and removed from CreditWatch negative its
ratings on the class A, B, and C notes.
Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 is a true sale transaction that
closed in July 2006 and was initially backed by a pool of nine
loans secured against 35 commercial properties and 2,400
residential units in Germany. Four of the loans have prepaid in
full since closing. The five outstanding loans are secured by a
total of 14 commercial properties. The outstanding note balance
has reduced to EUR270 million from EUR571.3 million at closing.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC
EUR571.25 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A B+ (sf) A (sf)/Watch Neg
B B- (sf) BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C CCC (sf) BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Rating Lowered
D CCC- (sf) B (sf)
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G R E E C E
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* GREECE: Moody's Says Outlook Remains Neg. for Banking System
--------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Greece's banking system remains negative,
unchanged since 2010, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
report entitled "Banking System Outlook: Greece".
The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that the stressed
operating environment, characterized by deep and prolonged
economic contraction, combined with still-high Greek sovereign
exposures, will continue to erode banks' asset quality, capital,
profitability and funding.
Moody's says that the deep and prolonged economic contraction
will further increase already very high levels of non-performing
loans (NPLs), exerting additional pressure on the stressed
banking system. Declining domestic purchasing power and
liquidity, compounded by the impact of government spending cuts
and increasing unemployment, will continue to weaken the
repayment capacity of banks' retail and corporate customers.
Within this context, Moody's expects that (1) NPLs will likely
exceed 30% of gross loans by end-2013 (from 24.6% in December
2012); and (2) the banks will remain loss-making in 2013 and in
2014.
Further downside risks stem from the banks' sizable portfolios of
Greek Government securities. Although the banks have reduced
these holdings to around EUR18.5 billion in December 2012 from
EUR44.9 billion in December 2011, Greek Government securities
still comprise approximately 87% of the banking system's pro-
forma Tier 1 capital. Greece's government bond rating of C
indicates that the probability of a Greek sovereign re-default
remains elevated, which could imply further substantial losses
for the banks.
Moody's also notes that despite the sector's recent EUR40 billion
recapitalization by the state-owned Hellenic Financial Stability
Fund (HFSF), which raised the banking system's pro-forma Tier 1
capital ratio to 9.5% as of December 2012, the rating agency's
scenario analysis indicates that additional capital could be
required. Moody's "central" scenario, which assumes continued
economic contraction, estimates EUR8 billion of further capital
needs stemming from the banks' loan book losses alone.
Greek banks' funding and liquidity profiles will remain weak, as
they still lack access to market funding and remain heavily
dependent on central bank funding. Despite some deposit inflows
since June 2012, outstanding private-sector deposits are down 31%
from their December 2009 peak. Moody's believes that in the wake
of developments in Cyprus, depositors' confidence will remain
highly vulnerable to any negative political or economic
developments.
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I R E L A N D
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EIRCOM GROUP: Examinership Process Cost EUR63 Million
-----------------------------------------------------
John Mulligan at Independent.ie reports that firms from New
York's Wall Street to London's Silk Street split EUR63 million in
fees for advising Eircom as the Irish company navigated through
Ireland's biggest-ever examinership process.
According to Independent.ie, newly filed accounts show that the
company paid advisors EUR10 million in the financial year to the
end of June 2011 and a further EUR53 million the following fiscal
year as it struggled to survive.
Eircom entered examinership early last year as it sought to
restructure a crippling EUR4 billion debt pile, Independent.ie
recounts.
It emerged from the process in June last year having reached
agreements with lenders that saw its debt mountain reduced to
EUR2.3 billion, Independent.ie notes. The examinership process
was led by Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton, Independent.ie
discloses. The advisors to Eircom and lenders included six law
firms, five Wall Street investment banks, and three of the
world's top five accountancy practices, Independent.ie says.
Among the firms that advised Eircom were JP Morgan, London-based
Gleacher Shacklock and law firm Linklaters, according to
Independent.ie.
According to Independent.ie, Eircom noted in its accounts that,
"As part of the overall financial restructuring, Eircom was party
to various agreements entered into with professional advisors
which provided for the payment of fees upon the successful
restructuring of the group's debt and other fees for services
provided prior to the completion of any restructuring
transaction."
Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent. It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.
FOLEY'S BAR: High Court Confirms Examiner
-----------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at Independent.ie reports that the High Court has
confirmed an examiner to companies operating the family-run
Foley's bar and restaurant business, and the adjoining O'Reilly's
bar, on Dublin's Merrion Row.
Bank of Scotland, the companies' major creditor owed some EUR5
million, had opposed examinership, Independent.ie notes.
According to the report, the court had heard that a receiver
appointed by it, but later discharged by the court, had reached
an agreement for sale of the premises at an undisclosed price.
Among the factors taken by Ms. Justice Mary Finlay Geoghegan into
account in exercising her discretion to confirm an examiner was
evidence indicating the business has a reasonable prospect of
survival provided certain conditions are met, Independent.ie
discloses.
She also took into account the bank's failure to tell the
directors it had appointed a receiver to one of the companies on
the day of that appointment last month, Independent.ie relates.
In a judgment on April 17 considering all the evidence, law and
arguments, she confirmed examinership for the two companies
involved, The Belohn Ltd., the operating company, and Merrow
Ltd., the holding company, Independent.ie discloses.
She directed the examiner to prepare, within three weeks, a
report outlining a survival scheme and addressing certain matters
raised by the bank's receiver, Independent.ie says.
She said that a successful survival scheme would have to address
how to obtain significant funding from a new investor given BOS's
refusal to provide further finance, Independent.ie notes. The
scheme would have to include a payment for the bank consistent
with the value of its current security, Independent.ie states.
She noted that five expressions of interest in investing had been
received from persons in the trade outside the Foley family,
Independent.ie discloses.
Foley's bar and restaurant business employs about 20 people.
VELTI PLC: Baker Tilly Raises Going Concern Doubt
-------------------------------------------------
Velti plc filed on April 11, 2013, its annual report on Form 20-F
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.
Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
expressed substantial doubt about Velti's ability to continue as
a going concern. The independent auditors noted that the Company
has recurring operating losses, negative cash flows from
operations and requires additional working capital to support
future operations.
The Company reported a net loss of US$61.2 million on US$270.3
million of revenues in 2012, compared with a net loss of US$15.2
million on US$189.2 million of revenues in 2011.
The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012, showed
US$537.0 million in total assets, US$244.5 million in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of US$292.5 million.
A copy of the Form 20-F is available at http://is.gd/Nse5ni
Dublin, Ireland-based Velti plc (Nasdaq: VELT) is a global
provider of mobile marketing and advertising technology and
solutions that enable brands, advertising agencies, mobile
operators and media to implement highly targeted, interactive and
measurable campaigns by communicating with and engaging consumers
via their mobile devices.
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I T A L Y
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WIND ACQUISITION: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR500MM Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB-' issue rating to the proposed EUR500 million-equivalent
senior secured debt to be issued through a combination of fixed-
and floating-rate notes by Wind Acquisition Finance S.A. Wind
Acquisition Finance is a wholly owned subsidiary of Italian-based
telecoms operator WIND Telecomunicazioni SpA (Wind; B+/Stable/--
). S&P has assigned a recovery rating of '2' to the proposed
notes, indicating its expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery for creditors in the event of a payment default.
At the same time, S&P placed its 'B+' issue rating on the
existing senior unsecured debt issued by Wind Acquisition Finance
on CreditWatch with negative implications. The recovery rating
on the senior unsecured debt is '4', indicating S&P's expectation
of average (30%-50%) recovery for creditors in the event of a
payment default.
The issue and recovery ratings on the existing senior secured
debt issued by Wind and Wind Acquisition Finance remain unchanged
at 'BB-' and '2', respectively.
The CreditWatch negative placement on the senior unsecured debt
signals that on completion of the proposed issuance, S&P expects
to lower the issue rating on the existing senior unsecured debt
to 'B' and revise downward the recovery rating to '5'. This
reflects S&P's understanding that the proposed notes will rank in
line with the existing senior secured debt and that Wind will use
the proceeds of both proposed note issuances to effectively
replace the prepaid scheduled 2014 and 2015 term loan A
amortization. In S&P's view, the elimination of the amortizing
debt and its replacement with bullet debt facilities will
increase the amount of secured debt outstanding at default and
consequently reduce the recovery prospects for the existing
senior unsecured debt.
Offsetting the increased subordination of the senior unsecured
debt is S&P's view that there is limited headroom for any further
prior-ranking debt issuance due to covenant restrictions. S&P
also believes that the unsecured notes benefit from a cushion of
subordinated payment-in-kind (PIK) debt, which becomes cash-pay
debt in 2014.
Nonetheless, assuming successful issuance of the proposed secured
notes, S&P expects the recovery prospects for the unsecured notes
to be at the low end of the 10%-30% range, with limited headroom
for further increases in prior-ranking or pari passu-ranking
debt.
RECOVERY ANALYSIS
The proposed notes are secured and guaranteed obligations,
similar to the existing secured notes and bank facilities. The
senior secured notes and senior unsecured notes benefit from
typical high-yield terms, including incurrence covenants. In the
event of a default, the senior secured bank lenders control
enforcement, while the senior secured bank debt represents more
than 25% of the total senior secured liabilities, including the
senior secured notes.
S&P's simulated default scenario assumes that a payment default
would most likely result from a slowdown in Wind's mobile revenue
growth due to saturation in the telecoms market, pricing and
regulatory pressure in the broadband market, and significant
capital investment, which also affects costs and profitability.
Assuming successful issuance of the proposed debt, S&P has
revised its hypothetical point of default to 2017 from 2016, to
reflect the reduction in debt repayments due in prior years. S&P
assumes that EBITDA would have declined to EUR1.45 billion by the
time of default.
Assuming a valuation multiple of 5.0x leads to a stressed
enterprise value of about EUR7.3 billion. From this, S&P deducts
EUR0.5 billion of enforcement costs, leaving a net enterprise
value of EUR6.8 billion. Assuming EUR6.3 billion of senior
secured debt outstanding at default (taking into account the
proposed issuance), there is sufficient value for nominally full
recovery of principal, plus six months' of prepetition interest.
However, S&P caps the recovery rating on the secured debt at '2'
to reflect the company's exposure to what S&P views as a
relatively unfavorable insolvency regime for secured creditors in
Italy and potential delays to the realization of recoveries.
After repayment of the secured debt, there is about EUR500
million remaining for the senior unsecured debt totaling EUR2.8
billion. Therefore, assuming completion of the proposed issuance,
S&P expects the recovery prospects for the unsecured noteholders
to decline to the low end of the 10%-30% range, leading to a
recovery rating of '5'.
Consistent with the waterfall described above, there would only
be negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects for the subordinated
PIK debtholders. The '6' recovery rating on this PIK debt would
therefore remain unchanged if the company proceeds with the
proposed notes issuance.
RATINGS LIST
New Rating
Wind Acquisition Finance S.A.
Senior Secured (1) BB-
Recovery Rating 2
Ratings Affirmed
Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA
Senior Secured (1) BB-
Recovery Rating 2
Wind Acquisition Finance S.A.
Senior Secured (2) BB-
Recovery Rating 2
Wind Acquisition Holdings Finance S.A.
Subordinated B-
Recovery Rating 6
CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Wind Acquisition Finance S.A.
Senior Unsecured (3) B+/Watch Neg B+
Recovery Rating 4 4
(1) Guaranteed by Wind Acquisition Finance S.A.
(2) Guaranteed by Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA.
(3) Guaranteed by Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA and Wind
International Services SpA.
WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates New Floating Notes 'BB(EXP)'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Wind Acquisition Finance S.A.'s
proposed senior secured fixed and floating notes to be guaranteed
by Wind Telecomunicazioni Spa (WIND; BB-, Negative) an expected
'BB(EXP)' rating.
The new instruments are structured as senior secured obligations
of WIND and will rank on par with other senior secured
obligations of the company including its bank debt and 2018
senior secured notes. The proceeds will be lent by Wind
Acquisition Finance S.A. to WIND. Fitch understands that in
conjunction with this transaction, WIND is planning to pre-pay
2014 and 2015 maturities of its senior secured bank debt. As a
result, the company's debt maturity will lengthen while the
proportions of secured and unsecured debt in its capital
structure will not change.
Wind is planning to place EUR500m equivalent of new euro-
denominated floating rate senior secured notes due 2019 and new
USD-denominated fixed rate senior secured notes due 2020. The
security package and covenants are the same as for the
outstanding senior secured notes.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
- High Leverage
WIND's leverage is high, estimated at around 5x net debt
(including payments in kind(PIK))/EBITDA (as calculated by Fitch)
at end-2012. Fitch believes the company will be unable to quickly
de-lever to below this level. The Negative Outlook reflects that
it will be challenging for WIND to stabilize its operating and
financial performance on the back of bleak macroeconomic
prospects in Italy and even minor additional pressures can
compromise deleveraging efforts.
- Parental Support
WIND's ratings continue to benefit from potential support from
its sole ultimate shareholder, Vimpelcom Ltd., whose credit
profile remains stronger than WIND's. On a standalone basis,
WIND's credit profile corresponds to a 'B+' level, which is
uplifted by one notch for benign shareholder influence. However,
Fitch cautions that Vimpelcom has not committed itself to any
level of support. Fitch believes that a further rise in WIND's
leverage may diminish Vimpelcom's propensity for providing
support to WIND.
- Successful Challenger Operating Profile
WIND's credit profile is supported by its established position as
the facilities-based number-three mobile operator in Italy,
complemented by an expanding alternative fixed-line/broadband
business. WIND has been able to outperform both Telecom Italia
SpA ('BBB'/Negative) and Vodafone Group Plc ('A-'/Stable)
reporting stronger revenue dynamics and improving its market
share at the expense of these two operators.
- No Short-Term Refinancing Risks
Wind does not face any material refinancing risks before 2017
when the bulk of its debt maturities come due. The company
successfully placed a EUR500 million 2018 senior secured notes
tap issue in Q112, which helped it refinance EUR250 million of
2012 bank amortizing facilities and repay a EUR500 million bridge
spectrum facility (EUR250 million of which was fully repaid with
cash on the balance sheet in September 2012).
RATING SENSITIVITIES
A deterioration in leverage beyond 5.5x net debt(including PIK
debt)/EBITDA for a sustained period and/or pressures on
EBITDA/FCF generation driven by regulation, austerity and
competition may lead to a negative rating action.
Any evidence of tangible parental support such as equity
contribution or debt refinancing via intercompany loans may
trigger a positive rating action as would stabilization of
operating and financial performance following two rounds of MTR
cuts in 2012 and 2013.
WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Corp. Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigned a provisional (P)Ba3 rating to the proposed
euro-denominated senior secured floating rate notes due 2019 and
a provisional (P)Ba3 rating to the proposed US dollar-denominated
senior secured fixed rate notes due 2020. The combined issuance
is expected to amount to EUR500 million (equivalent) and both
notes will be issued by Wind Acquisition Finance SA (WAF).
Moody's has also affirmed the B1 corporate family rating and B1-
PD probability of default rating of Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA
("Wind"). The ratings on all outstanding instruments have also
been affirmed as follows: B3 on the 2017 senior notes, Ba3 on the
secured credit facilities and Ba3 on the senior secured 2018
notes. The outlook remains negative.
Ratings Rationale:
Wind's B1 CFR continues to reflect (1) the company's high
leverage of 4.8x adjusted debt/EBITDA at year-end 2012 (excluding
the Payment in Kind (PIK) notes issued at Wind Acquisition
Holdings Finance S.A.); (2) the limited prospects for
deleveraging over the medium term, given the company's weak free
cash flow/debt; (3) the uncertainty surrounding the company's
future performance, given Moody's expectation that the
macroeconomic outlook in Italy will continue to deteriorate in
the coming year; (4) the expected negative impact on Wind's
EBITDA of aggressive mobile termination rates (MTR) cuts that
have accelerated in Italy in 2012 and will continue in the first
half of 2013; and (5) the company's complex capital structure and
the lack of explicit potential support from its ultimate parent,
VimpelCom Ltd.
However, more positively, the rating also continues to reflect
Wind's (1) solid and growing share of the telecommunications
services market in Italy and its strong competitive positioning
vis-…-vis its main competitors, Telecom Italia (Baa2 negative)
and Vodafone (A3 stable); (2) diversified business model, with
the company being active in mobile, fixed-line voice and
broadband internet; and (3) stable performance in 2012 on the
back of successful campaigns to attract new subscribers and grow
its data revenues.
WAF will lend the funds to Wind. Prior to the issue of the new
notes WIND intends to refinance the whole of the Term Loan A 2014
maturities and most of the 2015 maturities, totaling EUR575
million. The proposed transaction is hence expected to be
leverage neutral and will enhance Wind's maturity profile as the
company's next substantial debt maturity will be in 2016, when
the remaining EUR340 million of its Term Loan A comes due.
The negative outlook continues to reflect Moody's expectation
that continued pressure on ARPUs together with increased
competition could erode the company's EBITDA margins. The outlook
also reflects the macro-economic conditions in which the company
is operating and expectations that the Italian economy, and with
it consumer spending, could contract in the coming year putting
pressure on the local telecommunications industry in general as
users look to reduce usage.
Moody's assesses Wind's liquidity as being adequate, supported by
the back-ended nature of the company's maturity profile. Moody's
however notes that Wind's free cash flow generation is weak
relative to the carried quantum of debt and that it is at risk of
being substantially diminished should subscriber acquisition
trends or the company's ability to maintain its margins show
signs of weakening. Wind's revolving credit facility of EUR400
million (of which EUR100 million is drawn) is, in Moody's
opinion, an important positive factor in Wind's liquidity
assessment and any signs of covenant headroom deterioration
which, in Moody's view, could affect Wind's access to this
liquidity could put negative pressure on the ratings.
The (P)Ba3 ratings on Wind's proposed new notes is in line with
the company's Ba3 ratings on its senior credit facilities and its
2018 senior secured notes which reflect their first priority
ranking security over certain of Wind's assets. The new notes are
expected to rank pari-passu with the senior secured notes and the
senior credit facilities.
The new notes will bear near-identical terms as the current 2018
senior secured notes, including an incurrence test at 5.0x
(debt/EBITDA) and secured debt incurrence test at 3.0x (net
debt/EBITDA).
The B3 rating on the 2017 senior notes reflects their effectively
unsecured position within Wind's capital structure, behind
approximately EUR6.1 billion of drawn secured debt.
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Subordinated LPNs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazkommertsbank's perpetual
subordinated loan participation notes (LPNs) at 'CCC'/'RR6'. The
rating action follows the affirmation of KKB's other ratings on
April 16, 2013.
In February 2013 Fitch upgraded KKB's Tier 2 subordinated debt
issues to 'B-' from 'CCC', but the ratings of the perpetual
subordinated notes were unaffected by this action.
Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities
According to Fitch's criteria, the agency maintains a two-notch
difference between KKB's Viability Rating (VR) of 'b' and the
rating of the notes due to their deep subordination and
possibility of coupon omissions. The rating of the notes is
expected to move in tandem with KKB's VR, so that the two-notch
difference is maintained.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
GRESHAM CAPITAL I: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions
on notes issued by Gresham Capital CLO I B.V:
EUR75M (current balance is EUR8.9M) Class A1 Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)
EUR48M Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
EUR16.5M Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3
(sf)
EUR18M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed
A3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)
EUR21.6M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)
EUR75M (current balance is EUR28.2M) Revolving Loan Facility
Agreement Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2009
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)
Gresham Capital CLO I B.V., issued in April 2006, is a multi-
currency Collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Investec Bank Plc. This transaction ended its
reinvestment period on March 23, 2012.
Ratings Rationale:
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the amortization of the Class A1 Notes,
which have been paid down by approximately 82%, or EUR42.49
million, since the last rating action in July 2011.
As a result of this deleveraging, the overcollateralization
ratios (or "OC ratios") have increased since the rating action in
July 2011. As of the latest trustee report dated March 13, 2013,
the Class A, B, C, D and E OC ratios are reported at 177.38%,
148.57%, 126.21%, 106.90 and 98.82% respectively, versus April
2011 levels of 147.66%, 132.64%, 119.39%, 106.61% and 100.85%
respectively.
In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR166.9 million, defaulted par of EUR3.8 million, a weighted
average default probability of 26.29% with a weighted average
life of 3.69 years, a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 45.20% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of
25 and a weighted average spread of 3.51% on the EUR assets and
3.83% on the GBP assets. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 87.7% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.
Moody's has also corrected an error in the calculation of WARF
for these notes. The WARF calculation used in the previous rating
action was derived as a weighted average of the default
probability of each asset's rating at its own remaining life,
rather than the weighted average of the rating factor of each
asset combined with the weighted average life of the pool as
called for in the methodology. The rating action reflects the
corrected WARF calculation.
In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:
(1) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing
and sovereign risks -- Approximately 50% of the portfolio are
European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2014
and 2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
Approximately 4% of the portfolio are exposed to obligors located
in Spain. Moody's considered a model run where the base case WARF
was increased to 4497 by forcing ratings on 25% of such exposure
to Ca. This run generated model outputs that were within one
notch from the base case results.
Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.
Sources of additional performance uncertainties:
1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.
2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.
3) Moody's also notes that 59% of the collateral pool consists of
debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors
bearing a credit estimate have been subject to stress applicable
to concentrated pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach
to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published
in October 2009.
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.
Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.
Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.
The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology, is Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model.
This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
On March 12, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes how
sovereign credit deterioration impacts structured finance
transactions and the rationale for introducing two new parameters
into its general analysis of such transactions. In the coming
months, Moody's will update its methodologies relating to multi-
country portfolios including the one for collateralized Loan
obligations (CLOs) as well as for other types of collateralized
debt obligations (CDO), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Once those
methodologies are updated and implemented, the rating of the
notes affected by these rating actions may be negatively
affected.
REFRESCO GROUP: Merger Triggers Moody's Review of 'B2' Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the B2 corporate family rating
and the B2-PD probability of default rating of Refresco Group
B.V. under review for downgrade following the company's recent
announcement of its intention to merge with Gerber Emig Group
Limited (Gerber Emig), subject to regulatory approval.
Concurrently, the rating agency has also placed the B2 rating of
Refresco's EUR660 million of senior secured notes due 2018 under
review for downgrade.
Ratings Rationale:
The transaction, which has been approved by the shareholders of
both Refresco and Gerber Emig, is anticipated to be funded
through the use of Refresco's super-senior revolving credit
facility and cash from both companies. Moody's expects its review
to conclude when the transaction is finalized, which Refresco
expects to be by the end of August 2013.
Moody's review will concentrate on two areas: (1) the dilutive
effect the transaction may have on Refresco's Moody's adjusted
revenue margins, EBITDA, free cash flow, and liquidity profile;
and (2) the structural considerations associated with an
anticipated increase of the company's super-senior revolving
credit facility (RCF).
Firstly, the rating agency will consider how a merger with Gerber
Emig ties in with Refresco's stated strategy of concentrating on
margin growth and/or margin stability during the ongoing
difficult European trading environment. For example, Refresco's
three-year average reported EBITDA margin fell at financial year
ending (FYE) December 31, 2012 to 7.7% from 8.8% at FYE 2011, and
9.8% at FYE 2010. Moody's understands that Gerber Emig's revenue
margins have likewise been in decline and are currently
substantially lower than Refresco's.
Secondly, Refresco's EUR 75 million committed and undrawn super-
senior RCF ranks ahead of the company's EUR660 million senior
secured notes due 2018. Following the transaction, the super-
senior RCF is expected to increase to EUR150 million. This
additional super-senior debt ranking ahead of the senior secured
notes may result in downwards notching of the notes.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global Soft
Beverage published in December 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Headquartered in the UK, Gerber Emig Group Limited is an unrated,
privately owned, European manufacturer and distributor of fruit
juices. For the financial year ended December 31, 2012, the
company's parent holding company, Pride Foods Limited, reported
consolidated revenues of GBP 650 million.
WILLY SELTEN: Court Rejects Bid to Quash Meat Recall Order
----------------------------------------------------------
PTI reports that a Dutch court on Thursday rejected a bid by
Willy Selten to quash an order recalling 50,000 tonnes of beef
potentially contaminated with horsemeat.
According to PTI, Judge Reinier van Zutphen said at the
commercial court in The Hague, "The court rejects the request for
a preliminary injunction" on Dutch food authority NVWA's recall
of meat handled by Willy Selten.
Businessman Selten, allegedly a key player in Europe's horsemeat
scandal, had sought to overturn the NVWA's order to recall all
meat sold by the company over the last two years, PTI relates.
The watchdog recalled 50,000 tonnes of beef suspected to have
been contaminated with horse, asking hundreds of companies
across Europe supplied by Selten to check their products, PTI
discloses.
Mr. Selten's company was declared bankrupt on April 16 and placed
under curatorship, PTI recounts. His lawyer, Frank Peters, said
Mr. Selten was disappointed after he informed him of the court's
decision by phone, PTI relates.
"He (Selten) is very disappointed that with the tumult, the
distress caused by the recall, there is no intervention by this
court," PTI quotes Mr. Peters as saying.
According to PTI, NVWA spokesman Brenno Bruggink said that it was
now up to other countries that bought meat from Selten to decide
whether they wanted to order national recalls. Mr. Bruggink, as
cited by PTI, said that around half the suspect meat was sold in
The Netherlands and half in the EU.
PTI relates Mr. Peters had argued on April 16 that the recall was
"disproportionate" and "bizarre and bordering on the mass
hysteria gripping the whole of Europe".
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 18,
2013, The Associated Press disclosed that a Dutch labor union
requested the bankruptcy on behalf of workers who had not been
paid since February and can only claim unemployment benefits once
their employer has been declared bankrupt.
Willy Selten is a Dutch meat wholesaler.
* NETHERLANDS: Major Banks' Profitability to Remain Subdued
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a new special report that the three major
Dutch banks' operating profitability is likely to remain subdued
in 2013, given the poor economic conditions that have prevailed
in the Netherlands since H212. Earnings reported for 2012 were in
line with the agency's expectations.
The operating performance reported in 2012 by Rabobank Group
(Rabobank, 'AA'/Negative/'aa'), ING Bank NV (ING Bank,
'A+'/Negative/'a') and ABN AMRO Bank NV (ABN AMRO,
'A+'/Negative/'bbb+') primarily reflects the low stage of the
economic cycle in the Netherlands, which caused elevated loan
impairment charges (LICs) at the three banks.
The banks' impaired loans increased in 2012, due to strains in
the domestic housing market but essentially because of stresses
in the cyclical SME and commercial real estate (CRE) segments.
However, the agency indicated in its special report, 'Major Dutch
Banks' Exposure to Real-Estate Lending' (dated 11 April 2013,
available at www.fitchratings.com) that the current deterioration
in the residential and CRE loan books of the major Dutch banks
are manageable, under Fitch's current assumptions. Impaired loans
remained at 2%-3% of gross loans, which is relatively modest by
international standards.
Dutch banks are structurally reliant on wholesale funding due to
the large proportion of households' savings placed outside the
banking system as well as the banks' large mortgage books. The
three banks have retained good access to the capital markets in
recent years and pre-funded part of their 2013 funding needs in
2012. Already solid to strong capital ratios improved during
2012, despite internal capital generation being only modest.
SNS REAAL was nationalized on February 1, 2013 because of its
inability to weather the stresses hitting the very large and
particularly weak CRE loan book in its banking subsidiary, SNS
Bank ('BBB+'/RWE/'f'), the fourth-largest Dutch bank, although
much smaller in size than the three major ones. The size and
nature of SNS Bank's CRE exposure clearly positions it as a
unique case among the large Dutch banks.
Fitch revised the Outlook on the Netherlands' 'AAA' rating from
Stable to Negative on 5 February 2013, due to the macro-economic
shocks the country has undergone. GDP contracted by 0.9% in 2012
in the Netherlands and unemployment has risen to a still moderate
5.8%. Fitch does not expect the economy to return to growth
before 2014 and unemployment is likely to continue to rise (Fitch
forecasts 6.7% for 2014). Fitch has not yet revised its main
macroeconomic forecasts for the Netherlands following last week's
announcement of postponed austerity measures by the Dutch
government.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
PBG SA: To Present Debt Restructuring Proposals by End of June
--------------------------------------------------------------
Polska Agencja Prasowa reports that Jacek Balcer, PBG SA's
corporate communications director, said the company intends to
present the final proposals for a debt restructuring deal by the
end of June in order to conclude the deal by the end of the year.
Amended assumptions to the restructuring plan will be presented
to creditors in May, the official, as cited by PAP, said adding
that changes were needed after power group PGE withdrew from
plans to build power blocks at Opole.
Mr. Balcer also said that in the coming weeks PBG will also
present the list of liabilities, PAP relates.
"Schedule of works further ahead will depend on whether PBG
builder to present debt restructuring proposals by end-June,
appeals to the list will be filed and in what number, as well as
how much time will need to be devoted to settling them," PAP
quotes Mr. Balcer as saying.
At the end of March, PBG's restructuring coordinator
Agenor Gawrzyal said that PBG should reach an agreement with its
creditors on debt restructuring term sheet by end-April, PAP
notes.
Negotiations with creditors entered an advanced phase in January
this year, PAP recounts.
PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder. PBG secured court
bankruptcy protection for debt restructuring proceedings in June
2012, after signing a stand-down agreement with its banking
creditors in May.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
AEROFLOT JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to RUB5-Bil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Aeroflot's ('BB-'/Stable) 8.3%
RUB5 billion notes due in 2016 a final local currency senior
unsecured rating of 'BB-' and a final National senior unsecured
rating of 'A+(rus)'.
Key Rating Drivers
- State Support
In accordance with Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage
methodology, Aeroflot's Long-term IDR continues to benefit from
parental support via a one-notch uplift to its standalone profile
assessed by Fitch at 'B+'. The agency views the strategic and
operational ties between the parent (Russian Federation;
'BBB'/Stable) and the company as relatively strong. This is
supported, among other things, by its majority state ownership
(51.2% direct stake in addition to a 9.5% indirect stake), import
duty exemptions for the purchase of certain types of aircraft and
the company's importance in the development of the country's air
transportation sector.
At the same time, Fitch acknowledges the potential negative
implications of state links, for example, a potential aggressive
consolidation and/or acquisition plans at the expense of
Aeroflot's credit profile, but highlights that the recent
acquisition of Rostechnologii, whilst proposed by the state, was
to some extent at Aeroflot's discretion and following its own due
diligence process.
- Downgrade Reflects High Leverage
The downgrade of Aeroflot on 21 March 2013 reflected Fitch's view
that the company's standalone credit metrics were no longer
commensurate with the 'BB' rating category. Although Fitch
forecasts improvement in the company's financial profile over
2013-2016, its leverage metrics remain high compared with its
'BB' rated peers.
Fitch forecasts Aeroflot's FFO adjusted leverage to have
decreased to below 6x in 2012 and expects gradual de-leveraging
to below 5x by 2016, despite the company's ambitious fleet
expansion and renewal program. While we acknowledge the benefits
of a newer, more efficient fleet, the funding of the capex
program will require additional debt burden putting pressure on
the company's financials. The agency anticipates FFO fixed charge
cover to increase to around 2x over the forecast period. Based on
these financial ratios, the company is well placed compared with
its 'B' rating category airline peers.
- Solid Profitability Expected
Despite some erosion of its profitability in 2011-2012 due to
high fuel prices and consolidation of the financially weaker
Rostechnologii assets, we expect Aeroflot's profitability to
remain solid compared with its European and some US counterparts.
While yield and passenger revenue per available seat-kilometer
are largely in line with those of its rivals, the company's cost
ratios (eg cost per available seat-kilometer) put it at an
advantage over other airlines, providing a good foundation for
maintaining sound margins.
- Solid Business Profile
Fitch views Aeroflot's standalone business profile as
commensurate with the 'BB' rating category. It is supported by
its dominant position as Russia's national flag carrier in a
highly fragmented market (37% of the Russian passenger traffic in
2012), relatively diversified route network, strong position at
the Sheremetjevo airport hub and ability to capitalize on the
strong growth potential of the domestic market. While the yields
on the domestic routes fall short of those on the European
destinations, Fitch anticipates their increase in the medium
term.
Fitch expects Aeroflot to continue dynamic growth given forecast
Russian GDP growth, increased mobility of Russian citizens and
the integration of the Rostechnologii airline stakes. The
consolidation of these assets has enabled Aeroflot to strengthen
its dominant position in Russia's airline sector and extend its
network and should underpin the implementation of the company's
multi-brand strategy in the medium term.
LIQUIDITY & DEBT STRUCTURE
- Adequate Liquidity
Fitch views Aeroflot's liquidity position as satisfactory, with
cash of US$597 million at end-9M12 and committed credit lines of
about US$500 million (Aeroflot excluding recently acquired
Rostechnologii assets) at end-2012 sufficient to cover its short-
term obligations. As at end-9M12, short-term debt stood at
US$784.6 million (including US$263.8 million of finance leases).
This included bonds totaling c.US$400 million due in April 2013.
The company placed RUB-denominated bonds for RUB5 billion (around
US$167 million), the proceeds of which are likely to be used for
refinancing purposes. Fitch expects the company to generate
negative free cash flow (after finance lease payments) over 2012-
2014.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:
- Evidence of stronger state support.
- Improvement of the financial profile (eg FFO adjusted leverage
trending towards 4.0x and FFO fixed charge cover above 2.0x on
a sustained basis) due to, among other things, material
increase in profitability, moderation of investments in the
fleet and/or drop in fuel prices.
Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:
- Further material deterioration of the credit metrics due to,
among other things, acquisitions, ambitious fleet expansion
and/or high fuel prices (eg FFO adjusted leverage above 5.0x
and FFO fixed charge cover below 1.5x on a sustained basis).
- Weakening of state support.
Full List of Ratings
Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Long-term local currency IDR at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'
Short-term local currency IDR at 'B'
Foreign currency senior unsecured rating at 'BB-'
Local currency senior unsecured rating at 'BB-'
National Long-term rating at 'A+(rus)'; Outlook Stable
National Short-term rating at 'F1(rus)'
National senior unsecured rating at 'A+(rus)'
ATF BANK: Fitch Affirms 'b-' Viability Rating
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ATF Bank JSC's Viability Rating (VR)
at 'b-'. ATF's Long-term IDRs are unaffected at 'BBB-'/Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The affirmation of ATF's VR at 'b-' reflects uncertainties about
the bank's current asset quality, the bank's strategy following
the expected change of ownership and the extent of any leverage
taken on by the new shareholder as a result of the acquisition.
At the same time, the VR is supported by ATF's significant loss
absorption capacity, which is reasonable relative to its reported
loan impairment, the bank's currently comfortable liquidity and
an expected improvement in performance.
About one-third of ATF's loan book will continue to enjoy credit
protection from current owner UniCredit Bank Austria
('A'/Stable). Consequently, ATF will only need to create
additional reserves on this portfolio if losses exceed a very
high threshold. NPLs and restructured loans in the non-protected
book were broadly in line with system averages and Fitch
estimates that the bank could have created reserves on the
majority of these exposures without breaching minimum regulatory
capital requirements.
ATF's deposit base has stabilized since the loss of 30% of the
bank's corporate funding in Q412, when rumors of UniCredit's exit
appeared in the local market. Liquidity will be further supported
by a KZT95 billion two-year deposit to be placed by UniCredit (to
secure receivables on the credit protection) after deal
completion. Net of expected smaller repayments to UniCredit, this
should result in a liquidity cushion equal to about 25% of end-
Q113 customer accounts. In Fitch's view, any debt acceleration
from the sale should be minimal.
Performance has been weak, with four consecutive years of losses
reported between 2009 and 2012. However, stabilization of asset
quality and the reduction in the credit protection fee to be paid
to UniCredit should result in improved profitability in 2013.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
ATF's Long-term IDRs will likely be downgraded to the level of
its VR following the completion of the sale of the bank. The
transaction has now been approved by the National Bank of
Kazakhstan and the parties expect it to be closed by end-April
2013.
ATF's VR could be upgraded if Fitch receives information
supporting the current reported asset quality metrics,
performance improves, related party lending remains moderate
following the acquisition and shareholder leverage in Fitch's
view does not represent a significant contingent risk for the
bank. A weakening of asset quality or increase in related party
exposures/shareholder risks could result in downward pressure on
the rating.
The 'B+' rating of ATF's perpetual subordinated notes is four
notches below the bank's current Long-term IDR. This incorporates
two notches each for incremental non-performance risk and for
potential loss severity. Following the resolution of the RWN, the
rating of the notes will likely be downgraded to 'CC', two
notches below the bank's VR.
ATF's Support Rating of '2' reflects potential support from
UniCredit. The rating will likely be downgraded to '5' following
the completion of the sale.
The rating actions are:
-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'BBB-', RWN,
Unaffected
-- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'F3', RWN, unaffected
-- National Long-term Rating: 'AA(kaz)', RWN, unaffected
-- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
-- Support Rating: '2', RWN, unaffected
-- Senior unsecured debt 'BBB-', RWN, unaffected
-- National senior unsecured debt rating 'AA(kaz)', RWN,
Unaffected
-- Subordinated debt 'BB+', RWN, unaffected
-- National subordinated debt 'AA-(kaz)', RWN, unaffected
-- Perpetual subordinated notes 'B+', RWN, unaffected
In accordance with Fitch's policies the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action that is same as the original rating committee
outcome.
BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Affirms Rating on Old Style Sub Debt Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sberbank of Russia's (Sberbank;
'BBB'/Stable/'bbb'), Bank VTB JSC's (VTB; 'BBB'/Negative/'bb-')
and Bank of Moscow's (BOM; 'BBB'/Negative/'bb-') "old style" non-
convertible subordinated debt issues at 'BBB-'. Russian
Agricultural Bank's (RusAg; 'BBB'/'b'/RWN) "old style"
subordinated debt issue's 'BBB-' rating has been maintained on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
At the same time, Fitch has indicated that it will notch "new
style" subordinated issues with write-off/conversion triggers off
banks' Viability Ratings (VRs), for both state- and privately
owned banks. Fitch's rating approach and the implications of
recent regulatory changes for Russian bank capitalization are
detailed in a new special report, entitled "Implementation of New
Capital Rules in Russia: Moderately Positive, Unlikely to Lead to
Rating Changes" available at www.fitchratings.com or by clicking
on the link above.
RATING DRIVERS - SBERBANK, VTB, BOM & RUSAG "OLD STYLE" SUB DEBT
The 'BBB-' ratings of the "old style" subordinated debt issues
continue to reflect Fitch's view that these instruments are
unlikely to be bailed in should a state-owned bank require
government support. This reflects the fact that the terms of
these issues do not provide for "going concern" loss absorption
(e.g. coupon omission/deferral or principal write-
down/conversion), and Fitch's view that the Russian authorities
would be likely to place strong emphasis on the legal terms of
the issues in determining the parameters of any bank resolutions.
It also considers that defaults on "old style" subordinated debt
could trigger acceleration of senior debt.
Fitch will therefore continue to notch "old-style" subordinated
debt issues of Russian state-owned banks off their Long-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs), rather than their Viability
Ratings (VRs). The one-notch difference between the banks' Long-
term IDRs ('BBB') and the "old style" subordinated debt ratings
includes (i) zero notches for additional non-performance risk
relative to the Long-term IDRs; and (ii) one notch for likely
higher loss severity (relative to senior debt) in case of
default.
The Long-term IDRs of Russian privately-owned banks do not
benefit from potential government support and are equalised with
their VRs. Their "old style" subordinated debt ratings are one
notch below their Long-term IDRs/VRs, and are unaffected by
today's rating actions.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - SBERBANK, VTB, BOM, RUSAG "OLD STYLE"
SUBDEBT
The issues' ratings are linked to the banks' Long-term IDRs, and
are likely to be upgraded/downgraded if there was similar action
on the Long-term IDRs.
The RWN on the Long-Term IDRs, and therefore subordinated debt
rating, of RusAg reflects Fitch's concerns about the bank's asset
quality and the sufficiency of recent capital support. The
ratings may be downgraded by one notch (Long-term IDRs to 'BBB-',
"old style" subordinated debt to 'BB+') if Fitch views support as
having been insufficient, and there is no tangible strengthening
of the support framework for the bank.
The Outlooks on VTB and BOM's Long-Term IDRs are Negative due to
Fitch's expectation of a moderate reduction in government support
as VTB's privatization progresses. A downgrade of the banks'
Long-Term IDRs would also result in a downgrade of their
subordinated debt. Any downgrade would likely be limited to one
notch (Long-term IDRs to 'BBB-', "old style" subordinated debt to
'BB+').
The Outlook on Sberbank's Long-Term IDR is Stable and underpinned
by the bank's 'bbb' VR, so neither the bank's IDRs nor its "old
style" subordinated debt rating would be affected if Fitch
revised its support assumptions.
The ratings of all the banks would also likely be downgraded if
the Russian Federation ('BBB'/Stable) was downgraded. An upgrade
of Russia to 'BBB+' would be likely to result in a one-notch
upgrade of Sberbank. A sovereign upgrade could also result in
VTB, BOM and RusAg's ratings stabilizing at their current level.
The "old style" subordinated debt ratings of VTB, BOM and RusAg
could also be downgraded if the Russian authorities give any
clear indication that all subordinated liabilities of banks,
regardless of their terms, could be bailed in, in case of a bank
failure. However, Fitch currently views such a scenario as
unlikely.
APPROACH TO RATING "NEW STYLE" SUBORDINATED INSTRUMENTS
Fitch intends to notch "new style" subordinated instruments of
both state- and privately owned Russian banks off their VRs. This
reflects the agency's expectation that these instruments will
absorb losses as provided for in their terms of issue, ie the
agency does not expect government support for state-owned banks
to prevent losses on these securities if loss-absorption triggers
are hit.
Fitch expects to rate "new style" Tier 2 dated subordinated
issues of Russian banks one notch lower than their VRs. This
includes (i) zero notches for additional non-performance risk
relative to the VR, as Fitch believes these instruments should
only absorb losses once a bank reaches, or is very close to, the
point of non-viability; and (ii) one notch for loss severity,
(one notch, rather than two, as these issues will not be deeply
subordinated, and will actually rank pari passu with "old style"
subordinated debt in case of bankruptcy).
Fitch expects to rate "new style" Tier 1 perpetual subordinated
issues of Russian banks three-four notches lower than their VRs.
This includes (i) one-two notches for additional non-performance
risk relative to the VR, as the conversion/write-down trigger
(6.4% core Tier 1 ratio) has been set somewhat higher than the
point of non-viability, in Fitch's view; and (ii) two notches for
loss severity, given the issues' deep subordination.
BANK IDRS UNAFFECTED BY CHANGES IN CAPITAL RULES
Overall, Fitch views ongoing changes in Russian bank capital
regulation as moderately positive, as they will force some
lenders to hold slightly more and better quality capital.
However, the agency expects the impact to be marginal at most
banks, in part due to lenders' still significant flexibility in
reporting risk exposures, which in turn determine capital needs.
Fitch does not expect the changes to lead to movements in any
bank's IDRs.
A Fitch study of 18 large Russian banks suggests that most should
be able to comply with the newly introduced core Tier 1 (5.6%)
and Tier 1 (7.5%) ratios by end-2013 without raising additional
capital. Five banks (VTB, Alfa, Nomos, Russian Standard and
Probusinessbank) might need to take action to achieve the 7.5%
Tier 1 ratio, but Fitch believes this could mainly be addressed
by reallocating capital within groups. Banks will report new
ratios to the CBR from 1 May 2013, but mandatory compliance is
unlikely to be introduced before Q413, and may be delayed to
2014.
The rating actions are as follows:
Sberbank of Russia:
"Old style" subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB-'
Bank VTB JSC:
"Old style" subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB-'
Bank of Moscow:
"Old style" subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB-'
Russian Agricultural Bank
"Old style" subordinated debt 'BBB-'; maintained on Rating Watch
Negative
===============
S L O V E N I A
===============
* SLOVENIA: IMF Head Christine Lagarde Dismisses Bailout Rumors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sandrine Rastello at Bloomberg News reports that International
Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said she
supports policies announced by the Slovenian government and
dismissed investors' concern that the country will be the next
euro-area nation to receive a bailout.
"I would not trust the rumors," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Lagarde as
saying in a news conference in Washington on Saturday. The
country's prime minister, Alenka Bratusek, "has indicated she
wants to pursue privatization, that she wants to allow for better
management of companies" close to being bankrupt and to
"reinforce the capital of Slovenian banks."
"These 3 principles are not bad principles from which to start,"
Ms. Lagarde, as cited by Bloomberg, said.
* SLOVENIA: Adopts Amendments to Company Insolvency Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the Slovenian government said on Thursday it
adopted amendments to the insolvency proceedings to facilitate
the effective re-structuring of insolvent companies.
"Amendments and additional provisions were necessary to ensure
effective and real opportunities to restructure insolvent
companies, which is of the utmost importance for preserving
healthy businesses and jobs in Slovenia," SeeNews quotes the
government as saying in a statement on its web site.
The measures are also aimed to prevent and limit the influence of
bodies of insolvent debtors on decision-making, which would be
contrary to the goals of insolvency procedures, the protection of
creditors and new investors, as well as to improve the position
of creditors' committee and individual creditors, SeeNews
discloses.
=========
S P A I N
=========
BBVA CONSUMO: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating to Series B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings of 'A' (sf)
to the Series A floating rate notes and B (sf) to the Series B
floating rate notes to be issued by BBVA Consumo 3 F.T.A. The
Notes are backed by a pool of consumer loan receivables
originated in Spain by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ("BBVA")
and BBVA Finanzia.
Final ratings will be issued upon receipt of execution version of
the governing transaction documents. To the extent that the
documents and information provided by BBVA and Europea de
Titulizacion, Sociedad Gestora De Fondos De Titulizacion, S.A.
("EdT") to DBRS as of this date differ from the executed version
of the governing transaction documents, DBRS may assign different
final ratings to the Notes or may avoid assigning final ratings
to the Notes altogether.
The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:
* Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement.
* Relevant credit enhancement is in the form of subordination
and an amortizing cash reserve which provide credit support.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS
projected expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumption under
various stress scenarios at an 'A' (sf) standard for the Series A
Notes and B (sf) for the Series B Notes.
* The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in which
they have invested.
* The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
originations, underwriting, servicing, and financial strength.
* The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral.
* The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the consistency
with the DBRS Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions.
CAIXA PENEDES: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of the class A
notes and upgraded the ratings of all junior notes in Ayt
Colaterales Global Empresas Caja Granada I and CAIXA PENEDES
PYMES 1 TDA, FTA, two Spanish asset-backed securities
transactions backed by loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SME ABS). High levels of credit enhancement, which
protect against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove
the rating actions. These rating actions conclude the review for
downgrade initiated by Moody's on July 2, 2012.
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: AyT Colaterales Global Empresas Caja Granada I
EUR135.6M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR18.4M B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR10.5M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14,
2010 Assigned Caa3 (sf)
EUR10.5M D Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Assigned Ca (sf)
Issuer: Caixa Penedes PYMES 1 TdA Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos
EUR726M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR44.6M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
EUR19.4M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3,
2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
Ratings Rationale:
These rating actions primarily reflect the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The current credit enhancement levels in Ayt
Colaterales Global Empresas Caja Granada I are 83.4%, 56.0%,
40.5% and 24.9% for class A, B, C and D, respectively. The
current credit enhancement levels in CAIXA PENEDES PYMES 1 TDA,
FTA are 36.6%, 15.5% and 6.3% for class a, B and C, respectively.
Credit enhancement has built up to high levels as a result of the
deleveraging of these two transactions. The introduction of new
adjustments to Moody's modeling assumptions to account for the
effect of deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness has had no
negative effect on the ratings in both transactions.
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.
Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions
Following Moody's update of its methodology, the rating agency
increased its CoV for Ayt Colaterales Global Empresas Caja
Granada I, which is a measure of volatility, to 55.4% from 28.2%.
Together with the unchanged assumptions on mean default
probability of 27.7% on current pool balance and the recovery
rate of 55.0%, this volatility increase corresponds to a
portfolio credit enhancement of 27.9%.
In addition, Moody's increased its CoV for CAIXA PENEDES PYMES 1
TDA, FTA to 123.8% from 45.0%. Together with the unchanged
assumptions on mean default probability of 13.0% on current pool
balance and the recovery rate of 52.5%, this volatility increase
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 26.9%.
Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
this transaction, which it updated on 18 December 2012 (see
"Moody's updates key collateral assumptions in Spanish ABS
transactions backed by loans to SMEs and leases".
Counterparty Exposure Has Increased
The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased counterparty exposure due to weakened
counterparty creditworthiness.
Banco Mare Nostrum (not rated), acts as servicer in both
transactions.
In Ayt Colaterales Global Empresas Caja Granada I, the servicer
transfers collections daily to the issuer account at Barclays
Bank (A2/P-1). The reserve fund also resides at Barclays Bank.
The reserve fund represents 24.9% of the current pool balance.
The swap counterparty in this deal is Cecabank (Ba1/on review for
possible downgrade).
In CAIXA PENEDES PYMES 1 TDA, FTA, the servicer transfers
collections daily to the Bank of Spain (not rated) which services
as reinvestment account bank. The reserve fund also resides at
the Bank of Spain. The reserve fund represents 6.3% of the
current pool balance. The reinvestment account bank transfers all
monies in their account quarterly at every payment date to BNP
Paribas Securities Services (A2/P-1) which services as issuer
account bank. The swap counterparty in this deal is JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (Aa3/P-1).
Moody's has incorporated into its analysis the potential default
of the servicer, which could expose the transaction to a
commingling loss on the collections.
The rating agency also assessed the exposure to the swap
counterparties, which in both transactions do not have a negative
effect on the rating levels at this time.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse-normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
When remodeling these transactions affected by this rating
action, Moody's adjusted some inputs to reflect the new approach.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.
The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign risk to
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"), along with
the publication of its Special Comment "Structured Finance
Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".
Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.
GC FTPYME 5: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of eight notes
and upgraded the ratings of three notes issued by GC FTPYME
Sabadell 4, FTA, GC FTPYME Sabadell 5, FTA and GC FTPYME Sabadell
6, FTA. Sufficient credit enhancement, which protects against
sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove the rating
action.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated
by Moody's on July 2, 2012. These three transactions are Spanish
asset-backed securities transactions backed by loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS) originated by Banco Sabadell,
S.A. (Ba1 / NP).
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: GC FTPYME Sabadell 4, FTA
EUR162.3M A(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR24M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR14.3M C Notes, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: GC FTPYME Sabadell 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR880.3M A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR82.8M A3(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR40M B Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR26.9M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: GC FTPYME Sabadell 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR635.4M A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR134.1M A3(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR35.5M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR20M C Notes, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Rationale:
This rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness and the revision of key collateral
assumptions and increased exposure to lowly rated counterparties
has had no negative effect on the ratings of all classes of notes
in these transactions.
Furthermore, the current level of credit enhancement available
under the Class B (16.75%) of GC FTPYME Sabadell 4 in the form of
subordination from Class C and cash (via the reserve fund of
2.98%) is sufficient to support an upgrade to Baa3 (sf) from Ba1
(sf) for Class B. In GC FTPYME Sabadell 5, the reserve fund of
3.96% is sufficient to support the upgrade of Class C to Caa1
(sf) from Caa3 (sf). In GC FTPYME Sabadell 6, the credit
enhancement of 10.3% below the Class B (in the form of
subordination from the Class C as well as 2% reserve fund) allows
for an upgrade to Ba2 (sf) from B2 (sf).
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.
Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions
Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the three transactions, which it updated on 18 December 2012 (see
"Moody's updates key collateral assumptions in Spanish ABS
transactions backed by loans to SMEs and leases". According to
the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV, which is a
measure of volatility.
For GC FTPYME Sabadell 4, the current default assumption is 13.2%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 55%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 101.2%
from 48.55%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, resulted in a portfolio credit enhancement of 23.9%.
For GC FTPYME Sabadell 5, the current default assumption is 10%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 50%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 110.6%
from 44.5%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, resulted in a portfolio credit enhancement of 22.4%.
For GC FTPYME Sabadell 6, the current default assumption is 12.6%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 50%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 91.9% from
45.4%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, resulted in a portfolio credit enhancement of 22.3%.
Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk
The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.
In all three transactions, Banco Sabadell acts as servicer and
transfers collections every day to the issuers' accounts at
Barclays Bank Plc (A2/P-1). The reserve funds also reside at
Barclays Bank Plc for the three transactions. Moody's has
incorporated into its analysis the potential default of Banco
Sabadell, which could expose each transaction to a commingling
loss on the collections.
Banco Sabadell acts as swap counterparty in the three
transactions. As part of its analysis, Moody's assessed the
exposure to the swap counterparty, which does not have a negative
effect on the rating levels at this time.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.
The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign risk to
Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe"), along with
the publication of its Special Comment "Structured Finance
Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".
Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.
NCG BANCO: Fitch Maintains 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Spain-based Bankia, S.A.'s Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB', Short-term IDR of 'F2',
Support Rating of '2' and Support Rating Floor (SRF) of 'BBB' on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN). At the same time, Fitch has
maintained NCG Banco, S.A.'s (NCG) Long-term IDR of 'BB+', Short-
term IDR of 'B', Support Rating of '3' and SRF of 'BB+' on RWN.
The agency has also upgraded Bankia's Viability Rating (VR) to
'b' from 'f' and NCG's to 'b+' from 'f'.
Fitch has simultaneously taken rating actions on Bankia's parent
bank, Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, S.A. (BFA), including an
upgrade of its VR to 'b-' from 'f' and placing its Long-term IDR
and SRF of 'BB' on RWN. A full list of rating actions is at the
end of this rating action commentary.
These rating actions follow a review by Fitch of these banks'
credit profile, after receiving capital support from Spain's Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) under the terms and
conditions approved by the European Commission on 28 November
2012. While this capital support is the primary reason behind the
upgrade of Bankia, BFA, and NCG's VRs , Fitch has also factored
into these banks' VR the impacts on credit risk and liquidity of
the transfer of the vast majority of their real estate exposure
to the Spanish bad bank (SAREB) and the benefits on these banks'
capital from the forthcoming burden sharing, which entails
exchanges of hybrid and subordinated debt securities into the
banks' equity.
The RWNs on Bankia's and NCG's IDRs, Support Ratings and SRFs
reflect potential pressures on the propensity of future support
being available to these banks, which have been recent
beneficiaries of significant state aid. For example, Bankia and
NCG are substantially downsizing their franchises, which will
result in relatively smaller institutions of reduced systemic
importance. In its assessment of support, Fitch also notes the
intent within the EU to reduce implicit state support for banks.
In addition to these considerations, the RWN on BFA's Long-term
IDR and SRF reflects potential additional support pressures
arising from its effective status as a bank holding company,
rather than an active deposit-taking bank. The RWNs on the
Support Ratings reflect the potential for the banks' SRFs and
Long-term IDRs to be downgraded by more than one notch.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING AND SRF
Bankia and NCG's IDRs and senior debt ratings and BFA's IDRs are
driven by their SRFs. Bankia's SRF reflects a relatively high
likelihood of support given its size and systemic importance as
Spain's fourth-largest banking group with a market share of
around 10%. BFA, like Bankia, has benefited from extraordinary
support but its SRF (reflecting a moderate probability of
support) is lower than that of Bankia because it is effectively a
bank holding company, rather than an active deposit-taking bank.
NCG's SRF reflects a moderate probability of support due to its
smaller national franchise than Bankia but also its relatively
high importance in the north-western region of Galicia. As noted
previously, these SRFs and Long-term IDR are on RWN, which the
agency expects to resolve within the next three months.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING AND
SRF
Bankia, BFA and NCG's IDRs will be downgraded if their SRFs are
downgraded. The SRFs are on RWN for the reasons noted previously
but could also be downgraded were Spain's sovereign rating
('BBB'/Negative) to be downgraded. For lower-rated NCG, the
mostly likely cause of an IDR upgrade would be its acquisition by
a higher rated entity.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - BANKIA'S AND NCG'S VRs
The upgrade of Bankia's and NCG's VR reflects the improvement in
capital. Bankia received EUR10.7bn in contingent convertibles
(CoCos) from the state through the parent bank (BFA), which will
be converted shortly, and NCG increased capital by EUR5.4bn.
Further strengthening will arise from burden sharing of
subordinated and hybrid instruments, which is expected by Fitch
to generate EUR4.8bn of additional capital for Bankia and
EUR1.8bn for NCG. Fitch calculates that, after completing the
recapitalisation, Bankia's and NCG's pro forma Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) ratio will be a weak 4.6% and vulnerable 8.9%,
respectively, under further asset quality stress. Fitch also
considers that these banks' pre-impairment profitability will
remain modest at the early stage of the restructuring.
The VR also reflects their improved risk profile after
transferring most of the real estate assets to SAREB. At end-
2012, Bankia's and NCG's real estate exposure was only 6% and 5%,
respectively, of total loans and foreclosed assets. Non-real
estate loans however deteriorated further in 2012 and Bankia's
end-2012 non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at 12.9% and NCG's at
13.9% were above the sector average (10.4%). While reserves held
against impaired assets, at about 62% and 60%, respectively, at
end-2012, seem reasonable both banks also had large stocks of
restructured and watch-list loans, which Fitch regards as an
additional source of risk.
Bankia's and NCG's liquidity was boosted by the receipt of state-
guaranteed debt in exchange of SAREB transfers and FROB capital
via European Stability Mechanism bonds.
Bankia's unencumbered assets, at 8.8% of total assets at end-
2012, are sufficient to meet debt repayments scheduled for 2013-
2015. While the bank's retail funding imbalances have reduced
dramatically, the deposit base remains small at one-third of
total assets. Fitch anticipates that it will be challenging for
Bankia to turn around its franchise, whilst meeting restructuring
plans and facing burden sharing on instruments that were in part
sold to retail customers. Bankia's level of wholesale funding is
high, in particular ECB borrowings, which are well above peers
despite recent reductions and are needed to protect margins.
NCG's pool of liquid assets amounted to EUR11bn at end-2012,
which sufficiently covers scheduled debt maturities. The bank's
loan/deposit ratio declined to 118%, or 106% if adjusted for
retail bonds, impairment reserves and self-funded loans.
Nevertheless, NCG remains reliant on wholesale funding,
particularly ECB funding, which Fitch sees, like for Bankia, as
needed to support profitability. NCG's VR also takes into account
the risks involved in the execution of the restructuring plan and
challenges in managing the reputational issues related to burden
sharing, largely affecting retail customers. While the latter
could impair its strong regional franchise, the agency expects,
at the current VR level, the impact of this on deposits and
funding costs to be limited.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - BANKIA'S AND NCG'S VRs
Bankia's and NCG's VRs are sensitive to weaker than currently
expected economic and operating conditions, failure to implement
the restructuring and recapitalization targets as planned and/or
a substantial impairment of their business franchise and
financial profile, for example due to further weakening of asset
quality and/or of deposit levels following burden sharing.
Conversely, upgrade potential could mainly arise from a
stabilization of the asset quality trends, improvement of their
underlying profitability as well as further rebalancing of their
funding profiles.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - BFA'S VR
BFA is wholly-owned by the FROB and will have the majority
ownership of Bankia, after the conversion of CoCos and burden
sharing. BFA, as the parent of the group, received EUR22.5
billion of capital from the FROB, EUR10.7bn of which related to
Bankia. BFA's equity will be further reinforced by burden
sharing.
In its assessment, Fitch concluded that the risk profile of BFA
is closely correlated with that of Bankia, which is seen by Fitch
as BFA's main operating subsidiary. The one-notch difference in
the VRs of Bankia and BFA mainly highlights BFA's high double
leverage ratio and weak performance because of limited dividend
up-streaming potential from Bankia. BFA's debt servicing ability
depends on existing liquidity reserves, which were boosted by
FROB capital and SAREB transfers, and by proceeds from planned
divestments. At end-2012, BFA had EUR34.2bn of debt outstanding,
mostly related to ECB borrowings and state guarantees. Excluding
ECB debt, EUR7.1 billion is due in 2013-2015, while BFA has
EUR13.5 billion of unencumbered liquid assets.
BFA's VR is sensitive to a downgrade of Bankia's VR. Any further
requirement for write downs of the equity portfolio or its large
bond holdings, and/or any unforeseen liquidity shock could also
trigger a downgrade of BFA's VR. Conversely, upside potential
would come from a lowering of the double leverage ratio, and/or
from an upgrade of Bankia's VR.
SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
Subordinated debt and preferred stock of BFA and NCG have been
affirmed because they are subject to burden-sharing, as
established by the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July
2012 and Royal Decree Law 24/2012.
Burden sharing, whose terms and conditions were approved by the
Steering Committee of the FROB on 22 March 2013, is expected to
be completed in May 2013, with the holders of the tendered bonds
absorbing losses through the distressed exchange into equity. On
burden-sharing completion, the ratings of these instruments will
be withdrawn in accordance with Fitch's criteria for distressed
debt exchange.
The rating actions are:
Bankia, S.A.:
Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
VR: upgraded to 'b' from 'f'
Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
SRF: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
Long-term senior unsecured debt: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
Commercial paper: 'F2'; placed on RWN
Market-linked senior unsecured securities: 'BBBemr'; placed on
RWN
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, S.A. (BFA):
Long-term IDR: 'BB'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
VR: upgraded to 'b-' from 'f'
Support Rating: '3'; placed on RWN
SRF: 'BB'; placed on RWN
Subordinated lower tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'CC'
Subordinated upper tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'C'
Preferred stock: affirmed at 'C'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
NCG Banco, S.A.:
Long-term IDR: 'BB+', maintained on RWN
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
VR: upgraded to 'b+' from 'f'
Support Rating: '3', maintained on RWN
SRF: 'BB+', maintained on RWN
Long-term senior unsecured debt: 'BB+', maintained on RWN
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'B'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Subordinated lower Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'C'
Subordinated upper Tier 2 debt (ISIN: ES0214958045): affirmed at
'C'
Preferred stock: affirmed at 'C'
PESCANOVA SA: Stock Market Regulator May Replace Chairman
---------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Smyth at Bloomberg News, citing Expansion, reports that
Spain's stock market regulator studies replacing Pescanova
Chairman Manuel Fernandez de Sousa.
Accounting Failings
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 18,
2013, Reuters related that Pescanova filed for insolvency on
April 15 on at least EUR1.5 billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up
to fuel expansion before economic crisis hit its earnings.
Spain's stock market regulator said in a statement on April 16
that 2012 financial results documents it has received from the
fish-finger maker did not comply with required accounting
standards, possibly opening the door to sanctions, Reuters
disclosed. The documents, submitted on April 15, had not been
signed off by Pescanova board members or auditors, and the firm
was already more than a month beyond an official deadline to
present audited accounts, Reuters noted.
Stake Sale
On April 15, the firm revealed that Chairman Manuel Fernandez de
Sousa had sold half of his 14.4% stake in the firm between
December and February, shortly before starting work on the
insolvency process last month, Reuters disclosed. In a stock
market filing on April 16, Pescanova said Mr. Sousa lent EUR9.3
million to the company following the stake sale, at a 5% annual
coupon, Reuters related. His stake sale has further stoked the
fury of shareholders, who have been trapped in the stock since
trading was suspended on March 1 when the company failed to meet
the deadline to present its 2012 results, Reuters said.
According to Reuters, the stock, much of it held by retail
investors, lost 58% of its value between Jan. 1 and the March 1
suspension following a 41% decline in 2012. Reuters noted that
sources with direct knowledge of the situation said at least
three of the main shareholders have hired attorneys for advice
over the matter.
Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company. The company
catches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships. It is
one of the world's largest fishing groups.
TDA EMPRESAS 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of Class A notes
issued by TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA, At the same time, Moody's upgraded
to B1 and A3 the Class B notes issued by TDA EMPRESAS 1, FTA and
TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA respectively. Both transactions are Spanish
asset-backed securities transactions backed by loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS). Sufficient credit
enhancement, which protects against sovereign and counterparty
risk, primarily drove the rating action.
The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on July 2, 2012.
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: TDA Empresas 1, FTA
EUR60.5M B Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA
EUR156.3M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR43.7M B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Rationale:
The rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness has had no negative effect on the
ratings of the notes.
-- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.
Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions
For TDA EMPRESAS 1, FTA Moody's has increased its CoV from 47.5%
to 52.1%. Together with the unchanged assumptions on mean default
rate of 16% and the recovery rate of 30%, this volatility
increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 28.5%.
For TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA Moody's has increased its CoV from 51% to
72.3%. Together with the unchanged assumptions on mean default
rate of 9% and the recovery rate of 37.5%, this volatility
increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 20%.
Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the two transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012 (see
"Moody's updates key collateral assumptions in Spanish ABS
transactions backed by loans to SMEs". According to the updated
methodology, Moody's increased the CoV, which is a measure of
volatility.
Counterparty Exposure Has Increased
For TDA EMPRESAS 1, FTA Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P-1) has replaced
Banca March S.A.(Baa3/P-3) and Instituto de Credito Oficial
(Baa3/P-3) as the Issuer Account Bank and Paying Agent
respectively. For TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA Banco Santander
S.A.(Baa2/P-2) has replaced Banco Sabadell, S.A.(Ba1/NP) as the
Issuer Account Bank and Paying Agent. There is a two days' sweep
from the servicer account to the issuer account in both
transactions. The revised ratings of the notes, which reflect the
sufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk, are
consistent with this exposure.
The reserve fund represents 16.9% and 91.3% For TDA EMPRESAS 1,
FTA and TDA EMPRESAS 2, FTA respectively according to the last
servicer reports. There is no swap in place in both transactions.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February
2007.
The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013, along with the publication of its
Special Comment " Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the
Impact of Sovereign Risk".
Other factors used in these ratings are described in "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
TURK EKONOMI: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating From 'bb+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term (LT) foreign currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of Turkey's Finansbank A.S. and
Denizbank T.A.S. at 'BBB-' and of Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S. at
'BBB'. The ratings have a Stable Outlook. At the same time, the
agency has upgraded TEB's Viability Rating (VR) to 'bbb-' from
'bb+', reflecting improvements following a merger process in
2011.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS
The three banks are second-tier Turkish institutions, majority
owned by foreign shareholders. Finansbank's and Denizbank's IDRs
are driven by their intrinsic financial strength, as reflected by
their 'bbb-' VRs. Denizbank's IDRs are also underpinned by
potential support from the bank's owner, Sberbank of Russia
(BBB/Stable/bbb).
TEB's IDRs are driven by potential support from its majority
shareholder, BNP Paribas (BNPP; 'A+'/Stable). The 'BBB' Long-term
foreign currency IDR is capped at the Country Ceiling, and the
'BBB+' Long-term local currency IDR also takes into account
country risks.
The 'AAA(tur)' National Ratings of all three banks reflect the
agency's opinion that, on a relative scale, these issuers have
some of the best credit profiles in Turkey.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS
TEB's IDRs could be upgraded or downgraded if there were changes
to Turkey's Country Ceiling. The ratings could also be downgraded
if there was a multi-notch downgrade of BNPP, or a sharp
reduction in the parent's commitment to the subsidiary, neither
of which is currently anticipated by Fitch.
Denizbank's IDRs could be upgraded if the bank's VR was upgraded
or the Long-term IDRs of Sberbank of Russia were upgraded.
Denizbank's IDRs could be downgraded if both the VR was
downgraded and Sberbank's Long-term IDRs were downgraded.
Finansbank's IDRs are sensitive to any change in the bank's VR.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - VRs
Finansbank and Denizbank's VRs are supported by their solid
credit metrics, reflected in adequate capital levels, sound risk
management and credit underwriting capabilities, solid
profitability, expanding franchises and stable deposit funding.
However, the ratings also take into account risks resulting from
quite rapid recent and ongoing growth, and the fact that loan
books will season in an environment of slower economic growth.
Finansbank's VR also reflects Fitch's view that contagion risks
from its 95% ownership by National Bank of Greece ('CCC'/'f') are
low. Despite Greece's protracted and severe economic crisis,
Finansbank has suffered no deposit outflows, reputation damage,
loss of franchise or loss of market access. Asset exposures to
NBG, or Greece more generally, are negligible, and funding from
NBG is also limited. Any re-escalation of the Greek crisis is
unlikely to have a direct negative impact on Finansbank's
ratings.
The upgrade of TEB's VR reflects improvements in the bank's
credit profile following the merger with Fortis Bank A.S. in
February 2011. Following steps taken by management, significant
improvements have been achieved in both efficiency and funding
self-sufficiency, adding to the strengthening of the franchise
resulting from the merger. Most of TEB's standalone credit
metrics are now broadly in line with those of Finansbank and
Denizbank.
Key credit metrics for all three banks remain sound. Net interest
margins, in excess of 5% at all three banks, are especially high
at Finansbank (6.8%), reflecting a higher share of retail
business. Profitability is robust, with operating returns on
assets ranging from 1.6% to 2.2% in 2012.
Loan quality is varied, with impaired loans representing just
2.2% of total loans at TEB, slightly higher at Denizbank (3.6%),
and a high of 6.3% at Finansbank. This reflects the different
business mixes at the banks, with corporate lending comprising a
larger part of the portfolio at TEB, Denizbank more middle
market/SME-focused and Finansbank targeting retail segments. In
addition, Finansbank makes very few write offs and, unlike some
other Turkish banks, it sells a negligible amount of impaired
loans.
Funding at each of the banks is sourced primarily from customer
deposits. However, wholesale funding is also significant, with
loans/deposit ratios at end-2012 of 123% at Finansbank, 111% at
TEB and 110% at Denizbank.
Capital ratios are adequate considering risk profiles, with Fitch
core capital (FCC) representing 14.9% of Finansbank's risk
weighted assets at end-2012, in keeping with a client base
focused on higher risk segments. TEB and Denizbank's FCC ratios
were 11.5% and 10.1%, respectively.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - VRs
The three banks' VRs are now at the same level as the Turkish
sovereign's Long-term foreign currency IDR ('BBB-'/Stable).
Upgrades of the VRs without an upgrade of the Turkish sovereign
are therefore unlikely, given their mid-sized franchises, the
already investment grade level of the ratings and moderate risks
arising from continued growth in a more challenging operating
environment.
The VRs could be downgraded if there was a marked slowdown in the
economy, signs of significant deterioration in banks' asset
quality or underwriting, or a clear deterioration in leverage
and/or performance as the banks continue to grow.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATINGS AND
SUPPORT RATING FLOORS
TEB and Denizbank's Support Ratings of '2' reflect Fitch's
opinion that there is a high probability that the parent banks
will support their subsidiaries should the need arise. Near-term
changes in these ratings are unlikely given the shareholder
ratings and the current level of the Country Ceiling.
Fitch rules out support for Finansbank from NBG considering the
latter's currently weak ability to provide support. Finansbank's
'3' Support Rating and 'BB-' Support Rating Floor reflect Fitch's
view that there is a moderate probability of support from the
Turkish government, if required, given the bank's systemic
importance. The rating could be downgraded in case of a multi-
notch downgrade of Turkey, which Fitch views as unlikely.
The rating actions are:
Finansbank:
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB-'
with Stable Outlook
Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
National Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(tur)' with Stable Outlook
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB-'
Senior unsecured long-term debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Denizbank:
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB-'
with Stable Outlook
Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
National Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(tur)' with Stable Outlook
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB' with Stable
Outlook
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+' with Stable
Outlook
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(tur)' with Stable
Outlook
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb-' from 'bb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
BREWHOUSE THEATRE: No Recovery for Creditors After Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
thisissomerset.co.uk reports that an amateur opera society will
have to scale back its productions following the collapse of the
Brewhouse Theatre.
Taunton Amateur Operatic Society (TAOS) is among 162 traders,
societies and performers - on top of those who bought advance
tickets for shows - will not get a penny back, administrators
have confirmed, according to thisissomerset.co.uk. The report
relates that the total claims from preferential and unsecured
creditors totals GBP501,949.
thisissomerset.co.uk says that estimated figures released to
creditors by administrators BDO show general traders are owed
GBP129,081; unpaid artists GBP129,528 while the Redundancy
Payments Office is claiming GBP28,270 over jobs lost when the
352-seat theatre in Taunton went into administration in February.
Revenue and Customs is owed GBP75,068.
The report notes that advance ticket sales of GBP82,000 will not
be refunded.
thisissomerset.co.uk discloses that TAOS is owed GBP12,235 for
advance ticket sales for the Sound of Music.
Wayfarers Pantomime Society is owed GBP12,609 for advance sales
of Jack and the Beanstalk, the report relays.
thisissomerset.co.uk notes that the operatic society's show has
been able to go ahead at the smaller Tacchi Morris Centre in the
town and opened there on Monday with great support.
"After conducting a thorough review of the business and
evaluating all options available, we can confirm that,
regrettably, there will be insufficient assets to make a
distribution to unsecured creditors . . . . We have received
formal interest both in the assignment of the lease and also in a
temporary licence to trade," the report quoted Simon Girling,
joint administrator, as saying.
Negotiations are at a sensitive stage and formal bids will be
evaluated, the report adds.
HEALTHCARE SUPPORT: S&P Lowers Rating on Sr. Secured Debt to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'
its long-term issue ratings on the senior secured debt issued by
the U.K.-based special-purpose vehicle Healthcare Support
(Newcastle) Finance PLC (ProjectCo). The ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.
At the same time, S&P assigned a recovery rating of '2' to the
senior secured debt, indicating its expectation of substantial
(70%-90%) recovery for debtholders in the event of a payment
default. The debt comprises GBP197.82 million senior secured
bonds due 2041 and the GBP115.0 million senior secured European
Investment Bank (EIB) loan due 2038.
Both debt tranches benefit from an unconditional and irrevocable
payment guarantee of scheduled interest and principal provided by
Syncora Guarantee U.K. Ltd. (Syncora, formerly XL Capital
Assurance (U.K.) Ltd.). According to Standard & Poor's criteria,
a long-term rating on a monoline-insured debt issue reflects the
higher of the rating on the monoline and the Standard & Poor's
underlying rating (SPUR). Therefore, the long-term ratings on
the above issues reflect the SPURs, which are higher than the
rating on Syncora.
The downgrade reflects the issuance of a second warning notice by
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust under the
terms of the agreement with ProjectCo, and that there is thus an
increased chance of the project agreement ultimately being
terminated. S&P understands that the Trust continues to believe
that the angiography room at the Royal Victoria Infirmary (RVI)
does not receive the volume of air changes required under the
design specifications. It therefore applied further service
failure points (SFPs) for the room's unavailability from October
to December 2012. Due to the number of SFPs thus accrued, it then
issued a second warning notice to ProjectCo.
ProjectCo has continued to dispute the Trust's view, claiming
that the room has been built to specification. The creditors'
technical advisor agrees with ProjectCo, which is seeking to have
the warning notices withdrawn. ProjectCo is attempting to
resolve the situation by recourse to the project's dispute
resolution process (DRP), though S&P understands that the Trust
has been largely unresponsive to date.
S&P understands that the level of SFPs in respect of the
angiography room claim would also be sufficient to lead to an
event of default under the terms of the collateral deed governing
the senior secured debt, should they ultimately be accepted or
should the DRP find in favor of the Trust.
S&P views the behavior of the Trust as increasingly unpredictable
and volatile. In S&P's opinion, its recent actions increase the
risk of further actions that could lead to the project agreement
ultimately being terminated. The Trust has continued to apply
SFPs with respect to the angiography room claim . However, S&P
understands it has done so inconsistently during the four months
since it issued the first warning notice. In addition, it has
granted relief to ProjectCo with respect to other aspects of
service provision that could also have resulted in the accrual of
significant numbers of SFPs.
S&P continues to believe that the situation regarding the
angiography room is connected to the Trust's ongoing dispute with
the construction contractor over the clinical office blocks at
the RVI. Handover of the completed clinical office blocks has
been delayed beyond the contractual completion date of May 28,
2012, as a result of the Trust alleging noncompliance with
contractual specifications.
S&P believes that ProjectCo is likely to resolve this dispute
through the DRP. Importantly, S&P do not believe that either of
the above disputes will affect ProjectCo financially, since it
will pass any financial penalty on to the construction
contractor, Laing O'Rourke Northern Ltd.
The debt was issued to finance the design and construction of two
new facilities, Freeman Hospital and RVI, for the Trust. Freeman
Hospital was completed on July 7, 2008, and RVI is scheduled for
completion on June 24, 2013. Under a 38-year project agreement
it entered into on May 4, 2005, ProjectCo will be providing
maintenance and certain nonclinical services after construction
is complete. The project will rationalize the Trust's sites in
Newcastle and provide better facilities for the patients in its
catchment area.
The ongoing CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view of the
increasingly unpredictable and volatile actions of the Trust in
its management of the project agreement. In S&P's opinion, its
actions increase the chance of further actions that could
ultimately lead to a termination of the project agreement.
S&P could lower the ratings, potentially by more than one notch,
if the DRP finds against ProjectCo regarding any outstanding
claims, and SFPs continue to accrue, or if any settlement has a
material impact on ProjectCo's financial profile. Given the
uncertainty engendered by the Trust's recent actions, S&P could
also lower the ratings should the predictability of the Trust's
actions not improve in the near term. For example, S&P could
lower the ratings if there is no sign of improved dialogue
between ProjectCo and the Trust regarding the outstanding
disputes, or if the Trust's actions regarding the further accrual
of SFPs do not become more transparent.
Alternatively, S&P could remove the ratings from CreditWatch if
the outstanding disputes are resolved in favor of ProjectCo, and
ProjectCo and the Trust establish a more cooperative
relationship.
MERCHANT HOUSE: Follows Unit Into Administration
------------------------------------------------
Insolvency News reports that Merchant House Group has collapsed
into administration following the insolvency of its subsidiary
businesses Merchant Capital and Merchant House Financial
Services.
The group entered administration following a petition from
solicitors CMS Cameron McKenna and Reyker Securities in March,
according to Insolvency News.
The report relates that the financial intermediary arm of the
group - Merchant House Financial Services - entered
administration in March with Leonard Curtis appointed to handle
the case.
Insolvency News says that Reyker Securities has since issued a
statement saying that Merchant House had originally been
obligated to pay for the ongoing custody and administration costs
relating to structured product plans that it managed. In the
event of Merchant defaulting, its parent company, the formerly
AIM listed Merchant House Group had guaranteed to pay these
liabilities, Insolvency News discloses.
However, the report relates that because the group had not
honoured this guarantee some weeks ago, Reyker Securities
instigated winding up proceedings against MHG.
Alex Cadwallader, Michael Healy and Andrew Duncan were appointed
joint administrators to the financial advisory division of
Merchant House on March 21, 2013.
Aspire Financial Management Limited, a subsidiary of the Tenet
Group then purchased this subsidiary with 13 jobs transferred in
the process, Insolvency News discloses.
In November, the report recalls that the embattled Merchant House
Group was unable to raise sufficient funding to restore trading
on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and its admission to
the junior market was cancelled.
Merchant House Financial Services has struggled financially since
the acquisition of the business of Wisbech-based competitor
Clarkson Hill Group in 2010, the report adds.
SCOTTISH COAL: In Administration, Cuts 590 Jobs
-----------------------------------------------
Daily Record reports that Scottish Coal plunged into
administration cutting 590 jobs from sites in Ayrshire,
Lanarkshire and Fife, while the firm's 142 remaining workers will
be kept on to "assist in securing the sites".
Blair Nimmo and Tony Friar, of KPMG, were appointed provisional
liquidators of Scottish Coal at the Court of Session, according
to Daily Record. The report relates that sister firm
Castlebridge Plant were also placed in administration at the same
time.
Daily Record notes that the firm had suffered months of
uncertainty, with falling coal prices, rising operational costs
and a number of Scottish Coal sites exhausting their reserves,
leading to trading losses.
Daily Record says that KPMG said that staff were being kept on as
liquidators explore how best to "maximise returns from the assets
of the business, principally the sites, plant and stocks".
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 15 to April 19, 2013
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *