TCREUR_Public/130506.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

              Monday, May 6, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 88



* DENMARK: Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Seek Protection from Bail-in


SANITEC OYJ: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


AIR CARGO: Declares Insolvency Following AOC Suspension
CENTROTHERM PHOTOVOLTAICS: Sells Unit; Concludes Restructuring
HESS AG: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings
SGL CARBON: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.
SOLARWORLD AG: Nears Stake Acquisition Deal with Qatari Investor

TRIONISTA TOPCO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating


AGRICULTURAL BANK: European Union Okays Liquidation Aid


KAPUVARI HUS: Fails to Attracts Any Offers


VIVO SHELL: High Court Extends Court Protection to June 1
* IRELAND: EU Commission Lifts Deficit Forecast on IBRC Wind-Down


CELL THERAPEUTICS: Net Fin'l Standing at US$26.6MM as of March 31
COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA: Servicing Amendments No Impact on Ratings
GAMING INVEST: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
* ITALY: February 2013 RMBS Market Performance Deteriorates


* LATVIA: Rising Non-Residential Deposits Exert Pressure on Banks


UKIO BANKAS: Kaunas Court Commences Bankruptcy Proceedings


GLOBE LUXEMBOURG: S&P Rates US$500-Mil. Senior Secured Notes 'B'


HYVA GLOBAL: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
MONASTERY 2006-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B-'


AYT CAIXA: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E2 Notes to 'D'
AYT COLATERALES: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Notes


TURKIYE FINANS: Fitch Assigns 'bb-' Viability Rating
YAPIKREDI BANKASI: Moody's Changes Outlook on D+ BFSR to Negative
VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating


AGROTON PUBLIC: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'CCC'
SHORTLINE PLC: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' to Upcoming LPNs
STATE ADMINISTRATION: S&P Puts 'B-' CCR on CreditWatch Positive

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALDERSHOT FC: Goes Into Administration
EPIC BARCHESTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
EPIC CULZEAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'
HEARTS FC: Seeks Talks With Bank to Avoid Administration
SCOTTISH COAL: Liquidators in Talks with Potential Buyers

VANMASTER: In Administration, Cuts 20 Jobs
* UK: Moody's Says Outlook on General Insurance Sector Stable


* EMEA Companies Carry Lower Ratings Due to Slow Revenue Growth
* Fitch Reports Record Qtr for European High-Yield Market in Q113
* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 29 to May 3, 2013



* DENMARK: Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Seek Protection from Bail-in
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark's
biggest banks want the state to clarify its readiness to bail
them out.

According to Bloomberg, the six lenders identified by a
government committee as systemically important for the Danish
economy say they need to be shielded from the country's bail-in
legislation for their too-big-to-fail designation to be
meaningful.  Danske Bank A/S, Denmark's biggest lender, argues
the additional capital costs they face should be matched by
explicit guarantees of state support, just like in neighboring
Sweden, Bloomberg discloses.

"We are very concerned about the fact that the legal wording is
different to the extent that our rating is suffering," Bloomberg
quotes Danske Chief Financial Officer Henrik Ramlau-Hansen as
saying on Thursday in an interview.

Moody's Investors Service previously said that March proposals
naming Denmark's systemically important financial institutions
and their capital requirements won't prompt ratings upgrades,
Bloomberg recounts.  The banks will continue to get only one
notch in Moody's systemic support analysis, Bloomberg says.

Danish banks have struggled to persuade investors they're as safe
as their Swedish rivals after Denmark became the first European
Union country to force losses on senior bank creditors within a
resolution framework, Bloomberg states.  The 2011 failure of
Amagerbanken A/S left most banks in Denmark locked out of funding
markets as creditors shunned the nation's bail-in legislation,
Bloomberg notes.

The proposals, which have yet to be passed by lawmakers, seek to
raise capital requirements by as much as 5 percent and make Sifis
subject to greater scrutiny from regulators, Bloomberg says.
According to Bloomberg, the measures will help protect taxpayers
from losses should a Sifi get into trouble, according to the
committee.  Proposals include giving the Financial Supervisory
Authority the power to stop dividends, fire board members and
restrict interest payments on capital debt instruments, Bloomberg

"The committee felt that the state shouldn't give a guarantee,
binding for all future, completely independent of the situation,"
Bloomberg quotes Michael Moeller, chairman of the Sifi committee
as saying in an e-mailed response to questions "As far as I
remember, Sweden is the only country that has given such a strong

Denmark's banks argue such a stance has left them with the costs
and none of the benefits of too-big-to-fail designation,
Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Benny Engelbrecht, who heads Denmark's
parliamentary committee on bank laws, said he's unlikely to back
proposals that move away from Denmark's practice of bailing in
unsecured bank creditors.  He said that stance also applies to
systemically important banks, Bloomberg relates.

"We won't back giving Danish Sifis explicit government support,"
Bloomberg quotes Mr. Engelbrecht as saying in an interview on

Denmark's financial industry assets are almost four times the
size of the US$300 billion economy, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Mr. Moeller, investors should look to the fact that
the Danish government has the means help its banks should the
need arise.

"The fact that the Danish state has the strength to support its
banks should weigh something," he said.  "Some European countries
have, and may in the future have even further, problems saving
their banks, as we have seen in Cyprus."

Denmark's biggest banks also want lawmakers to lower triggers for
regulatory intervention and for converting debt to equity to
boost loss-absorbing reserves, according to Bloomberg.  Under the
current proposal, debt would convert to equity when the
underlying equity falls below 10.125% of risk-weighted assets,
Bloomberg discloses.


SANITEC OYJ: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
long-term credit rating to Finland-based European ceramic
sanitaryware supplier Sanitec Oyj.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the
proposed EUR250 million senior secured floating-rate notes due in
2018.  S&P assigned a recovery rating of '3', reflecting
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects for the noteholders in
the event of a default.

The rating actions follow Sanitec's announcement of plans to
refinance its existing debt facilities.  These plans include the
issue of EUR250 million senior secured floating-rate notes due in
2018 and using its cash balance to repay existing outstanding

The ratings on Sanitec reflect S&P's assessment of the group's
financial risk profile as "aggressive," given its private equity
ownership.  Pro forma for the transaction, Sanitec's Standard &
Poor's-adjusted ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to debt
would be about 25% and the adjusted ratio of debt to EBITDA would
be about 3x, in line with a "significant" financial risk profile.
However, S&P caps the financial risk profile at "aggressive," and
the overall rating at 'B+', based on its criteria for companies
owned by financial sponsors.

S&P assess Sanitec's business risk profile as "fair," based on
its view of the group's exposure to cyclical construction markets
as well as its limited scale and diversity and weak profitability
compared with some of its larger peers.  These factors are
partially offset by the group's leading market positions in
Northern and Central European markets, its branded product
portfolio, and its meaningful exposure to the less cyclical
renovation segment.  S&P views the group's strong cash flow
generation as a key rating strength.  S&P's business risk
assessment is also based on its belief that the group's cost
efficiency and restructuring initiatives will successfully
translate into a sustainable improvement in profitability in the
next few years.  S&P anticipates that Sanitec will be able to
sustain an EBITDA margin of about 13%-14% over the next few years
and that this will gradually improve thereafter.

S&P's base-case suggests that the group's revenues will likely
decline by low single digits owing to continued difficult trading
conditions in many of Sanitec's key markets, along with its
policy of exiting unprofitable contracts.  In S&P's opinion, the
competitive environment will restrict the group's ability to
increase prices beyond input cost inflation.

Despite the company's strong cash flow generation, S&P do not
include any surplus cash in its calculation of the group's
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt.  This is because S&P believes
that the group's ownership will likely change in the near term,
and such a transaction might use some of the group's cash

Swedish private equity firm EQT (via its EQT IV fund) has been
the majority owner of the Sanitec group since 2005 (owning 76.1%
at year-end 2012).  If the ownership were to change, S&P would
assess the effect on the group's credit quality.  Such an
assessment would include S&P's view of:

   -- The new owners' investment vision and background (for
      instance, whether they are strategic or private equity
      investors, and their intended synergy gains, expansion
      plans, and investment horizon).

   -- The likely future financial policy and strategic
      initiatives and focus.

   -- The post-acquisition capital structure of the group.

   -- Management changes, if any.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the Sanitec
group will continue to have a good degree of ratings headroom,
with credit metrics stronger than those S&P considers
commensurate with an "aggressive" financial risk profile.  S&P
also believes that the group will keep generating solid free cash
flows, despite its weak outlook for the construction sector in
the majority of Sanitec's key markets.

S&P could lower the ratings if it was to see more aggressive
financial policy measures or significant debt-funded
acquisitions, leading to an increase in adjusted debt and a
weakening of credit metrics to levels approaching a "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile.  S&P could also lower the
ratings if it was concerned about the future strategic focus of
the group under any new owners.

S&P currently believes that an upgrade is unlikely, given its
view of the group's private equity ownership.


AIR CARGO: Declares Insolvency Following AOC Suspension
Alex Lennane at The Loadstar reports that the management and
shareholders of Air Cargo Germany have unanimously decided to
declare insolvency, following the suspension of its German
operating certificate.

However, both parties believe there will be an opportunity to
restructure the company and have said they hope to return to
operating aircraft, the Loadstar notes.  According to the
Loadstar, in a statement on the Web site, chief executive
Michael Schaecher wrote: "All options will be taken into account
to restore customer confidence."

In a separate report, Loadstar relates that on April 18, AIG's
AOC was suspended by the LBA, Germany's civil aviation authority,
which, according to German media, claimed that the airline's
heavy debt burden could compromise safety -- after it was found
to be unable to sustain its operations financially over the next
12 months, a breach of European Community Directive 1008/2008.

Since then, the carrier, and its 49% parent Volga Dnepr, has
reportedly been working tirelessly to recapitalize, as well as
being in talks with the LBA, but as yet without success, the
Loadstar discloses.

Air Cargo Germany GmbH is a cargo airline based at Frankfurt-Hahn
Airport, Germany.  ACG is managed by the former LTU Manager
Thomas Homering and Michael Schaecher.

CENTROTHERM PHOTOVOLTAICS: Sells Unit; Concludes Restructuring
centrotherm has sold its subsidiary GP Solar to ISRA VISION AG,
thereby achieving its target structure for its new start shortly
before the Ulm District Court is due to terminate insolvency
proceedings.  With its future concept, centrotherm is
concentrating on its technological strengths in its core business
areas of crystalline solar cells and semiconductors, as well as
microelectronics.  During its reorganization phase, the
technology and systems provider sold subsidiaries such as Glatt
Maschinenbau GmbH, and now GP Solar, which do not form part of
its core business, as well as unprofitable parts of the company.

A fixed price component equivalent to approximately 50% of GP
Solar's forecast 2013 revenue and a unit-based earnout component
was agreed as the purchase price.  GP Solar and its subsidiary GP
Inspect anticipate current-year revenue of more than EUR3
million.  This generates a positive contribution for centrotherm
and its creditors that provides additional liquidity. The
purchase agreement also includes a partnership-based supplier
relationship from which centrotherm's customers from the
photovoltaic and semiconductor industries can benefit.

"With ISRA VISION -- a world market leader in surface inspection
systems -- we have found a strategic investor that can act as a
well-equipped partner to GP Solar in tapping the future potential
of the photovoltaic sector.  At the same time, a good supplier
relationship with GP Solar continues to exist through its new
owner," commented Tobias Hoefer and Jan von Schuckmann,
Management Board members responsible for the reorganization under
the company's own administration.

A strong and efficient "new" centrotherm is being created at the
Group's main site at Blaubeuren, Germany, following the
termination of insolvency proceedings and subsequent merger of
centrotherm thermal solutions with the parent company (the listed
stock corporation).  The subsidiary Anlagenbau GmbH in Dresden,
whose range of products and services rank among core competences,
remains within the Group. Newly-founded SiTec GmbH, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the parent company, is to continue to operate
the & Division, which will push further ahead with the
construction of a polysilicon factory in Qatar, among other
projects.  After the Ulm District Court confirmed centrotherm
photovoltaics AG's insolvency plan on April 26, the proceedings,
which are still running in formal terms, can soon be terminated,
prospectively by the end of May 2013.

                About centrotherm photovoltaics AG

centrotherm photovoltaics AG is one of the globally leading
providers of technology and production solutions to the
photovoltaic and semiconductor industries. Our core competencies
consist in the thermal processing and coating of waiters for the
manufacturing of crystalline solar cells and power
semiconductors, as well as for microelectronics.

HESS AG: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings
The District Court of Villingen-Schwenningen opened insolvency
proceedings over the assets of Hess AG with effect from May 1,
2013.  Previous temporary insolvency administrator lawyer Dr.
Volker Grub, Partnership Grub Brugger & Partner, Stuttgart, was
appointed insolvency administrator.

Furthermore, an application for the revocation of the admission
to the sub-segment of the regulated market with additional post-
admission obligations (Prime Standard) as well as an application
for a delisting of Hess AG shares were filed on May 2.

Hess AG is a German street light maker.

SGL CARBON: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised the
outlook on Germany-based graphite electrode producer SGL Carbon
SE (SGL) to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its 'BB' long-term corporate credit rating on SGL.

S&P also affirmed its 'BBB-' issue rating on SGL's senior secured
notes and its 'BB' issue rating on SGL's senior unsecured notes.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view of the current weak
steel market, the main end-market for SGL's graphite electrodes,
and the uncertainty over potential structural changes in the
market for needle coke (the main raw material for the graphite
electrodes) starting 2014.

In addition, markets are soft for SGL's other divisions: graphite
materials and systems (GMS) and carbon fiber composites (CFC).

As a result, S&P sees a risk that SGL's credit metrics will
deteriorate to below the level commensurate with a 'BB' rating
(adjusted FFO to debt of 20%-25%).  Recently, SGL has revised
downwards its guidance for EBITDA in 2013--the company now
expects an EBITDA drop of 20%-25%.  At the same time, S&P still
recognizes SGL's strong liquidity position.

S&P believes that the relevant European and U.S. steel end
markets for SGL, which account for about 70% of the company's
profits, will contract in 2013.  S&P assumes that steel demand in
Europe will drop by 5%, with muted demand in the U.S.  In
addition, companies outside China added about 6% of new capacity
to the graphite electrode market during 2012.  In S&P's view,
slower demand and additional capacity in the market will lead to
a drop in prices of about 8%-10% this year, and a shorter order
book than usual.

The stronger competitive position of needle coke suppliers also
presents a key strategic challenge for SGL, in S&P's view.
Currently, needle coke producer ConocoPhillips has a market share
of over 50%.  By the end of 2013, ConocoPhillips' agreement to
sell coke to GTI will have expired, and GTI will have the option
to consume the needle coke it produces internally or to remain
a needle coke producer for other graphite electrodes
manufacturers.  In S&P's view, if GTI decides to make its
operations fully vertical, it will result in a more concentrated
needle coke market and perhaps lead to higher prices.  It would
then remain to be seen to what extent SGL and others could pass
over the rise in raw material prices to the steel mini-mills.
This scenario would put significant profit pressure on SGL.

S&P has recently significantly lowered its estimate for SGL's
2013 adjusted EBITDA.  Under S&P's current base-case credit
scenario, it projects that the figure will be about EUR180
million.  This figure is below the EBITDA of about EUR215 million
in 2012 (excluding a EUR54.2 million receivables write-off and
proceeds related to the long-term contract agreement settlement).
SGL's management recently revised downward its guidance for
EBITDA in 2013 and now expects reported EBITDA to be between
EUR180 million and EUR192 million (about EUR205 million to EUR217
million after Standard & Poor's adjustments).  S&P's projection
incorporates the following assumptions:

   -- PP (performance products) division--A drop of 15%-20% in
      EBITDA in 2013 compared with 2012, reflecting flat volume
      year over year and a drop in prices;

   -- GMS division--A slowdown in the main business units leading
      to lower sales volumes.  With relatively high fixed costs,
      this will translate to a drop of 20% in EBITDA compared
      with 2012; and CFC division

   -- Another year of negative contribution to the company's

Those results would probably cause FFO-to-debt to fall slightly
below the level commensurate with the rating, 20%-25%.  In 2012,
SGL recorded FFO to debt of 16.1%.  In S&P's view, unless there
is a material improvement in all the business units, which is
currently not S&P's base case, it cannot expect material
improvement in the credit metrics in 2014.  Should the risks
regarding the needle coke market materialize, ratios could become

The negative outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the rating on SGL by one notch in the coming 12-18 months
if SGL's margins deteriorated materially in 2013-2014, given the
challenging industry outlook for steel (graphite electrodes) and
other carbon end-markets.  S&P could also lower the rating if
SGL's ratio of adjusted FFO to net debt does not recover to
20%-25%, which S&P views as commensurate with the current rating.

S&P could also lower the rating if SGL makes acquisitions without
conservative funding, or increases the leverage of the existing
joint ventures that are currently not consolidated in SGL's
reports (as of March 31, 2013, there was no significant debt in
the joint ventures).

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if there is no structural
change in the needle coke market in 2014 and the situation
improves in SGL's key end-markets, the steel and capital goods
industries.  That would allow the company to generate stronger
free operating cash flows and increase its capacity to reduce

SOLARWORLD AG: Nears Stake Acquisition Deal with Qatari Investor
Anneli Palmen, Alexander Huebner and Regan Doherty at Reuters
report that debt-laden SolarWorld AG is close to securing
financial backing from a Qatari investor.

"We will publish the size of the potential stake at the
extraordinary general meeting," Frank Asbeck, Solarworld's chief
executive, told Reuters on Thursday, declining to name the

According to Reuters, one source familiar with the process said
that Qatar Solar Technologies, a previous joint venture between
SolarWorld and the Qatar Foundation, was willing to take a
minority stake in what was once Germany's largest solar company.

SolarWorld holds 29% of QSTec, and the Qatar Foundation 70%,
Reuters discloses.  The remaining 1% is owned by the Qatar
Development Bank, Reuters notes.

Earlier last week, SolarWorld said it reached a preliminary deal
on restructuring its EUR1.2 billion (US$1.6 billion) debt load,
including a debt-to-equity swap that would hand its creditors
most of the ailing solar group, Reuters relates.

According to Thomson Reuters data, some of SolarWorld's biggest
bondholders in the company include GFC Advisers LLC, Do
Investment AG and Pioneer Investment Management Ltd.

SolarWorld AG is Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.

TRIONISTA TOPCO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B+'
long- and 'B' short-term corporate credit ratings to Trionista
TopCo GmbH, the intermediate holding company of energy sub-
metering group ista International GmbH.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B+' issue rating
and '3' recovery rating on the proposed senior secured credit
facilities and senior secured notes to be issued by Trionista
HoldCo GmbH.  A preliminary recovery rating of '3' indicates
S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.

S&P also assigned its preliminary 'B-' issue rating and '6'
recovery rating to the proposed senior subordinated notes to be
issued by Trionista TopCo GmbH.  A preliminary recovery rating of
'6' indicates S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
prospects in an event of default.

The final ratings will be subject to the successful closing of
the proposed issuance and will depend on S&P's receipt and
satisfactory review of all final transaction documentation.
Accordingly, the preliminary ratings should not be construed as
evidence of the final ratings.  If the final debt amounts and the
terms of the final documentation--including, notably, the
security provided to the noteholders--depart from the materials
S&P has already reviewed, or if S&P do not receive the final
documentation within what it considers to be a reasonable time
frame, it reserves the right to withdraw or revise its ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the company's
"highly leveraged" financial risk profile and "satisfactory"
business risk profile, as defined in its criteria.

Ista's "highly leveraged" financial risk profile is constrained
by the group's weak cash flow adequacy and credit measures.
S&P's assessment also takes into consideration what it views as
aggressive financial policies.  This is partly offset by an
"adequate" liquidity and availability under the committed credit

Ista's proposed new debt structure consists of senior secured
debt of a EUR1.15 billion term loan facility and EUR500 million
senior secured notes, as well as senior subordinated notes of
EUR525 million.  The capital structure also includes preferred
equity certificates (PECs) of EUR500 million.  S&P treats the
latter as debt under its criteria because it do not view the
instrument as being a permanent feature of the group's capital
structure, given maturity in 2028.  S&P also adjusts the group's
reported debt for operating leases and pension liabilities, which
were EUR44.8 million and EUR34.5 million, respectively, at the
end of 2012 and are not expected to change materially in the
coming years.

In S&P's base-case credit scenario, it anticipates that Ista's
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA and funds from
operations will be about 8.9x and 6%, respectively, at the end of
2013 (about 7.2x and 8% without the PECs).  S&P further expects
EBITDA cash interest coverage to be about 2.2x.  S&P expects the
group's cash flow generation to improve gradually over the next
few years as a result of price increases within the German sub-
metering market and a broadly favorable regulatory environment
across the other countries in which Ista operates.  This will, in
S&P's view, support improvements in the company's credit metrics.

S&P assess the business risk profile of ista as "satisfactory,"
supported by the group's leading position in the global energy
sub-metering market, reflecting its long experience both on the
mature German market (55% of group revenues) as well as
internationally.  In addition, the essential and nondiscretionary
nature of water and heat sub-metering leads to high operating
margins and provides stable and predictable cash flows.  Partly
offsetting these strengths is the lack of product and service
diversification, coupled with limited growth prospects in the
core German market due to low growth in new housing construction
and limited possibilities for increasing market share.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that operating margins
will remain robust and that the company's operations will
continue to deliver stable and predictable cash flows, allowing
for gradual deleveraging and improvements in credit metrics.  S&P
expects ista will maintain an adjusted EBITDA cash interest
coverage of at least 2x.  S&P also assumes that ista will
maintain "adequate" liquidity, as defined by its criteria.

S&P could lower the rating if the group's revenues and
profitability were to weaken, stemming for example from
unexpected regulatory changes or increased competition.  Downside
rating pressure could also be triggered by lower-than-expected
free cash flow generation or liquidity pressures.

S&P considers that rating upside is limited at this stage because
of the group's high leverage and aggressive financial policies.
S&P could raise the rating on ista if the group reported much-
better-than-anticipated credit measures, but S&P currently views
this scenario as remote.


AGRICULTURAL BANK: European Union Okays Liquidation Aid
Vanessa Mock at Dow Jones Newswires reports that the European
Union has approved liquidation aid for the Agricultural Bank of
Greece, or ATE SA, saying the measure was limited to the minimum
needed to ensure the lender's orderly resolution.

ATE Bank, which was Greece's fifth-largest bank, was liquidated
in July 2012, with certain assets and liabilities transferred to
Piraeus Bank SA, Dow Jones recounts.  The Greek state was
previously the bank's main shareholder, Dow Jones notes.

ATE's remaining assets and liabilities were put into a so-called
"bad bank" to be wound down, Dow Jones discloses.

According to Dow Jones, the European Commission, which reviews
state aid measures, assessed the following support measures for
ATE: a 2011 recapitalization of EUR290 million (US$381 million);
aid of EUR7,471 million to plug the funding gap between assets
and liabilities and a recapitalization of EUR570 million for the
transferred activities.

"The commission found that integration of the transferred
activities into Piraeus Bank should ensure their viability in the
long term, in particular in view of Greece's commitments
regarding the integration," Dow Jones quotes the EU Commission as
saying in a statement.

"Moreover, the aid granted in favor of the transferred activities
was limited to the minimum necessary to make the transaction

The Agricultural Bank of Greece is a commercial bank based in
Athens, Greece.


KAPUVARI HUS: Fails to Attracts Any Offers
MTI-Econews reports that bailiff Pal Peter Jendrolovics said
troubled meat companies Kapuvari Hus and Kapuvari Bacon, which
used to operate a plant in Kapuvar, has failed to attract any

"Now we have to decide to whether to call a new round to sell the
assets together or to try to sell them piece by piece," MTI
quotes Mr. Jendrolovics as saying.

The companies were ordered under liquidation last autumn,
resulting in the layoff of more than 200 workers, MTI recounts.


VIVO SHELL: High Court Extends Court Protection to June 1
Fiona Gartland at The Irish Times reports that Vivo Shell Ltd.
and related company Lafferty's Creeslough Ltd. have been given
extended protection at the High Court after local residents
launched a campaign to help keep them in business.

According to the Irish Times, Mr. Justice Peter Kelly said on
Thursday he was concerned at the length of time the examinership
was taking for both businesses.  But Mr. Justice Kelly, as cited
by the Irish Times, said he was also aware there were "25 jobs at
stake" and there was "a good deal of support in the area,
evidenced by a meeting of residents".

He agreed to extend the time to complete examinership to June 1,
which he said was "the outer limit" of what legislation would
allow, the Irish Times discloses.

The companies went into examinership in February, giving them
protection from creditors until a debt repayment arrangement
process is complete, the Irish Times recounts.  Local residents
organized a "Save Our Village" campaign in response, the Irish
Times states.

In court on Thursday, Mr. Justice Kelly was told there were two
potential investors for the businesses and it was expected they
would make offers by the 22nd of this month, the Irish Times
relates.  Owner Danny Lafferty also intended to sell some non-
core property at public auction later this month, the proceeds of
which would be used to pay creditors, the Irish Times notes.

Vivo Shell Ltd. is a supermarket and filling station in Co

* IRELAND: EU Commission Lifts Deficit Forecast on IBRC Wind-Down
Dara Doyle at Bloomberg News reports that the European Commission
said Ireland's deficit will be 7.5% of gross domestic product
this year, raising a February forecast of 7.3%.

According to Bloomberg, the Commission raised the forecast partly
because of the higher-than-expected costs of liquidating the
Irish Bank Resolution Corp.  Bloomberg relates that the
Commission said on Friday the deficit will narrow to 4.3% next
year as the government pushes on with austerity measures.


CELL THERAPEUTICS: Net Fin'l Standing at US$26.6MM as of March 31
Cell Therapeutics, Inc., provided information pursuant to a
request from the Italian securities regulatory authority, CONSOB,
pursuant to Article 114, Section 5 of the Unified Financial Act,
that the Company issue at the end of each month a press release
providing a monthly update of certain information relating to the
Company's financial situation.

The total estimated and unaudited net financial standing of CTI
Parent Company as of March 31, 2013, was US$26.6 million.  The
total estimated and unaudited net financial standing of CTI
Consolidated Group as of March 31, 2013, was US$29.9 million.

During the month of March 2013, the Company's common stock, no
par value, outstanding increased by 2,748,536 shares.
Consequently, the number of issued and outstanding shares of
Common Stock as of March 31, 2013, was 112,639,301.

A full-text copy of the press release is available at:


                      About Cell Therapeutics

Headquartered in Seattle, Washington, Cell Therapeutics, Inc.
(NASDAQ and MTA: CTIC) -- is
a biopharmaceutical company committed to developing an integrated
portfolio of oncology products aimed at making cancer more

Cell Therapeutics reported a net loss attributable to CTI of
US$62.36 million in 2011, compared with a net loss attributable
to CTI of US$82.64 million in 2010.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2012, showed
US$36.17 million in total assets, US$32.60 million in total
liabilities, US$13.46 million in common stock purchase warrants,
and a US$9.89 million total shareholders' deficit.

                    Going Concern Doubt Raised

The report of Marcum LLP, in San Francisco, Calif., dated
March 8, 2012, expressed an unqualified opinion, with an
explanatory paragraph as to the uncertainty regarding the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company's available cash and cash equivalents are US$47.1
million as of Dec. 31, 2011.  The Company's total current
liabilities were US$17.8 million as of Dec. 31, 2011.  The
Company does not expect that it will have sufficient cash to fund
its planned operations beyond the second quarter of 2012, which
raises substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue
as a going concern.

                        Bankruptcy Warning

The Form 10-K for the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, noted that if the
Company receives approval of Pixuvri by the EMA or the FDA, it
would anticipate significant additional commercial expenses
associated with Pixuvri operations.  Accordingly, the Company
will need to raise additional funds and are currently exploring
alternative sources of equity or debt financing.  The Company may
seek to raise that capital through public or private equity
financings, partnerships, joint ventures, disposition of assets,
debt financings or restructurings, bank borrowings or other
sources of financing.  However, the Company has a limited number
of authorized shares of common stock available for issuance and
additional funding may not be available on favorable terms or at
all.  If additional funds are raised by issuing equity
securities, substantial dilution to existing shareholders may
result.  If the Company fails to obtain additional capital when
needed, it may be required to delay, scale back, or eliminate
some or all of its research and development programs and may be
forced to cease operations, liquidate its assets and possibly
seek bankruptcy protection.

COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA: Servicing Amendments No Impact on Ratings
Moody's says the amendments to the transaction would not, in and
of itself and as of this time, result in the downgrade or
withdrawal of the rated notes issued by Compagnia Finanziaria 1
S.r.l. - 2007.

The amendments executed on the April 12 described in the
additional services agreement and servicing amendment agreement
result in the appointment of Zenith Services S.p.A. as master
servicer and in the appointment of Societa Gestione Crediti Delta
S.p.A. as new servicer which in turn delegates the servicing
functions to Carifin Italia SPA and Plusvalore SPA. The
amendments also include the creation of a cash reserve at the
next interest payment date as described in the master amendment

Moody's ran different stressed scenarios on the potential loss of
cash collections collected by and on accounts of Carifin Italia
SPA and Plusvalore SPA for the benefit of the issuer. Moody's
also took into account in its analysis the repayment of the Class
B notes at the next interest payment date and the remaining short
time exposure on the Class C notes based on current stream of

Moody's has determined that the amendments, in and of itself and
at this time, will not result in the downgrade or withdrawal of
the ratings currently assigned to the Class B notes rated Ba1 and
to the Class C notes rated Ba3. However, Moody's opinion
addresses only the credit impact associated with the proposed
amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to
whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for the Class B notes and Class C notes
was taken on July 22, 2010. Moody's carries these non-prime

Class B, Pass-Thru CTFS; Ba1
Class C, Pass-Thru CTFS; Ba3

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions" published in
October 2012.

GAMING INVEST: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional corporate family
rating of (P)B2 to Gaming Invest S.a.r.l., which is the ultimate
parent holding company of Sisal Holding Istituto di Pagamento
S.p.A. Sisal is the parent holding company of the subsidiary
guarantors to the group's senior credit facilities and proposed
senior secured notes.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating to
Sisal's proposed EUR 275 million senior secured notes due 2017.
This is the first time that Moody's has assigned ratings to
Gaming Invest and Sisal.

"The (P)B2 CFR reflects Sisal's high financial leverage and low
interest coverage, offset by our expectation that the company is
likely to maintain its adequate cash position and generate
adequate levels of unencumbered future free cash flow," says
Anthony Hill, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for Sisal.

Sisal recently announced a proposed refinancing transaction that
is expected to result in the maturity extension of some of the
company's senior secured credit facilities and the proposed
issuance of EUR275 million senior secured notes due 2017. Moody's
anticipates that it will convert the provisional CFR to final
once the proposed refinancing transaction, including the maturity
extension, has completed.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of debt instruments and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the debt. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

Sisal's (P)B2 CFR reflects the company's high financial leverage
and low interest coverage, which Moody's expects will
respectively be around 6.5x debt/EBITDA and 0.7x EBIT/interest
expense (on a Moody's-adjusted basis) for the financial year-end
December 2012 (FYE 2012) and pro forma the transaction.
Furthermore, with net revenues of EUR 823 million for FYE 2012
derived solely from Italy, the rating agency views Sisal's scale
as being somewhat limited.

Despite the typically low level of cyclicality in gaming
operations, the company is still significantly exposed to Italian
consumer discretionary spending behavior, which Moody's expects
will be negative for at least the next 12 months. The rating also
reflects Moody's cautious outlook regarding the company's high
level of exposure to the Italian gaming regulatory framework and
tax regime, which both can be subject to unforeseen changes that
may adversely affect Sisal.

However, more positively, the (P)B2 CFR also reflects Moody's
view that Sisal has (1) a solid market presence and name
recognition as an iconic Italian gaming company, known for
providing a safe and responsible gaming experience; (2) an
adequate cash position and positive underlying free-cash flow
generation; (3) potential for deleveraging over the coming
quarters due to expected cash generation; and (4) a long-term,
well protected, concession business model which positively
militates against earnings volatility that may occur due to
changes in the regulatory framework or tax laws.

Sisal's liquidity position, pro forma the transaction, will be
adequate for its near-term requirements. Pro forma the
transaction, Moody's expects the company to exhibit an adjusted
non-restricted cash balance of approximately EUR 80 million at
FYE 2012. Internally generated cash flow is also expected by
Moody's to adequately cover the company's ongoing basic cash
needs, such as debt service and amortization, working capital
needs and expected capital expenditures.


The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Sisal
will maintain its current operating performance. Whilst adjusted
leverage is high for the rating category, the rating agency
expects that the company will reduce slightly its indebtedness
over the next 18 months and maintain its adequate liquidity
profile. Moody's has also assumed that any debt-funded
acquisition activity will be small in nature.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Positive pressure on the rating could materialize if Sisal (1)
maintains its adequate liquidity profile; (2) generates a
sustained Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin of around 13%; and (3)
improves its leverage profile such that its Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA ratio falls below 5.0x.

Conversely, negative pressure on the ratings would emerge if
Sisal's liquidity profile and credit metrics deteriorate as a
result of (1) a weakening of its operational performance; (2)
acquisitions; (3) an aggressive change in its financial policy;
or (4) adverse regulatory action. Quantitatively, Moody's would
also consider downgrading Sisal's ratings if (1) the company's
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio rises above 6.5x; or (2) its
Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin falls sustainably below 6%.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Gaming published in December 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Sisal is an Italian gaming and
convenience payment service provider. For FYE 2012, Moody's
estimates that the company's Moody's-adjusted revenues and
EBITDA, pro forma the transaction and on an unaudited basis, will
be approximately EUR823 million and EUR174 million, respectively.
Moody's expects 100% of the company's 2012 revenues to have been
generated from Italy.

* ITALY: February 2013 RMBS Market Performance Deteriorates
The performance of the Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market deteriorated in February 2013, according
to the latest indices published by Moody's Investors Service.

The overall cumulative default rate (as of original pool balance
plus cumulative replenishment) index rose to 2.8% in February
2013 from 2.6% a year earlier. The 2008 vintage recorded the
highest default rate, increasing to 4.1% in February 2013 from
2.7% a year earlier, mostly due to the performance of Apulia
Finance N. 4 S.r.l. -- Series 2, Apulia Finance N. 4 S.r.l. --
Series 2008-2 and Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages S.r.l., the
cumulative default rates for which were 10.3%, 7.5% and 19.5%,

The 60+ day delinquencies and 90+ day delinquencies indices
increased during the year leading to February 2013, peaking in
December 2012 at 2.5% and 1.9%, respectively, a level that has
not been reached since 2009. However, Moody's noted a
stabilization in February 2013 with 60+ day delinquencies
decreasing to 2% from 2.1% a year earlier and 90+ day
delinquencies remaining stable at around 1.6%. The prepayment
rate index continued its decline, standing at 2.6% in February

Moody's outlook for Italian RMBS is negative. Moody's expects
that the unemployment rate in Italy will increase to 11.5% in
2013 from 11.0% in 2012. Italian house prices will continue to
fall in 2013, which will increase losses on foreclosed

On March 11, 2013, Moody's placed 44 notes on review for
downgrade due to potentially insufficient credit enhancement,
driven by the introduction of additional factors in Moody's
analysis to better measure the impact of sovereign risk on
structured finance transactions. On March 22, 2013, the rating
agency placed two further notes on review for downgrade due to
exposure to counterparties acting as issuer account bank.
Currently, 107 classes are on review for downgrade.

On March 11, 2013, Moody's published an update on the approach to
rating Italian RMBS containing assumptions used by the Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis model.

As of February 2013, 120 transactions are outstanding with a
total pool balance of EUR83.4 billion, down from EUR119.3 billion
in February 2012. In the three month leading to February 2013,
three transactions have been repaid early (Pontormo Mortgages
S.r.l., BPL Mortgages Series 4, CREDICO FINANCE 2 S.R.L.) and one
transaction has been closed (Agrobresciano SPV S.r.l.) with a
total pool of EUR143 million.

The reserve funds of 36 transactions are currently below their
target levels, of which six are fully drawn down.


* LATVIA: Rising Non-Residential Deposits Exert Pressure on Banks
Rising levels of non-residential deposit levels within the
Latvian banking system are credit negative, says Moody's
Investors Service in a new Special Comment entitled "Increasing
Non-Resident Deposits in Latvia are Credit Negative for the
Banking System."

Moody's says that the negative pressure arises from (1) the fact
that deposits are the main funding source for Latvian banks,
particularly for banks that lack parental funding; and (2) the
rating agency's view that non-resident deposits (currently 49% of
total deposits at end-2012) are inherently less stable than their
resident counterparts.

Non-resident business is driven by events in both the host
banking system and in the non-resident's home nation, and
although not uniformly distributed across the banks, levels have
increased in recent years. Moody's says that the increase in
these deposit levels are mainly due to the recovery of the
Latvian economy and the problems within some rival systems. At
the same time, these deposits (mainly from the Commonwealth of
Independent States) have played a significant role in the Latvian
banking system since the conclusion of EU accession negotiations
at the European Council (Copenhagen) in December 2002.

Moody's says that non-resident deposits pose additional risks
because they introduce extra complexity into the banking system
that further challenges system-wide stability.


UKIO BANKAS: Kaunas Court Commences Bankruptcy Proceedings
Bryan Bradley at Bloomberg News reports that a Lithuanian court
began bankruptcy proceedings against Ukio Bankas AB at the
request of the central bank, which shut the Kaunas-based lender
in February because of risky loans to related parties.

According to Bloomberg, the court said on its Website that Kaunas
District Court on Thursday also issued a decree naming the firm
Valnetas UAB as Ukio's bankruptcy administrator.  The statement
said that the decisions may be appealed within 10 days, Bloomberg

The Bank of Lithuania, citing financial statements prepared by
Ukio's temporary administrator, Adomas Audickas, and auditor KPMG
Baltic, said last month that the lender's liabilities exceeded
its assets by LTL1.2 billion (US$463 million) as of March 18,
Bloomberg recounts.

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Audickas said in a phone interview on
April 30 the permanent bankruptcy administrator will determine
how and when to seek recovery of Ukio's assets, which include
claims on a majority stake in Scottish premier-league soccer club
Heart of Midlothian as well as the team's stadium in Edinburgh.

                       About Ukio Bankas

Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies.  It
is Lithuania's sixth largest lender by assets.  The Central Bank
suspended Ukio Bankas' operations on Feb. 12, 2013, after it was
established the lender had been involved in risky activities.  A
majority 64.9% of Ukio Bankas had been owned by Russian born-
businessman Vladimir Romanov.


GLOBE LUXEMBOURG: S&P Rates US$500-Mil. Senior Secured Notes 'B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B' issue rating on the proposed $500 million senior secured
notes due 2018, to be issued by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Globe Luxembourg S.C.A.

S&P understands that the proceeds from the proposed notes will be
passed through to the proposed loan (facility D1) borrowers
(Norwegian entities) via a back-to-back loan, which will be used
to prepay certain tranches of KCA DEUTAG's senior secured
facilities, EUR379 million term loan B, and EUR71 million drawing
under the incremental capital expenditure (capex) facility.  The
issue rating on facility D1 and on the other senior secured
facilities is 'B'.  The recovery rating on the proposed loan and
other senior secured facilities is '4', reflecting S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default, although it sees recovery being at the high end
of this range.

The issue ratings on the proposed senior secured notes reflect
the notes' first-ranking security interest over Globe Luxembourg
S.C.A.'s rights to, and benefit in, the proposed facility D1,
which will in turn have all the same rights (in terms of security
and guarantee package) as a lender under KCA DEUTAG's existing
bank facilities.

                        RECOVERY ANALYSIS

The recovery ratings on the facilities reflect their fairly
comprehensive security package, comprising share pledges over the
company and its main subsidiaries and pledges over all assets
(receivables, inventory, stock and goods, and vehicles and
machinery) of certain subsidiaries.  The ratings also reflect a
guarantee by entities representing, as of Dec. 31, 2012, 52% of
consolidated EBITDA and 75% of consolidated revenue.  However,
the ratings on these facilities are constrained at the '4'
recovery rating level by the substantial levels of first lien
debt, which dilutes recovery prospects.

Globe Luxembourg S.C.A. is an orphan SPV whose activity is
limited only to the issue of the proposed notes and the onlending
of the proceeds to facility D1 borrowers.  These features offset
the fact that neither KCA DEUTAG nor any of its subsidiaries will
guarantee or provide any credit support to Globe Luxembourg
S.C.A., and that the proposed notes will not have a direct claim
on the cash flows and assets of the KCA DEUTAG group.  The
ratings on the proposed notes reflect, therefore, the issue
ratings on the proposed facility D1.  Any change to the
preliminary documentation related to the pass-through features
and other legal aspects of the transaction could have a material
effect on the ratings on the proposed notes.

Since the group is well-diversified in terms of revenues and
EBITDA generation, any insolvency process could possibly
incorporate multijurisdictional proceedings, which would likely
have a negative effect on ultimate recovery.  For further
information, see "COMIs in EU Insolvency Proceedings And Their
Bearing On Standard & Poor's Recovery Ratings," published July 8,
2008, and "Debt Recovery For Creditors And The Law Of Insolvency
In The U.K.," published June 25, 2007, on RatingsDirect.

S&P assumes that a default would be triggered by cyclical stress,
resulting in operating margin erosion, combined with a highly
leveraged capital structure.  Consequently, S&P believes that
lenders would achieve greater value through reorganization rather
than through a liquidation of assets.  In addition, S&P assumes
that both the EUR75 million revolving credit facility and the new
EUR50 million incremental revolving facility A will be fully
drawn at default, and the capex facility will be partially drawn
for future acquisitions.  S&P's hypothetical default scenario
projects a payment default in 2016.

Under S&P's default scenario, it anticipates that EBITDA will
have declined to about US$194 million.  Assuming a stressed
multiple of 4.5x, S&P calculates a stressed enterprise value of
about US$872 million at the hypothetical point of default.  After
deducting priority liabilities of about US$144 million,
comprising mainly enforcement costs and 50% of pension deficits,
about US$728 million remains for the senior secured debtholders.

S&P assumes that about $1.5 billion of debt will be outstanding
at default (including six months of prepetition interest),
assuming full drawing under both the EUR75 million revolving
credit facility and the new EUR50 million incremental revolving
facility A and partial drawing under the capex facility,
resulting in average (30%-50%) recovery prospects, albeit at the
high end of  this range.  This translates into a recovery rating
of '4'.


HYVA GLOBAL: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Netherlands-based Hyva Global's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured debt
rating to 'B' from 'B+'. The Outlook on the IDR is Negative.
Fitch has also downgraded Hyva's USD senior secured notes due
2016 to 'B' from 'B+'. The notes are guaranteed by Hyva Holding
B.V. and certain restricted subsidiaries.

Simultaneously Fitch has downgraded Hyva Holding's Long-Term IDR
and senior unsecured debt ratings to 'B' from 'B+' and has
withdrawn the subsidiary's ratings. The Outlook on the IDR is
Negative. The withdrawal is due to the reorganization of the Hyva
Group following the acquisition of Hyva Holding by Hyva Global in

Key Rating Drivers
Slowdown in key markets: A slump in demand for heavy duty trucks,
which started in H211 due to weak economic growth, continued
throughout 2012 across all regions. As a result, Hyva's revenue
fell by more than 20% in 2012, especially in in its key markets,
China and India. Fitch expects improvement in the coming quarters
but the scope of the recovery remains uncertain.

Deterioration in credit metrics: EBITDA was flat at USD56m in
2012. Adjusted for transaction-related costs in 2011, both
profits and margin declined significantly in 2012, reflecting a
decline in revenue. Fitch expects modest profit improvement over
the next two to three years, reflecting revenue growth and
ongoing cost cutting efforts. However, funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted net leverage is likely to remain above 5.0x (9.0x
in 2012) and FFO interest coverage below 1.5x (0.9x in 2012) for
the next two years.

Cash-generating capability: Working capital needs peaked in H112
with increase of inventory but through active working capital
management, the company was able to reduce inventory during H212
and generate negative working capital for the full year. The
company ended 2012 with a near free cash flow-neutral position.
Fitch expects the company to generate positive free cash flow
going forward with improvement in operations and moderate capex.

Robust market presence: Hyva's ratings are also supported by its
strong market presence in its niche markets and well-diversified
geographical sales base, with a strong focus on high-growth
emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil.

Liquidity remains adequate: The company breached covenants for a
USD30m revolving credit facility as of December 2012. As such, it
no longer has access to the facility. However, the company had
not used the facility for the past nine months. Fitch further
believes its existing cash position of USD89m as of December 2012
was adequate as its senior notes, which account for nearly all of
its existing debt, do not mature until 2016.

Rating Sensitivities

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include

  - FFO adjusted net leverage rising above 5.5x on a sustained

  - FFO interest coverage falling below 1.5x on a sustained basis

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action (back to Stable
Outlook) include

  - FFO adjusted net leverage falling below 5.5x on a sustained

  - FFO interest coverage rising above 1.5x on a sustained basis

  - Sustained positive free cash flow

MONASTERY 2006-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on Monastery 2006-I
B.V.'s class A2, B, and C notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
Monastery 2006-I B.V.'s class D notes, and has affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on Monastery 2004-I
B.V.'s class A2, B, C, and D notes.

The rating actions reflect what S&P considers to be the
transactions' increased credit risk following recent house price
declines and the reduced available credit enhancement due to
recent significant reserve fund draws.  S&P's rating actions also
reflect its analysis of set-off risk as a result of duty-of-care
claims and its counterparty risk analysis.

On Jan. 15, 2013, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on all classes of notes in Monastery 2004-I and Monastery 2006-I.

On the prior interest payment dates (IPDs), both transactions
realized "one off" residual debt losses of approximately 1.1% of
each transaction.  The recognition of these losses contributed to
reserve fund draws of EUR2.7 million in Monastery 2004-I and
EUR5.3 million in Monastery 2006-I, reducing the available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes.


In September 2011, DSB Bank's insolvency administrator and
consumer organizations entered into a framework agreement to
clarify the extent and potential set-off amount of these claims.
The agreement is to allow borrowers to offset compensation
amounts against their outstanding loan balance.  Under the
agreement, compensation amounts will first be set off against any
arrears, and borrowers will subsequently set off against the
principal amount outstanding of any loan at their discretion--
most likely the loans bearing the highest interest rate.

In October 2011, DSB's bankruptcy trustee estimated the maximum
potential impact of duty-of-care claims at EUR10 million in
Monastery 2004-I and EUR15 million in Monastery 2006-I.  Claims
completed and processed have been provisioned to the respective
principal deficiency ledgers, and to date, are in line with S&P's
January 2012 assumptions.

As at December 2012, the realized cumulative losses due to
completed and processed duty-of-care claims amount to
EUR2.2 million in Monastery 2004-I and EUR5.3 million in
Monastery 2006-I.  S&P understands that each of the issuers has
claimed against the DSB Bank estate on the basis of, among other
factors, a breach of the representations and warranties DSB Bank
provided at sale to the issuer.  To date, the issuers have
received EUR0.5 million in Monastery 2004-I and EUR1.2 million in
Monastery 2006-I, representing a payout ratio of 27% of the
amount claimed. However, given the uncertainty as to the recovery
timings, and as the issuers would be one of a number of unsecured
claimants against DSB Bank's insolvency, S&P has not considered
any future potential recoveries in its analysis.

                            CREDIT RISK

The collateral performance of these transactions deteriorated
following DSB Bank's insolvency in October 2009.  The
transactions suffered a significant increase in arrears over a
12-month period and an increase in losses.  However, the
performance has shown signs of stabilizing, in S&P's view.  In
the past 12 months, 90+ days arrears have fallen to 5.9% from
7.1% in Monastery 2004-I and to 4.3% from 5.1% in Monastery 2006-
I, which can be partially explained by the duty-of-care
compensation amounts first being set-off against arrears amounts.

Monastery 2004-I currently has a pool factor (the amount of
principal left to be distributed in the transaction) of
approximately 30%.  Available credit enhancement for all classes
of notes has improved since closing.  The reserve fund currently
provides 1.75% credit enhancement (compared with 3.70% at S&P's
previous credit and cash flow review in January 2012) to the
notes and is at 41% of its target level.  In S&P's view, the
reserve fund will somewhat mitigate the set-off risk relating to
potential duty-of-care claims.

Monastery 2006-I currently has a pool factor of approximately
58%. Available credit enhancement for all but the class D notes
has improved since closing.  The reserve fund currently provides
0.56% credit enhancement (compared with 1.93% at S&P's previous
credit and cash flow review) to the notes and is at 26% of its
target level.  The reserve fund will somewhat mitigate the set-
off risk relating to potential duty-of-care claims.

Cumulative losses have increased on the most recent IPDs: To
1.70% for Monastery 2004-I, and to 1.90% for Monastery 2006-I.

S&P has observed an increase in its weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) assumptions at all rating levels since its last
full credit and cash flow review.  This has been primarily due to
the decline in Dutch house prices, which has increased S&P's
estimate of the weighted-average loan-to-foreclosure value for
the pool and has increased its WALS assumptions.  S&P's weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions have reduced
slightly below 'AA' rating levels, primarily due to the lower
arrears observed since S&P's last full review.

Monastery 2004-I

Rating level          WAFF (%)       WALS (%)
AAA                      23.2           41.1
AA                       19.5           37.3
A                        15.5           31.8
BBB                      10.7           28.3
BB                        8.8           22.5

Monastery 2006-I
Rating level           WAFF (%)     WALS (%)
AAA                     24.4            48.5
AA                      20.2            45.0
A                       15.4            39.9
BBB                     10.5            36.5
BB                       8.4            30.8

S&P's analysis includes its expectation of a reduction in the
asset pools' balance (and a subsequent reduction in the reserve
fund as a result of the related realized loss) through set-off
risk.  This risk arises from duty-of-care claims relating to
overextension of credit and the misselling of insurance by DSB

Following a review of these factors, S&P has lowered and removed
from CreditWatch negative its ratings on Monastery 2006-I's class
A2, B, and C notes to reflect the results of its credit and cash
flow analysis.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed and removed
from CreditWatch negative its rating on Monastery 2006-I's class
D notes and has affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
its ratings on all classes of notes in Monastery 2004-I.  This is
because S&P considers that its ratings remain commensurate with
the levels achieved in our cash flow analysis.

                      COUNTERPARTY CRITERIA

In March 2012, Monastery 2004-I's swap agreement was novated to
DSB Bank's bankruptcy trustee, with a guarantee from Cooperatieve
Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank Nederland).
The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC is the swap counterparty in
Monastery 2006-I.  S&P do not consider the swap agreements for
either transaction to be in line with its 2012 counterparty
criteria.  The swap agreements reflect a replacement framework
that is in line with a previous version of S&P's counterparty
criteria.  Therefore, under S&P's current criteria, the highest
potential rating on the notes in these transactions is equal to
the issuer credit rating on the swap guarantor (for Monastery
2004-I) and swap counterparty (for Monastery 2006-I) plus one


S&P understands that the noteholders have voted in favor of Quion
Services B.V. being the transactions' servicer.  The migration of
servicing to Quion was originally scheduled for 2012, but a
number of operational issues have resulted in delays.  S&P
understands that June 2013 is the revised target date for Quion
to assume servicing responsibilities.  Under the subdelegation
agreement, Quion will service DSB Bank's portfolios for an
initial period of
five years.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class               Rating
          To                    From

Monastery 2006-I B.V.
EUR875 Million Secured Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2        A- (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
B         BB- (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C         B- (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

D         CCC (sf)              CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Monastery 2004-I B.V.
EUR861 Million Secured Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2        AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         A (sf)                A (sf)/Watch Neg
C         BBB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
D         BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg


AYT CAIXA: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E2 Notes to 'D'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded AyT Caixa Galicia Empresas I, FTA's
class E2 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and subsequently withdrawn the
rating. The remaining senior class A, B, C, D and E1 notes have
paid in full.

Key Rating Drivers

AyT Caixa Galicia Empresas I, FTA, a Spanish SME CLO, was
liquidated early on April 29, 2013, using proceeds from the sale
of the entire portfolio of SME loans. The class A, B, C, D and E1
notes were redeemed in full with the proceeds of the sale.
However, the class E2 notes did not receive the entire principal
owed and therefore experienced a partial loss. The class E1 and
E2 notes were not backed by SME loans as they were issued to fund
the reserve fund at the closing date in November 2007.

Since the last annual review in April 2012, cumulative defaults
have increased marginally to 2.9% from 2.6% of the initial
portfolio balance. In January, the portfolio represented 25% of
its original size.

AYT COLATERALES: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AyT Colaterales Global Empresas, FTA,
Serie Caja Circulo I's notes, as follows:

EUR9,899,336 Class A: affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to
Negative from Stable

EUR13,000,000 Class B: affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to
Negative from Stable

EUR10,400,000 Class C: affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative

EUR10,400,000 Class D: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative


The affirmation of the class A and the class B notes reflects the
increased credit enhancement (CE) levels, due to portfolio
deleveraging. The notes are capped at 'A-sf' three notches above
the Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of the transaction's
account bank, CECABANK ('BBB-'/Negative/'F3'). The Negative
Outlook on the class A and class B notes reflects Fitch's view
that any downgrade of CECABANK would lead to a downgrade of the
notes due to the rating linkage.

The affirmation of the class C and D notes reflects the increased
levels of CE, due to structural deleveraging, which has allowed
the notes to withstand the portfolio's volatile performance. The
class C notes' CE is provided by subordination of the class D
notes and the reserve fund (RF) of EUR5.8m held with CECABANK.
The Negative Outlook on the class C notes reflects Fitch's view
that if CECABANK is downgraded below 'BBB-', the class C notes'
CE is not sufficient to withstand a 'BBB-sf' rating stress,
assuming no RF in place. The Negative Outlook on the class D
notes reflects the notes' sensitivity to deterioration in
portfolio credit quality and the increasing obligor

As of the latest investor report in November 2012, the portfolio
has amortized to 39.2% of its initial balance. Loans more than 90
days in arrears account for 3.7% of outstanding portfolio
balance, down from 7.2% in May 2012. Current defaults have
increased to 14.2% of the pool compared to 10.1%. The largest
obligor accounts for 5.6% of outstanding portfolio balance and
the ten largest obligors account for37.7% of the outstanding
portfolio balance.

The current portfolio information provided to Fitch by Ahorro y
Titulizacion, SGFT, SA (AyT, the management company or Gestora)
for the analysis was missing essential fields. Fitch has overcome
the data issues by cross-linking the complete original portfolio
data and information provided by AyT in the closing collateral
data tape. Fitch has not received updated valuations on the
property values. This was addressed in the agency's rating
analysis by applying severe market value decline (MVD) stresses
for commercial properties, which constitute most of the
collateral. The MVD stress at the 'AA-sf' level is 75%.


Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of zero to two notches for
the notes.

Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of zero to one notch for
the notes.

AyT Colaterales Global Empresas, F.T.A., Serie Caja Circulo I
(the issuer) is a static cash flow SME CLO originated by Caja de
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad del Circulo Catolico de Obreros de
Burgos (Caja Circulo), now part of Banco Grupo Caja 3 S.A.
('BB+'/Rating Watch Negative/'B'). At closing, the issuer used
the note proceeds to purchase a EUR130 million portfolio of
secured and unsecured loans granted to Spanish small and medium
enterprises and self-employed individuals.


TURKIYE FINANS: Fitch Assigns 'bb-' Viability Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi A.S.'s
Sukuk issue a final rating of 'BBB'.

Key Rating Drivers

The 'BBB' rating assigned to the Sukuk is driven solely by
Turkiye Finans' Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'BBB' as the Sukuk structure is viewed as an originator-
backed/asset-based structure. According to Fitch's criteria, the
Sukuk rating is directly linked to Turkiye Finans' Long-term IDR.

By assigning a rating to the issue, Fitch does not express an
opinion on the Sukuk structure's compliance with Shariah
principles or whether the relevant transaction documents are
enforceable under any applicable law, including, without
limitation, English and Turkish law.


Fitch would expect the Sukuk rating to move in tandem with, and
be sensitive to any change in, Turkiye Finans' Long-term foreign
currency IDR, which is, in turn, driven by Fitch's view of
potential support from its majority shareholder.

Turkiye Finans engages in interest-free banking - primarily with
SMEs and corporate clients. It is a small but growing bank, 66.3%
owned by the The National Commercial Bank ('A+'/Stable) of Saudi

Turkiye Finans is currently rated as follows:

Long-term foreign currency IDR 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Long-term local currency IDR 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR 'F3'
Short-term local currency IDR 'F2'
National Long-term rating 'AAA(tur)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating 'bb-'
Support Rating '2'

YAPIKREDI BANKASI: Moody's Changes Outlook on D+ BFSR to Negative
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook to negative from
stable on the D+ standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR), equivalent to a ba1 baseline credit assessment (BCA), of
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS (YapiKredi).

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the bank's (1) D+ BFSR; (2)
Baa2 long-term and Prime-3 short-term local-currency deposit
ratings; (3) Baa2 long-term foreign-currency senior and the Ba1
long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt ratings; and its (4)
Ba2/NP long and short-term foreign-currency deposit ratings.

All debt and local-currency deposit ratings already carry a
negative outlook. The foreign-currency deposit rating, which is
constrained by Turkey's foreign-currency deposit ceiling, carries
a stable outlook.

Yapi Kredi's long and short-term Turkish national scale ratings
of long-term and TR-1 short-term ratings are unaffected by
this announcement.

Ratings Rationale:

Outlook on BFSR Changed To Negative

The outlook change was driven by the fact that YapiKredi's risk-
adjusted profitability indicators -- namely, pre-provisioning
income and net income over average risk-weighted assets of 3.6%
and 1.6%, respectively (based on audited FYE 2012 financials) and
4.3% and 2.4%, respectively (based on three year average) -- lag
behind its peers and the system average, which in Moody's opinion
will constrain the bank's ability to supplement its capital needs
required to internally fund its franchise growth aspirations. In
fact, over the past few years, YapiKredi's capital growth --
which was needed to keep pace with the developments in the
Turkish banking system -- benefitted to a large extent from the
provision of subordinated capital instruments -- partially from
Unicredit Spa (Unicredit; Baa2/Prime-2, negative; C-/baa2,
negative)-- rather than retained earnings. While its reported
total capitalization ratio of 15.2% (as of year-end 2012)
comfortably meets the minimum target regulatory requirement of
12%, Moody's notes that its capital is of comparatively lower
quality, which is reflected by a Tier 1 capital ratio (10.9%) at
the lower end of the peer group.

Moody's recognizes that YapiKredi will benefit from further
capital measures of up to 90 basis points following the recent
capital-accretive sale of its insurance business, which should
provide some additional room for future growth. However, the
bank's lower capital quality will likely affect its capacity to
retain earnings for future capital growth due to the
comparatively higher cost of capital for its mixed capital, which
comprises equity and subordinated debt components. This places
the bank at a disadvantage to most of its peers that have more
leeway for future growth and market share expansion.

Furthermore, Moody's anticipates that YapiKredi's profitability
will remain under pressure in an environment of shrinking net
interest margins and rising regulatory pressures for consumer
protection. The latter is aimed at limiting the rise in household
indebtedness driven by the increased use of debt financing though
the use of new retail products and has the potential to strongly
affect YapiKredi's fee income as a key top line contributor.
Moody's believes that regulatory initiatives in the form of caps
on interest rates and/or fees charged -- to ensure a healthy
sustainable deepening of retail banking penetration -- puts
YapiKredi at a disadvantage compared to its peers and system.

All of these factors have the potential to further dampen
YapiKredi's capital generation capacity and its franchise in an
environment of continued high lending growth. Moody's believes
these risks are more appropriately reflected in a negative
outlook the bank's BFSR.

Affirmation of Debt and Deposit Ratings and BFSR

The affirmation of the D+ BFSR reflects Yapi Kredi's satisfactory
financial fundamentals, and its large national franchise, with
leading market positions in certain product segments and granular
deposit base. The BFSR is constrained by the competitive
operating and evolving credit environment, particularly in
higher-risk consumer credits as also reflected in the bank's
moderate asset quality.

The affirmation of the Baa2/Prime-3 local-currency deposit
ratings reflects the affirmation of YapiKredi's D+ BFSR (BCA of
ba1), the moderate probability of support from Unicredit and high
likelihood of support from the Turkish government. Together, this
results in two notches of rating uplift from the bank's BCA,
reflecting Unicredit's 40.9% ownership, presence in management
and brand association, and YapiKredi's national loan and deposit
market shares of approximately 10%. Moody's affirmation of the
Baa2 foreign-currency debt rating follows the affirmation of the
bank's local-currency deposit ratings. The affirmation of the Ba1
foreign-currency subordinated debt rating follows the affirmation
of the bank's BFSR and continues to incorporate one notch rating
uplift from Unicredit.

The negative outlook on the local-currency deposit, subordinated
debt and foreign-currency debt ratings continues to reflect the
negative outlook of YapiKredi's and Unicredit's BFSRs.

What Could Change the Rating - Down/Up?

Downward pressure could be exerted on the long-term ratings in
the event of (i) a weakening in YapiKredi's intrinsic standalone
financial strength, for instance if profitability and capital
generation capacity weakens further and/or the bank's problem
loan levels increased materially; (ii) any adverse changes in the
parental support assumptions or a weakening of UniCredit's
creditworthiness; and/or (iii) any weakening in Moody's systemic
support assumptions on YapiKredi's ratings.

Currently, there is no upward pressure on the BFSR and the long-
term GLC deposit, subordinated debt and foreign-currency debt
ratings as reflected by their negative outlooks.

The foreign-currency deposit rating would move in tandem with the
respective ceiling in Turkey but would in any case not exceed the
Baa2 local-currency deposit rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating/analysis was
Moody's Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in
June 2012.

VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B2 Corporate Family
Rating and the B2-PD Probability of Default Rating for Vestel
Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. and the issuer rating for
Vestel Electronics Finance Ltd. for business reasons.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Moody's last rating action on Vestel was on June 22, 2012 when
the rating agency upgraded Vestel's CFR to B2 from B3 and the PDR
to B2-PD from B3-PD as well as the issuer rating on Vestel
Electronics Finance Ltd. and changed the outlook to stable from

Vestel Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. is a publicly listed
Turkish manufacturing company. Vestel is one of the leading
original design manufacturer (ODM)/original equipment
manufacturer of TVs, white goods and digital products both in
Turkey and in Europe. Vestel has production facilities in Izmir,
Turkey, and Vladimir, Russia. The company's revenues are mainly
driven by its exports (72% of revenues in 2012) to Europe, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Middle East and


AGROTON PUBLIC: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Agroton Public Limited's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'CCC'
from 'B-' and National Long-term rating to 'BB-(ukr)' from
'BBB(ukr)'. The agency has also downgraded Agroton's senior
unsecured rating to 'CCC'/'RR4' in relation to its USD50 million
Eurobond due in July 2014. All ratings have been placed on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).

The downgrade reflects the deterioration in available liquidity
primarily linked to some restricted funds in Bank of Cyprus (BOC;
RD/Viability Rating: f) and therefore the risk that Agroton may
not be able to make its next USD3m bond coupon payment in mid-
July 2013. Agroton's operating performance also deteriorated in
2012, driven by adverse weather conditions in Lugansk region,
which negatively affected crop yields, and low profitability in
poultry business. The uncertainty around the level of discount to
large deposits in Cyprus and the existence of capital control,
highly likely through the summer, may go against Agroton's
ability to service its debts in the near term, hence the RWN.


Deteriorated Liquidity
Agroton's reported cash as of Dec. 31, 2012, of US$10 million is
adequate, relative to only US$4 million in short-term debt.
However, US$8.5 million of cash was sitting in BOC (US$4.5
million more recently) and Agroton lacks access to foreign
currency in other bank accounts overseas at the moment, or
committed bank lines. A number of acquisitions made in 2012,
whilst accretive in terms of business profile, also added to the
weak liquidity position. In addition Fitch understands that
transferring cash out of Ukraine, where Agroton maintains
adequate liquidity, including grain in silos, may not be deemed
reliable due to a variety of foreign-exchange controls.

Increasing Refinancing Risks
While Agroton has not yet addressed the refinancing of its bond
in July 2014, Fitch recognizes that some options and time exist.
However, the situation in Cyprus, which is beyond management's
control, has moved Agroton's debt servicing capacity to the
forefront. Even if the next coupon is made, we would still
maintain a 'CCC' rating to reflect the uncertainties around the
refinancing options next year.

Weak Operating and Financial Performance
Agroton's operating performance deteriorated in 2012, driven by
adverse weather conditions in Lugansk region (Agroton's only area
of operations) which negatively affected crop yields, and low
profitability in poultry business due to unexpected increase in
production costs (lack of own breeding flock up to the end of the
year). Agroton should see a reversal of its fortunes in 2013 if
weather conditions return to normal, and acquisitions of land
lease rights and expansion in silo capacity enhance its top line.
However it has to demonstrate that profitability, measured as
funds from operations (FFO) margin (FY12: 11%) improves further
toward 20% to support a higher rating.

Collection of Receivables Solved
Baker Tilly (previous auditor) issued a qualification on
Agroton's FY11 accounts as the auditor could not satisfy itself
regarding the documentary evidence of a portion of sales. We
commented on this issue and said that governance of the audit
process is an important safeguard for the integrity of the
group's financial reporting. Since then KPMG has been appointed
new auditor. Its audit report for Agroton's FY12 accounts, dated
30 April 2013, is unqualified while Agroton has reversed USD7.3m
in provisions for bad debts (as those receivables were cashed in)
and the company has moved its sales policy towards prepayments
from customers (including but not limited to the State Agrarian
Fund from Ukraine). Fitch considers these positive developments
for the group.

Adequate Recovery Prospects
Despite the volatility in Agroton's operating performance and
EBITDA, unsecured creditors' claims are supported by Agroton's
asset base consisting on inventories and storage capacity (as
land ownership is not possible in Ukraine). The lack of any
meaningful senior indebtedness ranking ahead of the notes means
that, in the event of default, bondholders can expect above
average recovery prospects. However, we apply a soft cap of 'RR4'
in Ukraine given the jurisdiction of the surety providers,
resulting in a 'CCC' unsecured rating.


Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Lack of visibility regarding upcoming coupon payment
- A missed interest payment in mid-July would trigger a downgrade
  to 'C' and subsequently to 'D' after the grace period expires,
  30 days after the due date

Positive: Until Fitch has clarity on Agroton's ability to service
its debt, we do not envisage any positive rating movements within
the next months. If the next bond coupon is made, we would remove
the RWN and maintain a 'CCC' rating although this will depend on
Fitch becoming comfortable with the below factors:

- Visibility of refinancing options for the bond maturity in 2014
- Effective treasury management and adequate liquidity back-up to
  support the business operations, future growth and its
  financing needs

SHORTLINE PLC: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' to Upcoming LPNs
Fitch Ratings has assigned Shortline Plc's upcoming loan
participation notes an expected 'B-(EXP)' Long-term foreign
currency rating. The final rating is contingent upon the receipt
of final documents which are consistent with the information
already received.

Shortline Plc will issue the notes for the purpose of funding six
five-years loans (the loans) to the following state-owned
Ukrainian railway companies (together the borrowers):

Southwest Railway
Lviv Railway
South Railway
Odesa Railway
Donetsk Railway
Prydniprovska Railway

The loans have the benefit of the suretyship agreement entered
into on a joint and several basis by the borrowers, their
auxiliaries enterprises and a state-owned entity the State
Administration of Railway Transport of the Ukraine
(Ukrzaliznytsia; B-/Stable/B). The liability of Shortline Plc to
the noteholders is limited to its cash flow from repayment of the
principal of, and payments of interest on the loans by the
borrowers to Shortline Plc.

The notes will mirror the terms and conditions of the loans. Like
the loans, the notes will mature in five years, and interest
payments will be made semi-annually. The principal amount of the
notes will be repaid on the maturity of the loans. The notes will
have a fixed interest rate, which will be set at the time of
issuance. Proceeds from the issue will be used solely for the
purpose of making the loans to the borrowers. Should any of the
borrowers fail to make an interest or principal payment under the
terms of the notes, noteholders will benefit from the suretyship
agreement entered into by the borrowers and Ukrzaliznystisa.

The notes' rating is equalised with Ukrzaliznytsia's Long-term
foreign currency rating reflecting Fitch's view that default risk
on the notes and on Ukrzaliznytsia's other senior unsecured
obligations is essentially the same. It is not clear under
Ukrainian law whether Ukrzaliznytsia has the right and authority
to enter into suretyships. It may therefore be challenging for
noteholders to enforce the suretyship agreement in a court
against Ukrzaliznytsia, in case of need. However, the agency
believes that, given the strategic importance of the national
railways to the Ukrainian economy, Ukrzaliznytisa will perform is
obligations under the suretyship agreement and that, if needed,
extraordinary support from the central government would be
forthcoming to ensure that Ukrzaliznytsia performs those

Ukrzaliznytsia's Long-term ratings reflect the entity's key role
in the management of the national railway system and its strong
legal, strategic and operational links with the Ukrainian
government, which has approval powers on all strategic decisions,
including tariff setting, investment and debt planning. Although
Ukrzaliznystisa is the sole rated entity, its ratings also factor
in the opacity of links with the railway entities it manages and
contingent risk stemming from the liabilities of those entities.

Ukrzaliznytsia's mandate is to manage the six state-owned
regional operating railway entities and a number of auxiliary
enterprises (the group). Although it has no legal ownership ties
with those entities, Ukrzaliznytsia acts as the group's
management company. It controls most of the group's financial
flows and sets debt policy of the group. In its capacity as the
group's management company, Ukrzaliznytsia signed certain loan
agreements of the borrower operating entities. The Ukrainian
Government plans to streamline this complex organizational
structure by grouping Ukrzaliznytsia, the six railway operating
entities and other auxiliary enterprises under a new 100% state-
owned joint stock during 2013-2014.

The notes' rating is likely to move in tandem with
Ukrzaliznytsia's Long-term foreign currency rating, which is
credit linked to the Issuer Default Rating of Ukraine

STATE ADMINISTRATION: S&P Puts 'B-' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has placed its
'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on Ukrainian railway
operator The State Administration of Railways Transport of
Ukraine (Ukrainian Railways) on CreditWatch with positive

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
group's proposed senior secured loan participation notes due

The final ratings on the proposed notes are subject to the
successful closing of the proposed issuance and S&P's receipt and
satisfactory review of the final transaction documentation.  In
addition, S&P's issue rating analysis assumes that the short-term
debt will be fully repaid with the proceeds of the proposed

The CreditWatch placement follows Ukrainian Railways' recent
announcement that it plans to issue senior secured loan
participation notes and reflects the possibility of S&P upgrading
the group if the issuance is successfully completed under the
preliminary terms and conditions that S&P has reviewed.  These
include the amount, maturity, and use of the notes.

S&P believes that, depending on these conditions, Ukrainian
Railways' liquidity position could be boosted by a significant
reduction in the company's debt amortization in the years
following the issue.  Ukrainian Railways' currently "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile primarily reflects its
aggressive liquidity management, which has resulted from its
reliance on short-term debt, itself owing to the limited
availability of medium- and long-term financing in Ukrainian
markets in general.

However, the rating on Ukrainian Railways is supported by S&P's
opinion that there is a "very high" likelihood, under its
criteria for government-related entities, that the government of
the Ukraine would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to Ukrainian Railways in the event of financial distress.

S&P has assigned its 'B' issue rating to the proposed limited-
recourse senior secured loan participation notes to be issued by
special-purpose vehicle (SPV) Shortline PLC (not rated).  The
issue rating on the proposed notes will be equalized with the
corporate credit rating on Ukrainian Railways but is currently
one notch above the corporate credit rating, reflecting S&P's
view that on successful completion of the issue it would likely
raise the issuer rating to 'B'.

S&P understands that the proposed notes will be issued for the
sole purpose of funding the back-to-back unsecured loans to six
single railways managed by Ukrainian Railways on behalf of the
Ukrainian government, under the umbrella, Ukrainian Railways
group.  The railways will use the proceeds for short-term debt
repayment and for general corporate purposes, in particular, to
finance their investment programs.

The notes are secured by a pledge over the shares of the issuer
and all of the issuer's assets, including in particular, its
rights under the back-to-back loan facilities and the cash in its
bank accounts.

Shortline PLC is incorporated under U.K. law as a public company,
limited by shares and held by a charitable trust.  S&P has not
assigned a corporate credit rating to Shortline PLC.  The company
is an orphan SPV, whose activity is limited only to the issue of
the notes and the onlending of the proceeds to the six railways.
S&P's analysis relies on the efficiency of the pass-through
structure between the SPV issuer and the six borrowers.  In S&P's
view, however, the documentation governing the relationship
between the issuer and the borrower does not allow for full pass-
though of the corporate tax, but S&P do not consider this to be a
material constraint on the rating.

Ukrainian Railways, alongside the six borrowers that are governed
by Ukrainian law, provides support for the proposed notes to be
issued by Shortline PLC in the form of suretyship agreements.
S&P understands that, under current Ukrainian law, only financial
institutions can provide on-demand guarantees.  Under this surety
agreement however, S&P understands that the surety providers
unconditionally and irrevocably agree on a joint and several
basis to pay the outstanding amount in two business days after
such non-payment.

The positive CreditWatch placement reflects the likely benefit
that the successful completion of the proposed notes will bring
to Ukrainian Railways' liquidity and financial risk profiles.

If Ukrainian Railways successfully completes the transaction, S&P
thinks it likely that it would raise its rating on Ukrainian
Railways by one notch.  An upgrade would also likely depend on
whether the preliminary terms of the transaction, including the
size and maturity of the notes and the use of their proceeds, are

If S&P was to upgrade Ukrainian Railways, under S&P's criteria,
the long-term sovereign credit rating and transfer and
convertibility assessment on Ukraine would constrain the rating
on Ukrainian Railways, based on S&P's view that the group's cash
flow generation is sensitive to country risk.  As a result, the
outlook on the group's rating would most likely be negative,
mirroring that on Ukraine.

S&P could affirm the rating if Ukrainian Railways does not issue
the notes or if the proceeds from them do not materially lower
the group's yearly debt repayments.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement on completion of
the proposed transaction, or, if the transaction is delayed, over
the next three months.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALDERSHOT FC: Goes Into Administration
Jersey Evening Post reports that crisis club Aldershot Football
Club have been placed in administration just five days after
being relegated from the Football League.

And with the club's perilous financial state causing growing
concern and with players still not paid their April wages, it has
been announced that Aldershot have entered administration --
bringing back dark memories of their past, according to Jersey
Evening Post.   The report relates that Quantuma Restructuring
have been appointed as joint administrators and they released a
short statement.

Jersey Evening Post says that the news comes just a day after
Aldershot chief executive Andrew Mills resigned merely three
months into his post due to the actions of owner Kris Machala,
whom he accused of blocking all solutions to secure the long-term
future of the financially-stricken club.

Mr. Machala used his majority shareholding to vote against a
resolution to restructure capital funding at the club's AGM two
weeks ago, instead revealing he had secured a new investor who
would pump much-needed funds into the EBB Stadium, Jersey Evening
Post discloses.

The report notes that that deal subsequently fell through, with
Mr. Machala then revealing he was holding discussions with Shahid
Azeem, his replacement as chairman in February, to transfer the
majority of his shareholding provided Azeem could satisfy an
immediate cash requirement and guarantee the club's future.

But that deal also failed to materialise due to Mr. Machala's
requirements for proof of funds, with Aldershot confirming they
were seeking restructuring advice after an urgent board meeting,
the report notes.

EPIC BARCHESTER: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of Epic (Barchester) PLC's notes.

The rating actions reflect the refinancing risks relating to the
underlying loans to the borrower at the expected maturity date in
September 2013.  S&P has considered the recovery prospects upon
assumed failure to refinance, given the implied leverage of the
borrower in the context of the tenants' assumed "satisfactory"
business risk profile.

S&P's ratings address the issuer's ability to make timely payment
of interest and payment of principal not later than the legal
final maturity.

The transaction is an "OpCo/PropCo" (operating company/property
company) structure whereby the issuer purchased a senior loan
extended to a PropCo.  Substantial junior-ranking debt (a portion
of which ultimately partly secures the Isobel Finance No.1 PLC
transaction) remains outside the securitization.  The
relationship between the junior lenders and the noteholders is
governed by an intercreditor agreement.

The securitized portfolio comprises 160 predominantly purpose-
built long-term care homes in England, Scotland, Wales, and
Jersey, with a focus on London and the southeast.  The portfolio
is fully let to Barchester Healthcare Ltd. in an internal
OpCo/PropCo structure, where Barchester Healthcare entities are
the OpCos.  The PropCo comprises a substantial part of Barchester
Healthcare's business.  The rental payments received from the
OpCos provide the only source of income for the borrower to make
ongoing debt-service payments on the loans and ultimately the

Barchester Healthcare has a leading position in the U.K. long-
term care sector and is in the U.K.'s top-four largest providers.
The company mainly provides residential nursing care for the
elderly, although it also has a sizeable presence in specialist
care services.  The company has over 10,000 residents across a
portfolio of homes in the U.K., with the largest proportion of
homes located within London and the southeast.  Performance has
been relatively stable in recent years, although S&P believes the
future operating environment will prove challenging, particularly
in light of pressure on fees.

The securitized loan is scheduled to mature in September 2013.
The transaction incorporates an extended, 18-year tail period
until legal final maturity in 2031 due to the presence of
interest rate and inflation swaps that mature toward the end of
the tail period.

In S&P's opinion, although the OpCos have comfortably met their
rental obligations--the most recently reported rent coverage
ratio was 2.57x--refinancing prospects for the GBP900 million
whole loan to the PropCo are slim.  The securitized loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio will be 43% at expected maturity, based on the most
recently reported valuation, but on a whole-loan basis the LTV
ratio will be 75%.  Given that the termination of the swaps would
currently result in a liability for the borrower, S&P expects a
failure to refinance to be accompanied by a managed workout in
the tail period, in an attempt to avoid crystallizing swap
termination costs at the current levels.  S&P notes that current
termination costs would suggest a whole-loan LTV ratio that is in
excess of 100%.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class               Rating
            To                From

Epic (Barchester) PLC
GBP572 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A           BBB+ (sf)         A+ (sf)
B           BBB (sf)          A+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)          A+ (sf)
D           BB (sf)           A+ (sf)
E           BB- (sf)          A (sf)

EPIC CULZEAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCC'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Epic (Culzean) PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class B notes;

   -- Raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on the
      class C notes;

   -- Lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and removed from
      CreditWatch negative its rating on the class D notes;

   -- Lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and removed from
      CreditWatch negative its rating on the class E notes; and

   -- Lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the
      class F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
remaining loans under its updated European commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) criteria.

On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on the class D and E
notes on CreditWatch negative following an update to its European
CMBS criteria.


A single multilet office in Birmingham secures the loan, which
was scheduled to mature in April 2011.  The servicer agreed to
extend the loan to January 2014 following the removal of a 2013
break clause for the largest tenant.

The outstanding loan balance is GBP36.4 million, the reported
interest coverage ratio (ICR) is 2.25x, and the reported loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio is 110.3% based on a February 2010 valuation of
GBP33 million.

In S&P's opinion, this loan is likely to experience losses in its
base case scenario.

              PRIME A LOAN (38% OF THE POOL BALANCE)

Two retail and one office property in Greater London secure this

The outstanding loan balance is GBP35.8 million, the reported ICR
is 1.58x, and the reported LTV ratio is 57.9% based on a January
2013 valuation of GBP61.9 million.

In S&P's opinion, full recovery of this loan is likely to occur
in its base case scenario.

               PRIME B LOAN (22% OF THE POOL BALANCE)

A portfolio of five retail properties secures this loan.

The outstanding loan balance is GBP20.9 million, the reported ICR
is 1.27x, and the reported LTV ratio is 61.5% based on a January
2013 valuation of GBP34.05 million.

In S&P's opinion, this loan is likely to experience losses in its
base case scenario.

                        COUNTERPARTY REVIEW

The transaction's cash deposit agreement requires the cash
deposit account provider to be rated at least 'AA-/A-1+'.

If this rating trigger is breached, the cash administrator can
either find a replacement with the minimum required rating under
the cash deposit agreement, or enter into a repurchase agreement
with The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (A/Stable/A-1).

In applying S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, it considers the
replacement option which would be least favorable to the
transaction.  Therefore, the maximum potential rating in this
transaction is 'A+ (sf)'--one notch above S&P's long-term issuer
credit rating on The Royal Bank of Scotland.

                           RATING ACTIONS

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class D and E notes is not sufficient to withstand its
expectations of principal losses under their currently assigned
rating levels.  Therefore, S&P has lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class D and E notes.  In
S&P's opinion, there is at least a one-in-two likelihood of
default on the class F notes, therefore, in line with S&P's
criteria for assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' ratings,
S&P has lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the
class F notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class B and C notes is sufficient to maintain their
current ratings under higher rating level scenarios.  In
accordance with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, the maximum
potential rating on these notes is constrained to 'A+ (sf)'.
Therefore, S&P has affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class B
notes and have raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on
the class C notes.

Epic (Culzean) is a U.K. synthetic CMBS transaction that closed
in 2007, with a legal maturity date in October 2019.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class             Rating
             To           From

Epic (Culzean) PLC
GBP548.65 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

B           A+ (sf)

Rating Raised

C           A- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

D           BB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
E           B- (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Lowered

F           CCC (sf)      B- (sf)

HEARTS FC: Seeks Talks With Bank to Avoid Administration
Daily Record reports that Hearts Football Club is set for
showdown talks with the Central Bank of Lithuania in a bid to
avoid administration and automatic SPL relegation.

Daily Record understands hopes were high inside Tynecastle that a
solution can be negotiated despite the collapse of Ukio Bankas,
which was officially declared bankrupt in Kaunas.  The financial
institution - formerly run by Hearts owner Vladimir Romanov ? has
gone down with the Edinburgh club's GBP15million debt to it still
outstanding, the report relates.

The report discloses that the debt will now be transferred to the
country's central bank - who could call it in immediately and put
Hearts out of business or agree to allow the club to stagger on
so long as they continue to honour the terms of an existing
payment plan which runs until December 2015.

That was struck between Hearts and Ukio Bankas and covers only
the interest costs of the GBP15 million overdraft, the report

The report relays that Hearts, having been briefed by their own
Lithuanian legal teams, remain hopeful the plug will not be
pulled immediately.

They believe they can stave off administration at least until the
end of the season on May 19 -- thereby avoiding an 18-point
deduction which would sentence Gary Locke's team to the First
Division, the report notes.

Chief executive David Southern is confident his cost-cutting
plans -- which will be implemented over the summer -- will enable
a streamlined Hearts to live within their means, the report

Now these proposals will be put in front of officials from
Lithuania's Central Bank who will determine if the club should be
allowed to continue as a going concern, the report says.

Even if Hearts are granted a stay of execution there are still
huge concerns over the club's financial wellbeing and the threat
of a full-blown crisis this summer, the report says.

However, the report adds that if administrators move in after May
19, Hearts would begin next season with a massive points

SCOTTISH COAL: Liquidators in Talks with Potential Buyers
BBC News reports that liquidators handling the collapse of
Scottish Coal have confirmed they are in talks with parties who
have expressed interest in parts of the business.

Scottish Coal went into liquidation earlier this month, with the
loss of almost 600 jobs, BBC relates.

According to BBC, KPMG said it was assessing the interest shown
and continuing discussions with various unnamed parties.

BBC notes KPMG added, however, that the likely final outcome was
"far from clear".

BBC relates that in a statement, joint liquidator Blair Nimmo
said the failure of Scottish Coal presented "an extremely complex
set of issues" affecting a wide variety of stakeholders.

Mr. Nimmo, as cited by BBC, said: "While discharging our
statutory responsibilities as liquidator, we are also endeavoring
to liaise with key stakeholders such as the Scottish government,
various local authorities and Sepa in an open and consensual

"Site security and maintenance have been a key priority, which is
why we have retained a significant number of staff to assist in
this area.

"In tandem with this, over the last few days we have been in
discussion with a variety of parties who have expressed an
interest in the business -- or, more precisely, certain parts of

"Our assessment of this interest and discussions with these
parties continue with the aim of finding the best possible
solution in as short a timescale as possible," BBC quotes
Mr. Nimmo as saying.

"Many aspects of this insolvency are unprecedented and the likely
final outcome is far from clear, but it is essential that all
parties continue to work together in a constructive and
professional manner to find the best solution possible."

Scottish Coal is one of Scotland's biggest coal-mining firms. The
company operates six mines in East Ayrshire, South Lanarkshire
and Fife.

VANMASTER: In Administration, Cuts 20 Jobs
Suzette Rabout at Caravan Times reports that Vanmaster has gone
into administration making all 20 of its employees redundant.

Vanmaster bought Bentley Motorhomes in September 2012, but
production has stopped in both of its factories, according to
Caravan Times.

"The business entered administration due to a drop in orders and
supplier issues which affected production," the report quoted
James Sleight, partner at administrators Geoffrey Martin & Co, as

The report notes that there are hopes for a new buyer, possibly
an existing manufacturer or retailer, but no offers have been put
forward as of yet.

"James Sleight and Geoffrey Martin of Geoffrey Martin & Co have
been appointed as joint administrators of Vanmaster Ltd, which
operates under the trading styles of Vanmaster Caravans and
Bentley Motorhomes . . . .  The company employed 20 people on two
sites in Wigan.  All staff have been made redundant as ongoing
production is not possible," the official statement released by
administrators said, the report discloses.

Hope had been high for a revival of Bentley Motorhomes after the
Vanmaster buyout, and it was just five months ago that the new
Bentley Cerise was unveiled, the report adds.

The Wigan-based Vanmaster is a caravan manufacturers.  It bought
Bentley Motorhomes in September 2012.

* UK: Moody's Says Outlook on General Insurance Sector Stable
The stable outlook is primarily driven by Moody's Investors
Service expectation that rate increases and meaningful expense
reductions will mitigate the adverse effects of the challenging
macro-economic environment and tough market conditions. While
upcoming civil, legal and regulatory reforms may be positive for
the industry, they also elevate uncertainty and are insufficient
to positively influence the outlook. Moody's outlined these
findings in a new report, entitled "UK General Insurance

The economic environment is unfavorable for general insurers and
expectations that the UK's economic growth will remain sluggish
over the next few years translate into less demand for general
insurance products. Additionally, persistently low interest rates
continue to curtail earnings, while exposure to the euro area
market turmoil further increases risks of softening demand for
insurance products. "In the face of weak demand and low
investment yields, insurers have increased their focus on
underwriting profitability" explains David Masters, a Moody's
Vice President for European Insurance and co-author of the

"All-time-high levels of competition, rising claims inflation and
depleting reserve buffers however challenge underwriting
profitability, which should lead to upward pressure on premiums
across most lines of business" adds Helena Pacific, a Moody's
Associate Analyst and co-author of the report. Moody's believe
that rate increases, together with material expense reductions
can stabilize, or even modestly improve, underwriting

Civil, legal and regulatory reforms may be positive, but do not
change the overall outlook. Market reforms have the ability to
reduce claims inflation, particularly for motor insurers, but
elevate short-term pricing risk. Moody's considers the underlying
principles and economic capital based measures of Solvency II to
be superior to the current regulatory regime. However, the delay
in implementation is counter-productive for the largest players
as it makes strategic and financial planning more difficult.


* EMEA Companies Carry Lower Ratings Due to Slow Revenue Growth
Despite the balance sheets of EMEA non-financial companies
appearing to be healthier than four years ago, their credit
ratings are lower due to a more muted increase in revenues and
cash flows, says Moody's Investors Service in a report entitled
"EMEA Non-Financial Companies: Balance Sheets Appear Healthier
but Revenue and Cash Flow are Struggling to Keep Up."

Moody's found that the median ratio of assets to liabilities
derived from the balance sheets of 75 non-financial companies
spread across 15 sectors, has strengthened to 1.65 times from
1.52 times in 2008. While this would normally be a credit-
positive development because there are now more assets to cover
the liabilities, the credit ratings of the 75 firms have been
lowered by a net 45 notches overall since the beginning of 2009.

"A disconnect has developed between seemingly stronger balance
sheets and credit ratings due to the inability of the balance
sheet to track the change in the value of the entity's total
assets, says Trevor Piper, a Vice President - Senior Credit
Officer in Moody's Corporate Finance Group and author of the
report. "Being able to generate revenue and cash is ultimately a
better indicator of a firm's resources than the assets shown on
its balance sheet," Mr. Piper explains. "Whereas the latter are
now 20% higher on average than four years ago, revenue and cash
generated are lagging behind, having increased by no more than
12% and 10%, respectively."

A disproportionate increase in assets relative to revenue and
cash flow gives rise to "bloated asset" risk: the possibility
that the assets might have to be written down to reflect a more
up-to-date appraisal of their ability to generate cash.

Accounting standards require companies to assess whether the
assets on their balance sheet are supported by cash expected to
be generated in the future, and to record an impairment charge
when the recoverability of the carrying amount is judged to be
unlikely. The 80% surge in impairment charges recorded by the 75
firms in 2012 suggests that many managers and auditors,
particularly those in the steel and mining sectors, where
impairment charges were highest, are now taking a less optimistic
view of future cash flows.

* Fitch Reports Record Qtr for European High-Yield Market in Q113
In the latest edition of its quarterly European High-Yield (EHY)
chart book, Fitch Ratings says that Q113 marked a record quarter
for new issuance in the EHY market, an indicator that 2013 may be
a year of further growth potential for the asset class. Developed
market non-financial corporates issued EUR28 billion in new
bonds, taking advantage of record low yields and strong investor
demand for riskier asset classes in their quest for real returns.
Speculative-grade entities steadily ramped up issuance in the
months following the euro-affirmative ECB announcement in July
2012. Subsequent falls in risk premiums demanded by investors
allowed firms to issue bonds with longer maturities and
marginally increase the proportion of lower-rated credit in Q113
compared with Q112.

Corporates domiciled in troubled eurozone nations have benefited
from the positive market momentum. Companies based in Italy and
Spain were able to issue up to 85% and 53%, respectively, of
total 2012 volume in Q113.

The Fitch EHY Index recorded a default rate of 0.19% by volume
for the 12 months to March 31, 2013, down from 0.69% at the end
of 2012. The relatively high quality of outstanding bonds in EHY
-- mainly comprising 'BB' rated fallen angels -- coupled with
investors' continued preference for higher-quality credits from
repeat issuers, helps to cushion the default rate during periods
of elevated volatility.

EHY bonds have generated total returns of 3.9% in the year to end
April, slightly lagging the US HY market, which posted gains of
4.6%, according to data from Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
Investor flows into EHY have tended to coincide with periods of
positive total return performance, and this relationship has
demonstrably been in force since July 2012. Investors have
channelled EUR2.9 billion in net flows into EHY in Q113, compared
with net outflows of similar magnitude for investment grade

The full chart book illustrates recent trends in high-yield bond
issuance, maturities, default rates, fund flows and relative
performance, as well as secondary market risk-adjusted pricing.
It is available at or by clicking on the
link above. The report outlining key findings from Fitch's latest
senior fixed-income investor survey is referenced below.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 29 to May 3, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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